Ronquillo
states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
Antonio SO filed a case of collection of sum of money against 4 defendants,
one of thewm is ronquillo. They executed a compromise agreement which
states that they “ individually and jointly agree to pay the bal.
The 4 defendants fialed to pay the balane of 55k, Ronquillo alleged that he
tried to pay his share of the 55k but So was inaccessible.
The obligation is solidary. Individually has the same meaning as collectively.
An agreement to be individually liable undoubtedly create a several
obligation.
Malayan Insurance
A jeepney owned by Sio Choy, insured by Malayan Insurance, collided with a
passenger bus belonging to pantranco, causing damage to the vehicle and to
the passenger bus. Martin Vallejo was riding in the jeep, he also sustained
damages. Because of that, he sued the Sio Choy and Malayan insurance , and
pantranco. He prayed the defendants be ordered to pay him jointly and
severally. Vallejo filed a third party complaint against San Leon Rice Mill for
the reason that at the time of the accident, the person driving the jeedpney
was an employee of San Leon, and performing his dutieswithin the scope of
his assigned task. The trial court held Choy, Malayan and San leon Solidarily
liable.
Issue : whether or not the trial court is correct in ordering the thee 3 to pay
the plaintiff solidarily
Held: No. trial court is not correct
We hold instead that it is only respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice
Mill, Inc, (to the exclusion of the petitioner) that are solidarily liable to
respondent Vallejos for the damages awarded to Vallejos.
It must be observed that respondent Sio Choy is made liable to said
plaintiff as owner of the ill-fated Willys jeep, pursuant to Article 2184 of the
Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. it is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
“If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180
are applicable.”
On the other hand, it is noted that the basis of liability of respondent San
Leon Rice Mill, Inc. to plaintiff Vallejos, the former being the employer of the
driver of the Willys jeep at the time of the motor vehicle mishap, is Article
2180 of the Civil Code which reads:
“Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
It thus appears that respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. are the
principal tortfeasors who are primarily liable to respondent Vallejos. The law
quasi-delict is solidary.4
On the other hand, the basis of petitioner’s liability is its insurance
contract with respondent Sio Choy. If petitioner is adjudged to pay
respondent Vallejos in the amount of not more than P20,000.00, this is on
account of its being the insurer of respondent Sio Choy under the third party
liability clause included in the private car comprehensive policy existing
between petitioner and respondent Sio Choy at the time of the complained
vehicular accident.
PNB vs Garcia
PNB brough a case against its solidary debtors for a collection of sum of
money, one of them, Mr. Valencia died during the pendency of the case so
the case was dismissed and the court ordered PNB to prosecute its case
under Sec 6, Rule 86 of Rules of Court.
“SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent.—Where the obligation of the
decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the
decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the
estate to recover contribution from the other debtor. In a joint obligation of
the decedent, the claim shall be confined to the portion belonging to him.”
The PNB appealed
The appellant assails the order of dismissal, invoking its right of recourse
against one, some or all of its solidary debtors under Article 1216 of the Civil
Code—
“ART. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against
one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be
directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected.”
SC: . It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 (now Rule 86)
provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased
debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance
with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against
the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand
payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to
observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code
expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary
debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.”
“It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable
provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to
‘proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously.’ The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of
one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed
against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the
estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case
dismissed against the surviving debtors and file its claim in the estate of the
deceased solidary debtor.

Calang and PHiltranco vs People

Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along
Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when
its rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the
opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the
jeep’s driver, lost the jeep’s driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped
and killed Jose Mabansag.

The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious

physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog City.

The RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay
P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Armando

SC: Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang. We emphasize

that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco
was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang
was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco
jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles
21761 and 21802 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an
employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil
liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the
Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers,
tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as follows:
“In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees.