A Defense of Participatory Democracy

Author(s): Joel D. Wolfe

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 370-389
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A Defense of Participatory Democracy
Joel D. Wolfe
In order to defend participatorydemocracy in large-member voluntary or-
ganizations, Michels's challenge to traditional democratic theory must be an-
swered. By arguing that the technical, sociological, and psychological processes
of modern organizations invariably result in leaders dominating members, Mi-
chels questioned democratic theorists' assertions that participation is self-
reinforcingand that participation produces popular control. Defending partici-
patory democracy, then, involves showing how the problems of participation
and popular control can be overcome in formallyrepresentativeorganizations.
The answer proposed is that collective solidarityor communityformedby those
reacting to injustice and committed to egalitarian social relations provides the
motivation for mass participation and the basis for popular control in modern
union and party organizations.

Is participatorydemocracypossible in large-memberunion and

party organizations? The voluminous literatureabout participa-
tory democracy suggeststhat it is now a widely accepted ideal.'
Proponentsof an egalitarian social order argue that more partici-
pation will provide better discussions and a fullerrealization of
citizen rightsand human potentials. Yet, these proponents have
simply failed to respond to the powerfulanalyses of the internal
political processes of mass organization that reject the view that
participationgives members' controland that it is self-sustaining
and self-fulfilling.
Radical argumentsadvancing the ideal of more
in
participation decision-makingignore the importantquestionsof
the viabilityand realityof participatorydemocracyin an industri-
alized society.
The purpose of this essay is to defend the possibilityof partici-
patory democracy in large-memberorganizations. This involves
confrontingRobert Michels's challenge to traditionaldemocratic
theory.Michels argued that modern organization- through its
technical, sociological, and psychologicalprocesses--renderspar-
ticipatorydemocracyimpracticablebecause it invariablyresultsin
leaders dominatingfollowers.The firsttask, therefore,is to iden-
tifythe problems Michels's analysis of oligarchyraises forthe tra-
ditional model of participatorydemocracy. The result is to pose
anew questions about the sources of participationand modes of
popular controlin modern large-memberorganizations. Second,
to accommodate the ideals of participatorydemocracyto the reali-
ties of complex organization, the article outlines a revised model

370
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 371

designed to explain actual episodes of popular control in large-

member organizations. The revised model proposes that partici-
patory democracy is a power relation in formallyrepresentative
organizationsthat resultsfromthe developmentof collectivesoli-
darity(community)in small groups of members at the base and
the aggregationof this solidarityat higher levels as the basis of
controlof delegate councils. While representativedemocracy'sre-
liance on leadership,formaldecision-makingin delegate councils,
and social pluralism can lead to oligarchyjust as Michels main-
tained, it also provides the basis for episodes of popular control.
This paper, thus, is one attemptto suggesthow participatoryde-
mocracyis possible in large-memberorganizations.

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION

The theoryof participatorydemocracy,developed in the work

of Rousseau, J. S. Mill, and G. D. H. Cole, proposes thatpartici-
pation produces popular control of the issue-agenda, decision-
making, and implementation.Not only does participationlead to
controlbut it has an educative effectthat reinforcesand sustains
participation.The educative functionis crucial to the theorybe-
cause participationitselftransformsman's characterby strength-
ening his psychologicaland practicalcapacity forpoliticalinvolve-
ment. As Carole Pateman asserts, "participation develops and
fostersthe very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals
participatethe betterable theybecome to do so."'2
Participation,control,and education, then, constitutethe ele-
ments of the theoryof participatorydemocracyforthe major the-
orists.3For Rousseau, participationyields popular controlof the
body politic because participation involves each member in the
equal sharing of benefitsand burdens.4 Participation is funda-
mental to a just societybecause it involveseverymemberin decid-
ing his own best interestand because it links that interestto wider
public interest.Justiceresultsbecause freemen oblige themselves
to be obedient to self-prescribed laws, laws that affectall equally.
Significantly, this very process of mergingthe public and private
interestsalso educates citizens and provides them with the per-
sonal resourcesand motivationto continue to participate.
J. S. Mill argues thatparticipationfulfillsa protectivefunction
(as earlierutilitarianshad argued) and, more importantly, an edu-
cative functionthatleads to the developmentof involved,other-re-
372 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

garding citizens.5 Like Rousseau, Mill presumes that other-re-

garding behavior is shaped by political institutionsthat foster
participationand, in turn, that participatoryinstitutionsare self-
sustaining.6Even so, Mill emphasized the importanceof partici-
pation at the local level and never reallyformulateda concept of a
fullyparticipatorydemocracyat the national level.
The incompatibilitybetween direct and representativedemoc-
racy is more clearly presented in G. D. H. Cole's work. Like
Rousseau, Cole was skepticalof representation.Because no per-
son could representanother'sinterestin general,Cole argued that
a society of functionaland continuous associations based on ev-
eryday activitiesand concerns would enable members to scruti-
nize their "representatives"more effectivelybecause they would
have firsthandknowledgeof the representatives'activities.7Func-
tional representationthat stems from membership involvement,
though diverse and complex, would realize Rousseau's ideals of
participatorydemocracyin industrialsociety.
Robert Michels's theoryof oligarchychallenged the realism of
these theoriesof participatorydemocracy.8In industrialsociety,he
argued, the advancementof the interestsof the less-privilegedma-
jority required collectiveorganizationand action. Democratic ob-
jectives, in other words, depend on organization. As Michels
writes,"organization. . . is the weapon of the weak in theirstrug-
gle with the strong."'Michels then argues that what socialistsand
democratshave failedto recognize is that organizationalways de-
stroysdemocracy. Because democratic socialist or labor parties
could not realize participatorydemocracy,neither could parties
and groups less committedto democracy.'0
This argumentraises two fundamentalproblems of the theory
of participatorydemocracy that have to this day left it open to
charges of irrelevanceand impracticability. Firstis the problem of
participation.Michels argues that the division of labor in large-
member organizationsoperates to discourage members frompar-
ticipatingin shaping the issue-agenda and policy. He denies the
educative functionof participation.Large-memberorganizations,
he argues, teach apathy and limited involvement.First, the self-
interested,rational member has littleincentiveto participatebe-
cause he lacks the skillsand knowledgeto be effective,making it
cost effectiveto rely on officials'expertise. Second, organization
encourages psychological dependence. The majority depend on
and even worship their leaders; their gratitude is expressed by
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 373

loyal subservience.Third, the leaders' wealth, status, and limited

numbers encourage and facilitateparticipationin collectiveaction
to advance theirown material and social privilege.The educative
functiondoes not operate, even in workercooperatives,when par-
ticipationis motivatedby materialor instrumentalends, designed
to reinforcesocial inequality." Contraryto the major theorists'ar-
guments that participationis self-sustaining,Michels argues that
organization transformsman's inner characterin ways that limit
or preventparticipationand self-development.Hence, the rejec-
tion of the educative functionof participationraises the problem
of reconceptualizingthe sources and motives of participationin
modern organizations.
Second is the problem of popular control.The division of labor
in large-memberorganizationsenables officeholders to controlis-
sues and decisions and encourages them to develop intereststhat
diverge from the majority.The organizational requisites of effi-
ciency and effectiveness necessitatea division of labor that under-
mines popular participationand control.The abilityto decide and
to execute policy soon leads to domination. On the one hand, ef-
fectivegovernanceby direct discussion among large numbers of
people is technically and mechanically impracticable. On the
other,effectivepoweris cumulative,since officeholders develop ex-
pertise that enables them to consolidate theircontrolof decision-
making and implementation,eliminatingthe members' capacity
for autonomous action. Leaders are necessary and inevitable in
large-memberorganizations. Because the appropriationof effec-
tive controlby officeholders enables them to reinforcetheirpower
and benefits,the formalprocedures of representationinvariably
resultin oligarchy.Thus, another problem for supportersof par-
ticipatorydemocracy is how to conceptualize a means by which
members can exercise controlover leaders at various levels in the
hierarchyof any large-scalerepresentativeorganization.
Since Michels's challenge, democratic theory has never con-
vincinglyreassertedthe claims of the theoryof participatoryde-
mocracy.Instead democratictheoryhas assimilated elitism'scon-
tention concerningthe necessityand preeminence of leadership.
As a result,recentdemocratictheoristshave argued that electoral
competitioncan compel leaders to address the needs of various
subgroups or factions.This focus on elite competitionunderpins
the most prominentcontemporarymodel of democracy.Concep-
tualizing the theoryof democraticelitism,Schumpeterposits that
374 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

liberal democracy is a system in which the electorate chooses

among competingleaders, who decide political issues.'2 Like Mi-
chels, Schumpeterargues that the will of the masses does not flow
fromits own initiative.Rather,the will itselfis shaped by compet-
ing teams of leaders, much as competingfirmsshape consumers'
opinions. Unlike Michels, however, Schumpeter contends that
competitionforofficeaffordsthose outside the authority-structure
influenceover the political agenda. While Schumpeter makes it
clear that the mass electoratesimplyinstallsthe governmentand
does not controlit, he carefullyargues that various groups com-
posing the electoratehave access to the agenda as a consequence
of the competitivestrugglebetween elites. Democracy is indirect,
coming in the formof a sop fromleaders bargaining forelectoral
supportbut is nonethelessbeneficialto the mass electorate.Other
recent investigationsof democracy have underscored the impor-
tance of social pluralismin promotingcompetitionamong opposi-
tions.13
The democraticelitists'focus on competitiveprocedures,lead-
ers, and pluralismredefinesthe problem of democracyas a ques-
tion of who controls the agenda. Electoral competition among
leaders permitsthose outside the authority-structure to have ac-
cess to politicalpower,'4instead of merelydeterminingwhich elite
faction would prevail, as Michels contends. Yet, proponents of
democraticelitism,while correctlycriticizingMichels forignoring
the "sources and consequences of controversy,"fail to confrontthe
argument that values and biases operating throughthe political
process can limit the scope of issues. As Bachrach and Baratz
point out in identifyinga second face of power, the values built
into a political system tend to permit only safe issues onto the
public agenda and preventthose issues threateningthe statusquo
fromreceivingconsideration."5The furthersuggestionthat there
is conflictover covert interestsin addition to overt issues raises
concern for the identificationof "nondecisions"and their role in
policymaking.
Other attemptsto clarifythisproblem deal with the analysis of
objective interests.These effortsdistinguishtheoreticallydefined
or "real,"interestsfromsubjective
objective, (covertor overt)interests.
In one instance, Ralf Dahrendorf argues that authorityrelation-
ships involveinherentconflictbetween superordinatesand subor-
dinates, between those in possession of role-definedinterestsand
those excluded fromthem.16 In a second instance, Steven Lukes
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 375

posits that thereis "latent"conflictover wants and preferencesbe-

tween those exercisingpower and those subject to it, especially if
the subordinateswere to be aware of their"real" interests.Lukes
maintains"thatmen's wants may themselvesbe a productof a sys-
tem whichworksagainst theirinterests,and, in such cases, relates
the latterto what theywould want and prefer,where theyable to
make the choice.""7In order to analyze an exerciseof power when
thereis objectiveratherthan subjectiveconflict,Lukes argues that
one must posit a relevantcounterfactual,showing that B would
have otherwisedone b had it not been forA. This involves(1) jus-
tifyingthe belief that agent B should have recognized and acted
upon certainreal interestsand (2) identifying the means by which
agent A prevented B from carrying out his real interests.By at-
tributing real intereststo agents, objective-interest analysis links
interestswith ideals.'8 Because the concept of interestbridgesex-
planation and normativejudgment, the notion of interestused de-
termineswhich typesof issues become the focus of moral evalua-
tion.'9 While unavoidable, objective-interest analyses are,
nonetheless,limited because they fail to explain the relationship
betweenobjectiveinterestsand quiescence or protest.As a result,
power relationshipsare presumed to involve contradictoryinter-
ests. The logical resultis a conceptualizationof the divergenceof
interestsbetweendecision-makersand nonelitesthatis too simple,
one that unnecessarily posits the masses's permanent exclusion
fromthe material resourceswhich constitutetheironly means to
redressinevitableinequities.20
Yet, theseanalyses of agenda-settingfailto defendparticipatory
democracyagainst the challenge of the theoryof oligarchy.Demo-
cratic elitismand the debate over objective interestspresuppose a
division of power and interestbetween leaders and followersthat
entails a narrowingof debate and limitingof participation.Demo-
cratic elitism'sfocus on leaders and political stabilitymake it vul-
nerable to the charge that it ignores the role of participationand
its educative consequences.21 Unfortunately,these critics fail to
confrontMichels's challenge to traditionalparticipatorytheoryor
to show how participatorydemocracyis possible in complex orga-
nizations.
While advocates of democraticelitismdo not reassertthe ideals
of participatorydemocracy,they do representan effortto rescue
democratictheoryfromthe challenge of Michels's analysis of oli-
garchy.Given the importanceof leaders, formalrules, and social
376 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

pluralism, participatorydemocracy in large-member represen-

tativeorganizationswill necessarilyinvolve,as C. B. Macpherson
suggests,"a pyramidal systemwith direct democracy at the base
and delegate democracy at every level above that."22To suggest
how participatorydemocracyis possible in such organizations,we
must turn to a reexaminationof the two problems Michels's clas-
sic analysis of oligarchyraised for the traditionaltheory- prob-
lems of participationand popular control.

A REVISED THEORY OF PARTICIPATORYDEMOCRACY

To respond to the argument that modern organization fosters

apathy and oligarchy,we must ask again what, if any, factorscan
fosterthe membership'sautonomous participationin and control
of collectivedecision-makingin complex organizations. This pa-
per proposes that the answer lies in the developmentof collective
solidarity,or community,among small groups which formthe ba-
sis of larger organizationsthat, in turn, forma wider community
throughdelegates. This involvescreatingthe social relationsiden-
tified in Rousseau's concept of the general will: a community
based on mutual and equal exchangesof responsibilitiesand bene-
fitsamong other-regardingindividuals. A feelingof community
provides both the source of and motivation for participation in
collectiveaction and the basis of popular controlof large-member
organizations.23But before discussing the problem of participa-
torycontrol,we will offeran account of the sources of community
among workersin trade unions and socialist parties. Substantive
referenceswill be to Britishworkers,but the argumentthat com-
munityis the basis of participatorydemocracyis general.

SOURCES OF COLLECTIVE INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION

In industrialsocietiesthe circumstancesin which rank-and-file

groups shape organizational agendas and decisions depend on a
particular, if unusual, configuration of environmental factors.
Trade unions and socialist parties like those in Britain represent,
as Anderson argues, "both an oppositionto capitalismand a com-
ponent of it."24 The relationship of "antagonistic collaboration"
with capital relegatesunions and socialistpartiesto a subordinate
position withinthe larger systemof state capitalism that structur-
ally inhibitssocialistrevolutionarypotential.Yet gradualistparties
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 377

and trade unions can representtheir members' class interestsby

protectingand advancing their substantiveinterestsin improved
living standards,workingconditions,and controlover work. Par-
ticipatorydemocracyoccurs when the conditionsof the largerpo-
litical economy enable the organized membership to determine
their own aspirations and to make membership support condi-
tional on theirleaders takingup theircause.25
How, then, can the developmentof workers'participationand
collectiveautonomy be explained? Is there an alternativeto the
classic notion of the educative functionof participationthat can
stand up to the challenge of the theoryof oligarchy?The capacity
of workersto initiateautonomouslyand then shape union policy
depends on the developmentof class consciousnessand collective
solidarityat the workplace. The conflictof interestbetweenlabor
and employerderivesfromnonreciprocalrelationsof power in the
labor process.26 In capitalistsociety,thislack of reciprocityfosters
a sense of injustice insofaras workersfeel capable of expressing
theirbasic human integrityand need for respect.27For example,
an ethos of exploitationis at the heart of the historicalevolutionof
the Britishtrade union and labor movement.Inequalities must be
interpretedas unjust if theyare to motivateresistance.Yet, when
ideological, organizational,and repressiveconditionslimitthe re-
alization and articulationof grievancesabout unequal social rela-
tions,workersare unable to develop collectiveinterestsor to orga-
nize and act against inequalities.
Sentimentsof injusticemotivateresistanceto unequal social re-
lations by providingthe moral foundationsthatdefineperceptions
and bonds of collective unity and prescriptions for desired
changes. The sense of injusticefostersa common interestin sub-
stantiveand ultimate(moral) ends thatbind individual aspirations
to communityobjectives and that compel group members to de-
fendtheircollectivesolidarity.28 When experiencedas unjust, une-
qual social relations in production define workers' interestsin
termsof the ultimateends of human equality and reciprocalobli-
gations, provide a basis of common interest,and contributeto so-
ciabilityor ideological bonds between membersof the group. Im-
posed hardship can foster collective bonds in which shared
obligations and equal duties link individual futureswith that of
the collectivity.Private interestsof individuals are subordinate to
the public or communityinterestof the whole membership. In
short,substantiveor ultimateinterestsin more equitable social re-
378 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

lations and distributioncreate workplacecommunity,which is the

basis of autonomous interestsand work-grouporganizations.
The developmentof workplace communityis particularlyim-
portantbecause it provides an autonomous basis for interestfor-
mation and collective action. The result in these primary com-
munities is participatory decison-making by informal and
consensual processes. Small groups like printers'chapels or work-
shop units among skilledmachinistsare organized on substantive
or ultimateprinciplesand governthemselvesby directdemocracy.
The principle of greaterequality compels solidarityand consen-
sus, althoughagreementis fluidand open to negotiation.As soli-
darity grows, the collectivedefinitionof consensus limitsthe ini-
tiativesof individual membersand reinforcesgroup solidarityand
common interests.In short, workplace communityprovides the
directdemocracythat is basic to participatorydemocracyin hier-
archical representativeorganizations.
Environmentalfactorsmotivateparticipationin collectivesoli-
darityor communityat the workplaceor at higherlevels and un-
derpin the practice of participatorydemocracy.Egalitarian com-
munityresultsfromthe way factorsoutside the organizationitself,
varying between nations and over time, shape members' con-
sciousness of their interestsand motivationfor collectiveaction.
Certainly the great theoristsof participatorydemocracy realized
that participationin communityrelationships,while constituting
the social basis forautonomyand self-development, resultedfrom
special circumstancesindependentof, though reinforcedby, com-
munityties. In addition to the educative functionof participation
itself, to motivate participation and community Rousseau de-
pended on the general will, Mill on more open political institu-
tions, and Cole on membershipin producerand consumerassoci-
ations. Ultimately, the environment fosters participation in
communityrelationshipswhen experience involvingthe interac-
tion between the appropriationof nature throughproductionand
the socializationof values resultsin interpretations
of social condi-
tions as unjust.29
If the developmentof group power at the workplacedepends on
a high degree of collectivesolidarityamong members,more inclu-
sive groupingswill involve the aggregationsof the collectivesoli-
darityof small groups into largercommunitiesand the use of del-
egate councils and formalleadershiproles in decision-makingand
administration.Delegate councils which operate according to for-
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 379

mal procedures for the equal protectionof interestsand which

abide by majority rule and impersonal mechanisms of electoral
representationprovide the only means by which larger numbers
of members can coordinate the pursuit of collective interests.30
Representationthroughadversaryprocedures,however,engenders
conflict between the formal bureaucratic nature of large-scale
working-classorganization and their substantivecommunityba-
sis. Bureaucraticstructuresand formalproceduresat higherlevels
are undeniably necessary; the trouble is that they affordoffice-
holders opportunitiesto exercise influenceand control undemo-
cratically.Large-scale bureaucraticcollectiveaction also raises the
free-riderproblem, since some members cannot be convinced to
contributeto the pursuitof collectivegoals when theirbenefitsdo
not depend on theirparticipation.31Ultimate and substantiveval-
ues about equal sacrifice and return contribute to creating the
communitysolidarityin organizationsthat providesincentivesfor
collectiveaction. In order for delegate democracy to succeed in
pyramidal representativeorganizations, formalityand sectional-
ism must give way to common interestin moral ends ofjustice at
higherlevels.
The conditionswhich fosterexpressionsof injustice, demands
for greatersocial recip. ,city,and participationamong traditional
working-classgroups in Britain illustrate the complex environ-
ment that underliesepisodes of participatorydemocracy,exempli-
fiedforinstancein wage militancy.Importantfactorsinclude large
workforces(over 500 employees)in industrieswhich rigidlystruc-
ture work;32militanttraditions;33a production systemwhich af-
fordsworkersa middle-rangeof control,status, and common in-
terests;34 frequent bargaining and a complicated payment
system;35a strongcollectivebargainingpositionand a stable prod-
uct market;36and a centralizedbargaining structurebased on the
substantiveinterestsof work groups ratherthan the instrumental
interestsof union officeholdersand bureaucrats.37While having
an impact at workshoplevel, state repressionof workers'civil, in-
dustrial, and political rightsand customs,38preceptionsof une-
qual returnfor effortthat produce comparisons with the owners
and managers of capital,39and the homogeneityof the occupa-
tional community40play decisive roles in shaping solidaritiesand
interestsat higher levels. Clearly, the complexityof factorsthat
fosterworkers'solidarities at the workplace is increased signifi-
cantlyat higherlevels of organization. Because the contributionof
380 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

these factorsvaries with historicalcircumstances,this surveycan-

not specifythe relativeimportanceof particularfactorsin shaping
work-groupsolidarities. Nonetheless, these factorsgenerallyun-
derlie the developmentof the solidaritythat provideswork groups
with collectiveautonomy and controlof group interestsand sup-
port.

PARTICIPATORY CONTROL

How does communityfosterparticipatorycontrol in delegate

councils? What, in other words, is the character of the political
process in which officeholders,as representativesof their fellow
group-membersto highercouncils, are compelled to adopt mem-
bership initiativesin order to maintain the support necessaryfor
organizational persistence and leadership stability?Thus far I
have argued that feelings of injustice can fostera collective or
communitysolidarity.This solidarity,in turn,enables membersto
determinetheirown ends and to controlthe supportthey give to
their leaders. The next step is to explain how the membership
uses its interestsand supportto controlthe organizationalagenda
and the decisions made by officeholders.
First, common adherence to democratic and egalitarian ends
enables the membershipto controlorganizational agenda-setting.
The members' collective interests in common moral ends and
theirconsequent supportforends ratherthan authoritymean that
the locus of initiativeis at the base. Leaders are unable to manip-
ulate theirmembers'preferencesbecause these are collectivelyde-
fined in response to the imperativesof the environment.More-
over, collectivecreation of common interestsputs the timing of
initiativesin the hands of workgroups, not officeholders at the top
of the organizational hierarchy.Finally, since interestsrepresent
the community,the patterningof issue-formationis a collective
process that is fluidand has a variable momentum,and that thus
reflectsdiverseresponsesto the workers'environment.
Second, the collectiveconsciousness and organization that en-
able members to definetheirown interestsand, in turn, to make
ends ratherthan institutionsthe object of support,whetherat the
workplace or higher levels, create a situationin which workplace
and union leadership alike must constantlyrenew theirsupportin
order to prevent isolation and impotence. The extent to which
leaders commit themselvesto act on behalfof the substantiveand
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 381

ultimate ends specifiedby their members determinesthe level of

support theyreceive and hence the degree of power they have to
act on behalf of their members. In other words, authorityitself
comes to rest less on the legal-rational,material, technical, and
psychological resources that undergird oligarchical tendencies
than on a grantof supportcontingenton leaders' adequate pursuit
of membershipclaims. The organizational incentiveconditioning
leaders' choices in whether to adopt, reject, or modify the de-
mands of theirmembers is the recognitionthat a failureto gain
the requisite support would produce organizational impotence
and inviteindependentaction by component groups. This would
threatenthe power of officeholders and the stability,ifnot the very
existence,of the organization.
Participatorycontrol involveseither a delegate or coordinator
leadership role. Of these, the coordinatorrole is more important
for the concept of participatorydemocracy in modern organiza-
tions. While largelythe object of influence,a responsiveleader in-
evitably is also its subject; he will receive and magnifythe atti-
tudes of his members,therebyenlargingtheircollectiveinfluence.
In exercisinginfluence,however,a leader does so withinthe moral
imperativesestablishedby the collectiveconsensus. He is neither
an initiatornor an energizer.A participatorydemocratic leader
articulateshis followers'view, translatesthem into plans that can
be effective,and helps obtain agreementon a single policy out of
various alternatives.4'Because leaders are made responsiveby the
actions of organized members in pressing forwardtheir interests
and focusing their support, the leadership role becomes one of
service in realizing members'interests.This conceptionof leader-
ship implies that leaders should be more closely scrutinizedthan
J.S. Mill proposed in his argumentthatrepresentationcan invlove
the delegation of administrativetasks to competentpersons, yet is
less skepticalthan Rousseau's generaldismissalof the possibilityof
representation.42
In the developmentof leadership responsivenessto members'
interests,the substantiveand ultimate demands of the member-
ship play a decisive role. Autonomous rank-and-file protestcan be
disruptive,but in itselfit is not sufficientto give the organized
membership control over their leaders' decisions. For it is well
known that leaders adopt members' claims as theirown and con-
tinue to dominate preciselybecause they retain control over the
executionof policy.It is the substantiveand ultimateends thaten-
382 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

able the members to effectivelyscrutinize leadership behavior,

since such ends definestandardsof action which theyuse to evalu-
ate the resultsof theirleaders' actions. The identificationof policy
execution with domination constitutesa special and putativelyir-
refutableclaim to dominance over the organization,according to
Michels and his challengers.Yet, insofaras members'demands in-
volve substantiveor ultimate values, leaders cannot manipulate
the formationand execution of policy in theirown interests.The
moral ends of these issues prescribethe criterionby which leaders
and membersalike must assess policy decisions. Ultimate interest
in more equitable social relationsthus create a "generalwill" that
definesa communityand specifiesthe principlesof group solidar-
ity which enables members to activelyassess and respond to of-
ficeholders'actions.43
Moral ends ofjustice and equality,moreover,underminethe le-
gal-rational, technical, material, psychological, and ideological
bases of officeholders'authority,therebycompellingthe leaders to
continuously recreate the basis of their support. One reason for
this erosion of formalizedbureaucraticauthorityis that the asser-
tion of substantiveand ultimatemoral demands by the rank-and-
file undercutsthe claims of legal formalismand expediencythat
justifylegal and bureaucraticdomination.44In Britain, rank-and-
filedemands forgreaterjustice and controloftenarise fromwork-
ers' grievances over wages and job control and gain legitimacy
throughthe informaltraditionsof "customand practice"norms.45
This was the case, for example, in the Britishminers' strikesof
1972 and 1973-74. As a result,leaders of trade unions and social-
ist parties have no independentideological or legal source of au-
thoritywithwhichto justifytheirattemptsto shape decisions. The
narrow technical issues of wage negotiations, for example, are
overshadowedby the larger substantiveclaims forworkercontrol
of productionand distribution.
Second, substantiveand ultimateends preventleaders fromus-
ing their possession of or access to specialized knowledge as a
means to consolidate decision-makingpower.Just as substantive
and ultimateends enable members to exchange their support in
returnforofficeholders' service in pursuit of theirends, so it en-
ables them to demand and benefitfromaccess to the information
that is required to make decisions. Having knowledge about
choices and the consequences of policies enables members collec-
tivelyto evaluate options in termsof how well theyserve the com-
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 383

munity'smoral ends ofjustice and equality.Members' substantive

and ultimateends enable them to assess the moral consequences
of technicalquestions and thus to preventofficialsfromdevelop-
ing a disproportionateor exclusive rightto decide as a result of
theirtechnicalexpertise.
A third reason why substantiveand ultimate ends erode bu-
reaucraticauthorityis thatleaders are unable to engendersupport
by offeringspecific benefitsor claiming general effectiveness.46
Typicallyofficialsderive at least part of theirrightto make bind-
ing decisions fromthe materialbenefitsthat theyprovide to mem-
bers. However, claims for greatersocial, political, and economic
justice overshadowthe gratitudethat members feel for the mate-
rial improvementsachieved by theirleaders. Moreover,rank-and-
file demands that contain specific criteria for evaluating policy
consequences preventleaders fromdeterminingpolicies and then
convincing the members that it is in their intereststo support
them. Finally, the leaders' inability to bring about the social
changes required to realize the members' aspirationsforultimate
ends like greaterjustice and equality undermineofficials'justifica-
tion for the rightto make policy and therebyto exercise control
over othermembersof the organization.
A fourthreason why substantivemoral demands forparticipa-
tion and controllimitorganizationalauthorityis thattheydissolve
any deferenceor blind loyaltythat officialsmay enjoy. Whether
such loyaltyderives fromthe venerationof a particularleader or
the generalizedgoodwilltowardthe organizationitself,substantive
interestsreinforcethe delegitimationof authoritythat gives work
groups the abilityto choose theirown ends and to make theirsup-
port contingenton policy results.The productis an informalpoli-
cymakingprocess in which leaders constantlyattempt to renew
theirsupport and members continuouslyassert theirrightto fair
and just treatment.The substantiveand ultimate demands that
derive fromworkplace, factory,or class consciousness orient the
organized members' support toward the ends themselves,rather
than heroes or institutions.By making members' support for au-
thoritycontingenton results, substantiveand ultimate interests
promote what Habermas calls legitimation crisis. This involves
situationsin which members' expectationscannot be satisfiedby
authoritiesbecause there is a lack of the available quantityof ei-
ther a culturallyprovided general commitmentto authorityor
specificbenefitsthat conformto the system.47The pursuitof sub-
384 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

stantiveends, then, underminesany feelingsof generalized affec-

tion towardauthoritythatderive fromgoodwilltowardthe organi-
zation or particular leaders and compels officialsto adopt their
members'demands in order to regeneratetheirbasis of support.
Finally,the members'sense of injustice that fosterscommunity
relationsunderminesand limitsofficials'abilityto use ideology to
gain power and authority.The independentcontrolof aspirations
and the attachmentof supportto moral ends affordworkersa ba-
sis of unity and action independent of officials,thus limitingof-
ficeholders'credibilityto those issues consistentwiththe members'
self-definedinterests.Militant leaders are bound by the degree
and extent of communityconsciousness; they cannot lead their
members in militantaction unless the members themselveshave
made the commitment.By making it clear, moreover,that inde-
pendent action (or resistance)would ensue ifleaders of the larger
organizationfailto take up theircause or ifleaders pursue policies
thatexceed the collectivewill, autonomous rank-and-fileorganiza-
tion constitutesa threat to organizational persistenceand effec-
tiveness.Leaders, as a result,are forcedto close the gap between
members' demands and organizational policy in order to develop
the supportrequired to promoteorganizationalstabilityand effec-
tiveness.The threatof independentaction or inaction, then, con-
stitutesa powerfulsanction that enables membersto compel lead-
ers to adopt their demands and even to institute significant
changes in the structureof organizational authorityfor the pur-
pose of increasingmembershipparticipationand influence.
To summarize: participatorycontrolin delegate councils arises
from the consolidation of the social relations of participation
found in direct democracies at the base of the organization. The
formationand maintenance of this "general will" involvesthe de-
velopmentof a wider interestin more just social relationsthatde-
fines collectiveobjectives and obligates members to mutual and
equitable sharing in the responsibilitiesand achievementsof col-
lectiveorganizationand action. The moral ends that create com-
munityand defineits objectivesprovide criteriaby which to eval-
uate leaders' policy actions. Because participants can evaluate
leaders' actions and link their support to communityends rather
than to authorityin general, leaders are compelled to act in the
popular interestin order to retainorganizationalauthorityand ef
fectiveness.In delegate councils, in otherterms,communityint
ests enable members to trade theirsupport in exchange for
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 385

ers' pursuit of the members' ultimate and substantive ends.

Membership participation,thus, shapes the common interestand
determinesthe substance, if not the detail, of officeholders'
policy
decisions.

IMPLICATIONS

This revised theory of participatorydemocracy offersseveral

advantages over the earlier theories.First,the revised theorysub-
stitutesfor the educative function of the traditional theories a
more systematicanalysis that locates the source of interestsand
control of support in the complex and conditional confluenceof
environmentalfactorswhich fostera sense of injustice and moti-
vate revolt. The theoryrecognizes a fluidityin power relations.
While leaders normally do determine policies, certain circum-
stances can enable members to determinekey issues and the con-
tentof policies throughthe practice of participatorydemocracyat
particularpoints in time. Collective interpretation of injusticecan
explain how participationand egalitariancommunityrelationsare
stimulated.Examining conscious responsesto the way the impera-
tivesof the environmentshape what happens to certain groups in
comparison with othersprovides an analysis of the episodic char-
acter of power relations,an analysis that gives realism to the dis-
cussion of internalpoliticsin large-memberorganizations.
Second, it involvesthe interpretation of leadership as a product
of group needs. This analysis focuses on actual policymaking
processes involvingthe relations of interestand support between
leaders and members, going behind overtcontestsof power. As a
result,it is able to provide a realisticresponse to Michels's cumu-
lative theoryof power in organizations, a theorywhich logically
excludes the organized mass from any significantrole in policy-
making and portrayspower as a zero-sumcontestin which the ag-
gregationof power resourcesby those at the top entails the dimi-
nution of influence by those at the bottom. Instead, leadership
subject to participatorycontrolresponds to the bonds of commu-
nityin pursuitof ends crucial to the persistenceand development
of the group itself.In short,the revisedmodel providesan explicit
account of the manner in which participationaffordscontrol of
leaders in delegate councils.
Third, the focus on communitysolidarityand the exchange of
support for service by leaders conceptualizes members as partici-
386 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

pants in the exercise of power in large-scale voluntaryorganiza-

tions. Because collectivesolidarityfostersgroup autonomyand di-
rect democracy within an organizational hierarchy of delegate
democracy,the locus and timingof policy ends identifymembers
as the source of issues. And the exchange of support forleaders'
action on members' policy objectives, backed by threatsof inde-
pendent action and other challenges to leaders' authority,shows
members shaping collectivedecisions. In short,while it is difficult
to assess the power of organizationalmembersdirectly,the revised
model offersa frameworkforanalyzing membersas active partici-
pants in the exerciseof power.

CONCLUSION

This paper defends the possibilityof participatorydemocracy

in modern union and partyorganizationsby presentinga revised
theoryof participatorydemocracy designed to explain historical
cases of popular control. Taking account of formal procedures,
leadership, and social pluralism found in delegate democracy,it
offersa revisedaccount of the sources of participationand partici-
patorycontrol.Participatorydemocracyresultsfrom(1) the devel-
opment of small communitiescommittedto achieving egalitarian
and nonexploitativesocial relations and their combination into
largercollectivitiesand (2) membersofferingtheirsupportto lead-
ers in returnforleaders' advocacy of members'self-definedinter-
ests. Contrary to Michels, participatorydemocracy is possible in
large-memberorganizations.
The potential for participatorydemocracy that exists among
class or group conscious work groups, communes, cooperatives,
the ecology movement, the peace movement, and others makes
the revitalizationof a substantiveconcept of democracy impera-
tive. The delegitimationof state interventionin many spheres of
public policy and the rise of groups pursuingultimateends of sur-
vival and justice pose new possibilitiesforparticipatorydemocracy
in advanced societies. Participatory democracy provides the
means to a more just and rewarding society,not a strategyfor
preservingthe statusquo. In view of the failureof utopian experi-
ments and some rank-and-filerevoltsand the use of participation
to improve productivityand reinforcehierarchy,the practice of
participatorydemocracy consistentwith the ideals of the tradi-
tional theoristsrequires that power relations be based on mem-
 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 387

bers' conscious and autonomous use of moral principlesto orient

collective action toward more equitable and mutual social rela-
tions. By offeringan explanation of these processes in modern
partyand union organization,this revised model of participatory
democracywill hopefullycontributeto a greaterrealizationof the
ideals of participationand human development.

NOTES
C. George Benello and Dimitrios Roussopoulis, eds., The Casefor Partici-
patoryDemocracy (New York: Grossman, 1971); Terrance Cook and Patrick Mor-
gan, Participatory Democracy(San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971); Ronald M.
Mason, Participatory and Workplace Democracy:A Theoretical Development in Critique
of Liberalism(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982); Tony
Benn, ArgumentsFor Socialism (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1980);
Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer, EconomicDemocracy (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E.
Sharpe, 1980); Benjamin R. Barber, StrongDemocracy:Participatory PoliticsFor a
New Age (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984);
Philip Green, Retrieving Democracy: In Searchof CivicEquality(Totowa, N.J.: Row-
man & Allenheld, 1985).
2 Carole Pateman,
Participationand DemocraticTheory(Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UniversityPress, 1970), pp. 42-43
3 Ibid., chap. 2.
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: J. M. Dent and Son,
1973).
5 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on RepresentativeGovernment,ed. H. B. Ac-
ton (London: J. M. Dent and Son, 1977), chaps. 1-3.
6
Pateman, Participation and DemocraticTheory,p. 29.
7 Ibid., pp. 35-42; G. D. H. Cole, Social Theory(New York: Frederick A.
Stokes, 1920), chap. 6
8 Robert Michels, PoliticalParties.-A SociologicalStudyof theOligarchicalTenden-
cies of ModernDemocracy(New York: The Free Press, 1961). Restatements and
assessments of Michels's theory include S.M. Lipset's introduction, in Political
Parties,pp. 15-39; J. Linz, "Robert Michels," in the International Encyclopediaof
theSocial Sciences(New York: Macmillan, 1968), 10: pp. 265-72; C. W. Cas-
sinelli, "The Law of Oligarchy": AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,47 (1953), 773-
84; G. Hand,"Robert Michels and the Study of Political Parties,"BritishJournal
of PoliticalScience,1 (1971), 155-72; J. D. May, "Democracy, Organization, Mi-
chels,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,59 (1965), 417-84; R. T. McKenzie, Brit-
ish PoliticalParties(New York: Praeger, 1963); Peter Y. Medding, "A Framework
of Power in Political Parties,"PoliticalStudies,18 (1970), 1-17; David Beetham,
"From Socialism to Fascism: The Relation Between Theory and Practice in the
Work of Robert Michels. I. From Marxist Revolutionary to Political Sociolo-
gist,"PoliticalStudies,25 (1977), 3-24; and David Beetham, "Michels and His
Critics,"Archives Europeanesde Sociologie,22 (1981), 81-99.
9 Michels, PoliticalParties,p. 61.
10 Ibid., p. 50
1 See Edward S. Greenberg, "Industrial Self-Management and Political
Attitudes,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,75 (1981), 29-42.
12
J. Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York:
Harper and Row, 1950), pp. 278-83. Restatements of Schumpeter can be found
in S. M. Lipset, "The Political Process in Trade Unions," in his PoliticalMan
388 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), chapter 12 and Giovanni Sartori, "Anti-
Elitism Revisited," Government and Opposition,13 (1978), 58-80.
13 S.M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. S. Coleman, UnionDemocracy:The Internal
Politicsof theInternationalTypographical
Union (New York: Free Press, 1956); J.
David Edelstein, "An Organizational Theory of Union Democracy" American
SociologicalReview,32 (1976), 19-39; J. David Edelstein and Malcolm Warner,
ComparativeUnion Democracy(New York: Halsted Press, 1976); Roderick Mar-
tin, "Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework" Sociology,2 (1968), 205-
220; Roderick Martin, "The Effectsof Recent Changes in Industrial Conflict
on the Internal Politics of Trade Unions: Britain and Germany,"in C. Crouch
and A. Pizzorno, eds., The Resurgence of Class Conflictin Western
Europe since
1968, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1978), 110-22;John Hemingway,Conflict
and Democracy:Studies in Trade Union Government
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1978). Also see, R. A. Dahl, Who Governs?
(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress,
1961).
14
S. M. Lipset, "Introduction" p. 33-34.
15 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power,"Ameri-
can PoliticalScienceReview,56 (1962), 947-52.
16
Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflictin IndustrialSociety(Stanford:
Stanford UniversityPress, 1959).
S Steven Lukes, Power:A Radical View(London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 34.
17
8 Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms,Bases and Uses (New York: Harper
and Row, 1979), p. 196.
19 William E. Connolly, "On 'Interests' in Politics," Politics and Society2
(1972), 459-77.
20 This point is evident in Gaventa's Powerand Powerlessness: and Re-
Quiescence
bellionin an AppalachianValley(Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 1980), chap.
7.
21 G. Duncan and S. Lukes, "The New Democracy," Political Studies, 11

(1963), 156-77; Peter Bachrach, The TheoryofDemocratic Elitism:A Critique(Bos-

ton: Little, Brown, 1967).
22 C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of LiberalDemocracy (Oxford: Ox-
ford UniversityPress, 1977), p. 108.
23 Tilly and Calhoun argue that historicallycommunity provides the bases
for radical collective action. Charles Tilly, FromMobilizationto Revolution (Read-
ing, MA: Addison-Wesley,1978); Craig J. Calhoun, The Questionof Class Strug-
gle: Social Foundationsof PopularRadicalismDuring theIndustrialRevolution(Chi-
cago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1982).
24 Perry Anderson, "The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union Action'

reprinted in Trade Unions Under Capitalism, eds. T. Clarke and L. Clements

(London: Fontana/Collins, 1977), p. 344.
25 While democracy as defined here may eventuate in increased competi-
tiveness, my purpose is not merely to identifythe conditions that fostercompe-
tition; rather it is to illuminate the relations between leaders and followersthat
underlie such manifestations.
26 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974).
27 Injustice defined in terms of nonreciprocal social relations may lead to

protest in certain conditions and to quiescence in others. This is discussed in

Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice:The Social Bases of Obedienceand Revolt(White
Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978). Also see, Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm
of Reciprocity,"in his For Sociology:Renewaland Critiquein SociologyToday(New
York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 226-59.
28 "Substantive or ultimate values" refersto what Weber called substantive

rationality,as against formal rationality.This involves the "application of cer-

 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 389

tain criteria of ultimate ends. . ." to the evaluation of the outcome of economic
activity.Max Weber, Economyand Society,G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. (New
York: Bedminster Press, 1968), Vol. 1, p. 85. Also see, Joyce Rothschild-Whitt,
"The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic
Models" AmericanSociologicalReview,44 (1979), 512.
29 Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp.
8-12.
30 Jane J. Mansbridge, BeyondAdversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books,
1980), chaps. 1,2.
31 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of CollectiveAction(New York: Schocken

Books, 1968).
32 W. Brown, ed., The ChangingContours of BritishIndustrialRelations(Ox-
ford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), chap. 5; M. Mann, "Industrial Relations in Ad-
vanced Capitalism and the Explosion of Consciousness," in T. Clarke and L.
Clements, eds. TradeUnions UnderCapitalism,p. 298.
13 S. Hill, "Norms, Groups, and Power: The Sociology of Workplace In-
dustrial Relations," BritishJournalofIndustrialRelations12 (1974), 218-22.
34 L. Sayles, Behavior in Industrial WorkGroups (New York: John Wiley,

1958), chap. 3.
35 T. Lupton, On theShop Floor(Oxford: Pergamon, 1963), chap. 13.
36 M. Kalecki, "Political Aspects of Full Employment" in E. K. Hunt and

J. G. Schwartz, eds., A Critiqueof EconomicTheory(Harmondsworth: Penguin,

1972), pp. 420-30. Also see, Allan Flanders, Management and Unions.:The Theory
and Reform ofIndustrialRelations(London: Faber and Faber; 1970), pp. 111-12.
37 H. A. Clegg, TradeUnionismUnderCollective Bargaining.A TheoryBased on
Comparisons ofSix Countries(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976).
38 S. M. Lipset, "Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working-Class
Politics," AmericanPolitical Science Review, 77 (1983), 1-18. Also see, E. P.
Thompson, The Making of theEnglish Working Class (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin, 1968).
39
W. G. Runciman, RelativeDeprivationand SocialJustice.:A StudyofAttitudes
to Social Equalityin Twentieth Century England(London: Routledge, 1966).
40 Ira Katznelson,
City Trenches.:UrbanPoliticsand thePatterning of Class in the
UnitedStates(New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).
41
J. Roland Pennock, Democratic PoliticalTheory(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1979), pp. 484-91.
42
J. S. Mill, Representative
Government, chap. 6; Rousseau, The Social Contract,
Book III, chap. 15.
43 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, passim.
44 R. Bendix, Max Weber.: An IntellectualPortrait(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor
Books, 1960), pp. 418-20, 432.
45 William Brown, "A Consideration of 'Custom and Practice,' " BritishJour-
nal ofIndustrialRelations,10 (1972), 42-61.
46 Easton defines
support engendered by benefitsand performance as "spe-
cific support." See his "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,"
BritishJournalofPoliticalScience,5 (1975), 435-57.
47 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,especially pp. 68-75.