G.R. No.

L-7859 December 22, 1955

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.

Ernesto J. Gonzaga for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.

REYES, J.B L., J.:

This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of the
taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act.

Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a declaration of emergency, due to
the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the
Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market";
wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from
the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to
prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and
the imposition of the export taxes."

In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture
of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on
owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and ceded to others
for a consideration, on lease or otherwise —

a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration
collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land.

According to section 6 of the law —

SEC. 6. All collections made under this Act shall accrue to a special fund in the Philippine
Treasury, to be known as the 'Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,' and shall be paid
out only for any or all of the following purposes or to attain any or all of the following
objectives, as may be provided by law.

First, to place the sugar industry in a position to maintain itself, despite the gradual loss of
the preferntial position of the Philippine sugar in the United States market, and ultimately to
insure its continued existence notwithstanding the loss of that market and the consequent
necessity of meeting competition in the free markets of the world;

Second, to readjust the benefits derived from the sugar industry by all of the component
elements thereof — the mill, the landowner, the planter of the sugar cane, and the laborers in
the factory and in the field — so that all might continue profitably to engage
therein;lawphi1.net
 Third, to limit the production of sugar to areas more economically suited to the production
thereof; and

Fourth, to afford labor employed in the industry a living wage and to improve their living and
working conditions: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, until the adjourment
of the next regular session of the National Assembly, make the necessary disbursements
from the fund herein created (1) for the establishment and operation of sugar experiment
station or stations and the undertaking of researchers (a) to increase the recoveries of the
centrifugal sugar factories with the view of reducing manufacturing costs, (b) to produce and
propagate higher yielding varieties of sugar cane more adaptable to different district
conditions in the Philippines, (c) to lower the costs of raising sugar cane, (d) to improve the
buying quality of denatured alcohol from molasses for motor fuel, (e) to determine the
possibility of utilizing the other by-products of the industry, (f) to determine what crop or
crops are suitable for rotation and for the utilization of excess cane lands, and (g) on other
problems the solution of which would help rehabilitate and stabilize the industry, and (2) for
the improvement of living and working conditions in sugar mills and sugar plantations,
authorizing him to organize the necessary agency or agencies to take charge of the
expenditure and allocation of said funds to carry out the purpose hereinbefore enumerated,
and, likewise, authorizing the disbursement from the fund herein created of the necessary
amount or amounts needed for salaries, wages, travelling expenses, equipment, and other
sundry expenses of said agency or agencies.

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40
paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950;
alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar
industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutioally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintifs
appealed the case directly to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17).

The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and
particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory
purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In
other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power.

This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great industries of
our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment
to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of
the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the
plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and
advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the
legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in
turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution
of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of
the increase in taxes that it had to sustain (Sligh vs. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 59 L. Ed. 835; Johnson
vs. State ex rel. Marey, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853; Maxcy Inc. vs. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121).

As stated in Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, with reference to the citrus industry in Florida —

The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state's wealth
and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population
 of the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power
of the sovereign. (128 Sp. 857).

Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of
public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is
necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be
allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means
provided in section 6 of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen
why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may
be made the implement of the state's police power (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. vs. Grosjean, 301 U.
S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U. S. vs. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579).

That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of
complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be
benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the power to
tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
"inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe
no constitutional limitation" (Carmichael vs. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed.
1245, citing numerous authorities, at p. 1251).

From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment that the funds raised under the Sugar
Stabilization Act, now in question, should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is
that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar
protection; that the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or
none." As ruled in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson vs. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, "if the
law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied;" and that "the legislative authority, exerted within its
proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach" (N. L. R. B. vs. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893).

Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of
tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of
by-products and solution of allied problems, as well as to the improvements of living and working
conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such money being channeled directly to
private persons, constitutes expenditure of tax money for private purposes, (compare Everson vs.
Board of Education, 91 L. Ed. 472, 168 ALR 1392, 1400).

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 104786 January 27, 1994

ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID,
PRIMITIVA SEDO,respondents.

Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioner.

Garcilaso F. Vega for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In the case before us, we are called upon to decide whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral
home constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City.

On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363,
series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," Section 8 of
which states:

Sec. 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in the Expanded
Zoning Map) — AC-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible
industrial uses as provided hereunder:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space (see
parking standards of P.D. 1096) and provided that they shall be established not less
than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional
buildings. (Emphasis provided)

Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator issued on
February 10, 1987 Building Permit No. 870254 in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral
parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.

Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor.

Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the construction of
petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance
No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel
and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and
found that "the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the
south. . . . ."1

Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued to construct his
funeral parlor which was finished on November 3, 1987.

Consequently, private respondents filed on September 6, 1988 a case for the declaration of nullity of
a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with
the trial court.2

After conducting its own ocular inspection on March 30, 1989, the lower court, in its order dated July
6, 1989, dismissed the complaint based on the following findings:3

1. that the residential building owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25
meters and 55.95 meters away, respectively from the funeral parlor.
 2. Although the residential building owned by certain
Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, and is only separated therefrom by a
concrete fence, said residential building is being rented by a certain Mr. Asiaten who
actually devotes it to his laundry business with machinery thereon.

3. Private respondent's suit is premature as they failed to exhaust the administrative

remedies provided by Ordinance No. 363.

Hence, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. (CA G.R. No. 23243).

In its decision dated November 29, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court by annulling
building permit No. 870254 issued in favor of petitioner.4 It ruled that although the buildings owned by
Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo were beyond the 50-meter residential radius prohibited by Ordinance
363, the construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from the
Tepoot's building. The Appellate Court disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's
building was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Mr. Tepoot's lessee for laundry
business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for the
application of Ordinance No. 363.

Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds:

The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Tepoot building
adjacent to petitioner's funeral parlor is residential simply because it was allegedly
declared as such for taxation purposes, in complete disregard of Ordinance No. 363
(The Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City) declaring the subject area as
dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses.

We reverse the Appellate Court and reinstate the ruling of the lower court that petitioner did not
violate Section 8 of Davao City Ordinance No. 363. It must be emphasized that the question of
whether Mr. Tepoot's building is residential or not is a factual determination which we should not
disturb. As we have repeatedly enunciated, the resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts where findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding on
this court, except only where the case is shown as coming under the accepted exceptions.5

Although the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on us, 6 this
admits of exceptions as when the findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contrary to each other.7 While the trial court ruled that Tepoot's building was commercial, the
Appellate Court ruled otherwise. Thus we see the necessity of reading and examining the pleadings
and transcripts submitted before the trial court.

In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was
used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was
conducted.8 But while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of machineries
and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes
as such, was not fully substantiated.

The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building
being declared for taxation purposes as residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have
been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a
commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real
estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes.
Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real
Property Tax Code, a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment
levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the
Real Estate Tax Code,9 appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any
previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. In
fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city
assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial.

The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is
inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the
questioned area as commercial or
C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once
a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes
must prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the
ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their
claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose," as gleaned
from Ordinance No. 363.

The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of
police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary
thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.10 Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates
the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the
orderly development of the area covered thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED and the order dated July 6, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 43.

2 Annex "C", Rollo, p. 55.

3 Annex "P", Rollo, pp. 106-110.

4 Rollo, pp. 40-50.

5 FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 514.

6 Guita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60409, November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 576.
 7 Quality Tobacco Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65005, July 5,
1990, 187 SCRA 210; Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83122, October 19,
1990, 191 SCRA 1.

8 Hearing, October 27, 1988.

9 Presidential Decree No. 464, entitled, "Enacting a Real Property Tax Code."

10 Sangalang v. Intermediate Court, G.R. Nos. 71169, 76394, 74376 and 82281,
December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 634; Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati bank
and Trust Co., No. L-24670, December 14, 1989, 94 SCRA 533.

Fortich vs. Corona

G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA,

MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.

This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The
property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Bukidnon.

In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del
Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop
Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April,
1994.

In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed
the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38
million.

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that
the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of
both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of
Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just
compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-
3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon docketed as
Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and
141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on
May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.

Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order
further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The
motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.

In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President
was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-
beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the
President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying
the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order
of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued
the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari
because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They never
filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to
law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.

Issue:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly
with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and

(3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

Held:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line
between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be
taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.

However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued
with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas)
jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which
had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of
jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1
thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower court
or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may
file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be
filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if
it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have
original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction
of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it
involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of
Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of
concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, thus:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts , which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs
was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be directed.

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it
if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial
policy to be observed.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be
discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for
by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March
29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the
said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of
the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision
which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in
our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments
of courts having general judicial powers.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis
to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained
by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be
struck down.

3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in
anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in
the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or
at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for
determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the
cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with
the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in
RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying
for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void
by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation;
and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different
from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the
President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were
instituted.
Posted by Lerie Rose at 7:00:00 AM

EVY D. MACASIANO VS. HONORABLE ROBERTO C.

DIOKNO,MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE,METRO MANILA, PALANYAG
KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE GR No. 97764 August 10, 1992

Facts: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an

ordinance authorizing the closure of some streets located at Baclaran,
Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. By
virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract
to any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose,
respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement with the municipality of
Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently,
market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
 On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of
Metropolitan Traffic Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of
the stalls. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a
letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market
otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed
with the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages
and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the hearing on the motion for
writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque

authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for
flea market is valid?

Held: Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public
domain devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary
for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public
use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can use or convey
them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general
and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to
use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Hence the ordinance is null and void.

RAMOS VS CA (GR NO. 124354 DECEMBER 29, 1999)

Ramos vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Facts: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-year old robust woman. Except for
occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she
was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT), she has three children whose names are Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond. Because of
the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sough professional advice. She was told to undergo
an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which revealed that
she was fit for the said surgery. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for
the first time and she was advised by Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy and the same was
agreed to be scheduled on June 17,1985 at 9:00am at the Delos Santos Medical Center. Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to
look for a good anesthesiologist to which the latter agreed to. A day before the scheduled operation, she was
admitted at the hospital and on the day of the operation, Erlinda’s sister was with her insider the operating room. Dr.
Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina when Herminda heard
her say that intubating Erlinda is quite difficult and there were complications. This prompt Dr. Osaka to order a call
to another anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully intubated Erlina. The patient’s nails became bluish and the
patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. After the operation, Erlina was diagnosed to be suffering from
diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged that this was due to lack of oxygen supply to
Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages against petitioner for the result to Erlinda
of the said operation.

Held: Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care
of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate case of her piteous condition.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically follow that it apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to
the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case.
It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common
knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the
usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa
liquitor can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or
of a scientific treatment.

Scientific studies point out that intubation problems are responsible for 1/3 of deaths and serious injuries associated
with anesthesia. Nevertheless, 98% or the vast majority of difficult intubation may be anticipated by performing a
thorough evaluation of the patient’s airway prior to the operation. As stated beforehand, respondent, Dra. Guttierez
failed to observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had
appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could
have been more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the perceived atomic variations in the patient’s
neck and oral area; defects which could have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations
together with a change in technique. In other words, an experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a
thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and potruding teeth.
Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra.
Guttierez negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.

CITY OF QUEZON, petitioner vs. LEXBER INCORPORATED, respondent

G.R. No. 141616, March 15, 2001

FACTS :

LEXBER INC. owned a parcel of land of 26,010 sq.m. located in Antipolo. It was
offered and persuaded to have it used as a garbage dumping site by Quezon City and other
Metro Manila Cities or municipalities authorized by the latter for 5 years from Jan.1991 to Dec.
1995.

August 27, 1990 a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn among Quezon City, represented by
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., Lexber Inc. and Mun. of Antipolo. Part of the Agreement was that
Lexber Inc. shall be hired as the exclusive supplier of manpower, heavy equipment and
engineering services for the dumpsite and shall also have the right of furst refusal for con
tracting such services.

September 10, 1990 – first negotiated contract between Quezon City represented by
Mayor Simon and Lexber Inc. for Lexber to construct the necessary infrastructure at the
dumpsite, designated as the Q.C. Sanitary Landfill for a contract price of P4,381,069.00.
Construction of said infrastructure was completed on November 25, 1991 and contract price
was paid by Q.C.

November 8, 1990, second negotiated contract was entered into between Lexber and
Q.C. where it was agreed that Lexber shall provided maintenance services in the form of
manpower, equipment and engineering operations for the dumpsite for P1,536,796.00 monthly.
It was also agreed that Q.C. shall pay Lebster a reduced fee of 50% of the monthly con tract
price or P768,493 if Q,C. fails to dump the agreed volume of 54,000 cu.m. of garbage fcor any
given month.

December 11, 1991 – Lexber was notified to commence maintenance and dumping
operations at the site starting on Dec. 15, 1991 by Q.C. thru the City Engineer Alfredo
Macapugay, Proj. Manager Rene Lazaro, and Mayor Simon.

Q.C. immediately commenced dumping garbage on the landfill site continuously from
December 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, it ceased to dump garbage on the site without
notice to Lexber. Lexber claimed that even if the dumpsite remain unused, it was entitled to
payment for its services as stipulated in the second negotiated contract.

December 12, 1992 – Lexber’s counsel sent a demand letter to Q.C. demanding
payment of at least 50% of its services under the said contact amounting to P9,989,174.00.
Because of the idle state of the dumpsite for more than a year, Lexber also sought a
clarification from Q.C. regarding its intention on the dumpsite project, considering the waste of
equipment and manpower in the meantime, and its loss of opportunity for the property.

`This time, Q.C. is acting thru Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. who succeeded Mayor Simon in
the interim, denied any liability under the contract on the ground that it was invalid and
unenforceable. Accordidng to Mayor Mathay, the contract was signed only by Mayor Simon and
was not approved nor ratified by the City Council and it lacked the required budget
appropriation.

Feb. 21, 1994, Lexber filed a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance
or Rescission of Contract and Damages against Q.C. at the Q.C. RTC

Jan. 26, 1998 RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lexber ordering Q.C . to pay P768,493
per month starting Dec. 15, 1991 until Dec. 15, 1995 with legal interest starting Dec. 16, 1992
until Q.C. finally pays the entire amount. and ordering defendant Q.C. to pay costs of suit.

Q.C. appealed to the C.A. but it affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Its Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied.

Jan. 26, 2000 –Q.C. petitioned the Supreme Court for review on certiorari assailing the
Oct. 18, 1999 decision of the C.A.

ISSUES :

1. Was the second negotiated contract null and void ab initio because its execution was
done in violation of existing laws, more particularly Sections 85, 86 and 87 of P.D. 1445
and Section 177(b) of B.P. 337?

2. Do subsequent acts of Q.C. petitioner constituted a ratification of the subject negotiated

contract notwithstanding the lack of appropriation?

RULING :

1. The very same P.D. 1445 which is the cornerstone of petitioner’s arguments does not
provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a contract entered
into by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of the statute specifically
provides: Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository
except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
(underscoring ours)
 Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law,
but also in pursuance of other specific authority, i.e., section 84 of PD 1445. Thus,
when a contract is entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority,
the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the disbursement of funds from any public treasury or
depository therefor. It can thus be plainly seen that the law invoked by petitioner
QUEZON City itself provides that an appropriation law is not the only authority upon
which public funds shall be disbursed.

Furthermore, then Mayor Simon did not enter into the subject contract without legal
authority. He was so authorized under BP 337, the Local Government Code of 1993.
We note that while the subsequent Local government Code of 1991, which took effect
after the execution of the subject contract, provides that the mayuaor’s representation
must be “upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or
ordinance,” there was no such qualification under the old code. `

Therefore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this regard. It is clear that the second negotiated
contract was entered in to Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. pursuant to law or specific statutory
authority as required by P.D. No. 1445.

There is also no merit in petitioner’s claim that there was no appropriation therefor, for
it is evident that even as early as April 4, 1991, funds which were certified to as
available had been allocated for use in the first few months operation of the sanitary
landfill. The problem arose only because the new administration unjustifiably refused to
abide by the stipulations in the second negotiated contract. hence, petitioner’s
arguments on this issue fail to convince this Court that the second negotiated contract
was null and void ab initio for lack of prior appropriation or authority on the part of
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.

2. When appellant City government after the construction by the appellee of the dumpsite
structure in accordance with the contract plans and specifications started to dump
garbage collected in the City and consequently paid the appellee for the services
rendered, such acts produce and constitute a ratification and approval of the negotiated
contract and necessarily should imply its waiver of the right to assail the contract’s
enforceability.

Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that there was constructive ratification on the
part of petitioner.

The records also reveal that petitioner issued Disbursement Vouchers of various
amounts covering the period between March 1, 1992 to April 30, 1992 for the services
rendered by the Mud Regal Group Inc. to haul garbage to the sanitary landfill. The said
disbursement vouchers were passed in audit and duly approved and paid by petitioner.
These are facts and circumstances on record which led the trial court, the appellate
court and this Court to affirm the conclusion that petitioner had actually ratified the
subject contract.
Guilatco v. City of Dagupan
FACTS:

Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national road)
when she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her
hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable to
go to work, thereby losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial
self since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She filed an action for
damages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the
manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan.

ISSUE:

Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.

HELD:

Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, this control or supervision is
provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include
the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of Dagupan provides
that the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the
regulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage
hole is located.

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages
against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its
answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Baniña.

ISSUES:

1. Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?

HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence
to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was
not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any
liability.(Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, No. L-52179, April 8, 1991)

Case Digest: LCP VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREÑAS, in
his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,

v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE
OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,Respondents.

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen
(16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down
the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws

First issue:

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of
the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of
the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as
it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of
economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.

However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified
income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of
the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines
for economic growth in their respective provinces.

R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses
found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory
R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.

Second Issue:
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the
provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League
of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted
to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26,

1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MORENO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006

FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an
answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.

However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides
that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence.
The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect
his disqualification from running for an elective local office.

On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not
serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the
Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes
an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?

HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus,
when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers
from running for a local elective office.

Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local
Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local
elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a
canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a
prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.
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Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R.

No. 154512, November 12, 2002
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa,
and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn
to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running
for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive
full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared
Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the
recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First,
a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-
election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election
but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent
election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election
after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution
barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.

Rodriguez vs. Comelec

Post under Disqualification from office , Election law , Fugitive from justice , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:
In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon
Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the
ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court
for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held
that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition
for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitivefrom justice.
COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on
the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of thefelony complaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition
for certiorari.

Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZDecision?

Held:

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee toavoid prosecution.” This
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a
particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated
judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore
be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez.
Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of
thefelony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of
the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to
have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as
there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet
at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996)
Marquez vs Comelec
Post under Disqualification from office , Fugitive from justice , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of
Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto
proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive
from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against
him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but
which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice"
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the
IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was
confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was
a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by
final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.

Issue:
What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?

Held:

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing
the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,
to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the
fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly
agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it
must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can
neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a
determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to
Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)

Menzon vs Petilla
Post under Local Government , Permanent Vacancy , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:

In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as
Acting Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the
province of Leyte.

Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon
then took his oath of office.
In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar,
Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office
of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointmentof Menzon as the
temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily
performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both
offices.

As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where
it invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Menzon then wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued.
Rubillar replied that Menzon was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was not
appointed to the post since there was no vacancy of the office to speak of.

As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor Petilla
that the resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able
receive his salary as vice governor, if he was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the
Sanggunian refused to correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the
emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.

It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is
entitled to the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vice‐governor.
During the pendency of this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and
Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed Governor of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not there was a vacancy

Held: Yes. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever
the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy
when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of
the office.

In this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when
the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes
of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to
exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
There is no showing that Leopoldo Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of
the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time
occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely,
it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government
was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the
period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or
not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it
is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke anappointment made by a
higher authority.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to
make temporary appointments

Held: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a
temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must
not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting.

The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for theappointment of
an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had
been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina
Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before
the Commission on Elections.

The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is
disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte.
Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to leave the situation without affording any remedy
was ever intended by the Local Government Code.

Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government
Code, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum
created by the vacancy, the President, acting through heralter ego, the Secretary of Local
Government, may remedy the situation. We declare valid the
temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The
exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an
acting Vice-Governor.
The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that Undersecretary Jacinto
Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an
acting Vice-Governor.

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain
public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the
filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary
provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see
no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who
are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until
the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it
deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one
of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery
of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.

Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the province of
Leyte, is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As
shown in this case where for about two years there was only an acting Governor steering
the leadership of the province of Leyte, the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-Governor to free the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial problems and to
serve as the buffer in case something might happen to the acting Governor becomes
unquestionable. We do not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened to
acting Governor Petilla during the two-year period. The contingency of having simultaneous
vacancies in both offices cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time
Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those
in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations.

The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the
Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52
of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the
performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor.
The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent
vacancy, viz:

Section 49:

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of

the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan member who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall
assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .

By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for
permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same
office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The
Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

Issue: Whether or not Menzon is entitled to be paid the salary attached to the
Office of the Vice Governor

Held: In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the
Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated
to the petitioner, must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary,
shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.

Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government,
possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto
officer entitled to compensation.

There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color
of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no
less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he
took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local
Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.

Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves
acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was
only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who
recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the
petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.

The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the
Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of
public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based andbasic considerations of justice, it
would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually
rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. (See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61
SCRA 55 [1974])
(G.R. No. 90762, May 20, 1991)

Felipe Navarro vs Court of

Appeals
Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report
for a blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro
and the two reporters. Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena.
Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of
his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance against Navarro due to the
fact that he committed such crime in the police station?
HELD: A police station is a place wherein public authorities such as policemen are engaged
in the discharge of their duties. Since Navarro, who is a cop, committed the crime inside the
police station, an aggravating circumstance is appreciated against him.
GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS and AL NACINO, petitioners,
vs. MAYOR ANGELO M. ARBA, VICE MAYOR MANUEL S.
HERNANDO, and EDWARD PALAFOX, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; APPOINTING
AUTHORITY; VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR IN CASE OF PERMANENT
VACANCY CAUSED BY A SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER WHO DOES NOT
BELONG TO ANY POLITICAL PARTY, UPON RECOMMENDATION OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN CONCERNED. - Since the vacancy in this case was
created by a Sanggunian member who did not belong to any political party, the
specific provision involved is par. (c) of Sec. 45 of the Local Government Code. But
who is the local chief executive referred? And which is the Sanggunian concerned?
With respect to the first (local chief executive), petitioners look to Sec. 45(a) for the
answer and say that it is the governor, with respect to vacancies in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan, or the
mayor with respect to vacancies in the sangguniang Barangay. Reference to Secs.
50 and 63 provisions is appropriate not for the reason advanced by petitioners, i.e.,
that the power to appoint implies the power to remove, but because implicit in these
provisions is a policy to vest in the President, the governor and the mayor in
descending order the exercise of an executive power whether to appoint in order to
fill vacancies in local councils or to suspend local officials. These provisions
are inpari materia with Sec. 45. To be sure the President of the Philippines can not
be referred to as local chief executive in Sec. 45(c) but it is apparent that the phrase
is a misnomer and that the choice of this phrase was simply dictated by the need to
avoid, for stylistic reasons, interminably repeating the officials on whom the power
to appoint is conferred. Perhaps authorities concerned would have been a more
accurate generic phrase to use. For that matter, to follow private respondents
interpretation would be to run into a similar, if not greater, difficulty. For Sec.
45(a)(3) vests the power to fill vacancies in the Sangguniang Barangay in the mayor
but the local chief executive of a barangay is not the mayor. It is the punong
barangay. Yet local chief executive cannot be applied to the punong barangay
without rendering Sec. 45(a)(3) meaningless. For then there would never be any
occasion when the mayor, under this provision, can appoint a replacement for a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan who for one reason or another ceases from
office for reason other than the expiration of his term. And why should a vacancy in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be filled by a different authority (the governor,
according to this view) simply because the vacancy was created by a member who
does not belong to a political party when, according to Sec. 45(a)( 1), a vacancy
created by a member who belongs to a political party must be filled by appointment
by the President of the Philippines? With reference to the phrase sanggunian
concerned in Sec. 45(c), petitioners say it means, with respect to a vacancy in the
Sangguniang Bayan, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Their reason is that under
Sec. 61 of the Code, the power to investigate complaints against elective municipal
officials is vested in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This interpretation is
inconsistent with the fact that in filling vacancies in the Sangguniang Barangay it is
the Sangguniang Barangay which under Sec. 45(a)(3) recommends the appointee,
not the Sangguniarang Panlungsod or the Sangguniang Bayan, which would be the
case if petitioners view were to prevail. We think that the phrase sanggunian
concerned in Sec. 45(c) should more properly be understood as referring to the
Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in keeping with the policy
implicit in Sec. 45(a)(3). In other words, with the exception of the Sangguniang
Barangay pars. (a) and (b) must be read as providing for the filling of vacancies in
the various Sanggunians when these vacancies are created as a result of the
cessation from office (other than expiration of term) of members who belong to
political parties. On the other hand, Sec. 45(c) must be understood as providing for
the filling of vacancies created by members who do not belong to any political party.
There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay. Any
vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be made by
 the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that
members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party affiliations.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT BOUND TO APPOINT ANYONE RECOMMENDED TO HIM BY
THE SANGGUNIAN CONCERNED. - Having determined that appointments in case
of vacancies caused by Sanggunian members who do not belong to any political
party must be made in accordance with the recommendation of the Sanggunians
concerned where the vacancies occur, the next question is: Is the appointing
authority limited to the appointment of those recommended to him? We think an
affirmative answer must be given to the question. The appointing authority is not
bound to appoint anyone recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The
power of appointment is a discretionary power. On the other hand, neither is the
appointing power vested with so large a discretion that he can disregard the
recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned. Since the recommendation takes
the place of nomination by political party, the recommendation must likewise be
considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by analogy
to the provision of Sec. 45(b).
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Pineda Pineda Mastura Valencia and Associates for respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

The question in this case is: In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang
Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any
political party, who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what
procedure?
This case arose from the following facts:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, the mayor, respondent Angelo M.
Barba, recommended to the Governor of the province, petitioner Rodolfo C. Farias, the
appointment of respondent Edward Palafox.
A similar recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor
Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with 56 of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).1
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local
Government Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and
power to appointSangguniang Bay an members are lodged in the Governor, and
therefore, the Resolution should be addressed to the Provincial Governor. Accordingly,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of
petitioner Al Nacino, vice Carlito Domingo, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Nicolas. On June 8, 1994, petitioner Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and
swore him in office that same day.
On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox
to the same position on June 8, 1994. The next day, June 9, 1994, respondent Palafox
took his oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a
petition for quo warranto and prohibition, entitled Governor Rodolfo C. Farias and Al
Nacino v. Mayor Angelo M. Barba, Vice Mayor Manuel S. Hernando, Jr. and Edward D.
Palafox.
On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of
respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba. It held:

Under the facts and circumstances as shown clearly in the case, there is no doubt the
law that is applicable is sub-section C of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides:

In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member who does not
belong to any political party, the Local Chief Executive shall upon the
recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the
vacancy.

. . . Inasmuch as the permanent vacancy is in the Sanggunian Bayan of San Nicolas,

Ilocos Norte, it is the Sanggunian concerned referred to in the law which recommends
the appointment to fill the vacancy. . . . This being so, the Local Chief Executive
referred to in sub-section C of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 7160 is the Municipal
Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.

It cannot be denied that the Governor has the authority to appoint a qualified person
to fill the vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan caused by resignation of a member thereof
as that is vested in him or her by the Provision of No. 2, Sec. 45 of Republic Act No.
7160. To the mind of the court that authority is not vested in him or her where the
permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member who does not belong to any
political party as that authority is specifically vested upon the Local Chief Executive
upon recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned as per sub-section C of Section 45
of the same Republic Act No. 7160. Under No. 2 of Sec. 45 aforementioned the law
does not require a recommendation for the appointment of Sanggunian Bayan Member
to fill a permanent vacancy either from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or from the
Sanggunian Bayan. . . . As such there can be no other person referred to as the Local
Chief Executive having the authority to appoint other than the Municipal Mayor of the
Municipality of the Sanggunian Bayan where there is permanent vacancy. This can be
clearly inferred from the two (2) provisions of the law (No. 2 and sub-section C of Sec.
45 of Rep. Act No. 7160). While No. 2 of Sec. 45 specifically vests the power to appoint
in the Governor, sub-section. C of Sec. 45, specifically vests the power to appoint in the
Local Chief Executive. The Local Chief Executive specifically mentioned in said sub-
section C of Sec. 45 is not the Governor, for there would have been no need for the law
making body to have specifically stated in the law if it had intended that the Governor is
that one and the same Local Chief Executive vested with power to appoint.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the trial court
on August 18, 1994. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the power to fill a vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan,
which is created as a result of the cessation from office of a member who does not
belong to a political party, is vested in the provincial governor upon recommendation of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The statutory provision in question is 45 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) which reads:

45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. (a) Permanent vacancies in the

sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be filled
by appointment in the following manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and
the sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of the sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.

(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under
which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and
shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein
mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the
highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non,and any
appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab
initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible
therefor.

(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of
the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of
the organization concerned.

[1] Since the vacancy in this case was created by a Sanggunian member who did
not belong to any political party, the specific provision involved is par. (c), to wit:

(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of
the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.

But who is the local chief executive referred? And which is the sanggunian
concerned? With respect to the first (local chief executive), petitioners look to 45(a) for
the answer and say that it is the governor, with respect to vacancies in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan, or the mayor with respect to
vacancies in the sangguniang Barangay.
In support of this view, they cite, first of all, the following provision of the former
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337):

50. Permanent Vacancies in the Local Sanggunians. -In case of permanent vacancy in
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or
sangguniang barangay, the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the
Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in
the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod; the governor, in the
case ofsangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case
of sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the
appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunianmember who caused
the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.

and, second, the following provision of the present Code:

63. Preventive Suspension - (a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized or an independent component city;

(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or

municipality; or

(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay. . .

Reference to these provisions is appropriate not for the reason advanced by

petitioners, i.e., that the power to appoint implies the power to remove, but because
implicit in these provisions is a policy to vest in the President, the governor and the
mayor in descending order the exercise of an executive power whether to appoint in
order to fill vacancies in local councils or to suspend local officials. These provisions are
in pan materia with 45.
To be sure the President of the Philippines can not be referred to as local chief
executive in 45(c) but it is apparent that the phrase is a misnomer and that the choice of
this phrase was simply dictated by the need to avoid, for stylistic reasons, interminably
repeating the officials on whom the power to appoint is conferred. Perhaps authorities
concerned would have been a more accurate generic phrase to use.
For that matter, to follow private respondents interpretation would be to run into a
similar, if not greater, difficulty. For 45(a)(3) vests the power to fill vacancies in the
Sangguniang Barangay in the mayor but the local chief executive of a barangay is not
the mayor. It is the punong barangay. Yet local chief executive cannot be applied to the
punong barangay without rendering 45(a)(3) meaningless. For then there would never
be any occasion when the mayor, under this provision, can appoint a replacement for a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan who for one reason or another ceases from office
for reason other than the expiration of his term. And why should a vacancy in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be filled by a different authority (the governor, according to
this view) simply because the vacancy was created by a member who does not belong
to a political party when, according to 45(a)(1), a vacancy created by a member who
belongs to a political party must be filled by appointment by the President of the
Philippines?
With reference to the phrase sangguniang concerned in 45(c), petitioners say it
means, with respect to a vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Their reason is that under Sec. 61 of the Code, the power to investigate
complaints against elective municipal officials is vested in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan:

61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints -A verified complaint against any
erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or a component city shall be filed before the office of the
President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sanggunian panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President;

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be
final and executory.
 This interpretation is inconsistent with the fact that in filling vacancies in the
Sangguniang Barangay it is the Sangguniang Barangay which under 45(a)(3)
recommends the appointee, not the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the Sangguniang
Bayan, which would be the case if petitioners view were to prevail.
We think that the phrase sanggunian concerned in 45(c) should more properly he
understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in
keeping with the policy implicit in 45(a)(3).
In other words, with the exception of the Sangguniang Barangay pars. (a) and (b)
must be read as providing for the filling of vacancies in the various Sanggunians when
these vacancies are created as a result of the cessation from office (other than
expiration of term) of members who belong to political parties. On the other
hand, 45(c) must be understood as providing for the filling of vacancies created by
members who do not belong to any political party. Consequently, 45 must be construed
to mean that -
I. Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member belonging to a
Political Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities and independent component cities - The President, through the Executive
Secretary, upon the nomination and certification of the political party to which
the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in 45(b).
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan - The
Governor upon the nomination and certification of the political party to which the
member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).
II. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member Not Belonging to a Political
Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized
and independent component cities - The President, through the Executive
Secretary, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panlungsod as the case may be.
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan - The
Governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan as the case may be.
III. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the Sangguniang Barangay - City or
Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay.
There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay. Any
vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be made by the
mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that members of
the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party affiliations.
Indeed there is no reason for supposing that those who drafted 45 intended to make
the manner of filling vacancies in the Sanggunians, created by members who do not
belong to any political party, different from the manner of filling such vacancies when
created by members who belong to political party or parties. The provision for the first
must approximate the provision for the second situation. Any difference in procedure
must be limited to the fact that in the case of vacancies caused by those who have
political affiliations there is a party which can nominate a replacement while there is
none in the case of those who have no political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no
political party to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must
be considered the appropriate authority for making the recommendation, by analogy to
vacancies created in the Sangguniang Barangay whose members are by law prohibited
from having any party affiliation.
[2] Having determined that appointments in case of vacancies caused by
Sanggunian members who do not belong to any political party must be made in
accordance with the recommendation of the Sanggunians concerned where the
vacancies occur, the next question is: Is the appointing authority limited to the
appointment of those recommended to him? We think an affirmative answer must be
given to the question. The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone
recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of appointment is a
discretionary power. On the other hand, neither is the appointing power vested with so
large a discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian
concerned. Since the recommendation takes the place of nomination by political party,
the recommendation must likewise be considered a condition sine qua non for the
validity of the appointment, by analogy to the provision of 45(b).
[3] The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor
respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding
discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al
Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox
was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the
provincial governor who appointed him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, insofar as it
dismisses petitioners action for quo warranto and prohibition, is AFFIRMED, but for
different reasons from those given by the trial court in its decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.; Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., took no part.
Francisco, J., on leave.

1 Actually this provision only authorizes the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to review component city or
municipal ordinances of all kinds and resolutions dealing with local development plans and public
investment programs formulated by the local development councils. The resolution of the Sangguniang B
Administrative Law Case Digests Arellano University School of Law

aiza ebina/2015

JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 290 SCRA 279

Distribution of Powers of Government Traditional Branches

FACTS

The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from o ce of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as
Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the ice!Governor of said
province "hile private respondents #oreto P. Pan$ilinan% Crispulo &. Es$uerra% &olita C. &antos%
icenteC. Palilio and Napoleon 'nterior are members of the &an$$unian$ Panlala"i$an.On &eptember ()%
(**+% private respondents ,led "ith the O ce of the President a letter!complaint dated&eptember (-%
(**) char$in$ petitioner "ith $rave misconduct and abuse of authority. Privaterespondents alle$ed that
in the mornin$ of &eptember ( % (**+% they "ere at the session hall of theprovincial capitol for a
scheduled session of the &an$$unian$ Panlala"i$an "hen petitioner belli$erentlybar$ed into the /all0
petitioner an$rily 1ic1ed the door and chairs in the /all and uttered threatenin$ "ordsat them0 close
behind petitioner "ere several men "ith lon$ and short ,rearms "ho encircled the area.Private
respondents claim that this incident "as an o2shoot of their resistance to a pendin$ le$islativemeasure
supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P(34 million from thePhilippine
National 5an10 that petitioner6s acts "ere intended to harass them into approvin$ this loan0
thatfortunately% no session of the &an$$unian$ Panlala"i$an "as held that day for lac1 of 7uorum and
theproposed le$islative measure "as not considered0 that private respondents opposed the loan
because theprovince of Nueva Ecija had an unli7uidated obli$ation of more than P)4 million incurred
"ithout priorauthori8ation from the &an$$unian$ Panlala"i$an0 that the provincial bud$et o cer and
treasurer hadearlier disclosed that the province could not a2ord to contract another obli$ation0 that
petitioner6s act of bar$in$ in and intimidatin$ private respondents "as a serious insult to the inte$rity
and independence of the &an$$unian$ Panlala"i$an0 and that the presence of his private army posed
$rave dan$er to privaterespondents6 lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or
removal of petitioner0 foran emer$ency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija0 and for the
revie" of the proposed loan inli$ht of the ,nancial condition of the province.President 9amos noted that
the situation of :( &ep at the &ession /all%: i.e.% the refusal of the members of the &an$$unian$
Panlala"i$an to approve the proposed loan% did not appear to justify :the use of force%intimidation or
armed follo"ers.: /e thus instructed the then &ecretary of the 'nterior and #ocalGovernments ;&'#G<
9obert 5arbers to :ta1e appropriate preemptive and investi$ative actions%: but to:brea1 not the
peace.:=ctin$ upon the instructions of the President% &ecretary 5arbers noti,ed petitioner of the case
a$ainst himand attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its anne>es. 'n the same notice%
&ecretary 5arbersdirected petitioner :to submit his veri,ed?s"orn ans"er thereto% not a motion to
dismiss% to$ether "ithsuch documentary evidence that he has in support thereof% "ithin ,fteen ;(3<
days from receipt.'mmediately thereafter% &ecretary 5arbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned
petitioner and privaterespondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into an
a$reement "herebypetitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province "hile private
respondents promised torefrain from ,lin$ cases that "ould adversely a2ect their peaceful co!e>istence.
The peace a$reement "as not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their
letter!complaint. Petitioner "as a$ain ordered to ,le his ans"er to the letter!complaint "ithin ,fteen days
fromreceipt. Petitioner submitted re7uests for e>tension to submit his ans"er and "as each re7uest
"as$ranted each time. The @'#G ho"ever% informed him that his :failure to submit ans"er "ill be
considered a"aiver and that the plainti2 shall be allo"ed to present his evidence e> parte.: Three months
later% on =pril % (**)% Andersecretary Banuel &anche8% then =ctin$ &ecretary of the
@'#G%issued an order declarin$ petitioner in default and to have "aived his ri$ht to present evidence.
Privaterespondents "ere ordered to present their evidence e>!parte. 9espondent "as hereby declared in
default.On June % (**)% petitioner% throu$h counsel% ,led a :Botion to @ismiss.: Petitioner
alle$ed that the letter!complaint "as not veri,ed on the day it "as ,led "ith the O ce of the President0
and that the @'#G had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to re7uire him% to ans"er the
complaint.On July % (**)% petitioner ,led an :Ar$ent E>!Parte Botion for 9econsideration: of the
order of June -%(**) reinstatin$ the order of default. Petitioner also prayed that the hearin$ on the
merits of the case beheld in abeyance until after the :Botion to @ismiss: shall have been resolved. On
July ((% (**)% onrecommendation of &ecretary 5arbers% E>ecutive &ecretary 9uben Torres issued an
order% by authority of the President% placin$ petitioner under preventive suspension for si>ty ;+4<
days pendin$ investi$ation of the char$es a$ainst him. &ecretary 5arbers directed the Philippine
National Police to assist in theimplementation of the order of preventive suspension. 'n petitioner6s
stead% &ecretary 5arbers desi$nated ice!Governor Oscar Tinio as =ctin$ Governor until such time as
petitioner6s temporary le$al incapacity

shall have ceased to e>ist. Dorth"ith% petitioner ,led a petition for certiorari and prohibition "ith the
Courtof =ppeals challen$in$ the order of preventive suspension and the order of default.'n the
meantime% on October % (**)% the Court of =ppeals dismissed petitioner6s petition.= fe" days
after ,lin$ the petition before this Court% petitioner ,led a :Botion for #eave to Dile /erein'ncorporated
Ar$ent Botion for the 'ssuance of a Temporary 9estrainin$ Order and?or a rit of
Preliminary'njunction.: Petitioner alle$ed that subse7uent to the institution of this petition% the
&ecretary of the'nterior and #ocal Governments rendered a resolution on the case ,ndin$ him $uilty of
the o2enseschar$ed. /is ,ndin$ "as based on the position papers and a davits of "itnesses submitted by
the parties. The @'#G &ecretary found the a davits of complainants6 "itnesses to be :more natural%
reasonable andprobable: than those of herein petitioner Joson6s.On January F% (**F% the E>ecutive
&ecretary% by authority of the President% adopted the ,ndin$s andrecommendation of the @'#G
&ecretary. /e imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from o ce forsi> ;+< months "ithout pay.

ISSUE

hether or not the @'#G &ecretary% in his resolution% "as e>ercisin$ the po"ers of the President"hich
are clearly vested by la" only upon the President or the E>ecutive &ecretary% and thus his action
iscontrary to la"

RU!IN"

'n his second assi$ned error% petitioner 7uestions the jurisdiction and authority of the @'#G&ecretary
over the case. /e contends that under the la"% it is the O ce of the President that has jurisdiction over
the letter!complaint and that the Court of =ppeals erred in applyin$ the alter!e$o principlebecause the
po"er to discipline elective local o cials lies "ith the President% not "ith the @'#G &ecretary.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions a$ainst elective local o cials is lod$ed in
t"oauthorities the @isciplinin$ =uthority and the 'nvesti$atin$ =uthority. Pursuant to these
provisions% the@isciplinin$ =uthority is the President of the Philippines% "hether actin$ by himself or
throu$h theE>ecutive &ecretary. The &ecretary of the 'nterior and #ocal Government is the
'nvesti$atin$ =uthority% "homay act by himself or constitute an 'nvesti$atin$ Committee. The &ecretary
of the @'#G% ho"ever% is notthe e>clusive 'nvesti$atin$ =uthority. 'n lieu of the @'#G &ecretary% the
@isciplinary =uthority maydesi$nate a &pecial 'nvesti$atin$ Committee. The po"er of the President over
administrative disciplinary cases a$ainst elective local o cials is derivedfrom his po"er of $eneral
supervision over local $overnments. The po"er to discipline evidently includesthe po"er to investi$ate.
=s the @isciplinin$ =uthority% the President has the po"er derived from theConstitution itself to
investi$ate complaints a$ainst local $overnment o cials. =.O. No. -% ho"ever%dele$ates the po"er to
investi$ate to the @'#G or a &pecial 'nvesti$atin$ Committee% as may beconstituted by the
@isciplinin$ =uthority. This is not undue dele$ation% contrary to petitioner Joson6s claim. The President
remains the @isciplinin$ =uthority. hat is dele$ated is the po"er to investi$ate% not thepo"er to
discipline.Boreover% the po"er of the @'#G to investi$ate administrative complaints is based on the
alter!e$oprinciple or the doctrine of 7uali,ed political a$ency.Ander this doctrine% "hich reco$ni8es the
establishment of a sin$le e>ecutive% all e>ecutive andadministrative or$ani8ations are adjuncts of the
E>ecutive @epartment% the heads of the various e>ecutivedepartments are assistants and a$ents of
the Chief E>ecutive% and% e>cept in cases "here the Chief E>ecutive is re7uired by the Constitution or
la" to act in person or the e>i$encies of the situation demandthat he act personally% the multifarious
e>ecutive and administrative functions of the Chief E>ecutive areperformed by and throu$h the
e>ecutive departments% and the acts of the &ecretaries of suchdepartments% performed and
promul$ated in the re$ular course of business% are% unless disapproved orreprobated by the Chief
E>ecutive presumptively the acts of the Chief E>ecutive.

RATIO

Under the Constitution and as provided in the Administrative Code of 1987, the powers of theNational
Government are distributed among three ( ! bran"hes# $he e%e"utive power shall be vested inthe
&resident

Pablico vs. Villapando

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan

against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority
and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with
Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted
to appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under
Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of
Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate
within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to
a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision.
Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of Villapando.

The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered
Pablico to vacate the office.

Issue:
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the penalty
of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:

Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above
by order of the proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal
from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of
law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that “[t]he Office of the
President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of
the aforequoted Section 60.”

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds
enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the other.” The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or
contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing
rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which
operates to create a rule o
out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870. July 31,
2002)
De Rama vs. CA G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,

petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the
appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request
on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight”
appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the
appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed
petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out
that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those
appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to
local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly
issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets
the qualification standards for the position.

Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are
forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-
called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective
officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its

Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI vs. Hon.
FORTUNITO L. MADRONA
Posted on October 9, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.]

FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement,
the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner
municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC
denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government
Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out
their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that
Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY;
ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR. —
“Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. — Boundary disputes between and
among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
“(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
“(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
“(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
“(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the
other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians
of the parties.
“(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute
was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to
above.”

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or
a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other — or between two or more highly urbanized
cities — shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section
442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an
independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary
dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc
is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY
IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is
deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of
Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code,
which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President
of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its
Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES
EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. — As previously
stated, “jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.” It must exist as a matter of
law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue.
Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction
should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there is no law providing for the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an
independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for
judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is
not only original, but also exclusive.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez | ema

July 23, 2010
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs.
ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:

SUMMARY: Two complaints for abuse of authority, dishonesty, misconduct, and neglect were filed against P/B
Rodriguez, one in the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, and another in the Ombudsman.
The complaint before the Ombudsman was filed on Aug. 26, 2003; complaint in the SB was filed Sept. 1. SB served
notice on Rodriguez on Sept. 8, while Ombudsman did so on Sept. 10. After several motions filed, [allegation of
forum shopping, motion to dismiss filed by Rodriguez] the complainants eventually withdrew the SB complaint so they
could focus on the complaint with the Ombudsman. In the Ombudsman proceeding, Rodriguez filed MTD, claiming
that the SB still had jurisdiction because he never received a decision or resolution dismissing that complaint.
Complainants argued that the case was dismissed after the Vice-Mayor granted their motion to withdraw. Rodriguez
replied that the dismissal was invalid because only the vice-mayor signed it. Later, Ombudsman rendered a decision
dismissing Rodriguez from his position, disqualifying him from public office, and forfeiting his benefits and CSC
eligibility. On appeal, CA reversed, holding that SB still had jurisdiction because it was the first to serve notice on
Rodriguez. On appeal by the Ombudsman, SC reversed CA and affirmed the Ombudsman decision, ruling that the
Ombudsman had concurrent jurisdiction with the SB under RA 8749 and the LGC, because Rodriguez is a punong
barangay (SG 14). Contrary to CA conclusion and Rodriguez’ contention that jurisdiction is acquired by service of
summons [thus SB acquired jurisdiction first], in cases of 2 agencies exercising concurrent jurisdiction, the body in
w/c the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction continues until the case is terminated. CAB:
Complaint with the Ombudsman was filed first, so when it took of cognizance of [opted to assume jurisdiction over]
the case, jurisdiction had already vested, to the exclusion of the SB. Ombudsman decision was thus rendered with
jurisdiction and should be upheld.

DOCTRINE: Under LGC 60, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart
from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman
are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official
other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment. Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials with
salary grade below 27, e.g., punong barangay. The rule against forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to administrative cases.
NATURE: Petition for review under ROC 45. Administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman.

FACTS
 Aug. 26, 2003 – Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB) received a complaint against P/B Rolson RODRIGUEZ of
Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. The complaint alleged abuse of authority, dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
 Sep. 1, 2003 – Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Binalbagan, through Vice-Mayor Jose G. YULO, received a
similar complaint against Rodriguez. [no statement as to who the complainants were]
 Sep. 8, 2003 – Yulo issued a notice ordering Rodriguez to file an answer within 15 days from receipt of such
notice.
 Sep, 10, 2003 – OMB required Rodriguez to file his answer.
 Sep. 23, 2003 – Rodriguez moved to dismiss the complaint in the SB for being baseless in fact and in law.
He also argued that the complainants violated the rule against forum shopping.
 Oct. 24, 2003 – Rodriguez moved to dismiss the OMB complaint on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum
shopping, arguing that the SB had acquired jurisdiction on Sep. 8.
 Complainants, through counsel, moved to withdraw the SB complaint to prioritize the OMB complaint.
o Rodriguez insisted that the SB complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping
o Complainants admitted to forum shopping (LOL) and claimed that they were not assisted by
counsel when they filed the complaint.
 Nov. 4, 2003 – Yulo dismissed the SB complaint.
 Jan. 29, 2004 – OMB ordered both parties to file position papers. Rodriguez filed MR, citing pendency of his
MTD.
o MR denied. MTD is a prohibited pleading under AO 17, Rule III, Sec.5(g). OMB: Magfile ka ng
position paper.
o Rodriguez: Sige fa-file ako. SB still had jurisdiction over his person because he has not received
any resolution or decision indicating the dismissal of the SB case.
o Complainants: There was no more complaint in the SB because Vice-Mayor Yulo granted their
motion to withdraw.
o Rodriguez’ rejoinder: Dismissal not valid because only the Vice-Mayor signed it.
 Sep. 21, 2004 – OMBUDSMAN DECISION
o Found Rodriguez GUILTY of dishonesty and oppression
o Rodriguez dismissed from service, w/ forfeiture of all benefits and civil service eligibilites, and
disqualification from public office.
o Rodriguez filed MR.
 Jan 12, 2005 – OMB directed the Mayor of Binalbagan to dismiss Rodriguez.
 Rodriguez filed a petition for review with the CA.
 May 8, 2006 – CA DECISION
o OMB decision set aside for lack of jurisdiction
o Directed SB to continue hearing the case, as it acquired primary jurisdiction over Rodriguez, to the
exclusion of the OMB.
o BASIS: RoC 46, Sec. 4. SB was the first to serve notice on Rodriguez.
o OMB filed the present petition
 OMB: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired once a body vested with jurisdiction takes cognizance of the
complaint. OMB was first to take cognizance of the complaint because the SB complaint was filed later.
Summons or notices do not vest jurisdiction over the person in an administrative case. Consistent with the
rule on concurrent jurisdiction, OMB exercise of jurisdiction must be to the exclusion of the SB.
 Rodriguez: When a competent body has acquired jurisdiction over a complaint and over the person of the
respondent, other bodies are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over the same complaint. LGC IRR, Art.
124 provides that an elective official may be removed by the proper court or by disciplining authority
whichever acquires jurisdiction first to the exclusion of the other. SB acquired jurisdiction first. Jurisdiction in
administrative cases is acquired by service of summons or other compulsory processes. Complainants
committed forum shopping when they filed two identical complaints in two disciplining authorities exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.

ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N the complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman and the
sangguniang bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez (NO)
2) Who acquired jurisdiction first - the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman? (Ombudsman)

RATIO
1) FORUM SHOPPING NOT APPLICABLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
“The facts in this case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman, which likewise involved identical
administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against a punong barangay
for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial
cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the
sangguniang bayan identical complaints against [Rodriguez], they did not violate the rule against forum shopping
because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.”

2) OMBUDSMAN HAS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH SB BUT COMPLAINT WAS FIRST FILED WITH
OMBUDSMAN
 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 13(1): The Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1)
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
 Ombudsman Act, Sec. 15: The Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigations of such cases.
 LGC 61(c): Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified complaint against any erring elective
official shall be prepared as follows: (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final
and executory.
 Primary jurisdiction of Ombudsman applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
 In cases cognizable by the regular courts, Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is concurrent with other investigative
agencies.
 RA 8749 limits cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials with positions salary grade 27 and
higher. Punong barangay is salary grade 14, so no jurisdiction.
 From the applicable laws, it is clear that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang
bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials with salary grade below 27, such as
Rodriguez.
 In administrative cases involving concurrent jurisdiction of 2 or more disciplining authorities, the body in w/c
the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
 CAB: Since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and it opted to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
 Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Once acquired, it is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated. CAB: When complainants filed their case before the Ombudsman, jurisdiction
was already vested. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a
subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.
 Under LGC 60, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the
Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman
are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring
public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by
impeachment.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Ombudsman decision upheld.

Municipality of Sta Fe vs Municipality of Aritao
Date: September 21, 2007
Petitioner: Municipality of Sta Fe
Respondent: Municipality of Aritao

Ponente: Azcuna

Facts: In 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and
Canabuan.
The trial was almost over when the court realized its error. The court suspended the proceedings and
referred the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sanggunian adopted
Resolution 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian
approved the Committee’s recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further
proceedings.
In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied
the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue
a “decision” favoring a party. The court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral
was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of
the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be
resumed. Respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since
the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian. The RTC
granted the motion. The CA affirmed. According to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive
effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given
retroactive effect. Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed
through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous
ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling
boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will
of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional
Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction

Held: No

Ratio: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the
provinces in which the municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of
the Province where the municipalities are situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local
Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); - Sangguniang Panlalawigan where the municipalities are
situated, appeal with the RTC.
This Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that the trial court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint when it was filed on October 16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was
Section 2167 of the RAC, as amended by Sec. 1 RA 6128, which granted the CFI the jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of municipal boundary disputes. Municipality of Sogod reveal that it dealt with the
trial court’s dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction because at the time of the institution of the
civil actions, the law in force was the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the
provincial boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases. The difference in the factual
setting notwithstanding, Municipality of Sogod still applies in the sense that similar thereto the
pendency of the present case has also been overtaken by events – the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the enactment of the LGC of 1991.
As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been
the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among
two or more municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however, a major
change has been introduced – that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not
only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the
reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 outlines the
procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes.
 Unlike Ra 6128 and BP 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sanggunian
concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing
the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and
decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules
and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment
by R.A. No. 6128, under which the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties
and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the LGC of 1991, the trial
court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party
aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same.
The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the
responsibility of the court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.” Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to
dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters
of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial – for the decision of a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never
become final and executory. Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; otherwise,
the inevitable consequence would make the court’s decision a “lawless” thing. As correctly pointed out
by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a boundary dispute if its
decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because the decision is totally
unacceptable to them. How then can the Court enforce its decision?
Petitioner contends that the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 on the
settlement of municipal boundary disputes should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful
of the rule that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. An exception to this rule lies where the statute
either expressly provides or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending
before its enactment. Hence, this Court has held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so
provided expressly or if retroactivity is necessarily implied therefrom and no vested right or obligation of
contract is impaired and it does not deprive a person of property without due process of law.
The new provisions and requirements regarding changes in the constitution of political units are
intended to apply to all existing political subsidiaries immediately, i.e., including those with pending
cases filed under the previous regime, since the overarching consideration of these new provisions is the
need to empower the local government units without further delay. Furthermore, the RTC can still
review the decision of the Sangunian under the new set-up, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
so no substantial prejudice is caused by allowing retroactivity.

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R.

MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR
VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO,
NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978

MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,

vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO,
NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the
Honorable COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

Julian M. Armas, Assistant Provincial Fiscal for petitioners.

Isidro L. Padilla for respondents.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta
authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipality.

A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of the Municipality of
Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, for a
death which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta on January 22, 1959, and which was
attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members.

The following facts are not in dispute:

On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159
whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and
23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive
Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2
stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the
construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela" was "5-½ meters by 8
meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24 bamboo posts — 4 in a
row in front, 4 in the rear and 5 on each side — with bamboo braces." 1

The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui

employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of
January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The
program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went
up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the
stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath.
Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the
following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of
Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal
Council in 1959.

Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a
legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a
town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of any of its agents.

The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration
and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit;
furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. 2

After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the
defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he arrived at
the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due
diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage
strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of
the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10,
1962. 3

The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31, 1968,
the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V.
Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all
the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of
P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. 4

The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition
stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat:

Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or

public function or is it or a private or proprietary character?

1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and
be sued, and contract and be contracted with.5

The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the one
hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised
for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial
private and corporate. 6

As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that is generally a
difficult matter to determine. The evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence, for
instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have evolved and are stated in textbooks have set
down a conclusive principle or rule, so that each case will have to be determined on the basis of
attending circumstances.
In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has
... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private
(so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. 7

Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of
Indiana in 1916, thus:

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In
one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance
of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their
officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are
nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are
officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private. proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of
such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995)

In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, through Justice Grant
T. Trent, relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the municipality as
governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire, disease, preservation of public peace, maintenance of
municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. 8 Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and
airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. 9

2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.

If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no
recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter,10 nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that
they did not act wantonly and maliciously. 11 InPalafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958,
a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the
course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made liable because its
employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the construction and maintenance
of roads — and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration. 12

With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held
liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. 14

Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his
employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured.
Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of
this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
 requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed.
Sec. 1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)

3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the ho of
the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not
oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be
held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty
reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public
ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later
date in the same year, by resolution of the council.

This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a
religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community
and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The
mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of
parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to
be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes private or
proprietary in character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta. 15

4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable
for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- tributable to the negligence of the
municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. . .

On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants (now
petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces located on the
front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or "telon", and that when many people went
up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate
court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or "principal"
braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth
located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo twine. 16 That being the case, it
becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave
the front portion of the stage practically unsuported Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed
negligence as there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an
occurrence.

At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo
braces denied having done go. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could not have
removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top of the stags
for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be impractical and
unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage curtain. 17

The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00
was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of
wooden planks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo material We likewise observe that
although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts, nevertheless
there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest?

The Court of Appeals thus concluded

The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of
onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. Having filed to
take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the
participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection with the celebration of
the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non participants or spectators from
mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the
additional weight- the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)

The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence
as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of
the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a
gross misapprehension of facts." 18

Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise under the circumstances of the case." 19

Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during
the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila
Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of
services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage
show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and
stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of the
performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal safety of the
participants. 20 We agree.

Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942, which
was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the
steps of the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week" and one of the
features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was
invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for Damages in
favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district, California, heldinter alia that the "Know
your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a "governmental one" of the city, that defendant
owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and plaintiff was
entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of
sufficient illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. 21

We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The Municipality
of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of 1959; it created a committee in
charge of the entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call
for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla was one of the
participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that
occasion.

Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that it was
Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council
appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under
the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. 22

... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a
cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation
appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove
the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties
relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or
special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent
superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879)

5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who
enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee.

The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering ing material
or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. 23

In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on
their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the
Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and
the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. 24

We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code
against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public
officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an
official duty.

If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are
concerned, it is because of a plain error committed by respondent court which however is not
invoked in petitioners' brief.

In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz
Castro, held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned
as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution are indispensable or
necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule 51
of the Rules of Court. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant case.

The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by
the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal
consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle
that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
composing it 26 and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. 27

xxx xxx xxx

The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not
personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he Must be shown to have
personally voted for or otherwise participated in them ... Fletcher Encyclopedia
Corporations, Vol 3A Chapt 11, p. 207)

Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation
merely because of their official relation to it, but because of some wrongful or
negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury
... To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation
there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to, or
helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the
wrongful act. ... (pp. 207-208, Ibid.)

xxx xxx xxx

Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the corporate are
not personally liable for the negligent acts of the exhibitor. (p. 211, Ibid.)

On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.

6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court.
Petitioner-municipality assails the award.

Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be
granted when the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although
respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding attorney's fees, the records show
however that attempts were made by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an extrajudicial
compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but
failed to comply; and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved family of Vicente
Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was believed to be a just
cause. 28

We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all is a
matter of judicial discretion. The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the
Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from
liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993).

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED,

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 pp- 3-4 of Petitioner's brief

2 pp. 35-37, rollo L-29993

3 pp- 42-44, Ibid

4 pp. 21-31, Ibid.

5 Sec. 2125, Art. 1, Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code.

6 Mendoza v. de In 33 Phil 508; 56 Am Jur 2d 254, sec 199; Martin on the Revised
Administrative Code, 1963 ed., pp. 482-483, citing Cooley's Municipal Corporation,
pp. 136-137.

7 2nd Ed. Vol 1, Sec. 12&, p. 381, cited in Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville,
Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd 952,954.

8 supra, p. 509

9 Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville. supra, p. 956

10 For instance, Art. 2189, Civil Code provides "Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries, suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. "

11 Mendoza v. de Leon, supra, p 513. In Palma v. Graciano, the City of Cebu, et al.,
99 Phil. 72, the Court held that although the prosecution of crimes is a governmental
function and as a rule the province and City of Cebu are not civilly liable by reason
thereof, nonetheless when public official goes beyond the scope of this duty,
particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his
office but is liable for his acts like any private individual.

12 L-10659, January 31, 1958, Unrep 102 Phil. 1186

13 Municipality of Paoay Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, et al., 86 Phil. 629; Municipality of
Moncada v. Cajuigan et al., 21 Phil. 184

14 Mendoza v. de Leon, supra, p. 513

15 We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances

plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on
this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven et al, was an action to recover
damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display
resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants'
negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the
city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it
received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence, in i lie performance 4t which no
statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of
New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the
celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming
the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connection held inter alia.

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of
purely public governmental' duties, Illness made liable by statute ... "A municipal
corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statue, concluded a
public Court of July celebration, including a display, of fireworks, and sent up a bomb
intended to explode in the air, but which Jailed to explode until it reached the ground
and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty.
(99 A.R. 51)

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from ttis excerpt:

July 4th. or, when that date tails upon Sunday, July 5th. is made a public holiday,
called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have
similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision,
the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since
the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. 'Throughout the
country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations,
calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate
patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises
consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompartied by
a musical program including patriotic airs sometimes preceded by the firing of
cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the.
general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be
questioned. ... Ibid p. 52)

16 See page 8 of Court of Appeals decision, p. 28 rollo L-29993

17 p. 29, Ibid. Page 612

18 De Gala-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595-, Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co 19

SCRA 289; Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., 20 SCRA 54; Chan v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 33 SCRA 737, among others.
19 19 Cal Jur., P. 543; Corliss v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 "

20 Respondents brief p. 70, rollo L-29993

21 129 P. 2d 511, 514

22 See page 8 of this Decision for quotation from Dillon on Municipal Corporations.

23 p. 31, rollo L-29993

24 pp. 1-3, petitioners