(1)CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
, were charged and
[40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for
the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff
claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the
private cemetery and that the said lands are within
their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said
expropriation was not necessary because other routes
were available. They further claimed that the
expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those
persons owing and interested in
the graves andmonuments that would have to be
destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public
improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that
they have the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain and that the courts have no right
to inquire and determine the necessity of the
expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into,
and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise
the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity
for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain
is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question that the courts have the right to inquire to.
(2)PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)
Facts
Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of
Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the municipal
council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the
construction or repair of any building without a
written permit from the mayor prior to construction or
repairing.
1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardo’s son-in-law)
applied for a permit to construct a building adjacent
to their gas station, still on Fajardo’s private land,
separated from public plaza by a creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 – request denied because it would
destroy the view of the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again
on Jan. 18, 1954.
Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even
without a permit because they claimed that they
needed a residence badly due to a typhoon
destroying their previous place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 – Fajardo et at.
convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating
Ordinance no. 7
o CFI – Affirmed
o CA forwarded the case to the SC because “the
appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in
question.”
Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise
police power in its regulation of property.
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that
the municipality could enact and is therefore null and
void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.
Ratio:
• The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing
standards to guide and/or control the discretion
vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY
LACKING IN THIS CASE.
o Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair
permits
• Legislation may validly regulate property in the
interest of general welfare
à Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, ‘the
state may not under the guise of police power
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.’
o IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own
beauty and regardless of the fact that they are built
on private land are condemned by the
ordinance à appellants constrained would be
constrained to leave their land to idle without
receiving just compensation for the virtual
confiscation of their private land
• Municipal government justified the ordinance
under Revised Administrative Code – Sec. 2243 – C –
that municipal council shall have authority to exercise
discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits
in populous centers à empowers municipal
government to require construction/repair permits, to
charge fees for such permits
o IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety
regulations that the municipal council promulgated in
order to set a standard in the type of building that
can be safely constructed in the public plaza
(3) CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA [106 Phil; G.R.
No. L-12032; 31 Aug 1959]
Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a
complaint against defendant a public corporation,
created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act
does not include within its purview the Baguio Water
Works system, assuming that it does, is
unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff
ownership, control and operation of said water works
without just compensation and due process of law.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the
ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power
and eminent domain. The court denied the motion
and ordered the defendants to file an answer. The
court holds that the water works system of Baguio
belongs to private property and cannot be
expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of
R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA
assets for the value of the water works system of
Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just
compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration
was denied hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of
police power of eminent domain.
Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise
of police power. The act does not confiscate, destroy
or appropriate property belonging to a municipal
corporation. It merely directs that all water works
belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal
districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the
NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the
control and supervision of an agency with a view to
promoting their efficient management, but in so doing
does not confiscate them because it directs that they
be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.
The Baguio water works system is not like a public
road, the park, street other public property held in
trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the
public. But it is a property of a municipal corporation,
water works cannot be taken away except for public
use and upon payment of just compensation.
Judgment affirmed.
(4) Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, et al ; L-24440, March 28, 1968
FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into
two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur),
Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--
"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located within the
City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of
charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga."
Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just
compensation was unconstitutional because it
deprived the province of property without due
process. Included in the properties were the capital
site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital
and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.
ISSUES:
1. Are the properties mentioned, properties for
public use or patrimonial property?
2. Should the city pay for said properties?
HELD:
1. If we follow the Civil Code classification,
only the high school playgrounds are for
public use since it is the only one that is
available to the general public, and all the
rest are patrimonial property since they are
not devoted to public use but to public
service. But if we follow the law on Municipal
Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a
public service, the property should be
considered for PUBLIC USE.
2. If the Civil Code classification is used, since
almost all the properties involved
are patrimonial, the law would be
unconstitutional since the province would be
deprived of its own property without just
compensation. If the law on Municipal
Corporations would be followed, the
properties would be of public dominion, and
therefore NO COMPENSATION would be
required. It is the law on Municipal
Corporations that should be
followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may
classify them as patrimonial, they should not
be regarded as ordinary private property.
They should fall under the control of the
State, otherwise certain governmental
activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art.
424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
(S) PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
VS. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, digested
GR# L-24440 March 28, 1968 (Constitutional Law
– Just Compensation, Patrimonial Property)
FACTS: After the incorporation of the
Municipality of Zamboanga as a chartered city,
petitioner province contends that facilities
belonging to the latter and located within the City
of Zamboanga will be acquired and paid for by
the said city.
However, respondent city avers that pursuant to
RA No. 3039 providing for the transfer free of
charge of all buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga to the
said City.
ISSUE: Whether or not facilities which the
province shall abandon will be acquired by the
city upon just compensation.
HELD: Yes, If the property is owned by the
municipality in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and can be
transferred free of charge. But if the property is
owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then
it is patrimonial and can be expropriated upon
payment of just compensation.
(5) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT,
26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law –
Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just
Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against
private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau
of Telecommunications to demand interconnection
between the Government Telephone System and that
of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System
could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT.
Private respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them.
(s) The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a politi
cal entity exercising governmental powers through its
branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the
BureauofTelecommunications. The defendant, Philippi
ne Long Distance TelephoneCompany (PLDT for short
), is a public service corporation holding a legislative
franchise, to install, operate and maintain a telephone
system throughout the Philippines.BOT soon after its
creation set up its own Government Telephone
System (GTS) utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting the trunk lines of the PLDT
to enable government offices to call private
parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public. Through these trunk lines, a
Government TelephoneSystem (GTS) subscriber could
make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way
that the latter could make acall to the former.BOT
entered into an agreement with RCA Communications
(an American Co. party not in interest of the
case),Inc. for a joint telephone service whereby the
BOT would convey radio-telephone overseas call
received by RCAto and from local residents.PLDT
complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT
had used the trunk lines not only for
governmentoffices but even to serve private persons
or the general public in competition with the business
of PLDT. PLDTsever the telephone connections of
BOT resulting to isolation of the Philippines on
telephone services from therest of the world except
the US.
The BOT had proposed that both enter into
an interconnecting agreement, with
the government paying (on acall basis) for all calls
passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
GTS to the PLDT. The PLDTreplied that it was willing
to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone
service to Europe and
Asiancountries provided that the BOT would submit to
the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public ServiceC
ommission and in consideration sharing of the gross
revenues. The proposals were not accepted by either
party. The plaintiff commenced suit against the
defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment; (1)
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with
plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use of the facilities
of defendant's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as the
court might consider reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendant company
to restrain the severance of the existing telephone
connections and/or restore those severed. After trial,
the lower court rendered judgment that it could not
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the
Bureau because the parties were not in agreement
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT
and the Government Telephone System can be a valid
object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the
needs of the government service may require, subject
to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines
and services to allow inter-service connection
between the both telephone systems, through
expropriation can be a subject to an easement of
right of way.
(6) REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI,
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional
Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has
been rented and occupied by the government in 1947
refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced
expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the
private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has
taken place when the condemnor has entered and
occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when
the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1)
Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for
more than a momentary period, (3) and under
warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public
use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present
when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.
(7) De Knecht v. Bautista
100 SCRA 660 (1980)
FACTS: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard
to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road
Project, originally called for the expropriation of
properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later
on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided
to make the proposed extension pass through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the
protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on
Human Settlements recommended the reversion to
the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new
route which save the government P2 million. The
government filed expropriation proceedings against
the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets,
among whom was petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a genuine need to
expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht and
others similarly situated on the ground that the choice
of properties to be expropriated seemed arbitrarily
made by the DPWH.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval. The Human Settlements Commission
concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it
can be disregarded in making a choice between the
two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates
against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets, while the factor of social and economic
impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a
choice between people, on one hand, and progress
and development, on the other, it is to be
remembered that progress and development are
carried out for the benefit of the people.