College Assurance Plan Phil. Inc., vs. Belfranlt Development Inc.

G. R. No. 155604
November 22, 2007

AUSTRIA MARTINEZ, J:

FACTS:
Belfranlt Development Inc (Belfranlt) leased the second and third floors of its building to
College Assurance Plan (CAP). A fire incident destroyed the parts of the building, including the third
floor units occupied by CAP. The cause of the fire was identified to be an overheated coffee
percolator located in the leased premises of CAP located on the 3rd floor.

Belfranlt requested that CAP vacate the 3d floor as it needed to be repaired and demanded
that CAP pay P1.5m for repairs. CAP vacated both the 3rd and 2nd floors. Belfanlt stated that the 2nd
floor was not affected, thus there was no reason for them to vacate. Hence they still need to pay
rentals. Belfranlt through a second demand letter demanded that CAP pay P2m for repairs, as
estimate by professionals. CAP stated that they could no longer return as they had already leased
another area and that, they are not liable alleging that the fire was a fortuitous event for which they
could not be held liable.

ISSUE:
Whether the fire, which destroyed the building, is a fortuitous event.
Whether res ipsa loquitur applies with regard to the facts provided

HELD:
1) No, Fortuitous events are those events which could not be foreseen or which though
foreseen, were inevitable. In this case, it was the fault and negligence of Belfranlt in using the coffee
percolator that caused the fire. If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence
of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous
event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence

2) Yes, the CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert
testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites
obtain:
a) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
c) the injury sufferedmust not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.

The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the
outcome of a human act or omission. It originated in the store room which petitioners had
possession and control of. Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these
facts and circumstances speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire
or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is
sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former
and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence. It was all up to petitioners to
dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.