Miranda v. Sandiganbayan

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 154098. July 27, 2005.]
JOSE C. MIRANDA , petitioner, vs . HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the DILG, and FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as
Governor of the Province of Isabela , respondents.
Edna Herrera-Batacan for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1.CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT); TWO TYPES OF OFFENSES UNDER SECTION 13 THEREOF. — The Sandiganbayan
properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any
offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or
property. Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any
legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property.
The phrase "any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property" is
clear and categorical. To limit the use of "government" as an adjective that quali es "funds"
is baseless. The word "public" precedes "funds" and distinguishes the same from private
funds. To qualify further "public funds" as "government" funds, as petitioner claims is the
law's intent, is plainly super uous. We are bound by the rule that a statute should be
construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should
not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019,
commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be read to protect
the State from fraud by its own officials.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; FRAUD UPON GOVERNMENT; ELUCIDATED. — We further hold that the
Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that petitioner's act fell
within the catch-all provision ". . . or for any offense involving fraud upon government. The
term "fraud" is de ned, viz.: An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving
misrepresentation: an act of deluding. It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase "fraud upon
government" means "any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government." It
cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is
covered by the preceding phrase "any offense involving . . . public funds or property." It
ought to follow that "fraud upon government" was committed when the petitioner allegedly
assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to the Of ce of the Mayor under
pretense of official position.
3.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COURT CANNOT CORRECT
ERRORS OF FACT OR LAW WHICH DO NOT AMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. —
[T]he issue of whether petitioner committed fraud upon the government or public funds or
property is essentially factual. In a special civil action for certiorari, the only question that
may be raised is whether or not the respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
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or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot correct errors of fact or law which do
not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
4.ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; A PARTY CANNOT ESCAPE FROM HIS OWN ADMISSION.
— By petitioner's own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the
memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez and left only a few days after receipt thereof due
to the coercion of the Philippine National Police. This contradicts his assertion that he
immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez. Petitioner
cannot escape from his own admission.
5.ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; ENTERING A PLEA WAIVES ANY
OBJECTION AN ACCUSED MAY HAVE AS TO THE VALIDITY THEREOF. — The records will
show that petitioner did not le a motion to quash the information or a motion for bill of
particulars before pleading to the information. It is basic that entering a plea waives any
objection the petitioner may have to the validity of the information except on the following
grounds: (1) the information charges no offense; (2) the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (3) the penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and (4) double
jeopardy has attached. Objections to the suf ciency of the allegations in the Amended
Information do not fall among the exceptions to the rule. They fall under the objection that
the information "does not conform substantially to the prescribed form." Needless to
state, the petitioner has by his acts acquiesced to the validity and suf ciency of the
Amended Information. It is, thus, incorrect for the dissenting opinion to peddle the
proposition that the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Worse, it is improper for the
dissenting opinion to raise this issue motu proprio. Under our Rules of Court, it is the
petitioner who should raise this objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill of
particulars before entering his plea. The irregular procedure followed by the dissent would
encourage the pernicious practice of "sandbagging" where counsel foregoes raising a
pleading defect before trial where it can be easily corrected only to raise the defect later in
the hope of obtaining an arrest of judgment or new trial from a sympathetic magistrate. It
is precisely this evil that is addressed by Rule 117, Section 9 of our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OR SUFFICIENCY OF ALLEGATIONS
THEREIN. — The validity or suf ciency of allegations in an information is determined
according to the provisions of Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[.] . . .
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to
apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of
the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. A perusal of the Amended
Information will bear out that it has hurdled this legal bar.
7.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION; A CAP ON THE DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR
AND MAYOR TO IMPOSE EXCESSIVELY LONG PREVENTIVE SUSPENSIONS. — It is plain
that Section 63 of the Local Government Code was only meant as a cap on the
discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long
preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision and was
not meant to be governed thereby. Indeed, the reason is not hard to distill. The President,
governor and mayor are political personages. As such, the possibility of extraneous
factors in uencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The
Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence
of the office which is protected by no less than the Constitution.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT GOVERN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSIONS IMPOSED BY THE
OMBUDSMAN. — Verily, Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern
preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created
of ce and independent from the Executive branch of government. The Ombudsman's
power of preventive suspension is governed by Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"[.] . . . The six-month period of preventive suspension
imposed by the Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling law.
This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.
9.ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) SAFEGUARDS FOR
IMPOSITION OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION BY THE OMBUDSMAN. — The Constitution
has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political
pressure. Among these statutory protections are scal autonomy, xed term of of ce and
classi cation as an impeachable of cer. This much was recognized by this Court in the
earlier cited case of Garcia v. Monica. Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for
imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989
requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2)
that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such of cer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
CARPIO, J., dissenting opinion:
1.CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT); SUSPENSION AND LOSS OF BENEFITS; CONDITIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. — Section 13 of RA 3019 mandates the Sandiganbayan to
impose a preventive suspension on a nding that the information led against the public
of cial is suf cient in form and substance. The mandatory nature of the suspension
requires a strict compliance with the conditions for its imposition. As the provision clearly
shows, the existence of a valid information is not enough. The crime charged must be for:
a) a violation of RA 3019; or b) an offense contained in Title 7, Book II of the RPC; or c) "any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION CAN BE IMPOSED IF THE CHARGE OF
USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS INVOLVES FRAUD UPON
GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY. — The charge of usurpation of authority
or of cial functions is not a violation of RA 3019. Neither is it a violation of any offense in
Title 7, Book II of the RPC. Thus, the Sandiganbayan can impose the mandatory preventive
suspension on Miranda under Section 13 of RA 3019 only if the charge of usurpation of
authority or of cial functions against Miranda involves "fraud upon government or public
funds or property." Previously, Section 13 only covered violations of RA 3019 or Bribery,
which is one of the many crimes under Title 7 of the RPC. The amendment introduced by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 expanded this scope to include all the crimes in Title 7 of the
RPC as well as any crime that may fall under the new catch-all phrase "any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property." The common characteristic
of the crimes covered in the enumeration remains the same: fraud committed against the
government by public officials.
3.ID.; ID.; MEANT TO PUNISH PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO ABUSE THEIR POSITIONS
THROUGH ACTS WHICH PREJUDICE THE GOVERNMENT. — Miranda's arguments that
Section 13 of RA 3019 covers only offenses involving public funds or property is baseless.
Statutes are read and interpreted in their entirety, and their provisions viewed with
reference to the text and not dissected piecemeal. A statute is construed reasonably with
reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that
is inconsistent with its scope and object. The legislative intent here is clear. RA 3019,
commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is meant to punish public
of cials who abuse their positions through acts which prejudice the government. The law
seeks to protect the State from being defrauded by its own officials.
4.ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION AND LOSS OF BENEFITS NOT LIMITED TO ACTS INVOLVING
FRAUD ON PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY. — Nothing in RA 3019 evinces any legislative
intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The
phrase "any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property" is clear
and categorical. It covers two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the
government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. To limit the use of
"government" as an adjective that quali es "funds" is not merely baseless, it is also
super uous. The word "public" already precedes "funds," hence clearly distinguishing the
funds from private funds. To qualify further "public funds" as "government" funds, as
Miranda claims is the law's intent, is plainly super uous. In distinguishing in Section 13
between "any offense involving fraud upon government" and "any offense involving . . .
public funds or property, the law clearly intends to create two types of offenses. To limit
the applicability of Section 13 of RA 3019 only to offenses involving public funds or
property will exclude other offenses of fraud against the government not involving public
funds or property.
5.ID.; USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS; FRAUD ON THE
GOVERNMENT IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. — Not all acts of usurpation of authority
or of cial functions involve "fraud upon government." The essence of usurpation of
authority under Article 177 of the RPC is false and malicious representation. The
"gravamen of the offense of usurpation of authority is the false representation, maliciously
made, that one is an of cer, agent or representative of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government." Fraud on the government is not an essential element of the offense.
The mere act of making a false and malicious representation that one is a government
of cer is suf cient to continue the offense, whether or not the act defrauds the
government. The essence of usurpation of of cial functions under Article 177 of the RPC
is performing, under pretense of of cial position and without lawful authority, an of cial
act pertaining to an of cial. Fraud on the government is also not an essential element of
the offense. The offense usually results in injury to private parties who are victimized by
pretenders to public office.
6.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019; SUSPENSION AND LOSS OF BENEFITS; IT IS NECESSARY
THAT THE ACT SHOULD DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT. — [T]he gravamen of the "fraud
upon government" in Section 13 of RA 3019 is the public of cer's act of defrauding the
government. It is necessary that the act should defraud the government. Usurpation of
authority, while involving fraudulent means, does not necessarily involve fraud on the
government. The fraud may be committed only against private parties and not against the
government.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; A SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOREWARNED THE ACCUSED OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN'S POWER TO IMPOSE ON HIM PENDENTE LITE THE MANDATORY
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. — What is clear from the Amended Information is that
Miranda was accused of usurpation of authority, not of committing acts to defraud the
government. The information must have a complete allegation on the particulars as to how
Miranda defrauded the government when he reassumed of ce. The accused has the
constitutional right to be informed of the extent of the accusation against him. In this case,
the right to be fully informed is not solely to give the accused adequate preparation for his
defense. A suf cient information in this case would have also forewarned Miranda of the
Sandiganbayan's power to impose on him pendente lite the mandatory preventive
suspension. Moreover, fraud is never presumed. The Amended Information should have
stated expressly and clearly that Miranda reassumed of ce to defraud the government or
that in reassuming office Miranda committed acts that defrauded the government.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS IN THE DAY TO DAY AFFAIRS OF THE CITY
GOVERNMENT IS NOT AN ALLEGATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF WAS
DEFRAUDED. — The "serious disruptions in the day to day affairs of the city government" is
not an allegation that the government itself was defrauded. As interpreted by the
Sandiganbayan and the majority opinion, the "serious disruptions in the day to day affairs
of the city government" meant that there was chaos or confusion because the employees
did not know whom to obey. True, the ones who were inconvenienced by the confusion
caused by Miranda's re-assumption of of ce were the employees, and to a certain extent,
the public, but such confusion does not amount to fraud on the government.
9.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; SANDIGANBAYAN'S "FACTUAL
FINDINGS" BASED SOLELY ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS
CONSTITUTIVE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The majority opinion insists that "the
factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan are binding unless they are capricious or whimsical."
Lest we forget, this case has not yet gone to trial. The Sandiganbayan was only called upon
to rule on the motion to suspend Miranda pendente lite. No factual ndings should have
been made by the Sandiganbayan as to Miranda's alleged commission of fraud on the
government. The Sandiganbayan's "factual findings," based solely on the affidavit of private
complainant Amelita S. Navarro, constitute grave abuse of discretion. The
Sandiganbayan's inquiry should have been limited to the determination of the sufficiency of
the Amended Information. Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly appreciated the
suf ciency of the Amended Information is not a question of fact but a question of law,
which this Court can review.
10.CRIMINAL LAW; USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS; ABSENCE OF
THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO APPOINT DOES NOT IPSO FACTO MEAN THAT THE
GOVERNMENT IS DEFRAUDED BY SUCH APPOINTMENT. — The charge of fraud on the
government will stand or fall on the suf ciency of the Amended information. The Amended
Information miserably fails to recite the facts constituting the accusations of fraud on the
government. The Amended Information should have at least alleged that the of cials
appointed by Miranda did not render service to the public or malversed public funds in
conspiracy with Miranda. Since there was no allegation of such acts or any other
fraudulent acts, at most, the Amended Information accused Miranda of usurpation of
authority. The absence of the lawful authority to appoint does not ipso facto mean that the
government is defrauded by such appointment. Thus, it was incumbent on the
Ombudsman to craft the Amended Information with precision.
11.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; PROHIBITS
ANY SINGLE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF A LOCAL ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIAL TO
LAST FOR MORE THAN SIXTY DAYS. — Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code
prohibits any single preventive suspension of a local elective public of cial to last for more
than 60 days. When Miranda re-assumed of ce on 24 November 1997, he had already
served 60 days of preventive suspension. Hence, there was no longer any legal
impediment to his resumption of of ce. True, the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and immediately preventively suspend public of cials, whether appointive or
elective, under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA 6770"). However, the
Ombudsman must exercise such power in conformity with Section 63 (b) of the Local
Government Code, a later law. Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code governs
speci cally the duration of a single preventive suspension of local elective public of cials.
In contrast, Section 24 of RA 6770, imposing a maximum suspension of six months,
governs all other public officials, whether appointive or elective.
12.ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN'S POWER TO SUSPEND PREVENTIVELY A LOCAL ELECTIVE
OFFICIAL FOR SIX MONTHS IS REPUGNANT THERETO. — Indeed, the power to suspend
preventively a local elective of cial could be prone to abuse, frustrating the will of the
electorate. The Ombudsman's power to suspend preventively a local elective official for six
months is repugnant to the Local Government Code, which limits the preventive
suspension to only 60 days. Under Section 66 (b) of the Local Government Code, the
maximum suspension of six months is already a penalty. The power given by RA 6770 to
the Ombudsman is limited to the imposition of a preventive suspension while the
Ombudsman investigates the case of an elective of cial. A preventive suspension is not a
penalty. A person under preventive suspension, especially in a criminal action, is still
entitled to the presumption of innocence. By upholding the power of the Ombudsman to
impose a preventive suspension of six months on a local elective of cial, the Ombudsman
is in effect already penalizing the local elective of cial even before the Ombudsman's
investigation has begun.
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; UNNECESSARILY PROLONGED PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION UNLAWFULLY
SHORTENED THE ELECTIVE OFFICIAL'S TERM. — A preventive suspension of six months
by the Ombudsman and the mandatory 90-day preventive suspension imposed by the
Sandiganbayan pendente lite cut the term of an elective of cial by almost a third. This is
the very problem that the Local Government Code seeks to prevent. Theoretically, public
of cers in political positions could be in uenced to use the preventive suspensions as a
means to oppress a political opponent. The Ombudsman as a constitutional creation is
supposed to be shielded from the vagaries of politics, but the reality is the Ombudsman is
not immune from committing grave abuse of discretion. As we have seen in Garcia vs.
Mojica, the Ombudsman imposed the maximum period of six months when a suspension
of only 24 days would have suf ced. Whether the motive for imposing an unnecessarily
prolonged preventive suspension is political or is just a result of grave abuse of discretion,
the net effect is the same; the elective official's term is unlawfully shortened.
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; 60-DAY CAP IS NOT LIMITED TO PREVENTIVE SUSPENSIONS IMPOSED BY
EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS ONLY. — In Rios vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court applied the 60-day
cap in Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code to a 90-day preventive suspension
imposed by the Sandiganbayan. In Garcia v. Mojica, this Court cut short to 24 days a 6-
month preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman. Certainly, existing
jurisprudence does not limit the 60-day cap in Section 63 (b) of the Local Government
Code only to preventive suspensions imposed by executive of cials. To apply the 60-day
cap in Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code only to preventive suspensions
imposed by executive of cials will result in anomalous situations. In administrative
investigations, executive of cials have concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman over
local elective of cials. Executive of cials may refer to the Ombudsman administrative
cases against local elective of cials. This will give executive of cials the choice whether to
subject a local elective of cial to a maximum 60-day or a maximum 6-month preventive
suspension. If an executive of cial wants a local executive of cial subjected to a 6-month
preventive suspension, he will simply endorse the administrative investigation to the
Ombudsman. This will deny local elective of cials equal protection of the law. This could
not have been the intention of the legislature in putting the 60-day cap in Section 63 (b) of
the Local Government Code.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Applying the 60-day cap in Section 63 (b) of the Local
Government Code only to preventive suspensions imposed by executive of cials will
practically deprive executive of cials of their disciplinary authority over local elective
of cials. Every complainant will now le administrative cases against local elective
of cials only before the Ombudsman to secure longer preventive suspensions. Worse, this
will insure that all administrative cases against local elective of cials will be subjected to a
maximum 6-month preventive suspension. This will defeat the avowed purpose of Section
63 (b) of the Local Government Code, which is precisely to limit preventive suspensions of
local elective officials to not more than 60 days.
16.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THE LAW TO DEFEAT ITS
PURPOSE. — This is the anomalous result of a selective interpretation of Section 63 (b) of
the Local Government Code, applying it to preventive suspensions imposed by executive
of cials and not applying it to preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman. This
Court should not interpret the law to defeat its purpose. Neither should this Court sanction
an interpretation that so obviously fosters the very evil that the law seeks to eradicate.
DECISION
PUNO , J : p
First, the facts.

The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda (Mayor Miranda) then the mayor of
Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to
25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. 1 Subsequently,
then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro (Vice Mayor Navarro) led a Complaint with the Of ce
of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 1 December 1997 which was docketed as OMB-1-
97-2312. 2 In the said Complaint, Vice Mayor Navarro alleged that Mayor Miranda
committed the following acts on 24 November 1997 despite the continuing effectivity of
the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order: (a) issued a memorandum addressed to
Navarro advising her that he was assuming his position as City Mayor; 3 (b) gave directives
to the heads of of ces and other employees; 4 (c) issued Of ce Order No. 11-021 which
authorized certain persons to start work; 5 and (d) insisted on performing the functions
and duties of Mayor despite Navarro's requests to desist from doing so without a valid
court order and in spite of the order of Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez directing him to cease from reassuming the
position. 6 Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of
usurpation of authority or of cial functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). 7
In his counter-af davit, Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed of ce on the advice of
his lawyer and in good faith. 8 He contended that under Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code, local elective of cials could not be preventively suspended for a period
beyond 60 days. 9 He also averred that, on the day he reassumed of ce, he received a
memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his
of ce and he immediately complied with the same. 1 0 Notably, Mayor Miranda's counter-
af davit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after "coercion" by the Philippine
National Police. 1 1
On 28 October 1998, the Ombudsman led with the Sandiganbayan an Information against
Mayor Miranda for violation of Article 177 of the RPC, penalizing usurpation of authority.
On 20 November 1998, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Of ce of Special Prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case in light of the manifestations made by prosecution
and defense counsel. 1 2 After reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Of cer Rodrigo V.
Coquia (Coquia) recommended the dismissal of the case in a Resolution dated 14
September 2000. 1 3 Coquia held that Miranda reassumed his of ce in "good faith" and on
"mistake of fact" due to the "difficult questions of law" involved. 1 4
Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Ombudsman Desierto) referred Coquia's resolution
to the Ombudsman's Chief Legal Counsel for review. The Chief Legal Counsel disagreed
with Coquia's ndings and recommended the ling of the case against Mayor Miranda. 1 5
He pointed out that Mayor Miranda's invocation of good faith was belied by the fact that
he received a memorandum from the DILG informing him that his view of the preventive
suspension period was untenable and that he should serve out its remaining period. 1 6 He
further noted that Miranda violated the orders of both the Ombudsman and the DILG. 1 7
Ombudsman Desierto adopted the Chief Legal Counsel's recommendation, 1 8 and the case
was re-raf ed to Special Prosecution Of cer Evelyn T. Lucero. Subsequently, the
prosecution led an amended Information with the Sandiganbayan , 1 9 to which the
petitioner interposed a negative plea. 2 0
On 28 November 2001, the prosecution led before the Sandiganbayan a motion
to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite based on Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act . 2 1 Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that the offense of
usurpation of authority or of cial functions under Article 177 of the RPC is not embraced
by Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which only contemplates offenses enumerated under R.A.
No. 3019, Title VII, Book II of the RPC or which involve "fraud upon government or public
funds or property." 2 2
In a Resolution dated 4 February 2002, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Mayor
Miranda from of ce for 90 days . 2 3 The anti-graft court held that a violation of Article 177
of the RPC involves fraud "which in a general sense is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or con dence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another
or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another." 2 4 It further ruled
that Miranda's act fell within the catch-all provision ". . . or for any offense involving fraud
upon government." 2 5 Miranda's motion for reconsideration was denied in the
Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 17 June 2002. 2 6 Hence, the present petition assailing
the Sandiganbayan's orders of preventive suspension . The petitioner contends that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it preventively suspended him on a
ground not authorized by law and raises the following issues: (1) whether Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property; and (2)
whether the crime of usurpation of authority or of cial functions involves "fraud upon
government or public funds or property" found in Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
We rule in the negative.
First. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, provides:
Section 13.Suspension and loss of bene ts . — Any incumbent public of cer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from of ce. Should he be convicted by nal
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity bene ts under any law, but if he
is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and bene ts
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted of cer, who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received such bene ts he shall be liable to restitute
the same to the Government.
The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types
of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense
involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, nothing in
R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud
on public funds or property. The phrase "any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property" is clear and categorical. To limit the use of "government" as an
adjective that quali es "funds" is baseless. The word "public" precedes "funds" and
distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify further "public funds" as
"government" funds, as petitioner claims is the law's intent, is plainly super uous. We are
bound by the rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its
controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that is inconsistent
with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials. cTECIA
Second. We further hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when
it ruled that petitioner's act fell within the catch-all provision ". . . or for any offense
involving fraud upon government. The term "fraud" is defined, viz.:
An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving misrepresentation:
an act of deluding 2 7
It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase "fraud upon government" means "any instance
or act of trickery or deceit against the government." It cannot be read restrictively so as
to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is covered by the preceding phrase
"any offense involving . . . public funds or property." It ought to follow that "fraud upon
government" was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and
performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.
The dissent opines that fraud upon government is not necessarily an essential element of
the crime of usurpation of authority. The submission may be correct as a general
proposition but general propositions hardly decide a case. In the case at bar, the issue is
whether the alleged acts of usurpation of authority committed by the petitioner involve
"fraud upon government or public funds or property" as the term is understood under
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling in the affirmative, the Sandiganbayan held:
Let us take a look at the acts complained of as alleged in the Amended
Information dated July 27, 2001:
. . . the above-named accused, a public of cer, being then the elected City
Mayor of Santiago City, while under preventive suspension did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly and under pretense of of cial
position, assume the duties and functions of the Of ce of the Mayor, issue
directives and memoranda, and appoint certain persons to various
positions in the City Government and perform acts pertaining to an of ce
to which he knowingly was deprived of.
Moreover, in private complainant Amelita S. Navarro's Af davit of Complaint

dated November 26, 1997, she said: ". . ., he proceeded to his of ce and started
giving directives to the various heads of of ce and other employees, the
unexpected acts of respondents had caused serious disruptions in the day to day
affairs of the city government."
Accused's acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the Of ce of the
Mayor despite his suspension from said of ce resulted to a clear disruption of
of ce and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the
employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the
Of ce. This actuation of herein accused constitutes fraud which in general sense
is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or
con dence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue
and unconscious advantage is taken of another (37 Am. Jur. 2d 19 at Sec. 19).
Hence, the act complained of against accused herein falls in the catchall
provision ". . . or for any offense involving fraud upon government . . ."
Moreover, the rmly entrenched doctrine which was held by the Highest Tribunal
in a long line of cases is that ". . . under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law, the suspension of a public of cer is mandatory after a
determination has been made of the validity of the Information . . ." In fact, as
early as 1984 in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan , 128 SCRA 383, the
Honorable Supreme Court speaking thru Justice Relova said:
Once the information is found to be suf cient in form and substance, then
the Court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There
are no ifs and buts about it. . . .
After a perusal of the amended information herein, it clearly appeared that the
same was apparently valid for it conforms to the requirements laid down under
Section 6[,] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. In fact, accused herein interposed a
negative plea thereto thereby tacitly acquiescing to the validity of the said
Information. ScaAET
There being no valid ground raised by the accused suf cient enough to warrant
denial of the prayer of the prosecution in its Motion to Suspend Accused
Pende[n]te Lite (sic) and in consonance with the imperious mandate of the law,
the said prayer should be accorded affirmative relief. 2 8 (Citations omitted)
In denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan further held:

Accused in his motion substantially alleged that Article 177 (Usurpation of
Authority and Of cial Function) of the Revised Penal Code, which is the charge
against herein accused, does not fall under the catchall provision of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 ". . . or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property . . ." He said that the acts complained of as alleged in the
Information do not constitute fraud upon government or public fund or property.
Though the argument by the accused seems plausible, this Court is still inclined
to uphold its ruling suspending accused pendente lite. The accused argued that
the fraud contemplated in the law is one involving (1) government funds or
property; and (2) public funds or property. This is precisely availing in the case at
bar. The Information in herein case, says: ". . . accused . . . assume the duties and
functions of the Of ce of the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda and
appoint certain persons to various positions in the city government, and perform
acts pertaining to an of ce to which he knowingly was deprived of." When
accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions, he indirectly dealt with the
city's funds as those persons appointed will be given their respective salaries,
benefits and other monetary consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly out
of the city's funds. Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to the Of ce
of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of other expenses which is
subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the funds of the city.
Moreover, as the prosecution said, "when accused Miranda, willfully and
knowingly, during the effectivity of his suspension barged into the City Hall,
issued orders and directives and performed functions as City Mayor, he was
sending the unwritten yet visible message that he was authorized to do and
function as such. . . ." We hold this as a fraud upon government resulting in the
chaos or confusion albeit temporary, as the employees would be in a quandary
whom to follow or obey.
Hence, considering that the charge herein evidently falls within the compass of
the suspension provision invoked by the prosecution, there is no cogent reason
for this Court to depart from its previous ruling. Further, considering the
mandatory tenor of Section 13[,] Republic Act No. 3019, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. 2 9
This Court nds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan . Its conclusions are amply
supported by the record. Additionally, the issue of whether petitioner committed fraud
upon the government or public funds or property is essentially factual. In a special civil
action for certiorari, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court
cannot correct errors of fact or law which do not amount to grave abuse of discretion. 3 0
The dissenting opinion, however, says there was no fraud. It holds that "it would be fraud of
public funds if these public of cials just collected their salaries without rendering
service to the government ." It further asserts that "fraud upon government" must be
read so as to require that malversation of funds was committed. 3 1 This is a complete
volte face from its claim that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 covers two types of offenses:
(1) any offense involving fraud upon the government; and (2) any offense
involving public funds or property . 3 2 What is more, adopting the dissenting opinion's
line of reasoning would render super uous the phrase "fraud upon government" as
malversation is subsumed by "any offense involving public funds or property." aHSTID
Third. We are not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed of ce
under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioner's
pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioner's own affidavit states: 3 3
8.That on November 24, 1997, at that time, (sic) I had already served my single
preventive suspension for a total number of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) days
more or less counted from July 24, 1997, which far exceeds the allowable period
of 60 days as maximum preventive suspension, for a single suspension for a
local elective of cial like me as provided for under the Local Government Code of
1991 (sic) on the same date, November 24, 1997 in good faith and upon the
advise (sic) of my lawyers, I noti ed both the Ombudsman and DILG of my
intention to assume my office as the duly elected City Mayor of Santiago City;
9.That earlier on November 24, 1997 I started to reassume my of ce and

functions as City Mayor of Santiago City; surprisingly on the same date,
November 24, 1997 I received a memorandum issued by Undersecretary Manuel
R. Sanchez of DILG instructing me to cease and desist from my plan to reassume
the functions and duties of my office;
10.For less than a week, after November 24, 1997 Vice-Mayor AMELITA
NAVARRO relentlessly harassed and threatened me and my constituents with
bodily harm using the strong arm of the law thru the brute force of the PNP
courteousy (sic) of Undersecretary Manuel R. Sanchez I was constrained to
ceased (sic) from performing my duties and functions to avoid any
possible unfortunate incident that may happen to me and my
constituents ; . . . 3 4 (Emphases supplied)
By petitioner's own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum
of Undersecretary Sanchez and left only a few days after receipt thereof due to the
coercion of the Philippine National Police. This contradicts his assertion that he
immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez. 3 5 Petitioner
cannot escape from his own admission.
To be sure, petitioner's honest belief defense is old hat . In the 1956 case of People v.
Hilvano, 3 6 the facts are:
When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on of cial
business early in the morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the herein
defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his of ce.
Later, during of ce hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the
municipal building; and having found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he
served written notices to the corresponding municipal of cers, including Hilvano,
that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent
mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had been designated by
the Mayor. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary
informing the latter of the controversy. And the said Secretary replied by letter,
that under sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor
who should discharge the duties of the Mayor during the latter's temporary
absence. Shown this official pronouncement, Hilvano still refused to surrender the
position. Again the Vice-Mayor sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by
letter (Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-Mayor had the right to the of ce.
Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him — Hilvano declined to
vacate the post, which he held for about a month, appointing some policemen,
solemnizing marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor.
gWherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted — and after trial — was convicted
of usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due
time.
In rejecting the defense of the accused Hilvano, we ruled: 3 7

There is no excuse for defendant-appellant. In the beginning he might have
pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been
shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal,
he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully
convicted. TcDHSI
Petitioner's excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too imsy to merit
even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner
and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed the
validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.
Fourth. It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, this suspension is mandatory if the information is suf cient.
Understandably, the dissent argues that the Amended Information is insuf cient in form as
it should have "expressly and clearly stated that Miranda re-assumed of ce to defraud the
government or that in re-assuming of ce Miranda committed acts that defrauded the
government" 3 8 and that it is improper to take into account the petitioner's admissions in
his affidavit for this purpose.
With due respect, the dissent is way off-line. The records will show that petitioner did not
le a motion to quash the information or a motion for bill of particulars before pleading to
the information. It is basic that entering a plea waives any objection the petitioner may
have to the validity of the information except on the following grounds: (1) the information
charges no offense; (2) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) the
penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and (4) double jeopardy has attached. 3 9
Objections to the suf ciency of the allegations in the Amended Information do not fall
among the exceptions to the rule. They fall under the objection that the information "does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form." 4 0 Needless to state, the petitioner has
by his acts acquiesced to the validity and suf ciency of the Amended Information. It is,
thus, incorrect for the dissenting opinion to peddle the proposition that the petitioner has
been deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Worse, it is improper for the dissenting opinion to raise this issue
motu proprio . Under our Rules of Court, it is the petitioner who should raise this
objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars before entering his
plea. 4 1 The irregular procedure followed by the dissent would encourage the pernicious
practice of "sandbagging" where counsel foregoes raising a pleading defect before trial
where it can be easily corrected only to raise the defect later in the hope of obtaining an
arrest of judgment or new trial from a sympathetic magistrate. 4 2 It is precisely this evil
that is addressed by Rule 117, Section 9 of our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Even assuming for the nonce, that the objection to the suf ciency of the information was
raised in a timely fashion by the petitioner, the dissenting opinion's arguments still do not
convince. The validity or suf ciency of allegations in an information is determined
according to the provisions of Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms suf cient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. 4 3
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to
apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of
the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. 4 4 A perusal of the
Amended Information will bear out that it has hurdled this legal bar. We quote its contents:
That on or about 24 November 1997, in the City of Santiago, Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public of cer, being then the elected City Mayor of Santiago City, while under
preventive suspension, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly
and under pretense of of cial position, assume the duties and function of the
Of ce of the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda, and appoint certain
persons to various positions in the city government, and perform acts pertaining
to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of. 4 5
Using this test, it cannot be said that the Amended Information failed to properly apprise
the petitioner of the charge against him. The information charged the petitioner with
assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining to the of ce of Mayor willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly under the pretense of of cial position. Moreover, it states some
of the speci c acts which constitute usurpation of of cial functions, namely, issuing
directives and memoranda and appointing certain persons to various positions in the city
government. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand. Indeed, even
the petitioner does not complain about their ambiguity. Only the dissent does. TDcEaH
Fifth. The dissenting opinion also contends that the Ombudsman's authority to
preventively suspend local elective of cials for 6 months is limited by Section 63(b) of the
Local Government Code. Under the latter law, petitioner can only be suspended for a
maximum period of 60 days. It then jumps to the conclusion that petitioner could not have
usurped authority because he reassumed office after 60 days. 4 6
With due respect, the dissent fails to focus on the proper issue. The issue before this Court
is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
petitioner for 90 days. The validity of the Ombudsman's order of preventive suspension of
the petitioner for 6 months is not the one assailed in the case at bar. The irrelevance of the
suspension order of the Ombudsman notwithstanding, the reliance of the dissenting
opinion on Garcia v. Mojica is inapropos. In Garcia, we held:
Given these ndings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence suf ciently
strong to justify the imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner. But
considering its purpose and the circumstances in the case brought before us, it
does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum period of six months is
unwarranted.
On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during his oral argument at
the hearing that the documents mentioned in respondents' comment (such as
purchase orders, purchase requests, and disbursement vouchers), documents that
show petitioner's guilt, were obtained after petitioner had been suspended. Even if
an afterthought, he claimed they strengthen the evidence of respondents against
petitioner. If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to enable the
investigating authority to gather documents without intervention from petitioner,
then, from respondents' submission, we can only conclude that this purpose was
already achieved, during the nearly month-long suspension of petitioner from
June 25 to July 19, 1999. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is
already strong, even without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us
that the maximum six-month period is excessive and de nitely longer than
necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against petitioner. We
must conclude that the period during which petitioner was already preventively
suspended, has been suf cient for the lawful purpose of preventing petitioner
from hiding and destroying needed documents, or harassing and preventing
witnesses who wish to appear against him.
We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to
petitioner's claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply
to this case of an elective local of cial, has been violated . True, under said Code,
preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only
for a maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without
having had the chance to refute rst the charges against him, and for the
maximum period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as
respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under the
Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government
Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the
Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be
imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated by
partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a
longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated
because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our
view, of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a speci c case of
preventive suspension. 4 7 (Emphases supplied)
Nowhere in Garcia is it stated that the limits provided in the Local Government Code apply
to the Ombudsman. In fact, the Court expressly stated that its decision was rendered
without subscribing to the petitioner's claim that the Local Government Code had been
violated. In ne, the Court only ruled that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in imposing a 6-month preventive suspension since it was admitted that the
documents required were already obtained by 19 July 1999 or 24 days after the
imposition of the preventive suspension. Therefore, the purpose for which the suspension
was imposed was already served.
The dissenting opinion also cites the case of Rios v. Sandiganbayan 4 8 as basis for
assailing the Ombudsman's order of preventive suspension. Rios is neither here nor there
since the powers of the Sandiganbayan were at issue in that case, not those of the
Ombudsman. It is also worth noting that Rios cited Section 63 of the Local Government
Code as its legal basis. This provision provides:
SECTION 63.Preventive Suspension. —
(a)Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1)By the President, if the respondent is an elective of cial of a province, a
highly urbanized or an independent component city; TCASIH
(2)By the governor, if the respondent is an elective of cial of a component

city or municipality; or
(3)By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b)Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense,
there is great probability that the continuance in of ce of the respondent
could in uence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive
suspension of local elective of cials shall not extend beyond sixty (60)
days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases
are led against an elective of cial, he cannot be preventively suspended
for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
(c)Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective of cial
shall be deemed reinstated in of ce without prejudice to the continuation
of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was formally noti ed of the
case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is
due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly led, the
duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
termination of the case.
It is plain that the provision was only meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the
President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The
Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision and was not meant to be governed
thereby. Indeed, the reason is not hard to distill. The President, governor and mayor are
political personages. As such, the possibility of extraneous factors in uencing their
decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other
hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence of the of ce which is
protected by no less than the Constitution. This view was embraced by the Court in Hagad
v. Gozo-Dadole 4 9 and Garcia v. Mojica. 5 0 In Hagad, we held:
Respondent local of cials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension
without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to
the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local
Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions
govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public of cial
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a)
the charge against the of cer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that the charges
should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
of ce would prejudice the case led against him. The Ombudsman can impose
the 6-month preventive suspension to all public of cials, whether elective or
appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the
shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local
Government Code of 1991 on an elective local of cial (at any time after the
issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the
evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d)
the continuance in of ce of the respondent could in uence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. 5 1
In the same vein, we made the following observations in Garcia , viz.:

Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of
preventive suspension imposable under the Local Government Code. Political
color could taint the exercise of the power to suspend local of cials by the mayor,
governor, or President's of ce. In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the
constitutional origin of his Of ce, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries
of politics, as respondents would have us believe. . . .
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the
Ombudsman Law is "much too repugnant" to the 60-day period that may be
imposed under the Local Government Code. But per J. Vitug, "the two provisions
govern differently." 5 2 (Emphases supplied)
There is no reason to reverse this ruling. Our above ruling is in accord with the intent of the
law. It bears emphasis that Senator Pimentel 5 3 explained during the Senate deliberations
that the purpose of Section 63 of the Code is to prevent the abuse of the power of
preventive suspension by members of the executive branch, to wit:
The President. 5 4 I recall that in the case of Iloilo City Mayor Ganzon, he
challenged the right of the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, I think, Luis Santos, to suspend him —
Senator Pimentel. That is true, Mr. President.
The President. — contending that under the new Constitution, even the President
does not have that right.
Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate Committee is
ready to adopt a more stringent rule regarding the power of removal and
suspension by the Of ce of the President over local government of cials , Mr.
President. We would only wish to point out that in a subsequent section, we have
provided for the power of suspension of local government of cials to be limited
only to 60 days and not more than 90 days in any one year, regardless of the
number of administrative charges that may be led against a local government
of cial. We, in fact, had in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo where the
Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the ling of charges against him
so that he can be continuously suspended when one case is led right after the
other, Mr. President.HcSaAD
The President. Can that be done under this new Code?

Senator Pimentel. Under our proposal, that can no longer be done, Mr. President.
55
Verily, Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive suspensions
imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created of ce and independent
from the Executive branch of government. 5 6 The Ombudsman's power of preventive
suspension is governed by Republic Act No. 6770, 5 7 otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," which provides:
SECTION 24.Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any of cer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such of cer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in of ce may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Of ce of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Of ce of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided. 5 8 (Emphasis supplied)
The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman 5 9 was

indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling law. This enabling law has not been
modified by the legislature.
The dissenting opinion submits that providing for a six-month limit for the Ombudsman
while keeping the limit for executive of cials at sixty days violates the constitutional
proscription against equal protection of the law. In essence, it avers that there is no
substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman
and those imposed by executive of cials. On the contrary, there is a world of difference
between them. The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to
ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory protections are scal
autonomy, 6 0 xed term of of ce 6 1 and classi cation as an impeachable of cer. 6 2 This
much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica . 6 3
Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1)
that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are
present: (a) the charge against such of cer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression,
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in of ce may prejudice
the case filed against him. 6 4
The dissenting opinion nally points out the possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman in
imposing preventive suspensions. The short reply is that all powers are susceptible of
abuse but that is no reason to strike down the grant of power. Suf ce it to say that the
proper remedies against abuse in the exercise of power are a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or amendment of the Ombudsman's enabling
law by the legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by this Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002,
preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days. cSIACD
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Corona, J., I hereby certify that I voted for the majority during its deliberations. Is on of cial
leave.
Carpio Morales, J., I concur in the result of J. Carpio's dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO , J., dissenting :
I dissent from the majority opinion.

This case arose from a Complaint led by Amelita S. Navarro ("Navarro") on 1 December
1997 with the Of ce of the Ombudsman ("Ombudsman") docketed as OMB-1-97-2312. 1
Navarro alleged that petitioner Jose C. Miranda ("Miranda") committed the crime of
usurpation of authority or of cial functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code 2
("RPC") when he re-assumed his position as Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela on 24
November 1997 during his preventive suspension. The Ombudsman had placed Miranda
under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998, under
a charge of violating Republic Act No. 6713. 3
In his counter-af davit, Miranda asserted that he re-assumed of ce on the advice of his
lawyer and in good faith. Miranda maintained that under Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code, local elective of cials could not be preventively suspended for a period
beyond 60 days. Miranda added that when he received — on the day he re-assumed of ce
— a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his
office, he immediately complied with the memorandum.
On 28 October 1998, the Ombudsman led with the Sandiganbayan an Information against
Miranda for violation of Article 177 of the RPC. On 20 November 1998, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the Of ce of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
Special Prosecution Of cer Rodrigo V. Coquia ("Coquia") recommended the dismissal of
the case in a Resolution dated 14 September 2000, as Miranda re-assumed his of ce in
good faith and on mistake of fact.
However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto ("Ombudsman Desierto") referred Coquia's
Resolution to the Of ce of the Ombudsman's Chief Legal Counsel for review. The Chief
Legal Counsel disagreed with Coquia's ndings and recommended the ling of the case
against Miranda. Ombudsman Desierto adopted the Chief Legal Counsel's
recommendation. The case was re-raf ed to Special Prosecution Of cer Evelyn T. Lucero.
Subsequently, the prosecution led an Amended Information with the approval of the
Sandiganbayan. The Information reads:
That on or about 24 November 1997, in the City of Santiago, Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public of cer, being then the elected City Mayor of Santiago City, while under
preventive suspension, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully, and knowingly
and under pretense of of cial position, assume the duties and functions of the
Of ce of the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda, and appoint certain
persons to various positions in the city government, and perform acts pertaining
to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of. EHTSCD
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On 28 November 2001, the prosecution led a motion to suspend Miranda pendente lite
based on Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 5 ("RA 3019"). Miranda opposed the motion,
asserting that the offense of usurpation of authority or of cial functions is not embraced
in RA 3019 or Title VII, Book II of the RPC. Neither does it involve "fraud upon government
or public funds or property."
In a Resolution dated 4 February 2002, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's
motion and preventively suspended Miranda from of ce for 90 days. 6 The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the suspension pendente lite of JOSE C.
MIRANDA from his position as City Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela and from any
other position he may now or hereafter be holding for a period of ninety (90) days.
Once this Order shall have become nal and executory, the Hon. Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government as well as the Honorable Governor
of Isabela shall be ordered to implement this order. They shall be informed
accordingly when the Order is already executory.
SO ORDERED. 7
The Sandiganbayan denied Miranda's motion for reconsideration on 17 June 2002. Hence,
Miranda filed this petition.
The Sandiganbayan rejected Miranda's argument that the charge against him does not fall
within Section 13 of RA 3019. The Sandiganbayan reasoned in this manner:
Accused's acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the Of ce of the
Mayor despite his suspension from said of ce resulted to a clear disruption of
of ce and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the
employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the
Of ce. This actuation of herein accused constitutes fraud which in general sense
is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or con dence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and
unconscious advantage is taken of another (37 Am. Jur. 2d 19 at Sec. 19). Hence,
the act complained of against accused herein falls in the catchall provision ". . . or
for any offense involving fraud upon government . . . ". 8
The Sandiganbayan subscribed to the Ombudsman's argument that Miranda indirectly

committed "fraud upon government or public funds or property'' when he re-assumed
his office and appointed several persons to various public positions.
Miranda contends that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, when it preventively suspended him for a reason not authorized by law.
Miranda raises the following issues for resolution:
1.WHETHER SECTION 13 OF RA 3019 APPLIES ONLY TO FRAUDULENT ACTS
INVOLVING PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY; and
2.WHETHER THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL

FUNCTIONS FALLS WITHIN THE PHRASE "FRAUD UPON GOVERNMENT
OR PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY" FOUND IN SECTION 13 OF RA 3019.
Whether Section 13 of RA 3019 Applies Only

to Fraud Involving Public Funds or Property
The Ombudsman maintains that the catch-all phrase in Section 13 of RA 3019 is not
limited to fraudulent acts involving government funds or property. The Ombudsman
argues that the word "or" between "government" and "public" creates two types of
offenses, one involving public funds or property and the other involving all forms of "fraud
upon government."
Miranda counters that Section 13 of RA 3019 applies only if a fraudulent act involves
public funds or property. Miranda contends that the word "government" in Section 13 of RA
3019 simply quali es or describes the nature of funds or property to distinguish it from
"private" funds or property. IEaCDH
Section 13 of RA 3019 mandates the Sandiganbayan to impose a preventive suspension

on a nding that the information led against the public of cial is suf cient in form and
substance. 9 The mandatory nature of the suspension requires a strict compliance with the
conditions for its imposition. As the provision clearly shows, the existence of a valid
information is not enough. The crime charged must be for:
a)a violation of RA 3019; or
b)an offense contained in Title 7, Book II of the RPC; or
c)"any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property ."
The charge of usurpation of authority or of cial functions is not a violation of RA 3019.

Neither is it a violation of any offense in Title 7, Book II of the RPC. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan can impose the mandatory preventive suspension on Miranda under
Section 13 of RA 3019 only if the charge of usurpation of authority or of cial functions
against Miranda involves "fraud upon government or public funds or property."
Previously, Section 13 only covered violations of RA 3019 or Bribery, which is one of the
many crimes under Title 7 of the RPC. The amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg.
195 expanded this scope to include all the crimes in Title 7 of the RPC as well as any crime
that may fall under the new catch-all phrase "any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property." The common characteristic of the crimes covered in the
enumeration remains the same: fraud committed against the government by public
officials.
Miranda's argument that Section 13 of RA 3019 covers only offenses involving public
funds or property is baseless. Statutes are read and interpreted in their entirety, and their
provisions viewed with reference to the text and not dissected piecemeal. 1 0 A statute is
construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should
not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. The legislative intent
here is clear. RA 3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is
meant to punish public of cials who abuse their positions through acts which prejudice
the government. The law seeks to protect the State from being defrauded by its own
officials.
Nothing in RA 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving
fraud on public funds or property. The phrase "any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property" is clear and categorical. It covers two types of
offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving
public funds or property. To limit the use of "government" as an adjective that quali es
"funds" is not merely baseless, it is also super uous. The word "public" already precedes
"funds," hence clearly distinguishing the funds from private funds. To qualify further "public
funds" as "government" funds, as Miranda claims is the law's intent, is plainly superfluous.
In distinguishing in Section 13 between "any offense involving fraud upon government" and
"any offense involving . . . public funds or property," the law clearly intends to create two
types of offenses. To limit the applicability of Section 13 of RA 3019 only to offenses
involving public funds or property will exclude other offenses of fraud against the
government not involving public funds or property.
To illustrate, Mr. X, a BIR of cial is in charge of issuing tax credit certi cates. A garments
exporter, a co-conspirator of Mr. X, fakes a P1 million tax credit purportedly issued to his
garments company. The garments exporter sells the tax credit certi cate to an
unsuspecting oil company, which on the assurance of Mr. X of the authenticity of the tax
credit certi cate, pays P800,000 for the certi cate. The oil company pays its P1 million tax
liability with the government using the tax credit certi cate. Here, no public fund or
property is involved. To adopt Miranda's position will place Mr. X, a public employee,
beyond the reach of Section 13 of RA 3019. Yet clearly, Mr. X is a co-conspirator in
defrauding the government and the oil company. 1 1 The oil company will not pay its P1
million-tax liability to the government unless the government proves that the tax certi cate
is a forgery, which may take some time. Thus, the government suffers actual injury. Cdpr
Whether Usurpation of Authority Automatically

Triggers Application of Section 13 of RA 3019
The Ombudsman claims that a charge for usurpation of authority or of cial functions
under Article 177 of the RPC automatically quali es as a ground for preventive suspension
under Section 13 of RA 3019. The Ombudsman asserts that usurpation of authority or
official functions falls under "fraud upon government."
Not all acts of usurpation of authority or official functions involve "fraud upon government."
The essence of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the RPC is false and
malicious representation. The "gravamen of the offense of usurpation of authority is the
false representation, maliciously made, that one is an officer, agent or representative of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government." 1 2 Fraud on the government is not an
essential element of the offense. The mere act of making a false and malicious
representation that one is a government of cer is suf cient to constitute the offense,
whether or not the act defrauds the government .
The essence of usurpation of of cial functions under Article 177 of the RPC is
performing, under pretense of of cial position and without lawful authority, an of cial act
pertaining to an of cial. 1 3 Fraud on the government is also not an essential
element of the offense . The offense usually results in injury to private parties who are
victimized by pretenders to public office.
On the other hand, the gravamen of "fraud upon government" in Section 13 of RA 3019 is
the public of cer's act of defrauding the government. It is necessary that the act should
defraud the government. Usurpation of authority, while involving fraudulent means, does
not necessarily involve fraud on the government. The fraud may be committed only against
private parties and not against the government.
For example, Mr. Y, a private individual, represents himself as a traf c policeman. He
directs traf c at a busy intersection and because of his incompetence causes two private
vehicles to collide. Mr. Y is liable for usurpation of of cial functions but he did not defraud
the government. 1 4
Thus, one may be liable for usurpation of authority or of of cial functions without
defrauding the government. Miranda's case is an example. Miranda re-assumed of ce on
advice of his lawyer that his suspension had ended pursuant to Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which states that "[A]ny single preventive suspension of local
elective of cials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days." Miranda claims good faith in re-
assuming of ce since he acted on the advice of his lawyer under circumstances showing
an honest intention.
We must bear in mind that Miranda was the duly elected Mayor. Miranda was merely
restrained from discharging his duties as Mayor because of the preventive suspension.
Under normal circumstances, Miranda as a duly elected of cial would have the powers to
issue directives and appoint individuals to local positions. Without the preventive
suspension, Miranda's directives and appointments would have enjoyed the presumption
of regularity.
Certainly, Miranda did not re-assume of ce to defraud the government. Before re-
assuming of ce, Miranda wrote the Ombudsman and all concerned local and national DILG
of cials informing them of his stand and the legal basis for his re-assumption of of ce.
When the DILG informed him that he remained suspended, Miranda immediately vacated
his of ce. Miranda's actions do not show any attempt to defraud the government.
Miranda's acts of re-assuming of ce and performing his of cial functions reveal an honest
intention to perform his duties as the duly elected Mayor. EcTIDA
The Ombudsman argues that Miranda indirectly defrauded the government of funds or
property when he appointed certain individuals during the period of his challenged re-
assumption of of ce. The implication is that the payment of salaries to these public
of cials amounts to fraud of public funds. It would be fraud of public funds if these public
of cials just collected their salaries without rendering service to the government. If these
public officials performed vital services necessary to keep government offices functioning,
there would be no fraud on the government or of public funds. Since these public of cials
used government property or incurred expenses in good faith while rendering vital services
to the public, their acts cannot constitute fraud of public funds or property.
At any rate, the Ombudsman's argument is all for naught. Ultimately, the suf ciency of the
Amended Information in accusing Miranda of defrauding the government determines if the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in placing Miranda on preventive
suspension for 90 days. 1 5 A perusal of the Amended Information reveals its patent
insufficiency. The Amended Information merely alleged that:
the above-named accused, a public of cer, being then the elected City Mayor of
Santiago City, while under preventive suspension, did, then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully, and knowingly and under pretense of of cial position, assume the
duties and functions of the Of ce of the Mayor, issue directives, and memoranda,
and appoint certain persons to various positions in the city government, and
perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of.
What is clear from the Amended Information is that Miranda was accused of usurpation of
authority, not of committing acts to defraud the government. The information must have a
complete allegation on the particulars as to how Miranda defrauded the government when
he reassumed of ce. The accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the extent
of the accusation against him. 1 6 In this case, the right to be fully informed is not solely to
give the accused adequate preparation for his defense. A suf cient information in this
case would have also forewarned Miranda of the Sandiganbayan's power to impose on
him pendente lite the mandatory preventive suspension.
Moreover, fraud is never presumed. The Amended Information should have stated
expressly and clearly that Miranda re-assumed of ce to defraud the government or that in
re-assuming office Miranda committed acts that defrauded the government.
The Amended Information does not even state that the public of cials Miranda appointed
when he re-assumed of ce received their salaries without rendering the corresponding
services to the government. There is also no allegation that these public of cials
malversed public funds. If the Ombudsman really believed that Miranda, alone or in
conspiracy with the public of cials he appointed, had defrauded the government of public
funds or property, then the Ombudsman should have charged him with violation of RA
3019, or an offense under Title VII of the RPC, and not usurpation of authority or of cial
functions.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to suspend preventively a public of cer rests on the
suf ciency and validity of the information. 1 7 Oddly, while the Sandiganbayan and the
majority opinion recognize this doctrine, the Sandiganbayan and the majority opinion still
considered Navarro's complaint-af davit. The Sandiganbayan and the majority opinion cite
this portion of Navarro's complaint-affidavit:
. . ., he (Miranda) proceeded to his of ce and started giving directives to the
various heads of of ce and other employees, the unexpected acts of respondents
had caused serious disruptions in the day to day affairs of the city government.
18
The majority opinion agrees with the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the foregoing
allegations amount to fraud on the government "resulting in chaos or confusion albeit
temporary, as the employees would be in a quandary whom to follow or obey." 1 9
Assuming that the Sandiganbayan could consider Navarro's complaint-af davit in
imposing the mandatory preventive suspension on Miranda, the allegations in the af davit
fall short of accusing Miranda of defrauding the government. The Sandiganbayan de ned
fraud as that "which in general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to
deceive, including acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust or con dence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by
which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another." 2 0
Based on the Sandiganbayan's de nition of fraud, by no stretch of the imagination is the
bare allegation of "unexpected acts of respondents" tantamount to an allegation of fraud.
Miranda's "unexpected acts" were not described with particularity to show that the
"unexpected acts" were committed with the end view of defrauding the government. IEAHca
The "serious disruptions in the day to day affairs of the city government" is not an
allegation that the government itself was defrauded. As interpreted by the Sandiganbayan
and the majority opinion, the "serious disruptions in the day to day affairs of the city
government" meant that there was chaos or confusion because the employees did not
know whom to obey. True, the ones who were inconvenienced by the confusion caused by
Miranda's re-assumption of of ce were the employees, and to a certain extent, the public,
but such confusion does not amount to fraud on the government.
The majority opinion insists that "the factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan are binding
unless they are capricious or whimsical." Lest we forget, this case has not yet gone to trial.
The Sandiganbayan was only called upon to rule on the motion to suspend Miranda
pendente lite. No factual ndings should have been made by the Sandiganbayan as to
Miranda's alleged commission of fraud on the government. The Sandiganbayan's "factual
ndings", based solely on the af davit of private complainant Amelita S. Navarro,
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan's inquiry should have been
limited to the determination of the suf ciency of the Amended Information. Whether the
Sandiganbayan correctly appreciated the suf ciency of the Amended Information is not a
question of fact but a question of law, which this Court can review.
The majority opinion asserts that the issue is not whether the of cials appointed by
Miranda rendered service to the local government unit. The real issue, according to the
majority opinion, is whether Miranda misrepresented himself as having lawful authority to
make appointments when he was still under suspension by the Ombudsman.
The charge of fraud on the government will stand or fall on the suf ciency of the Amended
Information. The Amended Information miserably fails to recite the facts constituting the
accusation of fraud on the government. The Amended Information should have at least
alleged that the of cials appointed by Miranda did not render service to the public or
malversed public funds in conspiracy with Miranda. Since there was no allegation of such
acts or any other fraudulent acts, at most, the Amended Information accused Miranda of
usurpation of authority. The absence of the lawful authority to appoint does not ipso facto
mean that the government is defrauded by such appointment. Thus, it was incumbent on
the Ombudsman to craft the Amended Information with precision.
The majority opinion concludes that Miranda's "honest belief defense is old hat," as this
type of defense was long ago rejected by the Court in the 1956 case of People v. Hilvano .
2 1 The majority opinion points out that Miranda's own admission in his af davit shows that
he could not have in good faith re-assumed of ce because he openly de ed the
memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez.
The majority opinion confuses the issues. In People v. Hilvano , the accused was indicted
for usurpation of authority. After trial, the accused was found guilty of the crime charged.
The courts in People v. Hilvano passed upon the accused's defense of good faith and
found that the accused did not act in good faith because "after he had been shown the
letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial scal, he had
no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to his position ." In the present case, Miranda
d id not stubbornly stick to his position after he was shown Undersecretary Sanchez's
memorandum. Miranda in fact vacated his office upon receipt of Undersecretary Sanchez's
memorandum. Under Hilvano , good faith remains a valid defense. Thus, in the present
case, good faith in re-assuming of ce is relevant to the charge of usurpation of authority.
In short, a person accused of usurpation of authority could invoke good faith in assuming a
public office.
I nd it dif cult to see how the government could have been defrauded in the course of
Miranda's re-assumption of of ce when his de ance of the preventive suspension order
was not at all subtle. Miranda's insubordination was so open and blatant, as the majority
opinion describes it, that the acting Mayor, DILG and the Philippine National Police were
put on guard. To repeat, if the Ombudsman truly believed that aside from usurpation of
authority, Miranda also committed acts that defrauded the government during his re-
assumption of of ce, then the Ombudsman should have carefully worded the Amended
Information to convey clearly this charge.DIESHT
Finally, Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code prohibits any single preventive
suspension of a local elective public of cial to last for more than 60 days . 2 2 When
Miranda re-assumed of ce on 24 November 1997, he had already served 60 days of
preventive suspension. Hence, there was no longer any legal impediment to his resumption
of office.
Title, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and immediately preventively suspend
public of cials, whether appointive or elective, 2 3 under Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6770 ("RA 6770"). 2 4 However, the Ombudsman must exercise such power in conformity
with Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code, 2 5 a later law. Section 63(b) of the
Local Government Code governs speci cally the duration of a single preventive
suspension of local elective public of cials . In contrast, Section 24 of RA 6770,
imposing a maximum suspension of six months, governs all other public of cials, whether
appointive or elective.
In Rios v. Sandiganbayan , 2 6 this Court ruled that Section 63(b) of the Local Government
Code even limits the power of the Sandiganbayan to suspend preventively local elective
officials:
On the other hand, we nd merit in petitioner's second assigned error. The
Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon petitioner for the
single case led against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code,
"any single preventive suspension of local elective of cials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days." (Emphasis supplied)
I n Garcia v. Mojica , 2 7 the Court held that a preventive suspension of six months
imposed by the Ombudsman on local elective of cials constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. The Court further held that a preventive suspension of 24 days on such local
elective officials should suffice.
In the present case, Miranda re-assumed of ce after serving 60 days of preventive
suspension, the maximum preventive suspension period allowed by law. Thus, Miranda re-
assumed of ce not as a usurper or a pretender but as the duly elected Mayor of Santiago
City, free from the legal impediment of preventive suspension.
However, Miranda immediately vacated his of ce on the day he re-assumed it in obeisance
to the DILG memorandum informing him that his preventive suspension remained in effect.
Thus, Miranda remained suspended until 25 January 1998, or a single preventive
suspension period of one day short of 6 months. Miranda's preventive suspension for
more than 60 days is clearly contrary to law.
The majority opinion argues that Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code is a cap on
the discretionary power of the President but does not apply to the Ombudsman. The
majority opinion cites the Senate deliberations where Senator Aquilino Pimentel ("Senator
Pimentel") explained that the purpose behind Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code
was to prevent the abuse of the power of preventive suspension by the members of the
executive department. Invoking Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole and Garcia v. Mojica , the majority
opinion points out that the President, governor and mayor hold political positions. The
possibility that extraneous factors may in uence their decision to impose preventive
suspension is not remote. The majority opinion asserts that the Ombudsman is not
subject to political pressure due to the nature of his office.
I agree with the majority opinion only on one point: the Local Government Code puts a cap
on the power to impose preventive suspension on elective of cials as this power is
susceptible to abuse. However, the period of preventive suspension cannot exceed 60
days regardless of who is imposing the preventive suspension. There is no language in the
Local Government Code exempting the Ombudsman from the 60-day preventive
suspension cap. Where the law does not distinguish, we should also not distinguish. DHIcET
Prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code, the abuse of the power to impose
preventive suspensions was rife. Preventive suspensions were imposed in a serialized
manner to prevent an elective of cial from actually assuming of ce. During the Senate
deliberations, as an illustrative example, Senator Pimentel recounted how then former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos abused this power. The deliberations in the Senate
proceeded in the following manner:
The President . 2 8 I recall that in the case of Iloilo City Mayor Ganzon, he
challenged the right of the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, I think, Luis Santos, to suspend him —
Senator Pimentel . That is true, Mr. President.

The President . — contending that under the new Constitution, even the
President does not have that right .
Senator Pimentel . Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate Committee is
ready to adopt a more stringent rule regarding the power of removal and
suspension by the Of ce of the President over local government of cials, Mr.
President. We would only wish to point out that in a subsequent section, we have
provided for the power of suspension of local government of cials to be limited
only to 60 days and not more than 90 days in any one year, regardless of the
number of administrative charges that may be led against, a local government
of cial. We, in fact, had in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo where the
Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the ling of charges against him
so that he can be continuously suspended when one case is led right after the
other, Mr. President.
The President . Can that be done under this new Code?

Senator Pimentel . Under our proposal, that can no longer be done, Mr.
President. 2 9 (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the power to suspend preventively a local elective of cial could be prone to abuse,
frustrating the will of the electorate. The Ombudsman's power to suspend preventively a
local elective of cial for six months is repugnant to the Local Government Code, which
limits the preventive suspension to only 60 days. Under Section 66(b) of the Local
Government Code, the maximum suspension of six months is already a penalty. 3 0 The
power given by RA 6770 to the Ombudsman is limited to the imposition of a preventive
suspension while the Ombudsman investigates the case of an elective of cial. A
preventive suspension is not a penalty. 3 1 A person under preventive suspension,
especially in a criminal action, is still entitled to the presumption of innocence. 3 2 By
upholding the power of the Ombudsman to impose a preventive suspension of six months
on a local elective of cial, the Ombudsman is in effect already penalizing the local elective
official even before the Ombudsman's investigation has begun.
We quote the Senate's deliberations on Section 66(b) of the Local Government Code, to
wit:
Senator Pimentel . Can we proceed to page 44, Mr. President?
Now, one of the innovations that we have introduced here, Mr. President, is that
the penalty of suspension , which is found on line 8, paragraph 2, shall not
exceed the unexpired term of the respondent, or a total of six months for his entire
term, nor shall said penalty be a bar to his candidacy, etcetera. But we are putting
a limitation to the total period of suspension, which shall not exceed six months
of his entire term.
It must be remembered, Mr. President, that local government of cials

now only have a three-year term. So that, if we allow suspension to last
longer than six months, we will have a governor or a mayor serving for
only a few months of his given term . 3 3 (Emphasis ours)
A preventive suspension of six months by the Ombudsman and the mandatory 90-day
preventive suspension imposed by the Sandiganbayan pendente lite 3 4 cut the term of an
elective of cial by almost a third. This is the very problem that the Local Government Code
seeks to prevent. EAIcCS
Theoretically, public of cers in political positions could be in uenced to use the preventive
suspensions as a means to oppress a political opponent. The Ombudsman as a
constitutional creation is supposed to be shielded from the vagaries of politics, but the
reality is the Ombudsman is not immune from committing grave abuse of discretion. As
we have seen in Garcia v. Mojica , the Ombudsman imposed the maximum period of six
months when a suspension of only 24 days would have suf ced. Whether the motive for
imposing an unnecessarily prolonged preventive suspension is political or is just a result
of grave abuse of discretion, the net effect is the same: the elective of cial's term is
unlawfully shortened.
In Rios v. Sandiganbayan , this Court applied the 60-day cap in Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code to a 90-day preventive suspension imposed by the Sandiganbayan. In
Garcia v. Mojica, this Court cut short to 24 days a 6-month preventive suspension imposed
by the Ombudsman. Certainly, existing jurisprudence does not limit the 60-day cap in
Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code only to preventive suspensions imposed by
executive officials.
To apply the 60-day cap in Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code only to preventive
suspensions imposed by executive of cials will result in anomalous situations. In
administrative investigations, executive of cials have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Ombudsman over local elective of cials. 3 5 Executive of cials may refer to the
Ombudsman administrative cases against local elective of cials. This will give executive
of cials the choice whether to subject a local elective of cial to a maximum 60-day or a
maximum 6-month preventive suspension. If an executive of cial wants a local elective
of cial subjected to a 6-month preventive suspension, he will simply endorse the
administrative investigation to the Ombudsman. This will deny local elective of cials equal
protection of the law. This could not have been the intention of the legislature in putting the
60-day cap in Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code.
Applying the 60-day cap in Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code only to preventive
suspensions imposed by executive of cials will practically deprive executive of cials of
their disciplinary authority over local elective of cials. Every complainant will now le
administrative cases against local elective of cials only before the Ombudsman to secure
longer preventive suspensions. Worse, this will insure that all administrative cases against
local elective of cials will be subjected to a maximum 6-month preventive suspension .
This will defeat the, avowed purpose of Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code,
which is precisely to limit preventive suspensions of local elective of cials to not more
than 60 days.
This is the anomalous result of a selective interpretation of Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code, applying it to preventive suspensions imposed by executive of cials
and not applying it to preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman. This Court
should not interpret the law to defeat its purpose. Neither should this Court sanction an
interpretation that so obviously fosters the very evil that the law seeks to eradicate.
In the present case, the DILG could have administratively investigated Miranda and
preventively suspended him for 60 days in accordance with Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The DILG did not. A certain Amelita S. Navarro subsequently
led a complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 December 1997, allowing the Ombudsman to
suspend preventively Miranda for 6 months, beyond the 60-day maximum period allowed
in Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code. This is a stark illustration of the
oppressive and anomalous operation of Section 63(b) if it is not made to apply to
preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman. Miranda is clearly a victim here of
the oppressive and anomalous selective application of Section 63(b) of the Local
Government Code. This Court should not countenance such patent anomaly. HTAEIS
In sum, the offense of usurpation of authority or of cial functions under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code led against Miranda in the present case does not involve "fraud upon
government or public funds or property" under Section 13 of RA 3019. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the charge against
Miranda falls within Section 13 of RA 3019 requiring the mandatory preventive suspension
of Miranda by the Sandiganbayan. In addition, the maximum period of a single preventive
suspension of local elective public of cials like Miranda cannot exceed 60 days in
accordance with Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the instant petition and to SET ASIDE the Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan dated 4 February 2002 and 17 June 2002 in SB Criminal Case No.
24984.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 79, 85.
2.Id., pp. 76-78.

3.Id., p. 78.
4.Id., p. 77.
5.Ibid.
6.Id., pp. 77-78.

7.Id., p. 78.
8.Id., p. 81.
9.Ibid.
10.Id., pp. 10-11.
11.Id., pp. 81-82.
12.Id., p. 88.
13.Id., pp. 89-95.
14.Ibid.
15.Id., pp. 96-97.
16.Id., p. 96.
17.Ibid.
18.Id., p. 97.
19.Id., pp. 100-102.

20.Rollo, pp. 36-37.
21.Id., pp. 43-45.
22.Id., pp. 46-48.
23.Id., pp. 37-38.

24.Id., p. 36.
25.Ibid.
26.Id., pp. 41-42.

27.Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 904
(1993).
28.Rollo, pp. 36-37.
29.Rollo, pp. 40-41.
30.Elks Club v. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272 (1948).

31.Dissenting Opinion, p. 16.
32.Dissenting Opinion, pp. 9-10.
33.Rollo, pp. 79, 81; Petitioner's "Counter-Affidavit," pp. 1, 3.

34.Rollo, pp. 81-82; Petitioner's "Counter-Affidavit," pp. 3-4.
35.Rollo, pp. 10-11; Petitioner's "Petition," pp. 8-9.
36.99 Phil. 655-656.

37.Id., pp. 657-658.
39.The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Section 9 (2000); The rule provides as
follows:
SECTION 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not le a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

40.The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Section 3(e) (2000).
41.The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sections 1, 3 and 9, and Rule 116,
Section 9 (2000).
42.Kamisar, Israel, and LaFave, Modern Criminal Procedure — Cases, Comments and Questions,
pp. 1037-1038 (8th ed).
43.The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 9 (2000).

44.Matilde, Jr. v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456 (1975).
45.Rollo, p. 127.

47.Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, 223-224 (1999).
48.279 SCRA 581 (1997).
49.251 SCRA 242 (1995).
50.314 SCRA 207 (1999).

51.Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA 242, 253-254 (1995).
52.Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999).
53.Principal author of the Local Government Code.

54.Senate President Jovito R. Salonga.
55.Record of the Senate, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 68-69 (1990).
56.Const., Article XI, Sections 5, 11-14 (1987).

57.Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999); Castillo-Co v. Barbers, 290 SCRA 717 (1998): Hagad
v. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA 242 (1995); Lastimosa v. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 (1995).
58.Republic Act No. 6770, Section 24 (1989).
59.Rollo, pp. 79, 85.
60.Const., Article XI, Section 14 (1987).
61.Const., Article XI, Section 11 (1987).
62.Const., Article XI, Sections 2-3 (1987).

63.314 SCRA 207 (1999).
64.Ibid.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:

1.As cited in the Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 28 September 1998. Rollo, p. 84.
2.Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "Usurpation of authority or of cial functions .
— Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an of cer, agent
or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any
foreign government, or who, under pretense of of cial position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public of cer of the Philippine Government or of
any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods."
3.Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
4.Rollo, p. 100.
5.Section 13. Suspension and loss of bene ts . — Any incumbent public of cer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from of ce.
...
6.In Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 96131 dated 6 September 1991 (201 SCRA 417), the
Court ruled that preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 could not exceed 90
days.
7.Rollo, pp. 37-38.
8.Ibid., p. 36.
9.Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 103.
10.Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922).
11.Mr. X could be charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. This provision declares
unlawful "[C]ausing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his of cial, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. . . ."
12.Ramon C. Aquino, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Vol. II, p. 299 (1997 Edition).
13.Ibid.
14.For a similar case, see People v. Reyes , C.A. 70 O.G. 7801, cited in Luis B. Reyes, THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II, pp. 242-243 (2001 Ed.).
15.Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 6. See also People, et al. v. CA, et al ., 220 Phil. 59
(1985).
16.Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
17.Supra, note 15.

18.Rollo, p. 36.
19.Ibid.
20.Ibid.
21.99 Phil. 655 (1956).

22.Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides as follows: "Preventive
suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence
of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in of ce of the respondent could in uence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided , That, any single
preventive suspension of local elective of cials shall not extend beyond sixty
(60) days : Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are led
against an elective of cial, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety
(90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the
time of the first suspension." (Emphasis supplied)
23.Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole , G.R. No. 108072, 12 December 1995, 251 SCRA 242. The Court
framed the pivotal issue in this case as follows: ". . . whether the Ombudsman under
Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has
been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991 . . ." The Court ruled that R.A. No. 7160 did not divest
the Ombudsman of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local
elective officials.
24.Section 24 of RA 6770 provides: "Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any of cer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such of cer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in of ce may prejudice the case led
against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Of ce of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Of ce of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided."
25.Supra note 22.
26.Reported as Rios v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, 345 Phil. 85 (1997).
27.Reported as Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892 (1999).

28.Senate President Jovito R. Salonga.
30.SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. — . . .
b) the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period
of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the quali cations
required for the office.
xxx xxx xxx
31.Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
32.Ibid.

34.I n Rios v. Sandiganbayan , the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan can only impose a
preventive suspension of 60 days in compliance with the Local Government Code.

35.Sections 60 to 63, Local Government Code of 1991.

Miranda v. Sandiganbayan

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Miranda v. Sandiganbayan

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154098. July 27, 2005.]

JOSE C. MIRANDA , petitioner, vs . HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF

Edna Herrera-Batacan for petitioner.

First, the facts.

Moreover, in private complainant Amelita S. Navarro's Af davit of Complaint

In denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan further held:

Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. 2 9

9.That earlier on November 24, 1997 I started to reassume my of ce and

In rejecting the defense of the accused Hilvano, we ruled: 3 7

(a)Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(2)By the governor, if the respondent is an elective of cial of a component

In the same vein, we made the following observations in Garcia , viz.:

The President. Can that be done under this new Code?

The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman 5 9 was

I dissent from the majority opinion.

The Sandiganbayan subscribed to the Ombudsman's argument that Miranda indirectly

2.WHETHER THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL

Whether Section 13 of RA 3019 Applies Only

Section 13 of RA 3019 mandates the Sandiganbayan to impose a preventive suspension

b)an offense contained in Title 7, Book II of the RPC; or

The charge of usurpation of authority or of cial functions is not a violation of RA 3019.

Whether Usurpation of Authority Automatically

Senator Pimentel . That is true, Mr. President.

The President . Can that be done under this new Code?

It must be remembered, Mr. President, that local government of cials

1.Rollo, pp. 79, 85.

2.Id., pp. 76-78.

6.Id., pp. 77-78.

19.Id., pp. 100-102.

23.Id., pp. 37-38.

26.Id., pp. 41-42.

30.Elks Club v. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272 (1948).

33.Rollo, pp. 79, 81; Petitioner's "Counter-Affidavit," pp. 1, 3.

36.99 Phil. 655-656.

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43.The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 9 (2000).

46.Dissenting Opinion, p. 22.

50.314 SCRA 207 (1999).

53.Principal author of the Local Government Code.

56.Const., Article XI, Sections 5, 11-14 (1987).

60.Const., Article XI, Section 14 (1987).

61.Const., Article XI, Section 11 (1987).

62.Const., Article XI, Sections 2-3 (1987).

CARPIO, J., dissenting:

17.Supra, note 15.

21.99 Phil. 655 (1956).

27.Reported as Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892 (1999).

33.Record of the Senate, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 239-240 (1990).

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