De la Cruz v People

GR No. 209387, January 11, 2016

FACTS:
Upon x-ray scanning inspection of his bag, the accused Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was found to be
in possession of firearms, explosives and ammunitions during the COMELEC Gun Ban period.
He was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel and he frequently travel taking the vessel.
He was at the pier of Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. He allegedly left his bag with the
porter while buying a ticket. He did not have the proper documents for the firearms as well as the
license to carry it during this period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not double jeopardy is present in the conviction of accused for both illegal possessions
of firearms and violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban.

RULING:
Yes. Although it was established that all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban and Illegal
possession of firearms are present, he cannot be convicted for both offense. Under RA No. 8294,
otherwise known as illegal possession of firearms, a person may not be convicted for illegal
possession of firearms if another crime was committed. The unlicensed firearm need not be
actually used in the course of committing the other crime for the application of Section 1 of RA
No. 8294.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants,
are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be
so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling
public.

However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work, petitioner was a frequent
traveler who is well-versed with port security measures. We cannot accept that an average
reasonable person aware of travel security measures would leave his belongings with a stranger
for a relatively long period of time. Also, records show that petitioner had only one (1) bag. There
was no evidence to show that a robust young man like petitioner would have need of the porter’s
services. The defense did not identify nor present this porter with whom petitioner left his bag.

People v Bayker
GR No. 170192, February 10, 2016

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Marissa Bayker together with 2 others (Nida Bermudez & Lorenz Langreo),
illegally recruited the complainants: Basilio Miparanum, Virgilio Canazares and Reynaldo Dahab
for an overseas job abroad.
The complainant Miparanum was told by accused that she could help him find work abroad.
Convinced, he went to accused’s residence to apply as a seaman. He delivered to her the money
for his seaman’s book and another money for his placement fee. The accused told him to wait for
his deployment to Hongkong within two weeks. Complainant followed up on his application after
two weeks but was made to undergo another training and paid for his certificate. Sensing he was
defrauded, he filed a complaint.
On the other hand, accused-appellant alleged that it was Bermudez and Langreo who were directly
engaged in illegal recruitment and that her only participation was to sign the receipts as witness
and to receive payments.
On appeal, CA affirmed and held that the elements of illegal recruitment in a large scale had been
established. Accused was convicted for the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is double jeopardy when an illegal recruiter is charged of illegal recruitment
in large scale and estafa.

RULING:
No. There is no double jeopardy when an illegal recruiter is charged of illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa. An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed
in large scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused
has been charged under separate informations.

Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-appellant for both
crimes considering that they were distinct from each other not only from their being punished
under different statutes but also from their elements being different.

People v Comboy
GR No. 218399, March 2, 2016

FACTS:

Accused Godofredo Comboy y Cronico was charged of two counts qualified rape and one count
attempted rape against his minor biological daughter AAA, an 11 year old while asleep in
Barangay Bolo, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, Philippines.

Upon his arraignment on October 23, 2009, Comboy pleaded not guilty to each of the charges
levelled against him. The RTC found Comboy guilty beyond reasonable doubt and that the
prosecution successfully established that Comboy had carnal knowledge of AAA twice, the first
time occurring sometime in 2006 and the other time in February 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the charges on the accused of two (2) counts of Qualified Rape and one (1) count
of Qualified Attempted Rape is valid.

RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that the prosecution
was able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her without her consent on two (2)
separate occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008; and (b)
attempted to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason other
than his own desistance, i.e., BBB's intervention.

The elements of Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation.
The gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.28 On the other hand,
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a
woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act.
Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these are
not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law presumes that the offended
party does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, to sustain a conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the following: (a)
the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between
the accused and the complainant.
The foregoing acts of Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC if: (a) the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
People v Jugueta
GR No. 202124, April 5, 2016

FACTS:
Accused were charged for shooting two minor children Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age. who died and for shooting the children’s parents
and two other siblings who lived. The shooting took place in the victims’ houses.

Appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple
Attempted Murder

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be double jeopardy in the case against Estores and SAN Miguel.

RULING:
No. The case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus,
there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. After all, such reinvestigation would not subject
Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only attaches if the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel
in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

People v Ylagan
58 PHIL 851

FACTS:
A complaint for physical injuries was filed against Elisea Ylagan in the Province of Batangas.
After preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the
provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon
arraignment, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the private
prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the
case, which motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the defendant said nothing about
the dismissal of the case. 11 days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the
same justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same offense of serious
physical injuries. After another preliminary investigation, the case was again forwarded to the
Court of First Instance, where the information filed in the justice of the peace court was
reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy, based on section
28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After hearing, the court sustained the plea and dismissed
the case. From this order of dismissal, an appeal was taken by the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a double jeopardy.

RULING:
Yes. It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, defendant in a criminal prosecution
is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions:(1) In a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4)
after he has pleaded to the complaint of information.

The appellee has been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. All that
the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is
properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The rule against double jeopardy
protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment, but against being again tried for
the same offense.

This is the principle underlying Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows: A
person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
for which he has been previously brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed or otherwise terminated before
judgment without the consent of the accused.

The mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not
constitute a consent. The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the offense is as important
as the other constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should
not, be predicated on mere silence.
People v Balisacan
L-26376
17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966

FACTS:
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned,
he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his counsel de officio,
he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-
defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On
the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted
in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court
a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during
the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

The defense of second jeopardy is not proper because the presentation of evidence of complete
self-defense amounted to a withdrawal of his original plea. And since no new plea was entered,
there was no first jeopardy.
Cinco v Sandiganbayan
202 SCRA 726

FACTS:

Fredeswinda P. Balana lodge a letter-complaint with the Office of the Tanodbayan (now of the
Special Prosecutor) against Cirilo A. Cinco, et al. Cinco submitted his counter-affidavit on June
16, 1981, and supplemental counter-affidavit on July 16, 1981. Balana filed another letter-
complaint against Cinco and Amaro, which she put under oath before Prosecutor Ricardo A.
Buenviaje who also certified in writing that he personally examined the affiant and that he was
satisfied she voluntarily executed and understood the letter-complaint. The accused filed a motion
to quash on May 17, 1988, praying that the said informations be dismissed for lack of authority on
the part of Tanodbayan Gonzales or his prosecutor to file them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused’s right against double jeopardy is violated.

RULING:
No. Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in jeopardy of being charged with
informations or crimes other than the crime imputed in the dismissed cases is baseless. There could
be no double jeopardy for the simple reason that they have not year pleaded to the offense. Beside,
a preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double jeopardy attaches. We ruled in Tandoc
v. Resultan (G. R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43) that: a Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and it is often that only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complain or information. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
therefor, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
People v Vergara
221 SCRA 560

FACTS:
On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal
Cases 7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., et al for allegedly
conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado
Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon which would
have caused his death and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo
which would have caused her death.

On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., et. al were arraigned and pleaded "not guilty." When the
cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly
moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the accused
for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later
resolved in their favor. On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the
Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice.

Pending appeal to the DOJ, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on
the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real
aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9 February 1989, acting on the
motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal
of Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered
the Provincial Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new Informations
for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito
A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573). On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the
new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was
opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial court granted the
motion and dismissed Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10
July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado
and Teresa Rubite filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused placed in double jeopardy.

RULING:
Yes. The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a
crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The requisites which must concur
for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. Simply,
there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the
original Informations.
Navallo v Sandiganbayan
234 SCRA 175

FACTS:
Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational
School at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees,
preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections
exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds was
filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found.

On 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the
Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by
public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo
was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail
bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the
prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan.

Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking
cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held
otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's
arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC
Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending
(1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and
(2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him
before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However, this was denied and trial
ensued and he was found guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-petitioner’s plead of double jeopardy is valid.

HELD:
No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.

There is no jeopardy where the court had no jurisdiction. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid
of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been
conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction
or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
Galvez v CA
237 SCRA 685

FACTS:
Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and Godofredo
Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

Respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original

informations before petitioners could be arraigned which was granted by Judge Villajuan and the
cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners
before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of
petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order
was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original informations, and setting the arraignment
of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended
and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos
which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the
ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

RULING:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet
been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they
could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality,
the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the
filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional
offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for
the instant petition.

Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of
the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They
would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the
capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was
shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended
informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a
capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion
under either an amended or a new information.

The absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of
the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite
absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains
its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases
is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed
the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”
Cunanan v Arceo

Facts:

On 5 April 1991, information for Murder was filed against petitioner Ferdinand Cunanan before
Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San Fernando, Pampanga. The Information alleged that
petitioner was a member of the Philippine National Police; it contained no averment that he had
committed the offense charged in relation to his public office. On 11 March 1994, the Supreme Court
promulgated its En Banc Decision in Republic v. Hon. Asuncion, et a1., which laid down the rule that the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or more or a fine of P6,000.00.

In an Order dated 21 April 1994, Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the evidence adduced
during the trial, petitioner had committed the offense charged while in the performance of his official
functions. He then held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try this case and that, accordingly, any
decision it may render thereon would be null and void. Judge Arceo dismissed the Criminal Case "for
refiling with the Sandiganbayan," pursuant to the Asuncion ruling

Petitioner continues, the Asuncion ruling is inapplicable to the present case, since here trial had
already ended and the case was already submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling was
promulgated. A transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late stage will, accordingly, expose him
(petitioner) to double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Issue:
 Whether or not the transferring of the case of the accused appellant from the RTC to
Sandiganbayan will expose him to double jeopardy

Ruling:

No. The defense of double jeopardy does not become available to petitioner upon transfer of his
case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy by the
commencement and trial of Criminal Case because the RTC was not a court of competent jurisdiction to
try the case in the first place. Consequently, upon the commencement of this case before the
Sandiganbayan petitioner will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense of
murder. By the same token, the dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did
not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The "dismissal" (later deleted by the RTC) had
simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having
ascertained that it had no jurisdiction to try the case at all.

Since the offense with which petitioner Cunanan is charged falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and that the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga had no
jurisdiction over that offense.

People v Tampal

Facts:

LUIS TAMPAL, DOMINGO PADUMON, ARSENIO PADUMON, SAMUEL PADUMON, PABLITO SUCO,
DARIO SUCO and GALVINO CADLING were charged with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and
Multiple Physical Serious Injuries." Only private respondents Luis Tampal, Samuel Padumon, Arsenio
Padumon and Domingo Padumon, were arrested. The others remained at large.

Upon arraignment, the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The case
was set for hearing. On said date, however, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero mover for
postponement on the ground that he failed to contact his material witnesses. The case was reset
without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on but the prosecutor was not
present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed
the criminal case for failure to prosecute.

The prosecution moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal claiming, inter alia, that the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office was closed on said date. The date was legal holiday for Muslims, the same
being the birthday of Prophet Mohammad SAW. Despite the explanation, the motion for
reconsideration was denied by the respondent judge. And the judge order the dismissal of the case.
Private respondents invoked their rights against double jeopardy

Issue:

Whether or not there was double jeopardy when their case was dismissed due to failure to
prosecute

Ruling:
 No. Private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. The three (3)
requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same
offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. The held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It
must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the
private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State, postponement sought did not
constitute unreasonable delay. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against
double jeopardy.

People v Montesa

Facts:

On January 10, 1991, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, accused spouses
Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz , conspired to prepare a document denominated as "Kasulatan ng
Kaloobpala" making it appear therein that the same was executed and signed by the spouses Cenon
Constantino and Sotera de la Cruz and that said persons personally appeared before Notary Public
Santiago L. Lindayag and acknowledged the same to be their own free act and deed, when in truth and
in fact, as said accused well knew, said document was neither executed and signed by the
aforementioned Cenon Constantino and Sotera de la Cruz, nor did they ever appear before the above
named notary public for the purpose of acknowledging the same as said spouses were already dead at
the time of the alleged execution of said document. Accused spouses were charged with the offense of
Falsification of Public Document.

The trial court issued an order dismissing of the accused case on the basis of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rutor’s resolution for the reason of the absence of a clear and convincing proof to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The resolution of Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case however never became final, for it was not
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. Accused appellants
now contend that, reopening of the case after being dismissed will be tantamount to double jeopardy.

Issue:

Whether or not the reopening of the case of the accused appellants will cause them to suffer
double jeopardy

Rulng:

No. It must be observed that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's
recommendation to dismiss the case on the ground of want of probable cause because of the
"admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused spouses had no participation in the preparation of
the questioned document, he still ordered the arraignment of the private respondents. He seemed to
have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the private respondents. Presumably, he
thought that the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would
forever foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case.

For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to present its evidence and prove
its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge dismissing the accused’s case is null and void. We
thus set it aside and order the reinstatement of the information. Thus reopening of the case will not
cause double jeopardy, for in the first place, its dismissal was null and void. One of the valid requisites
for defense of double jeopardy is that the 1st jeopardy must have been terminated and in this case it was
not so.

De La Rosa v CA

Facts:

On October 22, 1991, nine (9) separate informations were filed against petitioner ROMULO
DELA ROSA, charging the latter with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54, upon complaint of private respondent BENJAMIN MAGTOTO. During the arraignment on
June 10, 1992. Petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.

On November 17, 1992, counsel for private respondent, in open court, moved for the
postponement of the trial set on that date on the ground that private respondent had doubts as to his
inability to bring out the details of the transaction. Petitioner objected to the postponement and
invoked his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Consequently, the trial court dismissed all the nine
cases against petitioner in its questioned order dated November 17, 1992, Aggrieved, private
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a Decision setting aside the two orders of
the trial court and reinstating the cases.

Petitioner contends that since the dismissal of the cases against him by the trial court was based
on his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same would place him
in double jeopardy

Issue:

Whether or not reinstatement of the case of the accused appellant will place him under double
jeopardy

Ruling:

No. Double jeopardy does not apply in the instant case. The requisites that must occur for legal
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking. The
dismissal of the cases was upon the motion of petitioner. When the dismissal is made at the instance of
the accused, there is no double jeopardy

In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court was therefore
proper since it was brought in his own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. That the
said proceedings benefited the People is not a reversible error. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of
discretion. There being no violation of the double jeopardy doctrine, the prosecution of the case may
still resume in the trial court, as decided by the Court of Appeals

People v Leviste

Facts:

An Information for libel was filed against private respondent Arnulfo C. Talisic in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for causing to be published in Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines based in Cebu City an article saying that the offended party DEMOCRITO T.
MENDOZA, a well-known labor leader in Cebu was portrayed to be a land grabber having grabbed Silot
Bay and caused the same to be titled in his name and of his children

On May 3, 1991, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. On July 29, 1991, the day of
the scheduled hearing, private prosecutor manifested in open court that he had filed an urgent motion
for postponement, and moved for the cancellation of hearing for that day due to the unavailability of
the prosecution witness. On July 26, 1991, private respondent, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense. The RTC then dismissed
the case

Private respondent contends that the dismissal of the case was based on the right of the
accused to speedy trial as the prosecution was not ready and could not present any other witness on the
day set for hearing. He further avers that a reopening of the case will place him in double jeopardy as
the dismissal was without his express consent.

Issue:

Whether or not the reversal of the trial courts assailed Orders place the accused in double jeopardy

Ruling:

NO. Anent private respondents claim that a reopening of the case would place him in double
jeopardy, this Court previously ruled in Tampal that: The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1)
a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first. Legal jeopardy
attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when
a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused (private
respondent) through his motion to dismiss; such dismissals made at the instance of the accused will not
constitute double jeopardy. Petitioner, also, cannot invoke his right against double jeopardy because his
right to a speedy trial has not been violated by the State.

People v Cawaling

Facts:

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the
Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon the said accused LYSSES M. CAWALING,
ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO which were policemen,
conspired and mutually helped one another, shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting
upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death. The RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

Seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right against double
jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before
the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) which is a military commission, which was allegedly
dismissed after several hearings had been conducted

Issue:

Whether or not after acquittal in the military court and then tried in the RTC will constitute
double jeopardy

Ruling:

Yes. However, in the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and
conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military commission,
or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely offered as evidence
certain disposition forms and a letter, dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against
Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed. No charge sheet
and record of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy. As pointed out by the
solicitor general, appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate
Generals Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered. Thus there was
no double jeopardy.

The requisites for double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before another one;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as
that in the first while the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) it was filed before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) valid plea has been filed; and (e) when the charged
individual was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
consent.

Cudia v CA

Facts:

On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga, allegedly for possessing an
unlicensed revolver. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of
prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, Upon his
arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-
trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner
had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing
arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes
committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to
criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city.

On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information
charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11987. On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987
on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed
despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. Both RTC and CA denied his motion.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of second information for the same offense which was dismissed
already would violate the accused right on double jeaopardy

Ruling:

No. The first information was filed in the RTC of Angeles City but jurisdiction was with the RTC of
Pampanga inasmuch as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Accordingly, when it
becomes manifest before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the first charge shall be dismissed to pave the way for the filing of the proper offense. The dismissal of
the first case will not give rise to double jeopardy

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in
form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the
dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed
by the prosecution.

Tecson v Sandiganbayan

Facts:

In the last week of September 1989, upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to
engage in an investment business. They would sell tickets at P100.00 each which after 30 days would
earn P200.00 or more. On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with
the instructions of Tecson. In the session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on
October 17, 1989 presided over by Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the business permit
at the instance of the Provincial Director of the Department of Trade and Industry. With the revocation
of her business permit, private complainant below filed an administrative case against petitioner, for
violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code)
with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The complaint was referred to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur for appropriate action. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
dismissed the administrative case.

Unsatisfied, a complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." It was subsequently referred to the
Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction.

Petitioner contends that being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional
protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already
cleared him of all charges.

Issue:

Whether or not being tried before the Sandiganbayan after Sangguniang Panlalawigan dismissed
the administrative case.

Ruling:

No. Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution provides: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3)
after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case. It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but
administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.

Dimatulac v Villon

Facts:
 On or about November 2, 2005 all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago Yabut
went to the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of the accused positioned themselves around the
house while the others stood by the truck and the mayor stayed in the truck with the body guard.
Accused BillyYAbut, Kati YAbut & Franncisco Yambao went inside the house strongly suggested to go
down to see the mayor outside and ask for sorry. As Dimatulac went down to the house was shot and
died. The assistant prosecutor Alfonso Flores found that the Yabut’s were in company with one another
that the offense committed was only homicide not murder and hereby subject to bail P 20,000.00 for
each of the accused.

The herein petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso Flores to the Secretary of Justice.
Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the case for arraignment.

The YABUTs opposed petitioner's Manifestation and Motion because they had already been
arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor — not the
private prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not an appeal on the DOJ after arraignment constitutes double jeopardy

Ruling:

No. It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

It was certainly grave error for the DOJ holding that murder was committed and directing the
Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information that
the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and
supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga. The
DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the
shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully
serve the ends of justice.

People v Maquiling

Facts:

That on or about June 3, 1988, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, the said accused Casan
Maquiling, armed with a deadly weapon, to wit[,] a cal. 45 pistol, by means of treachery and abuse of
superior strength, and with intent to kill, shoot and wound one Frederick Pacasum, thereby inflicting
upon him the following physical injuries. The trial court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 5 rendered its
Decision convicting private respondent of homicide and serious physical injuries. The CA however
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 5 ACQUITTING the accused
of the crimes charged.

Through the solicitor general, Petitioner People of the Philippines brings before this Court a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 65-page March 24,
1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioner prays that the Decision be annulled and the case
remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 5, so that the latter can effect the
entry of its judgment convicting herein Respondent Casan Maquiling of homicide and serious physical
injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not the appeal of the State of a judgment of acquittal constitutes double jeaopardy

Ruling:

Yes. The rule on double jeopardy prohibits the State from appealing or filing a petition for
review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. Certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the
lower court. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an information or a complaint is
purely capricious or devoid of reason, or when there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be
heard. The petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of
the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is
tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of
the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.

In dismissing this petition for certiorari, this Court is not ruling on the guilt or the innocence of
Private Respondent Maquiling. Neither is it agreeing with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
accused is innocent. Such conclusions are rendered only in an appeal properly brought before this Court.
But as already stated, an appeal or a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal is barred by the rule
on double jeopardy.

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN

302 SCRA 424, G.R. Nos. 107964-66
February 1, 1999

Facts: On January 9, 1992, three criminal information for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed against
private respondent Imelda R. Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. Petitioners
filed motions for the consolidation of the three information with the 21 other remaining cases
pending before the RTC.
The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that ͞the indictable acts under the three information
form part of and is related to the transaction complained.͟ RTC granted the consolidation and the
3 information were re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided public respondent
Judge Nitafan. Without any motion from the accused, Judge Nitafan issued an order requiring
petitioners to show because why the cases should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates
Marcos’ right against ex post facto law and the two other information on the ground that private
respondent’s right against double jeopardy was violated. On August 7, 1992, respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the 1st criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law and also
dismissed the two remaining criminal cases on the ground of violation of private respondent’s
right against double jeopardy. Prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether a judge can invoke double jeopardy?
Held: No. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same
is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the
concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached
nor any such jeopardy terminated.
Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
JEJOMAR C. BINAY vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
316 SCRA 65, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, G.R. No. 128136
October 1, 1999

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate information
against petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code (Illegal Use of Public Funds), and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (giving
undue favor to private parties). The information alleged that the acts constituting these crimes
were committed in 1987 during petitioner’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality
of Metro Manila. Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the cases
filed against him.
Issue: W/N there can be double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had
no jurisdiction.
Ruling: No. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double
jeopardy even though they had already pleaded “not guilty” to the information earlier filed in the
RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that
had no jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the
information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. Their remedy was
to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
LITO LIMPANGOG and JERRY LIMPANGOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
319 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 134229
November 26, 1999

Facts: Limpangog was charged with three Informations, one for murder and two for frustrated
murder. He pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. He, along with some other petitioners,
were found guilty by the trial court. When the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the
said case was dismissed because the CA had no jurisdiction over an appeal of a trial court
judgment imposing an indeterminate sentence of reclusion perpetua. The CA also dismissed the
trial court’s decision for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to their guilt. When the case
was later appealed to the Supreme Court, Limpangog contends that his right against double
jeopardy was violated.
Issue: W/N petitioners can invoke double jeopardy.
Ruling: No. Petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy because they were never legally in danger
of conviction by the Court of Appeals. The CA acted without jurisdiction in resolving the appeal
of the conviction for frustrated murder and dismissing the murder case. Hence, the CA’s acquittal
of the petitioners on charges of frustrated murder is void. We hasten to add that, with the voiding
of the CA Decision and the review by this Court of the RTC judgment, petitioners cannot claim
double jeopardy, because they were never legally in danger of conviction by the Court of Appeals.
JOAN M. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. JOVEN
394 SCRA 339, G.R. No. 129874
December 27, 2002

Facts: Petitioner filed a criminal complaint criminal complaint for Rape against respondent
Emmanuel Navarro and nine other persons as principals by direct participation. After preliminary
investigation, information was filed with the trial court, accusing Navarro and his other co-
accused of the crime of Rape.
Before arraignment, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does
not sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Art. 335 of the RPC. The trial
court thereafter issued an order dated October 23, 1996 re-setting the arraignment as the
prosecution intends to file several other cases of rape against the accused.
An Amended information for Rape was filed against Navarro as the principal accused. Likewise,
similar information for rape were filed against each of the other accused, the only difference
being that the accusatory portion of each information individually named each of them as
principal in committing the crime of Rape while the other co-accused held the victim and stood
as guard.
Respondent Navarro then filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information. The trial Court
issued the assailed order granting the Motion to Quash, finding that Navarro was not one of those
identified by petitioner to have abused her and that the Information failed to show his particular
participation in the crime. Navarro was not released from detention as there are other cases
against him that were still pending.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied the same. Hence, through
her private prosecutors, petitioner filed an action for certiorari. Navarro’s other co-accused were
arraigned and pleaded n ͞ ot guilty͟ and trial commenced as regards their respective cases.
Thereafter, Navarro escaped for detention and has remained at large.
Before prosecution could present evidence it filed a motion to withdraw respective information
against six principal accused for insufficiency of evidence but remained as co-accused in the cases
against Navarro and two others. The Court gave due course to herein petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Issue: W/N double jeopardy may be invoked.
Ruling: No, double jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be present for double
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted
or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The third
requisite is not present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro has not been arraigned.
JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
486 SCRA 377, G.R. No. 158763
March 31, 2006

Facts: March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela.
September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested. April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn confession
and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03 Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a certain Boyet dela Cruz
and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the death of Vicente Buazon and Elizar Tualiao.
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying said urgent
motion on the ground that, since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the Court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of the State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory.
Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy.
Ruling: None. The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.
JOCELYN E. CABO vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
491 SCRA 264, G.R. No. 169509
June 16, 2006

Facts: Cabo was charged with violation of RA 3019 for allegedly bribing her co-accused. She
claimed to have been deprived of due process, so the Sandiganbayan (SB) ordered for
reinvestigation of her case. While the investigation was ongoing, she filed for a motion to travel
abroad. This was granted by the SB in exchange for her ͞conditional arraignment͟, in which case
she pleaded not guilty. One of the conditions of her arraignment was that, if the complaint was
amended, she automatically waived her right to object the amendment and her right against
double jeopardy. Her arraignment was set on another date, and for this, she filed another motion
reiterating her previous plea.
Meanwhile, her co-accused, Municipal Mayor Balahay moved to quash the information on the
ground that the facts did not constitute the crime charged. The SB did not grant his motion, but
ordered the amendment of the original complaint, of which the prosecution subsequently
complied with. Cabo thus filed for a motion to cancel her second arraignment, on the ground that
the amendment was done after she had entered her plea, and that since she had already
reiterated her plea of not guilty, double jeopardy had already attached.
Issue: W/N there was double jeopardy.
Ruling: None. With or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the principle of double
jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. It is elementary that for double
jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the
instant case, the original information to which petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty” was
neither valid nor sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was also neither
dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach even if petitioner is
assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the original charge.
BENJAMIN (“KOKOY”) T. ROMUALDEZ vs. HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO
497 SCRA 89, G.R. Nos. 165510-33
July 28, 2006

Facts: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive
the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and
thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus,
this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal
Case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case
does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in
1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines
from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and
RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint
with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses
of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish
Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When
Prescription shall begin to run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when
the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in
the negative, should be applied.
Issue: W/N an order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy precludes the filing of another information for a crime constituting
the same facts
Ruling: No. An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime
constituting the same facts. There must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information
in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it
was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained,
its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority
to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in petitioner’s
subsequent prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH TERRADO
558 SCRA 84, G.R. No. 148226
July 14, 2008

Facts: Accused Joseph Terrado was charged with Carnapping under Republic Act 6538, otherwise
known as the ͞Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.͟ According to the Information, the accused carted
away a motorized tricycle after threatening the driver with a fan knife. The accused was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The defense claimed that the accused merely borrowed the tricycle from its driver Dalmacio.
However, when accused was about to return the same, he hit a stone, lost control of the tricycle
and bumped a tree. Three persons came and helped him bring the tricycle back to the roadside.
The accused returned the tricycle at around 11:00 pm of the same day to the Spouses Garcia,
owners of the tricycle. The defense did not deny that the tricycle, when returned, was damaged
and, in fact, the accused voluntarily paid the amount of P8,000.00 as partial remuneration for the
repair of the tricycle.
The trial court acquitted accused Terrado for failure of the prosecution to establish intent to take
the tricycle and intent to gain from the same. Thus, the court held that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied. Aggrieved, the
complainants come to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
decision
Issue: W/N there was double jeopardy
Ruling: Yes. In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous
acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However, and more serious than the procedural infraction, if the petition merely
calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, we would run afoul of the
constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the
petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed by the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy behind the principle is to afford
the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and to safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO ZUÑO, State
Prosecutor GERONIMO SY and Prosecution Attorney IRWIN MARAYA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
626 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 161083
August 3, 2010

Facts: On May 14, 2001, a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products
Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware).
The BFP found the following accused of destructive arson before the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor, namely: Samson Cua Ting, alias Ding Jian Zhi, External Vice-President; Wilson Cua
Ting, Plant Manager; Edward Ngo Yao (Yao), President of New Marketing Corporation; Willy So
Tan, alias Chen Yi Ming, Vice-President for Operations; Carol Fernan Ortega, Assistant to the
External Vice-President; and John Doe and Peter Doe.
In support of the accusation, petitioner submitted the Sworn Statements of Richard Madrideo,
Jaime Kalaw, Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua Reyes, Shanda Amistad, SPO1 Valeriano
Dizon and Inspector Allan N. Barredo.
In their defense, respondents submitted a Counter-Affidavit to refute the allegations made
against them. Prior to the arraignment of respondents and before warrants of arrest could be
issued, respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of Probable Cause.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case. The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing
the case, because of its observation that the sworn statements submitted by petitioner and
respondents contained contradictory positions.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the
RTC. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA denied. Petitioner then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution. Hence,
this instant petition, with petitioner raising the following ground for this Court’s consideration.
Issue: W/N double jeopardy may be invoked.
Ruling: No. In any case, the dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner from
availing of any other action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy cannot
be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that
the case was dismissed. Moreover, while the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the case, the same does not result in the
acquittal of the said accused.

NB: Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

751 SCRA 675, G.R. No. 183652
February 25, 2015

Facts: Oporto, Carampatana, and Alquizola were found guilty by the RTC of the crime of rape.
When the accused appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, they were acquitted of the crime
charged on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Alquizola’s liability was also reduced to that of a mere accomplice. Feeling
aggrieved, AAA appealed the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the CA acted with
grave abuse of discretion in acquitting and reversing the RTC ruling.
Issue: W/N the appellate decision of acquittal is null and void for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, an exception to the principle
of double jeopardy.
Ruling: Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the
Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and
furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana
sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even
admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of
any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of
rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed
from the decision of the trial court, he waived the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the accused-appellant.
Bulaong vs People

On May 31, 1956 Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna with the crime of rebellion. Trial did not proceed with respect to Agaton Bulaong until
1958 for he was then at large. Meanwhile Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic
Act 1700) which took effect on June 20, 1957.

On September 12, 1958, Agaton Bulaong was arrested.

On October 1, 1958 the information for rebellion filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna
was amended
On the same date another information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila
charging Agaton Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
Act.

The case for subversion is still pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila; while the case
for rebellion has already been decided by the Court of First Instance of Laguna adversely
against the accused. Accused contends that rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code is a lesser cognate offense to that defined in Section 4 of Republic Act 1700. And
he further contends that since the facts alleged in the informations for rebellion and subversion
are the same he can not be legally prosecuted for both offenses without being placed twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the same acts.

Issue: W/N accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double jeopardy.
Ruling: No.

The defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either convicted
or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent.

Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has not been convicted or acquitted in the
case filed in the Court of First Instance against him for subversion. Neither was the said case
dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as stated, it is still pending in said court.
Needless to say, it is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the
case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.

————————
Rebellion
The accused above named, ... did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously join the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CCP) and the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB), otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS),
the latter being the military arms of the former, whose aims and purposes are to remove people and territory of the
Republic of the Philippines and to overthrow it eventually by the use of force and arms, as in fact said accused
together with other officers and members of said organization have risen publicly and taken up arms, making armed
raids, ambuscades and attacks upon the Philippine Constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Police Forces
and other military detachments of the government, said accused AGATON BULAONG alias Ka Era being then an
organizer and leader.
Subversion
That in or about the month of July, 1957, and for the time subsequent thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
the place which he had chosen as the nerve center of all his activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the said
accused, knowingly and by overt acts, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully become an officer and/or a ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and its Military Arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan
(HMB) formerly known as Hukbalahaps, which organizations have aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines by means of force and which organizations have been outlawed and declared illegal and
continued and remained an officer and/or a ranking leader of said organizations until his arrest in or about
September, 1958, without having renounced his membership therein, as in fact that the said accused together with
other officers, members and affiliates of said outlawed and illegal organizations have taken arms against the
Government of the Philippine Republic, by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks against and
upon the Philippine Constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines and local police forces.
Bustamante vs Maceren

The petitioner was accused of murder. Upon arraignment on December 14, 1970, petitioner
entered a plea of guilty, and was later sentenced by the trial court to serve 1 year imprisonment.
On the very same day, the judgment was promulgated to the petitioner, who thereupon made an
express waiver of his right to appeal. Accordingly, the Hon. Coquia, who rendered the aforesaid
judgment, issued a commitment order addressed to the Provincial Warden of Laguna who
acknowledged receipt of the body of the Petitioner, who forthwith started serving his sentence of
imprisonment on that date.

Three days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna filed a motion for Modification of Penalty and
upon receipt of said motion, counsel for the petitioner on the same day filed a Motion for
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Commitment. In view of the motion of accused, the
motion of the prosecution has become moot and academic and the motion filed by the accused
is hereby granted and the judgment in this case is hereby set aside and the case shall be tried
on the merit on January 18, 1970.

The case against petitioner was reassigned to the sala presided over by the Honorable
Maceren, and after petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, said judge held a new hearing of the
case and rendered a new judgment against petitioner sentencing him to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum;
Considering that the accused is now serving under preventive imprisonment, he shall be
credited for the period of his preventive imprisonment

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision, in which motion petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court to try his case anew after he had fully served the
judgment rendered by Judge Coquia. Petitioner, in said motion, argued that the judgment of
December 14, 1970 against him had already become final when he started serving his sentence
thereunder and that therefore, the Court thereafter lost jurisdiction over his case; and that no
amount of waiver or consent on his part could bestow on said court jurisdiction that it had
already lost.

Issue: W/N accused is entitled to interpose the defense of double jeopardy

Ruling: Yes.

With the judgment of conviction not only promulgated but actually carried out with petitioner
having started to serve his sentence, no such order re-opening the case should have been
issued by Judge Coquia. That was not in accordance with the controlling doctrine on the
constitutional right against being twice put in jeopardy.

It is true that petitioner had in fact contributed to bringing about such judicial deviation from the
correct norm. That did not forfeit though, his right to a remedy to which he is entitled. There
should not have been any approval of such a move. The Constitution does not countenance
such a step. Nonetheless while observations partaking of a critical nature should not be instilled
they should be muted. What did transpire could have been due to sheer inadvertence caused by
a crowded docket. Even if the order could be looked upon as resulting from the clarity of vision
being dimmed or a diminution in one's grasp of authoritative precedents, such afflictions at
times bother even the most diligent and conscientious occupants of the bench. At any rate, what
cannot be denied is that petitioner, as mentioned at the outset, is entitled to his remedy.
People vs Obsania

Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta,
filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, alleging
that on or about the 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon,
particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan, municipality of Balungao, Province of
Pangasinan, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on
the roadside in the ricefields at the above-mentioned place while she was alone on her way to
barrio San Raymundo.

After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further
proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused,
embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense
was committed "with lewd designs".

The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege
"lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd
designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court granted the motion and ordered
dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to
allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court
jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.

Issue: W/N the present appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy
Ruling: No.

An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby
be placed in double jeopardy.
This Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the
express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no
double jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the
fiscal.

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he
thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgement
of conviction against him.

Rivera vs People

On December 16, 1988, petitioner Marcelino G. Rivera, Jr. was arrested and detained for he
allegedly was about to transport marijuana to Manila. Consequently, a case for violation of
Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425 was filed against him with the RTC presided over by respondent
Judge Bautista. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On April 5, 1989, the first witness for the prosecution Cpl. Victorio Afalla partially testified on
direct examination and reserved the right to identify the marijuana specimen allegedly
confiscated from the petitioner. The hearing was thus re-set to May 3, 1989 and June 6, 1989.
But due to the absence of any prosecution witness despite notice and the non-availability of the
allegedly confiscated marijuana specimen, the hearings set for May 3, 1989 and June 6, 1989
were postponed to June 8, 1989. On June 8, 1989, for the same reasons, the hearing was re-
set to February 27, 1990

On February 27, 1990, Capt. Lina Sarmiento, the Forensic Chemist who will present the
marijuana specimen, despite notice failed to appear. Petitioner through counsel then moved for
the dismissal of the case. This was denied by respondent Judge and the hearing was re-set to
March 28, 1990.

On March 28, 1990, when the case was called, Capt. Lina Sarmiento despite notice, was not
around thereby necessitating a second call. When the case was called for the second time,
Capt. Sarmiento was still not around. Hence, Atty. Tomas Gorospe, in behalf of petitioner orally
moved for the dismissal of the case invoking the right to speedy trial as the petitioner stands
confined and that the Government failed to prosecute or adduce evidence due to the non-
appearance of a vital prosecution witness. The respondent Judge verbally granted the motion
and ordered the immediate release of the accused.

While the subsequent calendared cases set for that day was in progress, and in less than an
hour after pronouncement of the verbal order of dismissal, Capt. Lina Sarmiento arrived direct
from Quezon City. Upon a satisfactory explanation, the respondent Judge issued his now
assailed Order setting aside his previous verbal order of dismissal and re-scheduling the Case
for continuation of trial.

Alleging that the verbal order of dismissal made in open court amounted to the acquittal of
petitioner and which order is immediately final and executory, the respondent Judge could no
longer set it aside without violating petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue: W/N the Judge could set the order aside without violating petitioner’s constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
Ruling: No.

Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of dismissal
issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on
the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a judgment of
acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order is also immediately executory. However, this
order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules
of Court. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by
the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to
writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so
that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order, now in
writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case."
Dizon-Pamintuan vs People

The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner with the violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law in that on or about and during the period from February 12, to February 24,
1988, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain for herself
or for another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in her
possession and/or sell or dispose of the following jewelries, to wit: one (1) set of earrings, a ring
studded with diamonds in a triangular style, one (1) set of earrings (diamond studded) and one
(1) diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at P105,000.00, which she knew or should have
known to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by Joselito
Sacdalan Salinas against the owner Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion.

The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals which found that the trial
court did not commit any reversible error, its decision dated October 26, 1990 convincing
accused appellant is hereby affirmed with the modification that the penalty imposed is SET
ASIDE and the RTC of Manila is ordered to receive evidence with respect to the correct
valuation of the properties involved in this case for the sole purpose of determining the proper
penalty to be meted out against accused. Let the original records be remanded immediately.

Accused asserted that Court of Appleas erred in remanding the case to the Court a quo for
reception of evidence for the purpose of dtermining the correct penalty to be imposed.

Issue: W/N remand of a case for further reception of evidence would not place an accused in
double jeopardy.
Ruling: No.

We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand for further reception of
evidence would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first
jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first. Such a concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was
remanded to the trial court.

Comelec vs CA

Petitioner Sixto B. dela Victoria was a candidate for the special elections for Mayor of Albuera,
Leyte. He lost the mayoralty election to Genoveva Mesina, who belonged to the same political
party as respondent Camilo J. Locsin's, the duly elected Congressman of the Fourth District of
Leyte.

An information was filed by the Comelec before the RTC, charging respondent Locsin with
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent Locsin was accused of intimidating the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Albuera, Leyte during the canvassing of
election returns in said province and preventing them from performing their functions and duties.
When arraigned, respondent Locsin entered a plea of not guilty and trial commenced
accordingly.

After the prosecution had rested its case, respondent Locsin filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
claiming that the prosecution failed to adduce the sufficient evidence to prove his guilt. The trial
court denied the demurrer and calendared the reception of evidence for respondent Locsin.

Respondent Locsin, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying
his demurrer to evidence, filed with the Court of Appeals to set aside the Order of the trial court.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari, dismissing the Criminal Case and the
Order issued by the respondent Judge is ANNULLED.

The instant petition was filed by petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals in granting the petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N the filing of the instant petition puts respondent Locsin in double jeopardy.
Ruling: Yes.

The granting of the demurrer to evidence by the court produces a different effect
altogether. The case is ordered dismissed, and the order of dismissal is equivalent to an
acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal, as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy.

We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the
dismissal of the case, this cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double
jeopardy.
People vs Bans

Acting upon an information that private respondent Vicente Magsaysay was keeping assorted
unlicensed firearms and ammunitions including radio equipment in his residence, as well as the
reported presence in the same residence of some rebel officers, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), applied for a search warrant with Hon. Judge Nicias Mendoza.
Finding existence of probable cause, Judge Mendoza issued a search warrant and on the same
day, the AFP and the Metrodiscom conducted a search of the Magsaysay residence in the
presence of private respondent which yielded the following unlicensed firearms.

An information against herein private respondents, brothers Vicente and Gil Magsaysay, for
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) was filed.

Upon arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. After the prosecution
rested its case, private respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging failure on the part of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the ground that since the
search warrant and the order to break open six vaults were illegally issued, the firearm and
ammunitions seized in compliance therewith are inadmissible in evidence. Respondent judge
granted the Demurrer to Evidence.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied on the ground that
any reconsideration will place private respondents in double jeopardy; the order granting the
demurrer having resulted in the acquittal of private respondents.

Issue: W/N the granting of the Motion for Reconsideration will place the respondents in double
jeopardy.
Ruling: Yes.

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the
Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal
of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy.

Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent
of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However,
this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a
speedy trial.

In the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence after a finding that the search warrant was illegally
issued. Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double
jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from
reviewing the order acquitting the accused.
State Prosecutors vs Muro
(Complicated beyond reasonable doubt, my apologies)

Respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the RTC of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State
Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct and violations of Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

1. Respondent judge issued an Order dismissing 11 cases filed by the undersigned

complainant prosecutors against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions.

2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports
concerning the announcement by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the
government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary
Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting
of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national
circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by
Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and,
therefore, motu, proprio had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;"

4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary
Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his
Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the
President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge
acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the
new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception,
as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of
Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice
purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had
announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal
is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice
thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as
required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental
precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of
the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the
Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into force and the
contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the basis
of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain
the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting
Grave Misconduct;

6. That respondent Judge did not even have the prudence of requiring first the comment of
the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on
the pending cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to
due process;

7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may
be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled
continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair
play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias
and partiality; and

8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting
for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order
suspect.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals
which found that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order of dismissal.
Issue: W/N the order of the respondent judge would have placed the accused in double
jeopardy.
Ruling: Yes.

It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of
double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the
consent of said accused.

This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings,
were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the
absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to
trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore
declared:

It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting
aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process
People vs. Bellaflor

Private respondent Reuben Albaño, was charged with the crime of arson before the RTC, then
presided by Judge Willelmo C. Fortun as assisting judge. Upon arraignment, private respondent
pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial ensued and the parties rested their case before Judge
Fortun.

It appears that on February 4, 1991, Judge Fortun was designated as Assisting Judge for the to
hold office in the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court in Manila. On March
13, 1991, respondent judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor was assigned as replacement of Judge Fortun
and assisting judge of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, wherein the criminal
case against private respondent was pending.

On May 3, 1991, Judge Fortun promulgated his decision, convicting private respondent of the
crime of arson. At the time of promulgation of Judge Fortun's decision, respondent judge was
already presiding as assisting judge. On May 9, 1991 private respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the said decision.

Respondent judge issued a resolution granting private respondent's motion for reconsideration
and acquitted the latter of the crime charged. In the same resolution, the decision rendered by
Judge Fortun was declared null and void for having been promulgated after said judge had
vacated his office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration of private respondent and acquitting the
latter. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the
offense charged has become final and executory and a reconsideration thereof would place him
under double jeopardy.

Issue: W/N private respondent’s reliance on the defense of double jeopardy is valid.
Ruling: No.
Private respondent's reliance on the defense of double jeopardy is misplaced.

In order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had
previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the
offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the
charge.

Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case
was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are only two instances where double
jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was dismissed with the express consent of
the accused. The first is where the ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for
the prosecution and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably
prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. None exists in the case at bar.

Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal case filed against
him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does not cover him.
Guerrero vs CA

An Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner
before the Court of First Instance, presided by Judge Manuel A. Argel.

The above-named accused being then the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, then in-charge of,
and has complete responsibility for, the maintenance and operation of said aircraft, without
taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid accidents or injuries to persons, and without
ascertaining as to whether the quantity of fuel in the tanks of said aircraft was sufficient for the
flight, did then and there operate, fly, pilot, maneuver and/or conduct the flight with 4
passengers on board, and while the said aircraft was already airborne after several minutes, the
engine quitted twice indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused to make an
emergency manner landing on a fishpond which he executed in a careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, and as a result of the improper execution of said emergency landing, the
aircraft's landing gear collided with a dike and trees near the fishpond, resulting to the fatal
injuries in 3 passengers which directly caused their deaths.

Petitioner entered his plea of "Not Guilty”. On August 19, 1975, the prosecution finally rested its
case. On February 7, 1978, the defense rested its case. The hearing was terminated and the
parties were ordered by Judge Argel to submit their respective memoranda. Judge Pardo who
took over as presiding judge, granted private prosecutor's omnibus motion to file memorandum
up to January 29, 1979. The case was subsequently assigned to Judge Alfredo Gorgonio who
apparently did not take action thereon.

The case was raffled to presiding Judge Aquino. Since the parties were not able to complete the
transcript of stenographic notes, the court ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the
witnesses. The private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals of the testimonies.
The presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses testimony. Petitioner contends that the re-
hearing (re-taking of testimonies) would place him in double jeopardy.

Issue: W/N re-taking of testimonies would put Petitioner in double jeopardy.

Ruling: No.
Anent petitioner's contention that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy, suffice it to
say that there has been no termination of the criminal prosecution -- i.e. of that "first jeopardy."
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur:

. . . It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt, to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (emphasis omitted).

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment: (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (emphasis omitted).

In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element --
dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused -- is not
present. Moreover, re-taking of testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second
jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond dispute that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is utterly
without basis.
258 SCRA 603
Amado B. Teodoro v. CA
FACTS:
The Metropolitan Trial Court found petitioner guilty of simple slander by deed and sentenced him
to pay a fine of P110.00. Petitioner appealed. It appears that the parties were required to file their
memoranda but petitioner filed instead a motion to withdraw his appeal and paid the fine of
P110.00 imposed in the judgment of the MTC. The RTC denied his motion. Petitioner filed a
petition for review, which the Court of Appeals dismissed. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the denial of petitioner’s motion for the withdrawal caused a double jeopardy
when petitioner already paid the fine.
HELD: No. In denying petitioner’s motion for the withdrawal of his appeal, the RTC did not
act with abuse of discretion. Because petitioner’s motion to withdraw his appeal had been
denied, his payment of the fine as imposed on the judgment of the MeTC did not render that
decision final and executory. Hence, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy by the decision
of the RTC on his appeal. Withdrawal of appeal is not a matter of right, but a matter which lies
in the sound discretion of the court and the appellate court.
Under the present rule the withdrawal of appeal may be allowed before judgment of the
case on appeal.— the parties in this case had been required to file their memoranda and the
memorandum of the prosecution had been filed and a copy served on appellant, it was too late for
petitioner to move for the withdrawal of the appeal. It was apparent that petitioner’s motion was
intended to frustrate a possible adverse decision on his appeal.

284 SCRA 173

Renato Cudia v. CA
FACTS:
Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City where a preliminary
investigation was conducted and as a result, the City Prosecutor filed an Information against
him. The case against him was raffled to Branch 60 of the RTC of Angeles City. Upon his
arraignment, the court called the attention of the parties and contrary to the information,
Renatio Cudia had committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus, the
judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court involving crimes committed outside
Angeles City. Consequently, it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudia
with the same crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which
resulted into two Information filed with the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to
file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information which the trial court granted. Renato filed
a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the ground that his
continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for
which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite
his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the first jeopardy did not attach because of the first
information filed against the accused was not valid.
HELD: No. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the
offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.
It is the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.
It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not,
the court does not acquire jurisdiction. In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient
complaint or information in the former prosecution. As the fiscal had no authority to file the
information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent
prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing
it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke
double jeopardy.

285 SCRA 595

Pp v. Roberto “Rambo” Lising, et al.
FACTS:
Conchise, 26 and Beebom, 22 were kidnapped and killed by herein accused. Cochise had just
graduated from the University of the Philippines with a degree of Bachelor of Laws and was
reviewing for the bar examinations, while Beebom was a graduating student at the College of Mass
Communications from the same university. Both excelled in academic and extra-curricular
activities. For the crimes for which they were charged and sentenced, appellants now are asking
the SC to give their case a second look, insisting on their innocence. RTC exonerated Manalili and
Garcia, while sentenced the rest with Slight Illegal Detention.

ISSUE: WON an appeal by the State constitute Double Jeopardy.

HELD: Yes. The decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the crime of
Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the crime of Slight Illegal Detention
does not escape the Court. There being conspiracy, all the accused should be equally guilty for
the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, the Court can no longer convict Manalili and Garcia for
Kidnapping in consonance with the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless,
they stand to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight
Illegal Detention should be qualified to Serious Illegal detention. The State is proscribed from
appealing a judgment of acquittal of some or all of the crimes already charged against the
accused in a case or filed in the same information.
GR. 125894 Dec. 11, 1998
Pp v. Narito Araneta
FACTS:
Joebert Araneta, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta, Marvin Deogluis, and Narito Araneta were
charged with the crimes of MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER for the death of Mansueto
Datoon, Jr. and the injury sustained by Hilario. Accused Narito Araneta posted a bond of
P40,000.00 and pled not guilty. The other accused, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta and Marvin
Deogluis, remain at large. The charges against Joebert Araneta, an active member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person. Trial court
convicted accused-appellant Narito Araneta but only for the crimes of homicide and frustrated
homicide. CA modified the decision of the trial court. It found the accused-appellant guilty of
murder in First Case and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua but acquitted him in Second Case.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy in this case.

HELD: No. Dismissal of accused-appellant's appeal at this stage will result in injustice. The
Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of homicide and sentencing him will become final.
The findings of the Court of Appeals that he should instead be convicted for murder and meted a
higher penalty and in the Second Case accused-appellant will be acquitted from the charge of
frustrated homicide as found by the Court of Appeals. To avoid this mockery of justice, we
resolved to continue exercising jurisdiction over 2nd Case. The acquittal of accused-appellant in
the Second Case however, can no longer be reviewed in view of the rule on double jeopardy
for the 1st and 2nd Case did not result from one information.

289 SCRA 159

Eduardo Cuison v. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Presiding Judge rendered a Joint Decision in two cases, rendering accused Eduardo
Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of
P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.’
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the
civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The case was remanded to RTC Pangasinan for
promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the
decision of the CA only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not
commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham
L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for
clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995,
the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision.

Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby declares that this Court
had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed
in the said trial court’s decision.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a
Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the following grounds:
1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4 April 1995 and therefore there is
nothing to promulgate anymore.
2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the accused’s constitutional right
against jeopardy.

ISSUE: WON the promulgation of the incomplete CA decision violated the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy.

HELD: No. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil
liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not
the criminal. As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was incomplete and
void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete
promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. The
Court emphasizes that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial
court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
GR. 128986 June 21, 1999
Pp v. CA and Casan Maquiling
FACTS:
Accused was convicted of physical injuries by the RTC. CA ruled he was innocent. An action for
certiorari filed by the Solicitor General now seeks to set aside Respondent Court’s Decision, for
having been allegedly rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The Office of the Solicitor General
raises a single issue: “Whether or not the Assailed Decision, of respondent court is void ab initio,
for having been rendered in denial of due process and with grave abuse of discretion.”
ISSUE: WON an appeal by the State will constitute Double Jeopardy.
HELD: Yes. The rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for
review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. It is rooted in the early
case U.S. v. Kepner, in which the United States Supreme Court, reviewing a Philippine Supreme
Court decision, declared that an appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would
place the defendant in double jeopardy. A denial of due process likewise results in a loss or lack
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an information or a
complaint is purely capricious or devoid of reason, or when there is lack of proper notice and
opportunity to be heard.

An appeal or a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal is barred by the rule on double
jeopardy.
GR. 135451 Sept. 30, 1999
Pp v. Danilo F. Serrano, Sr.
FACTS:
The Court, in the exercise of supervision over judges and court employees, has initiated this
action in consequence of the palpably erroneous ruling of Judge Pepe P. Domael of the RTC,
Naval, Biliran, allowing an appeal filed by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal. Maribel
D. Visbal filed a sworn complaint charging Danilo F. Serrano, Sr., with rape. At the arraignment,
accused Serrano pleaded not guilty. RTC rendered decision acquitting the accused on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Assistant Public Prosecutor Federico R. Huñamayor filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court from the decision acquitting the accused for being “contrary to the facts and the law. Judge
Pepe P. Domael, presiding judge issued an order giving due course to the appeal filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor. Consequently, the Clerk of RTC forwarded the original record of the case
to this Court.
ISSUE: WON an appeal by the State will constitute Double Jeopardy.
HELD: Yes. The rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal on the merits. —It is elementary that the rule against double jeopardy proscribes an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal on the merits. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and
a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in an appellate court, will put him a second
time in jeopardy for the same offense. The Constitution itself provides that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Such a constitutional guarantee prohibits an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal, and the law does not provide for exceptions other than
deprivation of due process or grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.

GR. 123307 Nov. 29, 1999

Samuel Barangan v. CA
FACTS:
The San Mateo Small Town MultiPurpose Cooperative (SMSTMC) was organized “to uplift the
economic condition of its members.” Undeterred, the officers of the SMSTMC lost no time in
organizing the Biyaya Foundation (BIYAYA) and had the Foundation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Apparently, the formation of the new corporation was a
mere subterfuge to perpetuate their illegal activity as it continued operating as a paluwagan(a
kind of money-lending scheme).

A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against BIYAYA’s Chairman Federico Castillo,
Vice-Chairman Samuel Barangan, and Board Members. The complaint alleged that these seven
(7) accused feloniously solicited investments from John Gatmen and despite repeated demands,
John Gatmen was never paid his investment and guaranteed profits. The trial court in both cases
acquitted Samuel Barangan, Efigenia Marquez, Federico Sison, Jr., and Rolando Remigio on
reasonable doubt. They were however ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount
of P43,000.00 to Leovino Jose.

ISSUE: WON an appeal by the State will constitute Double Jeopardy.

HELD: Yes. It difficult to fathom why the accused were acquitted considering that BIYAYA
could not have possibly undertaken the illegal transactions without the imprimatur of its officers
and board members. However, due to the constitutional mandate against double jeopardy, their
acquittal must stand. Petitioner Barangan cannot use the defense that since both parties were in
pari delicto they could have no action against each other. It is well to stress that the illegality is
attributable to the BIYAYA alone as there is no showing from the records that Jose was aware of
the illegality of their business operation or that it was prohibited by law. An appeal by the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in double jeopardy.

The assailed Decision of the CA is affirmed.

GR 127444 Sept. 13, 2000

Pp v. Hon. Tirso D. C. Velasco
FACTS:
Three criminal Informations—one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide—were
originally filed before the RTC Bulacan, against Hono-rato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and
Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the
charges were withdrawn, and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to
murder 1st Case and frustrated murder 2nd and 3rd Cases. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition,
with violation of PD 1866 4th Case for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence;
hence, a fourth Information had to be filed. After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue
of the cases was transferred to RTC Quezon City, Metro Manila. The acquittal of accused Honorato
Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this Court in a Petition for
Certiorari. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all
criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
HELD: No. Even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in
double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without
jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily
null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
The instant Petition for Certiorari, however, fails to show grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Rather, it effectively urges
this Court to re-evaluate the lower court’s appreciation of the evidence, which cannot be done by
certiorari. The doctrine that “double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial” may apply only
when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a sham” because the prosecution
representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The philosophy underlying the
rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is “part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction.”
GR. 127777 Oct. 1, 1999
Petronila C. Tupaz v. Hon. Benedicto B. Ulep
FACTS:
The case is a special civil action for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order
seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep of the RTC, Quezon City from trying the
Criminal Case and to nullify respondent judge’s order reviving the information therein against
petitioner, for violation of the Tax Code, as the offense charged has prescribed or would expose
petitioner to double jeopardy.
State Prosecutor Molon filed with the RTC, Quezon City, two (2) informations against
accused and her late husband, for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income
tax for the year 1979. Both accused posted bail bond for their provisional liberty. Accused filed
with the RTC a motion to dismiss/quash the 2nd information information for the reason that it
was exactly the same as the 1st information against the accused pending before RTC. The
prosecution filed with the RTC a motion for leave to file amended information. Petitioner
submits that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the
information in 1st Criminal because (a) the offense has prescribed; or (b) it exposes her to double
jeopardy.

ISSUE: WON double jeopardy is existing in the case.

HELD: Yes. Reinstatement of the information would expose petitioner to double jeopardy;
The reinstatement of the information would expose the petitioner to double jeopardy. An accused
is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted,
acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his
consent.
In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not
guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for
accused-petitioner’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be
expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity. As petitioner’s consent was not
expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-
filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating
the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against
double jeopardy.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ACELO VERRA G.R. No. 134732. May 29, 2002
FACTS:
People of the Philippines claims that it was denied its day in court and its due process right was
breached. Hence they filed this petition seeking to set aside the decision of the CA. Acelo Verra was
charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain Elias Cortezo hence a warrant of arrest was issued.
He voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court; he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution
called to the witness stand the wife of the victim, private complainant Damiana Cortezo, testifying that (1)
she has executed an affidavit of desistance; (2) she is no longer interested in prosecuting the case; and (3)
other witnesses of the shooting incident have turned hostile and have similarly lost concern in pursuing the
same. Thereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the accused, moved for the dismissal of the
case. The case was then dismissed and the warrant of arrest is canceled.

Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting incident appeared after learning of the dismissal
of the case and manifested their willingness to testify. Further, two sisters of the victim assailed the
allegation of lack of interest. The prosecution filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal asserting
that Damiana and the accused misled the trial court and deprived the plaintiff, People of the Philippines, its
day in court. For which reason, it argued, the Order dismissing the case should be voided. The trial court
set aside the Order of Dismissal and denied his motion for reconsideration; hence, he instituted a petition
in CA challenging said order. The CA granted the petition ruling that the dismissal of the case against
petitioner has attained finality, and that its revival requires the filing of a new case or information. Thus in
the case at bar, when the trial court issued its order of dismissal, as far as the court is concerned, the case
was ended. To revive the case against the same accused or to prosecute him anew for the same act imputed
to him, the government has to file a new case or information for the reason that the dismissed case had
already been terminated, definitely and finally.

ISSUE: WON reviving the case against the respondent would violate his Constitutional right against double
jeopardy?

HELD:
Yes. The petition is devoid of merit. The SC agrees with the respondent that doing so would violate
his Constitutional right against double jeopardy. In a long line of decisions, we have enumerated the
following requisites for double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. There are however two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss
the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
right to a speedy trial.
 In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited requisites present. First, there was a valid information,
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by
4th Assistant Provincial Fiscal Cesar M. Merin. Second, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Tacloban
City clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the respondent. Third, he was
arraigned in open court on May 24, 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de officio. Fourth, during the
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Finally, there was a valid termination of this case on the basis
of the trial judge's Order to Dismiss the case. While it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in
praying for its dismissal, double jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency
of evidence of the prosecution. In view of private complainant's desistance and her testimony that other
witnesses have turned hostile and are also no longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner clearly
lacks the evidence to support the charge. The petition is DISMISSED.
LETICIA R. MERCIALES vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO NUADA, PAT. EDWIN MORAL, ADONIS NIEVES, ERNESTO
LOBETE, DOMIL GRAGEDA, and RAMON "POL" FLORES G.R. No. 124171 March 18, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to reverse the decision of the CA in dismissing the charge of rape with homicide
based on a demurrer to evidence filed by private respondents. The trial court issued the assailed order
acquitting and dismissing the case against respondents for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the
said criminal cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the foregoing Order of
the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on October 4, 1995. A motion for
reconsideration was denied on March 6, 1996. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

REFUSED TO NULLIFY THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 21, 1994 OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR
BEING NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE TOLERATED AND/OR
COMMITTED INJUSTICE BY FAILING TO REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT ALL
THEIR EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF SUPPRESSING THEM APPARENTLY TO FAVOR THE
ACCUSED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DUE
PROCESS, OUSTING THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION?

HELD:
Yes. The petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused's right to double
jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which
attended the prosecution's premature resting and the trial court's grant of the demurrer to evidence when the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed. In any event, petitioner has an
interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution, being the mother of the deceased rape victim.

The trial court is guilty of nonfeasance. Notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the
prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on
utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the
case. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not
only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as
the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is
null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double
jeopardy. By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements
concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded;
and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent. Thus, even assuming
that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the
very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
OSCAR M. POSO vs JUDGE JOSE H. MIJARES, RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar and FLOR
SERIO, OIC Clerk of Court A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693 August 21, 2002
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the proceedings of a Criminal case for murder (CC No. 2477) where the
victim was a relative of complainant Oscar M. Poso. This case was raffled to the sala of Judge Mijares. The
accused pleaded not guilty but later on pleaded guilty for the lower offense of homicide. Accordingly, Judge
Mijares mishandled the case starting from when he granted a motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated 10 January 1996. Unfortunately however two (2) versions of the same Resolution, one being the
alleged draft version, and the other, a final copy thereof, although both were penned by respondent Judge,
surfaced and found circulation but each imposing different maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence.

On 22 August 2001, confronted with two conflicting versions of the pivotal Resolution dated 10
January 1996, and the apparent mishandling of Crim. Case No. 2477, the instant case was referred to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz for an exhaustive investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Cruz
submitted to this Court his Report and Recommendation calling the attention to the reprehensible actuations
of respondent Judge when he reduced the penalty to ridiculous terms so as to qualify the accused for
probation; hastily ordered the discharge of the accused from jail on recognizance without the benefit of
notice and hearing afforded the prosecution and the aggrieved parties, and even before he could order the
Probation Officer to conduct the requisite post-sentence investigation on the accused in violation of
the Probation Law; illegally admitted the accused to probation despite the appropriate maximum penalty
for homicide exceeding six (6) years which he should have been sentenced to serve. He is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law to the prejudice of the prosecution and the private offended parties in Crim. Case No.
2477. He however recommended the dismissal of the charges for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment and Issuing Unjust Interlocutory Orders since the questioned judgment and orders had not
been found in appropriate proceedings to be unjust or unfair. Also recommended for dismissal was the
count for Concealment of Documents on the ground that there was no factual basis for tasking Judge
Mijares with custody of the requested documents.

ISSUE: WON CC no. 2477 is to be maintained despite an obvious miscarriage of judicial ethics?

HELD:
No. Marred by what is obviously a miscarriage of judicial ethics, the proceedings beginning with
the issuance of the controversial 10 January 1996 Resolution are patently void and therefore produce no
legal effects whatsoever. From the lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the
authorization for temporary liberty on recognizance, and finally the grant of probation, the orders of
respondent Judge arising from these proceedings do not compel respectability and finality to constitute res
judicata or even double jeopardy. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due
process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the
simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. It may be attacked directly or
collaterally and set aside as in the instant case. To be sure, it has been said that probation is not a sentence
but is in effect a suspended sentence or an interlocutory judgment, for which reason, it cannot be argued
that courts are barred from correcting manifest injustice in the improvident and corrupt grant of probation.
At any rate, and without tinge of doubt, bare technical adherence to the letter of the law and jurisprudence
should not excuse our obligation in settings attended by unusual circumstances to rectify evident iniquity.

We recognize the general rule that this Court does not review a trial court’s decision in an
administrative proceeding since its main concern therein is to determine the ethical responsibilities of
judicial conduct. Nonetheless, in the instant case, it is our considered opinion that the salutary principle is
not controlling. Under clear considerations before us, the situation calls for the exercise of our equity
jurisdiction to the end that we render complete justice to all affected parties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LUCIO ALBERTO y DANAO G.R. No. 132374 Aug 22, 2002
FACTS:
Herein accused is charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when he
decided to rob one Terisa Semic of cash money and on the occasion thereof killed her by stabbing her
thereby inflicting mortal wounds which caused her death. On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution to submit its formal offer of exhibits. The said order was
lifted after the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on July 1, 1996. Thereafter, the prosecution
continued to present its evidence. On March 26, 1997, the defense orally asked for leave to file demurrer
to evidence. On April 25, 1997, the demurrer was filed but it was denied on May 13, 1997. On June 25,
1997, the trial court issued an order declaring that the accused should be deemed to have waived his right
to present evidence for the defense, and that the case be considered submitted for decision. On August 21,
1997, the trial court promulgated its judgment, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE: WON appellant was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its order
dismissing the case?

HELD:
No. The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof. As to the first jeopardy, it only arises (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3)
after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted,
convicted, or the case was dismissed. n our view, it is clear that no double jeopardy has attached in this
case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the trial court was not valid and
cannot be used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The said right cannot be grounded on an error of
law. As held in People vs. Navarro:
“The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to
present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution,
and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have heretofore
held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute
and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal)
without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, that is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double
jeopardy…”

We agree with the OSG’s contention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed
the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a violation of due process.
Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without
any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses.
Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
PABLO CONDRADA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ARNULFO C. BUGTAS,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar G.R. No. 141646 February 28, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770 presently pending before the RTC of
Borongan, Eastern Samar; he pleaded not guilty to the charge. The hearing of the case had numerous
postponements. During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested for another postponement.
Petitioner moved for at least a temporary dismissal of the case. The prosecution manifested that it would
not object to a temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same date, the trial court issued an order temporarily
dismissing the case. On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of
Criminal Case No. 10770. The trial court set the hearing on the motion for reinstatement on June 25, 1999.
Petitioner opposed the motion, by filing a motion for reconsideration, Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant
petition on February 1, 2000. He claims that Criminal Case No. 10770 cannot be revived because the
dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 is permanent in character, having been made in consideration of his
right to speedy trial contending that the revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in double
jeopardy. On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 10770 is still pending before the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 places the petitioner in double jeopardy?

HELD:
No. There is no merit in the petition. In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal
ordered by the trial court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a permanent
dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated by the delay in the
prosecution of the said case. The trial court apparently denied petitioner’s motion to have Criminal Case
No. 10770 dismissed on the ground of his right to speedy trial when despite said motion made in open court
on April 29, 1999; it ordered the resetting of the hearing of the case on May 31, 1999. In subsequently
granting petitioner’s request for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999, the trial court
expressly stated that the same was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary
dismissal.

The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged
with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in
any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double
jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment
of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the
dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two
exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with
the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him;
and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s
right to speedy trial.

Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reinstatement of Criminal Case
No. 10770 because as earlier stated, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion.
Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present
in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited exceptions. The prosecution had not yet
presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained,
said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the
date of dismissal. Hence, the Court finds no error on the part of the trial court in allowing the reinstatement
of Criminal Case No. 10770.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAQUITO ROMERO G.R. No. 144156 March 20, 2003
FACTS:
This case is an appeal of the decision of the RTC of Romblon in Criminal Case No. 2158, finding
herein appellant, Paquito Romero, alias "Ada," guilty of the crime of murder killing Augusto Ruba. When
arraigned on July 27, 1999, appellant Romero, assisted by counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the charge of
murder. However, on August 26, 1999, the appellant proposed to change his plea of not guilty to the charge
of murder to a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. After both parties agreed on the conditions
for the new plea, the trial court issued an order: (1) that there will be no modifying circumstances; (2) that
the father of the deceased shall be reimbursed for his actual expenses in the total sum of P30,000.00 aside
from his liability for P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of his victim; and (3) that the Court shall
take into consideration the penalty of prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years as
recommended by trial prosecutor Joel A. Sy.

Before the trial court rendered a decision, the prosecution, on August 30, 1999, moved for the re-
opening of the case on the ground that the appellant violated one of the above conditions when he refused
to pay the amount of P30,000 to the father of the victim. Instead, the appellant proposed to pay the lesser
amount of P20,000, conditioned on his being set free upon payment thereof. The trial court granted the
motion of the prosecution and ordered the commencement of trial. On March 16, 2000, appellant filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. This was, however, denied by the trial court
in an Order. On June 8, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, finding accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PROSECUTION’S
MOTION TO RE-OPEN THE CASE AND IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME OF MURDER?

HELD:
No. The Court disagrees with appellant’s claim. The trial court was correct in holding that there
was no double jeopardy in this case, considering that it was not terminated as a result of appellant’s
acquittal, conviction or dismissal. The order approving the guilty plea to homicide, with conditions, was
not a judgment of conviction. he dispositive portion of the said order which in part reads "WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, this case is deemed submitted for decision," clearly shows that the trial court still
had to render a decision on the criminal and civil liabilities of the appellant. The said order merely approved
the agreement between the parties on the new plea to a lesser offense by the appellant and the conditions
attached to it. The trial court neither sentenced the accused nor made any ruling on the civil indemnity in
favor of the heirs of the victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARIO K. ESPINOSA G.R. Nos. 153714-20 Aug 15, 2003
FACTS:
Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed before the SBN by
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, then provincial administrator of
Masbate. Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion for Reinvestigation of the cases. The SBN Fourth
Division granted the Motion in an Order. While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the
SBN a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad On the date set for the hearing of the Motion, the SBN (Fourth
Division) issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 22, 1999. It required private respondent to be
"conditionally arraigned on that date"5 before it would act on his Motion to Travel. As ordered, private
respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion to Travel.

On December 28, 2000, the OMB -- through the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- moved to
withdraw ex parte the two cases against private respondent. Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court
seven Informations for Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa and several others. Espinosa filed a
Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that double jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he
had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had
been granted without his express consent. Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previous
cases was "conditional," because it was made solely for the purpose of accommodating private respondent’s
request to travel abroad while the matters were pending reinvestigation. In its assailed Resolution, the SBN
First Division ruled that jeopardy had attached in the first instance when Criminal Case were dismissed
upon the prosecution’s "ex parte motion to withdraw the information." It noted that the dismissal had been
sought and obtained without respondent’s knowledge, much less express consent. It likewise held private
respondent’s actual arraignment to be straightforward and unqualified. The records did not disclose any
circumstance showing that the accused knew that his arraignment was subject to certain conditions.

ISSUE: WON the SBN acted with grave AODATLOEOJ in dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 34622 to
24628 as against Respondent Espinosa?
HELD:
Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against private respondent on the
ground of double jeopardy had no factual or legal basis, because his arraignment in the earlier cases was
only "conditional." The Court is unconvinced. Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22,
1999. No unusual ceremony punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple process
inconsistent with its studied manner of "conditionally" arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation in
other cases. In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent has waived his right to invoke double
jeopardy in the light of his allegedly "conditional" arraignment. Again, the Court is not persuaded. This
constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
“(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same
or is a frustration thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused."

It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights cannot be trifled with or
cast aside on the basis of mere suppositions and conjectures. The relinquishment of a constitutional right
has to be laid out convincingly. A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear,
categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment
must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be
simple and unconditional.
MANUEL O. ORIENTE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 155094 January 30, 2007
FACTS:
In an information the accused was charged with murder. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. The RTC rendered a Decision dated November 4, 1999 convicting the petitioner
of the crime of Homicide. However, on November 12, 1999, before the foregoing judgment became final
and executory, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio setting aside the said judgment because of a mistake
in the "judgment proper" and requiring both petitioner and his counsel to appear before the court. On the
latter date, the RTC promulgated its second Decision dated November 15, 1999, finding the accused
MANUEL ORIENTE y Orillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal of the crime of HOMICIDE.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is placed under double jeopardy when the RTC promulgated 2 decisions?

HELD:
No. Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and
justice. This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate amendments that are
substantial in nature. They merely cover formal changes or such that will not affect the crux of the decision,
like the correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make
substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party the right to contest the new
evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration. The Court finds that the change in the penalty by the
RTC in the instant case did not involve the consideration of any new evidence but a mere "correction" of
the penalty imposed to conform with the Revised Penal Code and The Indeterminate Sentence Law.
 And as the Solicitor General correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision
dated November 15, 1999 before the petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision dated
November 4, 1999 which was promulgated on November 10, 1999. Noteworthy is that it was the RTC’s
second Decision dated November 15, 1999 which the petitioner elevated on appeal to the CA. It is well
settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy, and, as discussed above, throws the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable
or unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be
borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to
appeal his sentence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Homicide.
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY vs HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007
FACTS:
An information for Homicide was filed against SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy when he shot his commanding
officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle which caused his instantaneous death. On September
12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge
of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon such
Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the
word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion
remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the
spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."

Pe titioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the
ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter
his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
etitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant
Motion on the ground of double jeopardy. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that
a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless
judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was
never acquitted or convicted of Homicide; Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for
Reconsideration. The Motion to Inhibit is DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
However, the charge was again changed from Homicide to Murder.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to
Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide?

HELD:
No. Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy
is for the same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination
of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the
frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide
without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced. If it appears at anytime
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. Homicide is necessarily included in the
crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the
dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by
merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there
was no dismissal of the homicide case.
SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING & CO., INC. vs HON. ANTONIO M.
EUGENIO, JR., in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of RTC-MANILA, BR. 24, and ELIDAD
KHO, VIOLETA KHO, and ROGER KHO G.R. No. 163741 August 7, 2007
FACTS:
The instant petition originated from a complaint for unfair competition filed by petitioner against
private respondents. After due investigation, City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila recommended the
prosecution of private respondents for unfair competition and dismissing private respondents’ counterclaim
against petitioner. The arraignment pushed through on October 11, 2000. Since the accused refused to plea
to the charge, a plea of not guilty was entered for each of them. On September 28, 2001, the DOJ issued a
Resolution dismissing both the complaint filed by petitioner and the counterclaim filed by private
respondents. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of the Secretary’s
ruling. On October 23, 2001, the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion to Withdraw Information on
the basis of the September 28, 2001 Resolution. The next day, the RTC issued the first assailed Order, dated
October 24, 2001. The Information against the accused is hereby ordered withdrawn.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the October 24, 2001 Order. the Khos filed a
supplemental motion insisting that the case be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy. On August 21,
2002, the trial court issued the second assailed Order, holding that due to its Order withdrawing the
Information, there is no necessity to order the dismissal of the case. The re-filing of the Information would
constitute double jeopardy. On April 2, 2003, the trial court issued its last assailed Order holding that the
"revival of the case is now barred by the impregnable wall of double jeopardy."

ISSUE: WON the re-filing or the reinstatement of the Information would constitute double jeopardy?

HELD:
No. It does not bar the reinstatement of the information. For double jeopardy to set in, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there is a valid complaint or information; (2) the complaint should be filed before
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been
convicted, acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the
accused. Since we have held that the October 24, 2001 Order granting the withdrawal of the Information
was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid and
legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and acquittal of the
accused in the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double
jeopardy has not set in.
HERRERA VS SANDIGABAYAN

FACTS:
 Petitioners were charged of Murder in an Information, they pleaded not guilty.
However, the information was amended and petitioners were convicted on such basis.
Petitioners insist that respondent Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for the crime of
murder under the amended informations (another criminal case) as they had earlier been
arraigned under the original informations for murder and their rearraignment under the
amended informations placed them in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: W/N the accused was placed in double jeopardy

RULING:

NO. The rule on double jeopardy does not apply. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
amendment of the informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the
pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed automatically
reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy did not
attach by virtue of petitioner’s plea of not guilty under the amended information.

In the present case, petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the
original informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition
for bail, they raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed
to allege in the informations that the crimes were committed "in relation to their office." On
the same day, respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations accordingly.
Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations
against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with.

JAVIER VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Javier was charged for violation of RA 3019 (aka Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) before the Sandiganbayan. Accused was also charged with malversation of Public Funds
under the RPC. An amended Information for the malversation charge was made, Javier filed
a Motion to Quash the malversation case by invoking her right against double jeopardy, her
motion was denied.

ISSUE: W/N accused was placed in double jeopardy

RULING:
 NO. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused
must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the
accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal
case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter
information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases
remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only
one in the criminal cases against her.

CO VS LIM

FACTS:

Lim was charged with violation of PD 1612 (aka Anti Fencing Law), the case was
remanded to court for further proceedings. A Motion to Withdraw Informations was filed,
thus during pre-trial the case was orally moved for dismissal on the ground of such motion,
the dismissal was granted. A petition for certiorari was file seeking to reverse the resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the present appeal by certiorari violates that accused right against double
jeopardy considering that they expressly moved for the dismissal of the criminal cases against
them

RULING:

NO. The Order of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved for the
dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had
given their express consent to the termination of the case. Therefore, the fourth requisite,
which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
without his or her approval, was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule on double jeopardy is
inapplicable to this case

LEJANO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

This is in connection with the case of People vs Webb and Lejano or the Vizconde
Massacre where Lejano in the previous case was one of the accused. In the case at hand, the
accused was acquitted by the SC in 2010, reversing the judgment of the CA on the ground of
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The relatives of the victims asked the Court to
reconsider its decision.

ISSUE: W/N reconsideration of a judgment of acquittal will place the accused in double
jeopardy

RULING:

YES. As a rule, to reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in

jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is
ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the
same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a
sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of
resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

BANGAYON VS BANGAYON

FACTS:

Petitioners are accused of having committed the crime of bigamy, during arraignment
petitioners pleaded not guilty. The RTC dismissed the case against petitioners for
insufficiency of evidence. The complainant elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari. The petitioners objected to this.

ISSUE: W/N the CA in a certiorari proceeding may inquire into the factual matters presented
by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional right of herein
petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy

RULING:

YES. Petitioner’s acquittal was already valid, entitling them to invoke their right
against double jeopardy. A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its
case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to
evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal
of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting
the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Elements of Double Jeopardy to Attach; Jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when
the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused.—Double
jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain
exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the
accused, to wit: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits
and operates as an acquittal. (2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double
jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not
allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham.

GOODLAND VS CO

FACTS:

Makati Prosecutors Office filed an Information for Falsification of Public Document

defined and penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (2) of the RPC against
private respondents Co. After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its
case, Goodland filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to
substantiate its claim that they are guilty of the crime charged, this was granted by the lower
court. A MR was filed by it was denied by the court on the ground, inter alia, that the
dismissal of a criminal case due to a granted demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal
of the accused. Co and Chan claimed that Goodland can no longer file an appeal for such
would violate their right against double jeopardy

ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy

RULING:

NO. A judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order

reconsidering the dismissal of the case nor can it be modified except to eliminate something
which is civil or administrative in nature; Exceptions. —It is settled that a judgment of
acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the
case, nor can it be modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in
nature. One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence. If there is grave abuse of
discretion, granting Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double
jeopardy

MELO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

Melo was charged with the CFI for frustrated homicide, on the following day an
amended information was filed charging him of consummated homicide because his victim
died. Melo filed a motion to quash the amended inf formation alleging double jeopardy,
motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition
to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.

ISSUE: W/N the accused was place in double jeopardy

RULING:

NO. It was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of
a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter
did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. FURTHER,
the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time
of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
"Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing
at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense

PEOPLE VS BULING

FACTS:
 Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for inflicting
wounds on a person which, according to the complaint, would require medical attendance for
a period from 10 to 15 days. Having pleaded guilty, he served his sentence fully. Later, the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused charging him with serious physical
injuries, the information alleging that the same wounds inflicted by the accused would
require medical attendance for a period from 1½% months to 2½ months. It appears that a
different physician examined the offended party anew, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of
the offended party which had been wounded, which method of examination was not adopted
by the first physician. The second physician's certification was the basis of the second
complaint.

ISSUE: W/N prosecution and conviction of the accused for less serious physical injuries a
bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries

RULING:

YES, right against double jeopardy applies. If the X-ray examination disclosed the
existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, that fracture must have
existed when the first examination was made. There was, therefore, no new or supervening
fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which
would justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

PEOPLE VS TIOZON

FACTS:

Accused Eutropio Tiozon killed Leonardo Bolima with the use of an unlicensed firearm
which gave rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 Illegal
possession of firearms and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249
(Homicide) of the RPC. The accused pleaded that one is a bar to the other and invokes his
right against double jeopardy

ISSUE: W/N the accused’s contention is correct

RULING:

NO. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be
invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder,
is punished by the RPC. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of
the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.”

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may
be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.

Since the informations were for separate offense –– the first against a person and the second
against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule
on double jeopardy.

LAMERA VS CA

FACTS:

Accused is charged for two separate offenses under the RPC, under two separate
informations. One for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with multiple
physical injuries and another for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal
Code on Abandonment. Accused contends that his right against double jeopardy was violated.

ISSUE: W/N accused was placed on double jeopardy

RULING:

NO. “It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle
to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.” ALSO, since the
informations were for separate offenses; the first against a person and the second against
public peace and order, one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy, case at bar
GONZALES v. CA
Facts
A criminal complaint for qualified seduction following a preliminary investigation, was filed the MTC against herein
petitioner Apolinario Gonzales. The latter, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. When the defense
was about to rest its case, the prosecution filed a motion to instead commit the accused to answer to a charge for rape
since the evidence submitted indicated that rape, not qualified seduction, was evidently committed.

Following the dismissal of Criminal Case, the prosecution filed six (6) separate informations for rape, alleged to have
been committed on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 November 1982, before different branches of the RTC. These cases were
later consolidated.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal action of the crime of rape in the MTC and the subsequent filing of the
case in the RTC constitute double jeopardy

Ruling
NO.
For that kind of jeopardy to arise, the following requisites must be extant:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.

When all the above elements concur, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the
said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily
included in, the first offense charged, can be rightly barred.

Here, there is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to try the
offense of rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the Regional Trial Court to take cognizance of.
Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case for qualified seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was
provisional but likewise with the express consent of the accused (herein petitioner). Then, too, rape and
qualified seduction are not identical offenses.

PEOPLE v. TURDA

Facts
GENER TURDA together with his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera, was charged with illegal recruitment in
Crim. Case No. 57218 and two (2) counts of estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. 57219 and 57220. However, Milagros Turda
and Carmen Manera were never apprehended so that only Gener Turda could be arraigned and tried. As the three (3)
cases involve the same factual milieu, they were jointly tried.

The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment under Art. 39, par. (a), in
relation to Art. 38 of P.D. No. 442, as amended. Also the court a quo convicted appellant of estafa under Art. 315, 1st
par., in relation to 4th par., subpar. 2(a), of the same article. In Crim. Case No. 57220, the trial court found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under the same penal provision.

Issue

Whether or not a prosecution for one crime constitutes an obstacle to a subsequent action for another distinct crime
upon the same facts

Ruling

NO.

Where two different laws define two crimes, the conviction of one of them is no obstacle to that of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element
of the other. The safest general rule is that the two offenses must be in substance precisely the same or of the same
nature or of the same species, so that the evidence which proves the one would prove the other; or if this is not the
case, then the one crime must be an ingredient of the other. A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and,
if each statute requires proof of an additional act which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either
statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other, for the accused would not be
twice in jeopardy for one offense, but only once in jeopardy for each offense.

Applying the foregoing principle, not all acts which constitute estafa necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for
estafa is wider in scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment activities. More importantly, the
element of damage, which is essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment;and, while estafa is malum
in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum.

PEOPLE v. MANUNGAS

Facts:
Accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and

Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with this, Fernando required the applicants the

several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and

upon verification with POEA, they found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed

complaints of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Fernando.

The RTC found Manungas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

for violating the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code.

This is an appeal by accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. alias "Percy" from the decision of the Regional Trial

Court in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994,L-3996 and L-4000 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.

Issue:

WON the conviction of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT shall constitute a bar to prosecution of the crime of

ESTAFA.

Ruling:

NO.

A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and

convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)] because illegal

recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while

estafa is a malum in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction. The one act results in two

distinct offenses, prosecution under one is not a bar to prosecution under the other.

People vs. Deunida

231 SCRA 520

FACTS:
The accused Jesus Deunida was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with murder
and illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in two separate information. On December
31, 1990, New Year's Eve, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, appellant came out of his store,
approached the victim and aimed the gun at him. But neighbor pleaded with appellant not to shoot.
The accused denied both the possession of the fatal gun and the responsibility for shooting the
victim, and offered a different version of the incident.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "qualified
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866" and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is correct that the charges filed against him constitutes the same
offense which infringes his constitutional right against double jeopardy?
RULING:
No, he was not placed in double jeopardy when he was also charged in another case with murder
because the former offense is a different offense punished by a special law while the latter offense
is defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The court reiterated that the constitutional
right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same
offense and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although
arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no double jeopardy.
People vs. Fernandez
239 SCRA 174

FACTS:
The Accused-appellant Fernandez was found guilty of the crimes of Homicide1 and for violation
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm) after the death of Marianito
Merced who died of internal hemorrhage caused by multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-
appellant who denied shooting the victim. He declared that on the day of the incident he was
gravely ill with malaria.
After trial, the court in a Joint Decision found accused-appellant guilty of Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearm and imposed the penalties adverted to earlier.
Accused-appellant Fernandez invokes the rule of double jeopardy and procedural due process. He
urges that the right against double jeopardy proscribes simultaneous prosecution for several
offenses made out of the same act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is correct that the charges filed against him constitutes the same
offense which infringes his constitutional right against double jeopardy?

RULING:
No, the two (2) Informations against accused-appellant charged him with two (2) distinct offenses,
i.e., murder and illegal possession of firearm. The first crime is punished by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code while the second crime is punished by a special law, P.D. 1866. The charge
for Illegal Possession of Firearm is not necessarily included in the charge of Murder. Accused-
appellant cannot therefore complain that he has been charged with two (2) offenses on the basis of
the same act.
People vs. Quijada
259 SCRA 191

FACTS:
Accused-appellant appeals from the decision of RTC convicting him of the two offenses separately
charged in two informations: murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866. It started with a fist fight that
occurred between the appellant-accused and private individual as the former was constantly
annoying and pestering the latter's sister during a benefit dance held at the Basketball Court. At
around midnight, shooting incident was reported. The appellant interposed the defense of alibi,
which the trial court rejected because he was positively identified by prosecution witness

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes committed pertains to the same offense which would amount to violation
of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy?
RULING:
No, the lower court is correct in finding the appellant guilty of two offenses murder and of
aggravated illegal possession of firearm, hence the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will
not apply. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first , homicide or
murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code while the second, illegal possession of firearm is
punished by a special law. For, undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these
crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former is malum prohibitum, while
both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's construction of the subject
provision would violate the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.
People vs. Ballabare
264 SCRA 350

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, together with this brother, were charged with double murder with the use
of illegally possessed firearms against Juan Tacadao and Leonardo Tacadao, Jr.
Accused-appellants defense was alibi. He testified that at the time of the incident, he was inside
his yard playing basketball with some friends. However, the trial court rejected the accused-
appellants alibi and dismissed the Affidavit for the withdrawal of testimony of Tessie Asenita and
the Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainant as mere attempts to escape liability for the
crime. It found accused-appellant guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearm and two counts of
murder.
The accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding him
guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. He points out that both offenses arose out of a
single incident and that as a result of the decision finding him guilty of separate crimes, he was
placed in double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion proceeding against accused for
murder and illegal possession of firearm in violation of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy?

RULING:
No, the Court upheld that Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition does not absorb the
crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and therefore does not bar the
simultaneous or subsequent prosecution for the latter crime.

PEOPLE v. CALONZO

Facts:
Calonzo told Danilo and Reydante that he can help them find work in Italy if they can pay him P120, 000.00 as

processing fee. Although both Danilo and Reydante were able to pay the processing fee that Calonzo asked for, the

latter was not able to send them to Italy. When Danilo and Reydante tried to verify from the POEA whether Calonzo

is licensed or authorized to recruit, they found out that Calonzo was not. Thus, Calonzo was convicted with Illegal

Recruitment and Estafa.

Issue:

WON the conviction of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT shall constitute a bar to prosecution of the crime of

ESTAFA.

Ruling:

NO.

The one act results in two distinct offenses, prosecution under one is not a bar to prosecution under the other.

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that Calonzo is liable for Illegal Recruitment. Firstly, Calonzo made his recruits

believe that jobs are waiting for them in Italy by representing to them that he had the facility to send them abroad;

however, Danilo and Reydante were never sent to Italy. Secondly, POEA certified that Calonzo was not licensed to

recruit workers for abroad.

In the above case, the Supreme Court said that although Calonzo was charged with Illegal Recruitment, he was also

held liable for estafa since the elements of estafa are also present. Calonzo defrauded his recruits through deceit by

making them believe that he could provide them employment in Italy. Because of his misrepresentations, the recruits

were made to part with their money. With deceit and damage present, estafa was also committed.

PEOPLE v. BENEMERITO

Facts:

In the cases at bar, accused Alex Benemerito and his sister Precy gave Quitoriano, Arcal and Gumarang,the
complainants, the impression that they could give them employment abroad and to earn one lapad or the equivalent
of P2,500.00 a day as represented to them. The complainants each gave accused Alex Benemerito and his sister the
amount of P50, 000.00.

As the complainants were not able to leave for Japan as promised, they filed a complaint against Alex and Precy
Benemerito before the NBI. They likewise secured a Certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration that Alexander Benemerito and Precy Benemerito are not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers
for overseas employment which was confirmed in open court by the Senior Labor and Employment Officer who
personally verified the same from the records of the Office.

The RTC convicted Benemerito of illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa. Accused-appellant then appealed the
decision of the RTC contending double jeopardy.

Issue:

WON the conviction of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT shall constitute a bar to prosecution of the crime of
ESTAFA.

Ruling:

NO.

It is settled in our jurisdiction that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately
of illegal recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as the former is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where
the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In short, a conviction for offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws.

PEOPLE v. TOBIAS

Facts:

For the death of Esteban "Jojo" Lim, Jr., accused Ricardo Tobias was charged with murder in a criminal complaint

filed on 8 October 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). On 22 November 1990 the complaint was amended

from that of murder to "Violation of PD 1866 Resulting to Murder” because the firearm used in the killing of Lim was

"not licensed/registered."

The MTC admitted the amended complaint, forthwith issued a warrant of arrest, and recommended no bail.
The accused filed a motion to reconsider the admission on the ground that the amended complaint does not refer to

the same offense charged in the original complaint nor to an offense necessarily included therein but to one distinct

from that originally charged.

Issue:

WON the MTC erred in amending the complaint because the amended complaint does not refer to the same offense

charged in the original complaint.

Ruling:

NO.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of

court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.

People vs Mañozca
Facts:
Accused-appellant Nestor Maozca y Almario was charged in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, Quezon City with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of Article
38(a) in relation to Article 39(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018;
and with two (2) counts of estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph(2)(a), of the Revised
Penal Code.

ISSUE: W/N accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy

Ruling:

No. Although Illegal recruitment and estafa arouse from the same offense, the filing of
charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Illegal recruitment
and estafa are entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. In the same manner, a person
acquitted of illegal recruitment may be held liable for estafa.

Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which there
is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which,
proof of criminal intent is necessary

People vs Tan Tiong Meng

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" was charged with Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa. That on or about the period comprising
June 1993 to August, 1993, in the City of Cavite, the accused, using a business name RAINBOW
SIM FACTORY, a private employment recruiting agency, and misrepresenting himself to have
the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad with the
ability to facilitate the issuance and approval of the necessary papers in connection therewith, when
in fact he did not possess the authority or license from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration to do so, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit
in a large scale and promise employment in Taiwan to Ernesto Orculio, Manuel Latina, Neil
Mascardo, Librado Pozas, Edgardo Tolentino and Cavino Asiman. Tan admitted having received
money from all the complainants but he said that all the money was turned over to Borja after
deducting his commission. Tan likewise admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about
seventy (70) cases of estafa and illegal recruitment but that it was Lorenzo who was the main
recruiter. The RTC rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the charges beyond
reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy

RULING:
 No. It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of double
jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not
necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary.

People vs Sadiosa

FACTS:

Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met the four
complainants, Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano, Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed
the four to apply for overseas employment informing them that she had a cousin who could send
them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse, the four went with
her on February 5, 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building,
Libertad St., Pasay City where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to accused-appellant Delia
Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as domestic helpers. -On that occasion, accused-appellant
assured the four that she could dispatch them to Kuwait and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from
each of them for processing fee and P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00 from complainant Cely
Navarro). The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Through an appeal before the CA, accused-appellant assails the trial court's Decision.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court err in not acquitting the accused-appellant and in convicting her of
the charge in the information

RULING:

Yes. In the case at bar, accused-appellant could have been validly charged separately with
estafa under the same set of facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not
to have been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the information, that it
accurately and clearly avers all of the ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale.

The crime of illegal recruitment (Labor Code) is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent
of the accused is necessary for conviction and so a person convicted under the Labor Code may
also be convicted under the RPC.

People vs Elvis Sanchez

Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with Illegal recruitment in Large Scale and 3 counts of
estafa. That during the period from the month of November, 1992, to March 8, 1993, the above
named accused representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and hire and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the following persons;
Alice G. Kimay, Veronica Filog, Aaron John Acena, Nancy Fesset, and Jerry Akia ,without first
securing or obtaining license or authority from the proper government agency.
Also the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one JERRY AKIA by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he is not
authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said JERRY
AKIA and pretended that he could secure a job for him abroad, for and in consideration of the
sum of P15,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could not; the said JERRY AKIA deceived and
convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum
of P15,000 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said JERRY AKIA in the
aforementioned amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS, (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency.
However in the course of the case in assessing the evidence, the trial court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale and of three counts
of estafa. It adjudged
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is placed on double jeopardy.
Held:
No.
Under Article 39 of the Labor Code, the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale, a
crime deemed to involve economic sabotage, is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). Conviction for the crime of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes if some other crimes
or felonies are committed in the process. Thus, a person convicted for illegal recruitment may
also be convicted for the crime of estafa. The principal reason for this is that the former offense
is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in sewhere the criminal intent of the accused is an additional element for
conviction.

PEOPLE vs. ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY

Facts:

Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code,
five separate informations were also instituted against appellant on various dates.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases filed
were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases were
consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.

The trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours
and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio.

Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of
illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was placed on double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No.

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the
offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
warrant conviction. Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person. Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.

People vs Nenita T. Juego

Facts:
NENITA JUEGO and WILFREDO GAERLAN were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale by twenty-six (26) individual complainants. In addition,
Nenita and Wilfredo were also charged with three (3) counts of Estafa by three (3) of the twenty-
six (26) offended parties. Only Nenita stood trial as Wilfredo has eluded arrest and remains at
large.
Of the twenty-six (26) complainants, only six (6) pursued the illegal recruitment case. Five
(5) complaining witnesses were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but refused to sign the
subpoena due to lack of interest to prosecute the case. The rest of the complainants were
likewise duly notified but failed to appear and testify.
In her defense, Nenita contended that the alleged recruiting firm, AJ International Trade
Link, was a sole proprietorship of her husband Abelardo who, before his death in 1992, was
engaged in real estate business and importation of cement and fertilizer from Iraq. Although
Abelardo was given a special power of attorney by two (2) licensed agencies accredited by the
Taiwan Labor he was not actually engaged in recruitment. The complainants had approached him
for assistance because they knew he had many friends abroad. Complainants then came to her
to follow up the status of their applications but she told them that her husband was still
abroad. This was her sole participation in his professional affairs as she was a plain
housewife. After Abelardo died complainants stopped asking her about their applications.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was placed on double jeopardy.
Held:
No. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under par. 2 (a), Art. 315,
of The Revised Penal Code, as the offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where
the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. In other words, a conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws.
People vs Balasa
Facts:
Sixty-four informations, all charging the offense of estafa, as defined in Presidential Decree
No. 1689, were filed against Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma Francisco, Guillermo
Francisco, Analina Francisco and eight other persons, mostly incorporators and employees of the
Panata Foundation, before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. Fourteen cases, including
Criminal Case Nos. 8429 and 8751, were raffled off to Branch 52.

A brief filed by appellants in the consolidated cases mainly argues that they cannot be
convicted of the defined in Presidential Decree No. 1689 (penalty for estafa) because the
informations filed against them alleged prejudice against the complaining witnesses, not against
the national, provincial, or city economy nor was evidence presented therefor.

The trial court convict the accused.

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in convicting appellants despite their prior conviction of the same
offense in Criminal case 8429 and thus placing the accused in double keopardy

Ruling:

No. They cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy for which the following requisites
must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. In the instant case, the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 8429 is different from the offense charged in the other cases. While these cases
arose out of the same scheme, the fraudulent acts charged were committed against different
persons, hence they do not constitute the same offense

Paluay vs CA

FACTS:

It appears that at about 5:30 p.m. in the afternoon of March 30, 1986, petitioner Vicente
Palu-ay and private respondent Domingo Pulmones were having drinks with Edgar Soldevilla,
Jonathan Fernandez, Efren Lauron, Basilio Pulmones, and Tirzo Superio at the house of Nelson
Irecillo when a gun (a .38 caliber Super) being held by Pulmones went off near the face of
petitioner. An information for frustrated homicide, later amended to frustrated murder, was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28 against private respondent. Private respondent
pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial was held. The trial court rendered a decision finding private
respondent Domingo Pulmones guilty of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Petitioner filed this case for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The case was,
however, dismissed.

ISSUE: W/N the petition an attempt to secure review of a final and executory decision of the trial
court and that a review of the case would expose the accused to double jeopardy

RULING:

Yes. Indeed, the question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a factual
question that cannot be reviewed not only because the decision of the trial court is now final but
also because a review of such question at the instance of the prosecution would violate the right of
the accused against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.

PEOPLE v MERCADO
G.R. Nos. 108440-42. March 11, 1999

FACTS: An information for illegal recruitment in large scale was filed – that accused, conspiring
and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist
and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to certain persons without first
having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.

Two other informations for estafa were also filed – that accused conspiring and confederating with
others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
another then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NELSON TAMARES Y
VERANGA.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused Vicente Mercado y Mercado alias Vicente
Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale
and Estafa.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado was placed under double jeopardy.

RULING: NO. A person convicted of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be
convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa, provided the elements
of the crime are present.
In People v. Romero, the elements of the crime were stated, thus: (a) that the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Both elements have been
proven in this case. The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused-appellant was able to
make private complainant Nelson Tamares part with his hard-earned money upon his fraudulent
misrepresentation that he can provide Tamares with work abroad.

PEOPLE v YABUT
G.R. Nos. 115719-26. October 5, 1999

FACTS: Accused in this case was charged with 8 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment in
large scale.
The trial court rendered a decision7 acquitting appellant of eight (8) counts of estafa but
convicting him of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant contends that the trial court ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
EVIDENCEADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND AS A RESULT IT
ALSO ERRED IN CONVICTING FERNANDO CORTEZ OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT ACQUITTED HIM OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA BASED
ON THE SAME EVIDENCE

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant could be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite
his acquittal of the crime of estafa.

RULING: YES. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment
may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa
under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.

Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It
follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

PEOPLE v ONG
G.R. No. 119594. January 18, 2000
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 13146-R, the information for illegal recruitment in large
scale alleged— That sometime during and between the period from November, 1993 to January,
1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to certain persons in Taiwan,
without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper governmental agency.

In Criminal Case Nos. 13147-R to 13154-R, eight informations for estafa were filed.
All indictments being based on the same facts, the cases were tried jointly.
The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of illegal recruitment committed
in large scale and of seven counts of estafa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was placed under double jeopardy.
RULING: NO. It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition,
be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of
double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal
intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the
accused is necessary.

PEOPLE v MERIS
G.R. Nos. 117145-50 & 117447 March 28, 2000

FACTS: Accused who was conspiring and confederating with three others whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NAPOLEON RAMOS y ESPEJO in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation
which they made to said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to the effect that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ him as Factory Worker in Hongkong and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to give and deliver, as in fact (he) gave and delivered to said accused
the amount of P30,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain the
amount of P30,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud he (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS, in the aforesaid
amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Accused was charged with estafa and illegal recruitment. The lower court found her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was placed under double jeopardy.
RULING: NO. A person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Illegal recruitment is a mala prohibita, while estafa is a mala in se.

PEOPLE v LOGAN
G.R. Nos. 135030-33 July 20, 2001

FACTS: The said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Rodrigo Acorda y Javier in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representations which she made to said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier to
the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ factory and construction
worker for Japan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier and to give and deliver, as in fact gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P65,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P65,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier in the aforesaid amount of P65,000.00.

The appellant, Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with 3 counts of estafa, as defined and
penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in 3 separate informations.

On the other hand, another information was filed charging the appellant Mercy Logan y
Calderon with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, under Article 38(b) in relation to
Article 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, convicted the appellant of the crimes of
estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was placed under double jeopardy.
RULING: NO. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is
that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted
under the Labor Code may also be convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.

POTOT vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 143547 June 26, 2002

FACTS: Joey S. Potot was charged with homicide in before the RTC, Branch 19, Catarman, Northern
Samar.

Upon arraignment, wherein the information was read to him in his own dialect, petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge. Forthwith, he invoked not only the mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty, but also the circumstance of voluntary surrender since, as shown in the records, he surrendered
voluntarily to the PNP Headquarters immediately after the commission of the crime. The public
prosecutor did not raise any objection. Instead, he manifested that there is no aggravating circumstance
which attended the commission of the crime.

Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied that petitioner understood the meaning and consequences
of his plea of guilty, rendered and promulgated its Decision in open court convicting him of homicide.

However, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim), filed through counsel, a motion
for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because
"there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice."

The trial court, in its order granted private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision "as proceeding
from a rigged, hence, sham hearing." It likewise ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor "for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding charge

Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the order as the Decision had become
final, and that the said order would place the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed orders would violate petitioner’s constitutional right against double
jeopardy.

RULING: YES. The Court agrees with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any
person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the
effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected
to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint
or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.

These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He
was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and
meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he
cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense charged.

PEOPLE v CA
G.R. No. 142051. February 24, 2004

FACTS: Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay, Sgt.
Roberto Cana, Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David Valenciano, Pat. Cesar
Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for the fatal shooting of
one Marcial “Boyet” Azada. The RTC rendered a decision finding them guilty beyong reasonable
doubt.

On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed and respondents Francisco and Pacao were
acquitted of the crime charged.

The prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, vehemently challenges the
acquittal in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing mat the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating the
private respondents notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of their guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

RULING: YES. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him
from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. The State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty.

The grant of said petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution. In the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a sham, a
judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether
it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of Appeals.

RAMISCAL v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 169727-28. August 18, 2006

FACTS: In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
(Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and the alleged anomalies"
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). In
its Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, among others, the anomalies in the
acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and
described the modus operandi of the perpetrators as follows:

The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions with two deeds
of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed). Another
deed of sale would be signed by the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed).
These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the System to the buyer(s)
than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation was obviously to evade payment of the
correct taxes to the government and save money for the seller(s), broker(s) and who knows,
probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the buyer.

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecute and/or cause
the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land," Ombudsman
Investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint,
stating that based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., among others, may be charged with
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
offices under the Anti-Graft Law exclude prosecution for felonies under the RPC, and vice versa.
RULING: NO. Crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their offices
defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do not exclude prosecution for felonies defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and vice versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis supplied) It is clear then
that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Code.
PEOPLE v COMILA
G.R. No. 171448. February 28, 2007

FACTS: On April 5, 1999, in the RTC of Baguio City, an Information for Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and penalized under Article 13(6) in relation
to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor
Code, was filed against Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra.
On the same date and in the same court, 12 separate Informations for Estafa were filed against the
same accused at the instance of the same complainants.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate in large scale and of estafa in seven (7) counts. The CA affirmed the
lower court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in adjudging appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, considering double jeopardy.

RULING: NO. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and

convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern:
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. Here, it has been
sufficiently proven that both appellants represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to
have the capacity to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do not have the authority or
license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this misrepresentation that induced the complainants to
part with their hard-earned money for placement and medical fees. Such act on the part of the
appellants clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Code.

ANTONIO DIAZ vs. DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC.

G.R. No. 160959. April 4, 2007.*

FACTS: Antonio G. Diaz was the president of Diaz and Co., Inc. He was also vice-president of
Diaz Realty Inc. which, in turn, owned the Doña Segunda Hotel, formerly known as the Davao
Imperial Hotel (Imperial Hotel Building), located along C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City. Davao
Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), on the other hand, is a public utility duly franchised to provide
light, heat and power to its customers in Davao City and the municipalities of Panabo, Santo Tomas
and Carmen, in Davao del Norte. Manuel Orig was the resident manager/vice-president for
Administration of DLPC, while Eliseo R. Braganza was its in-house lawyer.7 DLPC supplied the
Doña Segunda Building (Imperial Hotel Building) with electricity service under Account No. 087-
10669 and with Meter No. 36510.9

Davao Light and Power Co. sent a Notice of Disconnection to Diaz and Co., Inc. informing it that,
the hotel’s unpaid electric consumption bill amounted to P190,111.02. It also warned that if the
amount was not paid, DLPC would be impelled to discontinue its service. Since Diaz and Co., Inc.
ignored the letter, Meter No. 36510 was disconnected.

Respondents initiated two separate criminal actions against petitioner, one for theft of electricity
under the Revised Penal Code, and the other, for Violation of P.D. 401 amended by B.P. Blg.
876, I.S. No. 92-4590.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fault on the part of DLPC when it instituted two separate actions.

RULING: NO. While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D. 401,
as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on theft may
refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one
offense because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses; and where there
is variance or difference between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, as
in the case at bar, there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution
for the same act is not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence,
no fault could be attributed to respondent DLPC when it instituted the two separate actions.

100. Merencillo v. People

Facts: This petition for review assails the June 18, 1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan in A.R.
Case Nos. 004-005 affirming the omnibus decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T.
Merencillo guilty of violating Section 3(b) of RA 30195 and Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code.

That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, the accused
being then a public official connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as its Group
Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of
personal gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in connection, in
consideration and in exchange for the release of the certification of her payment of the capital gains
tax for the land purchased by the Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio,
a transaction wherein the aforesaid accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which
the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed but upon prior consultation with
the military authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal Investigation Command
[CIC] who set up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the
act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred peso bills and the rest all
bogus (paper) monies, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar
in particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be proved during the
trial of the case.

The Trial Court finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal by direct participation, defined and penalized by Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the trial court further finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation, for the crime of Direct Bribery
defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed the RTC
decision to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision with modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment for violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019.

Issue: Whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: No. One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under
the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to
being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code.27 There is no double jeopardy if a
person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the
Revised Penal Code.

The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is
an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

101. Lapasaran v. People

Facts: In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his sister Vilma
Villarin (Vilma) met petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours
Agency (Silver Jet) at SIMCAS Building, Makati. For a fee of P85,000.00, petitioner undertook
the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment (under a tourist visa) and employment
of Menardo in South Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be employed as "factory
worker," which was, subsequently, changed to "bakery worker." Thereafter, Menardo paid the said
fee in installments, the first in September 2001 in the amount of P10,000.00, which was received
by a certain Pastor Paulino Cajucom; the second installment was P35,000.00; while the third and
last payment was P40,000.00; the last two installments were delivered to the petitioner.

After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo finally left for South Korea on
November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South Korean immigration authorities
and was immediately deported to the Philippines because the travel documents issued to him by
the petitioner were fake. He immediately contacted petitioner and informed her of what happened.
Thereupon, petitioner promised to send him back to South Korea, but the promise was never
fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma demanded the return of the money they paid,
but petitioner refused and even said, "Magkorte na lang tayo." It was later found out that petitioner
was no longer connected with Silver Jet.

Hence, the separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Raffled to Branch 34, the cases were docketed as Criminal
Case No. 03-215331 for Illegal Recruitment and Criminal Case No. 03-215332 for Estafa. When
arraigned, she pleaded not guilty to both charges. The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC Decision with a modification in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No.
03-215332 for estafa.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of double
jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not
necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary.

102. Ivler v. Modesto

Facts: The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to
bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367)
for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Ruling: The Court’s ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and
2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information
in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
103. People v. Ocden
Facts: That sometime during the period from October to December, 1998 in the City of Baguio,
accused-appellant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JEFFRIES C.
GOLIDAN, by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that she is not (sic)
authorized job recruiter for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Jeffries C.
Golidan and pretended that she could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of
the sum of P70,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Jeffries C.
Golidan deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the
total sum of P70,000.00, in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Jeffries
C. Golidan in the aforementioned amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000,00). The
RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 16315-R) and three counts of estafa. The instant
appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated 02 July 2001, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of double
jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not
necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary.

104. People v. Lalli

Facts: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29 November
2005 (RTC Decision), found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, and sentenced each of
the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of fines and damages. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA
Decision), affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. The accused-appellants appealed to this Court by
filing a Notice of Appeal3 in accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: No.The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the
crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked
as a prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different
strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of
Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary
damages is likewise justified.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February 2010,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City dated 29 November 2005,
finding accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate

105. People v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Assailed in the instant petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated October 11, 1999 of
public respondent Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 13006 ("People of the
Philippines v. Geronimo Z. Velasco") granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused and
dismissing the said criminal case for insufficiency of evidence. The Information filed by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Geronimo Velasco, then Minister
of Energy, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act").

Issue: Whether the case should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling: Clearly, no trace of impetuosity or wantonness on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan

exists which would place this case within the purview of the evil sought to be prevented by the
said constitutional proscription. In Yao v. Court of Appeals,24 this Court, through Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., struck down a decision of a Regional Trial Court for being "starkly hollow,
otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form." The challenged Resolution can hardly
be characterized as such.

All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan warranting the
nullification of its October 11, 1999 Resolution.

106. Yuchengco v. CA, 376 SCRA 531

Facts: Several articles of defamatory imputations against the petitioner were published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer by the respondents. The trial court finds herein respondents guilty of libel.
The CA reversed the appealed decision of the trial court and acquitting both accused. The OSG
recommends that the assailed decision of the appellate court must be upheld principally on the
ground that the alleged guilt of the respondents was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether the acquittal of the respondents by the CA bars the petitioner from appealing the
present case

Ruling: A judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable whether it

happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. This means that a review of alleged
errors in the said judgment arising from misappreciation of facts and the evidence adduced cannot
be made without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy which is firmly
established in this jurisdiction.

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot be
considered at risk of double jeopardy which has the following essential elements: 1) the accused
is charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; 2) the court has jurisdiction; 3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded;
and 4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent.

107. San Vicente v. People, GR132081, Nov. 26, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for killing Wong. Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer
to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission
warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent. The trial court granted
the motion and dismissed the case together with the civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

HELD: the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. Significantly, once the court grants the
demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

MAINPOINT: Upon acquittal, any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.

108. People v. CA, GR 132396, Sept. 23, 2002

FACTS: The trial court rendered a decision finding appellants to have conspired with one another to
deceive complainant, and convicted them of Estafa. They interposed a timely appeal to the CA thus,
amended the decision. Accused Ma. Lourdes Deutsch whose crime has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, is hereby ACQUITTED. She argued that the acquittal was unfounded, arbitrary, unjust,
and constituted grave abuse and hence, following several contentions. Petitioner likewise denies that
Deutsch would suffer double jeopardy should this petition be granted. Relying on People vs. Castaeda,
that this petition is merely a continuation of the case before the trial court and not a new one, no jeopardy
has yet attached. The OSG, in turn, avers that in case of acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect should
be taken solely by the state and the private complainant is limited only to the appeal of the civil aspect.
The OSG argues that Deutsch stands to suffer from double jeopardy in the event that this petition is given
due course.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s appeal is merely a continuation of the case and does not constitute
double jeopardy

HELD: it is likewise true that an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction does not really acquit and therefore does not terminate the case. There can be no double
jeopardy if the said acquittal is based on a void indictment, however, as pointed out by the OSG, whatever
error might have been committed by the Court of Appeals in said decision, it could only be an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. It could not affect the intrinsic validity of its decision. Consequently, the
acquittal of Deutsch may no longer be reviewed, for to do so would place her in double jeopardy in
violation of the basic tenets of our fundamental law and current jurisprudence.

Legal jeopardy attaches only:

1. upon a valid indictment;

2. before a competent court;

3. after arraignment;

4. when a valid plea has been entered; and

5. the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

109. People v. Sandiganbayan 491 SCRA 185

FACTS: This case is for the reversal of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan acquitting the accused who were
charged with technical malversation for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt of guilt, when Dominador
T. Belac assumed office as Governor and Noe V. Dannang the Provincial Budget Officer at the time.
Outraged, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, sought for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted contrary to law
and applicable jurisprudence and with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in acquitting all the accused of all the charges, considering that proof beyond reasonable
doubt had been adduced to prove the guilt of the accused for all the crimes charged.

ISSUE: Whether an acquittal by erroneous ruling can be subject to appeal w/o violating the law on double
jeopardy.

HELD: The prosecution cannot simultaneously avail of the remedies of a special civil action for certiorari,
petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in civil cases. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate
remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45.21 A petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal.

The government has already been afforded one opportunity to prove defendant’s culpability and, when
it has failed to persuade the court not to enter a final judgment favorable to the accused, the
constitutional policies underlying the ban against multiple trials become compelling. It matters not
whether the final judgment constitutes a formal "acquittal" and no matter how erroneous the ruling.

MAINPOINT: The judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars further prosecution on any aspect of
the count, and consequently, bars appellate review of the trial court’s error. Unless grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is shown, the errors committed by the trial court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, or even the legal soundness of such decision, errors of judgment, mistakes in its findings
and conclusions, are not proper subjects of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It can may be
assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a
quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.

MAINPOINT: Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it
happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the
judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

People v. CA – 516 SCRA 383

Facts:
This petition for certiorari assails the Court of Appeals Decision reversing the trial courts
conviction for two cases of homicide of herein private respondent Ramon Galicia, and acquitted
him.
Issue:
Whether or not a review of the acquittal of Galicia constitute double jeopardy
Ruling:
Yes. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The
finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding
the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing
a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. Hence, it cannot be disputed that
the verdict of the Court of Appeals acquitting Ramon Galicia is now final and irreviewable.
This is not to say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is without
exceptions. For there are two recognized exceptions: (1) Where there has been deprivation of
due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse
of discretion under exceptional circumstances. However, in this case, we find that the exceptions
do not exist.
People v. Laguio – 518 SCRA 393
Facts:

Three informations were filed against Lawrence C. Wang for Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act,
Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban. During his arraignment, accused Wang
refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea
of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Thereafter, joint trial of the three consolidated cases followed.

On December 19, 1996, the prosecution filed Manifestation that it has rested its case in so far as
the Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its
Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997.
Prosecution opposed.

On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein
assailed Resolution granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not to appeal the demurrer to evidence will amount to double jeopardy

Ruling:

Yes. An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits,
and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
previously made some exceptions.

The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan presents one exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law: No court whose Presiding Justice
has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree made it
possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of
due process of law.

The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to
afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.

Take Note!

While the order of dismissal may be annulled by an original special civil action for certiorari, the
right against double jeopardy will not be violated. However, where appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper.
People v. Dumlao – 580 SCRA 409 (void acquittal)

Facts:

This is an appeal to the Sandiganbayan resolution which granted the motion to dismiss/quash of
respondent Dumlao and dismissed the case against him.

An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao and others with
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. After the pre-trial, Dumlao filed a motion to
dismiss/quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. And was held
meritorious. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan
resolution.

Issue:

W/N the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it dismissed the criminal
case against Dumlao

Held:

Insufficiency of evidence is not of the grounds of motion to quash. Insufficiency is ground for
dismissal only after the prosecution rests its case. In this case, Sandiganbayan deprived the prosecution
to present its evidence in doing so violated the rights to due process.

In the instant case, double jeopardy has not yet set in. The first jeopardy has not yet attached. There is no
question that four of the five elements of legal jeopardy are present. However, the Court find the last
element – valid conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of the case – wanting. In the instant case,
there was no error of judgment but a denial of due process resulting in loss of jurisdiction. Respondent
Dumlao would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the Sandiganbayan
had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist.

Tiu v. CA – 586 SCRA 118

Facts:

The case stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Edgardo
Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, David Tiu (Tiu) filed a
criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes. Upon motion of Pasion, the two criminal cases
were consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC of Pasay City.
 After trial, MeTC rendered judgment dismissing both charges on ground of insufficiency
of evidence.

Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. Afterwards, Tiu,
through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC of Pasay
City rendered a decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC and ordered the case to be
remanded in the MeTC. Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.

Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the
decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal
of the two cases. In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted
upon the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision
of acquittal which right the government does not have.

Issue:

Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning
the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.

Held:

Yes. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had
been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.

These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in the criminal case against
Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had
jurisdiction over the criminal case (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and
(4) the MeTC dismissed the Criminal Case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting
to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for the court to grant the petition and
order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to
transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense.

People v. De Grano – 588 SCRA 550

Facts:

An Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC
Batangas, against Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba, together with their co-
accused Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo Genil, who were at-large.
 When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence,
Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. RTC not only
failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.

The RTC entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who
were at large.

Issue:

Whether those accused can invoke double jeopardy considering that they have already lost their
standing in court when they were absent without justifiable reason during the rendering of the judgment,
making the lower court liable for abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

No. Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction
is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the
source of an acquittal. The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint
motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and
Domingo have not regained their standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

NOTES:

A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2)
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Exception: a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void.

Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or an
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is
dismissed without his express consent.

It also should be noted that any acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not
violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.

People v. Nazareno – 595 SCRA 438

FACTS:
Nazareno, Regala, Laureaga and Hular were charged with murder. Ramil Regala executed
affidavits, dated December 28, 1988 4 and January 2, 1989, admitting participation in the slaying
of Bunye and pointing to Narciso Nazareno and a certain Rey Taling as his co-conspirators. He
claimed that they had been hired by Orlando "Boy" Hular to kill the victim and told that they
would be paid P30,000.00 by Manuel Laureaga. His affidavits were corroborated by Orlando
Hular who, in an affidavit, executed on the same day, December 28, 1988, stated that it was
Laureaga who wanted Bunye killed, apparently in connection with Bunye's job as administrator
of the public market in Alabang.
However, Regala and Hular subsequently recanted. Regala claimed that he had been
tortured. 7 On the other hand, Hular claimed that, although he was not tortured, he admitted to
the crime and signed the affidavit because he was afraid he would also be tortured. 8 Narciso
Nazareno also claimed to have been tortured to admit to the crime but refused to sign any
written statement.
However, Nazareno and Regala were convicted, and Laurega and Hular were acquitted
for lack of evidence.
Nazareno and Regala contended that they were arrested without warrant, thus, a
violation of their constitutional right. However, they only questioned the validity of the
warrantless arrest after the lower court has rendered its decision.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in not acquitting the accused

Ruling:
No. Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their
arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in
the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the
fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent
proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on
record point to the culpability of accused.

People v. Duca – 603 SCRA 159 (void acquittal)

Facts:
A petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside and annul the CA decision reversing the
decision of the RTC of Dagupan City, in Criminal which affirmed an earlier decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent Arturo
Duca of the crime of falsification. Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process
when the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor
General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this
Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of
the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal
without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the
CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.

Issue:
Whether the decision of the CA, acquitting respondent should be considered void for
being violative of due process

Ruling:
Yes. In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court,
the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential
Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the
government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This
provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title
III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of
the Philippines in all criminal cases. The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent
without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review
clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed
before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. The CA decision being void for lack of due
process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is
justified.

*Mupas v. People, GR 189365, October 12, 2011 (void order on demurrer)

Facts: The Ombudsman filed two Informations with the RTC-Pasay against petitioner Zafra, Beltran and
Roga charging them for violating Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and malversation under Article 217
of the RPC. After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence.
She alleged therein that the prosecution failed to present proof that she and her co-accused had wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously caused the withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk and
appropriated these for themselves to the prejudice of DSWD. Thus, she concluded that the prosecution
failed to establish the elements of the crime of malversation. She likewise contended that the prosecution
was not able to present proof that she and her co-accused had done so in violation of R. A. 3019. public
respondent Judge Mupas issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra. Public
respondent ruled that, after evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, he found
them substantially insufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner Zafra under the charges filed against
her by the Ombudsman. With the grant of her demurrer to evidence, petitioner was acquitted. Public
respondent then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari assailing the lower courts grant of petitioner
Zafras demurrer to evidence, resulting in her acquittal. The CA found that public respondent Judge Mupas
committed grave abuse of discretion through his grant of private respondents demurrer, which
consequently resulted in her acquittal. Holding that the prosecution was able to present sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of the crimes in the Information filed against private respondent

Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated

Ruling: No. As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer
to evidence, its judgment is considered void.

In this case, the SC agrees with the CA’s disquisition that the lower court’s grant of the demurrer to
evidence of petitioner Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution’s evidence was
prima facie sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against her for her inexcusable negligence, subject
to the defense that she may present in the course of a full-blown trial. The lower court improperly
examined the prosecution’s evidence in light of only one mode of committing the crimes charged; that is,
through positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that the crime of malversation may be
committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or passively through
negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation. In the instant case, the Supreme Court
affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, as such, the Supreme Court deem the trial court’s
consequent order of acquittal void

Metrobank v. Meridiano, G.R. No. 118251, June 29, 2001

Facts:
 Petitioner challenges the decision of the RTC of Manila, in this petition for certiorari
acquitting private respondent Dominador Ong for violation of P.D. No. 115, otherwise known as
the Trust Receipts Law. Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari does not put the private
respondent in double jeopardy since the petition only seeks the nullification of the judgment of
the public respondent and does not in any way place the private accused on trial again. The
defense of double jeopardy, according to the petitioner, is therefore premature in these
proceeding. And that public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when the latter acquitted the private respondent. According to the petitioner, a
nullification of the said judgment will not violate the constitutional principle of double jeopardy
on the ground that the case at bar falls under one of the exceptions to the rule.

Issue:
Whether or not this petition for certiorari puts private respondent in double jeopardy

Ruling:
Yes. Exception to the double jeopardy rule attaches only when the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the prosecution was denied
the opportunity to present its case or that the trial was a sham. In the present case, inasmuch as
the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its case and that there is no
indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of the trial
court’s decision of acquittal will put the private respondent in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy
attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Consequently in such an event, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Accordingly, whenever there is an acquittal or dismissal of a criminal case and the private
complainant intends to question such an acquittal or dismissal, the same must likewise be
undertaken by the State through the Solicitor General. This, petitioner failed to comply. The
present petition for certiorari before this Court was filed by petitioner. It was not initiated by the
Solicitor General. In fact, the Solicitor General intimated to this Court in his comment that a
reversal of the assailed judgment would place the private respondent in double jeopardy. Thus,
this petition for certiorari must be dismissed.

*People v. Relova - 148 SCRA 292

FACTS:
 Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System,
equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined
the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the
private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building"

An information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974.
Manuel pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss because the crime there charged had
already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. The Batangas City Court granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground of prescription, it should have filed within 2 months, but the information
was filed more than 9 months. 14 days later, Manuel was charged for theft of electric power
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was double jeopardy considering that the first offense was
punishable under an ordinance and the second offense was punishable under a national statue?

RULING:
No. A person acquitted in violating the city ordinance cannot be further charged with
crime punishable in RPC since the Identity of the offense is on a single act committed by the
offender.

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the

essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the
respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts
which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time
and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion
and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary
design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable
of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal
ordinance and a national statute).

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute
literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first
and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
Estrada vs Desierto
GR 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Facts: On December, impeachment proceedings began in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out. The PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in
the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends. Estrada contends that he cannot be prosecuted now for the cases
filed against him for it would violate the double jeopardy clause of the constitution, considering
that he was acquitted in the impeachment proceeding.
Issue: WON the criminal cases filed against Estrada should be prohibited because was acquitted
in the impeachment proceeding.

Ruling: No. The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16 hearing of
the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second
envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner. The next day, the public
prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator
Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings
until the HOR shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors, which was
granted. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January
20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President
of the Republic. Thus, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio. Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. Petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor
was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioner’s claim of
double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the
impeachment court.

People vs Logan
GR 135030, July 20, 2001
Facts: The appellant Mercy Logan was convicted with 3 counts of the crimes of estafa and illegal
recruitment in large scale. This was based on the testimonies of 3 complainants alleging that in the
year 1993-1994, in Quezon City, the accused, without any authority of law, for a fee, recruited and
promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons: Rodrigo Acorda
(P65,000.00), Orlando Velasco (P145,000.00), Florante Casia (P100,000.00) without first securing
the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment. The
complainants paid the required fees and thereafter the travel documents were never made, and
when asked to return the fees, the appellant failed to make good her promises to pay back the
amount. The complainants went to court and Logan was convicted in the RTC of the above-
mentioned crimes (4 separate crimes).

Issue: WON the conviction of 3 counts of estafa and large-scale illegal recruitment violated the
provision against double jeapordy.
Ruling: No. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged
and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under
paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is that the crime
of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may also be
convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.