Chapter 3:

The emerging link between these two poses a serious threat to peace in the international

community (Ljujic et al., 2017). These challenges are getting worse as the nexus is progressing Commented [G1]: Inserted: the

from single co-existence towards a symbiotic relationship. Europe is the main example of a close Commented [G2]: Inserted: a

link between petty crimes and terrorism where individuals on the margins of society are most

susceptible to radicalization. While in other geographic locations such as Asian nations, the

relationship between organized crimes and terrorism is transformed to one of symbiosis and

convergence (Corner & Gill, 2017). In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, local conditions work as

the catalyst for both criminals and terrorists to carry out their activities. Commented [G3]: Inserted: the

South Asia is viewed as a key arena in the fight against militant religious extremism, most

especially in Pakistan. Pakistan has been described as the most dangerous place on earth (Shaefer

et al., 2016). One reason for this is terrorism which is enrooting political instability, questions of

nuclear surety, civil violence, religious extremism with intolerance attitude and its contentious

relationship with neighboring India. Amidst the myriad books and articles about Pakistan’s

terrorist dilemma, it is imperative to probe how terrorism became a significant part of Pakistan’s

existential reality. The holistic methodology will impend the evolution of terrorism in Pakistan

which brought Pakistan to its current position. On probing, it reveals that certain international

and national factors are justified.

The roots of terrorism in the country can be observed since the nativity. In the present situation,

it undertakes the examination into concrete and lucid periods of terrorism. A terrorist group such

as Taliban and Haqqani networks mutually cooperates with each other to obtain mutual benefits. Commented [G4]: Inserted: A t
Commented [PN5]: This research is pro Pakistan not anti
The list of their benefits includes resembling of organized criminal groups which are further Pakistan/
Commented [G13]: Deleted:T
motivated by a collection of profits such as integrity, vengeance and religious dogma. Commented [G14]: Deleted:s
Commented [G16]: Deleted:through
Theoretically, terrorism and organized crimes differentiate on the basis of their respective Commented [G6]: Inserted: by a
Commented [G7]: Inserted: are
objectives and modalities. Generally, terrorism includes those activities that deliberately Commented [G15]: Deleted:is

encounter the state authority and pursue political change through violence. Contrary to this,

organized crimes do not target political change but are concerned with profits. Organized crimes

target disruptions in the state to create, expand or maintain conditions that are beneficial for their

operations. While these two are theoretically different, in reality, such differences are not very Commented [G8]: Inserted: ,
Commented [G9]: Inserted: ,
much clear. Terrorists may directly or indirectly engage in criminal activities such as trafficking

of arms, person, drugs, and artifacts. Commented [G10]: Inserted: ,

Commented [G11]: Inserted: ,
Besides relationships between criminal and terrorists and their activities, the structure of these Commented [G12]: Deleted:n

organizations and their logistics requirements also scrutinized. Clark (2016) reported the study Commented [G17]: Inserted: the

conducted on the financing of 40 Jihadis cells that have plotted against European target from Commented [G18]: Inserted: the

1994 to 2013. The study revealed that second most common method of funding of these attacks

was the illicit trade. Pakistan is the most conducive to a nexus between terrorism and crimes. Commented [PN19]: Again, all this is copy pasted and
rephrased from anti Pakistan literature.

Afghanistan has been wracked by over three continuous decades of conflict, dating back to the

anti-Soviet War that began in 1979. Since then, Afghanistan has epitomized the term "failed Commented [G20]: Inserted: the
Commented [G21]: Inserted: z
state", alternatively ‘governed' by warlords, militias, and various other violent non-state actors. Commented [G26]: Deleted:s

Neighboring Pakistan is a major player in Afghanistan— according to some sources, its security

services, including the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), stand accused of providing sanctuary and

safe haven to a patchwork of terrorist groups, including the Quetta Shura Taliban, or QST (also Commented [G22]: Inserted: ,

referred to as Afghan Taliban), Haqqani network and Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT), among other (Clark,

2011). The Haqqani Network operates along the AFPAK border and has kidnapped numerous

Afghans and foreign nationals, including American soldier Bowe Bergdahl. The TTP has

extended its activities to major cities, including Karachi, focusing largely on abductions of
businessmen and entrepreneurs (Yousef & Hasan, 2015).The research investigates whether there

is any causal link between terrorism and crime and how terrorism became the leading cause of an

increase of criminal activities with special reference to Pakistan. The chapter will focus on crime Commented [G23]: Inserted: of
Commented [G27]: Deleted:behind
statistics taken from different journalist websites and compare the crime statistics between three

periods i.e., pre-cold war 1980, post-cold war/ an era 1980-1999 and 1990-2000s. Commented [G24]: Inserted: -
Commented [G25]: Inserted: n
Crime Scenario in Pakistan Commented [G28]: Deleted:zi

Terrorism is considered as a plausible course of actions for poor to achieve necessary resources

(Tinnes, 2017). In fact, it has become a profit making industry obtaining raw material from

crime. These crimes include both organized as well disorganized crimes. Abduction for ransom,

robberies, illicit car lifting, smuggling and proliferation, drugs and human trafficking, money

laundering, and hawala system are widespread and terrorism thriving on this fertile soil. Mainly Commented [G29]: Inserted: ,
Commented [G30]: Inserted: ,
there two strings attached with crime-terror nexus; one operational and other functions. In

structural terrorism, terrorist physically interacts with criminal gangs and mafias. In the

functional string, terrorists behave like chameleons. The phenomenon of crime-terror nexus has Commented [G31]: Inserted: the
Commented [G32]: Inserted: s
shifted from religious terrorism towards criminal terrorism (Bale, 2017). The religious terrorist Commented [G33]: Inserted: s
Commented [G34]: Inserted: -
groups, not necessarily sectarian; do not regard the sovereign of the state sacred. Religious

terrorism considers violence as first and foremost sacramental act or divine duty. Another new

phenomenon is the appearance of decentralization causing the emergence of leaderless nexus.

This decentralization has blurred the crime-terror boundaries. It is evaluated that criminals and

terrorist collaborate, provide technical assistance, expertise, weapons and financial support to

each other. Commented [G35]: Inserted: -

Commented [G36]: Inserted: the
The era of 1947-1980 is a display of multifaceted factor for terrorism. Commented [G37]: Inserted: the
The section “Afghan Jihad (1981–1989)” describes terrorist patterns during the period of the

Afghan Jihad.

In the Pre Cold war era, criminal gangs and terrorists groups have established as evil twins. This

association between crimes and terrorism can be best described as “Nexus”.

National and international events occurred at that time has a long-lasting impact on the political

scenario of Pakistan. At first, General Zia, to legitimize his autocracy and make his own Commented [G38]: Inserted: -
Commented [G39]: Inserted: a
particular body electorate, sustained some Islamic laws in the nation. One of the laws was an

assessment law named Zakat and Usher Ordinance (1980). Meanwhile, the Iranian Revolution

(1979) built up its impact in the Shia group of Pakistan. Empowered, Shias requested exclusion

from the new expense law which depended on the Sunni law. They likewise required the

legislature to implement Shia law in their own issues. Shias commandingly disturbed in

Islamabad and General Zia needed to acknowledge their requests. To counter the Shia

ascendance, General Zia helped Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Haqqani, 2006), a hostile to

Shia Deobandi religious association. Incidentally, the SSP was additionally upheld by the Iraq-

Iran war of 1980's, as the gatherings to the war made Pakistan an intermediary theater (Fair,

2004). The SSP was supported by both Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Stern, 2000) making it a "money

rich association" (Kamran, 2008). The SSP, later on, brought forth aggressor fragment

gatherings, the most hazardous and infamous of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which means the Commented [G41]: Deleted:m

armed force of Jhangvi, the murdered establishing father of SSP. Just about 30 % of Commented [G40]: Inserted: the

psychological warfare in Pakistan is followed back to the SSP or its subgroups and the Shia

bunches like Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP). In this way, dialect and partisan inspirations clarify

around 70% of psychological warfare in Pakistan.

Right after the Afghan Jihad against Soviets finished in 1989, the U.S. left the district with a

great many fights solidified mujahedeen, a significant number of them in Pakistan. This void

made by the US leaving the district without grounding the mujahedeen as indicated by Nawaz

(2009) drew Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) energetically. It endeavored to redirect mujahedeen

in two ways: to make key profundity in Afghanistan (Rashid, 1999) and to help the autonomy

battle in the Indian-held Kashmir. With the assistance of the ISI, mujahedeen (Taliban) came to

control in Afghanistan, and they offered asylum to Arab mujahedeen like Osama receptacle

Laden, their past friends in jihad. After the foundation of Taliban government in Afghanistan,

two imperative elements drove mujahedeen to challenge the United States. Initially, the U.S.

made grievances in them by overlooking mujahedeen once the Soviets pulled back. Second, the

achievement of the mujahedeen against the Soviets—a superpower—supported their certainty. Commented [G42]: Inserted: s

Bedouin mujahedeen had their own particular grievances particularly the nearness of the U.S

armed force in Saudi Arabia.

By the time, the number of terrorist's attacks increased 15 times after the Afghan Jihad in the

1980s.The wrongdoing and fear-based oppressor assault turned out to be more brutal, directed Commented [G43]: Inserted: the

and less deadly. There was a huge increment of ethnic and partisan wrongdoings and assault after

in the 1980s (Saeed et al., 2014). The nearness of partisan, religious, patriots and in addition Commented [G44]: Inserted: the
Commented [G45]: Inserted: a
ethnic fear monger in Pakistan has made it a remarkable case concerning psychological Commented [G46]: Inserted: -

oppression talk. Pakistan turned into a partner in the Afghan war and this investment opened the Commented [G47]: Inserted: the A
Commented [G49]: Deleted:a
way to a most fierce period of crime-terror in Pakistan. Commented [G48]: Inserted: a
The section “Ethnic and sectarian terrorism (1990–1999)” covers the intervening period of

democratic rule in Pakistan and explains the historical origins of sectarian and ethnic terrorism in

the country.

(1980-1990)

When Pakistan was dragged into Afghan Jihad, it resulted in a first surge of terrorism since

country's birth. This heave was embellished by two types of terrorist violence which were

strongly supported by Afghan and Soviet intelligence agencies to de-associate Pakistan with

Afghan rebels. The peak of this surge was observed when Jihad entered the final stage. The base

bastion of Afghan rebel like Peshawar suffered the most number of terrorist attacks as maximum

no of Afghan commanders died here than any other battleground. Another considerable factor is

sectarian. Sectarianism brought worse and brutal attacks during this time as it appeared as a

mammoth threat to life. Almost, there were 23 attacks per day consequential of 220 fatalities

annually. Most of the terrorist activity was observed in Province KPK (Khyber Pakhtun Khawa)

that restore justified logically of ideological and geographical proximity with support for the

Afghan Mujahideen. The frequency of attack incidence was in his province and especially in

Peshawar. The target areas were populated cities and public institutions in provincial and

national capital to discredit government to develop the political instability and sense of insecurity

that attracts terrorist to fish in the troubled water for their vested interests. The situation was

made more aggravated by the pathetic methodology of attacks. The statistics show s 3/4 attacks

were executed by implanting into vehicles. In conclusion about types of attack, the statistics

show that percentage Bombing, Assassination, Armed Assault and Others was 76, 8, 6 and 10

respectively.
In the 1980s, terrorist's attacks were usually targeting the localities hosting governmental

institutions. The major location of the attacks was densely populated areas, indicating attacks

were targeted to a large number of people causing maximum anxiety and fear as possible. The

statistics have been shown in table below; Commented [G50]: Inserted: ve

Commented [G51]: Inserted: a
Table 1: Frequency of terrorist attacks 1980-1989 Commented [G52]: Inserted: the
Commented [G53]: Deleted:s
Types of attacks Percentage Commented [G54]: Deleted:s

Bombing 76

Assassination 8

Armed Assault 6

Others 10

Above table indicates ethnic and sectarian terrorism was high in 1990. The last decade of the

century can be considered as the period of sectarian and ethnic warfare in Pakistan. Terrorism in

the era was significantly consistent with almost 200 incidents per year (Saeed et al., 2014). Commented [G55]: Inserted: the

Regional distribution of terrorist attacks in the post-cold war era has been highlighted in the

figure below. Commented [G56]: Inserted: t

Commented [G57]: Deleted:m

Figure 1: Religious distribution of terrorist attack

Geographically terrorism shifted from northern to southern rip. Sindh emerged as the major

victim of terrorism, its share increasing from 23% to 68% of the total. Most of the terrorist

activity was concentrated in the city of Karachi, which, by itself, experienced 60% of all the

terrorist attacks during that decade. The astronomical rise in the number of terrorist events

occurring in a single city is explained by two increasing trends. First, the roots of the conflict

were located domestically. Scholars have indicated the increasing social and political imbalances

between the ethnic communities of Karachi as one of the causes of the high political violence in

Karachi. Second, growing collective identities along ethnic and sectarian lines were fanned and

mobilized for political purposes. Another feature of this decade was the increasing use of shoot-

and-run assassination tactics. This is illustrative of the type of focused selective violence that

characterizes sectarian and ethnic terrorism. As mentioned previously, when terrorists have the

constituency among the population, their goal is to narrowly target the enemy while protecting

their own people. As in the previous decade, terrorism during this time remained an urban

phenomenon, with over 70% of the attacks occurring in national and provincial capitals (Saeed et Commented [G58]: Inserted: the

al., 2014). Commented [PN59]: Just one reference!!

Figure 2: Distribution of terror attacks in provincial capitals 1990-1999

However, the ugliest time of partisan gore was in the 1990s. Uncontrolled lethal conflicts

amongst Sunnis and Shiites, obscure beforehand in the short history of the nation, came to

possess the features. Partisan brutality, going from the murder of compelling people go through
and through slaughter in religious social affairs, brought about developing trepidation, doubt, and Commented [G60]: Inserted: g
Commented [G61]: Deleted:t
a feeling of distance among groups. Minorities turned out to be increasingly socially segregated

and pulled back. The development of partisan conflicts amongst Shiites and Sunnis in Pakistan

can be clarified to a limited extent by the outcomes of household political misfortunes and the

turbulent universal legislative issues of the late 1970s. The development of a developing Jihadi

culture, specifically, was to convey the seed of partisan disdain to the following decade when it

turned into the principle ideological push for fear monger movement in the nation (Saeed et al.,

2014).

Ethnic and sectarian terrorism (1990–1999)

This decade has been regarded as sectarianism between Sunnis and Shiite and also some sects.

Mutilated bodies and truncated souls were the outcomes of this frightening terrorism. The

government launched emphatically but the merciless operation to counter the burgeoning

pressure of insecurity that resulted in worsening backlash by militants. The number of incidence

and causalities from 1990-2000 went higher on Richter scale. The statistics describe the

tremendous facts as it shows no of incidence and causalities during 1990-2000 from 750 to 450

and 300 to 150 respectively with high percentages in mid-1990's Table 5. In this decade, the

average number of casualties per incident increased by almost 400% (Figure 5). Then there is

shifting of terrorism from northern to southern part of the country. Regional distribution of

terrorist attacks (percentages) (1990–1999) shows Sindh (69%) which is followed by Punjab

(20%) and other provinces suffer from <10 %.

Conflict in Karachi

Conflict in Karachi has the high rate of a percentage than any city in the country. Distribution of

terrorist attacks (1990–1999) shows that Karachi (60%) and followed by Lahore, Peshawar,
Quetta, and Islamabad which maintains percentage (<5%). Types of attacks (percentage) 1990–

1999 exhibits horrendous pattern bombing (25%), assassination (33%), armed assault (31%),

hostage (4%) and other (7%).

Sectarian Conflict

The violence dates back to ear when the country was in nascent stages. In this era, Ahmadis issue

came to light. The early 1950s, religious right-wing organizations in the country took to the streets in

their bid to get Ahmadis36 declared as non-Muslims. The ugliest period of bloodshed was in the

1990s.Rampant deadly clashes between Sunnis and Shiites, unknown previously in the short

history of the country, came to occupy the headlines. Sectarian violence, ranging from the

murder of influential individuals to the outright massacre in religious gatherings, resulted in

growing fear, suspicion, and a sense of alienation among communities. Minorities became more

and more socially isolated and withdrawn. The next peak in sectarian violence occurred during

the second government of Nawaz Sharif (February 1997–October 1999). But this escalation was

not due to deliberate immunity endowed upon the militants, as it was in the previous

governments

Non-sectarian terrorism trend 1990–1999 displays that no of incidence from 450 to 900 in late

mid 1990's. Non-sectarian terrorism trend 1990–1999 displays that no of causalities from 5 to

300 late mid 1990’s. (Jackle & Baumann, 2017)

(1947-1980)

Pakistan has been a victim of terrorism since its creation. There were certain reasons for violence

is justified by mutilated and truncated separation from United India, non-monolithic population,

military’s interventions, and vested interests of politicians. In addition to this, its strategic

position and more tilted to capitalism block resulted in unrest and terrorism in the country. East
Pakistan's break up is the vindication of these factors. Ahmadies' problem in 1953 and Mohajir's

development in Ayub's era provided the ways to terrorism. Before the 1973's constitution,

Afghanistan was trying to plot the Pakhutunistan in Pakistan's terrorism (Shahab, 2012). Due to

its strategic position, international powers always try to influence their interests into Pakistan and

outcome is terrorism.

(1990-2000)

In the post-internationalization paradigm, non-state actors like criminals and terrorist groups

denied the authority of the state. Another factor of ideology may bring schism to the crime-terror

nexus. The U.S. attacked Afghanistan in October 2001 and the Government of Pakistan helped.

Pakistan, therefore, purchased hostility of the Arab mujahideen and the Taliban. Psychological

oppression these days in NWFP, FATA and a few sections of Punjab is an immediate

consequence of Pakistan's showdown with the Arab mujahideen and Taliban. To additionally

irritate the circumstance, ramble assaults inside A Pakistani area have made "a reaction among Commented [G62]: Inserted: i
Commented [G63]: Inserted: i
the tribesmen and even among the all-inclusive community of Pakistan (Syed et al., 2015). Once Commented [G64]: Inserted: ,
Commented [G65]: Inserted: ,
the Northern Alliance with the U.S. help framed their administration in Afghanistan, India was
Commented [G66]: Inserted: P
Commented [G71]: Deleted:e
permitted to set up four offices and one international safe haven in a little nation like
Commented [G72]: Deleted:the

Afghanistan. Outside Minister of Pakistan asserted India to support race-based psychological Commented [G73]: Deleted:e
Commented [G74]: Deleted:p
warfare in Baluchistan. These affirmations against India are affirmed by C. Reasonable from

Rand Corporation when she stated: "Indian authorities have let me know secretly that they are

drawing cash into Baluchistan"(Goswami, 2012). The weapons utilized against the Pakistan

armed force in Swat task were originating from Afghanistan and these were the U.S. made which

the U.S says were stolen from the arms provided to Afghan powers. The U.S. is likewise Commented [G67]: Inserted: the
Commented [G68]: Inserted: the
concerned about China building Gwadar port in Baluchistan which China is accepted to utilize

this port "to extend the drive and undermine the U.S. what's more provincial security. Commented [G69]: Inserted: the
Commented [G70]: Inserted: the
Commented [G75]: Deleted:,

Figure 3: terrorism trend 1990-1999

Rate of Crime in Pakistan in different years

The graph below is mapping the outbreaks of terrorism onto other international events depicts Commented [G76]: Inserted: The g
Commented [G77]: Deleted:G
that Pakistan has seen five peaks of terrorist violence since 1974. The first peak is located in

1987 with 60 incidents out of which 22 occurred in NWFP alone and 11 in Islamabad.
Figure 4: Rate of terrorism and crime incidents in world and Pakistan

The GTD reflected them as incidents committed by unknown terrorists. The second peak is

visible in 1991 with 150 incidents, 77 occurring in Sindh followed by 34 in Punjab. Commented [G78]: Deleted:the

This peak was the result of two streaks of terrorism in Pakistan running together: language-based

and Sectarian terrorism. The third and the highest peak in figure 1 are seen at 1995 with 665

incidents out of which 630 incidents occurred in Sindh alone. It was mainly language-based

terrorism confined to Karachi and nearby city Hyderabad. The fourth peak of terrorist’s attacks Commented [G79]: Inserted: of
Commented [G80]: Deleted:in
resulted in 1997 with 206 terrorist’s attacks. The attacked were mostly sectarian and occurred in

Punjab province only. However, some language based incidents were also reported in Sindh too.

Because of strict government actions against sectarian organizations and language-based

terrorism in Karachi, the situation improved and there was some peace time from 1998 to 2003

(Hussain, 2010).

Figure 5: terrorism incidents and fatalities in Pakistan

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