PORTUGAL vs.

PORTUGAL-BELTRAN

Facts:

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la
Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave
birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal,
who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor. Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Portugal-
Beltran executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person”
adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in her name.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-
Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever
to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed
by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd
right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction
over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC‘s
dismissal of the case.

Issue: Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit
of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name

Held: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is
that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there
is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other
issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal
is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and
Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and
Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr.,
the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
 BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Eusebio Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor
of his wife, cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all
surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes (wife) died the following year. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of Capili, she was substituted by her collateral
relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed
Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. The executor filed a
project of partition in the estate proceedings in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Reyes,
whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. These relatives filed an opposition to the
executor’s project of partition and submitted a counter-projection of their own claiming ½ of the
properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Capili on the theory that they belong not to the
latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The probate court issued an
order declaring the donation void for the reason that it falls under Article133 of the Civil
Code which prohibits donation between spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the court
disapproved both project of partitions and directed the executor to file another, dividing the
property mentioned in the last will and testament of Capili and the properties mentioned in the
deed of donation, between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not a probate court in a special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the deed of donation in question and pass upon the question of title or ownership of
the properties mentioned in the will.

Held:
Yes. The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property
cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays
merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the
probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action. However, the court has also held that when the parties
interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a
question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon (and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under
judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate
proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The Court held that
the determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The
probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among heirs who are all
parties to the proceedings, including the widow, now represented because of her death, by her
heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who appeared
voluntarily. The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed
lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in question the
issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of the probate court.