People vs Tarapen GR 173824 August 28, 2004

• A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause

or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to
suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To
warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it
must be clearly shown that, independently of the
relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or
defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the
witness to incriminate the accused falsely.
• The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is not
applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or
cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both
parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege
• Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a witness may
be believed in part and disbelieved in another, depending
on the corroborative evidence or the probabilities and
improbabilities of the case. Where a part of the testimony
of a witness runs counter to the medical evidence
submitted, it is within the sound discretion of the court to
determine which portions of the testimony to reject as false
and which to consider worthy of belief

Borje vs Sandiganbayam GR No. L-55436 November 25,

1983\
• The rule is established that the absence of evidence as to an
improper motive actuating the offended party and the
principal prosecution witness tends to sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive existed and that
their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. (People
vs. Amiscua 37 SCRA 813; People vs. Mercado, 38 SCRA
168; People vs. Valdemoro, 102 SCRA 170). Conversely,
where there is showing as to improper motives, as in the
case at bar, the testimony of complainant Ducusin is
unworthy of faith and credit and, therefore, deserves scant
consideration. And since the prosecution theory is built or
based on such testimony, the cause of the prosecution
collapses or falls with it.

Capili vs Cardana GR No. 157906 November 25, 1983\

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2)
the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
 accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
14
injured.
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the
mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’
daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.
15
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control
or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendant’s want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is
presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents
made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference

Enrico Santos vs National Statistics Office GR No. 171129

April 26, 2011
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a
qualification. It does not apply if the landlord’s title has
expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been
defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the
commencement of lessor-lessee relationship [VII
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines
87 (1973)]. In other words, if there was a change in the
nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of
the lease, then the presumption does not apply. Otherwise,
if the nature of the landlord’s title remains as it was during
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant,
then estoppel lies against the tenant.
Marquez vs Fernandez AM No. P-07-2358 October 19, 2010
The facts and evidence, coupled with respondent’s
admission, sufficiently established her culpability.
Century Savings Bank vs. Samonte GR No, 176212 October
20, 2010
The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as
against the tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, [t]he tenant is not permitted
to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. The juridical relationship between petitioner
as lessor and respondents as lessees carries with it a
recognition of the lessors title. As lessees, then respondents
 are estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a
better title not only in themselves, but also in some third
person while they remain in possession of the leased
premises and until they surrender possession to the
landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had
no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was
created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor,
but also by those who succeed to his title
CIR vs Metro Star GR No 185371 December 8, 2010
Jurisprudence has consistently shown that this Court
accords the findings of fact by the CTA with the
highest respect. In Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 122605, 30 April 2001, 357 SCRA
441, 445-446], this Court recognizes that the Court of
Tax Appeals, which by the very nature of its function
is dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax
problems, has necessarily developed an expertise on
the subject, and its conclusions will not be overturned
unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise
of authority. Such findings can only be disturbed on
appeal if they are not supported by substantial
evidence or there is a showing of gross error or abuse
on the part of the Tax Court. In the absence of any
clear and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court
must presume that the CTA rendered a decision which
is valid in every respect.

On the matter of service of a tax assessment, a further

perusal of our ruling in Barcelon is instructive, viz
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if
the taxpayer denies ever having received an
assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the
latter to prove by competent evidence that such
notice was indeed received by the addressee. The
onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove
by contrary evidence that the Petitioner received
the assessment in the due course of mail. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that while a
mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in
the course of mail, this is merely a disputable
presumption subject to controversion and a direct
denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by
the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was
indeed received by the addressee (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 351). Thus as held by the
Supreme Court in Gonzalo P. Nava vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 104, January 30, 1965:
 "The facts to be proved to raise this
presumption are (a) that the letter was
properly addressed with postage prepaid,
and (b) that it was mailed. Once these facts
are proved, the presumption is that the letter
was received by the addressee as soon as it
could have been transmitted to him in the
ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the
said facts fails to appear, the presumption
does not lie. (VI, Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 ed, 56-57 citing
Enriquez vs. Sunlife Assurance of Canada,
41 Phil 269)."

x x x. What is essential to prove the fact of

mailing is the registry receipt issued by the Bureau
of Posts or the Registry return card which would
have been signed by the Petitioner or its authorized
representative. And if said documents cannot be
located, Respondent at the very least, should have
submitted to the Court a certification issued by the
Bureau of Posts and any other pertinent document
which is executed with the intervention of the
Bureau of Posts. This Court does not put much
credence to the self serving documentations made by
the BIR personnel especially if they are unsupported
by substantial evidence establishing the fact of
mailing. Thus:

"While we have held that an

assessment is made when sent within the
prescribed period, even if received by the
taxpayer after its expiration (Coll. of Int.
Rev. vs. Bautista, L-12250 and L-12259,
May 27, 1959), this ruling makes it the more
imperative that the release, mailing or
sending of the notice be clearly and
satisfactorily proved. Mere notations made
without the taxpayers intervention, notice or
control, without adequate supporting
evidence cannot suffice; otherwise, the
taxpayer would be at the mercy of the
revenue offices, without adequate protection
or defense." (Nava vs. CIR, 13 SCRA 104,
January 30, 1965).
 x x x.

The failure of the respondent to prove receipt of

the assessment by the Petitioner leads to the
conclusion that no assessment was issued.
Consequently, the governments right to issue an
assessment for the said period has already prescribed.
(Industrial Textile Manufacturing Co. of the Phils.,
Inc. vs. CIR CTA Case 4885, August 22, 1996).

Alferez vs People GR No. 183201 January 31, 2011

Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove

notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P.
Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice.
Moreover, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same
was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of
the addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible
that petitioner or his authorized agent did receive the
demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The consistent rule is that penal
statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient
proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the
presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of
funds cannot arise.

Heirs of Ochoa vs G&S Transport GR 170071 March 9, 2011

‘Self-serving evidence,’ perhaps owing to its descriptive

formulation, is a concept much misunderstood. Not
infrequently, the term is employed as a weapon to devalue
and discredit a party's testimony favorable to his cause.
That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are using it
now. This is a grave error. "Self-serving evidence" is not to
be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its
 proponent's interest. The term, if used with any legal
sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a
party in his own interest at some place and time out of
court.

Metropolitan Bank vs Tobias GR No. 177780 January 25,

2012

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State. The effect
is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in
the absence of proof to the contrary. As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual
trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference
is made should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case. This
is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the
existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court.

Syed Azhar Abbas vs. Gloria Goo Abbas GR No. 183896

January 30, 2013

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a

disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the
records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In
fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and
Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

People vs Laba GR No. 199938 January 28, 2012

​
Neither will the non-presentation in court of Police Senior
Inspector Ebuen, the forensic chemist who conducted the
laboratory examination on the confiscated substance,
operate to acquit appellant. The matter of presentation of
witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide.
It has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has
the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony
of the chemical analyst, and the report of an official
forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug
enjoys the presumption of regularity in its preparation.
Corollarily, under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court, entries in official records made in the performance
of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts they
state.