KilosBayan v Guingona G.R. No. 113375. May 5, 1994.

Facts: On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-
signal to operate the country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be
submitted not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive."

1.5 The Lessor is expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan ('Development
Plan') which will include the game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the games to all the
cities and municipalities of the country within five (5) years.

1.7 The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise, hardware and software capability,
maintenance support, and financial resources. The Development Plan shall have a substantial bearing on the choice
of the Lessor. The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least sixty percent (60%) of its shares owned by
Filipino shareholders.

1.8 Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO without any additional consideration.

The petitioners raise the following points of law to wit:

a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting Lotteries
'in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity';
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required before any person
may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation,
like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to
install, establish and operate the on-line Lotto and telecommunications systems."

Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group "undertook to reduce its
equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.

Issue: In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, the issues are regarding:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and

(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."

Held: Requirement of standing was waived by the Court. (a)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17
December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT.

Ratio: A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (a)

The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries
since it is, in reality, the PGMC which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight years.

As may be expected, it will induce in PGMC an active interest and participation in the success of PCSO that is not
expected of an ordinary detached lessor who gets to be paid his rental fee — whether the lessee's business prospers
or not. PGMC's share in the operation depends on its own performance and the effectiveness of its collaboration with
PCSO. Although the contract pretends otherwise, PGMC is a co-investor with PCSO in what is practically, if not in a
strictly legal sense, a joint venture.
Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,”
or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of
the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that
the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in
the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public right,
however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and
that a public grievance be remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied.”
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any
official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent “direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed
in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must
show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the
public.
This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De
la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases
of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief to assail the
following provisions of Republic Act 9372, the Human Security
Act of 2007:
a) Section 3, for being void for vagueness;
b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of communication
and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent
relationships;
c) Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition
against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
d) Section 26, for violating the right to travel; and
e) Section 27, for violating the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, since several
petitions were then pending at the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9372; the RTC granted the motion. On
October 5, 2010, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in
the Southern Hemisphere⁠1 case and dismissed the SC
petitions. In view of the decision, the petitioner moved to
dismiss the proceedings, arguing that the SC had already ruled
on the constitutionality of RA 9372, and the petition did not
meet the requisites for declaratory relief, which the respondents
opposed, arguing otherwise that the cases were dismissed on
mere technicalities and their petitions meet the requisites for a
declaratory relief.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the SC did
not pass upon the constitutionality of the law in the Southern
Hemisphere case and the petition satisfied the requirements of a
declaratory relief. On motion for reconsideration, the RTC
maintained its stance, holding that it “observed that private
respondents have personal and substantial interests in the case
and that it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences
of the aforesaid law’s implementation considering that the case
is of paramount impact to the Filipino people”.
The petitioners assailed the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The Issues:
Whether the Supreme Court have already ruled on the
constitutionality of RA 9372;
Whether the petition satisfied all the requirements for
declaratory relief.
The Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
An act of a court or t1ribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.⁠2 It is wellsettled that the abuse of discretion to be
qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross as to constitute
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.⁠3 In this relation,
case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.⁠4 The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be
met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no
grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the
RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases,
it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that private
respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion
to dismiss was altogether improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere,
did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA
9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were
dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the
remedy of certiorari was improper;⁠5 (b) petitioners therein
lack locus standi;⁠6 and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an
actual case or controversy.⁠7 Therefore, there was no grave abuse
of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to
the RTC’s ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents’
petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action
for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the controversy
must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the
terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an
actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief
is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding⁠8.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes
that while the first,⁠9 second,⁠10 and third⁠11 requirements appear
to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements,
however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual
justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one exists in
this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.⁠12 Corollary
thereto, by “ripening seeds” it is meant, not that sufficient
accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be
tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity,
distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown
battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the
issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.⁠13
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief
would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are
left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of
RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in
the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert
general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which
the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement
of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition
would disclose, private respondents’ fear of prosecution was
solely based on remarks of certain government officials which
were addressed to the general public.⁠14 They, however, failed to
show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or
governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA
9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real
or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern
Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become
pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
“double contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack
of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does
not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events
before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.⁠15 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions
in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others,
lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of
one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’
petition for declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the
required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge
against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA
9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest
in the case.⁠16 While it has been previously held that
transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement
that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury,⁠17 it must be stressed that
cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong
to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation.⁠18 Towards this end, compelling State and societal
interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a
closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi,⁠19 as in this case. To rule
otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus
standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.⁠20
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief,
neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for
adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-
discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain
highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.⁠21 This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at
bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it
irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of
adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites
for an action for declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of
the sixth requisite, private respondents’ petition for declaratory
relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to
the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
April 23, 2012 and July 31, 2012 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition for
declaratory relief before the said court is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., on leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave.
Case Brief: Lozano v Nograles
NOVEMBER 17, 2013JEFF REY
G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-
ENDRIANO,Petitioners,
– versus –
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives, Respondents
x––––––––––––––––––––––x
G.R. No. 187910
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner
– versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned
citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109
entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the
Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a
Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress,” convening the Congress into a
Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek
to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by
this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending
or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the House Resolution
contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the
amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the members of each
House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the “members of
Congress” without distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to).
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House
Resolution No. 1109.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners’ supplications. While some may
interpret petitioners’ moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful
perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability
set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional
disputes.
The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement
bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the
court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In

the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves
uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness:
first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the
parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would
be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a
branch of government before the courts may step in.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is
grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse
injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution
No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future
time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No
actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted.
More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power
or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109
involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed
a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still

unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after
it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case
be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at
bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them
with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the
presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult
constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case is no more
evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are
instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit
requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or
disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does
not infuse petitioners with locus standi

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement
derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of
justice to settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.”
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of
locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the
broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is
not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove
nothing but their cerebral deficit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

IMBONG V OCHOA

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers

no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of
the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1)
The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a
separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.