The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

Latin America and

Peace Operations:
Partners and Perspectives
English /Spanish
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

Latin america and

Peace OPeratiOns:
Partners and Perspectives

Ann Livingstone, Ph.D., Editor

Kristine St-Pierre, M.A., Managing Editor

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 3

 Published in Canada by the Canadian Peacekeeping Press
PO Box 100, Clementsport, Nova Scotia, B0S 1E0 Canada
orders@peaceopearations.org

© 2011 by the Canadian Peacekeeping Press of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other-wise, without prior written permission of the Canadian
Peacekeeping Press of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
The views and opinions expressed in these texts are those of the authors only. The accuracy of the quotations and references
in these texts is solely the responsibility of the authors.

Library and archives canada cataloguing in Publication

Latin America and peace operations [electronic resource] :

partners and perspectives / Ann Livingstone, editor ; Kristine St-Pierre, managing editor.

(The Pearson papers ; v. 13, 2011)

Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic monograph in PDF format.
Text in English and Spanish.
ISBN 978-1-896551-78-4

1. Peace-building--Latin America. 2. United Nations--Peacekeeping forces--Latin America. 3. Women and peace--Latin America.
I. Livingstone, Ann II. St-Pierre, Kristine III. Series: Pearson papers (Online) ; v. 13, 2011

JZ5584.L3L38 2011 327.1’72 C2011-901126-3

For more information please contact us:

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
HCI Building, Suite 5110, 1125 Colonel By Drive,
Ottawa, Ontario, K1S 5B6 Canada
www.peaceoperations.org

4 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

OTHER PEARSON PAPERS
PUBLICATIONS
The Pearson Papers, Volume 1:
Public Information Campaigns in Peacekeeping: The UN Experience in Haiti

The Pearson Papers, Volume 2:

The Level Killing Fields of Yugoslavia: An Observer Returns

The Pearson Papers, Volume 3:

African Peacekeepers: Partners or Proxies?

The Pearson Papers, Volume 4:

Intelligence In Peacekeeping

The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence-Gathering in UN Peacekeeping

Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modern Peacekeeping

The Pearson Papers, Volume 5:

The Laws of War and The Rules of Peace: Why Traditional Legal Models Do Not Work

The Pearson Papers, Volume 6:

Confronting Rwandan Genocide: The Military Options What Could and Should the
International Community Have Done?

The Pearson Papers, Volume 7:

The 1999 United Nations and 2000 Organizations of African Unity Formal Inquiries:
A Retrospective Examination of Peacekeeping and the Rwandan Crisis of 1994

The Pearson Papers, Volume 8:

Lessons Learned on UNMIK Judiciary

The Pearson Papers, Volume 9:

On Issues and Initiatives: The International Red Cross in Times of Duress and Ambiguity,
2nd Edition

The Pearson Papers, Volume 10, Issue 1:

Measures of Effectiveness: Peace Operations and Beyond

The Pearson Papers, Volume 11, Issue 1 (Spring 2008):

Challenges of Effective Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations

The Pearson Papers, Volume 11, Issue 2 (Fall 2008):

Opportunities for Enhancing Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations

The Pearson Papers, Volume 12, 2009:

Environmental Considerations for Building Peace

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 5

CONTENTS
Contenido
8 Editorial Review Board
Junta de revisión editorial
9 Contributors | Colaboradores
11 Foreword | Prólogo
Overview of the Pearson Peacekeeping
13 Centre’s Engagement in Latin America
Perspectiva sobre el compromiso del Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre en América Latina
38 Perspectives on Lessons Learned
in Peace Operations
Perspectivas sobre lecciones aprendidas en
las operaciones de paz
39 The Role of Women Peacekeepers in
Combating Sexual Violence in Armed
Conflict Situations: Perspectives from Latin
American Troop-Contributing Countries
– Cecilia Mazzotta

14 Timeline: PPC Partnership in Latin America,

1995-2010
47 Mejorando las operaciones de paz
a través de lecciones aprendidas en
Cronología: Colaboración entre PPC y la asistencia humanitaria: Perspectiva
América Latina, 1995-2010 de la UEMPE
– Angel Navas Cruz

ARTICLES | ARTÍCULOS
50 Lecciones aprendidas sobre género
en las operaciones de paz: Perspectiva
16 Perspectives on Latin American Contribution
to Peace Operations
del CAECOPAZ
– Ana Florencia Talamoni
Perspectivas sobre la contribución
latinoamericana a las operaciones de paz
54 Confidence-Building and “Good Offices”
After Angostura: Assessing the MIB/OAS
17 Regionalización de las misiones de paz:
La presencia de latinoamérica en
Initiatives along the Colombian-Ecuadorian
Burning Border
MINUSTAH – Fernando A. Chinchilla
– Ana Laura Borro
59 Perspectiva de un observador militar desde
22 Latin America’s Involvement in United
Nations Peace Operations and Brazil’s
el interior del Congo, 2002-2003
– Carlos R. Delgado
Engagement as a Key Player
Police Reform in Haiti: Lessons Learned,
– Eduarda Hamann
63 the Role of the International Community
26 Mujer, paz y seguridad: Chile y la
evolución de la incorporación femenina
and the Way Forward
– Allison Poff
en materias de defensa y orden público
– Carolina Céspedes Benaventes
About the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
y Jorge Canales Ukrow
70 and The Pearson Papers
31 The Brazilian PMDF and United Nations
Peace Operations: A Brief History and
A cerca del Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
y de The Pearson Papers
Future Perspectives
– Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque Melo
Neto and Antônio Sérgio Carrera de
Albuquerque Melo

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 7

EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD
Junta de revisión editorial

Margaret Daly Hayes has specialized in U.S.-Latin Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha has been a full professor
American governance, political economy and security of international relations at the University of Brasília since
issues throughout her career. She is an associate lecturer 1996, where he teaches international relations theories,
at Georgetown University and Vice-President of Evidence international security, Brazilian foreign policy,and has also
Based Research, Inc. From November 1997 to March conducted research on U.S. foreign and defence policies.
2004, she served as founding director of the Center for At the University, he has been chair of the Department,
Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) at the National as well as Coordinator for Graduate Studies and for
Defense University. Dr. Hayes is currently working on Undergraduate Studies. Dr Ramalho also works as Senior
security sector reform issues with USAID and on integration Civilian Defence Assistant to the Secretariat for Strategic
of civilian and military activities in post-conflict and fragile Affairs of the Brazilian Presidency of the Republic.
state environments.
Dr Ramalho received a Ph.D. from the University of Sao
Dr. Hayes has undertaken projects on homeland security Paulo, a master’s degree in international relations from
and defence for the Departments of Homeland Security the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
and Defence and has an on-going program to enhance and in political science from the Instituto Universitário de
competitiveness issues of concern in Latin American Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ). From April 2007 to
global trade and economic development relations. She July 2008, he worked at the Brazilian Embassy in Port-
has published widely on civil-military relations, inter- au-Prince as Director of the Brazilian Studies Center and
governmental and NGO relations, as well as peace and Cultural Counsellor and as a lecturer at the Université d’État
humanitarian operations, among other defence related d’Haïti. From 2003 to 2007, he directed the Department of
subjects. Dr. Hayes holds a bachelor of journalism, a Cooperation at the Secretariat for Studies and Cooperation
master’s degree in Spanish literature and political science, of the Ministry of Defence. He has been a visiting professor
and a Ph.D. in political science. at many universities, editor of academic journals, and
has worked as a consultant for both public institutions
Hal Klepak es profesor emérito del Royal Military College
and private firms. Dr. Ramalho has also represented the
(RMC) of Canada y asesor del gobierno de Canadá en
Brazilian community of international relations scholars
cuestiones de seguridad hemisférica. Después de su BA en
before the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal
McGill University en Montreal estudió para su maestría y
de Nível Superior (Capes) and the National Council of
doctorado en la Universidad de Londres en el campo de la
Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).
historia latinoamericana. Sirvió como oficial en la infantería
en el Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) de Canadá
pasando ‘stages’ con los ejércitos británico y francés.
Dr Klepak ha enseñado estudios estratégicos e historia
militar en Le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, la
Universidad de Montreal, Queen´s University y Oxford. En
2010 fue asesor del Ministerio de Defensa de Bolivia para
la IX Conferencia de Ministros de Defensa de las Américas
y es actualmente miembro de la comisión de verificación
de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA)
para la disputa entre Ecuador y Colombia. Es autor de
varios libros, incluso Raúl Castro: estratega de la defensa
revolucionaria cubana (Buenos Aires, Capital Intelectual,
2010) y Cuba’s Military 1990-2005: Revolutionary
Soldiers during Counter-revolutionary Times (Nueva York,
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005).

8 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

CONTRIBUTORS
Colaboradores
Allison Poff is a Senior Program Analyst for Foreign Affairs
and International Trade in Canada’s Stabilization and
Reconstruction Task Force (START). She is responsible for
managing START’s police and coast guard reform projects
in Haiti. In the months following the January earthquake
she spent time in Haiti assessing police reform needs,
meeting with national and international stakeholders to
discuss progress and developing new projects. Ms. Poff
joined Foreign Affairs in 2008 as a desk officer for the
Haiti Task Force and was recruited by START a year later.
Prior to joining the department she worked as a program
coordinator for the Critical Wildlife Habitat Program in
Manitoba for four years.
Ana Florencia Talamoni, es Licenciada en Relaciones
Internacionales por la Universidad del Salvador, Argentina.
Cursó estudios de posgrado en Operaciones de Paz
en la Universidad de la Defensa en Estados Unidos de
Norteamérica, de Negociación en la Universidad de
Buenos Aires y actualmente se encuentra cursando una
Maestría en Defensa. Desde fines de 2004 se encuentra
trabajando en el Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento
Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ), en el
Departamento de Doctrina. Allí es la responsable de la
División de Lecciones Aprendidas. Además se desempeña
como docente del Centro, dicta clases de Protección de los
Derechos Humanos en misiones de paz; Género y Derechos
del Niño; Marco Legal; Negociación, entre otras materias,
todas ellas referidas a las Operaciones de Paz. Desde el
2009 es el ¨Gender Focal Point¨ del CAECOPAZ.
Ana Laura Borro, es Licenciada en Relaciones Internacio-
nales de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario, maestranda
en Relaciones Internacionales América Latina-Europa de la
Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italia. En la actualidad
se desempeña como asesora de la Dirección General de
Cooperación para el Mantenimiento de la Paz del Minis-
terio de Defensa de la República Argentina.
Capitán Ingeniero Ángel Navas Cruz, es subteniente
del arma de Ingeniería de la República del Ecuador. En
el 2007, conformo el VI Contingente de Ingeniería en
Construcciones Horizontales como parte de la Compañía
Chileno–Ecuatoriana de la MINUSTAH y fue nombrado
posteriormente instructor de la Unidad Escuela de Misiones
de Paz Ecuador (UEMPE) hasta el 2010, desempeñándose
como jefe administrativo y logístico, jefe e instructor
de los diferentes cursos de la MINUSTAH. Después del
terremoto que azotó Haití, integró la “Fuerza de Tarea
Ecuador” como Oficial de Enlace, a fin de apoyar en
los trabajos de búsqueda, rescate y coordinación para
ayuda humanitaria. También en el 2010, obtuvo el título
de Licenciado en Ciencias Militares y actualmente forma
parte de la Compañía de Ingenieros Militares de Ecuador
en Haití, como segundo comandante y jefe de la sección
técnica, expertos en construcciones viales, realizando
trabajos para la reconstrucción de Haití.
Antônio Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque Melo, é Graduado
pela Academia Nacional do FBI (FBI National Academy,
Quântico, EUA), Especialista em Gestão Estratégica
em Segurança Pública, MBA em Gestão de Segurança
Pública e Defesa Social e Bacharel em Administração. Foi
Observador Policial na Operação das Nações Unidas
em Moçambique - ONUMOZ (1993/1994). É Tenente-
Coronel da Reserva da PMDF.
Coronel (Retirado) Carlos Ramón Delgado González, prestó
servicios en forma continua entre marzo de 1972, fecha
de su ingreso al Liceo Militar General Artigas, y noviembre
de 2010. En los años 1984 y 1995, integró la Fuerza
Multinacional y Observadores desplegada en la Península
del Sinaí totalizando dos años en ese territorio. Entre mayo
de 2002 y julio de 2003, fue Observador Militar en la
Republica Democrática del Congo donde se desempeñó
como Jefe del Equipo de Observadores Militares (en
Dubie), Comandante del Centro de Coordinación (Sub
Sector de Manono), y fundador y Comandante del Centro
de Coordinación (Sub Sector de Bukavu y de Goma).
También, el Coronel (Ret.) Delgado fue Jefe de la Cátedra
de Estrategia, Director de la Escuela de Estrategia, Jefe de
Estado Mayor de una División de Ejército y Director de la
Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz del Uruguay. El
Coronel (Ret.) Delgado es Licenciado en Ciencias Militares,
con mención en orientación estrategia y es también piloto
aviador civil.
Teniente Carolina Céspedes Benavente, es actualmente
Oficial del Ejército de Chile, condición bajo la cual ha
cumplido servicios en la Misión de Naciones Unidas para
la Estabilización en Haití (MINUSTAH) y ha participado
en talleres y seminarios relacionados con la perspectiva
de género en Argentina, Chile y Holanda. En el área
docente, dicta módulos relacionados con la protección de
grupos vulnerables y temas comunicacionales en el ámbito
de las operaciones de paz en el Centro Conjunto para
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 9
Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC), lugar donde
presta servicios desde el año 2009 a la fecha. Estudió
periodismo en la Universidad Santo Tomás y ha cursado
diversos estudios de post-grado en el ámbito de la Defensa.
Cecilia Mazzotta, is the author of the publication Women in
the Armed and Police Forces: Resolution 1325 and Peace
Operations in Latin America, published by the Security
and Defense Network of Latin America (RESDAL) in 2009
(Spanish version) and 2010 (English version). Ms. Mazzotta
is a program officer with the RESDAL project Women in the
armed forces and police: a gender approach to peace
operations, supported by the Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (2007-
2010). As a researcher on gender issues in security and
defense, Ms. Mazzotta is a member of the Advisory
Commission of the Act Nº 26.485 on Women Protection
of Argentina, member of the Review Board for the Gender
& Security Sector Reform Toolkit and the DCAFs Occasional
Paper on Female Security Sector Staff Associations
encouraged by DCAF & INSTRAW. Ms. Mazzotta holds
a Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and is part
of RESDAL.
Eduarda Hamann is a lawyer who has been working in
international politics and international security for the
last 10 years. She holds a Masters of Arts degree and a
Ph.D. in international affairs and is a senior researcher
and consultant for peacekeeping, United Nations and
international politics for VIVA RIO – HAITI. Her main areas of
interest are peacekeeping and peacebuilding, international
institutions, law of armed conflicts, international human
rights and humanitarian law, and prevention and reduction
of armed violence. Ms. Hamann has been highly involved
with teaching activities in undergraduate and graduate
courses of international affairs in the Catholic University of
Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV)
and Universidade Cândido Mendes. In recent years, she
has also been a researcher and a consultant on international
politics to a variety of institutions such as Canal Futura, Viva
Rio, Igarapé, and Quaker United Nations Office. Recent
publications include discussions on the UN peacekeeping
mission in Haiti (Conflict Trends 2009/4) and the impacts
of armed violence on civil population (Revista Brasileira de
Segurança Pública 2008/3).
Fernando A. Chinchilla holds a Ph.D. in Political Science
from Université de Montréal. His research focuses
on international interventions and conflict resolution
(peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding),
democratization processes, war-to-peace transitions, and
the establishment of sustainable or precarious peace in
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Mr. Chinchilla is a
Research Associate with the University of Montreal and the
Center for International Peace and Security Studies (CIPSS)
at McGill University. He has also been a consultant for
the OAS Good Offices Mission in Colombia and Ecuador
(MIB/OAS) since January 2009. In January 2010, he
10 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
began a post-doctoral research at the Centre d’étude
d’Afrique Noire (CÉAN) at the Institut d’études politiques
in Bordeaux, France. Mr. Chincilla is also, since August
2010, a guest Professor at the Facultad Latinoamericana
de Ciencias Sociales in Ecuador (FLACSO-Ecuador).
Jorge Canales Ukrow, desde el año 2009 a la fecha,
se desempeña como Analista Internacional del Centro
Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC).
Encargado de la investigación y monitoreo de la evolución
de las operaciones de paz a nivel mundial, ha participado
en diversos equipos y mesas de trabajo a nivel nacional
e internacional correspondientes a análisis de conflictos
armados, evolución de las Operaciones de Paz, catástrofes
naturales (Haití-Chile), perspectiva de género y ayuda
humanitaria, entre otros. En el área docente, es profesor
de las cátedras “Sistema de la Unión Europea”, “Cultura
Haitiana”, “Respeto a la diversidad” y “Relación con los
Medios de Comunicación”. Estudió periodismo y ciencias
políticas en la Universidad Gabriela Mistral y ha cursado
diversos estudios de post-grado concernientes al ámbito de
la defensa, entre los que se destacan los diplomados de
“Corresponsal de Defensa” dictado por la Academia de
Guerra del Ejército, Diplomado “La Seguridad Internacional
y Las Operaciones de Paz” impartido por la Academia
Nacional de Estudios Políticos Estratégicos, Curso para
Periodistas en Área de Conflicto, efectuado por el Centro
Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz “Sergio Vieira Mello”
(CCOPAB) Río de Janeiro, Brasil.
Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque Melo Neto, é Mestrando
em Ciências Políticas, Pós-graduado em Direitos Humanos
e Democratização, Bacharel em Relações Internacionais
e graduando em Direito. É Capitão da PMDF e serviu por
um ano na Direção de Operações da Polícia da ONU
na MINUSTAH - Haiti (2006/2007). Foi coordenador e
instrutor do Curso de Observador Policial para Operações
de Paz da ONU (PMDF, Brasília/2009), do United
Nations Police Pre-Deployment Course (PMDF & Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre – Canadá, Brasília/2010) e foi
Observador Internacional Convidado do United Nations
Police Officer Course (Peace Support Operations, Polícia
Nacional da Suécia e Centro Internacional das Forças
Armadas da Suécia – SWEDINT, Suécia/2010). Possui
blog especializado em UNPOL (www.missaodepaz.
wordpress.com) e ministra aulas e palestras sobre o tema.
FOREWORD
The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) is pleased to present the thirteenth volume of
The Pearson Papers: “Latin America and Peace Operations: Partners and Perspectives.”
Volume 13 of The Pearson Papers is a collection of articles by academics and practitioners
from the hemisphere who engage in a variety of peace operations activities. These partners
have graciously agreed to share their perspectives, experience and lessons learned on
a multitude of core issues within or closely related to peace operations. The articles
discuss a number of topics including the role of military observers and police in peace
operations, the participation of women and training requirements for addressing gender
issues, challenges to police reform, and confidence-building initiatives. It is our hope that
this volume, through the sharing of knowledge and ideas, will not only help to shed light
on the region’s long-standing involvement in peace operations, but will serve to further
strengthen regional linkages.
We would like to acknowledge the important contributions that have been made by others
in preparing this issue. First and foremost, we would like to thank the Latin American
Peacekeeping Capacity Building project at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre—Col. (ret.)
Mike Snell, Alexandra Reano and Jaimi Gardner—for collaborating on this special English-
Spanish volume of The Pearson Papers. This volume is the first of its kind and it is our goal
to mirror such collaboration in the future with other actors, both internal and external to
the PPC.
We would also like to thank Kathryn Robicheau for her continuous commitment to the
journal and her invaluable assistance and expertise throughout the process. We are very
appreciative of our Editorial Review Board as well as the internal PPC review team for their
enthusiasm and support in reviewing the articles. Finally, we would like to acknowledge
the incredible work of our translation partner, FORCE Translation & Interpreting.
We hope that you enjoy this issue and find that it makes a valuable contribution to your
understanding of complex peace operations.

Ann Livingstone, Ph.D.

Editor

Kristine St-Pierre, M.A.

Managing Editor

Ottawa, Ontario

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 11

 PRÓLOGO
El Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) tiene el placer de presentar el volumen decimotercero
de The Pearson Papers: “Latin America and Peace Operations: Partners and Perspectives.”
El Volumen 13 de The Pearson Papers es una colección de artículos de académicos y
profesionales del hemisferio que participan en una variedad de actividades relacionadas
con las operaciones de paz. Estos socios han aceptado gentilmente compartir sus
perspectivas, experiencias y lecciones aprendidas acerca de innumerables temas comunes
a, o estrechamente relacionados con las operaciones de paz. Los artículos presentan varios
tópicos incluyendo el rol de los observadores militares y de la policía en las operaciones
de paz, la participación de las mujeres y los requerimientos de entrenamiento para
abordar los temas de género, desafíos a la reforma policial e iniciativas de fortalecimiento
de confianza. Nuestra esperanza es que este volumen, a través del intercambio de
conocimiento e ideas, no solamente arroje luces sobre la participación de larga data de
la región en las operaciones de paz, sino que sirva para afianzar aún más los vínculos
regionales.
Quisiéramos reconocer la importante contribución que han hecho distintas personas en la
preparación de esta edición. En primer lugar, agradecer al Programa de Fortalecimiento
de Capacidades en Mantenimiento de Paz para América Latina del Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre en la persona del Coronel (R) Mike Snell, Alexandra Reano y Jaimi Gardner por su
colaboración en este volumen especial de The Pearson Papers en su versión inglés-español.
Este volumen es el primero de este tipo y nuestro objetivo es igualar dicha colaboración
en el futuro a través de otros actores, tanto internos como externos al PPC.
Todo nuestro aprecio a Kathryn Robicheau por su continuo compromiso con esta
publicación y su inestimable asistencia y experticia en todo el proceso. Estamos muy
agradecidos de nuestro Comité Editorial así como de nuestro equipo revisor del PPC
por su entusiasmo y apoyo en la revisión de los artículos. Finalmente, quisiéramos hacer
un reconocimiento al increíble trabajo realizado por nuestro socio en el área de las
traducciones, FORCE Translation & Interpreting.
Esperamos que ustedes disfruten esta edición y descubran en ella una valiosa contribución
a su entendimiento respecto a las operaciones de paz complejas.

Ann Livingstone, Ph.D.

Editor

Kristine St-Pierre, M.A.

Editor Jefe

Ottawa, Ontario

12 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

OVERVIEW OF THE PEARSON PEACEKEEPING
CENTRE’S ENGAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
Since its establishment in 1994, the Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre (PPC) has been engaged in Latin America. In the early
days of the Centre, numerous participants came to our campus
in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia to attend courses and other training
activities. While this commitment continues to this day, the PPC’s
presence has also become more noticeable in Latin America,
with seminars, exercises and courses being conducted in the
region together with our partners.
With the Canadian government’s renewed commitment
to engagement in the Americas and the need to strengthen
cooperation in peace operations, especially in Haiti, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
provided funding and support to the PPC’s expansion of its
activities in the Americas. As a first step, in April 2007, the PPC
and the Government of Brazil held a seminar in Brasilia, entitled
MINUSTAH: Supporting its Institutional Memory. Following this,
the PPC and the Centro Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz
de Chile (CECOPAC) co-hosted a seminar in Santiago, Chile
in May 2009 entitled Initiatives and Challenges to Integrated
Training for MINUSTAH Regional Contributors.
PERSPECTIVA SOBRE EL COMPROMISO DEL
PEARSON PEACEKEEPING CENTRE EN AMÉRICA LATINA
Desde su establecimiento en 1994, el Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre (PPC) ha estado comprometido con América Latina. Al
inicio de su creación, numerosos participantes llegaron a nuestro
campus en Cornwallis, Nueva Escocia para asistir a cursos y
otras actividades de capacitación. Esto continúa hasta hoy. Ya
que el modelo de entrega del PPC cambió a uno en donde la
capacitación se lleva a cabo fuera de Canadá, la presencia del
PPC se ha hecho más visible en América Latina y en la región se
llevan a cabo seminarios, ejercicios y cursos.
Con un gobierno canadiense renovado y comprometido con
la participación en las Américas y reconociendo la necesidad
de fortalecer la cooperación en las operaciones de paz,
especialmente en Haití, el Departamento de Asuntos Exteriores
y Comercio Internacional de Canadá, ha entregado fondos
y apoyo al PPC, con el fin de expandir sus actividades en las
Américas. Como un primer paso, en abril de 2007, el PPC
y el gobierno de Brasil realizaron un seminario en Brasilia
titulado MINUSTAH: Apoyo a su Memoria Institucional. Luego
el PPC y el Centro Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz de
Chile (CECOPAC) fueron los anfitriones de un seminario
realizado en Santiago, Chile en mayo de 2009 titulado
Iniciativas y Desafíos para un Entrenamiento Integrado de los
Contribuyentes Regionales a la MINUSTAH.
Debido al éxito de estos seminarios, el PPC recibió apoyo
adicional del gobierno de Canadá para desarrollar el Programa
de Fortalecimiento de Capacidades en Mantenimiento de Paz
Following the successes of these seminars, the PPC received
additional support from the Government of Canada
to develop the Latin America Peacekeeping Capacity
Building Project (LAPCB). Launched in October 2009, this
was the first PPC project dedicated to the region. Working
closely with members of the Latin American Association of
Peacekeeping Training Centres (ALCOPAZ), the project
was designed to enhance the Latin American peacekeeping
training centres’ ability to contribute civilian, military and
police personnel to United Nations peace operations. This
project has led to the undertaking of a number of activities
with partners in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay.
These activities allowed the PPC to identify several focus
areas that will guide the PPC’s partnership with Latin
America in the coming years, such as the participation of
women in peace operations, support to ALCOPAZ and new
peacekeeping training centres in the region, and police
training for peace operations.
The timeline on the following page provides an overview
of the PPC’s increasing involvement in Latin America.
para América Latina (LAPCB). El lanzamiento del LAPBC se
realizó en octubre de 2009, y este fue el primer proyecto
del PPC dedicado para la región. El proyecto se diseñó para
trabajar estrechamente con los centros de entrenamiento
para operaciones de paz de América Latina, especialmente
aquellos que son miembros de la Asociación Latinoamericana
de Centros de Entrenamiento de Operaciones de Paz
conocida como ALCOPAZ, para mejorar sus capacidades
en la contribución de personal civil, militar y policial a las
operaciones de paz de Naciones Unidas. Dentro de este
proyecto se han desarrollado un sinnúmero de actividades
con socios de Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Perú y Uruguay.
Estas actividades permitieron al PPC identificar varias áreas
que se convertirán en el foco central de la asociación entre
el PPC y América Latina en los años venideros, incluyendo
la participación de las mujeres en las operaciones de paz,
el apoyo a ALCOPAZ y los nuevos centros de entrenamiento
para operaciones de paz en la región, así como el
entrenamiento de la policía en operaciones de paz.
La secuencia cronológica en la página siguiente entrega
una visión general de la participación creciente del PPC
en América Latina.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 13
TIMELINE:
PPC Partnership in Latin America, 1995-2010
1995 Haiti – A field trip component to
Peacekeeping Management Command and
Staff Course (later The Advanced Course)
continued until 2000.
1998 argentina – The Changing Face of
Peacekeeping course (field tested in Japan)
and delivered in Argentina.
2000 colombia – The Changing Face of
Peacekeeping course and seminar.
Usa – Course on modern peace operations at
the Inter American Defence
College for three years.
2001 colombia and costa rica –
2002 The Changing Face of Peacekeeping course.
2001 argentina – Peacekeeping courses with the
Argentinean peacekeeping training centre,
CAECOPAZ, and multilateral Wargame Series
at the Argentine Naval College.
2002 chile – In the Service of Peace (basic course)
at the Chilean peacekeeping training centre
(CECOPAC).
2004 - chile – Seminario ejecutivo en Operaciones
2005 de Paz at CECOPAC.
Guatemala – Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration (DDR) course.
14 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
2006 chile – Wise Counsel course with the Chilean
training centre, CECOPAC.
2007 Brazil – Seminar with the Government of
Brazil on Supporting MINUSTAH’s Institutional
Memory.
2009 chile – Seminar with CECOPAC on Initiatives
and Challenges to Integrated Training for
MINUSTAH Regional Contributors.
argentina – Complex Peace Operations
(CPO) Seminar with CAECOPAZ.
2010 Peru – Seminar with Peruvian training centre,
CECOPAZ-Peru, on Handling Crises in Peace
Operations: A Case Study of MINUSTAH.
Brazil – UN Police Pre-Deployment course
with the Federal District Gendarmerie/State
Police of Brasilia (PMDF).
ecuador – Training standards workshop with
Ecuadorian training centre, UEMPE.
colombia – CPO Seminar with the
Colombian training centre, ESAMI.
Guatemala – Three-week Planning for
Integrated Missions (PIM) course with the
Guatemalan training centre, CREOMPAZ.
Uruguay – Seminar on Crosscutting
Challenges to Complex Peace Operations with
Uruguayan training centre, ENOPU.
CRONOLOGÍA:
Colaboración entre PPC y América Latina,
1995-2010
1995 Haití – Un componente del viaje a terreno
al Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor
de Gestión de Operaciones de Paz
(posteriormente El Curso Avanzado) que
continuó hasta el año 2000.
1998 argentina – Curso El Rostro Cambiante del
Mantenimiento de la Paz (probado en terreno
en Japón) y efectuado en Argentina.
2000 colombia – Curso y seminario El Rostro
Cambiante del Mantenimiento de la Paz.
2000 estados Unidos – Curso en mantenimiento
de paz moderno en el Colegio Interamericano
de Defensa durante tres años.
2001 argentina – Cursos de mantenimiento de la
paz de diez días con el Centro Argentino de
Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones
de Paz (CAECOPAZ) y series de juegos de
Guerra Multilaterales en la Escuela Naval
argentina.
2001 colombia y costa rica – Curso El
2002 Rostro Cambiante del Mantenimiento de
la Paz.
2002 chile – Al Servicio de la Paz (curso básico)
en el Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de
Operaciones de Paz (CECOPAC).
2004 chile – Seminario Ejecutivo en
2005 Operaciones de Paz en el CECOPAC.
Guatemala – Desarme, Desmovilización y
Reintegración (versión en el terreno).
2006 chile – Curso en Asesoría Inteligente en
colaboración con el CECOPAC.
2007 Brasil – El primer seminario MINUSTAH
en colaboración con el Gobierno brasileño
titulado MINUSTAH: Apoyando su Memoria
Institucional.
2009 chile – Segundo seminario MINUSTAH con
el CECOPAC titulado Iniciativas y Desafíos
para una Capacitación Integrada por los
Contribuyentes Regionales de la MINUSTAH.
argentina – Seminario de Operaciones
de Paz Complejas en colaboración con el
CAECOPAZ.
2010 Perú – Seminario titulado Manejo de Crisis
en Operaciones de Paz: Un Estudio de Caso
de MINUSTAH en colaboración con el Centro
de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Operaciones
de Paz de Perú (CECOPAZ-Perú).
Brasil – Curso de Entrenamiento Pre-
despliegue de la Policía de Naciones Unidas
(UNPOL) en colaboración con la Policía
Militar del Distrito Federal de Brasilia (PMDF).
ecuador – Taller de estándares de
entrenamiento en colaboración con la Unidad
Escuela de Misiones de Paz “Ecuador”
(UEMPE).
Guatemala – Curso de Planificación de
Misiones Integradas (PIM) en colaboración
con el Comando Regional de Entrenamiento
de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz
(CREOMPAZ).
Uruguay – Seminario titulado Desafíos
Transversales del Entrenamiento para el
Mantenimiento de la Paz en colaboración
con la Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de
Paz del Uruguay (ENOPU).
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 15
 PERSPECTIVES ON LATIN
AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION
TO PEACE OPERATIONS
Perspectivas sobre la contribución
latinoamericana a las operaciones de paz

16 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

 REGIONALIZACIÓN
DE LAS MISIONES DE PAZ:
La presencia de Latinoamérica en MINUSTAH

ana Laura Borro

resUmen
El aporte latinoamericano de tropas a la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití
(MINUSTAH) ha sido el inicio de la creación de un mecanismo político que busca encontrar soluciones
conjuntas y efectivas para conseguir la paz y la seguridad en Haití. El Mecanismo 2x9 es una muestra
de que se puede pensar en términos de una región ocupándose de la seguridad de su zona de
influencia.

aBstract
The contribution of troops from Latin America to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) has signalled the beginning of the creation of a political mechanism that aims to find
effective joint solutions to fomenting peace and security in Haiti. The 2x9 Mechanism demonstrates that
we can now think in terms of a region taking ownership of its security within its own area of influence.

Peacekeeping is a useful
and highly visible element of the efforts
of the United Nations to maintain
international peace and security. . . .
Peacekeeping, properly conceived,
directed, and financed, could become an
important and effective symbol of a new
determination to relieve the peoples of the
world of unnecessary conflict, excessive
armaments and the constant threat of war.
- Sir Brian Urquhart,
ex Secretario General de la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas1
intrOdUcciÓn
E l surgimiento de amenazas nuevas para la paz y la
seguridad internacional desde el fin de la guerra
fría, así como las dificultades con las que se encontró
la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) para
hacerles frente y promover estrategias que prevengan o
que incluso resuelvan los conflictos, crearon las condiciones
necesarias para que las organizaciones regionales puedan
desarrollar un rol más destacado en la preservación de la
paz y la seguridad internacional.
La creciente tendencia a la regionalización en ámbitos
como la economía y el comercio no ha sido ajena a
las cuestiones de la defensa y seguridad internacional,
así como tampoco al ámbito de las misiones de paz. El
objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que la tendencia global
de la regionalización en el área política y económica,
también se está delineando en otros sectores como el
de la seguridad internacional, a través de la formación
de espacios que homogenizan políticas de defensa y de
seguridad.2

_____________________________________________
Las opiniones y conceptos expresados son responsabilidad única del autor y no reflejan de ninguna manera la posición del Ministerio de
Defensa de la República Argentina.
1 Brian Urquhart, “Beyond the Sheriff’s Posse,” Survival 32, no. 3 (1990): 196-205.
2 Elsa Llenderosas, “La participación en Operaciones de Paz y la integración regional: el caso argentino,” Premio Internacional de
Ensayo Paz y Seguridad en las Américas (Woodrow Wilson Center-FLACSO Chile, 1998), 18.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 17

En este sentido, y en la región latinoamericana, el caso
de la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en
Haití (MINUSTAH) y la contribución de fuerzas armadas
y de seguridad latinoamericanas a la misma, así como
el involucramiento de los países contribuyentes con
tropas en mecanismos políticos formales tendientes al
restablecimiento de la paz y la democratización de Haití,
es un ejemplo claro de este planteamiento. Esta dinámica
se inserta en el amplio desarrollo que ha alcanzado la
cooperación en relación con la articulación de políticas
de defensa en el ámbito latinoamericano y hemisférico,
además de la generación de políticas de confianza mutua
entre los países de la región.
La MINUSTAH encarna la primera operación en la cual
la mayoría del personal desplegado es latinoamericano,
simbolizando una iniciativa naciente en la que estos Estados
contribuyentes con tropa manifiestan una respuesta activa
ante la situación crítica de un país de la región. En este
sentido, la convergencia de estos países en la misión de
Haití se presenta como una “solución regional a problemas
regionales”, asumiendo la responsabilidad de la respuesta
colectiva a una crisis en el propio ámbito de influencia.
En este marco, el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS),
recientemente creado dentro de la Unión de Naciones
Suramericanas (UNASUR), es un proyecto inédito que puede
representar un primer paso para consolidar una cooperación
en pos de una futura integración en materia de defensa y a
la vez fortalecer a la región como bloque político.
La MINUSTAH promovió la acción común de países
latinoamericanos en ámbitos como el entrenamiento de
tropa, con la formación de la Asociación Latinoamericana
de Centros de Entrenamiento Para Operaciones de Paz
(ALCOPAZ) e incluso a través de acciones que superaron la
contribución de fuerzas militares y de seguridad, creando
un mecanismo político denominado “2x9”, el cual estaba
destinado a buscar soluciones conjuntas y efectivas para
reestablecer la paz y democratizar el proceso político
en Haití.3 El mecanismo fue impulsado como instrumento
informal para coordinar las políticas latinoamericanas en
el Consejo de Seguridad y representa un destacado paso
hacia la formación de la UNASUR y, en especial, del CDS.
La reGiÓn LatinOamericana
cOmO ZOna de PaZ
La regionalización es un proceso intersectorial dinámico
de conformación de regiones como unidades geopolíticas,
como modalidades de organización de la cooperación
política en el seno de un grupo de estados, o como
subunidades regionales tales como las comunidades
pluralistas de seguridad.4
_____________________________________________
3 Rut Diamint, “El 2x9”: ¿Una incipiente comunidad de seguridad en América Latina?” Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad
Regional, Policy Paper 18 (2007), 2.
4 Andrés Serbin, “Globalización, Regionalismo y Sociedad Civil,” Documentos CRIES (Buenos Aires, CRIES, 2000), 15.
18 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
La región latinoamericana tiene las características
de un subsistema político internacional diferenciado.
Estas características tienen relación con la geografía,
la vecindad, con la proximidad de sus mercados y las
semejanzas culturales, las cuales generan en conjunto una
agenda de cuestiones: políticas, económicas y sociales
dominantes, que reflejan problemas y oportunidades
comunes y requieren respuestas colectivas.
La interdependencia entre los distintos países latinoameri-
canos ha crecido sustancialmente en las últimas décadas,
aproximando los sistemas políticos y económicos nacio-
nales y haciéndolos más sensibles a lo que ocurre en la
región.
Cabe destacar que, si bien la repercusión de los
acontecimientos cercanos es relevante dentro de la
región, la transposición de la cooperación económica o
los acuerdos de intercambio comercial establecidos hacia
los planos de la dimensión externa de la política de defensa
es un proceso reconocidamente lento y complejo.
Las relaciones cívico-militares correspondientes al
período de transición democrática que han vivido
muchos de los países latinoamericanos han tenido un
impacto directo sobre los cambios y las continuidades
de las políticas de defensa de la región. Estas relaciones
cívico-militares han evolucionado de manera distinta en
cada país, dependiendo de sus propias características
y de sus procesos de redemocratización, así como
de especificidades en los cambios introducidos en los
respectivos conceptos de seguridad internacional, las
negociaciones internas y las presiones internacionales
que tuvieron lugar durante las etapas de consolidación
democráticas. Estas características se han reflejado en
opciones diferenciadas de política exterior.
Dichas posiciones diferenciadas de los países de la región
frente a los nuevos planteamientos de la agenda de
seguridad internacional no han impedido, sin embargo,
que surjan intereses compartidos frente a las situaciones
de crisis acontecidas en la región. En este sentido, debe
destacarse el marco de convergencia generado por la
participación de distintos países latinoamericanos en las
operaciones de paz conducidas por las Naciones Unidas.
Al respecto, la relevancia que tiene su propio entorno para
los países de la región es muy importante, principalmente
cuando se ponen de manifiesto problemas complejos dentro
de la misma, como es el caso de Haití en Latinoamérica.
En este sentido, y en función del análisis de este artículo,
se debe destacar por ejemplo la concordancia originada
por la participación de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay
en operaciones de paz conducidas por la ONU. La
participación de estos países estuvo motivada por la
misma dinámica del sistema internacional, las soluciones
militares en la post-guerra fría, los modelos post-autoritarios
de relaciones cívico-militares al interior de los procesos de
democratización en cada país y el legado dejado en la
«memoria» de las Fuerzas Armadas de los tres países por
las experiencias previas en operaciones de paz.5
El compromiso con el desarrollo de las operaciones de
paz se ha transformado en una cuestión importante de la
política exterior. Es posible afirmar que el hecho de que
existan elementos culturales comunes y vínculos políticos
previos con las regiones donde participen los países,
representan condicionantes en las decisiones relacionadas
con las misiones de paz.
La contribución latinoamericana plantea oportunidades
para el contexto actual en el cual se desarrollan las
operaciones de paz. En este sentido, y si bien muchos
países como Argentina y Uruguay tienen una experiencia
de años en el tema, para la región como tal es un
ámbito por descubrir. La evolución de la participación
sudamericana específicamente en misiones de paz indica
que la región ha estado acompañando la dinámica de los
mayores acontecimientos mundiales que afectaron el rol de
las Naciones Unidas.
ParticiPaciÓn
LatinOamericana en
minUstaH
La MINUSTAH, que comenzó en 2004, es la primera
operación en la que participan conjuntamente efectivos
de Argentina, Brasil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Perú y Uruguay
y ha sido la primera iniciativa en la que estos estados
latinoamericanos responden activamente con gran cantidad
de efectivos militares y civiles y también con medios, frente
a la crisis política y de seguridad de un país vecino. Este
hecho representa, por sí mismo, un punto de inflexión en
la política latinoamericana en la participación en misiones
de paz y tiende a crear una identidad puramente regional.
MINUSTAH es la séptima misión de la ONU en Haití
desde 1991. Sin embargo, a diferencia de las anteriores,
que fueron limitadas en sus propósitos y dirigidas
específicamente a fortalecer la Policía Nacional de Haití
y monitorear la situación de los derechos humanos,
MINUSTAH tiene un mandato más extenso, con un amplio
componente militar, policial y civil.
La participación en esta misión ha constituido un espacio
para la acción coordinada latinoamericana, con un carácter
distinto a la relación bilateral de cada uno con Haití. Los
países latinoamericanos participantes han demostrado
capacidad político-militar coordinada para operar en una
_____________________________________________
5 Mónica Hirst, Integración regional y seguridad internacional: el caso Mercosur (Buenos Aires: Funceb/FLACSO, 2002), 17.
situación de conflicto en la región. Entre ellos ha habido
acuerdo sobre la importancia de continuar participando en
la misión hasta que se logre la institucionalidad adecuada
para la estabilización democrática del país y se complete
el proceso de reforma de la Policía Nacional y del sistema
de Justicia.
Dentro de las acciones coordinadas que surgieron a partir
de la participación en MINUSTAH, y en referencia a la
cooperación en materia de entrenamiento para la paz,
durante el año 2008 nació la ALCOPAZ. Entidad dedicada
fundamentalmente a la capacitación y entrenamiento de
miembros de las fuerzas armadas, fuerzas de seguridad y
personal civil destinado a participar en operaciones de paz
bajo mandato de la ONU y conformada por Argentina,
Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Perú y Uruguay, así
como Paraguay y Colombia, quienes se incorporaron
posteriormente.
Por otro lado, y en materia política, en mayo de 2005,
los Viceministros de Relaciones Exteriores y de Defensa de
Argentina, Brasil, Chile y Uruguay iniciaron una serie de
encuentros con la finalidad de buscar soluciones a la crisis
haitiana y garantizar el éxito de la misión en Haití. Este
compromiso se basó en el hecho de que la crisis haitiana
fue considerada por los países latinoamericanos como de
naturaleza política y, por lo tanto, su solución no era sólo
de carácter militar. Esta concertación política se generó
reconociendo que si bien existía la necesidad de crear
condiciones de paz por medio de fuerzas militares, había
que poner el énfasis en la reconstrucción post conflicto y en
la profundización de un entendimiento Sur-Sur.
La cooperación política entre los países latinoamericanos
se fue ampliando hasta transformarse en el “Mecanismo
del 2x9” formado, además de los países originarios, por
Ecuador, Guatemala, Perú, Bolivia y Paraguay. Su objetivo
fue mantener un diálogo para la elaboración de propuestas
y la coordinación de acciones destinadas a mejorar la
situación de seguridad, gobernabilidad y desarrollo en
Haití. En efecto, el Mecanismo ha permitido coordinar
acciones y posiciones sobre el terreno en la identificación
de nuevas formas de cooperación Sur-Sur, particularmente
en áreas sensibles para el desarrollo económico-social
haitiano. Las reuniones del 2x9 demostraron una voluntad
de coordinación regional y un sentimiento compartido de
responsabilidad hacia Haití.
El compromiso de este mecanismo regional, que contó
desde sus inicios con un gran apoyo de los gobiernos que
lo componen, es un antecedente positivo y fructífero de
coordinación política regional para resolver problemas
regionales, creando expectativas y esperanzas que
auspicien una nueva etapa en la historia latinoamericana.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 19
Por causa de los terremotos acontecidos en Haití en
enero y en Chile en marzo de 2010, todo el trabajo del
mecanismo 2x9 se vio frenado. Estas catástrofes naturales
hicieron imposible el cumplimiento del cronograma de
trabajo propuesto por el mecanismo en virtud de las
dificultades para que tales países focalicen su atención en
los programas de cooperación planteados.
Sin embargo, y más allá de las consecuencias del terremoto
de Haití, el esfuerzo llevado a cabo durante estos últimos
años por parte de los países de la región ha sido muy
útil. El mismo se demostró a través del fortalecimiento y
el apoyo del mecanismo impulsado por los países del sur
del Continente Americano—UNASUR—que ha continuado
de alguna manera el trabajo realizado por la iniciativa
latinoamericana del 2x9 y ha mostrado la relevancia
otorgada por estos países involucrados a los procesos de
integración propios.
UnasUr Y sU cds
Dentro de los objetivos de UNASUR se encuentra el
fortalecimiento del diálogo político entre los Estados
miembros que asegure un espacio de concertación para
reforzar la integración suramericana y la participación de
UNASUR en el escenario internacional.6 En materia de
defensa, busca desarrollar una arquitectura de medidas
de confianza entre todos los países para disminuir las
situaciones de riego que afectan la seguridad y la paz,
coordinar políticas de defensa, fortalecer la conducción
civil de la defensa y articular las capacidades instaladas
en todos los países en el área de ciencia, tecnología y
producción para la defensa. Dentro de sus objetivos
específicos en materia de defensa, figura en el inciso s)
del artículo 3 de su Tratado Constitutivo “el intercambio de
información y de experiencias en materia de defensa.” Bajo
este precepto nace el CDS. Este Consejo busca consolidar
a la región como una zona de paz; construir una identidad
en materia de defensa y generar consensos para fortalecer
la cooperación regional. Es una instancia de consulta,
cooperación y coordinación de las políticas de defensa,
que se rige por los principios consagrados en la Carta de
la ONU, en la Carta de la Organización de los Estados
Americanos y en las decisiones y mandatos emanados del
Consejo de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UNASUR,
según el Estatuto firmado por los presidentes.7
El CDS promueve la creación de un foro de diálogo donde
impulsar una política regional, identificar problemas
comunes y fomentar la confianza mutua. Asimismo, trata
_____________________________________________
6 Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de las Naciones Suramericanas, Artículo Nº 3.
7 Estatuto del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano del UNASUR firmado en Santiago de Chile en diciembre de 2008.
8 El objetivo del Plan de Acción es impulsar un conjunto de iniciativas factibles de realizar en el corto y mediano plazo, que den legitimidad
y visibilidad al Consejo, de acuerdo a los principios y objetivos establecidos en los artículos 2°, 3°, 4° y 5°, de la Decisión para el
Establecimiento del CDS.
9 Javier Ponce Cevallos, “En Uruguay se destaca que la cooperación regional es clave para contribuir a la paz,” Observatorio UNASUR, 27
septiembre 2010. http://observatoriounasur.wordpress.com/ (acceso 3 marzo 2011).
20 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
de incrementar los intercambios de personal militar en
el plano educativo castrense, de articular operaciones
conjuntas de paz, de prever mecanismos conjuntos de
actuación ante catástrofes naturales, de proyectar ejercicios
tácticos conjuntos, de fomentar la industria de defensa para
aumentar la autonomía de abastecimiento y de conjugar
posiciones comunes. En lo relativo a operaciones de paz, el
Plan de Acción 2010–2011 del CDS8 incluye en su Eje 2:
sobre Cooperación Militar y Acciones Humanitarias,
distintas acciones como la de organizar conferencias y
seminarios sobre lecciones aprendidas en operaciones de
paz, así como sobre los desafíos en el manejo de crisis en
operaciones de paz.
Durante el Primer Seminario organizado por el CDS
sobre la materia, denominado “Lecciones Aprendidas en
Operaciones de Paz, en el ámbito interno y multilateral”
que tuvo lugar en Montevideo, Uruguay, durante el mes
de septiembre de 2010, el presidente Pro Témpore del
CDS y Ministro de Defensa de Ecuador, Javier Ponce
Cevallos, expresó que las operaciones de paz es “uno de
los ámbitos que presenta mayores perspectivas y desafíos
para la cooperación regional.”9 En este mismo sentido,
el Seminario concluyó con la idea de implementar en el
ámbito del CDS un mecanismo de coordinación en todas
las áreas referidas a las operaciones de paz, integrado
por expertos y/o personal con experiencia en dichas
operaciones.
Una posición en bloque de la región sería
altamente beneficiosa, no sólo para evitar la duplicación
de esfuerzos y beneficiarse de las capacidades de todos los
países que forman parte del Consejo, sino además como
una herramienta que permita lograr una base común sobre
la visión de la región respecto de las operaciones de paz.
Este logro dependerá de la importancia asignada por cada
Estado a fortalecer una verdadera estrategia regional por
sobre otros intereses individuales.
cOnsideraciOnes FinaLes
La importante presencia regional en la MINUSTAH, con el
aporte de efectivos y liderazgo de países latinoamericanos,
significa que éstos han asumido la cuestión de Haití como
un problema común que debe ser resuelto con un importante
esfuerzo de la región. En este sentido han coordinado sus
acciones y políticas, comprometiéndose no sólo al aporte
de tropa a la misión, sino además a la formación de un
mecanismo de concertación política latinoamericano para
ayudar al país caribeño.
Este mecanismo denominado 2x9 es un antecedente
propicio para la construcción de una concertación
regional en materia de defensa en el cual se asemejan las
políticas de defensa y de seguridad de los Estados parte.
La participación latinoamericana en la MINUSTAH y el
aporte del 2x9 fue diferente a otras experiencias previas de
la región en misiones de paz, en las cuales la región había
asumido un rol pasivo. Esta cooperación latinoamericana
se basó en el principio de solidaridad, ya que no existió
primacía de un actor en particular o voluntad de liderazgo
de alguno de los Estados.
Se espera que la creación de un espacio institucional
sudamericano de cooperación como el CDS contribuya
significativamente a la paz y a la estabilidad de la región,
permitiendo unificar criterios para contar con una opinión
común dentro del sistema internacional a través de un
intercambio político y estratégico con organizaciones de
características similares del resto del mundo. Es necesario
agregar también que la creación de este Consejo es un
avance muy importante en un ámbito en el cual hasta
ahora la cooperación y eventual integración en materia
de defensa no habían avanzado con suficiente rapidez
en la región. En este sentido, el Consejo busca promover
la reducción de las asimetrías existentes entre los sistemas
de defensa de los Estados miembros de la UNASUR para
fortalecer la seguridad cooperativa de la región en el
campo de la defensa.
BiBLiOGraFÍa
Cevallos, Javier Ponce. “En Uruguay se destaca que la
cooperación regional es clave para contribuir a
la paz.” Observatorio UNASUR, 27 septiembre
2010. http://observatoriounasur.wordpress.com/
(acceso 3 marzo 2011).
Diamint, Rut. “El 2x9”: ¿Una incipiente comunidad de
seguridad en América Latina?” Programa de
Cooperación en Seguridad Regional, Policy Paper
18, 2007.
Hirst, Mónica. Integración regional y seguridad
internacional: el caso Mercosur. Buenos Aires:
Funceb/FLACSO, 2002.
Llenderrozas, Elsa. “La participación en Operaciones de
Paz y la integración regional: el caso argentino.”
Premio Internacional de Ensayo Paz y Seguridad
en las Américas. Woodrow Wilson Center-
FLACSO Chile, 1998.
Serbin, Andrés. “Globalización, Regionalismo y
Sociedad Civil.” Documentos CRIES. Buenos
Aires, CRIES, 2000.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (UN DPKO). Cooperation between
the United Nations and Regional Organizations/
Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment:
Suggested Principles and Mechanisms. New York:
UN DPKO, 1999.
Urquhart, Brian. “Beyond the Sheriff’s Posse.” Survival
32, no. 3 (1990): 196-205.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 21
 LATIN AMERICA’S INVOLVEMENT
IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE
OPERATIONS AND BRAZIL’S
ENGAGEMENT AS A KEY PLAYER
eduarda Hamann

aBstract
This article discusses the involvement of Latin American uniformed personnel in United Nations (UN)
peace operations in the last decade, focusing more specifically on the emergence of Brazil as a key
contributor. The author argues that although there are key domestic barriers that prevent Brazil from
better exploring its potential, Brazilian participation in UN peace operations is getting closer to what
is expected from a regional power.

resUmen
Este artículo examina la participación reciente del personal latinoamericano uniformado en las
operaciones de paz de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), y más específicamente, arroja
luces sobre el crecimiento de la participación de Brasil en misiones de paz. Aunque hay importantes
barreras internas que impidan que Brasil pueda explorar su potencial de mejor forma, es innegable
que la participación brasilera en misiones de paz de la ONU, se está acercando a lo esperado de
una potencia regional.

T his paper begins with a discussion of the engagement

of Latin American (LA) uniformed personnel in United
Nations (UN) peace operations throughout the last
tripled (from 30,446 to 86,231) from 2000 to 2010, the
participation of LA military saw a ten-fold increase (from
753 to 7,523).2
decade. It then focuses on the emergence of Brazil as
a key contributor to peace operations, highlighting its
performance, obstacles and potentials. Latin america’s PreFerence tO
WOrK in tHe reGiOn
Latin america’s inVOLVement When LA governments send military or police to UN
missions, their preference is undeniable: for geopolitical
in Un Peace OPeratiOns reasons, they prefer the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
Since the early 1990s, the number of UN-led peace (MINUSTAH). Despite the differences in language, history
operations has at times nearly doubled, and their mandates and culture between Haiti and most LA countries, the
have expanded considerably, creating a significant numbers demonstrate a strong commitment by the region
challenge for the international community.1 Since then, to the region: from the 7,246 LA troops currently deployed
and especially in the last decade, Latin America has been in UN missions around the world, 5,343 are in MINUSTAH,
recognized as the region that has responded the most to the corresponding to 73.7% of LA’s total troop contribution.3
challenge. As military involvement in UN missions nearly
_____________________________________________
This paper was elaborated with insightful inputs from Margaret Daly Hayes, Capt. PMDF Sergio Carrera, Capt. PMPA Fabricio Bassalo, Capt.
PMAM Algenor, Capt. PMRS Rogerio Araújo, Capt. PMSC Emerson Fernandes, Lt. Col. PMDF Valdemir Gomes dos Santos and Andrezza Fontoura.
1 In November 1990 there were eight UN-led missions. The number of missions from 1995 and 2011 fluctuated between 13 and 19. Data
available on the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UN DPKO, “Monthly summary of contributors of military
and police personnel” (2010).
2 UN DPKO, “Monthly summary.”
3 Numbers exclude the 279 LA military experts deployed in UN missions. UN DPKO, “UN Mission’s contribution by country, as of 31 July 2010.”

22 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

In MINUSTAH, LA military have a prominent position: of the
8,743 troops deployed with the mission, 5,343 come from
Latin America. This is more than 61%. Among them, four
countries from South America can be said to demonstrate a
special engagement: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay,
known as “ABC-U.” Their contribution represents 85.1%
of LA’s total troop contribution in MINUSTAH (or 4,549 of
5,343 troops).
The relevance of MINUSTAH to LA countries is also
illustrated by the deployment of police. As a rule, most LA
governments do not include the deployment of individual
police or Formed Police Units (FPU) as part of their foreign
policy. Some reasons may include domestic issues with
public security, lack of political will and lack of support from
the public, to mention a few. As a result, among the 13,648
police officers from all nationalities who are currently
deployed in 16 UN peace operations under the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),4 only 163 are from
LA. This corresponds to 1.2% of the total number of police
deployed in UN missions. Despite the small number,
it is relevant to note that there is a clear preference for
MINUSTAH by Latin American police-contributing countries:
more than half of police officers from LA working in UN
missions are in MINUSTAH (87 individuals, or 53.4%).
MINUSTAH has a police component of representatives from
49 countries, including seven countries from Latin America
and the Caribbean: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
El Salvador, Jamaica and Uruguay. The mission’s police
component consists of 2,825 professionals as individual
police and FPUs, to which LA countries contribute with 3.1%,
the 87 police officers mentioned above. The remaining
96.9% of MINUSTAH’s police component is represented
by Jordan, 364 (12.9% of the total); Bangladesh, 327
(11.6%); Pakistan, 304 (10.8%); Indonesia, 299 (10.6%);
Nepal, 199 (7.0%); Italy, 126 (4.5%); Canada, 103
(3.6%); and other countries, whose contributions equal
1,016 (39.0%).
These numbers highlight the disparity between the strategic
importance of MINUSTAH for Latin American countries and
their allocation of UN police to the mission.5 As a result,
it seems that there is a clear window of opportunity for LA
countries to increase their contribution to MINUSTAH and
for Brazil in particular.
BraZiL’s enGaGement
in Un Peace OPeratiOns
Since the very beginning of MINUSTAH (June 2004),
until the post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction
(2010), Brazil has had the largest contingent of troops,6
as well as the political leadership and the command of
the mission. Also, this is the first time in UN history that all
force commanders of a mission are of one single nationality,
Brazilian.7 The question arises: how did this come about?
Historically, Brazil has taken part in peacekeeping missions
since the first time the UN decided to send observers and
troops to the territory of other countries, in 1948 and 1956,
respectively. Brazilian battalions were deployed to the
missions in Suez, Angola, Mozambique, Timor Leste and
Haiti. Both the first and the current missions set precedents
for Brazil: in its experience in Suez, Brazil sustained its
longest participation in any UN mission (10 years), and in
MINUSTAH (2004–present), Brazil has surpassed its own
record in terms of numbers of military ever deployed.8
Throughout 60 years of UN missions, Brazil has been a
regular contributor, but 2004 saw a major increase in
Brazilian engagement in peace operations. In fact, when
the crisis in Haiti erupted and the international community
decided to react to it, three main factors seemed to push
Brazil towards the expansion of its own peacekeeping
policy. First, in the domestic arena, President Lula’s first
electoral mandate was in its second year. Second, in a
foreign policy context, on 1 January 2004, Brazil had
become a non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council, elected in 23 October 2003, and was seeking
a permanent seat in that body. Third, in a geopolitical
dimension, there was a clear lack of political will from
the United States to participate in a third armed conflict,
parallel to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover,
powers with historical and cultural ties with Haiti, such as
France or Canada, lacked direct interest in engaging or
commanding a mission in the Caribbean. The combination
of these three factors may have provided the opportunity
for Brazil not only to take the political leadership of the new
mission, but also to provide amplified military participation,
with the largest contingent of MINUSTAH. For the first time,
Brazil accepted the risk to lead and command a mission
which, by then, had a high probability of failing—a very
different position from its engagement in previous missions.

_____________________________________________
4 There are 16 missions under the DPKO—15 peacekeeping and 1 political mission—and there are 4 missions under the Department of Political
Affairs (DPA). See UN DPKO and UN DPA.
5 The first Latin American country to appear in the ranking is Colombia with 22 police officers (UN DPKO, 31 July 2010).
6 The top five largests contingents in MINUSTAH are from Brazil (2,187), Uruguay (1,130), Nepal (1,075), Sri Lanka (959) and Argentina
(715). UN DPKO, “UN Mission’s Contributions by country” (December 2010).
7 All the deputy force commanders in MINUSTAH, until today, were sent by Chile, Argentina or Uruguay. This, together with the presence of
Brazilian force commanders, creates a situation in which military representatives from ABC-U are in strategic positions within MINUSTAH.
8 The Suez Battalion lasted for 10 years and had 20 contingents of approximately 600 troops. The Haiti Battalion is on its sixth year but, because
the contingents are larger (approximately 1,200 troops), it was in the tenth contingent that Brazil beat its own record.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 23

Another major turning point in Brazil’s engagement in UN Figure 1. Brazilian uniformed personnel in UN Missions
peace operations occurred in 2010. After the earthquake (from October 2000 to July 2010)
in Haiti on 12 January 2010, the Brazilian government
sent a second battalion to MINUSTAH. It began arriving on
9 February 2010, elevating the number of Brazilian troops
to 2,216, thus doubling the total number of Brazilian
military in Haiti.
On the military police side, or the “Brazilian Gendarmerie,”9
in the last 10 years Brazil has deployed a limited number
of individual police, never exceededing 19. This was
different during the 1990s, when Brazil contributed to
UN missions with 39 police and more, deployed to the
missions in Angola (UNAVEM II and III, and MONUA) and
in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), for example.10 As of August
2010, there are 4 military police in MINUSTAH (Haiti),
2 in UNMIS (southern Sudan) and 6 in UNMIT (Timor
Leste). 11 These numbers do not seem significant for a
regional power. Brazil often receives several requests from
the DPKO to increase the number of police—especially
in MINUSTAH, where it was asked to provide 29 police
officers in both 2009 and 2010—but was not able to Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Monthly
deliver, mainly due to a shortage of police officers who summary.” Elaborated by Eduarda Hamann and Andrezza
speak a second language and who are available to stay Fontoura.
one year in an international mission.
The good news is that in September 2010 the Brazilian Brazil is definitely moving forward, but the leading LA
government made a significant effort to expand its police contributors of troops and police to UN missions are
contingent. There is now a total of 31 Brazilian police Uruguay (2,552 military) and El Salvador (49 police
officers working in UN missions. The Brazilian police officers), respectively.12 In fact, there are several obstacles
contingent in UNMIT has increased from 6 to 20, but the for an expanded and sustained engagement by the
numbers of police officers remain the same for UNMIS and Brazilian military and police. First, there are operational
MINUSTAH. limits, such as budget and logistics. Second, there are
legal obstacles, such as one that prevents the deployment
Hence, 2010 witnessed the largest number of Brazilian of police institutions other than the Brazilian Gendarmerie.
military ever deployed (2,224 professionals), and it also A third obstacle would be related to language, since
indicates the return to the patterns of the 1990s in terms proficiency in English is mandatory for both police and
of its police deployment (31 professionals). The growth of military officers in most UN missions, and it seems that
Brazil’s engagement between 2000 and 2010 can be seen skills in a foreign language other than Spanish are not yet
in the graphic below. Statistics demonstrate a clear increase a priority for most Brazilians. A final obstacle is political/
in 2010; however, it remains to be seen how long this level cultural: some officers in the gendarmerie and some sectors
can be sustained. of the society who suggest that there are enough security
problems in Brazilian urban areas, and that human and
financial resources should not be spent in foreign lands.

_____________________________________________
9 Melo Neto and Costa demonstrate that, in Brazil, there is a separation between the judiciary police functions (performed by the Civilian
Police) and the ostentive police functions (performed by Polícia Militar, or the Brazilian gendarmerie). The “full cycle of policing” is not
performed by a single police institution in Brazil. Thus, the national legislation decided that only the gendarmerie were to perform policing
activities in UN missions. Sergio Carrera de Albuquerque Melo Neto and Isângelo Senna Costa, “Características e competências essenciais
essenciais aos policiais das Nações Unidas (UNPOL) nas Operações de Paz,” Revista Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo 5, no. 8 (2010): 1-23,
15.
10 Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da Fontoura, O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz das Nações Unidas (Brasília: Instituto Rio
Branco and FUNAG, 2005), 215-216.
11 UN DPKO, “UN Mission’s contribution by country, as of 31 July 2010.”
12 UN DPKO, “UN Mission’s contribution by country, as of 31 July 2010.”

24 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

cOncLUsiOn
This paper aimed to demonstrate that, throughout the last
decade, Latin America changed its pattern of engagement
in UN peace operations. Brazil is making impressive
investments in its deployment capacity (impressive, that is,
compared with its previous record), with a clear increase in
2004 and again in 2010. To fulfill its potential, Brazil will
have to overcome some barriers in institutional and legal
frameworks, as well as in the cultural dynamics of its society.
However, 2010 has definitely shown Brazil’s political will
to perform a role not only as a regional power but also as
a key contributor to peace operations.
BiBLiOGraPHY
Fontoura, Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da. O Brasil e
as Operações de Manutenção da Paz das Nações
Unidas. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco and FUNAG,
2005.
Melo Neto, Sergio Carrera de Albuquerque, and
Isângelo Senna Costa. “Características e
competências essenciais aos policiais das Nações
Unidas (UNPOL) nas Operações de Paz.” Revista
Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo 5, no. 8 (2010):
1–23.
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
“Current Operations.” 2010, http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml (accessed 20
August 2010).
_______. “Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military
and Police Personnel.” 2010, http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/contributors/ (accessed 29
August 2010).
_______. “UN Mission’s Contribution by Country, as of
31 July 2010.” 2010, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/contributors/2010/july10_5.pdf
(accessed 28 August 2010).
United Nations Department of Political Affairs.
“Peacebuilding.” 2010, http://www.un.org/wcm/
content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacebuilding
(accessed 27 August 2010).
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 25
 MUJER, PAZ Y SEGURIDAD:
Chile y la evolución de la incorporación
femenina en materias de defensa
y orden público

carolina céspedes Benavente y

Jorge canales Ukrow

resUmen
La incorporación de la mujer a los diferentes procesos de paz ha llevado a la necesidad de que las
instituciones de la defensa incorporen la perspectiva de género en todos los ámbitos de acción. Es
por esta razón que en Chile han existido iniciativas para que las mujeres sean parte importante de las
operaciones de paz, tomando en cuenta las vulnerabilidades de éstas en tiempos de guerra o crisis,
pero también haciéndolas socias claves en la cooperación internacional, formando parte de las fuerzas
armadas y policiales que son desplegadas a las distintas áreas de la misión. Más específicamente, se
han desarrollado diferentes iniciativas de integración, al igual que una política nacional a través de
un plan de acción, con tareas transversales e intersectoriales en apoyo a la participación femenina
en el ámbito de la defensa en general, y en las operaciones de paz en particular.

aBstract
The incorporation of women into different peace processes has led to the need for defence institutions
to mainstream gender perspectives into all areas of operation. As a result, Chile has developed several
initiatives aimed at bringing more women into peace operations, showing greater consideration for their
vulnerability in times of war or crisis, but also making them key partners in international cooperation, as
members of the Armed Forces and Police Forces deployed to different mission areas. More specifically,
different integration initiatives have been implemented, along with a national policy based on a plan of
action which includes transversal and inter-sectorial tasks in support of female participation in defence
and in peace operations in particular.

E n la evolución del ser humano y a través de la historia,

la mujer ha debido ir buscando distintos espacios
de participación, que en la época contemporánea es
Grafica lo anterior el hecho que en el año 1934, durante
el gobierno de Arturo Alessandri, se dicta la Ley N° 5.357
que le otorga a la mujer el derecho a elegir y a ser elegida
de carácter ciudadano, de inserción y oportunidades en los comicios municipales, participando el 7 de abril de
laborales. En este contexto, la mujer ha debido luchar por 1935 por primera vez en una elección de este carácter.
tener los mismos derechos, deberes, resguardos, beneficios
Luego, en el año 1949, se le concede el derecho
y participación social que los hombres, por lo tanto, su
a participar en comicios de carácter presidencial y
inserción plena en la sociedad actual no ha sido fácil.
parlamentario, participando por primera vez en 1952,
Centrándonos en el caso de Chile, podemos señalar que elección en que fue electo Carlos Ibáñez del Campo.
durante los primeros 50 años del siglo XX, el aspecto más
Es así como la mujer chilena comienza paulatinamente a
destacable de la historia de la mujer chilena corresponde a
ganar campos, que son exclusividad absoluta del hombre, con
la llamada “emancipación femenina,” entendiéndose como
tal eficiencia y competitividad que se instauran definitivamente
el progresivo ingreso de la mujer al mundo laboral, a la
en áreas de desarrollo como el espectro político y social,
cultura y a un incremento en la participación política de
como también en el ámbito de las instituciones de las fuerzas
nuestra sociedad.
armadas y de orden y seguridad pública.

26 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

aPertUra de Las institUciOnes
A pesar de que se señala que la creación de los servicios de
enfermería son generalmente aceptados como el comienzo
formal de la mujer en el ámbito de la defensa nacional,
pudiendo mencionar a la legendaria Sargento Candelaria
Pérez que se integró al Ejército de Chile en 1938 con
ocasión de la guerra que Chile debió enfrentar en el siglo
XIX, como también, el ingreso de personal femenino de las
comunicaciones, escribientes o de sanidad a la armada de
Chile en 1937, sólo es en la década de los 60 que se da
una apertura para la participación femenina en el ámbito
de la seguridad y defensa nacional.
En este contexto, Carabineros de Chile en 1962 da marcha
al primer “Curso de Brigadieres femenino,” donde 104
mujeres ingresan a la institución, iniciando así un proceso
de instrucción marcado por la exigencia y la disciplina,
instaurándose como la primera institución—en el ámbito
de la defensa y seguridad nacional—en insertar a la mujer
en sus filas. Doce años después, el Ejército de Chile crea
la Escuela de Servicio Femenino Militar, con el objetivo
de formar a las futuras oficiales y suboficiales del Ejército.
Por su parte, el año 2000, el Alto Mando de la Fuerza
Aérea de Chile dispone el ingreso de mujeres a la Escuela
de Aviación “Capitán Manuel Ávalos Prado” en calidad
de cadetes y, por lo tanto, con la posibilidad de graduarse
como oficiales de la institución.
Frente a lo anterior, con la finalidad de insertar a la mujer en
los distintos ámbitos del quehacer nacional, en el año 2006
la Armada de Chile inicia el proceso de postulaciones para
el personal femenino para ingresar a la Escuela Naval por
un periodo de 4 años, para poder así egresar como futuras
oficiales de esa rama de la defensa nacional.
De esta forma, podemos ver que la incorporación femenina
al ámbito de la defensa y de orden y seguridad pública,
ha sido un proceso paulatino y sostenido en el tiempo, que
ha contribuido significativamente al engrandecimiento de
cada una de las Instituciones que la componen.
Piloto de la Fuerza Aérea de Chile, Teniente (A) Bernardita Astudillo,
quien ha cumplido dos misiones en MINUSTAH.
HitOs de La ParticiPaciÓn
Femenina
Lo anterior nos lleva a recordar un sin número de hitos
históricos de la participación femenina en este ámbito, entre
los que se destaca el año 1997, fecha en que por primera
vez una mujer es ascendida al grado de Oficial General
de la policía de Carabineros de Chile en Latinoamérica,
honor recaído en la General Mireya Pérez Videla.
El año 2006, la subteniente Karina Miranda se convirtió
en la primera mujer piloto de combate de la Fuerza Aérea
de Chile; y Bernardita Suazo, en 2009, como la primera
mujer piloto del Ejército de Chile, concretando su calidad
y competencias, mediante un sobrevuelo realizado en la
Elipse del Parque O’higgins en la Parada Militar del mismo
año.
Culmina este proceso y evolución, con el hecho de que el
año 2011, por primera vez en la historia de la Armada
de Chile, un contingente importante de mujeres será
parte de la dotación del Buque Escuela “Esmeralda” que,
hasta el presente año, sólo ha sido tripulado por personal
masculino.
De esta forma, se puede apreciar que la participación
femenina en las ramas de la defensa y de orden y seguridad
pública, más que un desafío, es una realidad nacional que
ha conllevado a que la mujer sea parte inherente y eficaz
de sus instituciones y, por ende, de la totalidad de sus
procesos en donde entre otras cosas, se encuentran las
operaciones de paz.
Conforme a lo anterior, es menester considerar que son
décadas de historia donde nuestro pueblo, comprometido
con la paz y seguridad internacional, compromete la
participación de la mujer chilena en las operaciones de
paz. Muchos son los análisis y publicaciones sobre el rol
que debe cumplir la mujer en las diferentes etapas de un
conflicto y sobre los efectos de éste grupo catalogado como
vulnerable que, a través de los siglos ha ido abriendo
espacios de desarrollo y que en la actualidad despierta la
inquietud internacional a la hora de proteger sus derechos.
Dentro de los hitos importantes que marcaron la lucha
por la igualdad de género en nuestra era, se encuentran
las Conferencias Mundiales sobre la Mujer, entre las que
destaca la de Beijing en 1995, donde la comunidad
internacional reafirmó su compromiso con la igualdad
de género; desembocando en que a la fecha existan
un sinnúmero de organismos que se preocupan por los
derechos de la mujer, ya no sólo mirada como víctima
de los conflictos, sino que como socia clave en los
diferentes procesos que conforman la sociedad y, con
especial atención en su participación en las operaciones
internacionales de paz.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 27
mUJeres, GrUPO VULneraBLe Y
sOcias cLaVes de La PaZ
En las operaciones de paz, la perspectiva de género es una
de las aristas en la que los países miembros que participan
en distintas áreas de la misión han puesto especial énfasis,
determinando enfoques y estrategias para realizar trabajos
atingentes y oportunos, para enfrentar así la temática del
conflicto y sus repercusiones sin distinción ni discriminación
alguna.
La “Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas
de discriminación contra la mujer,” adoptada por la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) en 1979,
insta a los Estados miembros a elaborar políticas respecto
a esta área de interés y así evitar cualquier discriminación
basada en el sexo de las personas, mencionando la
igualdad de oportunidades entre hombres y mujeres.
La amplitud del concepto de género y la clasificación de
las mujeres como grupo vulnerable, condujo a que el año
2000—luego de varias acciones impulsadas por grupos de
mujeres y por la misma ONU—se adoptara la resolución
1325, que complementa todos los documentos de
protección de la mujer, incentivando su participación en los
distintos niveles de las operaciones de la ONU, pidiendo
al Secretario General que se “proporcione a los Estados
miembros directrices y material de adiestramiento sobre
la protección, los derechos y las necesidades especiales
de las mujeres, como también, sobre la importancia de la
participación de ellas en la adopción de todas las medidas
de mantenimiento y consolidación de la paz,” ampliando el
espectro para que tomen un rol activo en estos importantes
procesos.1
Estas y otras iniciativas han puesto a la mujer en un
sitio importante en las operaciones de paz modernas,
en las que trabajando en un ambiente multidimensional
y coordinado, han situado los temas de género en una
posición prioritaria, impulsando a los países contribuyentes
con tropas a incentivar la incorporación de la mujer en
todas las etapas de una misión, poniendo especial atención
en el nivel de toma de decisiones.
Muchos de los argumentos para incentivar la participación
femenina están basados en la relevancia que adquiere
su presencia en el orden social y la reconstrucción en el
período de post-conflicto, en el que los grupos vulnerables
necesitan la asistencia de organismos internacionales
integrados tanto por hombres como mujeres para retornar
y recuperar la paz y estabilidad en su territorio.
_____________________________________________
1 Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas N°1325 – S/RES/1325 (Nueva York: Consejo de Seguridad, 2000).
2 Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas N°1820 – S/RES/1820 (Nueva York: Consejo de Seguridad, 2008).
3 Gobierno de Chile, Plan de Acción Nacional para la Implementación de la Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de
Naciones Unidas 1325/2000 “Mujer, Seguridad y Paz,” Chile, Agosto 2009. http://www.resdal.org/experiencias/plan-chile.pdf (acceso el
3 de marzo 2011).
28 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
iniciatiVas de inteGraciÓn
Teniendo en cuenta que los principales problemas que
afectan a la mujer en estos casos es la violencia sexual,
el año 2008, la ONU promulgó la resolución 1820 que,
vinculada a la resolución 1325 antes mencionada, le pide
al Secretario General directrices en torno a la protección
de civiles—incluidas las mujeres y las niñas—con respecto
a esta forma de violencia, como también el incremento de
la participación femenina en la organización.2
En la actualidad existen diversas iniciativas para integrar
estos temas en los distintos estamentos responsables de las
operaciones de paz de países contribuyentes y, en general,
en todos los aspectos a nivel nacional e internacional, cuya
finalidad es buscar alternativas para estandarizar marcos
de acción y comportamiento para la participación bajo el
alero de la ONU, en perfecta concordancia con las normas
de protección a las mujeres en situaciones de conflicto.
En el caso de Chile, el año 2009 nuestro país promulgó el
“Plan de Acción Nacional para la Implementación de la
Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas
N°1325.”3
Sin duda, la implementación del citado Plan, demuestra que
Chile adhiere a las tendencias internacionales de incorporar
definitivamente a la mujer en todo lo que tiene que ver
con el desarrollo de la sociedad humana, incluyéndose
por supuesto todas las actividades relacionadas con las
operaciones de paz en el mundo, sustentado en un marco
jurídico y social sólido y validado.
Adentrándonos en el ámbito de las operaciones de paz
internacionales, la participación nacional femenina data
con anterioridad a la resolución 1325 y su posterior
implementación, ya que comienza el año 1997 mediante
el despliegue de Berta Oliveros Venegas, Enfermera
Universitaria, a la Misión de Observadores Militares
Ecuador-Perú (MOMEP) de la Organización de los Estados
Americanos (OEA), constituyéndose en la primera mujer
enviada a una operación de carácter internacional;
lo anterior dio paso a que en 1998 se enviaran a las
Enfermeras Josefa Benavente Millán, Julia Doumont Arenas
y Raquel Garrido Salvatierra; esta última desplegada en
1999.
Por lo mismo, se hace menester mencionar que en el
año 2007 se produce un hito histórico relacionado con
la participación de la mujer en operaciones de paz, al
desplegarse en Liberia al primer contingente constituido
sólo por mujeres correspondiente a una Unidad Policial
Formada de la India.
cOmPrOmisO naciOnaL
Chile, absolutamente comprometido con esta inserción,
a través del Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz
de Chile (CECOPAC)—instituto encargado de preparar y
entrenar al personal de las fuerzas armadas, de orden
y seguridad pública y civiles para desplegarse en una
operación de paz—realiza programas y módulos de
carácter docente, dirigidos a enseñar la importancia de
la participación de la mujer en misiones de paz, a saber:
mujer, paz y seguridad; prevención del abuso y explotación
sexual y protección de la infancia en operaciones de paz.
En la actualidad, mujeres chilenas—civiles y uniformadas
—han sido parte de las fuerzas de paz con diversas labores
profesionales del área de la salud, las comunicaciones,
Hoy Chile ya tiene una política y se enmarca bajo las
normas de la ONU, pero la estandarización de procesos
no es un camino fácil de recorrer, ya que la característica
multicultural de las operaciones de paz incorpora visiones
desde diferentes ópticas de acuerdo a una misma temática.
Grafica lo anterior las cifras de participación femenina
que, a pesar de que han mostrado un aumento significativo
a nivel mundial, siguen muy por debajo de la participación
masculina, lo cual se observa en los siguientes cuadros.
cuadro 1. Participación 2009, países de la región en
MINUSTAH
PAÍS ARGENTINA BRASIL CHILE PARAGUAY URUGUAY

Estado Mayor
ingenieras militares y trabajos policiales— por mencionar M 0 0 0 0 0

Oficiales de
algunos— prestando sus servicios a la paz en éste tipo de
misiones; cuyas experiencias y trabajo han sido útiles para
el análisis de cómo las mujeres pueden ser socias claves en H 9 15 6 0 13
esta delicada y sensible actividad profesional.
Sin embargo, es importante considerar que a pesar de M 10 6 5 0 50
que la participación femenina en operaciones de carácter
Efectivos
Militares
internacional se remonta a la década de los 90, es en
el año 2004 que comienza una participación femenina H 539 1,261 492 31 1,059
nacional ininterrumpida hasta la fecha en la Misión de
Estabilización de Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH)
desplegando a la fecha un total de 89 mujeres; a lo cual M 0 0 1 0 0
se suma el envío de tres mujeres a la misión de la Unión
Policiales
Efectivos

Europea en Bosnia y Herzegovina.

H 4 4 14 0 0

M 10 6 6 0 50
Total

H 552 1,271 521 31 1,072

General
Total

562 1,277 527 31 1,122

Fuente: Donadio y Mazzotta, La mujer en las instituciones armadas y

policiales (2009).

cuadro 2. Estadísticas de un total de 18 operaciones,

diciembre 2006
Cabos del Arma de Ingenieros, Alejandra Núñez, Gabriela Retamal
y Natalie Contreras, desplegadas en la Compañía Combinada de Total Total Total
H M
Ingenieros de Construcción Horizontal, chileno-ecuatoriana. Hombres Mujeres General
Observadores
2.290 53 70.639 1.034 71.673
Militares
Staff Officers 953 26
Tropas 67.396 955
Fuente: Departamento Planes CECOPAC.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 29

cuadro 3. Estadísticas para un total de 19 operaciones,
julio 2010

Total Total Total

H M
Hombres Mujeres General
Expertos
2.233 99 96.600 3.279 99.879
militares
Tropa 81.929 1.970
Policías 6.181 827
Instructores
6.256 383
de Policías

Fuente: Departamento Planes CECOPAC.

Si comparamos los dos últimos cuadros, correspondientes

al año 2006, seis años después de la promulgación de
la resolución 1325, y las extrapolamos al año 2010,
Teniente Carolina Céspedes Benavente, quien se desempeñó como
debemos mencionar que de un total de 71.673 efectivos asesora comunicacional del contingente chileno en Haití.
desplegados en las distintas áreas de la misión, el
contingente femenino representa solo el 1,44% mientras
que el masculino representa el 98.5%. Durante el año
2010, de un total de 99.879 hombres desplegados, BIBLIOGRAFÍA
3.279 son mujeres lo cual corresponde al un 3,28% del
Donadio, Marcela, y Cecilia Mazzotta. La mujer en las
total de efectivos en el área de misión.
instituciones armadas y policiales: Resolución
De esta forma podemos mencionar que el incremento 1325 y operaciones de paz en América Latina.
de personal entre el año 2006 y julio del 2010 fue de Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2010.
un total de 28.206 efectivos, de los cuales solo 2.245
Gobierno de Chile. Plan de Acción Nacional para la
corresponde a personal femenino; lo cual indica que del
Implementación de la Resolución del Consejo
total del personal que se aumento desde el 2006 a la
de Seguridad de la Organización de Naciones
fecha, el incremento del personal femenino fue de un 7,9%
Unidas 1325/2000 “Mujer, Seguridad y Paz.”
de ese aumento.
Chile, agosto 2009.
Finalmente, tenemos que mencionar que la inserción de
Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Resolución
la mujer chilena en operaciones de paz no ha ocurrido
1820 – S/RES/1820. Nueva York: Consejo de
por azar; muy por el contrario, ha sido un proceso que
Seguridad, 19 junio 2008.
se inició ya en la primera mitad del siglo XX, a través de
iniciativas de carácter social, político como cultural que Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Resolución
han redundado en la integración definitiva y equitativa 1325 – S/RES/1325. Nueva York: Consejo de
en el más amplio ámbito, al desarrollo de nuestro país. Seguridad, 10 octubre 2000.
Sin perjuicio de las iniciativas de los países desarrollados
en este contexto, Chile es pionero, ya que el hecho de
que la mujer se encuentre en igualdad de condiciones, se
debe a que el Estado de Chile ha desarrollado un marco
jurídico que respalda íntegramente esta condición, por lo
cual la mujer es parte activa e integrante de cada una de
las Instituciones concernientes a las fuerzas armadas, de
orden y seguridad pública y, por ende, de las distintas
operaciones de paz en que las respectivas instituciones
participan.

30 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

 THE PMDF AND UNITED NATIONS
PEACE OPERATIONS:
A Brief History and Future Perspectives

sérgio carrera de albuquerque melo neto and

antônio sérgio carrera de albuquerque melo

aBstract
This article outlines the role of the Federal District State Military Police of Brazil (PMDF) in United
Nations (UN) peace operations since the early 1990s. The article presents a chronological overview
of PMDF police officers’ participation in different UN missions. The article concludes by providing
recommendations for enhancing partnerships in view of increasing the effective participation of
Brazilian police officers working abroad in the field of international security, and more specifically as
part of UN peace operations.

resUmO
O presente artigo busca apresentar o papel que a Polícia Militar do Distrito Federal (PMDF) do Brasil
vem desempenhando ao longo de quase duas décadas junto às Operações de Manutenção de Paz
da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). O texto traz a cronologia histórica da participação de
policiais militares da PMDF em todas as missões e discute a relevância do assunto. Traz também à
consideração, a necessidade da preparação do profissional para atuar no exterior, através de cursos
estabelecidos em parcerias, analisando o cenário atual e traçando perspectivas de um trabalho mais
significativo do policial militar, visando aumentar a efetiva atuação da diplomacia brasileira no campo
da segurança internacional, mas especificamente, no componente policial da ONU.

intrOdUctiOn police officers to serve with the UN. The deployments

T he participation of the Brazilian police in United Nations
(UN) peace operations is a recent addition to the
country’s history beginning in 1991. The Federal District
Military State Police (PMDF) was the first police organization
in the country to become part of a peace operation.1 Since
then, the Military State Police Departments (MSPD)2 of other
Brazilian states have also deployed personnel to UN peace
operations.
To date, military police officers (MPOs)3 from the PMDF
have participated in 10 peace operations to which Brazil
has contributed police personnel, and it is the institution
within Brazil that has deployed the greatest number of
have contributed greatly to the professional development
of the staff involved, and have been landmarks in the
representation of the PMDF and of Brazil in UN efforts
towards stabilization and the restoration of peace.
The following article provides a chronological overview of
the contribution of police personnel from the PMDF in UN
peace operations. In doing so, it highlights some functions
and tasks that police have undertaken and considers
future perspectives for greater engagement of the PMDF
in initiatives where the presence of MPOs is relevant to
the successful role played by Brazil and by the UN in
international security.

_____________________________________________
1 PMDF (Polícia Militar do Distrito Federal) is the Military State Police Department (MSPD) responsible for the capital of Brazil.
2 Military State Police Department (MSPD) is a state police institution that is responsible for police patrols and for the preservation of public
order, in accordance with the Brazilian Federal Constitution, and which acts in civil society under a military regime. In Brazil there are
27 MSPDs.
3 The MPOs are agents of the law enforcement system that is part of a MSPD. In Brazil, the military police are called army police.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 31

 a BrieF HistOrY OF PmdF cOntriBUtiOn tO Peace OPeratiOns
It is relevant to briefly mention the different types
of mandates performed by UN police officer
(UNPOL): in most peace operations, especially
those which took place during the1990s, the role
of UNPOL was known as “police observer,” and
such staff monitored local forces in daily activities,
both in patrol cars and on foot, and reported any
conduct issues or crimes. They participated in the
observation of peace agreements, in monitoring
human rights violations and acted as observers
during elections. In these missions, which were
classified as “non-executive,” UNPOL were not
armed and their actions were limited. With the rise
of peace operations in which the UN held executive
power, UNPOL began to carry small arms and
eventually began to act with full authority to perform
police activities, as in the cases of Kosovo, Timor
Leste and Haiti.
Over the years, the duties carried out by MPOs
as part of peace operations have included active
participation in police operations, technical support
of local police activities and involvement in the
host countries’ security sector reform, restructuring
and reconstruction (with the latter also forming
part of non-executive missions) at the tactical and
operational levels. Tables 1 and 2 present the
total number of PMDF deployed between 1991
and 2010, by the countries in which they were
deployed, the year and their rank.

table 1. Deployment of PMDF personnel by country and year

Country\Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total

32 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

Angola 9 10 1 2 2 4 4 32
El Salvador 5 5
Mozambique 6 1 7
Former
4 1 5
Yugoslavia
Guatemala 1 1 1 2 2 1 8
East Timor 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 4 4 1 9 31
Kosovo 2 2
Haiti 1 1 1 1 1 5
Sudan 2 2 1 5

Guinea-Bissau 4 4

Total 9 10 11 7 3 3 5 6 2 4 1 3 3 4 4 4 6 4 2 13 104
Source: Inspetoria Geral das Polícias Militares (IGPM) (Brazilian Army MSPD General Inspectorate), 10 September 2010.

table 2. Deployment of PMDF personnel by country and rank

Country\Rank CEL LC Maj Cap 1st Lieu 2nd Lieu ST 1st Sgt 2nd Sgt 3rd Sgt CO SOL Total
Angola 5 9 1 3 14 32
El Salvador 3 2 5
Mozambique 1 3 2 1 7
Former Yugoslavia 2 3 5
Guatemala 3 4 1 8
East Timor 2 1 10 13 4 1 31
Kosovo 2 2
Haiti 1 1 2 1 5
Sudan 1 4 5
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 2 4
Total 3 4 30 37 11 2 0 3 0 14 0 0 104
Source: Inspetoria Geral das Polícias Militares (IGPM) (Brazilian Army MSPD General Inspectorate), 10 September 2010.
Angola
The PMDF began its participation in this country with
the establishment of the UN Angola Verification Mission
II (UNAVEM II) in 1991 and remained there until 1999,
deploying a total of 32 MPOs: 15 officers and 17 non-
commissioned officers (NCOs)4, holding the position of chief
of the police component (at that time known as Civilian
Police – CIVPOL) by Captain Antônio Ribeiro da Cunha
(1991–1992) and by Major Sérgio Vasques (1992–1993).5
In 1991 and 1992, MPOs were posted in the cities of
Bengela, Kuito, Caxito, Bengo, Sumbe, Lubango, Saurimo,
Maringá and Luanda. In these locations, they joined
patrol teams (team sites) and performed the roles of police
observers. At that time, the resources were minimal and
the local infrastructure was practically non-existent; the
personnel were living mostly in UN compounds.
The second contingent (1992), consisting of 10 MPOs,
was sent mainly to cities in the interior, where its members
were assigned as team leader, patrol members and
Regional Chief of Police. From 1992 to 1994, 2nd Sergeant
Paulo Barbosa performed important functions as liaison
officer, maintaining direct contact with the provincial
governments, the military and the local police, with the
aim of strengthening ties between the different parties.
Between 19946 and 1996, five officers arrived in Angola
and were posted in different cities, where they served as
members of the Rapid Response Team (RRT), translators,
and liaison officer with the Angolan National Police, and in
administrative posts at Mission Headquarters (HQ). Some
participated in investigations, as well as escorted dignitaries
and formed part of the security team of UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan during his visit in March 1997.
In 1997, four MPOs integrated the mission area and were
deployed in the city of Huambo, among others. The last four
police officers from the PMDF to serve in Angola arrived in
1998 and worked in Suamse, Casongue, Caxito and Luanda.
Their roles covered those of team sites and human rights
officers. Major Ricardo Martins worked in Luanda as liaison
officer, member of the Board of Inquiry and chief of human
rights violations investigation. He also participated actively in
the mission’s demobilization and disarmament process.
El Salvador
The PMDF’s participation in the UN Observer Mission in El
Salvador (ONUSAL) began in Brasília with the process of
choosing the officers from among the registered volunteers.
Of the 15 Brazilian MPOs who left for El Salvador in 1993,
_____________________________________________
4 The hierarchy of the MSPDs follows the model of the Brazilian Army, where there is a distinction between command positions held by officers
and the lower ranks held by NCOs.
5 It should be noted that it was the only mission in which PMDF NCOs participated.
6 As of 1994, only PMDF officers participated in UN peace operations.
7 United Nations, “United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) – Mandate” (2010).
8 This officer returned home after six months for health reasons.
five were from the PMDF. Of these, three were assigned to
the Regional Office in San Miguel and mainly performed
the role of police and human rights observers. Captain
Luiz Fonseca Teixeira was a radio operator in the Regional
Office and after some months joined the leadership ranks
of the unit, and was placed in charge of investigations of
misconduct and crimes committed by Salvadoran police
and military.
The other two police officers were assigned to the capital
city, San Salvador. Captain Paulo Roberto Oliveira
performed a very relevant role in the mission, and he
remained in the country after the end of ONUSAL activities
and joined the new UN Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL).
From April 1995, he formed part of a small group of UN
staff aiming to provide assistance to institutions and to the
people, particularly with regard to verifying implementation
of peace agreement.7
Mozambique
For the UN Peace Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
established in 1992, the PMDF assigned six officers in
1993 and one in 1994.
Of these police officers, four remained in Maputo
performing different functions, such as logistics officer,
patrol chief, regional administration officer and Southern
Regional HQ services officer. Captain Antônio Sérgio
Carrera Melo, apart from his role as patrol team leader,
was also Southern Regional HQ liaison officer, interpreter
and assistant to visiting foreign authorities. Only one
captain and one 1st lieutenant worked in other parts of
the country. Captain Ceso Daier Gomes remained in the
province of Gaza throughout the duration of his mandate,
working as province division chief, liaison, logistics and
patrol officer, chief of personnel.
Former Yugoslavia
In 1994, four police officers from the PMDF were sent to the
former Yugoslavia. However, a few days after their arrival,
two of them were repatriated because of lack of proficiency
in the mission’s official language, English. The remaining
major joined the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and
was assigned to Sector East to work on special units.8
The fourth officer, Captain Nelson Garcia, performed
his duties in the city of Knin (Sector South) and was later
assigned to HQ in Zagreb, where he was the chief of
operations and UNPOL deputy police commissioner.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 33
1995 saw the arrival of Captain Erich Meier Júnior, who
participated in UNPROFOR, UNCRO (UN Confidence
Restoration Operation) in Zagreb and in the UNTAES (UN
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja
and Western Sirmium). He served as humanitarian officer,
duty officer and administration chief in the Ilok police station
(Sector East) and deputy chief of HQ in Erdut and Vukovar.
He was the first UNPOL chief of staff of UNTAES in the city
of Vukovar.
Guatemala
Captain José Carlos Figueiredo was the first UNPOL
deployed to the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
(MINUGUA) in 1994 and was assigned to execute his
mandate in Guatemala City. He was a member of the
Multidisciplinary Group (MG) for the Observation and
Verification of Human Rights and Peace Agreements, and
personnel security chief. He participated in the verification
of cases such as massacres and killings and worked as an
election observer.
In 1996, Captain Alair Júnior was assigned to the city
of Petén. He was a member of the MG with the same
attributions and he provided professional technical support
to the local police. Captain Alair was security chief and
was responsible for training and instructions given to
members of the National Police, the Treasury Guard and the
investigation assistants of the Guatemalan Public Ministry.
Besides, he worked on the demobilization of paramilitary
groups.
Between 1997 and 1999, three MPOs joined the mission,
working in the cities of Santa Maria Nebaj and Escuintla,
as liaison officer with the police and the military, security
chief and intelligence security.
In 1999, one captain was assigned to Escuintla as police
observer, working with agreements to strengthen civil power
and the role of the army. Major Adauto Filho was posted to
the city of Barillas as negotiation adviser for local disputes.
In the capital, he was responsible for contact between police
branches and giving instructions at the Guatemalan police
academy. In 2000, Major Adilson Evangelista became the
last PMDF in Guatemala and worked in the investigation of
cases of human rights violations.
Timor Leste
Captain Tarcísio Filho was the first PMDF officer to join
a peace operation in Timor Leste in 2000, performing
functions in the city of Manatuto, such as monitoring police
procedures, duty and operations officer and regional chief
of operations.9
_____________________________________________
9 Two officers who went along with Captain Tarciso Filho were repatriated because of lack of proficiency in English.
10 In 2008, one of them requested repatriation for health reasons.
11 CTO – Compesantory Time Off; AL – Annual Leave.
34 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
Between 2001 and 2003, four police officers joined the
mission, including the first woman from the PMDF, Captain
Cynthiane Maria Santos Paiva. Based in Dili, they worked
in the Department of Intelligence of the Timor Leste National
Police (PNTL), in monitoring and training national police,
as well as forming part of patrols and the Rapid Response
Unit (RRU).
From 2003 to 2005, Major Francisco Niño was member
and chief of the PNTL RRU in Dili, and the Civil Disturbance
Control Unit. In 2004, three officers performed their
mandates in Dili, Oecussi, in the districts of Manufahi and
Maliana, and fulfilled the roles of technical adviser to the
PNTL, team leader and technical adviser to the deputy
general-commander for PNTL operations, frontier service
coordinator, deputy team leader and liaison officer. Major
José Wilame Matias was technical adviser to the PNTL
Academy, team leader and chief of police administration
personnel.
In 2005, Major Leonardo Sant’anna was appointed police
training adviser, after approval from a roundtable in New
York, as a member of the transition group and of the team
that was formed for the elections in East Timor. Sant’anna
eye witnessed of what is generally better known as the
“PNTL Massacre” in 25 June 2005, when twelve unarmed
police officers were killed. The second PMDF female officer
to integrate a peace operation, Major Denise Dantas de
Aquino, joined the mission in 2006, as team leader for the
screening process, personal assistant and close protection
to the head of parliament, and team leader of police patrols
during the electoral period.
In 2007, four officers were assigned to the countryside,
in the district of Suai, at the region’s team site in Same
and as operations section chief, liaison officer and deputy-
commander in the district of Manufahi.10
In 2008, Captain Carlos Melo de Sousa served as
investigator in the Prosecution Support Unit (National
Investigations Department), deputy chief and chief of this
same office. First Lieutenant Rodrigo Campos was assigned
as a patroller and later as chief of the CTO/AL11 Registry
Unit, of the Personnel Unit. First Lieutenant Maximiliano
Marinho worked in the Close Protection Unit of the president
of Parliament and as security adviser to the secretary of state
for security. The third female officer from the PMDF to work
in a peace operation, 2nd Lieutenant Virgínia Souza Lima,
was an administrative assistant to the Deputy Commissioner
for Administration and performed duties as investigator at
the Professional Standards and Discipline Office (PSDO).
Lt. Col. Mário Júnior Silva was the only member of the
PMDF in Timor Lester in 2009, assigned to the Reform,
Rebuilding and Reconstruction Department (RRD), as
UNPOL adviser to the Secretary of State for Security. In the
first half of 2010, three MPOs joined the mission, with the
subsequent addition of six other officers who left Brazil on
10 September 2010.
Kosovo
The first Brazilian police contingent to join the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was composed
of three officers, two of them from PMDF, Captains
Florisvaldo Cesar and Jean Oliveira, in November 2003.
In Pristina, Captain Cesar performed the role of patrol
officer and supervisor of Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
officers in the North Station and was also a member of the
KPS Inspection Unit. Captain Oliveira was logistics officer
for the KPS and rotation officer, in charge with receiving
and dispatching police contingents in the mission.
Haiti
When the first Brazilian MPOs integrated into the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), in September
2004, 2nd Lieutenant Cleiton Batista Neiva12 was part of the
group. With a high level of communication ability in several
languages, he performed many leadership functions. He
was chief of the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), where he
coordinated actions with the other components in the Centre
(UNPOL, Military, UN Security and the Haitian National
Police – PNH) in procedures throughout the country; he
was chief of the National Operations Centre and chief of
operations of the Eastern Department, which coordinated
activities with UNPOL teams allocated in police stations
around the island. His contribution to operations, mostly
on a national level, was undeniable and highly significant
to the development of the mission.
On 29 October 2005, Captain Paulo César Rodrigues
arrived in Haiti, where he worked as technical adviser to
the PNH and VIP team leader.
In 2006, 1st Lieutenant Sérgio Carrera Melo Neto joined
MINUSTAH, initially as member of the Special Operations
Centre of JOC, and after three months was transferred to
the Direction of Operations (PNH-UNPOL Coordination
Unit). He worked as incident commander, operations and
planning officer of police and joint actions (that is, with the
military), as well as technical adviser to the PNH. Between
20 October and 3 November 2007, he was appointed
UNPOL acting director of operations, 13 becoming the
second Brazilian to hold the post.
_____________________________________________
12 Cleiton Batista Neiva was the only Brazilian police officer to lose his life as a result of the earthquake that devastated Haiti on 12 January
2010. He was on unpaid leave from the PMDF and was working in UN Security.
13 United Nations, MINUSTAH United Nations Police, Pol/COS/227/2007 (Port-au-Prince: UN, 9 October 2007).
14 Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque Melo Neto and Davis Heberton de Sousa, “A Tropa de Elite da Polícia Nacional do Haiti,” Revista Eletrônica
Boletim do Tempo 5, no. 15 (2010).
On December 2007, Major Agrício da Silva replaced
Lieutenant Sérgio and took over the same duties as his
predecessor, acting decisively in riots and demonstrations
in 2008. In January 2009, 1st Lieutenant Davis Heberton
Souza carried out foot and motorized patrols in the Belle
Air police station for one month. After this he began to train
and monitor the PNH/UNPOL special weapons and tactics
(SWAT) team.14 He was the UNPOL/SWAT team leader for a
period of three months, the only Brazilian to hold this position.
Sudan
Two PMDF police officers were part of the first Brazilian
UNPOL group in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in
October 2005. Lt. Col. Nelson Souza was assigned as
team leader in Sector III of Malakal, regional operations
officer in Khartoum and chief coordinator of reform and
restructuring throughout Southern Sudan.
In 2006, two majors worked in UNMIS: one served in Wau
as patroller in the team site and was chief of personnel.
Major Valdemir dos Santos was chief of the Personnel Unit
in Sector 1, in charge of the state of East Equatorial, in the
city of Juba.
In 2007, Major Alexandre José da Silva worked initially in
the province of Yei, as police observer and gender officer.
In Khartoum he was security section officer, where his
tasks included monitoring, coordination and establishing
directives of movement restrictions.
Guinea-Bissau
The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
(UNIOGBIS) is a special political mission dedicated to post-
conflict peacebuilding and recovery. It was established in
January 2010 and is non-executive. The mission is under
the authority of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO).
Major Florisvaldo Cesar was the first PMDF to join the
mission in January 2010. As the chief of the Administration
Department, he is currently developing several projects and
is part of the Police Reform Unit (PRU).
In February 2010, Major Denise Dantas, on her second
mission, joined the team as project manager on police
gender and protection of vulnerable persons. In the same
month, Colonel Nelson Garcia took up the post of senior
police advisor, the most senior police authority in the
mission. Also, in the first half of 2010, Lt. Col. Marcos
Matias took up the position of police advisor to the Security
Reform Unit (SRU).
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 35
PrOactiVe initiatiVes
in 2009–2010
In 2009, the PMDF created the first police observer course
for peace operations in association with foreign embassies
and international organizations. This course, the first
UNPOL specialization training in Brazil, was conducted at
the facilities of the Portuguese Embassy and was carried out
mainly in English. It included the participation of mission
veterans who gave classes and shared their experiences in
different missions. The course also included the first PMDF
international seminar on peace operations, which involved
police officers from Brazil, Germany, Jordan and Spain.
In May 2010, the PMDF and the Canadian Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), having signed an agreement,
jointly held the UN police pre-deployment course at the
PMDF Academy, following a format defined by the UN as
appropriate for UNPOL training. The course was taken by
police from 10 Latin American countries and 8 Brazilian states.
In September 2010, the PMDF accepted the invitation of
the Swedish National Police Peace Support Unit to send a
veteran to attend the UNPOL Officer Course (UNPOC) as
international guest observer. With perspectives towards the
future, the PMDF understands the importance of looking to
other countries in order to gain knowledge, and started a
partnership for exchange of students and instructors with
the Swedish police for 2011 and 2011.
Analysis of the Current Situation
Taking a brief look at the deployment of PMDF officers, it is
notable that in recent years there has been a considerable
reduction in the participation of its personnel in some peace
operations. In 2009 only one MPO was sent to work in a
mission. In Haiti, as of 2009, no representatives were sent to
that country. Neither was there representation in Sudan, where
personnel had been deployed between 2005 and 2008.
Between 2008 and 2009, the PMDF was requested on two
occasions to appoint veterans to compose the UN Logistics
Base team in Italy. According to the information available,
no reasons were given for denying this opportunity. In
August 2010, three places were offered for the same
function, and the institution presented names for application
to the UN selection process.
The UN opened six places in 2009 and fourteen in 2010 for
senior officers to apply for posts in the DPKO. The positions
are strategic and important for the country, and until now no
Brazilian MPO has ever taken these posts. Currently, six PMDF
officers are participating in this international selection process.
_____________________________________________
15 Marco Antonio dos Santos Morais, UNPOL: Brasil pasará a contar com 31 Oficiais em Missão de Paz (2010).
16 Ministry of Defence, Decree no. 952 (2010).
36 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
Brazilian police currently apply for UNPOL posts in the
following missions only: MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMIS (Sudan)
and UNMIT (East Timor); and to staff posts at the UN DPKO
and DPA: Guinea-Bissau; Brindisi, Italy; and UN HQ. Today
the PMDF has nine MPOs in East Timor and four in Guinea-
Bissau, representing 13 out of the 31 Brazilian UNPOL
working in peace operations.15
So far, only three female police officers from the PMDF
have served in UN peace operations, representing less
than three percent of the total PMDF UNPOL ever deployed.
As of 2010, the PMDF and Swedish National Police have
established a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on
UNPOL training in which the expansion of female MPO
participation in the courses to be conducted in Sweden and
at the PMDF Academy is an explicit priority, with the overall
aim of increasing the interest for and the growth of female
participation in peace operations.
cOncLUsiOns
Possible Partnerships
Brazil is increasingly involved in peacekeeping affairs,
mostly in a military aspect, and its interest in a more active
role in diplomacy is also rising. However, somewhat
paradoxically, it has one of the lowest levels of contribution
of police officers. There are an increasing number of UNPOL
posts in UN peace operations and the Brazilian police need
to be more proactive and adequately trained for these kinds
of opportunities, which are undoubtedly increasing. The UN
is encouraging member states to deploy more police, and
proper training, from a police perspective, is imperative to
achieving the goals laid out.
The Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MD) has recently created
the Joint Centre for Peacekeeping Operations (CCOPAB),
which is in charge of training, and preparing military
troops/individuals and MPOs.16 The Centre offers a month-
long training course that is given to MPOs and military
observers, who are split up after the third week in order
to receive specific instruction. Nevertheless, this training is
not recognized by the UN, which obliges Brazilian UNPOL
members to take tests and training during the first days of
arriving in mission.
The PMDF could host, with the support of the Brazilian Army,
Ministry of Defense, Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) and other federal agencies, the creation of
a Brazilian UNPOL training centre, since it already provides
specialized training for police officers from all over the
country and from friendly nations, contributing to Brazilian
efforts towards becoming a more important international
actor. The PMDF has qualified personnel, vast experience,
knowledge about the development of UNPOL courses and
an existing training structure.
Similarly, in the search for closer international relations for
the exchange of experiences and support, the PMDF has
connections to several UNPOL centres, such as the Swedish
Peace Support Unit, Canadian PPC, the Norwegian
Police and the UNPOL Training Centre of the Argentinean
Gendarme, among others.
Perspectives
It is expected that the PMDF will begin planning to make
adaptations to the proposed objective of wider cooperation,
as, in a first instance, the Department of Education and
Culture (DEC) already has the appropriate conditions to
create a UNPOL training centre in order to attend to the
needs of all the MSPDs in Brazil, with the aim of providing
adequate UNPOL training. Political interest, technical
knowledge of peace operations, genuine understanding
of the different forms of training and needs, an independent
budget, a perception of the importance of UNPOL in the
area of international security in peace operations and a
total detachment from all institutional self-seeking are the
initial basic requisites for the feasibility and practicality of
a Brazilian UNPOL centre located in the PMDF.
More than a decade ago, Ambassador Paulo Tarrisse da
Fontoura gave the following suggestion:
The Itamaraty could, for example, promote the
discussion at the PMDF on the opportunity of creating
a teaching core on peace operations at the PMDF
Academy. The PMDF is the Department which assigns
most officers to peace operations, some of whom
perform important functions in the field, especially
in the Former Yugoslavia and in El Salvador. This
Agency therefore has officers with broad experience
in the field and of general staff, which can be
exploited to improve the training of Brazilian MPOs
to take part of peacekeeping missions. Establishing
a training center for police observers would place
the country on a par with others, such as Canada,
Spain and the Nordic nations, which give courses
for police officers interested in participating in UN
peacekeeping operations or those of other regional
agencies.17
Initiatives to promote UNPOL courses in 2009 and 2010,
with a few more to be conducted in 2011, and the exchange
of professional experiences with other countries, together
with good relations with the Brazilian Army and Itamaraty,
all based in Brasília, puts the PMDF in a strategic position,
with the capacity to develop significant projects, including
adequate training for UNPOL and gradual increase in the
number of UNPOLs, without distinction in terms of ranks.
_____________________________________________
17 Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da Fontura, O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção de Paz das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG, 1999),
237–238.
The PMDF is passing through a phase of restructuring and
significant change, with an increasing number of blue
berets with experience and leaders capable of developing
ambitious projects in line with international demands and
national interests. As of 10 September 2010, the PMDF’s
participation is calculated at around 28% of the total of
Brazilian police in peace operations, with 104 of the 370
UNPOLs ever deployed. It is hoped that federal and state
governments will make every possible effort to improve
the performance of Brazilian police participation in UN
peace operations and strengthen collaboration in order
to create greater possibilities for more representation in
UN peace operations.
BiBLiOGraPHY
Fontura, Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da. O Brasil e
as Operações de Manutenção de Paz das Nações
Unidas. Brasília: FUNAG, 1999.
Melo Neto, Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque and Costa,
Isângelo Senna. “Características e competências
essenciais aos policiais das Nações Unidas
(United Nations Police - UNPOL) nas Operações
de Paz.” Revista Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo (Rio
de Janeiro) 5, no. 8, (2010).
Melo Neto, Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque and Sousa,
Davis Heberton de. “A Tropa de Elite da Polícia
Nacional do Haiti.” Revista Eletrônica Boletim do
Tempo 5, no. 15 (2010).
Ministry of Defence. Decree no. 952, 15 June 2010.
Morais, Marco Antonio dos Santos. UNPOL: Brasil
pasará a contar com 31 Oficiais em Missão
de Paz (2010). http://unpolicebrasil.blogspot.
com/2010/09/com-um-esforco-dos-integrantes-
do-grupo.html (accessed on 8 September 2010).
United Nations. “United Nations Observer Mission
in El Salvador (ONUSAL) – Mandate.” http://
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/
onusalmandate.html (accessed 9 September
2010).
_______. MINUSTAH. United Nations Police. Pol/
COS/227/2007. Port-au-Prince: 9 October
2007.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 37
 PERSPECTIVES ON LESSONS
LEARNED IN PEACE OPERATIONS
Perspectivas sobre lecciones aprendidas
en las operaciones de paz

38 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

 THE ROLE OF WOMEN PEACEKEEPERS
IN COMBATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS:
Perspectives from Latin American
Troop-Contributing Countries

cecilia mazzotta

aBstract
This paper explores the context and impact of sexual violence in armed conflict in light of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1820 and its implications for current peace operations. The use of sexual
violence in conflict settings is considered a threat to achieving a sustainable peace. The participation
of women peacekeepers has become an operational imperative, as they are called upon to play a
crucial role in preventing the phenomenon of sexual violence, by helping affected women build their
own capacities for conflict resolution and empower themselves. As an important troop contributor,
Latin American peacekeepers can play an important role in protecting civilians from sexual violence.
However, key challenges remain including the region’s need to develop its own expertise on how to
combat sexual violence and recruit more women in its military and police mission components.

resUmen
Este trabajo examina el contexto e impacto de la violencia sexual en los conflictos armados a la
luz de la Resolución 1820 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas y sus implicancias en
las operaciones de paz en curso. El uso de la violencia sexual en los escenarios de conflicto, es
considerado una amenaza a la consecución de una paz sostenible. La participación de mujeres
peacekeepers se ha convertido en un imperativo operacional, ya que ellas son llamadas a jugar un
rol crucial para prevenir este fenómeno y ayudar a las mujeres afectadas a desarrollar sus propias
capacidades en la resolución de conflictos y otorgarle poderes. Las peacekeepers latinoamericanas
pueden jugar un rol importante en la protección de los civiles contra la violencia sexual ya que la región
es un importante contribuyente con tropas. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de una experticia propia para
combatir la violencia sexual y el aumento del número de mujeres en el componente militar y policial
de la misión, hacen que ambos representen desafíos para la región.

intrOdUctiOn operational imperative of UN peace operations’ mandates

around the world. As important contributors to peace

C ombating sexual violence in armed conflict has been

one of the main concerns of United Nations (UN)
peace operations since widespread and systematic use of
such violence against civilians gained notoriety in recent
decades. Women are among the most vulnerable groups
during conflict, and the incidence of sexual violence
undermines the opportunity to achieve a durable peace.
This was recognized in 2008, when the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 1820. In this new context, the
participation of women peacekeepers has become an
operations, Latin American countries have a significant
role to play.
This article will explore the role of women peacekeepers
in combating sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict
situations. The article will also examine Latin American
countries’ contribution to the fight against sexual violence
by discussing the participation of women in the armed
forces and their deployment to peace operations, as well as
specific requirements to strengthen peacekeepers’ capacity
to address and respond to sexual violence.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 39

seXUaL ViOLence and Peace
OPeratiOns: tHe cOnteXt
Each armed conflict has a particular configuration; however,
the use of sexual violence is increasingly recognized as
a common theme in conflict and post-conflict situations.1
Sexual violence is used to apply political pressure, to break
the resistance of a community, to alter the family balance, to
carry out ethnic cleansing or as part of an overall warfare
strategy. Frequently, women from opposing groups are
viewed as trophies by combatants, who wipe out entire
villages by breaking the social fabric and increasing
discrimination within communities, as many of these abused
women face severe difficulties in returning to social life at
a later stage.2
Socio-cultural implications of sexual violence are
exacerbated by the risk-laden legal contexts that allow
perpetrators to remain unpunished, especially if sexual
violence is exercised through abuse of authority by police
and military institutions. Often, when rape allegations are
reported, they are solved through common mechanisms of
dispute resolution and generally victims are not favored. In
other cases, the existence of strong cultural norms impels
victims to request legal protection.
As a consequence, when an armed conflict takes place,
the increase of sexual and gender-based violence is so
great that the confrontation affects civilians much more than
combatants. As a result, the cycle of violence tends to be
perpetuated from one generation to another, progressively
undermining conflict resolution efforts.
Until recently, sexual violence during conflict periods was
perceived as a war by-product and as an issue that had
to be addressed from a purely humanitarian perspective.
The armed conflicts suffered by Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone during the nineties resulted in
thousands of raped and displaced women. These cases
brought to the forefront the devastating effects of sexual
violence on societies and on their ability to achieve a
sustainable peace.3 The cases, in turn, led the international
community to sound the alarm on the phenomenon of
sexual violence.4 The International Criminal Court (ICC),
for example, has recognized crimes of sexual violence
as crimes against humanity.5 Widespread attacks against
civilians are also considered a crime under the Geneva
Conventions and their protocols as well as other instruments
that make up international humanitarian law.
The UN has also recognized the systematic use of sexual
violence in conflict environments as posing a challenge
for conflict management, and as having a direct impact
on the way multidimensional peace operations are carried
out. More specifically, the UN has acknowledged that the
prevention of sexual violence in countries affected by armed
conflicts is directly linked to the establishment of several
conditions that tend to favor women’s empowerment.6
When the Security Council passed Resolution 1325 in
2000, it acknowledged the close relationship between the
active role that women can play in conflict prevention and
resolution and the maintenance of international peace and
security.7 The UN further recognized, with the adoption of
Resolution 1820 in 2008, the use of sexual violence as a
tactic of war and the link between the existence of sexual
violence and the lack of empowerment of women politically,
economically and socially.8
Today, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Timor-
Leste, Darfur, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, are examples
of countries where sexual and gender-based violence is
destroying the social fabric and undermining future conflict
resolution. The concern, however, is that international
regulations are not enough to prevent these crimes, and
peace operations frequently find themselves limited by the
capacities, or lack thereof, of contributing countries. The
major obstacle that exists stems from the UN’s perceived
lack of effective strategies to manage the complexity of
the phenomenon. For instance, in August 2009, a mob of
Rwandan rebels gang-raped at least 150 women in four
days in eastern Congo in a village only 20 miles away from
a military base of the UN mission.9

_____________________________________________
1 See for example Agnès Stienne, “Viols en temps de guerre, le silence et l’impunité,” Le Monde diplomatique, 14 February 2011.
http://blog.mondediplo.net/2011-02-14-Viols-en-temps-de-guerre-le-silence-et-l-impunite (accessed 20 February 2011). See also Amnesty
International, Haiti: Don’t turn your back on girls: Sexual violence against girls in Haiti (London, UK: Amnesty International, November 2008);
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Now, The World Is Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International, April 2010).
2 Amnesty International, Violence Against Women in Armed Conflict: A Fact Sheet (2005). http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence-against-
women/stop-violence-against-women-svaw/violence-against-women-in-armed-conflict/page.do?id=1108213 (accessed 20 February 2011).
3 Stelet Kim and Dustin Sharp, Crafting Human Security in an Insecure World (New York: Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, 2008).
4 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone in the Light of Security Council Resolution 1820 (New York: DPKO, March 2009).
5 United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - A/CONF.183/9 (New York: General Assembly, 1998), article 7, g.
6 UN DPKO. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml (accessed 28 August 2010).
7 United Nations, Resolution 1325 - S/RES/1325 (New York: Security Council, 2000).
8 United Nations, Resolution 1820 - S/RES/1820 (New York: Security Council, 2008). Other Security Council Resolutions such as 1888 and
1889 (2009) complement and seek to operationalize Resolutions 1325 and 1820.
9 Josh Kron, “At least 150 women raped in weekend raid in Congo,” New York Times, Africa Section, 22 August 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/africa/23congo.html?_r=1.

40 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

A recurring objection from within the UN has been that
the inclusion of sexual and gender-based violence in
peace operations’ mandates implies the involvement of the
institution in a State’s sovereign domain. Still, the scope and
consequences of this phenomenon, as well as its impact on
conflict resolution, are increasingly ensuring that the issue is
included as part of operational mandates. Regarding troop-
contributing countries, the concern is that few countries have
developed military doctrine to combat the use of sexual
violence as a tactic of war.10 Moreover, their action in the
field must be conducted within the confines of the mission
mandate.
In this context, the challenge that arises is very complex,
but clear: to develop the capacity of peacekeepers to work
together to combat sexual violence. This initiative will help
to improve the support given to local women, and thus to
the entire civilian population.
The UN has been working diligently to raise awareness of
the impact of sexual violence in armed conflict. Regarding
troop-contributing countries, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has focused on providing
basic gender materials for pre-deployment training and has
called upon troop-contributing countries to deploy a greater
number of women peacekeepers and to appoint them to
decision-making posts. In addition, a crucial initiative was
launched in August 2010 by the DPKO and the Department
of Field Support (DFS): Guidelines for Integrating a
Gender Perspective into the Work of the UN Military in
Peacekeeping Operations. The Guidelines provides a
checklist of gender-sensitive actions for peacekeepers at
the three levels of military engagement in peace operations:
strategic, operational and tactical level.11 It is hoped that
troop-contributing countries will include these guidelines as
part of their peacekeeping training in the future.
Moreover, while the presence of women peacekeepers is
now seen as an essential part of the response to situations
of sexual violence and to the promotion of local women’s
empowerment in conflict resolution, 12 reinforcement of
women peacekeepers is still, to this day, urgently needed.
Studies from the field have shown that women peacekeepers
can more easily support conflict-affected women, who,
because of questions of embarrassment or fear, cannot talk
to men as they would to another woman. In many situations
local women do not feel comfortable and confident to speak
freely to male peacekeepers on sensitive issues. As an
officer of the Bolivian Army said about her experience as
part of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUC):
It is on women where the enemy can humiliate
the opponent most . . . . Women are the worst
victims. . . . When military observers go to areas of
conflict, the last thing (local) women are willing to
see is a male officer. Many times they hide from them
and don’t talk to them; but the opposite happens with
female officers, as women identify them as equals,
which makes them have more confidence in them and
provides them with information about certain facts;
the same happens with children.13
Female peacekeepers also help to empower women
by serving as role models. In the UN Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL), for instance, the deployment of a female Formed
Police Unit (FPU) has been deemed a success based on how
it encouraged local women to enter into national security
institutions.14 Their participation in the police has been
met with high expectations that their presence will help to
diminish sexual violence and to promote better reporting
conditions for the affected women.
WOmen’s cOntriBUtiOn FrOm
Latin american cOUntries:
sitUatiOn and PersPectiVes
Latin American participation in peace operations has been
on the rise since 2000, thanks to the existence of several
favourable factors. These include the democratization
progress of security and defence institutions, the enhanced
links between foreign policy and defence, the discussions
on rethinking the role of the military, and the growing
expectation that the region should contribute given its own
experience with conflict.15 Countries such as Argentina
and Uruguay have pioneered the participation in
peacekeeping activities, and together, can boast about 50
years of experience. The last decades have seen other Latin
American countries joining them in this activity.

_____________________________________________
10 United Nation Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and UN DPKO, Analytical Inventory of Responses by Peacekeeping Personnel to War-
Related Violence against Women: Executive Summary and Checklist (New York: UNIFEM and DPKO, 2010).
11 UN DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS), Guideline to Integrate a Gender Perspective into the Work of Military in Peacekeeping
Operations (New York: DPKO and DFS, 2010).
12 UN DPKO, Policy Dialogue to Review Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance among Uniformed Personnel in Peacekeeping Missions: Final
Report (New York: DPKO, 2006).
13 Marcela Donadio and Cecilia Mazzotta, Women in the Armed and Police Forces: Resolution 1325 and Peace Operations in Latin America
(Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2010), 124.
14 Allyn Gaestel, “Female peacekeepers empower Liberian women to participate in national security,” Media Global, 15 March 2010,
http://www.mediaglobal.org/article/2010-03-18/female-peacekeepers-empower-liberian-women-to-participate-in-national-security.
15 Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 104.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 41

Statistics show that between December 2000 and table 1. Year of first admission of women into the
June 2009, the total regional contribution to UN peace command corps of armed forces
operations increased by 725%.16 During that same period,
troop contribution grew from 800 to 6,500 members.17 As Army Navy Air Force
Force
of July 2010, regional participation represented 7.7% of Country Officers
NC
Officers
NC
Officers
NC
the global contribution, which means 7,688 elements of a Officers Officers Officers
total of 99,879.18 Argentina 1997 1996 2002 1980 2001 1998

These contingents, however, are far from gender balanced, Bolivia* 1979–
1985/ 2008 — — 2007 2004
as women’s presence remains low. This can be explained 2003
by the fact that women’s participation in peace operations
Brazila — — — — 1996 2002
is a recent and ongoing process in the region, and it is
closely related to their incorporation into the military and Chile 1995 1998 2007 2009 2000 2009
police institutions. Colombia 2008 1983 1997 — 1997 1997

In the case of the armed forces, a sign of true institutional Ecuadorb 1999 — 2001 1965 2007 2008
openness to gender issues was noted when women were El Salvador c
2003 — — — 2003 —
given the opportunity to study in military academies as Guatemala 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997
part of the command corps. Until recently, women were Honduras 1998 2004 1999 1999 1996 1997
part of the forces, but only as staff (civilian professionals
Paraguay 2003 — 2003 — 2003 —
bearing a military status). In most countries of the region,
this openness occurred after democracy returned in the mid- Peru 1997 1998 1999 1998 1998 1998
eighties. By 2009, women represented approximately 4% Uruguayd 1998 1972 2000 1992 1997 1997
of the military forces, including troops, officers and non-
NC = Non-Commissioned
commissioned officers.19
* A first admission was allowed between 1979 and 1985. The
second admission took place in 2003.
a In Brazil, the year of the opening of military academies in each
of the forces is regarded as the year of entrance.
b In Ecuador, “non-commissioned officers” refers to the volunteers
of the Army, the members of the crew in the Navy and the
aero-technicians in the Air Force. All of them, along with the
soldiers, are called “troops.” In the Army’s command corps,
women have not been allowed to access as volunteers.
c In El Salvador, women are not allowed into the Navy. They do
not have access as non-commissioned officers in the Army and
the Air Force either.
d In Uruguay, the expressions “troops” and “baggage corps”
were mentioned within the Army, the Air Force and the
Navy until the 1970s. Since then, all of the armed forces
members, except commissioned officers, were given the name
of “subordinate personnel.” The non-commissioned officers’
category corresponds to first sergeants and sergeants major of
the Army and Air Force and their peers in the Navy.

Source: Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 55.

_____________________________________________
16 Ibid., 103.
17 Ibid.
18 UN DPKO, Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/july10_1.pdf.
19 Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 56.

42 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

The incorporation of women into security forces has been begun to join the armed institutions.
more natural considering the close relationship that this kind
of institution has with civil society. In contrast to the armed table 3. Year of the first deployment of women in a UN
forces, women represent about 13% of the security forces,20 peace operation
and in many countries in the region they have reached the
Country Year
highest command positions. However, the participation of
police officers in peace operations has not been considered Argentina 1993
by all the countries in the region, with participation levels Bolivia 2002
differing from country to country. When talking about Brazil 1991
female police in peace operations, part of the restrictions
Chile 1987
they face is in fact due to political hurdles against the
Ecuador 2007
general participation of the police in these missions.21
El Salvador 2008
table 2. Year of women’s first incorporation into police Honduras —
forces as commissioned officers
Guatemala 2005
Country Year Paraguay 2004
Argentina (Argentine Federal Police) 1978 Peru 2004
Argentina (National Gendarmerie) 2007 Uruguay 1994
Argentina (Naval Prefecture) 2000 Source: Data from Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, Chapter 3.
Bolivia* 1979–1986/ 1999
Brazil (Sao Paulo Military Police)** 1955 Women who were deployed agree that being part of a
Chile (Investigation Police) 1939 peace operation is an enriching experience, both from a
professional and personal perspective. A Latin American
Chile (Carabineers) 1962
female officer that was part of MONUC states:
Ecuador 1977
El Salvador 1993
It has been one of the best experiences I have had
professionally as I had the chance to join people from
Honduras 1977
a different culture, with different beliefs, languages
Guatemala 1997 . . . . Something I really appreciated while there,
Paraguay 1992 is that I was valued for my skills, my professional
Peru 1992 performance and for how professionally well trained
you are. I felt very satisfied because nobody cared
Uruguay 1971
whether I was a man or a woman or what my
* In 1986 the Police Academy closed the entrance to women, condition was, but they gave me what I deserved
reopening it in 1999. according to my capacity.22
** The Military Police of Brazil is the only police corps participating
in UN peace operations. The Military Police forces from the Likewise, a Medical Officer of the Brazilian Army taking
Federal District, Goias and Sao Paulo are the ones having part in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
contributed the greatest number of personnel to such operations. says:
Source: Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 88. I was really surprised at the integration of the entire
troop on these occasions, when we were really
a unique body, where each cell was extremely
important and the trust between mates was an
As noted above, the first experiences of women involved
essential factor when it came to carrying out the duty
in peace operations are concentrated mainly in the armed
of another partner. In those circumstances extremely
forces, especially as part of the professional corps, where a
close bonds are built, things for what words are not
large number of women have the necessary requirements to
good enough to explain, as they have to be felt and
deploy with the UN, such as level of experience and rank.
experienced.23
The inclusion of female personnel from the command corps,
however, remains scarce as women have only recently Aside from the chance to provide important aid and services,
_____________________________________________
20 Security forces include the Police forces of the countries. In the case of Argentina it also includes the National Gendarmerie and Naval
Prefecture which are militarized forces but do not respond to the command of the Ministry of Defence. Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 95.
21 Many countries such as Honduras and Peru face legal restrictions against assigning peacekeeping activities to their police personnel.
22 Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), Project: Women in the Armed Forces and Police in Latin America: A Gender
Approach to Peace Operations (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2007-2010).
23 Ibid.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 43

being part of a peace operation offers the possibility to MINUSTAH, its participation represents 88%. 27 But,
carry values, concepts and practices, which can improve considering the statistics mentioned, the proportion of Latin
the situations of the societies affected by conflict, including American women peacekeepers in Haiti remains far from
women affected by sexual violence. As an officer of the commendable. For example, in 2010, the Argentinean Joint
Bolivian Army in MONUC says: Battalion deployed in Port-au-Prince included 31 women
from a total of over 493 personnel, 19 of which were nurses
Because my condition of women, it was easier for
working at the mission Mobile Hospital and who had no
me to be in contact with women in that country, as
contact with the local population.28
in Africa women are not considered individuals. So,
is rather difficult they approach to a man to confess The same can be said of the other missions where a force
they have been abused. But, they see women soldiers from the Latin American region is deployed such as the
as equal and so they give us much more confidential UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
information.24 Congo (MONUSCO), UNMIL and UN Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP). For instance, in Cyprus, Argentina’s
MINUSTAH (led by Latin American countries since 2006)
military contingent consists of 256 men and only 9 women.
has been effective in restoring the peace; however, similarly
Of those 9 women, 8 are from the Army and only 1 is from
to other UN operations, its presence has not resulted in a
the Naval Force.29 In Uruguay’s case, although the country
decrease in levels of sexual violence. The situation of women
has the highest number of women historically deployed (by
in the country has worsened since the conflict re-emerged
June 2009 the total was 1,368 women), the contingent’s
in 2004. Although Haiti has ratified several international
composition is far from being gender balanced, as women’s
agreements on gender equality and non-discrimination,
representation never reaches more than 10% of the total.30
weak state institutions have rendered these agreements
difficult to enforce. Moreover, the culture itself, the The objective of a gender-balanced contingent in peace
atmosphere of impunity, and the disputes among gangs have operations is crucial to ensure that the mission leads by
also contributed to an increase in sexual violence. Some example and therefore portrays women as both security
non-governmental organizations estimate that the number providers and beneficiaries. However, the small number
of raped women and girls has increased by more than 40% of women in Latin American contingents reveals a gap in
since 2007.25 Experts have ascribed this to safer reporting current regional contributions. Therefore, countries need to
conditions, but incidents remain sufficiently widespread to work to better fill this gap in future deployments. Recently, the
threaten overall security. This situation has become critical Ministries of Defence and the Armed Forces from important
since the 2010 earthquake, as the perpetrators are taking regional contributors (Argentina and Chile mainly) have
advantage of the chaos and desolation, especially during begun to internalize the implications and significance of
the night in improvised camps.26 Resolution 1325, carrying out research and organizing
meetings to analyze the situation of women in the armed
In February 2009, the mission had 82 women out of almost
forces in order to implement gender security reforms within
4,200 regional staff. The country with the highest number
their institutions. Many peace operations training centres
of female personnel deployed was Uruguay, followed by
have started to consider the design of different strategies
Argentina (ten female personnel), Brazil and Guatemala
to recruit more women to serve as peacekeepers and to
(six each), and Bolivia and Chile (five each). In terms of
deliver gender training material to candidates, apart from
police forces, only one woman from Carabineers of Chile
the standardize training modules provided by the DPKO. In
was part of the mission. By June of that year, figures were a
Argentina, for instance, the peacekeeping training center,
little more optimistic: 95 women, representing an increase
CAECOPAZ, has started to put into practice many of the
of 9.7% since February. It is worth mentioning that if the
recommendations made by the Ministry of Defence in its
contribution of Latin American women peacekeepers is
Action Plan on Defense to Effectively Implement Gender
compared to the grand total of female personnel within
Perspectives within the Scope of International Peacekeeping
_____________________________________________
24 Ibid.
25 Valeria Vilardo, “Women ‘More Protected’ to Report Sexual Violence,” IPS, 22 July 2009,
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47753 (accessed 12 August 2010)
26 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti – S/2010/200, (New York: Security Council,
2010).
27 Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 124.
28 Government of Argentina, Ministry of Defence, Informe sobre la Integración de la Mujer en las Fuerzas Armadas (Buenos Aires: MINDEF,
2010), 39.
29 Ibid., 40.
30 Donadio and Mazzotta, Women, 122. See also República Oriental del Uruguay, National Support System to Peacekeeping Operations
(SINOMAPA).
31 Government of Argentina Ministry of Defence, Action Plan on Defense to Effectively Implement Gender Perspectives within the Scope of
International Peacekeeping Operations - Resolución Ministerial MD N° 1226, (Buenos Aires: MINDEF, 2008).

44 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

Operations.31
Latin American contributing countries do not have specific
pre-deployment training on the impact of sexual violence
in armed conflict and on managing concrete situations
of gender-based violence in the field. Knowledge about
Resolution 1820 is non-existent, and the need for wider
gender perspectives in peace operations needs to be
acknowledged as relevant for both men and women
peacekeepers. The women that are currently receiving
training, as well as the future generations of women
peacekeepers, should be aware that they have an
operational advantage in preventing of and responding
to sexual violence. Their role in the field is crucial to limit
the impacts of sexual violence caused by armed conflicts.
FinaL WOrds
If Latin American troop-contributing countries intend to
support UN initiatives against sexual violence in armed
conflict they should consider:
• redoubling current efforts to deploy more women
peacekeepers in the near future; and
• collecting and documenting from the field theatre their
own experiences and common responses to concrete
situations of sexual violence.
Each of these considerations constitutes a major challenge
for Latin American countries. On one hand, the possibility
to contribute more women to peace operations is directly
linked to the situation of women within military and police
institutions. Most female officers from the region have not
yet achieved the necessary rank to be part of a peace
operation as military observers or staff officers; thus
some years will have to pass if they intend to apply for
command positions in a mission. However, considering
that women involved in these activities are usually sourced
from the professional corps (officers and NC officers),
wider recruiting and information campaigns could be put
into practice. The same could be done to enhance the
participation of civilian women.32
The improvement in the status of women within the security
forces is closely related to the political participation of this
kind of institution as a whole. Considering the growing
demands from the UN for police personnel, it is probable
that in the future Latin American security institutions will
begin to discuss their participation.
On the other hand, countries in Latin America (like those
in many other regions) lack a specific doctrine to combat
sexual violence when it is used as a tactic of war. As a
result, few strategies have been developed to protect
_____________________________________________
32 Some of these gaps could be identified during the events on gender and peacekeeping that RESDAL conducted between 2008 and 2010.
civilians from this phenomenon, which fundamentally
calls for non-conventional responses. To move forward,
peacekeeping training centres should collect and document
the experiences and lessons learned in combating sexual
violence, and also incorporate the DPKO/DFS Gender
Guidelines in their pre-deployment training.
Beyond the challenges mentioned above, it is important that
Latin American troop-contributing countries understand
the impacts and consequences of sexual violence on the
achievement of a durable peace. A window of opportunity
was set at the Eighth Conference of Defense Ministers of
the Americas (2008) when for the first time ever the region
included Resolution 1325 in the Declaration of Banff. More
recently, in November 2010 at the Ninth Conference in
Santa Cruz, Bolivia, countries renewed their commitments
on gender issues within defence institutions, taking a step
forward in the advancement of equality and quality in its
regional contributions to peace operations.
BiBLiOGraPHY
Agnès Stienne. “Viols en temps de guerre, le silence et
l’impunité.” Le Monde diplomatique, 14 February
2011. http://blog.mondediplo.net/2011-02-
14-Viols-en-temps-de-guerre-le-silence-et-l-impunite
(accessed 20 February 2011).
Amnesty International. Haiti: Don’t turn your back on
girls: Sexual violence against girls in Haiti. London,
UK: Amnesty International, November 2008.
_______. Violence Against Women in Armed Conflict: A
Fact Sheet. 2005. http://www.amnestyusa.org/
violence-against-women/stop-violence-against-
women-svaw/violence-against-women-in-armed-
conflict/page.do?id=1108213 (accessed 28
August 2010).
Government of Argentina. Action Plan on Defense
to Effectively Implement Gender Perspectives
within the Scope of International Peacekeeping
Operations - Resolución Ministerial MD N° 1226.
Buenos Aires: Ministry of Defence, 21 de octubre
de 2008.
_______. Informe sobre la Integración de la Mujer en
las Fuerzas Armadas. Buenos Aires: Ministry of
Defence, 2010.
Donadio, Marcela, and Cecilia Mazzotta. Women in the
Armed and Police Forces: Resolution 1325 and
Peace Operations in Latin America. Buenos Aires:
RESDAL, March 2010.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 45
Gaestel, Allyn. “Female peacekeepers empower Liberian
women to participate in national security.”
Media Global. 15 March 2010. http://www.
mediaglobal.org/article/2010-03-18/female-
peacekeepers-empower-liberian-women-to-
participate-in-national-security (accessed 27 August
2010).
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. “Now, The World Is
Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual Violence
in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
and Oxfam International, April 2010.
Kim, Stelet, and Dustin Sharp. Crafting Human Security
in an Insecure World. San Diego: Joan B. Kroc
Institute for Peace & Justice, 24–26 September
2008.
Kron, Josh. “At least 150 women raped in weekend raid
in Congo.” New York Times, Africa Section, 22
August 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/
africa/23congo.html?_r=1 (accessed 28 August
2010).
Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina
(RESDAL). Project: Women in the Armed Forces
and Police in Latin America: A Gender Approach
to Peace Operations. Buenos Aires: RESDAL,
December 2007 to April 2010.
República Oriental del Uruguay. National Support System
to Peacekeeping Operations (SINOMAPA). June
2009.
United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field
Support (DFS). Guideline to integrate a
gender perspective into the work of military in
peacekeeping operations. New York, NY: UN
DPKO/DFS, 3 August 2010.
_______. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines. New York: DPKO and
DFS, January 2008.
UN DPKO. Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
contributors/2010/july10_1.pdf (accessed 28
August 2010).
46 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
_______. Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the
Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone in the Light of Security Council
Resolution 1820. New York: DPKO, March 2009.
_______. Policy Dialogue to Review Strategies for
Enhancing Gender Balance among Uniformed
Personnel in Peacekeeping Missions. Final Report.
New York: DPKO, 28-29 March 2006.
UN. Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti –
S/2010/200. New York: Security Council, 22
February 2010.
_______. Resolution 1889 – S/RES/1889. New York:
Security Council, 5 October 2009.
_______. Resolution 1888 – S/RES/1888. New York:
Security Council, 30 September 2009.
_______. Resolution 1820 - S/RES/1820. New York:
Security Council, 19 June 2008.
_______. Resolution 1325 - S/RES/1325. New York:
Security Council, 10 October 2000.
_______. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
- A/CONF.183/9. New York: General Assembly,
17 July 1998.
United Nation Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
and UN DPKO. Analytical Inventory of Responses
by Peacekeeping Personnel to War-Related
Violence against Women: Executive Summary and
Checklist. New York: UNIFEM and DPKO, June
2010.
Vilardo, Valeria. “Women ‘More Protected’ to Report
Sexual Violence.” IPS News, 22 July 2009. http://
www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47753
(accessed 28 August 2010).
 MEJORANDO LAS OPERACIONES
DE PAZ A TRAVÉS DE LECCIONES
APRENDIDAS EN LA ASISTENCIA
HUMANITARIA:
Perspectiva de la UEMPE

angel navas cruz

resUmen
A partir de 2010, la Unidad Escuela de Misiones de Paz “Ecuador” (UEMPE) implementó el curso
de Coordinación Civil-Militar y Asistencia Humanitaria, a fin de desarrollar en los estudiantes las
competencias generales y específicas, en técnicas y procedimientos de acuerdo a estándares de la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU). El curso considera la experiencia de Ecuador en las
distintas operaciones de paz en las que ha participado, para que los alumnos puedan desempeñarse
como parte de un equipo coordinador en asuntos de asistencia humanitaria, asesores e integrantes
de un Cuartel General de una misión, así como oficiales de enlace de las diferentes instituciones que
forman parte del Sistema Descentralizado de Gestión de Riesgos.

aBstract
As of 2010, the Unidad Escuela de Misiones de Paz ‘Ecuador’ (UEMPE) is implementing the course
‘Civil-Military Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance,’ with the objective of providing students
with general and specific skills, techniques and procedures in accordance with United Nations (UN)
standards. Using the experiences of Ecuador in different peace operations, the course allows students
to work as part of a team in coordinating issues related to humanitarian assistance, as consultants and
members of the General Staff of a mission, and as liaison officers to the different institutions that form
part of the Decentralised Risk Management System.

A partir del 2010, la Unidad Escuela de Misiones de

Paz “Ecuador” (UEMPE) implementó el curso de
Coordinación Civil-Militar y Asistencia Humanitaria, a fin
Cabe mencionar algunos desafíos en diferentes situaciones
donde la asistencia humanitaria fue de vital importancia:
• Conformar y desplegar una fuerza de tarea conjunta
de desarrollar en los estudiantes las competencias generales
y multidisciplinaria de las diferentes instituciones
y específicas, en técnicas y procedimientos de acuerdo a
públicas y privadas, en reacción inmediata a las graves
estándares de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas
consecuencias ocasionadas por el sismo que azotó a
(ONU). Este curso considera la experiencia de Ecuador
Puerto Príncipe – Haití el 12 de enero de 2010.
en las distintas operaciones de mantenimiento de paz que
ha participado, para que puedan desempeñarse como • Conformar y desplegar un equipo de médicos de
parte de un equipo coordinador en asuntos de asistencia diferentes especialidades a fin de brindar sus servicios
humanitaria, asesores e integrantes de un Cuartel General profesionales a los heridos en Haití.
de una misión, así como oficiales de enlace de las diferentes
• Ejecutar con éxito las tareas de búsqueda, rescate,
instituciones que forman parte del Sistema Descentralizado
remoción de escombros como parte de la asistencia
de Gestión de Riesgos.
humanitaria, específicamente en el Hotel Montana-Haití.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 47

• Materializar un efectivo enlace y coordinación con
representantes de la organización no gubernamental
“Instituto Haitiano de Desarrollo Integral,” con el fin de
conocer su trayectoria, poder concretar y garantizar
la entrega de donaciones como parte de la ayuda
humanitaria enviada por el Gobierno ecuatoriano.
• Se concretó la visita a varios orfanatos apadrinados
por la CHIECUENGCOY (Compañía de Ingenieros
Chileno-Ecuatoriana en Haití), en donde se realizaron
chequeos médicos y curaciones a los niños, la entrega
de medicinas, ropa recolectada por personal de dicha
Compañía y alimentos del programa “Mi bebida” de
Ecuador. Adicionalmente se realizaron actividades
lúdicas, se mantuvo conversaciones, dinámicas y juegos,
a fin de tratar de superar cualquier trauma en los niños
sobre lo ocurrido (apoyo psicosocial).
Con la cooperación de varias instituciones nacionales
se implementó, un proceso de selección del personal
que cumpla con el perfil profesional para el curso de
Coordinación Civil-Militar y Asistencia Humanitaria, a
través de una participación voluntaria y coordinada. Para
conformar estos equipos de trabajo de ayuda humanitaria,
no sólo es suficiente contar con la voluntad, sino también
con todos los medios necesarios que posee cada
institución, para brindar una mejor ayuda en momentos de
emergencias o desastres. Cada institución es responsable
de seleccionar al personal calificado para cumplir tareas
de alto riesgo en momentos de crisis.
La UEMPE a través de éste curso, también se encargará
de implementar la estandarización del entrenamiento
haciendo énfasis en: coordinación, liderazgo, seguridad y
profesionalismo, para cumplir misiones de ayuda humanitaria,
con ejercicios aplicativos conjuntos, a fin de implementar las
capacidades y lecciones aprendidas en Haití.
• Materializar una fuerza de tarea conjunta y
multidisciplinaria con personal calificado y unidos
por una noble causa, con representantes de diferentes
instituciones tales como: Cruz Roja, bomberos, policías
y militares.
• Fue importante considerar varias alternativas para
generar la movilidad, comunicación y la seguridad de
los equipos de asistencia humanitaria, aspectos claves
para ser eficientes y oportunos con la ayuda.
• Las coordinaciones y el manejo de información son
vulnerables en el lugar de desastre, por lo que se debe
implementar un mecanismo de prevención y control para
mejorar las mismas.
• La movilidad es determinante, se debe crear estrategias
que permitan suplir esta necesidad, ya que en medio de
una crisis puede tornarse determinante para acudir con
rapidez a los lugares más afectados por desastres.
48 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
La capacitación se completará con la implementación de
áreas apropiadas de entrenamiento que brinden condiciones
reales de empleo; para esto se contará con el apoyo de la
Secretaria Nacional de Gestión de Riesgo, Policía Nacional,
Cruz Roja, Cuerpo de Bomberos y el Comando General de
Desminado, explotando sus capacidades y el trabajo en
equipo en diferentes ejercicios aplicativos conjuntos.
enLace cOn La POLÍtica deL
estadO ecUatOrianO
El Plan Ecuador es una política del Estado ecuatoriano
que concibe a la seguridad humana como el resultado
de la paz y el desarrollo. Tiene tres ejes: 1) consolidar la
seguridad y una cultura de paz centradas en el ser humano,
la satisfacción de sus necesidades y la potenciación de
sus capacidades y libertades; 2) mantener una política
de relaciones internacionales equitativa y solidaria; y 3)
afirmar una política de defensa basada en la protección
de la población, de los recursos naturales, del patrimonio
nacional y el control efectivo de su territorio.
Ante esta situación el Comando Conjunto de las
Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador, dispone al Instituto de
Perfeccionamiento y Especialización Conjunta, especializar
al personal de oficiales, voluntarios, tripulantes,
aerotécnicos y servidores públicos de las Fuerzas Armadas
nacionales e internacionales como miembros de un
equipo de ayuda humanitaria y coordinación civil-militar,
a fin de enfrentar con éxito este difícil reto, basado en
los principios y procedimientos de la ONU, de la cual el
Estado ecuatoriano es miembro fundador.
Una operación de ayuda humanitaria y CMCOORD,
consiste en: acciones que sirven para establecer relaciones
de coordinación para poder llegar de forma oportuna
y eficiente con una ayuda humanitaria. Este tipo de
operaciones involucra la participación de personal militar
y civil, pero no el uso de la fuerza, sino de la conciliación y
mediación, como métodos para ayudar a mantener la paz.
De hecho, el arma más potente de un integrante en este tipo
de operaciones, radica en su imparcialidad, capacidad de
conciliación, mediación y negociación.
Los dos mayores ideales de las Naciones Unidas son: la
paz mundial y el respecto de los derechos humanos; sin
embargo, el objetivo final de estas operaciones es regular,
controlar y planificar una coordinación para poder llegar
con la ayuda humanitaria a los conflictos que amenazan
la paz y la seguridad internacional, así como a desastres
naturales u ocasionados por la intervención del hombre.
Las Fuerzas Armadas ecuatorianas como parte de la política
de Estado, contribuyen al incremento de la presencia del
Ecuador en la promoción profesional en operaciones
multinacionales, desarrollando un proceso de preparación
que considere apropiadamente la complejidad de las
actuales amenazas a la paz y el buen vivir de los seres
humanos en el mundo; de esta forma, Ecuador podrá
concretar un valioso, efectivo, eficiente y eficaz aporte
en todas y cada una de las etapas, que una operación
moderna considera.
El curso de Coordinación Civil-Militar y Asistencia
Humanitaria aplicado a operaciones multidimensionales
capacitará y especializará tanto a oficiales de las Fuerzas
Armadas como a representantes de organizaciones
gubernamentales y organizaciones no gubernamentales
nacionales e internacionales, con la finalidad que este grupo
humano pueda emplearse eficientemente como miembro de
un equipo de ayuda humanitaria y equipo de coordinación
civil-militar y poder enfrentar con éxitos la difícil tarea de
asistir a los más necesitados en situaciones adversas.
Es innegable que una operación de paz lleva consigo de
manera implícita actividades de asistencia humanitaria,
la cual está definida como “acciones de ayuda para la
mitigación y alivio del sufrimiento humano sea cual fuere
su causa para restablecer las condiciones básicas de vida.”
Para materializar las acciones de Asistencia Humanitaria es
necesario establecer la coordinación con todos los actores
que persiguen este fin, en donde el componente militar
brinda su apoyo al proveer sus capacidades al beneficio
de estas actividades, creando para esto “la Coordinación
Civil-Militar” (CIMIC), generando una estrecha relación de
trabajo entre civiles y militares en pro de nuestro único
objetivo: la seguridad humana.
cOncLUsiOnes
Se desarrollará la competencia de gestión ante una crisis
humanitaria con los diferentes actores que participan en
una operación de paz y tareas desarrolladas en distintos
ámbitos tanto civil como militar, al activarse un plan de
contingencia en el país.
Se alcanzará las competencias necesarias para cumplir las
tareas de coordinación civil-militar y/o asesorar a quienes
cumplen esta tarea, en una operación de paz o al activarse
un plan de contingencia en el país.
Se realizará una transferencia de lecciones aprendidas en
las diferentes instituciones que forman parte del Sistema
Descentralizado de Gestión de Riesgos.
Se realizará las coordinaciones necesarias a fin de
estandarizar los conocimientos generados a la Asociación
Latinoamericana de Centros de Operaciones de Paz,
ALCOPAZ.
Para mayor información y para obtener el listado de asignaturas y cargas
horarias del primer curso de Coordinación Civil-Militar y Asistencia
Humanitaria, consultar la página Web de la UEMPE a la siguiente
dirección electrónica: www.uempe.mil.ec .

OBJetiVOs deL Primer cUrsO de

cOOrdinaciÓn ciViL-miLitar Y
asistencia HUmanitaria
• Elaborar y ejecutar planes tácticos empleando
métodos y procedimientos adecuados con eficacia,
con responsabilidad y profesionalismo.
• Realizar simulaciones y verificaciones de los
planes con realismo y veracidad, actualizando y
corrigiéndolos de acuerdo a la situación.
• Emitir sugerencias y recomendaciones elocuentes,
realistas y acertadas tomando como base la doctrina
y marco legal vigente.
• Exponer alternativas y planes alternativos a
situaciones imprevistas.
• Prever y plantear escenarios futuros con posibles
soluciones.
• Impartir conocimientos, experiencias y lecciones
aprendidas, empleando técnicas didácticas de fácil
comprensión.
• Emplear en ejercicios aplicativos los conocimientos
adquiridos en el área de estudio básico de
CMCOORD y asistencia humanitaria.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 49

 LECCIONES APRENDIDAS
SOBRE GÉNERO EN LAS
OPERACIONES DE PAZ:
Perspectiva del CAECOPAZ

ana Florencia talamoni

resUmen
Reconocida como el ¨hito¨, en temas de género, la resolución 1325 cumplió, el 31 de octubre de
2010, diez años de vigencia dentro del ámbito de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) y
también en la historia propia de los países como Argentina, los cuales, además de contribuir con tropas
de paz, asumen su entrenamiento previo al despliegue con excelencia y responsabilidad y se adjudican
obligatorias las fuertes recomendaciones que realiza la ONU a sus Estados miembros. El presente escrito
pretende presentar un breve resumen de los documentos que siguieron a la antedicha resolución, así
como comentarios referidos a la implementación de sus recomendaciones para el entrenamiento de las
tropas de paz en el Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ).

aBstract
Recognized as a “landmark” resolution for addressing gender issues, United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolution 1325 celebrated its tenth anniversary on 31 October 2010. This resolution is
significant for countries like Argentina, which, apart from contributing peacekeeping personnel, provide
pre-deployment training with the aim of instilling excellence and responsibility. This article provides a
brief summary of the documents which followed Resolution 1325, and discusses the implementation
by the Argentinean peace operations training centre (CAECOPAZ) of their recommendations for peace
operations training.

…Reafirmando el importante papel que
desempeñan las mujeres en la prevención y
solución de los conflictos y en la consolidación de la
paz, y subrayando la importancia de que participen en
pie de igualdad e intervengan plenamente en todas las
iniciativas encaminadas al mantenimiento y fomento de
la paz y seguridad, así como la necesidad de aumentar
su participación en los procesos de toma de decisiones
en materia de prevención y solución de conflictos…
Resolución Nº1325 del Consejo
de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas1
R
econocida como el ¨hito¨, en temas de género,
la resolución 1325 cumplió, el 31 de octubre de
2010, diez años de vigencia dentro del ámbito de la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) y también
en la historia propia de los países como Argentina, los
cuales, además de contribuir con tropas de paz; asumen
su entrenamiento previo al despliegue con excelencia y
responsabilidad y se adjudican obligatorias las fuertes
recomendaciones que realiza esta organización a sus
Estados miembros.
El presente escrito pretende presentar un breve resumen de
los documentos que siguieron a la antedicha resolución,
así como comentarios referidos a la implementación de
sus recomendaciones para el entrenamiento de las tropas
de paz en el Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto
para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ).

_____________________________________________
1 Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas N°1325 – S/RES/1325 (Nueva York: Consejo de Seguridad, 2000).

50 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

Las naciOnes Unidas Y La
aGenda sOBre La mUJer, PaZ Y
seGUridad
Podemos citar varios antecedentes de la resolución 1325
dentro del sistema de la ONU. Algunas resoluciones
aparecen como esfuerzos tempranos para incorporar
la temática que nos ocupa;2 así también la declaración
formulada a la prensa con motivo del Día de las Naciones
Unidas de los Derechos de la Mujer y la Paz Internacional
(Día Internacional de la Mujer), el 8 de marzo de 2000.3
Asimismo, tanto la declaración de la plataforma de Beijing y
la declaración de Windhoek y el Plan de Acción de Namibia
sobre la incorporación de una perspectiva de género en
las operaciones multidimensionales de apoyo a la paz,
aportaron antecedentes directos a la resolución 1325.4
Durante los diez años transcurridos desde la resolución
1325 se trabajó intensamente al respecto, más las
preocupaciones que le dieron origen siguen alertando a
la comunidad internacional y exigen hoy más que nunca
que continúen vigentes y se siga con el rumbo establecido
allá por el año 2000.
La resolución 1325, encabeza la lista de documentos
principales sobre Mujer, Paz y Seguridad elaborados y
patrocinados por las Naciones Unidas, siendo el más
destacado hasta el momento. Resalta la necesidad de
alcanzar estándares de equidad e igualdad entre el hombre
y la mujer para las diferentes oportunidades en todas las
etapas de paz, fomento de la seguridad, como así también
brindando las garantías mínimas de participación en los
procesos de adopción de decisiones. Este llamado de las
Naciones Unidas permite la integración del factor género
en el contexto de los conflictos - no siempre armados - y
también en las etapas de mantenimiento de la paz; de
reconstrucción y de estabilización.
A la resolución 1325 le siguieron otras que la reforzaron
y se concentraron en ciertas materias. Para mencionar
algunas podemos referirnos a las resoluciones: 1820;
1888 y 1889.5
La resolución 1820 (2008) apela a denunciar y a combatir
la violencia sexual y abuso en las operaciones de paz, e
insta a que los Estados adopten medidas y se comprometan
al seguimiento de la situación.
Por su parte, la resolución 1888 (2009) nos invita
nuevamente a reflexionar sobre la cuestión de género,
dando más énfasis a la violencia sexual en los conflictos
armados. Acentúa la relación directa que existe entre
la prevención de estos actos, con la paz y la seguridad
internacional.
_____________________________________________
2 Ver las Resoluciones Nº 1261 y Nº 1265, del 25 de agosto y del 17 de septiembre de 1999 respectivamente; las Resoluciones Nº 1296 del
19 de abril del 2000 y Nº 1314 del 11 de agosto del mismo año.
3 Ver SC/6816.
4 A/52/231 and S/2000/693.
5 Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas N°1820 – S/RES/1820 (Nueva York: Consejo de Seguridad, 2008); N°1888
(2009); N°1889 (2009).
Del mismo modo, invita a que en las resoluciones del
Consejo de Seguridad, donde se renueven los mandatos de
las operaciones de paz u otras disposiciones, se incorpore
una perspectiva de género y violencia sexual. Solicita
además la obligatoriedad de presentar informes cuando
se haya cometido algún delito, así como el seguimiento de
la cuestión.
Por otro lado se estimula a los Estados miembros, a que
desplieguen cada vez más personal militar y policial
femenino en las operaciones de paz, capacitándolos
para el cumplimiento de sus funciones. Asimismo, propone
también intensificar los esfuerzos para una correcta
aplicación de la política de ¨tolerancia cero¨ referidas a
la explotación y el abuso sexual.
Por su parte, la resolución 1889 (2009) prosigue con
el tema, ampliando e intensificando las anteriores, por
ejemplo, con la invitación a los países miembros a tomar
medidas tendientes a lograr que, tanto mujeres como niñas,
tengan igual acceso a la educación en las situaciones
posteriores a los conflictos. Recuerda además, que deberá
incorporarse en forma permanente la perspectiva de
género a los programas de desarme, desmovilización y
reintegración para los ex combatientes.
En definitiva, en todas estas resoluciones pueden
encontrarse muchos aspectos que se reiteran, como por
ejemplo la promoción de compromisos a futuro y una
enérgica solicitud a los Estados que contribuyen con
tropas, a seguir comprometiéndose más activamente en
esta problemática.
La resOLUciÓn 1325:
imPLementaciÓn Y LecciOnes
aPrendidas en eL caecOPaZ
El CAECOPAZ, que el 27 de junio pasado cumplió un
nuevo aniversario de su creación y festejó sus 15 años
de entrenamiento para la paz, fue creado para brindar
capacitación y entrenamiento del más alto nivel para el
personal designado para participar en operaciones de
paz. Durante estos 15 años de existencia, las lecciones
aprendidas y su liderazgo en la región, impusieron a
sus instructores la necesidad de especializarse en ciertas
temáticas prioritarias para la ONU. De esta forma se
abrió el camino a cursos y programación para otro tipo
de actividades que complementan las misiones a cumplir.
En particular, la resolución 1325 nos exhorta a
incorporar en forma urgente una perspectiva de género
en las operaciones de paz, teniendo en cuenta todas las
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 51
recomendaciones referidas al adiestramiento especializado
para la protección y el reconocimiento de las necesidades
especiales y de los derechos humanos de las mujeres y los
niños en las situaciones de conflicto.
Dar cumplimiento a este propósito, es decir, incorporar la
temática en el adiestramiento, supone reconocer:
• La necesidad de una correcta implementación de
las cuestiones de género en una operación de paz
promovida por la ONU;
• Que la cuestión de género en las operaciones de paz es
una asignatura compleja donde intervienen numerosos
factores que deben interpretarse correctamente, en
relación al derecho internacional y nacional aplicable
en las operaciones de paz; y
• Que el tiempo disponible de instrucción en la etapa
previa al despliegue, no resulta del todo suficiente y
muchos aspectos no se pueden profundizar.
Asimismo, ante la necesidad de desarrollar y promover
acciones dirigidas a la equidad entre mujeres y varones
en el marco de las operaciones de paz; el CAECOPAZ
desde hace más de 6 años tomó conciencia de lo anterior
incorporando a sus políticas institucionales una serie de
actividades y procedimientos que permiten realizar este
propósito y demostrarlo.
Este propósito se evidencia con la incorporación de la
materia género en los programas de estudio de la mayoría
de los cursos que dicta el CAECOPAZ. El contenido es
revisado por expertos en la temática y complementado
cada momento que se considere necesario, tomando nota
de los últimos desarrollos doctrinarios a nivel internacional,
las realidades del terreno y la propia experiencia de los
peacekeepers desplegados en el terreno. Así mismo,
nuestros instructores van adquiriendo capacitación y
perfeccionamiento en la materia participando activamente
en cursos, seminarios y congresos relacionados con esta
temática.
Para mejorar aún más la eficiencia y alcanzar una
correcta implementación de la resolución 1325, desde el
año 2009 funcionan en el CAECOPAZ los Gender Focal
Point, rol desempeñado por un equipo conformado por
dos profesionales, uno civil (mujer) y otro militar (hombre),
cuya función consiste en el planeamiento y organización
de clases, seminarios y otras actividades, a fin de alcanzar
un adecuado proceso de aprendizaje que permita una
correcta transversalización de estos temas a todas las
áreas. En definitiva, alcanzar una correcta implementación
de las recomendaciones de la resolución 1325 a nivel del
entrenamiento pre-despliegue.
Consistentemente con la adecuada participación igualitaria
de género en todas las etapas del planeamiento de la paz,
resulta imperativo incorporar esta asignatura durante las
distintas etapas formativas de los miembros que participen
en operaciones de paz y seguridad internacional.
52 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
Una lección aprendida en este aspecto, es no sólo
incorporar la materia género a los distintos cursos, sino
incorporar la perspectiva de género a las demás materias
del entrenamiento pre-despliegue.
Como mencionamos anteriormente, tanto la resolución
1820 como la 1325, son algunos de los principales
documentos sobre Mujer, Paz y Seguridad adoptados por
el Consejo de Seguridad, sobre los que el CAECOPAZ
viene estudiando, capacitándose y reflexionando para
encontrar la mejor manera de entrenar a sus peacekeepers
que despliegan bajo mandato de la ONU.
Cumpliendo con las competencias y responsabilidades
derivadas de su misión institucional, el CAECOPAZ da
respuestas al llamado del Consejo de Seguridad y destaca
la participación plena e igualitaria tanto de hombres como
de mujeres en todas las etapas e iniciativas de paz de un
conflicto armado, mantenimiento de la paz y reconstrucción.
La implementación de las resoluciones mencionadas
anteriormente así como informes y recomendaciones
de las Naciones Unidas, más el aprendizaje desde la
propia experiencia (lecciones aprendidas) se incorporan
sistemáticamente al programa de estudio de la materia
sobre Cuestiones de Género.
Forman par te de los objetivos y propósitos del
entrenamiento, el transmitir no sólo los contenidos de dichos
documentos y resoluciones, sino que todo nuestro personal
conozca el derecho aplicable y la conducta esperada de la
ONU por parte de los peacekeepers en todo lo relacionado
con ésta temática.
En estos momentos el CAECOPAZ se encuentra actualizando
íntegramente los programas de estudio de sus cursos y
materias, incluyendo los nuevos módulos de entrenamiento
de la ONU—Core Pre-deployment Training Materials
(CPTM)—en lo que al género respecta. Así también está
incorporando a sus programas de estudio los contenidos de
las guías sobre género publicadas en marzo de 2010 por el
Departamento de Apoyo a las Actividades sobre el Terreno
de las Naciones Unidas. Como puede observarse, al mismo
tiempo que se actualiza el material, se formulan nuevas
estrategias didácticas para enseñarlo, en concordancia con
las exigencias y progresos alcanzados por la sociedad y a
través de las experiencias prácticas internacionales. Nuestra
experiencia nos indica que constantemente el material de
entrenamiento debe ser revisado y actualizado, contando
con casos de estudio y material didáctico para el logro de
los objetivos de enseñanza.
Resulta sumamente importante que el contenido de la
materia Cuestiones de Género en una operación de paz,
incorpore los siguientes ejes temáticos mínimos: definición
de género y su aplicación e importancia en las operaciones
de paz; diferentes impactos del conflicto en hombres y
mujeres; cómo los peacekeepers pueden promover las
equidad de género en una misión; necesidades específicas;
vulnerabilidades especiales; cuestiones culturales; violencia
sexual; violaciones a los derechos humanos, entre otros
temas destacados. Asimismo, es necesario que los
peacekeepers realicen una parte práctica y resuelvan
distintos escenarios relacionados con esta temática. El
CAECOPAZ lo logró a través de los distintos escenarios
y simuladores que cuenta en sus instalaciones, que dan
realidad y práctica a las clases teóricas. Incorporar
recursos didácticos de todo tipo contribuye al logro de
la capacitación deseada. Ejemplo de lo anterior es la
incorporación de la perspectiva de género a los ejercicios
en el terreno, como role players; check points; negociación
y comunicación, etc.
También se han incorporado a los programas de estudio de
los cursos previo al despliegue del contingente, una materia
específica para aquellos oficiales designados como puntos
focales de género dentro del contingente que desplegará
en una misión. Para este tipo de clase, los asesores de
género del CAECOPAZ realizan actividades específicas e
intensivas para quienes están designados para esta tarea.
Cabe destacar que los temas de género no sólo se abordan
exclusivamente en el módulo mencionado. Lo transversal
de esta temática, así como lo puntualmente recomendado
mediante las resoluciones 1325 y 1820 hacen que el
género esté presente en otras clases dentro del programa
de actividades. Se ha llegado a la conclusión que el
entrenamiento debe ser integral y actualizado de manera
tal que los conocimientos están unidos uniformemente bajo
criterios claros y útiles.
Resumiendo lo anterior, el principal desafío para el
entrenamiento en cuestiones de género en una operación
de paz, es lograr un proceso de enseñanza/aprendizaje
no sólo con excelentes niveles académicos en el aula, sino
también llevarlos a la práctica con distintos casos de estudio
y ejercitaciones que reflejen la realidad del terreno y que
el personal próximo al despliegue conozca el derecho
aplicable, como cumplir exitosamente el mandato de la
misión y ser promotores de la paz.
resOLUciÓn 1325:
resPOnsaBiLidad de tOdOs
A modo de una primera conclusión, podríamos afirmar
que, a lo largo de diez años de trabajo en relación con
la problemática de género, mujer, paz y seguridad, es
necesario continuar promoviendo la toma de conciencia, y
ver en qué lugar nos situamos, qué roles y responsabilidades
asumimos para promover los estándares de equidad e
igualdad deseados tanto para hombres como para mujeres.
Los hechos pondrán en evidencia si fuimos y seremos
capaces de crear conciencia entre los responsables de
la toma de decisiones a fin de producir y utilizar más y
mejores métodos de capacitación tanto en sensibilización
de género, como en la generación de indicadores
más efectivos para monitorear la efectividad en la
operacionalización de conceptos.
No podemos dejar de resaltar que las presentes cuestiones
de género y otras iniciativas en pro de la igualdad, la
no discriminación, la defensa de los derechos del niño, y
otros aspectos conexos, poseen un efecto enriquecedor aún
puertas adentro de nuestras organizaciones. No sólo se
incluyen en contenidos didácticos, se aprenden y se aplican
durante las operaciones, sino que a su vez contribuyen a
perfeccionar nuestras relaciones interpersonales y laborales
en lo cotidiano.
Asimismo, el reconocimiento de esta problemática por
parte de las Naciones Unidas representa, a nuestro
entender, la transformación de un sistema de ideas en
acciones concretas que no hacen sino reflejar un avance
de la humanidad en su búsqueda de la paz.
La resolución 1325 hace un llamado integral, no sólo
a los responsables directos de las calamidades, o a los
trabajadores humanitarios en el terreno. Reconoce a cada
uno de los seres humanos como potenciales promotores de
seguridad; haciendo una convocatoria general de creación
de conciencia, reconociendo que cada uno de nosotros
podemos, desde nuestros puestos de trabajo, contribuir a
la paz, la seguridad internacional y a un planeta cada vez
más pacífico. Cada uno puede considerarse responsable
por acción o por omisión.
BiBLiOGraFÍa
Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto
para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ).
www.caecopaz.mil.ar.
RESDAL. Informe seminario taller “A diez años de la
resolución 1325: género y operaciones de paz,”
25 y 26 de febrero de 2010. www.resdal.org.
Resolución 1325 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones
Unidas, 31 de octubre de 2000.
Resolución 1820 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones
Unidas, 19 de junio de 2008.
Resolución 1888 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones
Unidas, 30 de septiembre de 2009.
Resolución 1889 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones
Unidas, 5 de octubre de 2009.
Sitio Web oficial de la Organización de las Naciones
Unidas. www.un.org.
United Nations. DPKO/DFS Guidelines Integrating a
Gender Perspective into the Work of the United
Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations.
2010.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 53
 CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND “GOOD
OFFICES” AFTER ANGOSTURA:
Assessing the MIB/OAS Initiatives along
the Colombian-Ecuadorian Burning Border

Fernando a. chinchilla

aBstract
This article presents the experience of the Organisation of American States’ (OAS) Good Offices Mission
for Colombia and Ecuador over 33 months of operation. The author examines how the mission’s initial
focus on from-above confidence building was redirected in favour of a from-below confidence building
scheme, and identifies four factors which help explain the complexity in moving towards the reestablishment
of full diplomatic relations. The author concludes that despite the difficulties of the situation, the OAS has
made decisive contributions in preserving peace and stability in the Andean region.

resUmen
Este artículo presenta la experiencia de la Misión de Buenos Oficios de la Organización de Estados
Americanos (OEA) en Colombia y Ecuador durante 33 meses de operación. El autor examina cómo
el enfoque inicial de construcción de confianza de la misión desde el nivel superior hacia abajo fue
redireccionado a favor de un esquema de construcción de confianza desde abajo hacia arriba, y el
identifica cuatro factores que ayudan a explicar la complejidad de avanzar hacia un reestablecimiento
total de relaciones diplomáticas. El autor concluye que más allá de las dificultades de la situación, la OEA
ha hecho contribuciones decisivas hacia la preservación de la paz y estabilidad en la región andina.

O n 1 March 2008, the Colombian Military Forces

performed a night incursion in Angostura, an area
localized in the Ecuadorian Amazonia, approximately
1.8 kilometres from the Colombian border. Raul Reyes,
the second-in-command of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), was killed in the raid.
Quito’s initial cautious reaction promptly led to a strong
protest that ruptured diplomatic relations: from 3 March
2008 until 26 November 2010 (when both governments
announced the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations),
the great majority of mechanisms for binational co-operation
between Colombia and Ecuador were frozen solid.1
On 17 March 2008, after two international statements
addressing the events, the Twenty-Fifth Meeting on
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs rejected the
Colombian manoeuvre and created the Organization
of American States (OAS) Good Offices Mission for
Colombia and Ecuador (MIB/OAS). Through Resolution
RC.25/RES.1/08 rev. 1,2 the MIB/OAS was mandated
to restore, through its “Good Offices,” an atmosphere
of trust between the parties, that is, “trying to induce
conflicting parties into maintaining peaceful relations or
entering into mutual negotiations or both.”3 The MIB/OAS
was also expected to implement a system for observing

_____________________________________________
The author would like to thanks Ryan Mendez, graduate student at the FLACSO-Ecuador, and Bryan Urbsaitis, Adjunct Faculty, City University
of New York (CUNY), who both worked on the final version of this text. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Organization of American States.
1 Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions (DDSSM), Informe final de la visita a Colombia y Ecuador de la Comisión de
Verificación de la Misión de Buenos Oficios de la OEA (MIB/OEA) (Washington, DC: OAS, 2009), 11–12, 16. See also Enrique Parra,
“Unasur, el padrino de la nueva boda Quito-Bogotá,” El Tiempo.com, http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_
INTERIOR-8460040.html (accessed 8 January 2011).
2 Organization of American States, Resolution of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs (Washington D.C.: OAS, 2008),
http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_08/RC00118E06.doc (accessed 20 August 2010). See also the Group of Rio’s Santo
Domingo Declaration, http://www.minfor.gov.gy/tsite/images/minfor_docs/rio_group/2008/santo_domingo_declaration.pdf (accessed 26
August 2010).
3 Raymond R. Probst, “Good Offices” in the Light of Swiss International Practice and Experience (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 10.

54 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

compliance with their commitments, to propose, promote
and coordinate the establishment of concrete confidence-
building measures, and to help prevent and verify
incidents in the border zone.4 The mission, which belongs
to the Political Secretariat’s Department of Democratic
Sustainability and Special Missions (DDSSM), has a
preventive-operative goal designed to rebuild confidence,
and a long-term structural-preventive dimension aimed to
generate sustainable diplomatic relations. This integrated
approach is essential for long-term stability; the OAS
believes that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations
will be sustainable if structural conditions in the border area
improve.
In the first section, I examine the mission’s initial focus
on from-above-confidence-building—urging for more
contacts between the national governments in Bogotá and
Quito—and how it was gradually redirected in favour of
a from-below-confidence-building scheme, which provided
space for cooperation between the local authorities of the
Colombian Department of Nariño and the Ecuadorian
Provinces of Carchi and Esmeraldas. Four factors
identified in the second section explain this movement
and also elucidate why it has been hard to move toward
the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations. Given the
complexity of the case, it is possible to conclude that the
OAS contributes decisively to preserving peace and stability
in the Andean region.
FrOm a tOP-dOWn LOGic tO a
BOttOm-UP tactic
Since March 2008, the MIB/OAS integrated both top-down
and bottom-up logics, even if it initially emphasized a “from
above” logic. Indeed, from March to September 2008, the
Mission made efforts to bring together Bogotá and Quito,
organizing four binational meetings of vice-ministers of
foreign relations. At that time, the parties argued that the
Binational Border Commission (COMBIFRON) and the
binational Neighbourhood Commission, both created
to improve the management of shared issues, were not
effective. The MIB/OAS then suggested the creation
of a new Bilateral System of Co-operation, Assessment,
and Security (SIBDES), which would have included
a Commission of Politics and Defense, an Early Alert
Commission, a Special Group of Observation, Prevention,
and Verification, an Arbitral Compensation Commission,
_____________________________________________
4 Organization of American States, Report on Implementation of the Resolution of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs [RC.25/RES.1/08 REV.1] (Washington, DC: OAS, 2008), http://scm.oas.org/IDMS/Redirectpage.aspx?class=RC.25/
doc&classNum=15&lang=e (accessed 20 August 2010).
5 Personal telephonic communication with an OAS staff member held on 25 August 2009.
6 DDSSM, “Informe final,” 17–18.
7 Grace Jaramillo, “Las relaciones Ecuador-Colombia desde el incidente de Angostura,” in Construyendo puentes entre Ecuador y Colombia, ed.
Grace Jaramillo (Quito: OEA, PNUD, FLACSO-Ecuador, 2009), 23–24.
8 See El Economista, “Colombia acusa a Ecuador de ‘convivencia’ con las FARC,” El Economista.es, http://www.eleconomista.es/politica/
noticias/391316/03/08/Colombia-acusa-a-Ecuador-de-convivencia-con-las-FARC.html (accessed 11 January 2011).
9 For further information, visit www.frace.org.
and a High-Level Judicial Commission. By October 2008,
however, it became clear that there was no political will to
put this idea into practice.5
Subsequently, the MIB/OAS proposed to deploy a
Verification Commission to the border area to produce
a technical diagnosis. The team was comprised of six
international experts who visited Bogotá and Quito, and
then deployed to the border area, observed the transition
from a top-down confidence-building tactic to a from-below
approach. The Commission identified divergent perceptions
at the national level on the causes and consequences of
border insecurity but recommended more local co-operation
in order to help change these national perceptions.6 In
Bogotá’s view, for example, Quito’s tolerance of criminal
groups explained why those groups could traffic arms and
chemical products through Ecuador to attack Colombian
objectives. Ecuador, on the other hand, believed that
Bogotá did not recognize the government’s efforts to stop
violence at the border (e.g., investments of U.S. $919
million from the national budget to purchase or renew
military equipment and ammunitions for the 7,000 troops
deployed at the border).7 Further, Ecuador was offended in
its belief that Colombia was in effect suggesting that illegal
Colombian armed actors were deliberately tolerated and
ignored by the Correa government.8
The commissioners recommended to the MIB/OAS to
prioritize the bottom-up structural-confidence-building
tactics, Good Offices from below, which had already
been part of the mission since the beginning—the MIB/
OAS released two academic books and organized “civil
society” conferences between September 2008 and
February 2009.9 With the Commission’s recommendations,
the mission launched a website designed to (re)create
and promote multidisciplinary binational shared views
among local actors. It has been argued that most of the
lack of confidence was due to the circulation of misleading
information by the mass media. Consequently, stimulating
the emergence of binational perspectives—that is, shared
views of common problems—should improve prospects
for a lasting confidence-building process. Moreover, and
precisely because the MIB/OAS’s goal is not only to re-
establish diplomatic relations but to do it sustainably in
the long term, the commissioners proposed to delineate
a binational Integrated Water Resources Management
Project. This was a creative and innovative way to
potentially transform the management of binational water
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 55
resources (often seen as possible source of conflict) into
a tool for conflict prevention. The project would also
provide the opportunity for articulating wide-ranging state
interventions in peripheral regions historically abandoned
by the political centres.10
diFFicULties in BUiLdinG
cOnFidence at tHe PreVentiVe-
communiqué signed by both countries during the Sixty-
Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(2009), for example, resulted in the appointment of new
chargés d’affaires and the creation of three binational
commissions—Security and Criminality Control, Frontier
Development, and Sensitive Considerations. However, the
entire process relied on progress being achieved by the
latter commission.14 It was only in late August 2010 that
some significant progress was finally made.

OPeratiVe LeVeL Third, the “regionalization” of the Colombian conflict

Since the summer of 2009, national authorities have often
stated publicly that the re-establishment of full diplomatic
relations was an overt goal, even though progress was
very slow before August 2010. Four reasons explain the
prolongation of the diplomatic breakup.
First, Bogotá took its time—in fact it took a new president—
to understand that “dignity” was a core issue for Ecuador.
Correa will probably never forgive former Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe for presenting a surgical military
action as a sudden result of a blistering persecution in the
jungle.11 In 2009 and 2010, Quito’s five preconditions for
participating in negotiations—to stop linking the Ecuadorian
authorities to the FARC; to control the Colombian southern
border; to deliver information about the Angostura incursion;
to release Reyes’ computer information; and to contribute
financially to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)—were all related to dignity. The Uribe
Government dismissed these claims, indicating that placing
conditions on talks was not the best strategy.
Second, the gaps identified by the MIB/OAS during 2009
developed into politically sensitive issues. For example,
an Ecuadorian public prosecutor had accused current
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the Colombian
Minister of Defence in 2008, for authorizing the attack.12
Bogotá stated that it does not recognize the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian justice system. Just because
the order of imprisonment was revoked and Santos’
Ecuadorian (public) lawyer asked for the abandonment of
the process in August 2010, it does not mean that this
kind of misunderstanding had a benign effect on the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations. 13 The 11-point
(understood as an increase of military actions amongst
Colombian armed groups in other countries, forced
displacement of populations, militarization of the borders,
local arms races, loss of confidence between neighbours,
the rise of barriers to regional integration, and an increase
of regional instability) is real.15 The Ecuadorian government
stated that the “internationalization” or “regionalization”
of the Colombian internal conflict was unacceptable
because by accepting to join Bogotá in its fight against
“international terrorism,” neighbouring countries would be
forced to pay for resolving Colombian domestic issues. But
as a sociologically observable phenomenon, the FARC, the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and paramilitaries’
successors such as the New Generation Organisations
(NGO), the Rastrojos, and the Aguilas Negras are indeed
present on both sides of the border.16 In fact, Angostura
may not be the cause of current political instability in
the Andean region but a consequence of the Colombian
conflict’s spilling over into Ecuador, Venezuela, and most
likely Brazil and Peru.
The last issue preventing rapid reconciliation was that the
OAS lacks legitimacy among some of its members, which
believe it is merely an annex of the “hegemonic” policies
of the U.S. and the best example of a useless bureaucracy.
Therefore, internal changes in the Ecuadorian government—
the minister of foreign affairs, Fander Falconí, a moderate
intellectual, was replaced by left-wing hardliner Ricardo
Patiño—indicates a radicalization of the Ecuadorian views
on the OAS’s role in the Americas and the country’s support
of the alternative “non-US-dominated” Unión de Naciones
Suramericanas (UNASUR).17 Certainly, feeble leverage
is characteristic of most international organizations, but

_____________________________________________
10 For more details see OAS, Primer Taller Colombo-Ecuatoriano sobre Gestión Integrada de Recursos Hídricos: Relatoría (Quito: MIB/OAS,
OAS’s Integrated Water Resources Unit, Fund of Peace, 2010).
11 César Montúfar, “Necesidad de un diálogo hemisférico sobre seguridad regional a propósito de la crisis diplomática entre Ecuador y
Colombia,” in Construyendo puentes, ed. Jaramillo, 229.
12 Redacción, “Santos califica de ‘agresión contra Colombia’ orden de arresto desde Ecuador,” Diario Hoy.com.ec, 30 June 2009,
http://www.hoy.com.ec/wphoy-imprimir.php?id=355768 (accessed 25 August 2010).
13 Reuters, “Corte de Sucumbíos revoca orden de prisión contra Santos,” El Comercio.com, 30 August 2010,
http://www4.elcomercio.com/Generales/Solo-Texto.aspx?gn3articleID=259194 (accessed 10 January 2011); El
14 Gobierno de Colombia y Gobierno de Ecuador, “Comunicado Conjunto Ecuador-Colombia” (New York, 2009),
http://www.mmrree.gob.ec/2009/nu_declara_ecu_col.pdf (accessed 25 August 2010).
15 Ricardo Vargas, “Drogas y conflicto alrededor de las fronteras,” in Ecuador-Colombia construyendo puentes: política de paz y desarrollo
para la Frontera, ed. Socorro Ramírez (Bogotá, DC: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, OEA, PNUD, 2009), 210–211.
16 Vargas, “Drogas y conflicto,” 281–285.
17 Diverse personal communications with an OAS staff member held during 2010.

56 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

it becomes an especially serious issue since effective
Good Offices rely, precisely, on prestige. For example,
in July 2010, when Venezuela announced the breakup
of diplomatic relations with Colombia, Patiño stated that
given the OAS’s inability to avert that crisis, its role as
mediator in the Colombia-Ecuador dossier was finished.18
This proclamation never resulted in any written changes, but
the lack of trust and legitimacy remained. Indeed, the OAS
must not only work to build confidence between the parties,
but also between the OAS and Ecuador, and periodically
between Washington and Bogotá.
tOWards a (PreLiminarY)
assessment OF tHe miB/Oas
actiOn in cOLOmBia and
ecUadOr
On 26 November 2010, during an UNASUR meeting,
Bogotá and Quito announced the return of full diplomatic
relations. On 26 August 2010, Colombia and Ecuador
met on the border (without the MIB/OAS), and their
representatives agreed to reactivate COMBIFRON and
created a Compensation Commission to study the human
costs of the Colombian conflict’s spillover for Ecuador.19 It
was also decided to revitalize the Sensitive Considerations
Commission and the Commission for Security and Criminality
Control. 20 Although the OAS were excluded from this
process, it is nevertheless possible to argue that the mission
has attained significant results in the Angostura case.
First, the OAS’s contribution to inter-American peace and
stability was decisive through its refusal of Uribe’s defence
doctrine, which justified attacking sites pre-emptively in
other countries when the “victim” perceives them as threats
to its own national security, and when the neighbour
does not behave according to the “offended” country’s
wishes.21 By this logic, not only could Colombia attack
guerrilla camps in Peru and Venezuela, but also all its
neighbours could strike back, arguing deterrence and even
“prevention” of the Colombian internal conflict’s spillover
effect. In short, Secretary General José Miguel Insulza of
the OAS understood that allowing impunity could have set a
dangerous precedent for the inter-American system. Second,
the vice-ministers of foreign affairs agreed from May 2008
to reinstitute COMBIFRON’s security handbook.22 In this
_____________________________________________
18 Redacción, “Patiño responsabiliza a Insulza de crisis en región,” Diario El Universo, 23 July 2010, http://www.eluniverso.
com/2010/07/23/1/1355/patino-tilda-insulza-incapaz-resolver-tema.html?p=1355&m=861 (accessed 26 August 2010).
19 Paúl Romero, “Ecuador y Colombia llegan a acuerdos,” Diario El Universo, 27 August 2010, http://www.eluniverso.
com/2010/08/27/1/1355/colombia-compromete-apoyo-asistir-sus-refugiados-ecuador.html (accessed 27 August 2010).
20 Romero, “Ecuador y Colombia llegan a acuerdos.”
21 Montúfar, “Necesidad de un diálogo hemisférico,” 223, 232.
22 Jaramillo, “Las relaciones Ecuador-Colombia,” 17.
23 DDSSM, “Informe final,” 12.
24 Vargas, “Drogas y conflicto,” 210–211.
25 Christopher Mitchell, Cutting Losses: Reflections on Appropriate Timing (working paper, Institute for Analysis and Resolution, George Mason
University, Virginia, 2009), http://icar.gmu.edu/wp_9_mitchell.pdf (accessed 15 January 2009).
sense, Insulza also understood that the winners from the
breakup of diplomatic relations were first and foremost the
illegal armed groups operating in the border area.23 Finally,
the Secretary General obtained a commitment from both
presidents to avoid bothersome public declarations, if not
against the OAS, at least between themselves.
Of course, since the MIB/OAS is deployed in a region rich
in oil and natural gas, where most of the cocaine and heroin
exported to North America is produced, and where there
is a spillover of Colombian violence,24 it is always pertinent
to ask if a mandate allowing manipulations of perceptions
and understanding would give further leverage to an
organization whose decisive and creative contributions to
peace and stability in the Americas (e.g., landmine-removal
programs in Central America and the Ecuadorian-Peruvian
border; electoral observation missions across the continent)
remain for the most part unknown. These activities are
based on the idea that the “key to effective mediation lies
in understanding, managing and transforming the ‘psycho-
political dynamics’ of conflict, which make adversaries
resistant to negotiations.” 25 Yet regarding the goal of
proposing, promoting, and coordinating the establishment
of precise confidence-building measures, the OAS has been
very effective at from-below confidence-building approaches,
first and foremost through the opening of new windows of
opportunity for binational co-operation at the local level.
Handshakes can be significant political signals, but the
complexity of transborder challenges call for integrated
binational policies with the support of diverse international
donors. In other words, in an area historically neglected
by the capitals, as is the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, it
would be premature to claim that the primary goal of the
MIB/OAS—to restore a lasting atmosphere of trust between
the parties—has been reached just because Patiño and
the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, María Angela
Holguín, shook hands during an international meeting.
For this reason, and because this experience could be
replicated in other tension-filled parts of the Americas, the
OAS has considered the possibility of transforming the MIB
from a peacemaking mission into a peacebuilding effort
focused exclusively on from-below confidence-building
structural approaches. At stake is the capacity of the only
multilateral organisation that can build bridges between
the north and the south, to restore peace, confidence and
stability to diverse burning borders across the Americas.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 57
BiBLiOGraPHY
Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special
Missions (DDSSM). Informe final de la visita
a Colombia y Ecuador de la Comisión de
Verificación de la Misión de Buenos Oficios de la
OEA (MIB/OEA). Washington, DC: OAS, 2009.
El Comercio. “Defensor de Santos en Ecuador pedirá
suspensión de juicio.” El Comercio.com.
http://www4.elcomercio.com/Generales/Solo-
Texto.aspx?gn3articleID=258128 (accessed 10
January 2011).
El Economista. “Colombia acusa a Ecuador de
‘convivencia’ con las FARC.” El Economista.es.
http://www.eleconomista.es/politica/
noticias/391316/03/08/Colombia-acusa-
a-Ecuador-de-convivencia-con-las-FARC.html
(accessed 11 January 2011).
Gobierno de Colombia y Gobierno de Ecuador.
“Comunicado Conjunto Ecuador-Colombia.”
New York, 2009. http://www.mmrree.gob.
ec/2009/nu_declara_ecu_col.pdf
(accessed 25 August 2010)
Group of Rio. “Santo Domingo Declaration.”
http://www.minfor.gov.gy/tsite/images/
minfor_docs/rio_group/2008/santo_domingo_
declaration.pdf (accessed 26 August 2010).
Jaramillo, Grace. “Las relaciones Ecuador-Colombia
desde el incidente de Angostura.” In Construyendo
puentes entre Ecuador y Colombia, ed. Grace
Jaramillo. Quito: OEA, PNUD, FLACSO-Ecuador,
2009, 15-32.
Mitchell, Christopher. Cutting Losses: Reflections on
Appropriate Timing. Working Paper, Institute for
Analysis and Resolution. Virginia: George Mason
University, 2009. http://icar.gmu.edu/wp_9_
mitchell.pdf (accessed 15 January 2009).
Montúfar, César. “Necesidad de un diálogo hemisférico
sobre seguridad regional a propósito de la
crisis diplomática entre Ecuador y Colombia.” In
Construyendo puentes entre Ecuador y Colombia,
ed. Grace Jaramillo. Quito: OEA, PNUD, FLACSO-
Ecuador, 2009.
Organization of American States. Resolution of the Twenty-
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs.
Washington, DC: OAS, 2008.
http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_08/
RC00118E06.doc (accessed 20 August 2010).
________. Report on Implementation of the Resolution
of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs [RC.25/RES.1/08
REV.1]. Washington, DC: OAS, 2008.
http://scm.oas.org/IDMS/Redirectpage.
aspx?class=RC.25/doc&classNum=15&lang=e
(accessed 20 August 2010).
58 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
________. Primer Taller Colombo-Ecuatoriano sobre
Gestión Integrada de Recursos Hídricos: Relatoría.
Quito: MIB/OAS, OAS’s Integrated Water
Resources Unit, Fund of Peace, 2010.
Parra, Enrique. “Unasur, el padrino de la nueva boda
Quito-Bogotá.” El Tiempo.com,
26 November 2010. http://www.eltiempo.
com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_
INTERIOR-8460040.html (accessed 8 January
2011).
Probst, Raymond R. “Good Offices” in the Light of
Swiss International Practice and Experience. The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 10.
Redacción. “Santos califica de ‘agresión contra
Colombia’ orden de arresto desde Ecuador.”
Diario Hoy.com.ec, 30 June 2009.
http://www.hoy.com.ec/wphoy-imprimir.
php?id=355768 (accessed 25 August 2010).
Redacción. “Patiño responsabiliza a Insulza de crisis en
región.” Diario El Universo 23 July 2010.
http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/07/23/1/
1355/patino-tilda-insulza-incapaz-resolver-tema.
html?p=1355&m=861 (accessed 26 August
2010).
Redacción. “Ecuador y Colombia llegan a acuerdos.”
Diario El Universo, 27 August 2010.
http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/08/27/1/
1355/colombia-compromete-apoyo-asistir-sus-
refugiados-ecuador.html (accessed 27 August
2010).
Reuters. “Corte de Sucumbíos revoca orden de prisión
contra Santos.” El Comercio.com, 30 August
2010. http://www4.elcomercio.com/Generales/
Solo-Texto.aspx?gn3articleID=259194 (accessed
10 January 2011).
Vargas, Ricardo. “Drogas y conflicto alrededor de las
fronteras.” In Ecuador-Colombia construyendo
puentes: política de paz y desarrollo para la
Frontera, ed. Socorro Ramírez. Bogotá, DC:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, OEA, PNUD,
2009, 281–285.
OTHER SOURCES
Personal telephonic communication with an OAS staff
member held on 25 August 2009.
Personal communications with an OAS staff member
(during 2009).
 PERSPECTIVA DE UN OBSERVADOR
MILITAR DESDE EL INTERIOR DEL
CONGO, 2002-2003
carlos r. delgado

resUmen
En el año 2002, el autor llega a la Republica Democrática del Congo, donde estaba ubicado un
grupo de Observadores Militares de Naciones Unidas (Team Site) de la Misión de Observación de
las Naciones Unidas en Congo (MONUC), para desempeñarse como su jefe. Se detallan ejemplos
reales de las tareas cumplidas y de los desafíos encontrados para elaborar, a modo de lecciones
aprendidas, recomendaciones sobre el equipo más necesario que debe estar a disposición, así como
una guía para una mejor selección del personal.

aBstract
In 2002, the author arrived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to take on the role of the
team leader to a United Nations Military Observers Team Site from the United Nations Mission in the
DRC (MONUC). The author discusses the tasks that had to be performed and the challenges faced while
on mission, and based on lessons learned, makes several recommendations for improving personnel
selection and equipment.

La LLeGada aL LUGar de La Este relato carece de la valoración adecuada si no les

comento donde estamos y los desafíos que enfrentábamos
misiÓn diariamente, para que puedan apreciar, entre otras cosas,

E l 21 de junio de 2002, cuando aterricé en el paraje

Mutabi de la villa Dubie en la Republica Democrática
del Congo, se descargó todo el equipaje menos un bolso de
cómo nos afectó.

mano conteniendo cosas elementales como la almohada, ¿dÓnde estamOs?

colchón inflable, ropa de cama, ropa interior, calzado
de baño, alpargatas y el equipo de mate. La tripulación
del helicóptero controló los bultos según un manifiesto de
carga que por supuesto carecía de los bolsos de mano
que no se declaran como carga. A último momento y sin
que me diera cuenta, volvieron a subir lo que no figuraba
y decolaron. El bolso tenía una etiqueta que decía Dubie,
sin otra identificación o seguridad alguna.
El día siguiente llamé a un camarada para que me asegurara
el reenvío del bolso junto con comestibles que nos faltaban
y no podíamos comprar en nuestros alrededores aunque
tuviéramos el dinero del mundo, porque sencillamente era
normal la escasez. Me respondió por teléfono que el bolso
estaba en un depósito sin identificación y permanecía sin
ningún tipo de seguridad, aparte de su cierre metálico
de cremallera. Una semana después, en el vuelo regular
semanal, lo recibí con absolutamente todo intocado en su
interior, junto con los comestibles que habíamos pedido.
Comienzo estas notas a las 24 horas de estar en el medio
de la nada, en las afueras de la villa Dubie, a una hora
y media de helicóptero al sur-este de Manono y a 30 km.
al noroeste de Lukonzolwa, que tiene costas en el lago
Moero (o Mwero), al sur del lago Tanganika, a unos 200
km de Zambia. Esto es en el límite sur-este del Congo, en
la provincia de Katanga.
El lugar que habita el Equipo de Observadores Militares
(el Team) pertenece a una congregación religiosa católica.
Hay que recordar que los Observadores debemos hacernos
cargo del alojamiento y comida; el equipo lo pone la
Organización de las Naciones Unidades (ONU), la
seguridad es responsabilidad de la autoridad local que
exista y la atención médica se tramita por canales de la
ONU. Las instalaciones constan de una sala grande donde
trabajamos, cocinamos y comemos (10mts por 5mts). Por
una puerta interior se accede a otra sala mas pequeña
(6mts por 5mts) donde esta mi dormitorio con escritorio.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 59

Al este hay otra habitación similar, con puerta al exterior,
donde se alojan dos integrantes del Team, de Nepal y
Jordania. También en ese lugar guardamos las raciones de
combate y el agua embotellada de reserva, solo para casos
de emergencia. Al oeste hay otra habitación similar donde
guardamos los tanques de gasoil para las camionetas y
los generadores de electricidad. También guardamos
herramientas y duermen algunas gallinas para consumo. A
continuación se hospeda el restante observador de Kenia.
Por otra parte, somos vecinos del Comandante de Brigada
del Ejército del Congo (FARDC) con jurisdicción en esta
zona, vivimos frente al Oficial de Enlace de las Fuerzas de
Defensa de Zimbabwe, estamos al lado de la casa del Cura
y de las Hermanas de la congregación católica, así como
de salones de primaria y secundaria gestionados por dicha
congregación, con cuyos jóvenes compartimos un amplio
patio con piso de tierra.
El clima es agradable durante el día y algo fresco durante
la noche. (18 - 28 ºC). Hay que recordar que estamos
en junio del hemisferio sur (latitud 8º 33´ S y longitud
28º 32´ E).
Los comestibles los obtenemos del mercado local y de
Kalemie vía aérea, o del poblado Lukonzolwa cuando se
concurre por razones del servicio. El agua se obtiene de
una cañería que viene de las alturas cercanas, se hierve
durante la noche y se pasa por un filtro de origen indio
comprado por el Team. Para calentar agua y hacer la
comida se dispone de un brasero a carbón, pero para
hacer un té, café o preparar el mate (infusión tradicional del
Uruguay), se usa una jarra eléctrica. La energía eléctrica
surge de dos generadores que se usan alternadamente,
alimentados a gasoil. En resumen, nuestra situación
existencial mostraba juntos y simultáneos los recursos más
tradicionales de campaña con la última tecnología.
nUestra misiÓn
La misión a cumplir consistió en estar al tanto de lo que
ocurría en los alrededores e informar si algo se salía
de lo normal. Esta tarea se consideraba “estática” ya
que la geografía imponía limitaciones físicas a los
desplazamientos y en épocas de lluvia era inviable mover
los vehículos a pesar de tener tracción en las cuatro ruedas.
Para el cumplimiento del cometido contamos con dos
teléfonos internos, un fax, un teléfono satelital, dos
computadoras portátiles: una con contacto satelital y otra
para tramitar mensajes por banda de radio, una antena
parabólica satelital montada en un trailer, una impresora
láser, una radio portátil en banda aérea y dos camionetas
4x4 equipadas con dos equipos de radiocomunicaciones
cada una.
Los integrantes del Team somos cuatro, obligatoriamente
de nacionalidades diferentes. La realidad mostró que casi
siempre llegábamos solo a tres y en algunas circunstancias
60 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
inclusive a dos. A menor número, mayores dificultades para
las recorridas y para hacer frente a los costos de nuestra
supervivencia diaria.
Desafíos en el terreno: recorridos de patrulla
Si la circunstancia es propicia salimos de patrulla. El
tema de patrullar implica varias cosas: acondicionar
todo el equipo a utilizar incluyendo lo relacionado a
los vehículos y todas las herramientas posibles de ser
necesarias para solucionar problemas de enterramientos,
vuelcos o desperfectos mecánicos. También debemos
gestionar la compañía de personal de enlace de las fuerzas
locales, para que informen a sus autoridades de nuestros
desplazamientos y nos faciliten los accesos que fueren
necesarios.
Por otro lado, debemos avisar a nuestro comando superior
para que nos puedan seguir con el posicionador satelital
y además podamos comunicarnos directamente por radio
desde los vehículos. Luego de todos estos preparativos
recién empezamos los recorridos de patrulla.
La patrulla normalmente insume todo el día porque las
distancias en tiempo son largas, aunque en kilómetros son
cortas. El mayor problema son las deplorables condiciones
de las escasísimas vías de comunicación.
La situación “estática” del Team implica una presencia
virtual en el terreno, dependencia de información de
terceros, dificultades para evaluar su veracidad y un gran
aburrimiento. Por esa razón fue propiciado que las fuerzas
locales repararan dos puentes linderos a la aldea, para
abrir posibilidades de llegar hasta donde la luz del sol nos
permitiera.
Cumplido esto, pudimos mostrar por vez primera en la
historia la bandera de la ONU y la bandera del Uruguay
en nuestro hombro, a los habitantes de un Congo profundo
desconocido para el resto del mundo.
Patrullando la aldea vecina de Kiona que queda a 6 km,
vimos que tiene dos kilómetros de largo y unas dos casas
de ancho, extendida sobre el camino principal. Allí habitan
muchos Soldados y había un puesto de vacunación contra
la polio de una organización no gubernamental (ONG),
en el marco de una campaña a nivel de todo el Congo y
los países vecinos. Visitamos la casa/cuartel del Jefe Local
y luego fuimos al lago Tambe que está a continuación y
es usado para baños corporales de inmersión y lavado de
ropa. Nadie comentó los peligros de víboras acuáticas y
cocodrilos porque se dio por sobreentendido.
En otra patrulla a Lukonsolwa recorrimos 35 km pero nos
llevó unas tres horas llegar a destino. Fue una experiencia
inolvidable. Desde el arranque el camino parecía
inexistente, y al transcurrir algún kilómetro se puso peor.
Algunas partes parecían insuperables, pero las camionetas
que tenemos y un poco de osadía nos animaron a intentar
e hicieron posible la hazaña.
Por supuesto que era un trillo de menos de una vía, ya que Teniendo el generador funcionando disponemos de
los locales transitan caminando o en bicicletas. teléfono interno con toda la MONUC, fax y mensajería
satelitales e impresora láser. Esto significa que en esos
Pasamos por zanjones profundos y anchos producidos
momentos hacemos nuestras comunicaciones más grandes
por el arrastre del agua de lluvia, por zonas rocosas que
o que requieren necesariamente de esos equipos. Sin el
tuvimos que trepar, subidas empinadas, terrenos arenosos
generador tenemos autonomía de internos por veinte
y al final una buena bajada sobre terreno blando con dos
minutos y para la mensajería por una hora. A pesar de
curvas de 270 grados para rematar.
eso, aun disponemos de radios en las dos camionetas que
Varios cursos de agua angostos pero profundos se pueden pueden ser usadas en emergencias intentando enlaces o
cruzan exclusivamente sobre troncos puestos a lo largo, retransmisiones con otros integrantes de la ONU.
es decir que las camionetas debían “deslizarse” sobre los
En definitiva, sabemos que toda la tecnología a nuestro
troncos a riesgo de que alguna rueda cayera entre ellos o
alcance para la comunicación con el Comando Superior
quedara en el aire o se rompiera el tronco. La profundidad
está principalmente en el puesto de Comando y depende de
era variable entre dos metros y unos siete metros, pero con
la generación de energía eléctrica. También de la existencia
bordes verticales, que hubiera hecho necesario disponer
de gasoil para hacer funcionar los generadores. Los otros
de otras ayudas para sacar el vehículo de una posible
recursos han presentado dificultades, fundamentalmente
situación comprometida.
por la distancia y las características geográficas. Si
El clima es bien seco en esta época, de lo contrario ni existiera una emergencia sanitaria, por ejemplo, debemos
siquiera se hubieran podido mover los vehículos porque lograr la comunicación de alguna forma y recién después
quedan estampados en el barro gredoso. podemos esperar la buena dicha del destino que nos
provea de helicóptero con tiempo suficiente para venir y
El poblado resulta extendido por la existencia de espacios
volver en horas diurnas, con buenas condiciones climáticas
entre las chozas, con poca vegetación entre ellas, bien
y sin enfrentamientos bélicos en su recorrido, porque el
delimitados los patios de cada una en forma cuadrada,
seguro de las aeronaves se pierde si actuaran fuera de
dejando una senda para pasar entre ellos y con calles de
esas condiciones.
tierra bien anchas como para dos vehículos bien cómodos.
En los tiempos intermedios y libres aprovecho de buscar
Visitamos al responsable de los asuntos legales civiles y
la frecuencia adecuada en la radio de la camioneta para
militares en su casa/oficina y él hizo venir al delegado
tratar de comunicarme directamente con Uruguay. Hasta
regional responsable de las campañas de vacunación.
ahora sólo he podido escuchar el tráfico familiar de otros
Posteriormente fuimos a reunirnos con el Administrador
uruguayos, pero me falta poder ser oído desde este lugar
de la región, que vendría a ser como un Intendente
tan apartado.
Departamental mientras que nosotros estábamos en una
de sus “ciudades”.
Desafíos culturales
Con él se encontraba el Administrador del poblado y
concurrieron posteriormente el Jefe del Puerto y el Jefe de En una oportunidad el vuelo semanal trajo una encomienda
Policía. Por nuestro lado, además de los observadores, la con una lata de leche condensada de regalo y una nota
delegación incluía al Cura Párroco de Dubie y un Oficial pidiendo la opinión de su contenido. Grande y grata fue la
de Inteligencia del Comando de Brigada de Dubie. sorpresa de encontrarnos con dulce de leche “fabricado”
artesanalmente sin abrirse la lata de origen. El nepalés y
el keniata nunca habían probado ese dulce. Fue de esas
Desafíos en la comunicación ocasiones que toda cuantificación del valor del gesto que
Siempre enviamos informes diarios antes de las 16.00 horas tuvo un camarada, resulta inferior a la inmensa sensación
utilizando la posibilidad de asociar texto de la computadora de apoyo y cercanía que el mismo nos produce.
portátil con la radio satelital que lo transmite. Esto sólo
Los trabajadores locales que habíamos contratado tampoco
es posible desde nuestro puesto de comando, es decir, si
conocían ese dulce, entonces junto con el jordano del
tenemos una emergencia durante las patrullas, posiblemente
equipo se dio un interesante intercambio de costumbres y
nadie se entere hasta que llame la atención nuestra ausencia
hábitos alimenticios. Al uruguayo le resultó más fácil que
en la ronda de novedades radiales, debido a la ubicación
explicar todo lo que concierne al mate.
muy remota de nuestro lugar de misión y a las dificultades
geográficas para las comunicaciones entre los “Team” ¿Cómo hacíamos para almorzar? Fue muy difícil al
vecinos de observadores militares. comienzo. Unos debían matar de determinada forma
a los animales que fueran elegidos para alimentarse,
Cada vez que se prende el generador aprovechamos a
otros eran vegetarianos, otros no comían cerdo, pollos
recargar los equipos y también concurre personal de la
eran escasos y otras cosas casi no existían en esa villa
Brigada congolesa cercana para cargar alguna de sus
de desplazados por los combates. Hubo que ejercitar un
baterías, cosa que autorizamos como gesto de buena
alto grado de comprensión y tolerancia al tiempo que
voluntad y vecindad.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 61

usábamos la solidaridad de nuestros camaradas ubicados
en mejores entornos, que nos enviaban alimentos en los
vuelos semanales de helicóptero, a cambio del reembolso
en dinero correspondiente.
Así pasamos la mayor parte de los días, hablando de
nuestros países o de las costumbres locales, aunque bien
sabemos que en otras partes de este gran territorio, en
estos momentos, otros están bajo fuego de combates entre
grupos diversos, mientras observadores militares como
nosotros están muy cerca de las situaciones, desarmados,
tratando de cumplir con su misión de calmar los ánimos y
lograr la negociación de una difícil paz.
También sabemos que nuestra situación es transitoria
y en cualquier momento podemos reemplazar a esos
camaradas, entonces resulta muy importante conocer todas
las particularidades culturales de propios y ajenos, así
como ejercitar la comprensión y tolerancia que coadyuven
a la convivencia armónica para lograr como equipo el
éxito deseado en nuestra misión de paz.
62 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
cOnsideraciOnes FinaLes
Ningún observador militar debe ser desplegado sin recibir
la instrucción correspondiente, según los parámetros
mínimos sugeridos por la ONU. El incumplimiento puede
resultar en un serio perjuicio propio tanto como para los
demás integrantes de su equipo de trabajo. Aun así, es
sabido que la teoría necesita de la practica correspondiente,
entonces resulta de suma importancia tener acceso a la
experiencia acumulada de otras personas, en cuanto a los
retos particulares de la misión que esté siendo considerada,
las soluciones sugeridas, las conductas apropiadas, el
empleo correcto de las herramientas más adecuadas, las
consideraciones culturales y los riesgos potenciales de
diferentes orígenes que acechan durante toda la misión.
Cabe agregar que la selección del equipo para
desempeñarse como observador militar fue un punto clave
para el mejor desarrollo de las actividades.
Asimismo, la planificación previa a cada salida debe ser
de orden, para prever los problemas o necesidades que
podrían surgir, a fin de tomar el equipo más adecuado
evitando faltantes sensibles o artículos inútiles que ocupan
espacio y aumentan el peso.
Siempre hay que tener presente que la razón de existir de
nuestra tarea es la dificultad en asegurar las condiciones de
paz y seguridad necesarias para una vida social normal,
por lo tanto, nuestro equipo debe acompañar esa realidad.
Hay que tener lo necesario y suficiente sin excesos, en
condiciones de perderlo todo debido a una evacuación
rápida o una situación difícil.
Cuando estemos de regreso en nuestras respectivas patrias,
con nuestros seres queridos, será la oportunidad propicia
para disfrutar de mayores comodidades.
Para finalizar, es oportuno manifestar aquí el profundo
agradecimiento a todos los camaradas de diferentes
jerarquías que aportando su desinteresada colaboración
están “siempre presente” y hacen posible que los demás
colegas puedan mantenerse activos y saludables en
situaciones extremas mientras cumplen su delicada misión.
Las dificultades de todo tipo que existen a veces en estas
circunstancias, fueron superadas una vez más por un buen
capital humano.
 POLICE REFORM IN HAITI:
Lessons Learned, the Role of the International
Community and the Way Forward

allison Poff

aBstract
Efforts to reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) have been underway since shortly after its creation
in 1995. This paper discusses the 2006 HNP Reform Plan, the lessons learned in its application, and
the role of the international community, including Canada, in HNP capacity development. The paper
concludes by outlining priority issues to be addressed in order to further advance police reform in Haiti,
while taking into account the setbacks experienced after the January 2010 earthquake.

resUmen
Al poco tiempo después de su creación en 1995, se iniciaron esfuerzos para reformar la Policía
Nacional Haitiana (PNH). Este trabajo examina el Plan De Reforma 2006 de la PNH, las lecciones
aprendidas en su aplicación y el rol de la comunidad internacional, incluyendo Canadá, en el
desarrollo de capacidades de la PNH. El trabajo concluye señalando los temas prioritarios que deben
ser abordados para promover la reforma de la policía haitiana, al mismo tiempo que considera los
obstáculos enfrentados después del terremoto de enero 2010.

a BrieF resUme OF tHe recent were largely unsuccessful, as gang leaders struck deals with
the Haitian government to send members for DDR training
HistOrY OF tHe Haitian without surrendering weapons. Only the large-scale 2006
natiOnaL POLice (HnP) operation by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in

U p until 1995, all security in Haiti was provided by the
Haitian Armed Forces (HAF), which included a police
force that operated primarily in Port-au-Prince and some
rural areas. The HAF was disbanded in 1994 after the return
of President Aristide from exile. In 1995, President Aristide,
with the support of the international community, created
the Haitian National Police (HNP). The HNP is headed by
a Director General, and its activities are overseen by the
Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Under the umbrella of
the HNP are several police-related services including coast
guard; correctional service; fire brigade; and the border,
air, port, airport, migration and forest police.
The HNP faced several challenges during its initial start-
up. Many former military joined the HNP, resulting in its
militarization and, through the rapid rate at which officers
were hired, calling into question their vetting. Members
of the HNP were accused of human rights violations,
which further undermined public support. Early attempts
by the HNP and international community at disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of gang members
Haiti (MINUSTAH) targeting gangs in Cité Soleil seemed to
have any effect in reducing insecurity in one of the poorest
areas of Port-au-Prince.
Between 2000 and 2004, inexperienced political
appointees took over many of the key positions in the
HNP, compromising the political neutrality of the police.
Following the departure of President Aristide in 2004, in an
attempt to improve the effectiveness and public perception
of the HNP the interim president dismissed more than 200
officers because of inexperience or corruption; however,
an increase in violence in Haiti between 2004 and 2006
put further pressure on the HNP, as did the unfavourable
public view of the force due to continued rights violations
and corruption. Improved training since 2006 has helped to
professionalize the force, although it remains understaffed
and under-equipped. Currently, MINUSTAH continues to
provide approximately 80% of security services in Haiti,
while the HNP provides the remainder (mainly in urban
centres).

_____________________________________________
This article benefited from contributions by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs Americas and Europe Team and other divisions in the
Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), the Canadian Embassy in Haiti, the Haiti Task Force of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of National Defence.

The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 63

tHe 2006 HnP reFOrm PLan
In 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1608 called on
the UN Secretary-General to present a police reform plan
jointly developed by Haitian authorities and MINUSTAH.
The 2006 HNP Reform Plan,1 adopted by the Government
of Haiti on 8 August 2006, is a five-year strategy that aims to
strengthen the organizational and administrative capacities
of the HNP, strengthen the operational capacity of the HNP
through augmentation of staff and professionalize the HNP
through the provision of human and material resources to
the Inspectorate General. Specific objectives set out in the
Plan were:
• a total of 14,000 HNP officers by 2011
• new office for the Inspectorate General by 2007
• new office for the Director General by 2007
• new facilities at the Police School by 2007
• construction of new commissariats (three in 2007 and
five in 2010)
• rehabilitation of existing commissariats (20 in 2007 and
30 in 2010)
• new building for the Control and Command Centre by
2008
• new building for the Central Directorate of the
Administration and General Services by 2008
• construction of a new police academy by 2008 and
• construction of three departmental centres of the Judicial
Police by 2010.
Progress in HNP reform was seen between 2007 and
2009, particularly in terms of improved recruitment,
training and vetting of police officers. However, as of
August 2010, only three of the ten objectives listed above
had been achieved or partly achieved (construction and
rehabilitation of commissariats (32 of 58) and new facilities
at the Police School); one was underway (construction of the
Inspectorate General) and one was expected to start in the
coming months (police academy). In January 2010, there
were close to 10,000 police officers, and the international
community generally accepted that the goal of 14,000
officers would not be realized by the deadline initially set
out in the Plan.
_____________________________________________
1 Police Nationale d’Haïti 2006 Plan de Réforme.
2 The following sections are based on the experience of START in Haiti, conversations with the Canadian Embassy and conversations with key
actors (MINUSTAH, other donors, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations and other bilateral partners).
64 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
cHaLLenGes and
LessOns Learned
One of the main challenges is the constraints of the Haitian
government’s implementation capacity, both in the areas
of personnel and equipment. This constraint has only been
further exacerbated by the earthquake. Several more
specific issues have contributed to the delay in meeting the
goals set out in the 2006 HNP Reform Plan. They need to
be immediately addressed and require concerted action
by both the Haitian government and the international
community in order to improve the ability of the HNP to
provide security to Haitians.2
Training
The inability to meet the goal of 14,000 trained HNP
officers by 2011 can be traced to several factors. The
process of vetting new officers takes a significant period
of time, resulting in delays between promotions (classes of
cadets that complete their initial training). The earthquake
of 12 January 2010 further delayed the start of the 22nd
promotion, in part because of the need for members of the
Haitian Senate to use the cadets’ classrooms as temporary
office space. It is expected that, at the current rate of
graduation, it could take at least 14 years to reach the
target of 14,000 trained officers, based on the projections
of an estimated 500 to 600 officers per promotion and one
promotion every two years. In order to increase the rate
of graduation, the HNP will need to fully utilize the space
available, which can accommodate up to 1,000 cadets,
and speed up the vetting process.
In-service training for the HNP needs to be further developed
to ensure that, upon graduation, officers are able to continue
their professional development. There remain significant
delays in training and a lack of a structured curriculum,
in addition to a shortage of opportunities for firearms and
mid- and upper-management training. Courses that are
offered are often poorly attended although officers are
instructed to participate. Currently, once cadets graduate,
the only further training they will receive is that offered by
the international community on an ad hoc basis. The HNP
management and government officials need to develop
a training plan and encourage the ongoing professional
development of officers once they have completed their
basic training.
Corruption
Corruption continues to be a problem with the HNP. To
reduce the risk of corruption among new officers, the issue of
remuneration during basic training needs to be addressed.
Currently cadets are not paid throughout their basic training
(nine months) and their first three months as HNP officers.
This practice encourages corruption, as young officers look
to find ways to support themselves during these 12 months,
often resulting in close relationships with suspected and
known drug traffickers and gang members.
Infrastructure and Equipment
The lack of proper facilities and equipment has further
delayed HNP reform. Infrastructure is outdated and too
small to accommodate personnel, forcing officers to work in
temporary structures or share desk space. Vehicles are often
out of service because of a lack of spare parts, reducing
the number of patrols that can be conducted and the size
of the area that can be patrolled. Basic equipment, such as
flashlights, handcuffs, notebooks and writing instruments, is
in short supply, resulting in improperly documented crimes
and dangerous working conditions for officers. The issue
of infrastructure is addressed in the 2006 HNP Reform Plan
with the construction or rehabilitation of commissariats
and buildings for management; however, the issues of
vehicles and basic equipment maintenance need to be
addressed to assure that the HNP are able to provide
basic security services to Haitians. Initially this would need
to be undertaken by the international community, until the
Government of Haiti is able to increase the budget of the
HNP.
A major hurdle for HNP construction projects is land tenure.
Before being able to start a project, implementing agencies
require official letters indicating that they have permission
to build on the site in question. Given that most land lacks
proper paperwork regarding ownership, this can delay
the onset of construction. This can be addressed through
the establishment of a list of government-owned land
identifying the Ministry to which it is assigned. Not only
would this minimize delays by ensuring that HNP projects
are designed appropriately, but it would also help avoid
multiple projects being approved for the same parcel of
land by different Ministries.
Another issue facing construction is misunderstanding about
the expected outcomes of each project. Often donors’
visions for projects reflect the situation in their own home
country, visions that may clash with what the HNP envisions
as the outcome of the project. For example, donors and
the HNP have had different views on the capacity and
the size of an infrastructure, and which HNP agency is
expected to be housed there. Involvement of the HNP at
the planning stage and throughout the project can minimize
these misunderstandings and help the HNP plan for future
needs.
The hurricanes of 2008 and the earthquake of 12 January
2010 have further delayed the ambitious timelines set out
in the Plan, with the HNP and MINUSTAH now working
on a new reform plan to better reflect the current situation
and take into account the new reality. Some of the new
challenges include the increased level of insecurity,
lack of police in rural areas and loss of equipment and
infrastructure. These topics are discussed further in the
section “The Way Forward” below.
tHe rOLe OF tHe internatiOnaL
cOmmUnitY
The 2006 HNP Reform Plan underscores that the Haitian
State must guide police reform with reinforcement by
the international community. It calls for the international
community to provide assistance for institutional support
and planning at the Central and Departmental levels,
the specifics of each to be determined in consultation
with government authorities and police and achieved
through the formation of a partnership or a team of experts
connected to various police authorities. The Plan also calls
for an international adviser in planning and development to
assist the Director General of the HNP within the framework
of the reform and with the coordination of international
aid. Despite these guidelines, the objectives or goals of the
Plan are being achieved in a piecemeal fashion with little
coordination amongst the various players. For example, the
police reform working group meets infrequently, and not all
key players attend the meetings (see “The Way Forward” for
more on this). The current roles of the various international
players are markedly different, as outlined below, yet they
must work together in order for reform to progress.
MINUSTAH
First established under Security Council Resolution 1542
on 1 June 2004, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) has a mandate consisting of creating a secure
and stable environment, supporting the political process
and monitoring human rights. Over time the mission has
evolved, and more recent mandates have included a role
for MINUSTAH in supporting the capacity building of the
HNP (Security Council Resolution 1927 on 4 June 2010).
MINUSTAH provides both training and development
support to the HNP. Currently courses are offered to mid-
level HNP members, but these courses are not offered
consistently and are often poorly attended. MINUSTAH
also provides technical support to the HNP, including
infrastructure plans that are developed in cooperation with
the Haitian government.
As of July 2010, 49 countries were providing police
officers to MINUSTAH, either as individual police or
Formed Police Units (FPUs). Individual police officers are
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 65
involved in the training, development and mentoring of the
HNP and management of police deployed to MINUSTAH,
such as plant operator training offered by Brazil. FPUs,
meanwhile, are responsible for maintaining security.
Countries contributing significant numbers of FPUs include
Bangladesh, India and Jordan, while those contributing
significant numbers of individual police include Canada,
Côte d’Ivoire, France and Mali (whose francophone officers
have the advantage of interoperable language skills).
Bilateral Training Programs
Several countries offer training to the HNP on a bilateral
basis. Brazil and Colombia offer weapons and special
operations training; France offers weapons, special
operations and driver training; Mexico has provided
forensics training; Spain and the United States have focused
on community policing; and Chile has previously offered
both basic training and mid-level officer training. Offers
have come in from Argentina to give maritime training, from
Turkey for investigations training and from the Dominican
Republic for more general training.
Other International Organizations
There are a few key players in the area of police reform,
mostly multilateral organizations such as the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Development
Programme (UNDP), who act as executing agencies for
the international community, taking on infrastructure,
procurement and training projects. There are, however,
some NGOs which focus on issues that fall under the HNP
mandate, such as human trafficking, but choose to work
with little interaction with the HNP. Limited coordination
exists between the international community and those that
chose to operate outside the HNP, as there are very few
forums for them to meet and discuss their work.
Canada’s Role in Police Reform in Haiti
The Government of Canada takes a whole-of-government
approach to our engagement in Haiti. The Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT)
coordinates this whole-of-government approach with
support from the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP), the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and
the Department of National Defence (DND). The priorities
for Canada in Haiti are better living conditions, a more
secure environment, sounder democratic structures, and
strengthening of the rule of law. HNP reform factors into all
of these priorities but has a central role in creating a more
secure environment.
Canada has been deploying police to Haiti since 1994 as
part of a series of UN missions (MINUSTAH is the eighth
UN mission since 1993). The RCMP is currently authorized
to deploy up to 150 officers to MINUSTAH and works
closely with other provincial and municipal police forces,
66 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
such as the Sûreté du Québec and the Service de Police de
la Ville de Montréal, to find French-speaking officers. Since
2006, Canadian police personnel have been deployed
to MINUSTAH through the Canadian Police Arrangement
(CPA), a partnership between DFAIT, CIDA, Public Safety
Canada and the RCMP. The Arrangement is funded through
DFAIT’s Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) and the
RCMP’s Policing Operations Branch, which is dedicated to
international police peacekeeping and peace operations. The
role of Canadian police officers has evolved over time from
that of a security provider to a trainer and mentor, with officers
often working side by side with their Haitian counterparts.
Canada is also actively involved in HNP development and
provides training and infrastructure. CIDA will be building
the Police Academy in Ganthier and is in the process of
developing a training curriculum that would allow senior
officers to be promoted to inspectors (an 18-month program)
as well as other programs for promotion. Complementing
this are the efforts of DFAIT’s Stabilization and Reconstruction
Task Force (START), whose work in Haiti has focussed on
supporting justice and security projects since 2006. A total
of $51 million has been committed to train and equip the
security system in Haiti, with an average annual allocation
of $15 million through the START-managed GPSF. The
majority of START projects have been to build, refurbish
and equip infrastructure for the Haitian police, corrections
and border services. In response to the needs of the HNP,
START has constructed/refurbished and equipped 14 police
stations in the South Department and 18 along the border
with the Dominican Republic. The stations along the border
will help reduce cross-border trafficking of people or illicit
substances, increase border security, improve bilateral
relations and create the conditions for customs officials to be
able to capture revenues owed to the state. Other projects
include providing classrooms to the police school in Port-au-
Prince in 2007 and 2011, construction of the Inspectorate
General building and the provision of vehicles to replace
those that were damaged or destroyed in the January 12
earthquake. START is playing a leading role in the training
and equipping of police and is being approached by other
countries that wish to provide donations but do not have
representation in Haiti to discuss these donations with
Haitian officials.
Canada is also partnering with Latin American countries,
particularly with those countries deploying troops and police
to MINUSTAH. In 2007 Canada and Brazil co-hosted a
seminar that brought together all stakeholders involved in
MINUSTAH for a discussion on how to better coordinate
and integrate their collective efforts. Canada also funds
the Latin America Peacekeeping Capacity Building Project
in support of Latin American Centres of Excellence, which,
through a process of meetings, guided consultations,
training courses and capacity building activities, seeks to
enhance the ability of Latin American troop- and police-
contributing countries to deal with increasingly complex
situations in Haiti.
tHe WaY FOrWard
We are currently at a crossroads in Haiti. The earthquake
has dramatically changed the context: the government
and people have lost key infrastructure and capacity,
and resources and energies have been diverted to urgent
humanitarian needs. The question now is, Where do we
go from here? Some of the same challenges which existed
prior to the quake remain, but the Haitian government and
donors are now confronted with a host of new challenges
as well.
The New Reality
In the aftermath of the earthquake, with more than a million
people left homeless, a number of internally displaced
persons (IDP) camps have sprung up in and around Port-
au-Prince and in other affected regions. They remain largely
unpatrolled, particularly at night, and have created a host
of security problems that will need to be addressed by the
HNP and MINUSTAH. Unfortunately, the HNP lacks the
equipment and training necessary to patrol the camps
and deal with many of the crimes committed. Criminals
who escaped from the National Penitentiary have returned
to their neighbourhoods and taken refuge in the camps,
undoing much of the work of the past few years to increase
community security. The incidence of rape has increased
significantly in some camps, mainly because of the lack of
security forces, highlighting the need for more female HNP
officers and training dealing with gender-based violence.
The establishment of temporary HNP structures with basic
police equipment near the camps would help address some
of the security needs.
A second effect of the earthquake was the loss of HNP
infrastructure and equipment. Many commissariats were
damaged or destroyed, forcing HNP officers to work out
in the open, in tents or in temporary structures. Officers
lack basic materials needed for their jobs—paper, pens,
flashlights, vehicles for patrols, etc.—making it difficult to
document crimes. In some areas, HNP officers are receiving
rides from MINUSTAH police (UNPOL) and patrolling only
during daylight hours because of a lack of vehicles. Until
these fundamental issues are addressed by the international
community, there will continue to be a lack of progress in
police reform in Haiti.
With most government infrastructure having been damaged
or destroyed by the earthquake and the Government of Haiti
having lost many personnel (the HNP alone lost 77 officers
and four administrative staff), the problem of institutional
capacity has become urgent. With more members of the
international community involved in the reconstruction effort
in the police sector, including those not historically active
in Haiti, are we overwhelming the HNP? To maximize our
efforts, and minimize the burden on the HNP, we need
to be better coordinated (see the section “International
Community” below). Another outcome of the huge loss of
government infrastructure is the competition for land. The
many government ministries requiring new infrastructure,
as well as foreign businesses looking to participate in
reconstruction, have all been hampered by the lack of
available land, forcing the government to make difficult
decisions. We are already seeing the effects on the HNP.
Land that had been earmarked for HNP infrastructure has
been given to private companies, further delaying police
reform objectives.
Areas of Haiti outside the earthquake zone have not
received the attention they deserve. Both the Government
of Haiti and the international community remain focused on
HNP issues in the earthquake-affected area; the remainder
of the country risks falling behind in police reform. Needs
that had been identified prior to the earthquake remain
(and have been compounded), although the chance of
their being addressed in the near future is slim, as scarce
resources are diverted to Port-au-Prince. Many of these
needs increased as people fled the earthquake-affected
area to the rest of the country, increasing the burden on the
HNP. The same number of officers is expected to maintain
the level of security in areas where the population has
increased by as much as 20%. With little HNP presence
prior to the earthquake, rural areas in particular continue
to be ignored, and it is doubtful that their presence will
increase in the near future.
A lack of HNP presence along the border also needs to be
addressed in the immediate future. Trafficking in persons and
drugs has always been an issue in Haiti and has become
more prominent following the earthquake. Immediately after
the earthquake, UNICEF estimates that 25 to 100 children
per day were smuggled to the Dominican Republic. The
amount of illegal drugs reaching the southern shores of
Haiti has also increased since the earthquake, as traffickers
continue to take advantage of the instability in the country.
Until the HNP deploys officers along the border with the
Dominican Republic (donor-funded infrastructure for which is
already in place) and augments the number of officers in the
coast guard monitoring Haitian national waters, trafficking
will continue to be a major problem for Haiti.
Justice
A larger issue, which poses a further hurdle for
police reform, is the status quo in the antiquated
justice system. Absence of Haitian political will has
created challenges for the international community
to prioritize and address the many issues of the
justice system. As a result, justice reform lags behind
the reform of both the police and the correctional
system in Haiti. As the HNP captures more suspects,
the prisons become more overcrowded, forcing the
HNP to confine more and more accused criminals
in temporary holding cells at the commissariats,
making the working conditions for HNP officers and
the living conditions for detainees both unsafe.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 67
MINUSTAH
Many of the challenges for MINUSTAH remain the same
as prior to the earthquake. Language barriers remain
a constant challenge, particularly for UNPOLs. The
majority of Haitians, including the HNP, speak Creole, so
communication between citizens and MINUSTAH remains
difficult. The HNP find it difficult to communicate with
UNPOLs and learn from them. While MINUSTAH makes
every effort to find French-speaking officers, a limited
number are available.
In terms of maintaining security in Haiti, the main challenge
for MINUSTAH as a UN peace operation is that its mandate
does not give it jurisdiction to arrest anyone; the HNP is
the sole security agency that can perform this task, and its
presence is therefore required during patrols. Currently an
HNP presence is lacking in MINUSTAH patrols, as a result
of which MINUSTAH is unable to stop suspected smugglers,
gang members and criminals. Better cooperation and
coordination between the HNP and MINUSTAH is needed in
order to ensure that the security situation in Haiti improves.
The International Community
Coordination amongst all players in HNP reform is the key
to success. Unfortunately, improving coordination within the
international community continues to be a challenge in the
post-earthquake environment. The police reform working
group is not attended by all of those who are involved,
resulting in knowledge gaps. Until we communicate
our efforts to one another, we risk duplication of efforts,
focussing on non-priority areas and undermining reform
efforts. Attendees at meetings should include not only those
who have infrastructure projects, but also those who offer
training projects (both those offered in-country and those that
take HNP officers out of Haiti for training). Donor countries
must also encourage those NGOs whose projects in police
reform they are funding to work cooperatively within the
HNP Reform Plan framework. Representatives from NGOs
who focus on areas that fall under HNP reform should be
encouraged to attend meetings and share their experiences.
A major hurdle for reform could be the potential delay in
project approval as a result of the Interim Haiti Recovery
Commission (IHRC) that was formed after the earthquake
to coordinate and implement resources from bilateral and
multilateral donors, NGOs and the business sector. While
the IHRC should be able to help with coordination of efforts,
it also risks delaying police reform as donors wait for
approval prior to starting projects. A streamlined process
would need to be adopted to mitigate this risk.
Police reform in Haiti is still progressing, but better
communication, cooperation and coordination amongst
all players are required if Haiti is to be responsible for
its own security. The updated reform plan currently being
developed by the HNP and MINUSTAH will provide the
framework for reform over the next few years and should
be the basis for all assistance for the HNP.
68 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011
POtentiaL sOLUtiOns
In order for police reform to move forward, better
coordination needs to be established between the
Government of Haiti and the international community.
By working together through the police reform working
group to establish priorities, we can ensure that projects
are effective and are targeting the immediate needs of
Haitians. Donors will have a better understanding of how
their projects fit into the larger reform picture and will be
better able to plan for future projects. Better communication
will also ensure that duplication of efforts is avoided, which
should allow for additional projects to be undertaken. More
importantly this will give the HNP a leading role in planning
its reform, for only when all partners support the HNP in
charting its own future and respect its intentions will true
reform be achieved. A good first step would be to include
the HNP in the donor coordination meetings.
This paper has provided a brief overview of some of the
lessons learned and the role of the international community,
including Canada, in supporting the Government of Haiti
in reforming its police. Some of these lessons point to key
areas where donors should focus for greater impact and
results.
Making MINUSTAH Work Better
Taking a more strategic approach to placing international
expertise within MINUSTAH requires better matching of skill
level and function in sets and job descriptions before arrival
in theatre. Canada, with one-third of the individual police
contingent in MINUSTAH, has on occasion seen its officers
under-utilized, e.g., trainers deployed in the absence of
trainees. MINUSTAH needs to play a more prominent role
in helping HNP officers develop the skills and capacities to
implement the police reform.
Coordinating National and International Efforts
Increased coordination will be the main challenge for
the international community with regard to HNP reform.
Coordination in needed not only in Haiti but also at the
UN in New York (where meetings on police and corrections
reform take place and where MINUSTAH’s mandate is
debated) and in donor meetings amongst the main players
in police reform (the United States, Canada, Argentina,
Chile, Brazil and Japan). Aligning and harmonising our
efforts is essential for HNP reform to continue to progress.
Donors that provide infrastructure to the HNP also need
to start focusing on project operationalization. Many
infrastructures are under-utilized, as the HNP does not have
the means to equip them and has limited human resource
capacity to staff them. Donors should work with the HNP
to ensure that these infrastructures are used properly and
may need to consider bilateral deployments to provide
specialized mentoring that is outside MINUSTAH’s areas
of expertise. Recognizing that Port-au-Prince had for
decades been favoured vis-à-vis rural areas of the country,
the Haitian government and the international community
recognized the need to rebalance efforts, including police
reform in different parts of the country. The opportunity to
provide concrete and positive examples of police reform
in Haitian rural areas, now home to many who fled the
earthquake zone, should not be missed.
Police reform in Haiti will take time and require catalytic
projects leading to larger initiatives and changes. The
international community should focus attention on areas
where critical mass can be achieved and where efforts can
be compounded. For instance, Canada is building a prison
in Croix-des-Bouquets and will also rebuild the local police
commissariat. Canadian initiatives aimed at providing
increased access to justice are also being developed in the
same jurisdiction. By assembling a set of tools and expertise
in pilot geographic areas, the aim is to demonstrate positive
results across the justice-security continuum which could be
replicated elsewhere in the country.
cOncLUsiOn
Police reform is one component of the larger system
which also deals with reforming the corrections, border
management and justice sectors. The international
community will need to continue to emphasize the systemic
and holistic nature of these reforms.
HNP reform will continue to require the right mix of political
will, coordination and focus from both the national and
international community, as well as an updated reform
plan. Continued progress will allow Haiti to become more
secure and provide a new more resilient foundation for
reconstruction.
The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011 | 69
 ABOUT THE PEARSON
PEACEKEEPING CENTRE
AND THE PEARSON PAPERS
The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) specializes in bringing together military, civilians and police
in an open and collegial environment. This, coupled with years of experience in problem-based and
multidisciplinary education and training, has earned it an international reputation for excellence in peace
operations training, education, and research, a reputation which brings credit to Canada from around
the world.
Since its founding in 1994, the PPC has engaged in innovative research in the area of peace operations. The
Pearson Papers provide a forum where researchers and practitioners can openly explore the complexities
of evolving peace operations. Peer-reviewed, the journal represents an opportunity for professionals and
practitioners to engage and share in an interdisciplinary dialogue on the complexities experienced in peace
operations within the global peace and security realm.
The topics covered in each issue of The Pearson Papers are chosen through a nexus of internal discussion,
while a finger is kept on the pulse of dialogue taking place within the international peace operations
community. Each volume is thematically oriented, with space for field contributions, research articles, and
topical reviews examining emerging trends.
For more information, visit www.peaceoperations.org.

A CERCA DEL PEARSON PEACEKEEPING

CENTRE Y DE THE PEARSON PAPERS
El Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) se especializa en reunir a militares, civiles y policías en un ambiente
abierto y de relaciones profesionales. Esto, junto con años de experiencia en educación y capacitación
multidisciplinaria y basada en análisis de problemas, le ha permitido al PPC ganar una reputación
internacional de excelencia en el área de capacitación, educación e investigación en operaciones de
paz, una reputación que le ha significado un reconocimiento a Canadá en todo el mundo.
Desde su fundación en el año 1994, el PPC ha estado comprometido en una investigación innovadora
en el área de las operaciones de paz. The Pearson Papers proporciona un foro en donde investigadores
y profesionales pueden explorar abiertamente las complejidades de las operaciones de paz en curso. La
publicación es revisada por pares y representa una oportunidad para que los profesionales participen y
compartan en un diálogo interdisciplinario, las complejidades experimentadas en las operaciones de paz
dentro del ámbito de la paz y seguridad global.
Los temas cubiertos en cada edición de The Pearson Papers se seleccionan a través de un nexo de discusión
interna y al mismo tiempo se controla el pulso del diálogo que tiene lugar en la comunidad internacional
de las operaciones de paz. Cada volumen está orientado temáticamente, con espacio para contribuciones
de campo, artículos de investigación y revisión de temas de actualidad que examinan las tendencias
emergentes.
Para mayor información, visita www.peaceoperations.org.

70 | The Pearson Papers, Volume 13, 2011

 Articles | Artículos

Perspectives on Latin American Contribution to Peace Operations |

Perspectivas sobre la contribución latinoamericana a las operaciones de paz
Regionalización de las misiones de paz: La presencia de Latinoamérica en MINUSTAH
Ana Laura Borro

Latin America’s Involvement in United Nations Peace Operations and Brazil’s Engagement as
a Key Player
Eduarda Hamann

Mujer, paz y seguridad: Chile y la evolución de la incorporación femenina en materias de

defensa y orden público
Carolina Céspedes Benaventes y Jorge Canales Ukrow

The Brazilian PMDF and United Nations Peace Operations: A Brief History and Future
Perspectives
Sérgio Carrera de Albuquerque Melo Neto and Antônio Sérgio Carrera de
Albuquerque Melo

Perspectives on Lessons Learned in Peace Operations

Perspectivas sobre lecciones aprendidas en las operaciones de paz
The Role of Women Peacekeepers in Combating Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict
Situations: Perspectives from Latin American Troop-Contributing Countries
Cecilia Mazzotta
Mejorando las operaciones de paz a través de lecciones aprendidas en la asistencia
humanitaria: Perspectiva de la UEMPE
Angel Navas Cruz
Lecciones aprendidas sobre género en las operaciones de paz: Perspectiva del CAECOPAZ
Ana Florencia Talamoni
Confidence-Building and “Good Offices” After Angostura: Assessing the MIB/OAS Initiatives
along the Colombian-Ecuadorian Burning Border
Fernando A. Chinchilla
Perspectiva de un observador militar desde el interior del Congo, 2002-2003
Carlos R. Delgado
Police Reform in Haiti: Lessons Learned, the Role of the International Community
and the Way Forward
Allison Poff

CANADIAN
PEACEKEEPING
PRESS
www.peaceoperations.org ISBN: 978-1-896551-77-7