Compiled Digests

Contents
DYING DECLARATION 2
76. Pp vs. Mara-mara 2
77. People v Molo XXX 3
78. People v Bautista 3
79. People v Basay XXX 3
80. People v Cabrillas 3
81. Zarate v Gingoog XXX 5
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST 5
82. Lichauco v Atlantic 5
83. People v Toledo 6
84. Fuentes Jr v CA 8
85. People v Bernal XXX 9
86. Parel v Prudencio 9
87. Phil Free Press v CA 12
88. Dantis v Maghinang XXX 18
PEDIGREE 18
89. Mendoza v CA 18
90. Jison v CA XXX 21
91. Solinap v Locsin 21
92. Tecson v Comelec XXX 22
93. Gravador v Mamigo XXX 22
94. People v Villanueva 22
95. People v Flores 24
COMMON REPUTATION 26
96. In re Mallare 26
RES GESTAE 30
97. Air France v Carrascoso XXX 30
98. Aballe v People XXX 30
99. People v Reyes 30
100. People v Dela Cruz 31
101. People v Cariquez 32
102. People v Tampus 35
103. People v Sace 35
104. People v Lauga 37
105. People v Tulagan 4 1
106. DBP Pool v Radio Mindanao Network 43
45
107. Borromeo v CA 45
108. People v Espinoza ????? 47
DYING DECLARATION
76. Pp vs. Mara-mara
[G.R. No. 110994. October 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRESENCIANO MARAMARA alias Cresing,
accused-appellant.
Principle:
For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur: (1) that death is
imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is
competent to testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is offered in a
criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.
Bar Question:
Accused-appellant Mara-Mara was convicted of the crime murder and without any mitigating
circumstances and the existence of treachery in using a firearm in taking the life of Miguelito Donato.
Mara-mara's conviction was based on the testimonies of (1) Ricador (Donato's brother) who was an eye
witness to the crime, and (2) Regarder Donato's recollection of his son Miguelitos dying declaration, as
truthful testimonies coming from credible witnesses. Accused appellant contends that he cannot be
convicted based on Regarder's testimony because it is not a dying declaration. Is Mara-mara correct?
What are the requisites for a dying declaration be admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
Mara-mara's contention is bereft of merit. Regarder Donatos testimony regarding Miguelitos
identification of the accused-appellant as his assailant certainly qualifies as a dying declaration that is
worthy of credence. For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur:
(1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the
victim is competent to testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.The degree and
seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito Donato and the fact that his death supervened
shortly thereafter may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by him with
the full realization that he was in a dying condition.The victim Miguelito Donatos dying declaration
having satisfied all these requisites, it must be considered as an evidence of the highest order because, at
the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled. A victims utterance after sustaining a mortal
wound may be considered pure emanations of the incident.
77. People v Molo XXX

78. People v Bautista
78. People vs. Bautista
Facts: Bautista was convicted by the RTC of the crime of murder for killing one Cipriano Bardarlipe. On
his defense (appellant) he presented as evidence the police blotter made by Barangay Captain Felipe Solis
with the information given to him by Gagaza Jr. ,wherein, Gagaza Jr. stated that while he accompanied
Cipriano at the hospital, Cipriano stated that he was shot by Domy Ferreamil.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC failed to consider and take into account the dying declaration made by the
deceased victim.
Ruling: No.
A dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is
admissible under the following requisites: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that
fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the
declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4) that the declaration is
offered in a case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of the inquiry.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly rejected the ante mortem statement of the victim. Records show
that Jose Gagaza, Jr., the person who allegedly heard the victim's ante mortem statement, was never
presented in court to testify on the matter. It has been held that if the dying declaration was made orally, it
may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it was made.
The entry of the same statement in the police blotter alone will not suffice to confer upon it the desired
evidentiary weight. Entries in police blotters are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
79. People v Basay XXX

80. People v Cabrillas
People of the Philippines vs. Adriano (accused) and Benny (appellant) Cabrillas
Principle: A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on
the premise that no x x x person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts on concocting lies disappear.
FACTS: (long digest)

Benny and Adriano Cabrillas were convicted with the crime of murder.
Prosecution witness Wilfredo narrated that one night, Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their
drinking spree to which Wilfredo obliged. Wilfredo noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos tucked on
their waists. Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the house of Jesus Cabujats (Jesus)
daughter, Elena Raypan. Later on, he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn C. Raypan
(Jonalyn) walking towards the house of Jonalyns mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned towards a
grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They held
Jesus by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus shouted I am wounded, please
help me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano. Jesus then fell to the ground while Benny and
Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.
For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that she saw the two men take hold of her grandfathers
arms, after which Benny stabbed her grandfather with a long bolo. She heard her grandfather say Donie,
help me, I am wounded.
Elena also testified that when she heard her father shouting for help. As she got nearer to Jesus, Benny
and Adriano ran away. When Elena asked her father as to who stabbed him, the latter replied that it was
Benny and Adriano.
Benny interposed the defense of alibi: that he had accepted the invitation of Adriano and a certain Manuel
to join in their drinking spree and stayed there until 6:00 p.m. Thereafter, he went home. He just learned
of Jesus’ death the next day. Benny’s mother also testified that Adriano admitted that he attacked and
injured someone.
RTC convicted Benny with murder. It gave more credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions two
eyewitnesses since their positive declarations that Benny and Adriano stabbed the helpless Jesus were
never refuted. Besides, the ad mortem statement of Jesus that the two stabbed him would serve to cleanse
any doubt on their responsibility.
CA affirmed.
Short digest:
Benny and Adriano Cabrillas were convicted with the crime of murder.
3 witnesses were presented: Wilfredo, who testified that he saw Benny and Adriano attack and stab Jesus,
after having a drinking spree with them.
Jonalyn (Jesus’ granddaughter) testified that she saw 2 men hold her grandfather and that Benny stabbed
the former with a bolo.
Elena (Jesus’ daughter, Jonalyn’s mother) testified that she heard her father call for help and later asked
her father as to who stabbed him, the latter replied that it was Benny and Adriano.
Benny appealed and interposed the defense of alibi: that he joined Adriano and Manuel in drinking but
left early. That a few days later, Adriano admitted to his and Benny’s mothers that he had attacked and
injured a person.
ISSUE: WON Benny can escape liability by imputing the crime to Adriano.
RULING:
NO.
Bennys assertion that Adriano was solely responsible for the murder of Jesus is undeserving of
consideration. Such a claim is common among conspirators in their veiled attempt to escape complicity. It
is a desperate strategy to compensate for a weak defense.
Besides, it is the victim himself who pointed to Benny as one of his assailants. Such statement of Jesus
before his death is a dying declaration that is admissible in evidence against Benny. A dying declaration is
an evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no x x x person
who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all
thoughts on concocting lies disappear.
81. Zarate v Gingoog XXX
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

82. Lichauco v Atlantic
82. Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.
PRINCIPLE:
a declaration against the interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence, notwithstanding its
hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane, or for some
other reason is not available as a witness.
FACTS:
Richard Fitzsimmons, the president of Atlantic Gulf, a foreign corporation registered and licensed to do
business in the Philippines, held 1,000 shares of stock of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for but
were covered by promissory notes in favor of Atlantic Gulf. P64,500.00 was credited in his favor on
account of the purchase price of the said stocks out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled
from the company. Under an agreement with Atlantic, should he die leaving the shares unpaid, Atlantic, at
his option, may either acquire said shares by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in
favor of his estate the corresponding shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon.
Subsequently, it appears that Richard Thomas Fitzsimmons sued his wife Miguela Malayto for divorce in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment granting plaintiff's petition for divorce
and ordering the dissolution of the marriage between the parties. After the decree of divorce had become
final the plaintiff Fitzsimmons, pursuant to the provisions of the divorce law then in force, submitted to
the court an inventory of the assets and liabilities of the conjugal partnership.
Fitzsimmons died and a proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted. Atlantic then filed a
claim against the estate and offered to reacquire the shares sold to Fitzsimmons upon return to the estate
of the P64,500 paid thereon.
The administrator, Marcial Lichauco, however, denied the alleged indebtedness. During trial, Atlantic
presented the testimonies of the chief accountant and assistant accountant, and of the president and vice-
president-treasurer of the corporation. Lichauco also presented the inventory marked as Exhibit 1 as his
evidence in the present case.
According to Exhibit 1 the gross value of the assets of the conjugal partnership between the deceased
Fitzsimmons and his wife Miguela Malayto was P174,700, and the total amount of the obligations was
P30,082. These obligations consisted of only two items: one of P21,426 in favor of the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company and another of P8,656 in favor of the Philippine Bank of Commerce.
In other words, no obligation whatsoever in favor of the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila
was listed in said inventory Exhibit 1. And upon that fact the administrator based his opposition to the
claim in question.
ISSUE:
WON the inventory(exhibit 1) is admissible in evidence
HELD:
Yes. The court finds no merit, that Exhibit 1, insofar as the commission therefrom of the claim in question
was concerned, far from being self-serving to, was a declaration against the interest of, the declarant
Fitzsimmons. He having since died and therefore no longer available as a witness, said document was
correctly admitted by the trial court in evidence.
A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to the interest of the declarant. It is not admissible in
evidence as proof of the facts asserted. "The vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its
hearsay character. Furthermore such declarations are untrustworthy; to permit their introduction in
evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries."
On the other hand, a declaration against the interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence,
notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, become
insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. "The true test in reference to the reliability
of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem motam, as is the case with reference to some
classes of hearsay evidence, whether the declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the
conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify."
Insofar, at least, as the appellant was concerned, there was no probable motive on the part of Fitzsimmons
to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not including therein appellant's present claim of P63,000 among his
obligations or liabilities to be deducted from the assets of the conjugal partnership between him and his
divorced wife. He did not know then that he would die within one year and that the corporation of which
he was the president and one of the largest stockholders would present the claim in question against his
estate. Neither did he know that the books and records of that corporation would be destroyed or lost. Yet,
although he listed in said inventory his obligations in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust Company and
the Philippine Bank of Commerce aggregating more than P30,000, he did not mention at all any
obligation in favor of the corporation of which he was the president and one of the largest stockholders.
Assuming that he owed his corporation P63,000 for which he signed receipts and vouchers and which
appeared in the books of said corporation, there was no probable motive for him not to include such
obligation in the inventory Exhibit 1. It would have been to his interest to include it so that his estranged
and divorced wife might share in its payment.
83. People v Toledo

PRINCIPLE:
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded
by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally
recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the
reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own
pecuniary or proprietary interest (NOT APPLICABLE TO PENAL INTEREST). But the general rule is
stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he
committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro,
finding him guilty of the crime of homicide.
Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in
the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. The two men happened to meet and engaged in a
bolo duel which resulted to the death of Filomeno. Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal
building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only
he and Filomeno Morales fought.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether
the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. The
prosecution presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to
the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the
witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place
when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting
Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. The defense also relied upon
the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of
Pinamalayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or ot the Court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1.
RULING:
NO
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded
by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally
recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the
reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own
pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person
other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for
accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most of
them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as
the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the
crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased
and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When
Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a
rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I
met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio
Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been
received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in
connection with the other proven facts.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi states, "to reach
those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person
accused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in
evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again admissions are
receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. We
fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will
not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted against
its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet
the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.
84. Fuentes Jr v CA
Facts:
At 4 in the morning of June 24, 1989, Julieto Malaspina was attending a benefit dance at Dump Site,
Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. The accused, Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. called the victim over and suddenly
stabbed him. Petitioner alleges that his cousin, Zolio Fuentes, Jr., nicknamed "Jonie", was the one who
stabbed the victim after spontaneously confessing to him that he did so after said victim untied his boxing
gloves after a boxing match and punched him. The RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime of murder.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty for the crime of murder by treachery considering that a
declaration was made by his cousin that he killed the victim.
Ruling: YES.
The allegation that it was another who stabbed the victim is too incredible.
No less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that
Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same person. On cross-
examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro Fuentes,
Jr., as "Joni" or "Jonie" Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina occasionally called
petitioner "Junior".
The declaration is not covered by the exception to the hearsay rule regarding declaration against interest;
hence, inadmissible.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
The far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is
that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from
the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the
defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the
acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the
effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any
serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the
admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be
open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the
probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not
altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.
Bar Question:
Accused was charged and convicted of murder by treachery before the trial court. Accused alleges that his
cousin, Zolio, confessed to him that he stabbed the victim. However, the accused is unable to produce
Zolio since the latter fled. Rule on the admissibility.
Answer:
The declaration is inadmissible.
Under Section 38 of Rule 130 of the rules of court, the declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.
In this case, there is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. Hence, the declaration is excluded for being hearsay.
85. People v Bernal XXX

86. Parel v Prudencio
DANILO PAREL V. PRUDENCIO
PRINCIPLE:
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the ocassion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further
that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interests.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.
FACTS:
Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner (Parel)
alleging that:
• he is the owner of a two-storey residential house at Forbes Park National Reservation (Baguio City);
• that the property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under tax
declarations;
• that he allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein
and occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise
the construction and to safeguard the materials;
• that he allowed petitioner and children to temporarily reside thereat out of sheer magnanimity since
respondent’s wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father.
In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former
was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated
to U.S. in 1986. However, without his knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took
possession of the ground floor of Prudencio’s house. The refusal to vacate compelled him to file an
action for recovery of possession as well as payment for monthly rental until the petitioner vacates the
premises.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that:
• his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to
respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents;
• he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondent’s
full knowledge;
• his parents spent their own resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey house as co-
owners thereof;
• the late Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co-owner of the
house, he occupied the ground floor thereof;
• the demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-
owner of the said house; and
• that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject
house which were all dismissed.
Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.
Basically the counterclaim is that Florentino, the father of petitioner was an awardee of the land on which
the house stands, and as co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof.
RTC: THERE WAS CO-OWNERSHIP
CA: PRUDENCIO IS THE SOLE OWNER
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove that his father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey
residential house.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner’s father was not a co-owner of the two storey-residential house.
The SC agreed with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for
recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.
Respondent presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before
the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1,
after having been sworn to according to law depose and say:
That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City
which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor,
Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55
Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.
8
Further, affiant say not. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-
in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further
9
that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with
respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that
while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by
respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s
10
interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
11
certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed
said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even
when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino)
and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of
evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will and held that the remedy of
12
respondent was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that
respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal
13
Trial Court.
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of
respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross-examination that the existing
14
structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared under
15
his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted that there was no
16
occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the house in their name.
The SC agreed with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
17
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The house
which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father had been consistently declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-mentioned,
inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of the
litigation.
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to contravene respondent’s claim. The burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove
that his father was a co-owner of the subject house.
In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his
20
documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment
21
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule that the mere fact
that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already
22
been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
The testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-owned by
petitioner’s father and respondent.
Candelario Regua merely testified that he was hired by petitioner’s father, Florentino, to construct the
24
residential building in 1972; that he listed the materials to be used for the construction which was
25
purchased by Florentino; that he and his men received their salaries every Saturday and Wednesday
26
from Florentino or his wife, respectively; that he had not met nor seen respondent during the whole time
27
the construction was on-going. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he cannot tell where
28
the money to buy the materials used in the construction came from.
Corazon Garcia merely testified that Florentino started building the house when he was allocated a lot at
29
DPS compound, that she knew Florentino constructed the subject house and never knew
30
respondent. The bare allegation that Florentino was allocated a lot is not sufficient to overcome
Florentino’s own affidavit naming respondent as the owner of the subject house.
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and purchased
31
the materials to be used; and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon order of his
32
father and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of the witnesses saw
respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that petitioner’s father and
respondent co-owned the house.
SHORT DIGEST:
Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner(Parel). In
November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was
due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to
U.S. in 1986. However, without his knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took
possession of the ground floor of Prudencio’s house. The refusal to vacate compelled him to file an
action for recovery of possession as well as payment for monthly rental until the petitioner vacates the
premises. On the other hand, petitioner says that his parents are the co-owners of the said residential
house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents.
He said he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with Prudencio’s
full knowledge and that the former’s parents spent their own resources in improving and constructing the
said two-storey house as co-owners thereof. Basically the counterclaim is that Florentino, the father of
petitioner was an awardee of the land on which the house stands, and as co-owner of the house, he
occupied the ground floor thereof.
87. Phil Free Press v CA

PRINCIPLE:
The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
FACTS:
Philippine Free Press, Inc (Free Press) is engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press Magazine, .
Due to its wide circulation, the publication of the Free Press magazine enabled Petitioner to attain
considerable prestige prior to the declaration of Martial Law as well as to achieve a high profit margin.
Free Press purchased a 5000sqm parcel of land situated at No. 2249, Pasong Tamo Street, Makati as
evidenced by TCT No. 109767 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati. Upon taking possession of the
subject land, Free Press constructed an office building thereon to house its various machineries,
equipment, office furniture and fixture and made the subject building its main office.
Free Press supported the late President Diosdado Macapagal against Ferdinand Marcos during the 1965
Presidential Election. Upon the election of the late President Marcos and prior to the imposition of
Martial law on September 21, 1972, Free Press printed numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos
administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. Petitioner likewise ran a series of
articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the guise of Martial Law.
In the evening of September 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press Building, forced out its
employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said establishment. The soldier in charge of the military
contingent then informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., the son of Teodoro Locsin, Sr., the President of Free Press
that Martial Law had been declared and that they were instructed by the late President Marcos to take
over the building and to close the printing press.
On September 21, 1972, Teodoro Locsin, Sr. was arrested and was brought to Camp Crame and was
subsequently transferred to the maximum security bloc at Fort Bonifacio.
In December, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were to be filed against him and that he was
to be provisionally released subject to the following conditions, to wit: he remained under city arrest and
he was not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write anything critical of the
Marcos administration.
The publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased. The subject building remained padlocked and under
heavy military guard . The cessation of the publication of the magazine led to the financial ruin of Free
Press whose situation was further aggravated when its employees demanded the payment of separation
pay as a result of the cessation of its operations. Petitioners minority stockholders, furthermore, made
demands that Locsin, Sr. buy out their shares.
Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers from then President Marcos for
the acquisition of the Free Press and he refused the offer stating that Free Press was not for sale. A few
months later, the late Secretary Guillermo De Vega approached Locsin, Sr. reiterating Marcoss offer to
purchase the name and the assets of the Free Press.
Locsin, Sr. was contacted by Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, the former aide-de-camp of then President Marcos
concerning the sale of theFree Press. Locsin, Sr. requested that the meeting be held inside the Building
and this was arranged by Menzi . During the said meeting, Menzi once more reiterated Marcoss offer to
purchase both the name and the assets of [petitioner] adding that Marcos cannot be denied. Locsin, Sr.
refused but Menzi insisted that he had no choice but to sell. Locsin, Sr. then made a counteroffer that he
will sell the land, the building and all the machineries and equipment therein but he will be allowed to
keep the name of the Petitioner.. Menzi promised to clear the matter with then President Marcos. Menzi
thereafter contacted Locsin, Sr. and informed him that President Marcos was amenable to his counteroffer
and is offering the purchase price of P5, 750,000.00 for the land, the building, the machineries, the office
furnishing and the fixtures on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Menzi tendered to Locsin, Sr. a check for P1, 000,000.00 downpayment for the sale, Locsin, Sr. accepted
the check, subject to the condition that he will refund the same in case the sale will not push through.
The Board of Directors of Free Press held a meeting and reluctantly passed a resolution authorizing
Locsin, Sr. to sell the assets to Menzi minus the name Philippine Free Press.
The parties then executed 2 notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land, building and the machineries and
paid the balance of the purchase price. The proceeds of the sale were then used to pay separation pay of
the employees buy out the shares of the minority stockholders as well as to settle all its obligations.
On February 26, 1987, Free Press filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against Liwayway and the
PCGG before the RTC of Makati, Branch 146 on the grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of
purchase price.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred not granting the petitioner’s action for annulment of deeds of sale
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
We can not accept the petitioners contention that the period during which authoritarian rule was in force
had interrupted prescription and that the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino
government took power. It is true that under Article 1154 [of the Civil Code] xxx fortuitous events have
the effect of tolling the period of prescription. However, we can not say, as a universal rule, that the
period from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure. Plainly, we can not
box in the "dictatorial" period within the term without distinction, and without, by necessity, suspending
all liabilities, however demandable, incurred during that period, including perhaps those ordered by this
Court to be paid. While this Court is cognizant of acts of the last regime, especially political acts, that
might have indeed precluded the enforcement of liability against that regime and/or its minions, the Court
is not inclined to make quite a sweeping pronouncement, . . . . It is our opinion that claims should be
taken on a case-to-case basis. This selective rule is compelled, among others, by the fact that not all those
imprisoned or detained by the past dictatorship were true political oppositionists, or, for that matter,
innocent of any crime or wrongdoing. Indeed, not a few of them were manipulators and scoundrels.
In their testimonies before the trial court, both Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. claimed that they had not filed
suit to recover the properties until 1987 as they could not expect justice to be done because according to
them, Marcos controlled every part of the government, including the courts,
While that situation may have obtained during the early years of the martial law administration, We could
not agree with the proposition that it remained consistently unchanged until 1986, a span of fourteen (14)
years. The unfolding of subsequent events would show that while dissent was momentarily stifled, it was
not totally silenced. On the contrary, it steadily simmered and smoldered beneath the political surface and
culminated in that groundswell of popular protest which swept the dictatorship from power.
The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro
Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins, collectively), which, in gist, established the following facts: 1) the widely
circulated Free Press magazine, which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the strongest critical
stand against the Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such declaration, which closure
eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos orders, Mr. Locsin, Sr. was arrested and
detained for over 2 months without charges and, together with his family, was threatened with execution;
3) Mr. Locsin, Sr. was provisionally released on the condition that he refrains from reopening Free Press
and writing anything critical of the Marcos administration; and 4) Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained
fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
Per the Locsins, it was amidst the foregoing circumstances that petitioners property in question was sold
to private respondent, represented by Gen. Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly applied the squeeze on
Mr. Locsin, Sr. thru the medium of the Marcos cannot be denied and [you] have no choice but to sell line.
The appellate court, in rejecting petitioners above posture of vitiation of consent, observed:
It was under the above-enumerated circumstances that the late Hans Menzi, allegedly acting on behalf of
the late President Marcos, made his offer to purchase the Free Press. It must be noted, however, that the
testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged implied threat that Marcos cannot be
denied and that [respondent] was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press is
hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend himself; the same can be
said of the offers to purchase made by Atty. Crispin Baizas and Secretary Guillermo de Vega who are also
both dead. It is clear from the provisions of Section 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
that any evidence, . . . is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a
party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely
because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine
the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed. And there can be no quibbling that because
death has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos subalterns, Messrs. Baizas and
De Vega, cannot cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening statements allegedly made by them for the
late President.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of the exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section
38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify,
However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzis supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that
he was acting for the late President Marcos when he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free
Press property, we are loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us.
For, the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from
the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be
viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips had been
sealed by death.
[I]t has been said that of all evidence, the narration of a witness of his conversation with a dead person is
esteemed in justice the weakest. One reason for its unreliability is that the alleged declarant can not recall
to the witness the circumstances under which his statement were made. The temptation and opportunity
for fraud in such cases also operate against the testimony. Testimony to statements of a deceased person,
at least where proof of them will prejudice his estate, is regarded as an unsafe foundation for judicial
action except in so far as such evidence is borne out by what is natural and probable under the
circumstances taken in connection with actual known facts. And a court should be very slow to act upon
the statement of one of the parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other party; such
corroborative evidence should be adduced as to satisfy the court of the truth of the story which is to
benefit materially the person telling it.
Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of a
live witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live witness heard from one already dead, the
other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in character.
The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge.
There can be no quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify respecting what President Marcos said
to Gen. Menzi about the acquisition of petitioners newspaper, if any there be, precisely because none of
said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the declaration-
against-interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can
conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in
offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his own
interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act
for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.
Short Digest
Facts:
Philippine Free Press, Inc, one of the widely circulated political magazines in the Philippines, purchased a
parcel of land and built their building thereon. Free Press printed numerous articles highly critical of the
Marcos administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. In September 1972, soldiers
took over the premises as were instructed by the late President Marcos to take over the building and to
close the printing press.
Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers from then President Marcos for
the acquisition of the Free Press and he refused the offer stating that Free Press was not for sale. A few
months later, the late Secretary Guillermo De Vega approached Locsin, Sr. reiterating Marcoss offer to
purchase the name and the assets of the Free Press.
Locsin, Sr. was contacted by Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi reiterated Marcoss offer to purchase both the name
and the assets. Menzi insisted that he had no choice but to sell for P4,500,000.00. A downpayment of
P1,000,000.00 was paid. Later, The parties then executed 2 notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land,
building and the machineries and paid the balance of the purchase price.
On February 26, 1987, Free Press filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against Liwayway and the
PCGG before the RTC of Makati, Branch 146 on the grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of
purchase price.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred not granting the petitioner’s action for annulment of deeds of sale
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is not unmindful of the exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section 38, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify,
However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzis supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that
he was acting for the late President Marcos when he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free
Press property, we are loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us.
For, the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from
the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be
viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips had been
sealed by death.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the declaration-
against-interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can
conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in
offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his own
interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act
for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.

88. Dantis v Maghinang XXX
PEDIGREE
89. Mendoza v CA
PRINCIPLE: “Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because “it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the
rejection of such proof than from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay
evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco
enumerated the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding
pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.”
FACTS:
Private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied
her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for
compulsory recognition.
Respondent Teopista alleged that she was born on Aug. 20, 1930 to Brigida Toring, who was then single,
and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at the time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such according her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages
and attorney’s fees. Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro.
She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she
married, Casimiro bought a passenger truck which was later on sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the
sale to her and her husband. Casimiro also gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente
Toring. Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor of PCI Bank.
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista namely, Gaudencio Mendoza, the cousin of Casimiro, and Isaac
Mendoza, the nephew of Casimiro.
Gaudencio testified that knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in the saltbed in Opao
and Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart knew of her pregnancy, giving birth to Teopista.
Casimiro also gave him P 5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his father Hipolito, Casimiro’s brother, and his grandmother Brigida Mendoza, so
informed him. He worked on Casimiro’s boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also
give him various amounts to be delivered to Teopista and that Casimiro likewise gave certain properties to
Teopista.
The RTC rejected the plaintiff’s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the
alleged father. On appeal, the respondent court disagreed and concluded that appellant had sufficiently
proven her continuous possession of such status.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza. What are the
requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted
in evidence.
HELD:
Yes. We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective conclusions,
focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of
an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had
apparently based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the
Civil Code.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to
comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous
possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of
Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been because
defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into
his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In
fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his
wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of
Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of
defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not
been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on,"
not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath
she said that her mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting
her.
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another
method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this
matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record
straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he
did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's
illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is
the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such
proof than from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are
certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following
requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted
in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the
pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were
both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the
paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose
between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been
established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate
of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this
case, Teopista has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be
recognized as such.
Petition is Denied.
SHORT DIGEST:
X claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Y. X claimed to be the daughter of her mother, Z, single then
and her alleged father Y, who was married to another. 2 witnesses testified for X namely, G and I. G was
the cousin of Y and I was the nephew of Y. G and I testified that they knew about X’ s mother, Z, and that
the latter gave birth to X. However, the testimony of I showed that only his father, the brother of Y, and
his grandmother informed him about the relationship of X and Y.
Issue: May such acts or declarations be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule?
Ruling: Yes. Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the
rejection of such proof than from its admission. The following requisites have to be complied with before
the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the
pedigree of X, namely, the mother of Y and his brother were both dead at the time of I's testimony. The
declarations referred to the filiation of X and the paternity of Y, which were the very issues involved in
the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by
X or before the controversy arose between her and Y. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and
Y has been established by evidence other than such declaration.

90. Jison v CA XXX
91. Solinap v Locsin
91. Solinap v Locsin
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the
Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry
General prevails.
Facts:
After Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for Letters
of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He
alleged, among others, that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin.
Petitioners filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be
appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit
"D")of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of
the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is
Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his
signatures.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a
certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro
Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.
After hearing, the trial court, finds that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph
(Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial.
Issue:
Which of the two documents — Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
Ruling:
A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8",
as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records
of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious
document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the
signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.
In Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals the Supreme Court held that "a birth certificate not signed by the
alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "
(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the
two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D"
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry
General.
92. Tecson v Comelec XXX

93. Gravador v Mamigo XXX
94. People v Villanueva

94. People v. Filomeno Villanueva
Topic: how to prove pedigree
Facts:
• BBB, the victim, is the appellant’s daughter. She was born on January 23, 1983;
• Around February 1998, her father went into her room and forcefully had sexual intercourse
with her
• She did not tell her mother about it as she was threatened that he would kill the rest of the
family if she reports the incident
• BBB got pregnant and it was then that she told her mother about what happened in
February
• Accused interposed the defense of denial and alibi
• RTC sentenced the accused to death by lethal injection; CA affirmed
• Appellant’s contention, he did not question the conviction, only the penalty imposed:
qualifying circumstance of minority was not sufficiently proven because only a mere
photocopy of the birth certificate was presented and not certified as a true copy thereof
Issue:

WON the pedigree or minority of the victim was sufficiently proven not withstanding that the
evidence used was a mere photocopy of the birth certificate?
Ruling: YES
• Pp v. Pruna: Guidelines in appreciating the age of the victim:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: TSHEIc
(a.a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
(a.b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
(a.c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4.  document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age,
the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused.
• In the case at bar, during the testimony of the victim, appellant’s counsel reiterated that she was 15
years old when the incident happened; as to the presentation of a mere photocopy of the
certificate of live birth, the SC ruled: A certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of
the local civil registrar who is a public officer. As such, the presentation of the photocopy of the
birth certificate of the victim is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents.
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the
opponent does not dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
95. People v Flores

TOPIC: Pedigree (Rape; penalty when committed in the presence of parents)
Doctrine:
1. The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: (3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity. This Court has found
the testimonies of both AAA and BBB to be candid, frank, and genuine. Despite the fact that both
daughter and mother did not know how to read nor write, they were able to narrate to the court their
harrowing experience with the utmost openness, candor, and sincerity.
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged
to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the
victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
SHORT DIGEST:
Facts: F raped AAA in the presence of BBB, victim’s mother. BBB was not able to do anything since F
had a bladed weapon on her neck. Prosecution failed to prove AAA’s minority and BBB gave
contradictory statements of her daughter’s true age. However, the information stated the qualifying
circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of BBB. AAA and BBB testified on what
happened on that fateful day. F was sentence to death. CA affirmed in toto, however sentence him
Reclusion Perpetua pursuant to RA 9346.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in affirming RTC’s decision despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
AAA’s minority?
RULING: Yes
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: (3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, Flores still cannot escape the penalty of death
since the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of AAAs mother was also
alleged in the Information. This Court has found the testimonies of both AAA and BBB to be candid,
frank, and genuine. Despite the fact that both daughter and mother did not know how to read nor write,
they were able to narrate to the court their harrowing experience with the utmost openness, candor, and
sincerity
LONG DIGEST
Facts: A case a filed against Flores for raping AAA, a minor, 13 years old at the time of the commission
of the offense. The crime of rape was committed with qualifying circumstances of victim being under 18
years of age, the accused was her stepfather, and that the rape was committed in full view of the victim’s
mother, BBB.
When the prosecution presented BBB, she testified that AAA was 13 years old. On that fateful day, she
was awakened by the pinch of her daughter. BBB was shocked to see Flores on top of her daughter, who
was shouting aray aray nanay aray. She felt angry but could not do anything because Flores has a bladed
weapon on her neck and had to endure the horrifying episode for the next 30 minutes.
The third witness for the prosecution was the victim herself, AAA. She identified him in open court and
said that she filed this case against him because he raped her. She testified that on the night she was raped.
Flores, for himself, denied raping AAA. He claimed that BBB was his mother-in-law and alleged that he
and AAA had been sweethearts. He averred that AAA was already 19 years old at the time of the incident
and even produced a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar.
RTC found Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Qualified Rape and imposed upon him
DEATH penalty.
In the CA, The Court of Appeals agreed with Flores that AAA was indeed already 18 years old when she
was raped. However, CA still affirmed in toto RTC’s ruling. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, in lieu of death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in affirming RTC’s decision despite failure of
the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of minority?
RULING: YES.CA correct in imposing Reclusion Perpetua upon Flores.

The Supreme Court agreed with Flores that AAA’s age was not proven since minority as a qualifying
circumstance it must not only be alleged in the information but also established with moral certainty.
In People vs. Pruna SC has set out the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or
4. date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall
be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
5. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
6. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
7. In the case at bar, not only did the prosecution fail to present AAAs birth certificate, but BBB, the
victim’s mother herself, gave contradictory statements on the true age of her daughter. However,
as the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, Flores still cannot escape the penalty of death since the
qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of AAAs mother was also
alleged in the Information.
8. The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: (3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse,
parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity. This
Court has found the testimonies of both AAA and BBB to be candid, frank, and genuine. Despite
the fact that both daughter and mother did not know how to read nor write, they were able to
narrate to the court their harrowing experience with the utmost openness, candor, and sincerity
COMMON REPUTATION
96. In re Mallare
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE
LONG DIGEST
Principle:
Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question
of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may
proceed from persons who are not members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the public
interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
Facts:
On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo, the Court ordered the
investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on
March 5, 1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of
persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a decision was rendered by
the Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent
Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a
Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent was declared excluded
from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to the Court,
the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision but was denied. He petitioned for the reopening of
the case and for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which could
alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an
entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting
to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2)
testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
The Court Resolved to set aside the decision of April 29, 1968 and to grant the re-opening and new trial
prayed for, which shall take place before the Court's Investigating Officer on the days specified by him
upon notice to respondent Mallare, the Commissioner of Immigration and the Solicitor General, wherein
said parties may adduce all proper additional evidence that they may desire to present. The proofs taken at
the original investigation shall not be retaken, but considered as part of the evidence in the new trial.
Thereafter, the Court Investigator shall submit his report on this Tribunal. Accordingly, the parties
submitted their respective additional evidences before the Court's investigator.
Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of the court is premised upon three basic arguments, to wit:
(a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino
citizen; (b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine
citizenship; and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and
right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this Court,
the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency
of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who
had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such
declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation
has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether
a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed
from persons who are not members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the public interest that
is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community where relationships not
in conformity with established contentions become the subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus,
the public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would
constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Esteban were really born out of legal union, it
is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of
adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was
purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that
alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and,
therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value.
The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-
ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it must be realized
that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog
would normally detect if a person hails from the same region even from the way the latter speaks.
Considering that the witnesses testified having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their
declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibility.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act
would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S.
vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs.
Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It
has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928 (Exh. "K-9"), and
that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections
and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular
proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party
by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
It is true that in the death certificate of Esteban Mallare (Exh. "C"), he was referred to as a Chinese
national, and in the birth certificates of respondent and his brothers and sister (Exhs. "D", "E", "F" and
"G"), they were declared to be of Chinese nationality. Respondent likewise appeared to have applied for
alien registration on August 25, 1950 (Exh. "N"). While said documents are public and the entries therein
are, consequently, presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to
more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
Artemio Mallare, Esteban's eldest son and who supposedly supplied the data appearing in Exhibit "C",
denied having any hand in the funeral arrangements and the preparation of the said death certification of
his father. He declared that he was merely 16 years old when his father met his death in an accident in
1945, and he came to know of it only when he was brought to the funeral parlor on the following day. The
entries in the birth certificates (Exhs. "D", "E", and "G"), on the other hand, appeared to have been
prepared upon information given by the nurse or midwife who attended to respondent's mother during her
deliveries and who would have no knowledge of the actual fact of the place of birth and the citizenship of
Esteban, the father; and in the case of respondent Florencio Mallare, the informant was neither his father
or mother; it was Maria Arana a "hilot". In the case of the birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare (Exh.
"F"), the informant appeared to be Esteban Mallare himself. It is noted, however, that no proof has been
presented to show that it was Esteban Mallare who personally gave the information that the child's and
parents' nationality is Chinese. And any error on his part can not affect respondent Florencio Mallare.
With respect to the registration of respondent as a citizen of China in 1950 (Exh. "N"), it was explained
that this was secured by respondent's mother, on the belief that upon the death of her husband, Esteban
Mallare, she and her children reverted to Chinese citizenship. At any rate, even assuming that said
documents were prepared with actual knowledge and consent by respondent or by his parents, on the
erroneous belief that Esteban was a non-Filipino, such acts would not cause the loss or forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship which Esteban acquired from his Filipino mother.
Complainant places much emphasis on the convicting testimonies of the expert witnesses on the entry in
the baptismal registry of the Immaculate Concepcion church. The discrepancy in the testimonies of said
witnesses, however, loses significance in the face of the finding, based on other evidence that Esteban
Mallare is the natural child of Ana Mallare, born to her in 1903 at Macalelon, Quezon.
QUICK DIGEST
FACTS:
Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962. A complaint was filed by the
then Acting Immigration Commissioner, the purpose of which is to determine whether Mallare should be
stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines. Consequently, Mallare, was
considered as a Chinese national. He was declared excluded from the practice of law and his admission to
the bar was revoked. He movedfor reconsideration of the decision but was denied by the Court. He then
petitioned that the case be opened for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which
would alter the decision previously promulgated by the Court. The evidence consisted of an entry in the
registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church purporting to show Esteban Mallare, the
petitioner's father, to be the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipina; and testimonies of certain persons who
had known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime. The Court resolved to set aside its
previous decision and granted the new trial prayed for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and
right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The Court found sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its previous decision, and a
definite declaration that Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right
to continue the practice of law.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency
of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who
had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such
declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation
has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a
child was born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from
persons who are not members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is
taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community where relationships not
in conformity with established contentions become the subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus,
the public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would
constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union,
it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of
adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was
purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that
alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and,
therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value.
The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-
ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it must be realized
that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog
would normally detect if a person hails from the same region even from the way the latter speaks.
Considering that the witnesses testified having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their
declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibility.
RES GESTAE
97. Air France v Carrascoso XXX
98. Aballe v People XXX
99. People v Reyes
#99 Res Gestae
Pp vs. Reyes et al
Principle:
A conversation overheard only, although hearsay, is admissible as an admission and as part of the res
gestae.
Facts:
On the night of April 19, 1946, while attending a pabasa (reading of life story of Christ) in barrio
Cacutud, Arayat, Pampanga, three Military Police, — Benjamin Neri, Alfredo Laguitan and Francisco
Orsino, — were taken by four armed individuals (members of Hukbalahap), brought to the road leading to
Cabiao and there shot by them. As a result Neri and Laguitan died. Orsino recovered from his wounds.
Six witnesses testified for the prosecution.
The question in this appeal is whether or not appellants Vicente Gatchalian and Maximino Austria alias
Severino Austria participated in the crime.
Whether or not Reyes' testimony formed part of the res gestae.
Ruling:
Yes.
Pedro Reyes turned state evidence, but he did not confirm every statement he had previously made at the
fiscal's investigation. He testified, however, that at about seven o'clock that night he saw, among the
people gathered at the "pabasa", "Pipit" (Marcelo Due) Piping, Gervasio Due alias Oliveros, Vicente
Gatchalian and Maximino Austria alias Big Boy; that Pipit and Piping (Felipe Sese) called him and told
him that Oliveros wanted to talked with him; that taking with Oliveros he was invited by the latter to
speak to the MP's (the members of the military police, Nery, Laguitan and Orsino); that he refused; that
thereafter he heard several detonations; that he ran to the rice field and there he met Oliveros (Gervasio
Due) and Gatchalian talking, the former declaring he was sure the MP he had shot will die and Gatchalian
making the same assurance as to the MP he (Gatchalian) had sot in turn. Reyes had previously told the
authorities in his affidavit Exhibit A, in addition to what he related court, that Oliveros, Magallanes and
Big Boy had approached the three MP's and lined them up on the road, after which shots were heard.
Enough, however, may be gathered from his testimony in open court to identify Gatchalian as one of the
assailants, the conversation he overhead in the rice field being admissible as an admission and as part of
the res gestae.
100. People v Dela Cruz

PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ
PRINCIPLE: RES GESTAE refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
the victim(s) or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement
FACTS: Fr. Garabato hired Abundo Tad-y and Mario Mascardo in the construction of his house at
Sangandaan, Quezon City. On June 16, 1993, at around 2:40 oclock in the afternoon, the two workers
were unloading construction materials consisting of wood and sand from a Ford Fiera owned and driven
by Fr. Garabato.
The Ford Fiera was parked in front of the house of the petitioner, SPO4 Pablo De La Cruz. While the two
workers were unloading the materials from the Ford Fiera, the petitioner who was standing at the garage
of his house confronted Fr. Garabato on the manner by which the Ford Fiera was parked which practically
blocked the petitioners drive way in such a way that petitioners owner-type jeep could not pass through.
Petitioner demanded from Fr. Garabato to move the Ford Fiera backward and angrily uttered, (P)utang ina
mo, you are still there! Lalabas na ako.
Fr. Garabato moved his Ford Fiera forward at a distance of about 15 meters towards Tandang Sora,
Avenue, leaving petitioners driveway open. Immediately thereafter, Fr. Garabato got off from the Ford
Fiera and helped his two workers unload the remaining materials.
Moments later, petitioner drove his jeep out from the garage of his house with his two kids on board at the
backseat. Petitioner accosted Fr. Garabato to move his Ford Fiera since petitioners jeep could not pass
through abreast together with the Ford Fiera (the road is more or less five (5) meters wide).
Fr. Garabato drove the Ford Fiera forward and parked further at the side of the road. By that time,
petitioners jeep could already pass through the road.
At that moment, the two workers were standing behind the Ford Fiera, and they heard successive shots of
gunfire. They instinctively turned their sights towards the origin of the gunshots; such that they saw
smoke coming from the side of petitioners jeep and saw petitioner seated in the drivers seat still holding
his gun pointing towards the Ford Fiera.
Petitioner alighted from his jeep, walked towards Fr. Garabatos position, re-loaded his gun with another
magazine and shot Fr. Garabato anew.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS ADJUDGED GUILTY ON THE BASIS OF
CLEARLY FABRICATED AND UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE?
RULING: NO.
Petitioner further puts in issue the admission by the trial court of the statement made by the bystanders
imputing the crime to petitioner as res gestae.SP03 Jesus Patriarca, a prosecution witness, testified that
when he conducted the investigation immediately after the incident occurred, he questioned those people
at the scene of the crime if they know who shot the victim. The response he got was: yun hong pulis na
nakatira sa tapat referring to petitioner. The trial court admitted this statement as part of res gestae. The
Court finds no reversible error in this as the trial court correctly reasoned that:
[A]lthough the people who gave this information were not presented on the witness stand, this Court still
resolved to admit and consider this spontaneous exclamation from the spectators competent as PART OF
RES GESTAE. Records of this case reveal that the incident was reported to SPO3 Patriarca at around
2:45 in the afternoon of June 16, 1993, while the latter was on duty, and immediately, they rushed to the
scene of the crime to investigate. It was at that instance that he gathered the aforesaid information.
RES GESTAE refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victim(s)
or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement (People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70). As borne by evidence on record, all the
elements of res gestae are sufficiently established, insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is
concerned:
a) the principal act (res gestae) the killing of Fr. Garabato in broad daylight is a startling occurrence;
b) the statements were made before the declarants had time to contrive or devise that is, within several
minutes after the victim was shot; and
c) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances the identity of the assailant is a material and vital information that concerns the
aforementioned startling occurrence.[22]
In any case, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if the declaration was not to be considered as res
gestae, the testimonies of Mascardo and Tad-y Benito positively identifying petitioner is sufficient to
establish the latters guilt.
101. People v Cariquez

People vs Cariquez
Res Gestae
Principle:
There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae. (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
LONG DIGEST:
Facts:
Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter AVA) and Leezel Franco y Samson (hereafter LEEZEL) are
accused of the crime of parricide and homicide, respectively for the death of Mariel Cariquez y Cruz
(hereafter ETHEL). Leezel is the live-in partner of Ava, but he is not the father of Ethel.
In an Information dated 30 May 1996, AVA and LEEZEL were initially charged with serious physical
injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. NO. 7610.3 [Otherwise known as "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."] However, on 31 May 1996 the
victim, Mariel Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter ETHEL) died. On 30 August 1996 the information was
amended to charge AVA and LEEZEL with the crime of parricide.
The trial court convicted AVA and LEEZEL on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Circumstancial
evidence is sufficient to convict provided the following requisites are present, namely: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [Section
5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.] The circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so
as to lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of the accused.
The following are the testimonies of witnesses which are considered by the Trial Court as circumstantial
evidence sufficient to convict the accused:
1. In 14 April 1996, prosecution principal witness, Lilia Gujol (the sister of Ava), saw Ethel shaven, with
many constusions on her face, black eyes, cigarette burns on her arms and neck, and several marks of
maltretament on her legs and both knees as well as traces of pinching all over her body. When asked who
caused her those injuries, the 2 year old girl pointed to her own mother, Ava, and her mother's live in
partner, Leezel Franco;
2. When Lilia next saw Ethel on 12 May 1996, Ethel had even graver injuries and was sickly. Again,
Ethel pointed to appellants Ava and Leezel as the ones who caused her the injuries.
3. Michelle Torrente, a resident of the unit adjacent to the townhouse unit occupied by Ava Cariquez,
Leezel Franco and Ethel Cariquez, testified that she used to hear Ethel crying between 1:00 to 2:00 in the
morning. She further testified that one day she saw Ethel with bruises and cigarettes burns and when
asked what happened to her, Ethel replied, "pinaso po ako;" Ethel pointed to her Papa Leezel as the one
who did it to her.
4. Theresa Castillo, another occupant of an adjacent unit, also testified that she often saw Ethel bruised
and crying and sometime in April, saw her head shaven. When she asked the "yaya" why Ethel's hair was
shaved, the "yaya" answered "parusa."
5. Dr. Jose Bienvenida, the doctor who attended to Ethel at the Cardinal Santos Memoraial Hospital,
opined that the injuries found on the head of Ethel were inflicted on different dates.
6. Dr. Bienvenida further testified that in the course of taking the medical history of the child, he
interviewed the mother, Ava Cariquez, who gave conflicting accounts as to how the child got injuries:
while the mother initially said that her daughter was mauled by her uncle (AVA's brother), she later
changed her story by claiming that the child fell from the stairs.
7. Dr. Vertido testified that the cause of death was traumatic Head Injury, Severe.
AVA and LEEZEL appealed to the SC from the decision.
In their Appellant's Brief, AVA and LEEZEL interpose this lone assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR CONVICTION.
In support thereof, they argue that the prosecution's principal witness Lilia Gojul, as well as the other
witnesses never saw how ETHEL sustained the injuries inflicted upon her; Lilia never testified that during
her stay in AVA's house the child was the object of their quarrel; the prosecution's evidence is purely
hearsay, conjectural and fails to show any conspiracy that they maltreated and caused ETHEL's death; her
death was purely accidental; only circumstantial evidence is on record against them and there was no evil
motive on their part to kill ETHEL.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence are hearsay.
Ruling:
No.
The declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they observed on ETHEL were not hearsay.
They saw her and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the answer of
ETHEL as to who inflicted the injuries may have been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL could not be
confronted on that, yet it was part of the res gestae and, therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule
pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae. (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.25 [People v. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 [1992]; People v. Taneo, 218
SCRA 494 [1993]; Anciro v. People, 228 SCRA 629 [1993].] In this case the startling occurrences were
the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them spontaneously pointed to AVA and
LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the infliction of the injuries and the disclosure, it
must however, be pointed out that there has been no uniformity as to the interval of time that should
separate the occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declarations. What is necessary is
that the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the incident on 27 May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and
LEEZEL. These acts are covered by and punished under R.A. No. 7610, under which they were originally
prosecuted. However, the then Information was amended to charge them with parricide under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence on the prior incidents cannot legally justify a conviction for the
physical injuries inflicted before 27 May 1996.
Short Digest/Bar Q:
X and Y are accused of parricide and homicide respectively for the death of the child A. The prosecution
presented testimonial evidence of witnesses who saw the bruises and other signs of physical maltreatment
of A inflicted by X and Y. The RTC convicted them for the crimes charged. They appealed to the SC
contending that the prosecutor’s evidence is purely hearsay.
Are the evidence hearsay?
102. People v Tampus

FACTS: The case is an automatic review of the death sentence of Tampus for the murder of Saminado, a
co-prisoner inside Bilibid. Tampus, member of Oxo gang killed the victim, a member of rival Batang
Mindanao gang, for revenge.
Tampus and Avila, co-prisoner, tubercular patients in the prison hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet
and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted eight incised wounds on
Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila
surrendered to a prison guard with their knives (Exh. B and D). They told the guard: "Surrender po kami,
sir. Gumanti lang po kami."
Vivencio Lahoz, the officer of the day investigated the incident right away and submitted a written report
on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired (Exh. J dated January 14, 1976).
Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and
obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado (Exh. A and
C).
The contention of the accused is that the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused under custodial investigation when Tampus was first investigated on the day of the
killing by Lahoz.
ISSUE: WON the confession is admissible

HELD: YES
Even before Lahoz investigated the killing, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming
out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom
they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous
statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a
voluntary confession of guilt.
103. People v Sace

People of the Philippines vs Tirso Sace y Montoya
Gr No. 178063
Principle: Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in this case. Appellant had just been
through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAAs death. His admission was made while he was still
under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a
story. In addition, he was still under the influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking
spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA.
Appellants spontaneous statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are
not covered by the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in
evidence against him.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision dated November 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02324 which affirmed the June 1, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94 convicting appellant Tirso Sace y Montoya of the crime of rape with
homicide.
On September 9, 1999, at around seven (7) oclock in the evening, AAA was inside their house with her
10-year-old brother BBB and a nephew, who was still a toddler, when appellant suddenly showed up. As
admitted by appellant, he came from a drinking spree that began at about eleven (11) oclock in the
morning. AAA told appellant to leave and go home, but he did not heed her. Appellant then made sexual
advances on AAA. AAA was able to evade appellant when he tried to embrace her, but appellant pulled a
bladed weapon from his pocket. Sensing danger, AAA ran upstairs to the second level of their house.
Appellant followed AAA, leaving BBB and the toddler in the first floor of the house. BBB heard
appellant ordering AAA to remove her clothes, otherwise, he will stab her. Scared with the turn of events,
the two (2) children hid at the lower portion of the house for around twenty (20) minutes, and came out
only when CCC, the mother of AAA and BBB, arrived.
CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a certain Abelardo Motol (Abelardo), was on her way
home when she and her companions heard AAA scream. They hurried towards the house and searched it
but found it to be empty. As they searched further, appellant came out from somewhere in the kitchen area
of the house. They noticed that he was bloodied and he told them that he was chasing someone. Appellant
then joined in the search for AAA. Before long, Abelardo found the lifeless body of AAA lying on the
ground nearby. AAA was half-naked and she appeared to have been ravished when they found her.
Immediately, Abelardo called the barangay officials and the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and other barangay officials and tanods, including
Rafael Motol and Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon arrival, they noticed the bloodstains on appellants
clothing. Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but appellant denied any knowledge of what happened.
Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA and again asked appellant why he did such a thing to
his cousin. At that point, appellant admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the one (1)
who committed the crime. He admitted that he raped and killed AAA. Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol also
obtained the same confession from appellant when he interviewed him infront of other people, namely,
Abelardo, Carmelita, and Bonifacio Vitto, as well as Arnaldo Mawac, Conchita and Iboy Serdea,
and Salvador and Julieta Motol. Appellant was then photographed by the police and Maribeth, who at that
time had a camera on hand.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and killing of AAA. The CA upheld
the lower court’s decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
RULING: Supreme Court said yes. Why?
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. While it is
established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting
standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct
evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in
the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious
felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
In the case at bar, as found by the RTC, the following chain of events was established by prosecutions
evidence: (a) a drunken appellant came to AAAs house; (b) appellant tried to embrace AAA but when the
latter resisted and ran away, he chased her with a knife; (c) when appellant caught up with AAA at the
upper portion of the house, he was heard uttering the words Pag hindi daw po naghubad ay asaksakin; (d)
appellant was hiding when CCC and her companion searched the house for AAA, then he suddenly
appeared from his hiding place with bloodied apparels; (e) when asked by CCC, appellant denied any
knowledge of the whereabouts of AAA and what happened to her; and (f) appellant voluntarily confessed
to having committed the rape with homicide infront of many witnesses then he submitted himself to
police custody.
Also, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime to the
prosecutions witnesses. According to their testimonies, appellant admitted having raped and killed AAA.
Their testimonies were not rebutted by the defense. Appellants statements infront of the prosecution
witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a
declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All these requisites are present in this case. Appellant had just been through a startling
and gruesome occurrence, AAAs death. His admission was made while he was still under the influence
of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he
was still under the influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00
p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellants
spontaneous statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not
covered by the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in
evidence against him.
104. People v Lauga

PEOPLE VS LAUGA
Principle:
• The specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights.
• Inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or
rehearsed
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with QUALIFIED RAPE of his 13-yr. old daughter.
During the pre-trial conference: parties stipulates the ff: During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical
certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the
alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. [5] On trial, three (3)
witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; [6] her brother BBB; [7] and one Moises
Boy Banting, [8] a bantay bayan in the barangay.
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.[9] AAAs father, the appellant, was
having a drinking spree at the neighbors place.[10] Her mother decided to leave because when appellant
gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.[11] Her only brother BBB also went out in the
company of some neighbors.[12]
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;[13] removed his pants, slid inside the
blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;[14] warned her not to shout for help while
threatening her with his fist;[15] and told her that he had a knife placed above her head.[16] He proceeded
to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside her vagina.[17]
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.[18] Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out
late.[19] BBB decided to take AAA with him.[20] While on their way to their maternal grandmothers
house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.[21] Upon reaching their grandmothers
house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,[22] after which, they sought the assistance
of Moises Boy Banting.[23]
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.[24] He invited appellant to
the police station,[25] to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped
AAA because he was unable to control himself.[26]
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.[27] Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula,
Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody
discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident[28]
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision[41] in Criminal
Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.
the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS[44] by the Court of Appeals.
Appellant’s contention:
(1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;[51] (2) his extrajudicial
confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his
constitutional right;[52] and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.
ISSUE:
1. WON the confession with a bantay bayan is admissible.

2. WON witnesses are credible.
RULING:
1. NO. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the occasion to mention the nature
of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose
of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.[60]
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11
November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve
as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.[61] The
composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay
Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch
Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.[62]
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence showing
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. YES. Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA
testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
relatives, proceeded to look for a bantay bayan. On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her
sister to the house of their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help
of a bantay bayan. Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this
Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs testimony
that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect
the veracity of the testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential
circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies
have been coached or rehearsed.[67]
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is
likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor
complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.[68] As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent
a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring
their fathers into the gallows of death.[69] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable
for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a
public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact
committed.[70] No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired
her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting
gratefulness.[71] Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity
for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the most of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame.[72] It is highly
improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to
fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since
her accusing words were directed against a close relative.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape,
Short Digest:
X was charged with QUALIFIED RAPE of her 13-yr. old daughter.
X questioned the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession before the bantay-bayan since he was
not assisted with counsel. He further objected to the credibility of the witnesses, AAA and BBB
because their testimonies were inconsistent.
ISSUE: 1. WON extrajudicial confession is admissible

2. WON the witnesses are credible
RULING:
1. NO. This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
2. YES. Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought
the help of a bantay bayan. Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,
which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect
the veracity of the testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential
circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies
have been coached or rehearsed.[67]
105. People v Tulagan

Principle (res gestae):
Not every statement made on the occasion of a startling occurrence is admissible as part of the res gestae;
only such are admissible as appear to have been involuntarily and spontaneously wrung from an observer
by the shock or impact of the occurrence such that, as has aptly been said, it is the event speaking through
the witness, not the witness speaking of the event.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FREDDIE TULAGAN alias "Eding", VALENTIN DE GUZMAN alias "Satsoy", alias "Vicente",
RAMON MENDOZA, and ROMEO "Romie" MENDOZA, accused, ROMEO "Romie"
MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On the night of May 19, 1979, one Marlon Catungal died a violent death, due to stab wound in the chest.
The deceased was killed while attempting to flee from at least two men, identified as Freddie (or Eding)
Tulagan and Valentin "Satsoy" de Guzman. Later, Ramon Mendoza and Romeo Mendoza were included
as additional accused.
The trial court imposed on the accused the penalty of death on the strength of the following evidence:
The testimony of Bonifacio Ulanday, who testify that he saw the accused chasing the victim with a
“balisong” but he did not saw who among the assailant stab the victim as they went inside a house yard.
The testimony Natalia Macaraeg (with whom Vicente de Guzman spoke to an hour or so after the
killing) — it was Vicente de Guzman who supposedly volunteered to give information, without initially
having to be asked by Natalia. ( the conversation is herein reproduced for your guidance):
Q What happened when these three persons you mentioned arrived in your store for the second time
naked waist up?
A Vicente de Guzman, alias Satsoy, told me that they ran after my neighbor Marlon.
Q What else if any?
A Then I asked them, what did you do to him? Then they told me — they ran after my neighbor who is
working with the PNR.
Q What did they answer you?
A Vicente de Guzman told me that — we killed him.
The trial court ruled that:

the statement made by accused Vicente de Guzman alias Satsoy ... is admissible against accused Romeo
Mendoza as part of the res gestae. Section 36, Rule 130 provides that statements made by a person while
a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae (Revised Rules of Court).
Besides, the statement of Valentin de Guzman alias Vicente de Guzman ...partakes of an oral
confession or part of the res gestae. The testimony of Natalia Macaraeg on his point is competent
evidence.
(The case is now before the Supreme Court on automatic review)
Issue:
WoN the statement (confession) made by an accused an hour after the killing (incriminating his co-
accused) is admissible as part of res gestae?
Ruling:
No.
That statement is not admissible as part of the res gestae; and considered as an oral confession, it is
admissible only against Valentin de Guzman, not against any other person.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the statement attributed to Valentin de Guzman was made by him
"immediately subsequent" to the startling occurrence which the Trial Court obviously had in mind: the
slaying of Marion Catungal.
On the contrary, if account be taken of the claim of another prosecution witness, Bonifacio Ulanday, that
17
he had followed the four persons pursuing the deceased for "almost one hour" , it would most certainly
have taken Valentin de Guzman and his companions that length of time to return from the crime scene to
where the chase had started, or to Natalia's store. Natalia herself testified that the three (3) accused
18
returned to her store at "about 10:30 PM," or after "more or less 1 1/2 hours."
More importantly, not every statement made on the occasion of a startling occurrence is admissible as part
of the res gestae; only such are admissible as appear to have been involuntarily and spontaneously wrung
from an observer by the shock or impact of the occurrence such that, as has aptly been said, it is the event
19
speaking through the witness, not the witness speaking of the event.
The startling occurrence must produce so powerful an effect or influence on the observer as to extract
from his lips some description of the event practically without being conscious of his utterance.
There is no indication in the record that Valentin de Guzman was so affected when he made the statement
in question under the circumstances related by Natalia Macaraeg. Indeed, it may reasonably be inferred
from Natalia's testimony that he was in nowise agitated, stunned or shocked but was, on the contrary,
calm, imposed, in full possession of his faculties and fully aware of what he was doing and saying. His
statement regarding the killing of Marlon Catungal is not admissible as part of the res gestae,contrary to
the view of the court a quo.
106. DBP Pool v Radio Mindanao Network

PRINCIPLE :
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the
declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant
complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3)
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
FACTS:
The assailed decision originated from Civil Case No. 90-602 filed by Radio Mindanao Network, Inc.
(respondent) against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies (petitioner) and Provident Insurance
Corporation (Provident) for recovery of insurance benefits. Respondent owns several broadcasting
stations all over the country. Provident covered respondents transmitter equipment and generating set for
the amount of P13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No. 30354, while petitioner covered
respondents transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter facilities for the amount of P5,883,650.00
under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-66860.
In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondents radio station located in SSS Building, Bacolod City, was
razed by fire causing damage in the amount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent sought recovery under the two
insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk
excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit:
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly
or indirectly, of any of the following consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or
not), civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power.
[3]
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied the claims.
Hence, respondent was constrained to file Civil Case No. 90-602 against petitioner and Provident.
The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if the fire was due to the intentional act
committed by the members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), are the testimony [sic] of witnesses Lt. Col.
Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who were admittedly not present when the fire occurred.
Their testimony [sic] was [sic] limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted and in the course of
the investigation they were informed by bystanders that heavily armed men entered the transmitter house,
poured gasoline in (sic) it and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting Mabuhay ang NPA (TSN,
p. 12., August 2, 1995). The persons whom they investigated and actually saw the burning of the station
were not presented as witnesses. The documentary evidence particularly Exhibits 5 and 5-C do not
satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were members of the NPA. Exhibit 5-B which is a letter
released by the NPA merely mentions some dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the media
in Bacolod. There was no mention there of any threat on media facilities.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, rendered a decision in favor of
respondent.
Hence, herein petition by DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies.
ISSUE:
WON the statements of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae.
RULING:
The court ruled on the NEGATIVE.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those
facts which are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and
may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not
given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-
examination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the
declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant
complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3)
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may concede that
these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however,
that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders statements while
they were making their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these
statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk
to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual
experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be
ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk
is not remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were made may be
considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their investigation, and are
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.
DISMISSED.

107. Borromeo v CA
BORROMEO VS CA
PRINCIPLE:
Res Gestae
A witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more
credible just because he support his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even
if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is
priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of
the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to
conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature.
FACTS:
Borromeo was the administrator of the property of deceased Rallos. Crispina was the daughter of Rallos.
Aznar was the alleged “buyer”.
Borromeo wants to claim the land in question. Aznar insist that the contract was a contract of absolute
sale. Meanwhile Borromeo claims that it was only equitable mortgage.
One of the evidence presented was the notes/ memorandum of Crispina.
According to the testimony of Crispina, who claimed to have been present when the transactions took
place, her deceased father merely borrowed money from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00
and P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to the latter the properties described in
Exhibits A, B and C. She testified that the transactions were disguised as absolute sales and Rallos was
assured by Matias Aznar that he could exercise the right to repurchase the lots and would deliver to him
the corresponding options in writing.
The appellant urges that Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara,
were her notations allegedly representing the deductions made by Matias Aznar for advance interest,
attorney's fees and miscellanous expenses are corroborative of her testimony that the transactions in
controversy were really loans with mortgages. We, likewise, find the said exhibits weak and unsatisfactor
as evidence of the facts asserted. They are clearly self-serving, as they were admittedly prepared by the
declarant herself (2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 690; 2 Jones on Evidence, 2d., Ed., Sec. 895),
who was a daughter of the deceased Rallos and who cannot, therefore, be said to be disinterested witness.
With respect to Exhibit J, the option to repurchae Lots Nos. 462 and 7032, also relied upon by the
appellant as allegedly corroborative of the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara that all the transactions
in question were loans secured by mortgages, it is to be noted that said exhibit his to do with the two lots
mentioned therein and none other. Certainly, it is no proof that Rallos was similarly given a written option
to redeem any of the lots covered by Exhibits B and C, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara,
was taken back by Matias Aznar but never renewed. The evidence shows that the period fixed in Exhibit J
expired without the lots involved being redeemed.
To show, too, that Matias Aznar had agreed to the repurchase of the lots in question by Rallos, the
plaintiff presented at the trial of the case Exhibit L, which appears to be a copy of a draft of deed of
absolute sale. This exhibit deserves but the scantest consideration, it being undated, unsigned and
unsubscribed by any purported party thereto. Besides, even granting arguendo that the same was prepared
by a lawyer of the Aznars, as alleged by Crispina Rallos Alcantara, we fail to see its materiality to the
resolution of the main issue involved in this case of whether or not reformation is proper or justified, as
the draft appears to have been drawn in favor of Crispina RalloE Alcantara who was not a party to the
instruments sought to be reformed, and there is nothing in said exhibit to indicate that the contested
transactions were really loans secure by mortgages.
RTC did not admit the evidence since according to them it was a self-serving statement. Moreover, RTC
did not admit the disputed notes as part of res gestae. Their reason:
Statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main ion as to form a part of it,
and which illustrate, elucidate qualify, or the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae. Accordingly, the
attendant circumstances and the statements then made by the pudes are admissible as part of the res
gestae to show the execution of a contract, and, where relevant, matters said and done which are parts of
the res gestae of the negotiation and execution of a contract are admissible to show the existence and
nature of the contract and the relation of the parties. Matters attendant upon a sale or conveyance may
also be admissible m part of the res gestae.
Coversations occurring during the negotiation of a loan or other transaction, as well as the instrument
given or received, being part of the res gestae, are competent evidence to show the Page 343 nature of the
transaction and the parties for whose benefit it was made, where that fact is material
... The character of the transaction is precisely what the intention of the parties at the time made it. It will
therefore be discovered that the testimony of those who were present at the time the instrument was made,
and especially of those who participated in the transaction, becomes most important.
Thus, while the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara may nor, be free from bias, she being the daughter
of the deceased, Simeon Rallos, the same should not, however, be totally rejected on the ground of bias
alone (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil. 124; People vs. Pagaduan 37 Phil. 90), considering that it appears to be
clearly and sufficiently supported by memoranda which, as already stated, are admissible in evidence as
part of the res gestae
The CA reversed the ruling of RTC and admitted the evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the disputed notes and memoranda can be considered in any sense as part of the res gestae.
SC RULING:
No.
We cannot see how the disputed notes and memoranda can be considered in any sense as part of the res
gestae as this matter is known in the law of evidence. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that
Crispina was not a party to the transaction in question. Only Simeon Rallos, on the one hand, and Matias
Aznar, if she is to be believed, or Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, as the documents show, on the other, were
the parties thereto. The record does not reveal why Crispina was with her father and the time, hence, there
can be no basis for holding that she actually took part in the transaction. That she allegedly took notes
thereof while there present made her at best only a witness not a party. It cannot be said, therefore, that
her taking down of her alleged notes, absent any showing that she was requested or directed by the parties
to do so or that the parties, more particularly the Aznars, who are being sought to be bound by then, knew
what she was doing, constitute part of the transaction, the res gestae itself. If such alleged taking of notes
by Crispina has to be given any legal significance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one
circumstance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one circumstance relevant to the main fact in
dispute. In other words it could at the most be only circumstantial evidence.
The trouble however is that the admission of said notes and memoranda suffers from a fatal defect. No
witness other than Crispina has testified as to the veracity of her testimony relative to her alleged notes
and memoranda. Not even her husband who, according to her, was present on one of the occasions in
issue, was called to testify. It cannot be denied that Crispina is interested in the outcome of this case. In
the words of the Court of Appeals itself in its original decision, "her testimony cannot be considered as
absolutely unbiased or impartial", hence, "unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the
instruments in question." Such being the case, how can the notes and memoranda in dispute add any
weight to her testimony, when she herself created them? Surely, they cannot have anymore credibility
than her own declarations given under oath in open court.
The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties relative to the issue of whether or not self-serving
statements may be admitted in evidence as parts of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but
We fee they are rather very interesting and illuminating, but We feel they are rather off tangent. The notes
supposedly prepared by witness Alcantara during the transaction between her father and the Aznars do
not partake at all of the nature of hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda contemplated
in Section 10 or Rule 132 which provides:
SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred,
or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that
the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read
it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
The court ruled that it was indeed an absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage.
108. People v Espinoza ?????

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Contents

77. People v Molo XXX

79. People v Basay XXX

FACTS: (long digest)

81. Zarate v Gingoog XXX

DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST ​

83. People v Toledo

85. People v Bernal XXX ​

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

87. Phil Free Press v CA

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

92. Tecson v Comelec XXX ​

94. People v Villanueva

Topic: how to prove pedigree

95. People v Flores

RULING: YES.CA correct in imposing Reclusion Perpetua upon Flores.

100. People v Dela Cruz

101. People v Cariquez

Are the evidence hearsay?

102. People v Tampus ​

ISSUE: WON the confession is admissible

103. People v Sace ​

RULING: Supreme Court said yes. Why?

104. People v Lauga

1. WON the confession with a bantay bayan is admissible.

ISSUE: 1. WON extrajudicial confession is admissible

105. People v Tulagan

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The trial court ruled that:

106. DBP Pool v Radio Mindanao Network

Hence, herein petition by DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies.

The CA reversed the ruling of RTC and admitted the evidence.

108. People v Espinoza ????? ​

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DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

85. People v Bernal XXX

92. Tecson v Comelec XXX

102. People v Tampus

103. People v Sace

108. People v Espinoza ?????