IRTB Module 08 PG 01.2017

Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings
Training Support Package Participant Guide
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... 1
MODULE 8 UNIQUE RESPONSE CHALLENGES – Administration Page.................. 2
Duration ....................................................................................................................... 2
Scope Statement ......................................................................................................... 2
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO) ............................................................................ 2
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)............................................................................ 2
Resources ................................................................................................................... 2
Instructor to Participant Ratio ...................................................................................... 3
Reference List ............................................................................................................. 3
Assessment Strategy ................................................................................................... 3
ICON MAP ...................................................................................................................... 4
MODULE INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 5
Unique Response Challenges ...................................................................................... 9
SUICIDE BOMBINGS ................................................................................................... 21
SUICIDE DEVICE TYPES............................................................................................. 36
POTENTIAL TARGETS ................................................................................................ 44
ELIMINATING THE THREAT ....................................................................................... 48
SPECIAL SITUATION CASE STUDIES ....................................................................... 78
COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL CASE BRIEF ................................................................ 79
DISCOVERY CHANNEL HEADQUARTERS CASE STUDY ..................................... 102
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 118
January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-1

Emergency Operations Sensitive
MODULE 8 UNIQUE RESPONSE CHALLENGES –

Administration Page
Duration
1.75 Hours
Scope Statement
This module addresses unique response challenges, which are response scenarios that
differ significantly from most pre- and post-detonation incidents and require substantial
modifications to normal response policies, procedures, and techniques. This module
focuses on two kinds of events that could occur in the U.S.: bombing incidents where
perpetrators are still present at the incident scene, active shooter/Hostile events, and
are positioned to interfere with response operations, and suicide-bombing attacks.
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO)
At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to discuss the unique
procedures and tactics required for a safe and effective operational response during
active shooter, hostile event, and suicide bombing situation.
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)
8-1 Identify characteristics of active shooter/hostile event situations that
require specialized procedures and tactics.
8-2 Identify the nine phases of a suicide bombing attack.
8-3 Identify unique characteristics of potential targets for a suicide bombing

attack.
8-4 Identify effective countermeasures and procedures to prevent or deter a

suicide bombing attack.
Resources
• IRTB Course Handouts, including course evaluation forms, pre-test forms,
registration forms, travel reimbursement forms, and self-evaluation form (one per
participant).
• Pencil or pen, protective glasses, badge, and nameplate (one per participant).
• Flash drive containing Participant Guide, Video Library, Case Study Library,
Additional Resources (one per participant).
• Digital projectors, flip-chart, and whiteboard.
• Slides and video clips.

Instructor to Participant Ratio

Conference (Classroom–2:50; Range–3:50).
Reference List
See Appendices.
Assessment Strategy
• Observation of the level and quality of classroom participation.
• Participation and quality of performance on the performance exercise.
• Administration of the post-test to assess mastery of module objectives (TLO and
ELOs).

ICON MAP
Question: Used when there is an opportunity to ask a question or start a class
discussion.
Key Points/Learning Objectives: Used to highlight each time lesson content is

directly relevant to an Enabling Learning Objective.
First Responder Safety: Used to highlight information that relates directly to the
personal safety of first responders.

MODULE INTRODUCTION
Slide 8-1 IRTB Module 8: Unique Response Challenges
This slide displays the Module 8 title slide.
This module addresses the unique challenges and response

requirements of two specific bombing scenarios which require
substantial response policy modification. One, perpetrators still
present at the incident scene, active shooter/hostile events, and are
positioned to interfere with response operations. Two, suicide
bombing attacks where the perpetrators are willing to die.

Slide 8-2 Terminal Learning Objective
This slide contains the Terminal Learning Objective for the module.
At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to discuss

the unique procedures and tactics required for a safe and effective
operational response during active shooter, hostile event, and
suicide bombing situation.

Slide 8-3 Enabling Learning Objectives
This slide contains the Enabling Learning Objectives and should be

summarized by the instructor.
The Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) for this module are:
8-1 Identify characteristics of active shooter/hostile event

situations that require specialized procedures and tactics.
8-2 Identify the nine phases of a suicide bombing attack.
8-3 Identify unique characteristics of potential targets for a

suicide bombing attack.
8-4 Identify effective countermeasures and procedures to

prevent or deter a suicide bombing attack.

Slide 8-4 Course Map
This slide depicts the Course Map.
Module 8 is the third and final module that focuses on response to

terrorist attacks involving explosives and incendiaries, with a
focus/concentration on unique response challenges. The skills and
knowledge acquired during previous modules about terrorist threats
and energetic materials will be used in performing tasks associated
with the objectives in this module.

Unique Response Challenges
Slide 8-5 Unique Response Challenges
This slide shows illustrations of unique response challenges using a

collage of pictures from the incident at Columbine High School.
This slide contains images from the school shooting/bombing

incident at Columbine High School in Littleton, CO, in April 1999.
Clockwise from top left, the photographs show: Aerial photo of
Columbine High School; students being evacuated from the school
with hands over head until they are deemed not one of the threats;
a pipe bomb IED (one of 99 IEDs made by the perpetrators), which
did not detonate in the attack; a propane tank IED made by the
perpetrators that also did not detonate; students fleeing the school
towards first responders; and initiation of a propane IED.
All terrorist incidents involving energetic materials are unique

situations. No two events are alike requiring first responders to
make adjustments to plans, solve unanticipated problems, and
modify response procedures.
However, most pre- and post-detonation situations have common

characteristics, and therefore, response operations during such

events also share some common characteristics. Despite these

commonalities, some events differ from other to the extent that
major modifications may be required in the response planning and
execution.
For purposes of this course, two unique challenges have been

selected for detailed discussion.
Active Shooter/Hostile Events
The first, active shooter/hostile events, are incidents where the

perpetrators are still at the incident scene and are positioned to
interfere with response operations when first responders arrive.
On April 20, 1999 Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, two senior
students at Columbine High School, set off a fire bomb with a timer
which was set to go off several miles away from their school as a
diversion for first responders. The fire bomb partially detonated and
caused a brush fire. After placing the fire bomb Harris and Klebold
drove to the school and then proceeded to attack teachers and
students at1119 am with two 9mm firearms, two shotguns, and
ninety-nine improvised explosive devices which were constructed
by viewing videos online. The result of this massacre was the
murdering 12 students and one teacher. Harris and Klebold were
found by first responders after they committed suicide inside the
school after this rampage.1
This incident serves as an example of tactics that terrorists

coulduse when attacking a school, shopping mall, or other public
location. Additional discussion within another module will elaborate
on the Columbine incident.
Suicide Bombing Attacks
The second unique response challenge is a suicide bombing

attack. A tactic is used by a wide range of terrorists with differing
backgrounds. Suicide attacks are difficult for emergency response
agencies to prevent, deter, and mitigate.
1
(1999). U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Repot Series: Wanton Violence at Columbine High School. U. S.
Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from: https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-
128.pdf

The only successful terrorist suicide bombing events that occurred

on U.S. soil were the explosions caused by the hijacked planes
flown into the World Trade Center, The Pentagon, and an
unintended field in Stoneycreek Township, Pennsylvania when the
intended target became unattainable. Passengers on Flight 93
retook the plane during this incident on September 11, 2001
causing it to crash prior to the actual target location.
Intelligence agencies and/or law enforcement agencies through

undercover operations have thwarted other known terrorist suicide
bombing attempts on U.S. soil. However, terrorist suicide
bombings have killed American service members and civilians at
U.S. embassies, on peacekeeping missions, and at tourist
destinations in other countries.2
Although there have been other suicide bombings in the United

States, none of those have met the definition of a terrorist incident.
In Bath, Michigan 1927, Andrew Kehole was upset about an

increase in taxes and being defeated in the local election for the
town clerk. As a result, Kehole set off a bomb in the local school
and detonated a suicide bomb in his truck. A total of forty-five
people were killed, including Andrew Kehole, and fifty-eight were
injured. This is the first suicide bombing and worst mass murder in
the history of the United States.3
2
The 9/11 Commission Report, (2002). National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
3
Andrew Kehoe Biography. Bio. Retrieved from http://www.biography.com/people/andrew-kehoe-235986

Slide 8-6 Active Shooter/Hostile Events
Active shooter/hostile events which can be encountered are listed

on this slide.
ELO 8-1
Identify characteristics of active shooter/hostile event
situations that require specialized procedures and tactics.
Planning for and responding to events of this kind are addressed in

this discussion. Participants are encouraged to review additional
discussions in discipline-specific references. What must be done in
these situations can also be located within outsides sources,
references and training materials to assist in the development of a
complete perspective.
As always, first responders should follow their local

department policies and procedures for active shooter/hostile
events.
Attacks Using Multiple Weapon Types

Terrorists will conduct attacks using multiple weapons (such as
firearms and explosives) and tactics, sometimes in multiple
locations. Examples of this are the terrorist attack in Mumbai, India

in November 20084 and the series of coordinated attacks on

November 13, 2015 in Paris, France,5 which consisted of mass
shootings, suicide bombings, and the taking of hostages or
“doomed captives” (people who are captured by perpetrators who
intend to execute them part of a strategy to prolong the attack,
maximize media coverage, or obtain other terrorist objectives).6
Hostage and Barricade Situations

If terrorists are holding hostages or doomed captives in a facility
that has been attacked or is threatened with attack by explosive
devices, response options are constrained. Responders may be
unable to evacuate and provide medical treatment for survivors.
Survivors in the targeted facility may not be evacuated to receive
appropriate medical treatment. The tactical situation often dictates
what aspects of response can be executed.
Response Timeline Accelerated

Despite impediments to action posed by the presence of terrorists,
the danger of persons in the immediate vicinity of the target
significantly increases the opportunities of the terrorists to take and
kill any hostages. They can prevent rapid evacuation of the hot
zone by directing small arms fire or other weapons on evacuees
and first responders attempting to guide the evacuation effort. For
that reason, there is often substantial pressure to neutralize
terrorists as quickly as possible.
At Columbine High School, law enforcement officers did not mount

a concerted effort to enter the building until a tactical team was on
scene. In most communities, tactical officers also have other duties
and must be mobilized prior to action. The officers report to an
assembly area, suit up, and prepare specialized arms, ammunition,
and equipment. All this preparation takes time, but the threat of
execution-style murders, along with the potential for a catastrophic
explosive event, sometimes allows little time for appropriate
preparation and action.
4
Mumbai Massacre: Background Information. PBS. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/mumbai-
massacre-background-information/502/
5
(2015, Dec. 9). Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night. BBC News. Retrieved from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994
6
Fire Department of New York (FDNY) Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. (December 2015).
Fireguard: November 2015 Paris Terror Attack. Pages 10-11. Retrieved from
https://info.publicintelligence.net/FDNY-ParisAttacks.pdf

The critical need for accelerated response time magnifies the

importance of pre-planning and other forms of preparation (training,
exercises, and detailed policies and procedures), because the less
time that is available, the less time there is for analysis and
selection of courses of action.
Detailed plans must be in place and trained personnel must be

available to accomplish what otherwise are difficult tasks (release
and evacuation of survivors) in a far more challenging situation.
Intelligence Requirements
Responding to bombing incidents is a hazardous task because of
uncertainties concerning the size, location, and means of
detonation of the initial or secondary/additional devices.
Additionally, uncertainties concerning terrorists who remain at the
target, and the hazards increase substantially. First responders
must consider and plan for these complex situations.
Officials at Columbine High School had installed security cameras

in common-use areas, including the cafeteria and library where the
two offenders spent a considerable amount of time. However, these
cameras were connected to recording devices inside the school
and could not be monitored from a remote location. Likewise, fire
alarms activated and alarm bells continued to ring long after the
initial fires had been detected. As a consequence, responders
could not use available video to assess the situation and could not
hear some events occurring in the school because the sounds were
masked by alarms that continued to ring.7 These are two examples
of considerations that should be made in preparing for incidents of
this kind. Communication with key public officials such as school
superintendents, business owners, and others is as important as
onsite communication capabilities in preparation, planning, and
response.
Expanded Perimeters
The hot zone in these types of incidents must be expanded to
include any areas that can be fired upon by terrorists using
weapons at their disposal. In the absence of concealment from
observation and cover (shielding) from the effects of weapons, the
7
128.pdf

hot zone perimeter, where responders and others are in immediate

danger of death or injury must extend to the effective range of
terrorist weapons. First responders must also consider the
possibility that suspects and hostages could travel, creating a
constantly-moving perimeter. Heightened security at perimeters
and control of ingress and egress becomes crucial, as incidents
that have a very loose perimeter have the potential for a moving
threat.
Airspace also becomes a consideration in these incidents. Although

bomb fragments can be projected large distances from the seat of
an explosion, any vertical projection is limited by gravitational
forces. However, the presence of small arms, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), or portable shoulder-held weapons such as
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) gives terrorists the capability to
engage helicopters and other aircraft in close proximity to the
target. In incidents of this kind, it is paramount to establish the
protection of pilots and aircraft from engagement in restricted
airspace.
Unique Scene Control Challenges

Any situation where there is pending injury or death to innocent
individuals brings out the best and worst in people. In some cases,
rescuers assume extraordinary personal risks to save the lives of
others (particularly, the most innocent of individuals—children). At
the same time, unofficial or wannabe rescuers (such as family or
friends of survivors) generate additional risks that further
complicate the actions of legitimate responders.
In the Columbine High School incident, some parents, hearing of

the standoff at the high school, collected their rifles and went down
to the school to help out. The last thing that law enforcement
officers needed was well-intentioned citizens standing behind them
with loaded weapons while those officers focused to their front at
the immediate threat facing students and teachers in the school.
Keeping distressed friends and family members from interfering

with response operations is difficult in any bomb-response
operation. However, when firearms are present at the scene, some
community members will consider it their responsibility to bring their
own firearms in support of law enforcement.
It is essential that perimeters be airtight and a sufficient distance

from the target to ensure that perimeter problems do not bleed into

the actual incident response in the hot zone. First responders

operating along perimeters must have explicit instructions
concerning who can be allowed access and be prepared to deal
with well-intentioned citizens who may be armed.
Control of egress is another important consideration. When

hostages are released, they must be treated as potential terrorists
until proven otherwise. There have been situations in the past
where terrorists and other hostage takers have attempted to leave
the scene by posing as hostages or other survivors.
You may recall that all the students and teachers who departed
Columbine High School during the incident came out of the building
with their hands held up. That is an appropriate tactic and should
be implemented in any situation where evacuees cannot be
identified with certainty during the evacuation process.8
8
128.pdf

Slide 8-7 Tactical Fire and EMS Response (TEMS)
This slide lists various circumstances that could be encountered

during an active shooter/hostile event.
Conducting fire suppression and rescue operations and providing

emergency medical treatment are difficult tasks at any bombing
scene. However, they take on added complexity when they must be
conducted under fire.
TEMS units could be armed law enforcement officers capable of

defending themselves or unarmed non-law enforcement officers.
TEMS units who are non-law enforcement require the protection
and security of tactical teams. There is also the potential to have
TEMS units that are not law enforcement but have received some
tactical training in support of the tactical team members they assist.
Although some jurisdictions have tactical EMS personnel to support
law enforcement tactical teams, most do not provide tactical
training for the general population of firefighters and emergency
medical personnel. These groups are not equipped for and do not
conduct exercises for operations under fire from terrorists or other
criminals.
Despite this typical state, citizens in many communities fully expect

first responders in all disciplines and agencies to perform their

duties under extremely adverse conditions. For example, after the

Columbine High School incident, there was criticism of emergency
medical personnel who allegedly left a student in an open area to
die, rather than operate in that open area under fire from the two
student shooters.
Untrained and/or unequipped officers with limited experience in

small arms fire have an unreasonable expectation of properly
handling a suspect(s) and scenario such as the Columbine High
School incident. However, it may be in the best interest of all
emergency response agencies to consider the following:
 Implications of tactical response in their own disciplines
 Conduct some preparatory activities either to build such
capabilities
 Encourage other agencies to build those capabilities
 Build partnerships with agencies that possess those
capabilities
 Clearly establish a publicly understood expectation that
some emergency response operations simply will not be
performed under fire in their communities
When an incident develops, it is too late to engage in

meaningful dialogue and action to resolve any
misunderstandings in this area.

Slide 8-8 THREAT: Medical Disaster Preparedness
This slide explains the acronym of THREAT in regards to medical

disaster preparedness.
In March 2014, an article in the Journal of the American College of

Surgeons introduced the “Hartford Consensus: A Call to Action for
THREAT, a Medical Disaster Preparedness Concept.”9 The article
proposed an approach for an integrated response by fire, rescue,
Emergency Medical Services, and law enforcement when
responding to active shooter/hostile events. The THREAT system
has been endorsed by FEMA, Special Operations Medical
Association, National Association of Emergency Medical
Technicians, International Association of Fire Chiefs, International
Association of Fire Fighters, International Association of Chiefs of
Police, and the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care
(COTCCC).
9
Jacobs, L.M., Wade, D., McSwain, N.E., Butler, F.K., Fabbri, W., Eastman, A., … Burns, K.J. Hartford Consensus:
A Call to Action for THREAT, a Medical Disaster Preparedness Concept [Abstract]. Journal of the American
College of Surgeons, 218(3), 467-475. Retrieved from http://www.journalacs.org/article/S1072-
7515(13)01295-7/abstract

The acronym “T.H.R.E.A.T” spells out the order of multi-disciplinary

priorities responding to such incidents, and stands for:
T – Threat suppression
H – Hemorrhage control
RE – Rapid Extraction to safety
A – Assessment by medical providers
T – Transport to definitive care
The system promotes training, equipping, and combining law

enforcement and EMS (not tactical medics) to provide point of
injury care to the wounded. In the traditional protocol, EMS would
wait in the “cold zone” until law enforcement gave the all clear once
the lethal threat was eliminated. Under the THREAT concept, law
enforcement sends a first team of officers to eliminate the active
shooter, while a second team of combined law enforcement and
EMS establish and staff a casualty collection point or points near
the entrance. Law enforcement provides security at the casualty
collection point. A third group comprised of law enforcement and
EMS wearing helmets and body armor then move through “safety
corridors” (established by first team of law enforcement) and
provide triage to survivors and extract them to the casualty
collection point, where EMS personnel prepare survivors for
transport to appropriate medical facilities.
The Hartford Consensus document on THREAT is contained in the

Additional Resources section of the IRTB Flash Drive.

SUICIDE BOMBINGS
Slide 8-9 Suicide Bombings
This slide shows a photograph of forensic investigators working at

the site of a suicide bombing suspected to have been planned by
ISIS on July 20, 2015 in the Turkish town of Suruc near the border
with Syria.
ELO 8-2
Identify the nine phases of a suicide bombing attack.
Suicide bombings concern all first responders. Law enforcement

personnel, firefighters, EMS personnel, and other members of the
emergency response community are responsible for assisting in
identifying the signs of preparatory activity. Emergency planners
and senior officials at all other emergency response agencies are
responsible for preparing comprehensive plans that fully coordinate
the actions of responding agencies.
Law enforcement agencies have the lead responsibility for

detecting and interrupting plans and preparations for a suicide-
bombing attack; if present at the scene of an attack, they are
responsible for identifying, isolating, and arresting the suspect prior

to detonation. If a detonation occurs, firefighters and emergency

medical personnel have the lead responsibility for rescue
operations and treatment of the injured.
Law enforcement agencies have lead responsibility for securing the

scene and conducting the resultant criminal investigation to include
isolating and retaining prospective witnesses. Other emergency
response agencies assist in the identification of suspects and in
locating, protecting, and preserving evidence.

Slide 8-10 Suicide Attacks: An Increasing Threat
This slide is a satellite photo of Manhattan shortly after the

September 11th attack.
The suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, display the danger of the suicide tactic. It
is possible and likely that we will see future suicide attacks in the
U.S. and that such attack will involve IEDs. In 2002, FBI Director
Robert Mueller told a meeting of lawmakers that terrorist groups in
the U.S. will begin using individual terrorist suicide bombers against
civilian targets. "I think we will see that in the future. I think it's
inevitable," Mueller said.10 On July 9, 2002, al Qaeda spokesman
Abu Ghaith said that al-Qaeda's "suicide militants are ready and
impatient to carry out attacks against U.S. and Jewish targets
inside (America) and abroad." He repeated earlier statements,
saying America should "fasten its seat belts…we will strike in a
period of time which is not long.”11
10
FBI Director: Suicide Bombings ‘Inevitable’. FOX News. Retrieved from:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/05/21/fbi-director-suicide-bombings-inevitable.html
11
(2002). CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports. CNN.com/Transcripts. Retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0207/09/wbr.00.html

A 2015 report by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

entitled “Threat to the Homeland” stated: “The up-tick in moderate-
to-small scale attacks in the West since last summer by individual
extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely and
immediate threat to the Homeland will come from Homegrown
Violent Extremists (HVEs) or individuals with loose affiliation to
terrorist groups overseas.”12
12
Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2015, Feb, 12). Current Terrorist Threat to the
United States. pg 3, Retrieved from
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Current_Terrorist_Threat_to_the_United_States.pdf

Slide 8-11 History of Terrorist Suicide Bombings
This slide shows a photo (on the left) of rescue workers at the
Marine Battalion Headquarters in Beirut after it was bombed in
1983. The photo on the upper right shows damage to the USS Cole
after a bomb exploded in the Port of Aden, Yemen. The photo on
the lower right shows the New York Times headline on September
11, 2001.
Background
Suicide attacks, in one form or another, have been directed at
military and civilian targets for many years. The Japanese
kamikaze pilots of World War II are among the most famous suicide
bombers. In more recent history, a suicide bomber conducted the
attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. Suicide
bombings have also occurred in settings that did not involve
terrorism or military action. For example, in some instances,
individuals have detonated explosives and destroyed themselves
during domestic conflicts and other purely criminal incidents.

The following timeline lists terrorist suicide bombing attacks against

the United States and Americans living either in the U.S. or
abroad.13
1983
April 18, Beirut, Lebanon: U.S. embassy destroyed in
suicide car-bomb attack; 63 dead, including 17 Americans.
The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.14
Oct. 23, Beirut, Lebanon: Shiite suicide bombers exploded
truck near U.S. military barracks at Beirut airport, killing 241
marines. Minutes later, a second bomb killed 58 French
paratroopers in their barracks in West Beirut.15
Dec. 12, Kuwait City, Kuwait: Shiite truck bombers
attacked the U.S. embassy and other targets, killing 5 and
injuring 80.16
2000
Oct. 12, Aden, Yemen: U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole
heavily damaged when a small boat loaded with explosives
blew up alongside it. 17 sailors killed. Linked to Osama bin
Laden, or members of al-Qaeda terrorist network.17
2001
Sept. 11, New York City, Arlington, VA, and Shanksville,
PA: Hijackers crashed two commercial jets into the twin
towers of World Trade Center; two more hijacked jets were
crashed into the Pentagon and a field in rural Pennsylvania.
Total dead and missing numbered 2,99218: 2,749 in New
York City, 184 at the Pentagon, 40 in PA, and 19 hijackers.
13 Chicago Project on Security & Terrorism. (February 2106). Suicide Attack Database. Retrieved from
http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php
14 (2014). FLASHBACK: April 18, 1983: U.S. Embassy Attacked in Beirut. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved
from: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-story-archive/flashback-
april-18-1983-u-s-embassy-bombed-in-beirut.html
15 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from: http://www.britannica.com/event/1983-
Beirut-barracks-bombings
16 Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988. Frontline. Retrieved from:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html
17 The USS Cole Bombing. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved from: https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/uss-cole
18 On Oct. 29, 2003, New York officials reduced the number of people killed at the World Trade Center in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States by 40 names. The list of casualties dropped to 2,752 from
2,792 for a variety of reasons: some people initially reported missing have been found, there were duplicate names,
there was no proof that a person was at the World Trade Center that day, and because of fraud. On January 2004,
the number was reduced by 3 more to 2,749.

Islamic al-Qaeda terrorist group blamed. (See September

11, 2001: Timeline of Terrorism.)19
2003
May 12, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Suicide bombers kill 34,
including 8 Americans, at housing compounds for
Westerners. Al-Qaeda suspected.
2005
Nov. 9, Amman, Jordan: Suicide bombers hit three
American hotels--Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn--in
Amman, Jordan, killing 57. Al-Qaeda claimed
responsibility.20
2008
May 26, Tarmiya, Iraq: A suicide bomber on a motorcycle
kills six U.S. soldiers and wounds 18 others in Tarmiya, Iraq.
June 24, Karmah, Iraq: A suicide bomber kills at least 20
people, including three U.S. Marines, at a meeting between
sheiks and Americans in Karmah, a town west of Baghdad.
Aug. 18 and 19, Bamiyan, Afghanistan: As many as 15
suicide bombers backed by about 30 militants attack a U.S.
military base, Camp Salerno, in Bamiyan. Fighting between
U.S. troops and members of the Taliban rages overnight. No
U.S. troops are killed.
2009
Feb. 9, Iraq: A suicide bomber kills four American soldiers
and their Iraqi translator near a police checkpoint.21
April 10, Iraq: A suicide attack kills five American soldiers
and two Iraqi policemen.22
Dec. 25: A Nigerian man on a flight from Amsterdam to
Detroit attempted to ignite an explosive device hidden in his
underwear. The explosive device that failed to detonate was
a mixture of powder and liquid that did not alert security
personnel in the airport. The alleged bomber, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, told officials later that he was directed by the
19
The 9/11 Commission Report, (2002). National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
20
Fattah, H. M. & Slackman, M. (2005, Nov. 10). # Hotels Bombed in Jordan: At Least 57 Die. The New York Times.
Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/10/world/middleeast/3-hotels-bombed-in-jordan-at-least-
57-die.html
21
Rubin, A. J. (2009, Feb 9). Northern Iraq Suicied Blast Kills 4 American Soldiers. The New York Times. Retrieved
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/world/middleeast/10iraq.html
22
Dagher, S> (2009, April 10). Suicide Attack Kills 5 G.I.’s and 2 Iraqis in Northern City. The New York Times.
Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/world/middleeast/11iraq.html

terrorist group al-Qaeda. The suspect was already on the

government's watch list when he attempted the bombing; his
father, a respected Nigerian banker, had told the U.S.
government that he was worried about his son's increased
extremism.23
Dec. 30, Afghanistan: A suicide bomber kills eight
American civilians, seven of them CIA agents, at a base in
Afghanistan. It's the deadliest attack on the agency since
9/11. The attacker was reportedly a double agent from
Jordan who was acting on behalf of al-Qaeda.24
2013
Feb. 1, Ankara, Turkey: Ecevit Sanli detonates a bomb
near a gate at the U.S. Embassy. Sanli dies after detonating
the bomb andone Turkish guard is killed. Didem Tuncay, a
respected television journalist, is injured in the blast. Unlike
the bombing at the embassy in Benghazi in September
2012, the U.S. government immediately calls the bombing a
terrorist attack. According to Turkish officials, the attack is
from the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party, which is
labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S. and other
nations.25
Suicide bombers hold an assortment of opinions, beliefs, and

values. Many are motivated by religious principles that are typically
viewed by experts as distortions of actual religious teachings. In
the case of radical Islam (also called Salafi Jihadism), suicide
bombers believe that their actions will lead to a special place in
heaven and a host of attendant personal benefits. They believe that
their actions will benefit them and in turn, most are determined to
be successful.
Suicide bombings can occur against U.S. targets within national

boundaries and overseas. The lessons learned by other countries
and by U.S. anti- and counter-terrorism forces over the past
decades can be applied in preparing law enforcement, firefighters,
23
Ariosto, D. & Feyerick, D. (2012, Feb 17). Christmas Day Bomber Sentenced to Life in Prison. CNN. Retrieved
from: http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/16/justice/michigan-underwear-bomber-sentencing/
24
Rubin, A. J. & Mazzetti, M. (2009, Dec. 30). Suicide Bomber Killed C.I.A. Operatives. The New York Times.
Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/world/asia/31khost.html
25
Fraser, S. (2013, Apr.3). U.S. Embassy Bombing In Turkey Was Suicide Attack; 2 Dead, Police Say. The
Huffington Post. Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/01/us-embassy-turkey-suicide-
bombing_n_2597384.html

and emergency medical personnel to respond effectively and safely

to this potential threat.

Slide 8-12 Video: Timothy McVeigh
This slide contains a video of an interview with Oklahoma City

Bomber, Timothy McVeigh. McVeigh, explains in the interview why
he attacked the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building with a vehicle
bomb in 1995. McVeigh was executed for his crimes on June 11,
2001,.

Slide 8-13 Nine Phases of a Suicide Attack
This slide depicts the nine phases and progression of a suicide

bomber attack.
The Nine Phases of a Suicide Attack are:

• Bomber identification
• Bomber recruitment
• Bomber training
• Target selection and reconnaissance
• Purchasing items
• Device construction
• Final preparation
• Moving to target
• Device detonation
This chart, the “Nine Phases of a Suicide Attack,” was developed

by EMRTC instructors and experts based on their comprehensive
study of suicide bombing incidents (both completed international
incidents and domestic incidents that were thwarted by intelligence
and law enforcement agencies). The y-axis shows how the risk of a
successful attack increases as the developing attack moves
through these nine phases. Be aware that some of these phases
may overlap or occur simultaneously. Combining one or more
phases reduces the time required to plan, prepare, and carry out a

suicide attack. The red circle represents the planning phases, in

which first responders have the best opportunities to interdict and
prevent the attack.
The ability of first responders to prevent a suicide attack is directly

proportional to their ability to detect these phases and take
appropriate action. Once the movement to target has begun, the
possibility of preventing a suicide attack, even if first responders
manage to mitigate some of its effects, is greatly decreased.
“Effective police intelligence programs have the potential to identify

preparatory actions during the first three phases: identification,
recruitment, and training of potential bombers. However, there are
significant limitations on intelligence collection within the United
States; constitutional guarantees and legal and cultural precedents
constrain the ability of police and intelligence organizations to
operate aggressive collection programs against U.S. citizens,
independent of formal criminal investigations. Recruitment and
training can occur quietly, with little chance of detection by state
and local law enforcement agencies. There is evidence to suggest
that recruiting initiatives may be under way in U.S. prison
populations and among radicalized extremists—including U.S.
citizens—in a number of U.S. communities.
“Perhaps the best opportunities for detection and successful

interdiction occur when terrorist organizations are selecting targets
and conducting reconnaissance against them as well as when they
are purchasing explosives components and fabricating explosive
devices. Aggressive countersurveillance at potential or anticipated
target locations is a critical component of any preventive program.
In addition, close liaison with potential sources of bomb-making
materials and components can often generate information
concerning inquiries and purchases that warrant further
investigation. The public plays a key role in this effort; its
willingness to report suspicious activity may be the key in early
identification of preparations for a suicide attack.”26
26
Priem, R. G. & Hunter, D. M. (September 2007). Terrorists and Suicide Tactics: Preparing for
the Challenge. The Police Chief, 74. Retrieved from
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1265&issue_i
d=92007.

Slide 8-14 Example: ISIS-inspired Bomb Plot,

Fort Riley, KS, April 2015
This slide shows a photo of Fort Riley, Kansas and John T. Booker
Jr.
John T. Booker Jr., also known as Mohammed Abdullah Hassan,

enlisted in the United States Army and was getting ready to start
boot camp when he posted the following on Facebook: “Getting
ready to be killed in jihad is a HUGE adrenaline rush!! I am so
nervous. NOT because I’m scared to die but I am eager to meet my
lord.” Based on this intelligence, Booker was questioned by the FBI
at which point he admitted that he wanted to commit an insider
attack on U.S. soldiers similar to Nidal Hassan at Fort Hood, Texas.
Booker was denied entrance into the Army after the questioning.
Several months later, Booker met with two FBI informants and
planned to set off a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
(VBIED) at Fort Riley, Kansas. The FBI informants assisted Booker
in making an inert IED. On April 10, 2015, Booker was arrested
while he was getting ready to drive onto Fort Riley and enact his
suicide mission. Booker showed support for ISIS during this plot.27
27
Criminal Complaint: United States of American V. John T. Booker, Jr. In the United States District Court For the
District of Kansas. Retrieved from: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2680.pdf

Slide 8-15 Example: Wichita, KS Airport Bomb Plot,

December 2013
This slide shows a photo of the Wichita, KS Airport and Terry Lee
Loewen.
Terry Lee Loewen, a 58-year-old American and recent convert to

Islam was an avionics technician at the Wichita Mid-Continent
Kansas Airport when he started communicating online with an FBI
employee who he thought was a Jihadi. Loewen made it known that
he was willing to assist in carrying out a terrorist attack at the
Wichita Mid-Continent Airport. The conversation went on for several
months and finally he agreed to meet a second FBI employee that
was going to help him plan and carry out the suicide mission. The
plan was to drive a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
(VBIED) into a loaded passenger plane at the airport. The FBI
employee assisted Loewen in obtaining a storage property where a
vehicle and bomb making components would be stored. Loewen
also agreed to provide items from work for the operation. Loewen
thought he was on his way to a martyr operation when he was
taken into custody on December 13, 2013. Loewen left a letter for

his family explaining what he was doing and that he wanted to

cause “Maximum carnage + Death”.28
The John Booker and Terry Loewen plots are examples of suicide
attack plots that went through 8 of the nine phases of a suicide
attack. Had the FBI not been involved in an undercover operation in
both cases it may have been possible for both plots to reach the
ninth and final phase. These plots demonstrate there are
individuals in the United States that are willing to carry out a suicide
attack and this why first responders should be aware of each phase
and any information that is brought to their attention should be
investigated or forwarded to the proper agency for follow-up.
28
Criminal Complaint: United States of American V. Terry L. Loewen. The United States District Court For the
District of Kansas. Retrieved from: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2281.pdf

SUICIDE DEVICE TYPES
Slide 8-16 Suicide Device Types
This slide shows three different types of suicide devices.
This slide shows three different types of suicide devices. The top
photo is of a carried device—an X-ray of a briefcase. The middle
photo is of an individual wearing and displaying a worn device, and
the bottom photo is of a vehicle device (a car bomb) that was
interdicted in the Middle East.
How the bomber intends to deliver the explosive device can be

grouped into three categories:
• Carried – The bomber actuates an IED carried in a bag, box,

or other object
• Worn – The bomber actuates an IED worn under his or her

clothing
• Vehicle – The bomber actuates an IED concealed in a

vehicle

Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) incidents pose the most dangerous

hazard in terms of explosive power. However, Person-Borne IED
(PBIED) incidents may pose the most significant security challenge
because countermeasures for PBIED incidents are often more
difficult to implement than those for VBIED incidents.

Slide 8-17 Carried IED Attacks
The top picture on this slide displays the courtroom mock-up of the
alleged IED used in Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist bombing, where it
was believed that the explosives carrier was a Toshiba cassette
radio player. The bottom picture shows a scale holding 10 kg of
explosives (about the weight a bomber can easily carry).
A typical carried device will range from eleven to thirty-three

pounds, including the explosive and any additional fragmentation
material. The explosive will likely be concealed in packaging
designed to blend in with the environment. In incidents involving
carried devices (PBIED), the bomb is typically concealed in an
object with cursory camouflage to hide the device from casual
observation.
Devices may be concealed in ordinary items intended to blend into

the target environment. In one 2001 bombing, which occurred in an
area adjacent to a music academy and on a street with several
music shops, the bomber concealed the bomb in a guitar case (see
details below). Other incidents have involved suicide bombers
carrying consumer electronics boxes in areas where there are
numerous electronics stores. One of the most common tactics is to
use a backpack or small duffel bag to carry the device into the
target area.

In general, bombers try to match the external package with the

target environment and select items that will not attract attention.
Typically, a push-button switch is attached to a wire extending out
of the object and into the hand carrying the device.
Example: Sbarro Restaurant Suicide Bombing, Jerusalem,

2001
At 2:00 PM on August 9, 2001, a Palestinian terrorist detonated a

suicide bomb inside a crowded Sbarro pizzeria in downtown
Jerusalem. The perpetrator, Izz al-Din Shuheil al-Masri, concealed
the explosives in a guitar case, which he had carried with him into
Jerusalem. The 5 kg-10 kg bomb, which was packed with nails,
screws, and bolts to ensure maximum damage, destroyed the
restaurant, killing 15 people, including 7 children and one pregnant
American woman, and injured 130 people.29 Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad Movement in Palestine both claimed responsibility, saying the
attack was in response to Israel’s assassination ten days earlier of
two leading Hamas commanders as well as six civilians (including
two children).
29
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (9 August 2001). Suicide bombing at the Sbarro Pizzeria in Jerusalem – 9-Aug-
2001. Retrieved from
http://web.archive.org/web/20130426201937/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2000/10/S
uicide%20bombing%20at%20the%20Sbarro%20pizzeria%20in%20Jerusale

Slide 8-18 Person-borne IED (PBIED) Attacks
This slide shows a picture of a body bomb.
Worn devices (also known as person-borne IED or PBIED) involve

use of body bombs, which are useful for the infiltration of the target
area by terrorists. Body bombs typically weigh from one-half to ten
kilograms (approximately one to twenty-two pounds); their size is
limited only by the need to conceal the device under clothing. Keep
in mind that ten kilograms of many explosives will cause significant
damage on detonation. Bombers often use military explosives such
as TNT or improvised high explosives such as TATP.
Many identified bombers wear a belt or build in outer garment

containing their explosive device. In some cases, the explosives
are contained in metal or PVC pipe, or lined with sheets of added
shrapnel such as ball bearings, nails or hex nuts designed to
enhance the fragmentation effect.
A 1.5-volt lamp can initiate an explosive device. A nine-volt or

larger battery supplies power. A simple switch concealed in a
pocket of the outer clothing, the bomber’s trousers, or run through a
sleeve to the bomber’s hand can all control the initiator.

In some cases, the inner liner of an item of clothing is removed, the

pipes or other devices are inserted, and the liner replaced, making
identification based on casual visual inspection extremely difficult.
Some bombers have used an apron with pouches in the front for
securing pipes or other explosive devices. This type of
configuration permits the carrying of more explosives; however,
such clothing configurations are difficult to conceal.

Slide 8-19 Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED) Attacks
A VBIED can be used in a vehicle such as the one on this slide.
Suicide bombers in vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) can use a variety

of explosives selected based on characteristics of the target,
materials available to the bomber, and his or her level of technical
knowledge. Often, these devices are initiated by pressing an
electrical switch mounted near the vehicle driver. In such attacks,
additional personnel have often accompanied the bomber to attack
or distract security personnel.

Slide 8-20 Video: SVBIED Attack in Iraq
This video depicts a SVBIED attack outside the green zone in

Baghdad, Iraq, in October 2005. Killed in this incident was Staff
Sergeant Jerry L. Bonifacio from the California National Guard
along with an Iraqi translator. In this security checkpoint video,
three cars come to the checkpoint. After Staff Sergeant Bonifacio
checks the first two vehicles, the third vehicle starts to move
forward. The driver of the vehicle holds out a hand with an ID card
of some kind. Staff Sergeant Bonifacio motions for the car to stop
and then detonates. Investigators believe the initiator was wired
into the parking brake.30
This video is included to illustrate how a suicide bomber can and

will change targets if the first target is not attainable. In this case,
the bomber parked when he first came into the compound,
assessed the situation and followed the cars that were entering the
checkpoint. When he realized that he was not going to be able to
get past the checkpoint, he detonated at the gate. He did not
accomplish his initial mission, but he still killed people.
30
(2005, October 24). Explosions Rock Central Baghdad. CNN.com. Retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/24/iraq.main/

POTENTIAL TARGETS
Slide 8-21 Potential Targets
This slide lists potential targets of suicide bombers and what makes
the potential target attractive.
ELO 8-3
Identify unique characteristics of potential targets for a suicide
bombing attack.
A location or event is a potential target for a suicide bomber, if
• A large number of people congregate in a small, limited area

• Security screening or focused observation probably would
not occur or would only occur in close proximity to the
assembled target group.
• The location has substantial significance—it is a symbolic
target or a critical military facility, a part of critical civilian
infrastructure, or a target associated with the effective
operation of the U.S. economy.

Some experts have argued that everything is a potential terrorist

target.31 Although that may be true in the general sense, terrorists
have limited resources and capabilities. Because of that, they try to
attack targets that offer the greatest opportunities for achieving their
objectives. They want their attacks noticed; they want the impact of
their attacks to linger; and they want to embarrass or otherwise
negatively affect the country, organization, institution, or individuals
that are the targets of their attacks.
Suicide-bombing attacks in Israel have targeted small restaurants

and other typical neighborhood locations where people congregate.
These targets are relatively close to bombers' homes and the
operations and logistical infrastructures that support them. Similar
campaigns could develop in the United States. Extremist groups
may try to recruit U.S. citizens or resident aliens to mount such
attacks. Alternatively, they may transport residents of foreign
countries—via lawful or unlawful channels—into the U.S. to launch
their attacks.
However, it is likely that attacks in the U.S. would focus on major

symbolic targets or targets that afford substantial opportunity to kill
Americans. Alternatively, extremist groups may target locations that
have some economic significance. It is likely that terrorists will look
for a select number of potential targets that would generate the
greatest potential impact on Western and U.S. institutions and
society.
Suicide bombers want to kill or injure people. They look for

opportunities to approach large groups occupying constricted areas
or spaces without subjecting themselves to focused observation or
surveillance during the approach to their targets. For that reason,
they typically avoid security checkpoints, unless they have to pass
through them to reach a target (or unless there are large groups in
a space adjacent to the checkpoint's location). For example, a
suicide bomber is not likely to approach the screening point at an
airport unless there is a large group of people in an open,
unprotected area on the outside of the checkpoint.
31
Achenbach, J. (2015, Nov. 15). Experts: Terrorists Learning From One Another and Going After Soft Targets. The
Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/experts-
terrorists-learning-from-one-another-and-going-after-soft-targets/2015/11/15/68405564-8bb2-11e5-acff-
673ae92ddd2b_story.html

Keep in mind, however, that the suicide bomber at the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut penetrated the compound by accelerating his
truck and crashing through a five-foot-high barrier of concert in a
wire and drove past a perimeter guard post manned by armed
Marines. The Marines were working under strict rules which didn’t
allow them to keep ammunition in their weapons which made it
difficult to engage the VBIED Bombers may duplicate this tactic if
they suspect that the armed guards will not engage in effective
countermeasures during the brief time between perimeter
penetration and activation of the explosive device.
Suicide bombers also look for public transportation conveyances

where there is little potential for focused observation on approach.
Such conveyances often deliver large groups, some of whom are in
vehicles or attendant structures that can actually increase blast
effects and amplify the damage caused by shrapnel and
fragmentation. In Israel, the presence of security guards at markets
and restaurants has apparently served as a deterrent in some
cases.
To counter this, bombers have simply moved their targets to bus

stops and other locations where security screening is not easy.

Slide 8-22 Attractiveness of target increases if…
This slide lists factors that increase the attractiveness of potential

terrorist targets.
The potential that a particular location will be targeted increases if

one or more of these factors are present:
• A particularly large number of people are present at the

location
• The event or location receives widespread publicity
• Celebrities and/or senior government officials will be at the
location
• The event or location draws extensive media coverage, such
as live TV coverage

ELIMINATING THE THREAT

Eliminating the threat of suicide bombers involves the implementation of
countermeasures at one or more steps in the planning and execution process.
Slide 8-23 Countermeasures must focus on the planning

and execution process
This slide lists countermeasures that can disrupt the terrorist

planning and execution process. The slide also shows surveillance
camera footage showing suicide bombers rehearsing for the terror
attacks in the London subways on July 7, 2005.
ELO 8-4
Identify effective countermeasures and procedures to prevent
or deter a suicide bombing attack.
As first responders, your ability to prevent a suicide attack is

directly proportional to your ability to detect these first seven steps
and take appropriate action. Once the movement to target and
conduct the attack has begun, a decrease with the possibility of
preventing a suicide attack occurs, even if you manage to mitigate
some of the effects.

Obtaining funding. Terrorist groups need money to operate. By

eliminating the sources of money or constraining the ability of
terrorist groups to move money, their ability to target us is
impacted.
Training personnel. Terrorists must be recruited and trained. In the

case of suicide bombers, the training is minimal. However, if a
terrorist group cannot train its operatives, it cannot operate.
Moving personnel to the targeted country or area. The decision of

the Israeli government to install a fence between Israel and portions
of the West Bank is designed to stem the flow of terrorists into their
country. If terrorists cannot enter the country where a target is
located, they cannot attack the target.
Conducting preoperational surveillance. See detailed discussion on

this topic later in this module.
Gathering materials. To build an explosive device, a bomber must

have some materials such as explosives, fuses, and blasting caps.
The extent to which access to these materials is limited is the
extent to which these bombing attacks can be stopped.
Constructing devices. At this point, bombers assemble all the

materials they have obtained into an explosive device or bomb.
This process is somewhat dangerous and often leads to accidents
involving bomb makers and their immediate supporters.
Rehearsing the attack. Terrorists often go through the motions of

an attack several days before they actually execute it. Rehearsals
are normally conducted away from the target, although there have
been cases where careless bombers have actually walked through
the incident in the actual target location as a means of physically
and mentally preparing. At this point, terrorists are extremely
vulnerable to identification.
Conducting the attack. As mentioned earlier in the module, once a

suicide bomber begins moving toward the target, he or she is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify.

Slide 8-24 Example: U.S. Capitol Bomb Plot, 2015
This slide shows a photo of Raheel Mahrus Ubaydah and the U.S.
Capitol building.
A plot to attack the U.S. Capitol building with firearms and bombs
failed January 2015, when the FBI arrested Christopher Lee
Cornell, age 20, of Green Township, Ohio. Investigation on Cornell
revealed that he had completed several steps toward planning and
executing a terrorist attack.
From summer 2014 to January 2015, Cornell established and used

Twitter accounts under the alias Raheel Mahrus Ubaydah, from
which he posted statements, videos, and other content indicating
his support for the Islamic State and violent jihad in North America.
In the fall of 2014, an informant began cooperating with the FBI in
order to obtain favorable treatment with respect to his criminal
exposure on an unrelated case. This informant supplied information
to the FBI about Raheel Mahrus Ubayda, with whom the informant
had first made contact via an instant messaging platform in August
2014. Cornell and the informant met twice in Cincinnati, OH, and
each time, Cornell expressed his intention to plan and carry out
jihad attacks against U.S. government buildings in Washington, DC.
He showed the informant pictures and research on his computer
showing that he had researched the targeted government buildings

in Washington, DC, researched the construction and ingredients to

make pipe bombs, and researched the cost and sourcing for
firearms. He identified the gun store where he intended to purchase
a semi-automatic rifle. On or about January 13 and 14, 2015,
Cornell and the informant discussed and took the final steps in
order to travel to Washington, DC to execute the plan. He was
arrested by law enforcement outside the gun store where he had
just purchased two semi-automatic rifles and 600 rounds of
ammunition with the plan to travel to Washington, DC and kill
employees and officers working in and around the U.S. Capitol.32
32
Criminal Complaint, United States of America v. Christopher Lee Cornell, Case No. 1-15MJ-024. (2015. Jan.
14).United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Retrieved from”
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/01/15/cornell_complaint.pdf

Slide 8-25 Strategic Interventions
This slide lists types of strategic interventions that can disrupt

suicide-bombing attempts. The slide also contains a photo of a
child suicide bomber caught by the Pakistani Army.
Strategic interventions can occur during all but one of the steps
listed previously in this module. Such interventions can occur in one
of three forms:
Destroy the leadership and logistics support bases associated with

groups that sponsor suicide bombers. The best place to start is in
the foreign countries where terrorist groups reside. The U.S.
government, working with allied governments throughout the world,
is aggressively pursuing this strategy. U.S. counterintelligence and
law enforcement agencies can support this effort by identifying
signs of terrorist activity at the local level. This occurs with
intelligence which identify leaders and supporters who are
engaging in preparatory actions before suicide attacks can be
executed.
Disrupt the operational tempo of preparatory actions. The

implementation of effective countermeasures can make it difficult
for terrorists to complete all required preparatory actions. For
example, security measures at potential targets can make it difficult

for terrorists to collect information about possible security

vulnerabilities. Limitations on purchases of explosive precursors or
explosive chemicals can force terrorists to search for alternative
sources of these materials. More effective controls and oversight of
domestic sources of precursors and explosives would play a key
role in disrupting preparatory actions associated with attacks on
domestic targets. Such actions are important because it is likely
that terrorists or other criminals operating in the U.S. would, as a
first option, attempt to obtain their materials from local sources
rather than attempting to transport materials from other countries.
Interdict suicide bombers before they begin their approach to the

target. Interdiction can begin with effective controls at the U.S.
border. Aggressive actions must be taken to identify potential
suicide bombers and deny them entry into the U.S. Within the U.S.,
domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies must collect
information on a systematic basis to identify individuals who have
expressed, through words or actions, a willingness and
determination to be employed by extremist groups as suicide
bombers.
The most effective countermeasures against suicide bombers are

those implemented before a bomber is moving toward the target.
Suspicious behavior must be identified—including signs of bomb
making—to disrupt the tempo and effectiveness of preparatory
behavior by terrorist organizations. Every member of the
emergency response community, from law enforcement officers to
firefighters to emergency managers, must be on the lookout for pre-
attack indicators that suggest the potential for an impending
terrorist attack. Pre-attack indicators that foreshadow possible
suicide-bombing attacks are particularly important if the widespread
use of this tactic in the U.S. for prevention.
Terrorists typically conduct preoperational surveillance before they

execute an attack. Preoperational surveillance collects information
about a target--information that used to decide if a target is
vulnerable and, if it is, what tactics and procedures are likely to
afford terrorists the greatest potential for successful attack
execution.
Preoperational surveillance affords law enforcement and security

personnel some of the best opportunities for identification of pre-
attack indicators.

Slide 8-26 Preoperational Surveillance Indicators
This slide list practices that might indicate terrorists are conducting
preoperational surveillance.
You should be suspicious of any of the observed behaviors that

could indicate preoperational surveillance against a target:
Repetitive or extended presence of an individual or group at a

location where there is no logical explanation. For example, most
tourist destinations attract visitors for a day or two. The presence of
an individual over an extended period is suspicious. Likewise,
someone who lingers at a location for no apparent reason is
suspicious. Recently, it was reported that some individuals with late
afternoon flights were arriving at foreign airports early in the
morning, then spending the day observing the actions of security
personnel and flight crews. Although such behavior may be
innocent, it should be subjected to counter surveillance and
analysis by emergency response agencies.
Video recording or photographing of unusual locations or

structures. For example, a visitor who pays particular attention to
doors and windows that are of common construction (rather than to
noteworthy aspects of a building’s design or construction) should

be viewed as suspicious. In 2002 three men suspected of being al-

Qaeda operatives were arrested in Spain and they possessed a
videotape recording of the Golden Gate Bridge; the recordings
included extensive, close-up views of structural components that
would be of little interest to the average tourist, but of some
potential interest to someone interested in destroying the bridge.
Any questioning about security practices or procedures. Most

tourists or other visitors are only interested in security measures
that influence their access or movement. Detailed questioning,
(beyond “What should I do now, officer?”) should be viewed as
suspicious.
Presence of an individual or group in a restricted location that is

clearly marked. Anyone who ignores posted signs should be
viewed as suspicious.
If you can interfere with attempts by terrorist groups to conduct

preoperational surveillance, you increase the probability that
terrorists will target another location.

Slide 8-27 Countermeasures for Prevention and Deterrence
This slide shows some countermeasures for prevention and

deterrence. Ask the participants to list some other countermeasures
that used for prevention and deterrence of a suicide bombing.
Deterrence can take the form of structures or procedures.

Procedures often involve actions taken by law enforcement or
security forces that would force a suicide bomber to detonate
explosives at a considerable distance from the target, thus limiting
potential casualties and property damage. This condition occurs if
individuals approaching the target must undergo security screening
at a considerable distance from it.
The use of explosive detection canines can be a deterrent.

Terrorists will typically avoid situations where dogs could raise an
alarm before they can make the final approach to a target. Keep in
mind, however, that the presence of a large number of people near
a screening point creates an additional and potentially attractive
target at that location.
Surveillance of areas surrounding a potential target can not only

deter an attack, but also prevent the successful execution of an
attack (in this case, successful meaning detonation of an explosive
device at the intended location with the intended consequences).

Police and military organizations that have experience operating

against suicide bombers have developed tactics to increase the
potential for identification and neutralization of suicide bombers.
These operations typically involve a 50/50 mix of uniformed and
plain-clothes officers or soldiers organized in squads of seven to
ten personnel.
Uniformed personnel provide some deterrence and are responsible

for identification of suspicious persons. Plain-clothes personnel are
responsible for identifying suspicious persons and executing
countermeasures designed to neutralize terrorists before they can
execute a successful attack. These teams train and work together.
They develop internal communications and other operational
procedures that reflect the character of the team and their typical
operational environments. They have the potential to work together
far more effectively than ad hoc organizations assembled to
support a specific event.
Alternatively, structural features that would inhibit the proliferation

of blast effects (the presence of blast walls that separate lanes at
points of ingress and egress (as part of a maze-type construction)
could discourage terrorist leaders from targeting a location. Gates
at amusement parks or similar structures—where large groups of
people typically congregate when trying to access recreational
events or performances—are appropriate locations for maze-type
construction. Areas adjacent to security-screening points in
airports, where lines of people often form, are also appropriate for
this type of construction. Barriers capable of stopping vehicles at a
considerable distance from a target can deter terrorists from
attempting a VBIED attack.
Prevention involves implementing measures that would cause a

terrorist attack to fail. Forcing detonation of concealed explosives in
an open field away from targeted individuals constitutes a failure.
Unfortunately, prevention of suicide-bomb attacks is extremely
difficult to accomplish, particularly after the bomber has initiated
movement toward the target. Deterrence involves implementing
measures that would cause a terrorist group to decide against
attacking a potential target. However, it is possible to deter without
the ability to prevent. Deterrence occurs when the terrorist is
convinced that he probably cannot succeed. That assessment is
based on fact or perception.

Preoperational surveillance involves answering two important

questions:
• Is the target vulnerable to attack?
• What tactics appear to offer the greatest opportunity for
success?
Deterrence is associated with the first question and involves

presenting a security posture that discourages initial targeting. The
best scenario is when terrorists view potential targets as relatively
invulnerable to attack, at least in comparison to other potential
targets. Ideally, all attractive targets should appear well protected
that they afford terrorists little potential for successful execution.

Slide 8-28 Example: Beirut Barracks Bombing, 1983
This slide shows images of the Beirut Barracks Bombing aftermath.
The Beirut suicide attack against United States soldiers on October

23,1983 brought the U.S. in line with modern suicide bombing
tactics. U.S. soldiers were there in Beirut as part of a United
Nations Peacekeeping Force. At this incident, troops were ordered
not to have any rounds chambered in their weapons and not to
make their housing look like a military compound. Based on these
orders, there were very little countermeasures in place to protect
the troops.
On the morning of October 23, 1983 at 6:22 AM, a large vehicle

filled with 12,000 lbs. of TNT crashed through the front gate area,
then crashed into the building and detonated, killing 220 U.S.
Marines and 21 other U.S. Military. The soldiers on post that
morning did not even have time to charge their weapons before the
bomb detonated. The housing barracks were built with a wide-open
first floor parking area, which aided in the collapse of the structure
upon detonation.

The soldiers knew that the perimeter fencing was weak and
vulnerable and would park their vehicles at night around the
perimeter for added protection.33
Lessons learned include:

 Always have your weapons charged and ready
 Provide proper perimeter protection and countermeasures
 Utilize over watch positions
 Install the appropriate chicane and vehicle inspection points
 Ensure that there is an adequate assessment/reactionary
zone between the gate and the asset being protected
33
(2014). FLASHBACK: April 18, 1983: U.S> Embassy Attacked in Beirut. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved
from: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-story-archive/flashback-
april-18-1983-u-s-embassy-bombed-in-beirut.html

Slide 8-29 Indicators of an Attempt to Close In on Target
This slide contains photos of a Palestinian boy caught trying to

cross an Israeli army checkpoint in a suicide vest in March 2004.
Soldiers noticed a bulge under his sweatshirt and his extreme
nervousness, and ordered him to stop while they conducted a
search. During the search they noticed a suicide vest; The suicide
vest was then removed by a remote-controlled robot. In an
interview, the 16-year-old boy said, “When the soldiers stopped me,
I didn’t press the switch. I changed my mind. I didn’t want to die
anymore.”34
Four characteristics offer some potential value in making this critical

identification. First responders should pay particular attention to
anyone in the vicinity of a potential suicide bombing target with
regard to the following:
 outward signs of nervousness
 clothing and personal appearance
 isolation from others in a crowd
 how an individual fits in a situation
34
Matza, Michael. (2004, March 27). Angry uncle leads uproar on the hesitant boy bomber. Retrieved from
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/03/26/1079939847304.html

Because suicide bombings are one-time events in the lives of all

suicide bombers, they are considered novices. Therefore, they
experience some degree of personal anxiety. Will they actually
detonate the explosive when the time comes? Will they be
successful? Will death be painful or will it come quickly, without
personal discomfort? As these questions work their way through
the consciousness of the suicide bomber, anxiety manifests itself in
behavior.
Some of the more obvious signs are excessive perspiration, darting

of eyes or an unwillingness to look others in the eye, nervous
twitches or repetitive behaviors that have no obvious rationale (for
example, an individual continually running his or her hands through
hair). Anyone showing these signs is considered suspicious.
In one case in Israel, a soldier identified a suicide bomber when he

made eye contact with him. The look of terror in the bomber’s eyes
keyed the soldier to the nature of the situation. Keep in mind,
however, that drugs can reduce anxiety, producing more relaxed
behavior. Suicide bombers in some attacks have used drugs or
been forced by their handlers to use drugs.35
In some instances, clothing or overall personal appearance may be

helpful in identifying potential suicide bombers. Anyone improperly
dressed for weather conditions is considered suspicious. An
individual wearing a heavy coat on a hot day could be using the
coat to conceal explosives or other contraband.
However, keep in mind that clothing, by itself, does not establish

the intent of an individual to commit a criminal act. People will dress
varied based on their body temperature, their unique individual
style and/or overall comfort level; in some cases, this may appear
excessive.
Likewise, the absence of heavy clothing does not establish that an

individual is not bearing an explosive device. Some explosive
materials are manufactured in thin, flat sheets that have significant
35
Tanquintic-Misa, E. (24 October 2014). International Business Times: Young Teen Fighter Says ISIS Uses Drugs
on Suicide Bombers to Get Them to Perform the Act. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com.au/young-teen-
fighter-says-isis-uses-drugs-suicide-bombers-get-them-perform-act-1382183.

explosive power. Detonators, fuses, and other devices commonly

found in IEDs are small and easily concealed. Consider, for
example, the shoe bomber36 who tried unsuccessfully to take down
a commercial airliner with an explosive device hidden in his shoe.
Bombers will disguise their devices in all types of clothing apparel,
although in most cases, bombers will wear additional clothing to
help cover their IED.
PBIED suicide bombers are typically not accompanied to the target

location. In any situation where most people are interacting in
groups of two or more, an individual who is standing alone, away
from others in the group, should be viewed as suspicious. For
example, people typically do not go to a movie or similar
entertainment event by themselves. Anyone alone in what is
normally a group environment warrants additional observation.
Finally, anyone who appears different from others at a location

should be viewed as suspicious. For example, a young person in a
crowd of older people probably warrants additional attention;
however, realize that suicide bombers are selected and dress to fit
in.
36
(2009, December 25). Shoe Bomber: Tale of Another Failed Terrorist Attack. CNN. Retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/25/richard.reid.shoe.bomber/

Slide 8-30 Identifying Potential Suicide Bombers
This slide contains pictures of recent suicide bombers.
This slide contains images of recent suicide bombers. Clockwise

from top left:
1) A screen grab from a surveillance video shows the suspected
suicide bomber who attacked an Israeli tourist bus at Burgas
Airport, outside the Black Sea city of Burgas, Bulgaria in July
2012. He was dressed as a tourist and carrying a fake Michigan
driver’s license. Seven people were killed and at least 32 were
wounded.37
2) Sajida al-Rishawi, confessing on Jordanian TV to trying to
detonate a suicide bomb in 2005. She has been on death row in
Jordan since the failed bombing attempt, when she traveled to
Jordan from Ramadi, Iraq with her husband and three other
men. The other bombers succeeded, but al-Rishawi was able to
37
Kulish, Nicholas & Schmitt, Eric, (2012, July 19). Hezbollah is Blames for Attack on Israeli
Tourists in Bulgaria. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/europe/explosion-on-bulgaria-tour-bus-kills-at-least-five-
israelis.html?pagewanted=all

set off her explosive belt , so she fled with survivors, but was
later apprehended.38
3) Reem al-Riyashi, a 22-year-old Palestinian mother of two, who
carried out a suicide mission at a checkpoint in Jerusalem in
January 2004.39
4) Two photographs of a 15-year-old girl called Rania, captured
wearing a vest with 33 lbs. of explosives in a suicide vest in the
al-Qaeda stronghold of Baqouba, 40 miles north of Bagdad,
Iraq, in 2008.40
5) “Jihadi Jake” Bilardi, an Australian suicide bomber who is
considered among the youngest recruited from a Western
nation. He discovered radical Islam on the Internet, was
radicalized after his mother died of cancer, and travelled to Iraq
in August 2014. He died in a coordinated suicide attack in
Ramadi, Iraq in March 2015.41
6) Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha, an American citizen who killed
himself in a suicide bombing in Syria in May 2014.42 Abu-Salha
was from Florida and is believed to be the first American-born
jihadist to die in the Syrian conflict.
Immediate indicators that an attack is in progress are also

important to everyone in the emergency response community. A
law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency medical
technician, posted at a location to support a public event, may be
the first to spot such indicators.
Unfortunately, the immediate indicators of a pending suicide-

bombing attack are not identified often or identified too late.
Terrorists have used clever disguises to hide their identities. For
example, one Palestinian terrorist dyed his hair blonde to disguise
38
Graham-Harrison, Emma. (2015, January 27). The female suicide bomber Isis wants freed in return for Japanese
hostage. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/27/profile-female-
bomber-sajida-al-rishawi
39
Negrea, Sherrie. (2012, April 10). Rutgers Profressor Tackles the Stereotypes of Women
Suicide Bombers. Rutgers Today. Retrieved from http://news.rutgers.edu/issue.2012-
03-28.2735481175/article.2012-04-10.5571236543#.VeX2EPlViko
40
(2008, August 25). Girl, 15, caught with suicide bomb vest. Metro. Retrieved from
http://metro.co.uk/2008/08/25/girl-15-caught-with-suicide-bomb-vest-412118/
41
Owens, J. & Maley, P. (2015, March 12). Aussie Teen, Jake Bilardi, Carries Out Suicide Bombing Says Islamic
State. The Australian. Retrieved from: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/aussie-teen-jake-
bilardi-carries-out-suicide-bombing-says-islamic-state/news-story/bafd57d595452aa84600ece89fe98043.
42
Windrem, Robert. (2014, August 27). American Suicide Bomber Says He Was Watched by FBI,
Inspired by Awlaki. NBC News. Retried from
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/american-suicide-bomber-says-he-was-watched-fbi-inspired-
awlaki-n190606

his identity. Another wore clothing typical of members of the

Orthodox Jewish community to blend into the environment around
his target.
Conventional stereotypes may not be useful in identifying suicide

bombers because bombers can be male or female. They can have
hair and even eye color atypical of terrorist stereotypes.They can
be dressed in any style, color, or manner, and blend in at a target
location.

Slide 8-31 Suicide Bomber Considerations
This slide characterizes the dangers posed by suicide attacks. The

attacks of September 11th are an example of the danger.
Suicide-bombing incidents are virtually impossible to prevent after a

bomber has started moving toward the targeted location. The most
effective countermeasures occur well before the actual attack is
initiated.
Responding to a suspected suicide bomber is also a complex and

dangerous task. Initially, you may not be certain that an individual is
a suicide bomber. Actions that could be taken in other scenarios to
develop the situation are inappropriate in suicide-bombing incidents
because such actions are likely to cause a detonation.
If a suspected suicide bomber has been identified, action must be

taken quickly. Neutralizing a suicide bomber normally requires
application of lethal force. The use-of-force decision in these
situations must be made in accordance with the law and local
procedures.
No one should be permitted to approach a suicide bomber who

appears to have failed in his or her attack. There is always a
danger that the bomber will detonate the device when surrounded

by first responders and civilians. Even after a bomb detonates, first

responders should avoid approaching the seat of the explosion until
bomb technicians or EOD experts have arrived at the scene.

Slide 8-32 Suicide Bombing Pre-detonation Response

Procedures
In any situation where you have identified a potential suicide

bomber, you should take these actions:
 Avoid making direct eye contact with the individual. The act
of making direct eye contact could cause the bomber to
detonate his or her IED.
 Stand back from the individual. Do not make an immediate

approach and do not engage in any negotiating behavior.
(Typically, law enforcement officers try to use verbal
persuasion prior to using any physical force.)
 Notify emergency response agencies as quickly as possible;

however, avoid taking any actions that would be obvious to
the bomber, such as yelling, “Bomb!” Carefully consider the
use of radio transmitters in the vicinity of the suspected
bomber. Remember that transmissions from cellular
telephones, two-way radios, and other emitters can cause
detonation of devices that contain electric blasting caps. In
some cases, rapid notification concerning the threat requires
an emergency responder to assume some risk of accidental
detonation. The determination is a judgment call that can

only be made at the time of the incident.
 If possible, discreetly move others from the immediate

vicinity of the bomber. Explain to people that they have to
move, but avoid telling them that a bomber may be present.
If you tell others of your suspicions, you could produce panic
that, in turn, would cause the bomber to detonate the IED.
 Never take action to restrain the suspected bomber

physically unless you are within arm’s reach of the individual
and you sense that he or she is going to detonate the device
immediately. In other words, do not take such action unless
it is the only alternative remaining.
 Immediate action must be taken to stop a vehicle used by a

suicide bomber to transport explosives to a target. Rules of
engagement or use of force guidelines should be clearly
written and specific. Armed law enforcement and security
personnel must respond quickly to prevent the bomber from
driving a vehicle to the targeted location.
 Local policies and procedures typically include that the

senior law enforcement officer present assume the role of
incident commander once a potential suicide bomber has
been identified. He or she must act quickly in response to
the situation because the suicide bomber can detonate the
IED at any time, in response to any action or provocation on
the part of first responders or others in the crowd.
The incident commander should first call for backup from law
enforcement, fire or rescue, and emergency medical organizations.
The supporting bomb squad or EOD unit should be among the first
organizations notified. Additionally, Local FBI and BATFE offices
should be notified immediately.
Responding emergency units should approach the scene without

lights or siren, in a manner normally used in burglary in progress
calls. The sound of sirens or the appearance of emergency lights
could cause the suicide bomber to detonate the IED.
If the suicide bomber is moving in the direction of the selected

target (toward a large crowd, for example), immediate action should
be taken to stop or slow the approach. If possible, you should use
vehicles or barriers to close off the approach temporarily. If the

bomber cannot be stopped or slowed by an unobtrusive

countermeasure, consideration must be given immediately to use
force to stop the individual or his or her vehicle. Letting the bomber
reach the target only assists him or her in meeting the terrorists’
objectives.
The most difficult decision for the incident commander involves

using force to stop the bomber’s approach. In many cases, lethal
force is the only way to stop the bomber. Using intermediate
options on the use-of-force continuum will likely cause the bomber
to detonate the IED. For example, ordering the individual to stop
will likely cause him or her to detonate the device. Likewise,
attempting to use a police baton or similar device will likely lead to
detonation. To complicate matters, you may be forced to operate
on suspicion rather than hard evidence. Using lethal force against a
suspicious, but innocent, individual represents the worst possible
scenario for an event of this kind.
The decision to use lethal force must be made in accordance with

local agency policies and procedures and any state or local
guidelines that govern use of force.
Once the decision is made to use lethal force, the officer

designated to fire should attempt to kill the suicide bomber with one
shot. A center of mass shot may be ineffective; it may leave the
bomber with sufficient time and strength to detonate the IED. A
more dangerous shot to the head may be required. Striking a
bomber in the head, except from extremely short distances, is
difficult to accomplish without a specialized sniper weapon. A miss
is likely to lead to immediate detonation of the device and could
cause death or injury to innocent bystanders.
Even a shot that causes immediate death may prove ineffective in

suicide-bombing situations. If the bomber is using a dead man
switch (where typically he removes, rather than applies, pressure to
the switch), a detonation will occur immediately after the bomber is
struck. Likewise, terrorist organizations often send another
individual to shadow each suicide bomber. This person’s role is to
cause detonation (using a cellular telephone call or other
transmitting device) to detonate the explosive if the bomber fails to
follow through or is killed or injured in a manner that makes it
impossible to detonate the IED.

For this reason, it is essential that no one move in the direction of a

suicide bomber who appears to have been killed or injured while
approaching his or her target (where a detonation has not
occurred). The individual shadowing the bomber may observe such
movement and delay detonation until a large number of first
responders have approached the apparently disabled bomber.
Bomb technicians or EOD experts should assume control of the
crime scene in situations of this kind, to provide safety to first
responders and citizens.
Immediately after action is taken to stop a suicide bomber,

everyone should be moved away from the scene in accordance
with safe evacuation distances suggested by BATFE.

Slide 8-33 Suicide Bombing Post-detonation Response

Procedures
This slide contains an image showing first responders in New York

City at the scene of the September 11th attacks.
If a bomb is detonated, the response situation rapidly becomes a

rescue operation where life-safety issues become paramount. At
the same time, however, all responders must ensure that actions
taken at the scene do not imperil the follow-on criminal investigation
that may play a key role in identifying individuals not at the scene
who were involved in planning and orchestrating the attack.
There is always the potential for a multiple attack and/or additional

devices targeting first responders. The following are potential
events that may lead you to identify an additional attacker:
• Surveillance of attack site to study first responders’ behavior

and plan for future attacks.
• Diversion devices set off to divert first responder resources.
• Synchronized serial attacks implemented in stages, in close
physical or temporal proximity to increase casualties of first
responders, including law enforcement and medical
personnel.

• An additional attack is likely to occur within twenty minutes

and be carried out along the evacuation route of casualties
or near the first targeted area.
The following actions should be taken in most instances where a

detonation occurs:
 If a first responder is injured before they can provide life

safety measures, they will be of no assistance to survivors of
the bombing. First responders should be aware of potential
hazards before entering a bombing scene.
 Since hazards may exist, first responders should not

approach the vicinity of ground zero until cleared to do so by
appropriate authority, who could be a senior police, a fire
official, or a bomb technician. Think safety, safety, safety.
The senior fire rescue or EMS representative (where such
organizations are independent of the fire service) should
typically assume the role of incident commander if a
detonation occurs and first responders or citizens have been
injured in the attack.
 Render aid to survivors and evacuate them from the area.

Use mass casualty incident protocols, if available and
appropriate. Rapid and effective actions to locate and
evaluate the injured, and apply appropriate medical
treatment, are the principal means of mitigating effects of a
bombing that could not be stopped.
 Emergency medical personnel should remember that some

serious bomb injuries (such as those involving blast-
pressure damage to internal organs) might not be obvious
during the time immediately following the detonation. For
that reason, anyone in the immediate vicinity of the
detonation should undergo a medical evaluation before
release, even in cases where there is no apparent injury.
 In addition, survivors of suicide bombers are often exposed

to body parts (bomb fragments are common) and body fluids
of the bomber. Medical evidence suggests that disease can
be spread from the bomber to survivors in this manner.
Israeli medical personnel now routinely immunize survivors
against hepatitis and are considering prophylactic measures
for other diseases.

 Notify federal, state, and local agencies that have an interest

in bombing incidents. At the federal level, notification
includes the FBI and BATFE. State police, state and local
emergency management personnel, and police and fire
agencies from adjacent jurisdictions should also be notified
as soon as possible.
Contact the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to request

that airspace overhead be closed for at least a one-mile
radius. This prohibition should include law enforcement
aircraft for safety purposes.
Area emergency rooms should also be notified to mobilize

resources to treat casualties. Mutual aid agreements should
be implemented if local resources cannot handle the total
response requirement.
 Law enforcement personnel should immediately establish a

crime-scene perimeter. As a rule of thumb, the crime scene
should extend, at a minimum, one and one-half times the
distance from the seat of the explosion as the furthest
obvious piece of evidence, such as bomb component and
residue. When in doubt, extend the crime scene. Do not
reduce the size of the crime scene until bomb technicians
and/or EOD experts arrive on the scene and approve the
adjustment. Limit vehicle and personnel access to the area.
Ensure that bystanders are not in position to view

emergency response operations in the immediate vicinity of
the seat of the explosion; an bystander could observe the
response to time the detonation of other explosive devices in
the area. Media should not be allowed to record the actions
of first responders, particularly during the initial period of the
response. Information obtained from videotapes, film, or
other storage media could be used by terrorists in planning
subsequent attacks.
 Begin an immediate search for secondary/additional devices

in the vicinity of the seat of the explosion and adjacent to
areas used for triage or holding witnesses. Pay attention to
other hazards, including risk of structural collapse, or
infrastructure hazards like damaged gas, electrical, water, or
sewage systems.

 Establish a unified command post with representatives of

law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical
organizations (and other appropriate emergency response
agencies) a safe distance from the seat of the explosion.
Search the area around the command post for additional
devices before you occupy the area. Implement integrated or
unified command procedures.
 Establish a formal record of all actions taken at the crime

and blast scene. Record information concerning treatment
locations of survivors, names and other identifying
information on witnesses, emergency vehicles entering and
leaving the crime scene, location of any evidence identified
by first responders, and other information that could be
useful to investigators and incident response managers.
 Identify and conduct initial interviews of witnesses and of

survivors, if possible (survivor interviews should not interfere
with emergency medical treatment). Normally, initial
interviews are conducted by law enforcement officers;
however, in exigent circumstances, firefighters or other first
responders can assist. If possible, interviews should be
recorded in audio and video formats. First responders can
also become witnesses based on what they saw, heard, and
experienced.
 Photograph the overall crime scene as soon as possible to

document conditions at the scene prior to initiation of
comprehensive emergency response operations.

Slide 8-34 Follow Policies
A first responder’s worse nightmare is going from the normalcy of

every given day to an unprepared situation of a suspected suicide
bomber. Despite effective pre-attack interdiction programs,
experience dictates there will be instances when a suicide bomber
will successfully evade early detection and will appear at a critical
detection point, such as a checkpoint, roadblock, or screening
point. In such situations, there are indicators that will aid the first
responder in evaluation of the immediate situation.
Agencies should include procedures and use of force policies for

handling a suicide bombing incident. If an agency does not have a
policy for suicide bombing incidents, any agency member who is
also a member of the International Association Chiefs of Police
(IACP) can obtain a model policy on suicide bombers. Access to
the policy can be found on the IACP’s website or by contacting the
IACP.

SPECIAL SITUATION CASE STUDIES
Slide 8-35 Unique Response Challenges – Case Studies
The class will now review two short case studies about the
Columbine High School attack in April 1999,43 and the suicide
bombing/hostage incident at Discovery Channel Headquarters in
2010.44 The case studies are special situation incidents and the
information in this module will assist you in understanding and
responding to these types of incidents. Special situation incidents
are complex and need particular attention.
43
(1999). U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Repot Serie: Wanton Violence at Columbine High School. U. S.
Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-
128.pdf
44
Discovery Channel Post Incident Analysis. Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Service.

COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL CASE BRIEF
Slide 8-36 Columbine High School Case Brief
This slide shows a photo of the parking lot and school entrance at
Columbine High School.
At approximately 11:15 am on April 20, 1999, Eric Harris, 18, and

Dylan Klebold, 17, went on a shooting spree at Columbine High
School in Littleton, CO, where they were students of the graduating
class. Harris and Klebold killed 13 people and wounded over 20
others before turning their weapons on themselves and committing
suicide.
The photo on this slide was taken around 4:30 pm, at which point,
the school and parking lot were still an active scene. Bomb squad
vehicles and fire trucks can be seen in the upper left corner of the
photo. The center of the photo shows a two-story portion of the
school. The upper floor is the library and the lower floor is the
cafeteria, where most of the incident activity took place.

Slide 8-37 Perpetrators
This slide shows photos of the suspects: Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold.
At Columbine High, Harris and Klebold were involved in school play

productions, operated video productions, and became computer
assistants maintaining the school's computer server.
Prior to the school shooting, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold got into
trouble with the law for various reasons. In January 1998, Harris
and Klebold were charged with mischief, breaking and
entering, trespassing, and theft. While working as pizza delivery
employees, Harris and Klebold were known to have set off bombs
outside the store, but no one turned them in for this type of
activity.45
Starting in April 1998, a short time after Harris and Klebold were
convicted of breaking into a van, Harris began keeping a journal. It
was then that the two began formulating plans to attack Columbine
High School, as reflected in Harris’ journals.
45
CNN. (2000). Table of Contents: Columbine High School Incident. Retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/columbine.cd/Pages/TOC.htm

In December 1998, Harris and Klebold made a video for a school

project titled Hitmen For Hire. In this video, the two swore, yelled at
the camera, made violent statements, and acted out shooting and
killing students in the hallway of their school.
Before the attacks, Robyn Anderson, an 18-year-old Columbine

student and friend of Klebold, purchased two shotguns and Hi-Point
carbine for Klebold and Harris because they were both underage at
the time. After illegally acquiring the weapons, both Klebold and
Harris sawed off their shotguns and collected explosives while
working at a fireworks stand. From there, Klebold and Harris
received pyrotechnic powder, which they used to create the cricket
IEDs they used throughout the school.
Armed with Intratec TEC-DC9, Hi-Point 995 Carbine, Savage 67H

pump-action shotgun, Stevens 311D double-barreled sawed-off
shotgun, 99 explosives, and 4 knives, Klebold and Harris intended
to carry out their attack plan.

Slide 8-38 The Plan
This slide outlines the main points of the suspects’ plan for their
attack on Columbine High School. The slide contains hand-drawn
images highlighting details of Harris and Klebold’s plan.
Through journals left behind by Harris and Klebold, investigators

eventually discovered that the perpetrators had been planning for a
year to bomb the high school in an attack similar to the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
Harris and Klebold’s plan was to draw first responders to a

diversion away from the high school before enacting their attack on
the school. They intended to arrive at the school separately, with
timed IEDs ready to be set in their vehicles. Once at the school,
they would enter the cafeteria with two IEDs hidden in duffel bags.
The IEDs to be used in the cafeteria contained 20-pound propane
tanks, which would detonate and cause a fuel-air explosion causing
the students who were not incapacitated to run outside, where
Harris and Klebold had set up a cone of fire to shoot the students.
The perpetrators would then return to the school and continue
causing mayhem while responders dealt with the chaos. Outside,
vehicle IEDs would injure and kill responders while Harris and
Klebold burned down the school.

Harris created the map on this slide indicating the placement of the
perpetrators’ IEDs, with specific details in the margin. The left side
of the diagram contains times and how many students would be
inside the cafeteria at specific times:
 10:30-10:50, 60-80 students
 10:55-10:58, lunch ladies bring food #2 door
 10:55-11:05, 140-180 students
 11:07-11:08, 200-220 students
 11:08, #3 door opens
 11:09, #1 door opens
 11:09, 250-270 students
 11:10, 270-300 students
 11:11, 300-350 students
 11:12, 350-450 students
 11:14, 500+ students
Stars on the map indicate where the IEDs were placed, which were
set to go off at 11:17 AM. Circles on the map represent the tables in
the cafeteria.

Slide 8-39 Timed IEDs
This slide shows an aerial photo of the school with icons indicating
where the suspects planned to detonate IEDs. The bottom photo is
of one of the propane tank IEDs found in the cafeteria.
After arriving to the school at approximately 11:10 am, Harris and

Klebold carried two bags into the school, headed for the cafeteria.
With alarm clocks set for the IEDs to detonate at 11:17, the
suspects planted their bombs. As visible in the aerial photo on this
slide, Harris and Klebold had also previously placed two IEDs in
their vehicles in the parking lot, the design of which included 20-
pound propane tanks and flammables. These devices were
constructed similar to the devices used in the cafeteria and as a
diversion in the greenbelt. The vehicle-borne IEDs were intended to
injure and kill the first responders as they addressed the incident.
All of the IEDs were to be initiated by an Estes Rocket Motor using
an electrical current. The timer for these IEDs was an alarm clock,
set to detonate at noon. Ultimately, none of these devices
functioned as Harris and Klebold intended.

Slide 8-40 Columbine Event
This slide contains a photo of the west entrance of the school (left)
where the incident began. The photo on the right shows Daniel
Rohrbough on the sidewalk outside the school after being shot and
killed by Harris and Klebold.
With the bombs in place, Harris and Klebold left the school and
went back outside to their cars to wait for the bombs to go off.
When the bombs failed to detonate as planned, Harris and Klebold,
dressed in trench coats and proceeded to shoot students near the
west entrance of the school. They then moved into the school,
where they next gunned down students and teachers in the library.
According to dispatch logs, the incident began at 11:15 am when

Harris and Klebold first shot students outside the school near the
cafeteria and library. Two students were initially killed and several
others were wounded. First-in fire personnel and deputies reported
a chaotic scene: a number of individuals with gunshot wounds and
shots from inside the school being fired at rescue personnel.
The cafeteria was the only place where there were video cameras
set up. The camera system was a VHS system and the video would
jump from camera to camera. There is no video of the Harris and

Klebold placing the bags in the cafeteria because it appears the

audio/video person was changing the VHS tapes with new ones.
By approximately 11:35 am, Harris and Klebold had killed 12
students and a teacher and wounded over 20 others.
 Rachel Scott, age 17. Killed by shots to the head, torso, and leg
alongside the west entrance of the school.
 Richard Castaldo, age 17. Shot in the arm, chest, back, and
abdomen alongside the west entrance to the school.
 Daniel Rohrbough, age 15. Fatally injured by shots to the
abdomen and leg on the west staircase, shot through the upper
chest at the base of the same staircase.
 Sean Graves, age 15. Shot in the back, foot, and abdomen on
the west staircase.
 Lance Kirklin, age 16. Critically injured by shots to the leg, neck,
and jaw on the west staircase.
 Michael Johnson, age 15. Shot in the face, arm, and leg to the
west of the staircase.
 Mark Taylor, age 16. Shot in the chest, arms, and leg to the
west of the staircase.
 Anne-Marie Hochhalter, age 17. Shot in the chest, arm,
abdomen, back, and left leg near the cafeteria's entrance.
 Brian Anderson, age 17. Injured near the west entrance by
flying glass.
 Patti Nielson, age 35. Hit in the shoulder by shrapnel near the
west entrance.
 Stephanie Munson, age 17. Shot in the ankle inside the north
hallway.
 William David Sanders, age 47. Died of blood loss after being
shot in the neck and back inside the south hallway.

Slide 8-41 Diagram of SRO Contact
This slide contains a diagram of the west entrance of the school

where the School Resource Officer (SRO) exchanged gunfire with
Harris.
School Resource Officer Deputy Neil Gardner, who was assigned

to the school, was notified by the school radio that he was needed
at the senior parking lot. Approximately one minute later, he heard
over the police radio that a female was down, which he assumed
meant that a vehicle had hit someone. While exiting his vehicle, he
heard over the police radio, “Neil, there’s a shooter in the school.”
Harris saw Deputy Gardner and began to shoot at him with a rifle.
Deputy Gardner returned fire with his service handgun, but was
unable to hit Harris. There was a second deputy with the SRO,
Deputy Paul Smoker, who was a motorcycle officer. He had also
responded and attempted to assist the injured when he observed
Harris and SRO Gardner in a gunfight. Deputy Smoker returned fire
and Harris retreated into the school. Klebold was inside the school
when Harris engaged the deputies.

Slide 8-42 Initial Response
This slide contains two photos of the law enforcement response to

the attacks. The top photo shows police officers in a gunfight with
the perpetrators inside the school. The bottom image shows
students fleeing the school. The map on the right shows the
distance between the location of the diversionary devices and
Columbine High School.
Sometime before their attack at the school, Harris and Klebold

placed two bags containing IEDs on a path located in a greenbelt
area adjacent to a residential area, approximately three miles from
the high school. A surveyor came upon the bags and moved the
bags off the trail, so he could complete his work. The bags
contained an Estes rocket igniter, battery, alarm clock, and a
propane bottle, a device built according to exact instructions in the
Anarchist Cookbook.
One of the IEDs on the path partially detonated and caused a fire.
The devices did not detonate as planned likely because the IEDs
needed the switch to have constant contact in order to detonate
correctly. Two district deputies and the Fire Department responded
at 11:21 am and put out the fire. Later, it was determined that these
two IEDs were intended to be diversionary devices while Harris and
Klebold executed their plan at the high school.

At approximately the same time, first-in units arrived to Columbine

and began to secure the perimeter around the school. In 1999, the
protocol was to contain the situation and wait for SWAT.
As officers arrived, they began to exchange gunfire with Harris and

Klebold, until the two shooters entered the school to continue their
mayhem by shooting and dispersing IEDs.

Slide 8-43 Library Massacre
This slide shows a photo of police helping injured Patrick Ireland

escape from the library. The bottom photo shows evidence
recovered from the library.
Teacher David Sanders was shot at the top of the stairs while he
was attempting to move students to a safe area. Students pulled
him into a classroom, where one student, who was a Boy Scout,
attempted to keep Sanders alive. Sanders survived for a while, but
died because of his injuries and lack of emergency care.
Outside, law enforcement surrounded the school and waited for

SWAT to arrive. In 1999, law enforcement tactics were different and
the “Active Shooter” tactics were not known, which is why officers
did not enter the school until SWAT arrived.
While outside, law enforcement was unaware of the damage Harris

and Klebold were doing inside the school. As law enforcement
waited for SWAT to arrive, the following students were shot in the
library:
 Evan Todd, age 15. Sustained minor injuries from the splintering
of a desk he was hiding under.

 Kyle Velasquez, age 16. Killed by gunshot wounds to the head

and back.
 Patrick Ireland, age 17. Shot in the arm, leg, head, and foot.
 Daniel Steepleton, age 17. Shot in the thigh.
 Makai Hall, age 18. Shot in the knee.
 Steven Curnow, age 14. Killed by a shot to the neck.
 Kacey Ruegsegger, age 17. Shot in the hand, arm, and
shoulder.
 Cassie Bernall, age 17. Killed by a shotgun wound to the head.
 Isaiah Shoels, age 18. Killed by a shot to the chest.
 Matthew Kechter, age 16. Killed by a shot to the chest.
 Lisa Kreutz, age 18. Shot in the shoulder, hand, arms, and
thigh.
 Valeen Schnurr, age 18. Injured with wounds to the chest, arms,
and abdomen.
 Mark Kintgen, age 17. Shot in the head and shoulder.
 Lauren Townsend, age 18. Killed by multiple gunshot wounds to
the head, chest, and lower body.
 Nicole Nowlen, age 16. Shot in the abdomen.
 John Tomlin, age 16. Killed by multiple shots to the head and
neck.
 Kelly Fleming, age 16. Killed by a shotgun wound to the back.
 Jeanna Park, age 18. Shot in the knee, shoulder, and foot.
 Daniel Mauser, age 15. Killed by a single shot to the face.
 Jennifer Doyle, age 17. Shot in the hand, leg, and shoulder.
 Austin Eubanks, age 17. Shot in the hand and knee.
 Corey DePooter, age 17. Killed by shots to the chest and neck.

Slide 8-44 Shooters in Cafeteria
This slide contains an image from security footage of Harris and

Klebold in the cafeteria.
After shooting students in the library, Harris and Klebold went back
to the cafeteria and attempted to set off the IEDs by shooting at
them, which failed to work. Harris and Klebold were attempting to
set the school on fire, however the emergency sprinkler system
prevented this.
Once again, Harris and Klebold returned upstairs to the library.

Upon seeing that rescue personnel were attempting to rescue
students, Harris and Klebold began shooting at the paramedics and
again engaged in a gunfight with law enforcement. Then, Harris
and Klebold walked around the school throwing “crickets” (small
IEDs made of an empty CO2 canister filled with gunpowder and
initiated with a fuse) and pipe bomb IEDs. They never entered any
other classrooms and did not shoot anyone else after they left the
library.

Slide 8-45 Suicide in the Library
This slide contains a photo of Harris and Klebold in the library after
they committed suicide.
At approximately 12:02, the shooters returned to the library with the

bodies of those they killed strewn about the floor. Harris and
Klebold went to the west windows and opened fire one last time on
the police outside. Approximately six minutes later, they walked
behind some bookshelves to end their lives. Art teacher Patti
Nielson, who had locked herself inside a break room with a student
and a library staff member, overheard Harris and Klebold shout out
in unison: “One! Two! Three!” followed immediately by gunshots.
Harris fired his shotgun through the roof of his mouth while Klebold
shot himself in his left temple.
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold committed suicide after murdering a

total of 12 students and one teacher. They injured 21 additional
people, with three others being injured while attempting to escape
the school.
After Harris and Klebold shot and killed themselves, as previously

stated, the school and parking lot remained an active scene well
into the evening. At the end of the day, five SWAT teams searched

the school, with the bomb squad entering the school at

approximately 4:30pm.
For weeks following the attacks, local law enforcement and the FBI
investigated additional threats and Internet leads, conducted
witness interviews, and processed physical evidence.

Slide 8-46 Bomb in Vehicle/Unexploded Bomb in Cafeteria
This slide contains photos of the bombs used during the incident.
The next few slides illustrate some of the physical evidence and
information that law enforcement collected in regards to the attacks.
The photo on left of this slide was taken of the backseat of

Klebold’s vehicle after the pan disrupter was used. One 20-pound
propane tank IED was discovered on the back seat and one was
found in the trunk.
The photo on the right shows a duffle bag containing an IED found
in the cafeteria. On the day of the incident, a bomb-sniffing dog
missed this IED as it searched the school. In an environment where
there are flammable liquids and exploded devices, bomb dogs can
miss explosives. Ultimately, this IED was not discovered until two
days later by a bomb technician during evidence collection
operations.

Slide 8-47 Columbine IED Hazard
This slide contains a photo of one of the undetonated IEDs

Harris and Klebold placed in the cafeteria.
It is estimated that the perpetrators created 99 IEDs total, including

six of which were timed. Two were VBIEDs, two were diversionary
IEDs, and two more were set to start the attack by exploding in the
school’s cafeteria. 76 IEDs were found in the school, 13 in the
perpetrators’ vehicles, and two at their homes. The only timed IED
that worked was one of the diversionary IEDs, however, it did not
function properly.

Slide 8-48 VBIED Hazard to First Responders
This slide contains a photo of Klebold’s car (top) and the IED items
recovered from Klebold’s vehicle (bottom), which included anti-
freeze, propane tanks, gas containers full of gasoline, Molotov
cocktail containers, and 1-pound propane bottles.
The VBIEDs in the perpetrators’ vehicles were set to go off at 12

noon. These VBIEDs were designed to pose a problem for the first
responders. When the perpetrators were shooting at rescue
personnel and engaged in a second gun battle with law
enforcement, it appeared the suspects were trying to draw first
responders closer to the VBIEDs. The VBEIDs were set up where a
pipe bomb would explode and make a hole in the propane tank,
which would cause a bigger explosion as a fuel-air explosion. The
IEDs failed to function as the perpetrators intended, but had they
functioned as planned, they would have detonated with first
responders in the area and while rescuers were treating the injured.

Slide 8-49 Bomb Types
This slide shows examples of the types of bombs used by the

suspects: pipe bombs and cricket devices.
The items photographed on this slide were located inside the

suspects’ vehicle. The left photo shows pipe bombs with BBs and
nails duct taped to the outside of the pipe. The photo on the right
shows a cricket style IED.
The “cricket style” IED were the most common IED encountered
throughout the incident area. These “cricket style” IEDs were made
up of a CO2 cartridge filled with pyrotechnic powder, strike
anywhere matches, a fuse, and BBs duct taped to the outside.
These IEDs were found throughout the school, but it is unknown
how many functioned properly.

Slide 8-50 Attempt at Fuel-Air Explosion (FAE) IED
This slide shows a photo of a recreation of a device used by the

suspects.
The bomb photographed on this slide is a recreation used during a

press conference after the incident: A propane bottle with cricket
IED duct taped to the outside.

Slide 8-51 Lessons Learned
One of the important lessons we learn from this incident is that

bomb techs should train with SWAT. During this incident, SWAT
team members were operating around live IEDs, some of which
were moved during the operation. Furthermore, as paramedics
checked the bodies, a doctor came to the scene to verify the
deaths. In the process, the doctor kicked a few live IEDs, which
caused additional hazards for him and others around him because
this could have initiated the devices.
It is important for first responders to know the job responsibilities

and capabilities of those with whom they may interact while
responding to emergencies.
Another lesson learned is that agencies should notify the family

members of the deceased as soon as possible. At Columbine,
family members of the deceased knew their loved ones were
missing for almost 24 hours before they were officially notified of
the deaths.

Slide 8-52 Lessons Learned (cont.)
This incident, shed light on valuable information on the search

process after an incident. When searching items like backpacks,
the items should be marked after they are thoroughly searched. All
locker doors at a school should be left open after they, too are
searched. It is also important to note that first responders should
not completely rely on bomb dogs; as previously stated, the bomb
dogs used during this incident missed one of the timed IEDs that
had been placed in the cafeteria.
First responders should have communications for SWAT teams

covering the bomb squad.
As leaders, you should require your team members to go home and

rest and that everyone receive PTSD counseling.

DISCOVERY CHANNEL HEADQUARTERS CASE STUDY
Slide 8-53 Discovery Channel Headquarters Incident

Overview
This slide contains a photo of a police officer outside the Discovery

Channel building.
At approximately 1:00 pm, on September 1, 2010 in Silver Spring,

Maryland, multiple 911 calls were made reporting a man with a gun
and explosives strapped to his body in lobby of the Discovery
Channel building. It was reported that shots had been fired and
hostages were taken. Visual confirmation of reports was made
when first responders arrived within minutes of the call. A PBIED
incident with hostages was confirmed by first responders.46
46
Discovery Channel Post Incident Analysis. Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Service

Slide 8-54 The Building: Discovery Communications

Headquarters
This slide shows two photos: The top photo is of the front of the
Discovery Headquarters. The bottom photo is an aerial view of the
building.
Discovery Communications is a large nonfiction media company

reaching more than 1.5 billion cumulative subscribers in over 180
countries. The headquarters for Discovery Communications is in a
high-rise building in Silver Spring, Maryland, an urban and
populous area northwest of Washington, DC. At the time of the
attack, the building held approximately 1,900 employees and 100
daycare children. The lobby of this building is open to the public.

Slide 8-55 Video: The Incident Begins
This slide contains video surveillance footage of the front lobby’s

entrance where the suspect entered and took hostages. This slide
also contains an audio clip of the initial dispatch call.
On September 1, 2010 at approximately 1:00 PM, the Montgomery

County Police Emergency Communications Center received
numerous calls advising of a shooting in the lobby of the Discovery
Channel Building located at 1 Discovery Place, Silver Spring,
Maryland. Within minutes, police units arrived on scene where the
unimaginable was verified.
A security guard called 911 and said, “You’re probably going to

need a sniper.” He described the suspect, said his name was Lee,
that he had an IED strapped to him, and that he was holding three
hostages.

Slide 8-56 Initial Response: Officer Ed Paden
This slide contains a photograph of Officer Paden in uniform and a

photograph of him on the day of the Discovery Channel
Headquarters incident.
Off the clock and in plain clothing, Officer Ed Paden heard the 911
call and responded to the scene, being one of the first officers to
respond. He was able place himself behind a wall in a position
where he could see the suspect and pass on vital information to
other officers until he was relieved by the SWAT team. Officer
Paden relayed the following information that allowed first
responders to contain the area and start evacuations:
“I am directly behind the suspect — behind a wall — I have visual

of his apparatus,” Paden reports in hushed tones. He describes in
detail the canisters Lee had strapped to his body. “Looks like two
canisters on the outside … flashing light in his left hand … almost
like a death grip … uh, red, luminous light … same thing on his
front, strapped around his waist.”

The initial officers to arrive secured the Discovery building and the
immediate area. Officer Paden was awarded the Congressional
Badge of Bravery for his actions.47
47
(2012, January 9). Officer honored for bravery in Discovery standoff. Washington’s Top News. Retrieved from
http://wtop.com/news/2012/01/officer-honored-for-bravery-in-discovery-standoff/slide/1/

Slide 8-57 Initial Response (Cont.)
This slide contains a photograph of Montgomery County Police

officers on perimeter blocking an intersection around the Discovery
Channel building.
The Immediate Action Team contained the suspect in the lobby of

the facility which allowed them access to the video surveillance
room. This was critical in acquiring real time intelligence of the
suspect, his actions, and the device strapped around him. Bomb
technicians were notified and responded; a perimeter was set
around the building; and command and staging areas were
established. Multiple outside agencies provided assistance and a
media briefing area was set up. Ultimately, an Emergency
Response Team callout was initiated and communication with Mr.
Lee was established.

Slide 8-58 Discovery Incident
This slide contains photos of the evacuation of children and

employees from the daycare.
Police evacuated the building with Fast Action Teams clearing each
floor. A total of 1,900 people, including 100 children from the
daycare center, were evacuated from the building.

Slide 8-59 Suspect: James Jae Lee
This slide contains photos of James Jae Lee protesting the

Discovery Channel on several different occasions. The slide also
shows the Lee’s Myspace page, where he expressed his concerns
about overpopulation and environmental degradation.
Lee, would pay homeless subjects to carry his signs protesting the
Discovery Channel. He was arrested in 2008 and ordered to stay
away from the Discovery Channel building.

Slide 8-60 Video: News Clip
This slide contains a video of an ABC news clip about Lee.

Slide 8-61 Initial Negotiations
This slide contains a photo of the suspect and a Discovery Channel

building security guard who was being held hostage.
On this audio clip, the negotiator is attempting to speak with Lee,

who was described as being agitated at times. Ultimately,
negotiations went on for two hours.

Slide 8-62 Suspect Begins to Doubt Living
This slide contains a photo of Lee inside the lobby.
During this audio clip, it is clear that Lee was highly agitated while
talking to the negotiators.

Slide 8-63 Video: Hostage Action and Tactical Response
This slide contains a video sequence specifically focused on the

hostage situation during this incident.

Slide 8-64 Discovery Building Secure, Subject Neutralized
This slide shows crime scene photographs of Lee after he was shot
and killed during a tactical response in the Discovery Channel
headquarters front lobby.
The hostage action resulted in a tactical response by the SWAT

team. Lee pointed his handgun at one of the hostages before police
shot him.

Slide 8-65 The Device
This slide shows a photograph of the IED device the Lee was
wearing during the incident.
The Montgomery County Bomb Squad used robots to remove the

device from Lee’s body. The robot then moved the device to a
designated location that was contained by concrete walls. The
items were then rendered safe using various disruption techniques.

Slide 8-66 Incident Investigation
This slide contains photos of evidence located in Lee’s home: a

handgun packaging, diagrams, and bomb making materials.
After the incident, a search warrant was served on Lee’s residence,

revealing some important information. Implements used to make
devices, detailed assembly and operation instructions for devices,
and bomb making videos were all recovered from Lee’s home.
Besides bomb making materials and instructions, live pipe bombs
were also recovered from his residence. Finally, an Outlook
calendar marked “The End” on September 1, 2010.

Slide 8-67 Video: Lee Testing IED
This slide contains a video of Lee describing the pipe bomb IED he
made.
This video demonstrates aspects of the nine phases of a terrorist

attack.

SUMMARY
Slide 8-68 Summary
This slide is an opportunity for instructors to summarize the key

points in the module.

Slide 8-69 Questions?
This slide is an opportunity for participants to ask questions about

the module content and the case studies.


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Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings

Training Support Package Participant Guide

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-1

MODULE 8 UNIQUE RESPONSE CHALLENGES –

8-2 Identify the nine phases of a suicide bombing attack.

8-3 Identify unique characteristics of potential targets for a suicide bombing

8-4 Identify effective countermeasures and procedures to prevent or deter a

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-2

Instructor to Participant Ratio

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-3

Key Points/Learning Objectives: Used to highlight each time lesson content is

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-4

Slide 8-1 IRTB Module 8: Unique Response Challenges

This slide displays the Module 8 title slide.

This module addresses the unique challenges and response

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-5

Slide 8-2 Terminal Learning Objective

At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to discuss

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-6

Slide 8-3 Enabling Learning Objectives

This slide contains the Enabling Learning Objectives and should be

The Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) for this module are:

8-1 Identify characteristics of active shooter/hostile event

8-2 Identify the nine phases of a suicide bombing attack.

8-3 Identify unique characteristics of potential targets for a

8-4 Identify effective countermeasures and procedures to

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-7

Slide 8-4 Course Map

This slide depicts the Course Map.

Module 8 is the third and final module that focuses on response to

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-8

Unique Response Challenges

Slide 8-5 Unique Response Challenges

This slide shows illustrations of unique response challenges using a

This slide contains images from the school shooting/bombing

All terrorist incidents involving energetic materials are unique

However, most pre- and post-detonation situations have common

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-9

events also share some common characteristics. Despite these

For purposes of this course, two unique challenges have been

Active Shooter/Hostile Events

The first, active shooter/hostile events, are incidents where the

This incident serves as an example of tactics that terrorists

Suicide Bombing Attacks

The second unique response challenge is a suicide bombing

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-10

The only successful terrorist suicide bombing events that occurred

Intelligence agencies and/or law enforcement agencies through

Although there have been other suicide bombings in the United

In Bath, Michigan 1927, Andrew Kehole was upset about an

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-11

Slide 8-6 Active Shooter/Hostile Events

Active shooter/hostile events which can be encountered are listed

Planning for and responding to events of this kind are addressed in

As always, first responders should follow their local

Attacks Using Multiple Weapon Types

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-12

in November 20084 and the series of coordinated attacks on

Hostage and Barricade Situations

Response Timeline Accelerated

At Columbine High School, law enforcement officers did not mount

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 8-13

The critical need for accelerated response time magnifies the