001 AQUINO vs MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN (STA.
MARIA) DOCTRINE: (based on sir’s reviewer) Forest lands, although under the
September 29, 2014| Velasco Jr., J. | Nature of LGUs – territorial and political
subdivisions
PETITIONER: Crisostomo B. Aquino
RESPONDENT: Municipality of Malay, Aklan, represented by Hon. Mayor John
P. Yap, sangguniang bayan of Malay, Aklan, represented by Hon. Ezel Flores,
Dante Pasuguiron, Rowen Aguirre, Wilbec gelito, Jupiter Gallenero, office of the
Municipal Engineer, Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Boracay PNP Chief,
Boracay Foundation, Inc., represented by Nenette Graf, Municipal Auxiliary
police, and John and Jane Does.
SUMMARY: Crisostomo Aquino is the president and chief executive officer of
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. The company applied
for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While
the company was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over
a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement
for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove. Through a Decision
on Zoning, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied Aquino’s application on
the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone”
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance). Aquino appealed the
denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the
municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011,
the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Aquino filed a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA alleging that the order was
issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the petition
solely on procedural ground, the writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy.
(related to our topic on LGU) Aquino argued that Boracay West Cove was granted
a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the company the right to construct
permanent improvements on the area in question. In rebuttal, respondents
contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying with the
Ordinance and PD 1096, National Building Code of the Philippines. The issue is
WON the FLAgT can prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096? – NO.
The SC held that the rights under the FLAgt are not unbridled. <doctrine>.
Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations
circumscribed in the ordinance are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact,
cumulative. Aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by
the DENR, it was incumbent on Aquino to likewise comply with the no build zone
restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in force even
before the FLAgT was entered into.
management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of
municipal laws, for local government units legitimately exercise their powers of
government over their defined territorial jurisdiction 

FACTS:
1. Crisostomo Aquino (Aquino) is the president and chief executive officer of
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
2. The company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a
resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit
covering the construction of a three- storey hotel over a parcel of land located
in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is
covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
favor of Boracay West Cove.
3. The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied Aquino’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone”
demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance.
4. In due time, Aquino appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor.
He followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken by
the mayor.
5. A Notice of Assessment was sent to Aquino asking for the settlement of
Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a
recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation
since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building permit, and business
and mayor’s permit.
6. In reply, Aquino expressed willingness to settle the company’s obligations,
but the municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment.
Meanwhile, Aquino continued with the construction, expansion, and
operation of the resort hotel.
7. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining
the expansion of the resort, and the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel. EO 10 was partially implemented. Thereafter, two more
instances followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements
introduced by Boracay West Cove.
8. Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of
discretion, Aquino filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive
relief with the CA.
9. He argued that judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the
respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s
establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR,
which bestowed the company the right to construct permanent improvements
on the area in question; that since the area is a forestland, it is the DENR—
and not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for that
 matter—that has primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional
Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an opinion
regarding the legal issues involved in the present case; that the Ordinance
admits of exceptions; and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed
for not issuing the necessary clearances in the company’s favor.
10. In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the
company from complying with the Ordinance and PD 1096, National
Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the
demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal
of illegally constructed buildings.
11. The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special
writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO
10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for
the petitioner is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC.
ISSUE/s
(RELEVANT ISSUES)
1. WON the mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued EO 10?
– NO. The mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal
constructions. The requirements for the exercise of this power are present.
2. WON the FLAgT can prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096? –
NO.
Other issues
1. WON certiorari is the proper remedy? – YES. Declaratory relief is no longer
viable. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari.
2. WON the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the controversy? – NO.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The mayor did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he issued EO 10.
A. The Hotel’s classification as a nuisance
1. The LGU effectively made a determination that constructions therein,
without firs securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances
for they pose a threat to public safety.
2. There are 2 kinds of nuisances. Nuisance per se is a nuisance under any and
all circumstances because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or
safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined
law of necessity. Nuisance per accidens is that which depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
3. In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per
se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or
structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances,
regardless of location or surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue.
As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our
mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
B. Mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions
1. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance
unless such a thing is a nuisance per se.
2. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We
still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.
3. One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals
and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein
is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the
closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to
secure the necessary permits,
C. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present
1. In the case at bar, Aquino admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits,
clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation
of Boracay West Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan.
2. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was
still pending with the office of the mayor even though construction and
operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer
be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-131
3. In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to have been
sufficiently complied with. First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. The burden
is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West Cove was deprived of
 the opportunity to be heard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of
the Cease and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10
itself were never attached to the petition before this Court, which documents
could have readily shed light on whether or not petitioner has been accorded
the 10- day grace period provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of
this fact, the presumption of regularity must be sustained. Second, as quoted
by petitioner in his petition before the CA, the assailed EO 10 states that
petitioner received notices from the municipality government on March 7 and
28, 2011, requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning ordinance
and yet it failed to do so. If such was the case, the grace period can be deemed
observed and the establishment was already ripe for closure and demolition
by the time EO 10 was issued in June. Third, the observance of the 10-day
allowance for the owner to demolish the hotel was never questioned by
petitioner so there is no need to discuss the same. Verily, the only grounds
invoked by petitioner in crying due process violation are (1) the absence of a
court order prior to demolition and (2) the municipal government’s exercise
of jurisdiction over the controversy instead of the DENR. Therefore, it can
no longer be belatedly argued that the 10-day grace period was not observed
because to entertain the same would result in the violation of the respondents’
own due process rights.
The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096
1. According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT constitutes
sufficient authorization from the DENR to proceed with the construction of
the three-storey hotel. The argument does not persuade.
2. The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled.
Forestlands, although under the management of the DENR, are not
exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over
their defined territorial jurisdiction.
3. Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations
circumscribed in the ordinance are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact,
cumulative.
4. Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the
DENR, it was incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build
zone restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in
force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to
stress that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from
complying with the restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant
exemptions from the ban on constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the
no build zone.
5. Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD
1096. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and will
not amend or change the law because a legislative act cannot be altered by
mere contractual agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its
failure to secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National
Building Code.
OTHER ISSUES:
Certiorari, not declatory relief, is the proper remedy.
1. The petition for declaratory relief became unaivailabe by EP 10’s
enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel
rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court
for carrying out the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA
erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a
situation.
2. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari. In the case at bench, the assailed
EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that Boracay West
Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is
illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise
of quasi-judicial functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may
lie.
The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the controversy.
1. Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power
granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power
devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted,
which is subject to review by the DENR.
2. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland
under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved
herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection,
conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance,
but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an
environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of
this debacle––compliance.
3. Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of the DENR
over respondents’ actions exercised through an instrumentality of an ex­parte
opinion, in this case, finds no sufficient basis. At best, the legal opinion
rendered, though perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts and
should be taken with a grain of salt.
002 CAPITOL WIRELESS V PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS
(Soriano)
30 May 2016 | Peralta J. | Power of Taxation
PETITIONER: Capitol Wireless Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Provincial treasurer of Batangas, Provincial Assessor of
Batangas, Municipal Treasurer and Assessor of Nasugbu
SUMMARY: Capwire signed with local and foreign telecommunication
companies covering international network of submarine cable systems. Capwire
claims that it s only a co-owner of the Wet-Segment of APCN, and alleges that
the Wet-Segment is laid in the international waters. 4. For loan restructuring
purposes, Capwire claims that "it was required to register the value of its right,"
hence, it engaged an appraiser to "assess the market value of the international
submarine cable system and the cost to Capwire. provincial assessor issued had
determines that the submarine cable systems described ib Capwire’s sworn
statement of true value of real properties are taxable real property. Such was
contested by Capwire in an exchange of letters between Capwire and the
Provincial Assessor arguing that the cable system lies outside the Ph territory.
Capwire received a warrant of levy and a notice of auction sale from the provincial
treasurer. Capwire sought to annul the order.
Issue:
1. Whether the case is the case cognizable by the administrative agencies
and covered by the requirements in Sections 226 and 229 of the Local
Government Code which makes the dismissal of Capwire's petition by
the RTC proper [Yes]
2. May submarine communications cables be classified as taxable real
property by the local governments? [Yes]
In disputes involving real property taxation, the general rule is to require the
taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax under protest
before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the assessment itself
is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal authority. Stated differently, the
general rule of a prerequisite recourse to administrative remedies applies when
questions of fact are raised, but the exception of direct court action is allowed
when purely questions of law are involved.
Submarine or undersea communication cables which are akin to electric
transmission lines were declared by the Court "no longer exempted from real
property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under
the Local Government Code. To the extent that the equipment's location is
determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no
reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for communications and
aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that both
pieces of property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect of real property
taxation.
Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption for
its lines and cables from real property taxation, then this interpretation applies and
Capwire's submarine cable may be held subject to real property tax.
DOCTRINE: In disputes involving real property taxation, the general rule is to
require the taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax under
protest before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the assessment
itself is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal authority.
FACTS:
1. Capwire is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing international
telecommunications services. Capwire has signed agreements with other
local and foreign telecommunication companies covering an international
network of submarine cable systems such as the Asia Pacific Cable Network
System (APCN), the Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable Network System
(BMP-CNS), the Philippines-Italy (SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam
Philippines (GP-CNS) systems. The agreements provide for co-ownership
and other rights among the parties over the network.
2. Capwire claims that it is co-owner only of the so-called "Wet Segment" of
the APCN, while the landing stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN
located in Nasugbu are allegedly owned by PLDT, and alleges that Wet
Segment is laid in international waters.
3. It also claims that it does not own any particular physical part of the cable
system but it owns the right to use certain capacity of the said system
(Indefeasible Rights in Cable Systems)
4. For loan restructuring purposes, Capwire claims that "it was required to
register the value of its right," hence, it engaged an appraiser to "assess the
market value of the international submarine cable system and the cost to
Capwire.
5. Capwire submitted a sworn statement of true value of the real properties. It
also claims that it reported that the system interconnects at the PLDT landing
station in Nasugbu which was covered by a transfer certificate of title and tax
declarations in the name of PLDT.
6. The provincial assessor issued had determknes that rge submarine cable
systems described in Capwire’s sworn statement of true value of real
properties are taxable real property. Such was contested by Capwire in an
exchange of letters between Capwire and the Provincial Assessor arguing that
the cable system lies outside the Ph territory.
7. Capwire received a warrant of levy and a notice of auction sale from the
provincial treasurer.
8. Capwire sought to declare null the Levy and Notice of Auction. RTC
dismissed the petition for Capwire’s failure to pay under protest a d to first
appeal to the Local Board of assessment appeals (LBAA) as provided by the
Local Government Code (LGC).
9. Capwire’s MR was denied. Filed appeal to CA. CA dismissed appeal.
10. CA held that the trial court correctly dismissed Capwire’s petition because of
 the latter’s failure to comply with the requirements prescribed by the LGC.
11. Although Capwire claims that it saw no need to undergo administrative
proceedings because its petition raises purely legal questions, the appellate
court did not share this view and noted that the case raises questions of fact,
such as the extent to which parts of the submarine cable system lie within the
territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authorities, the public respondents.
12. Capwire asserts that the recourse to LBAA, or payent of te tax under protests,
is inapplicable, since there is no question of fact involved, rather the authority
and power of the assessor to impose tac and of the treasurer to collect it.
Capwire also argues that the cable system is not subject to tax.
13. Respondents insist that hat the case presents questions of fact such as the
extent and portion of the submarine cable system that lies within the
jurisdiction of the said local governments, as well as the nature of the so-
called indefeasible rights as property of Capwire. Such questions are
allegedly resolvable only before administrative agencies like the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals.
14. Hence this petition
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the case is the case cognizable by the administrative agencies and
covered by the requirements in Sections 226 and 229 of the Local
Government Code which makes the dismissal of Capwire's petition by the
RTC proper [Yes]
2. May submarine communications cables be classified as taxable real property
by the local governments? [Yes]
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision
dated May 30, 2007 and Resolution dated October 8, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Petition is denied. CA did not err in holding that the issue involved factual
questions that should have been resolved before the appropriate
administrative bodies.
2. In disputes involving real property taxation, the general rule is to require the
taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax under protest
before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the assessment
itself is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal authority.
3. Stated differently, the general rule of a prerequisite recourse to administrative
remedies applies when questions of fact are raised, but the exception of direct
court action is allowed when purely questions of law are involved.
4. Submarine wires or cables used for communications may be taxed like other
real estate.
5. Submarine or undersea communication cables which are akin to electric
transmission lines were declared by the Court "no longer exempted from real
property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax
under the Local Government Code. To the extent that the equipment's
location is determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the
Court sees no reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for
communications and aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric
transmission, so that both pieces of property do not merit a different treatment
in the aspect of real property taxation.
6. Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption
for its lines and cables from real property taxation, then this interpretation
applies and Capwire's submarine cable may be held subject to real property
tax.
7. It is not in dispute that the submarine cable system's Landing Station in
Nasugbu, Batangas is owned by PLDT and not by Capwire. Obviously,
Capwire is not liable for the real property tax on this Landing Station.
Nonetheless, Capwire admits that it co-owns the submarine cable system that
is subject of the tax assessed and being collected by public respondents. As
the Court takes judicial notice that Nasugbu is a coastal town and the
surrounding sea falls within what the UNCLOS would define over which the
country has sovereignty it follows that a portion of the submarine cable
system lies within the Ph territory and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the
taxing authorities.
8. Thus, the jurisdiction or authority over such part of the subject submarine
cable system lying within Philippine jurisdiction includes the authority to tax
the same, for taxation is one of the three basic and necessary attributes of
sovereignty, and such authority has been delegated by the national legislature
to local governments with respect to real property taxation.
9. Under the LGC, every person by or for whom real property is declared, who
shall claim tax exemption for such property from real property taxation "shall
file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within 30 days from the
date of the declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in
support of such claim." Capwire omitted to do so.
10. Under Capwire's legislative franchise, RA 4387, which amended RA 2037,
where it may be derived that there was a grant of real property tax exemption
for properties that are part of its franchise, or directly meet the needs of its
business, 53 such had been expressly withdrawn by the Local Government
Code.
11. Capwire fails to allege or provide any other privilege or exemption that were
granted to it by the legislature after the enactment of the Local Government
Code. Therefore, the presumption stays that it enjoys no such privilege or
exemption. Tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer
because taxes are considered the lifeblood of the nation.
 003 China Banking Corp. vs. Abel (Siapno)
July 20, 2006 | Carpio, J. | Gov’t Instrumentality vs. GOCCs
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Manila International Airport Authority
DEFENDANT APPELLANT: CA, City of Parañaque, City Mayor of
Parañaque, Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Parañaque, City Assessor of Parañaque,
and City Treasurer of Parañaque
SUMMARY: MIAA administers land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA complex in Parañaque City under EO No. 903. The OGCC issued Opinion
No. 061 which withdrew the real estate tax exemption under Section 21 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 granted to MIAA. MIAA then had to pay the tax
imposed by the City. On 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001 which
amounted to P624,506,725.42. The City of Parañaque threatened to levy the land
and sell it at a public auction. After failing to win the case at the Commission on
Audit on January 2003, Paranaque announced public auction sale of Airport Lands
and Buildings on barangay halls and the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Issues: 1) WON MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a

government owned and controlled corporation and as such 
exempted from
tax.—YES 
2) WON the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public

dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale. 
—YES 
 expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government- owned and
1) Under the Local government code, GOCC are not exempted from real estate
tax. MIAA is not a GOCC, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or
non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not
divided into shares. It is not a non-stock corporation since it distributes income to
the National Treasury. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with
corporate powers and government functions.
2) Yes, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax
imposed by Parañaque City. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently government functions, not a government
owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). It is not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation; no capital stock dividends. Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA is a property of public
dominion.
DOCTRINE: As MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a GOCC nor a
non- stock corporation, it is not subject to real property tax.
FACTS:
1. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order
No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land,
improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. 

2. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued
Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC)
withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21
of its Charter. 

3. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it
received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings. 

4. At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion
No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from
real estate tax to show proof of exemption. 

5. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA
is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the CA seeking
to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but
this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. 

6. Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from
real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. 

7. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a justification
for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use
and public service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. 

8. On the other hand, the City of Parañaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which
controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. 

9. It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in
the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque posted and published notices
announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings.
ISSUE/s:
a. WON MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a GOCC and
as such exempted from tax. (GOCCs are not subject to real property taxes)
—YES
b. WON the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and
thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.—YES 

RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals of 5 October 2001 and 27 September 2002 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66878. We DECLARE the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila
International Airport Authority EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by the City
of Parañaque. We declare VOID all the real estate tax assessments, including the final
notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Parañaque on the Airport
Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority, except for the
portions that the Manila International Airport Authority has leased to private parties.
We also declare VOID the assailed auction sale, and all its effects, of the Airport
Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority.
RATIO:
MIAA is an Instrumentality of the Government
1. The Court tested the charter and the characteristics of MIAA against the definition
of a GOCC, non-stock Corporation and an instrumentality. MIAA failed to fall
under the definition of a GOCC and a non-stock corporation.
2. The Administrative Code of 1987 defines GOCCs as “any agency organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock”
3. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is
not a non-stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is an
instrumentality of the gov’t vested with corporate powers & government functions.
4. Also, Section 87 of the Corporation Code defines a non-stock corporation as "one
where NO PART OF ITS INCOME IS DISTRIBUTABLE as dividends to its
members, trustees or officers."
Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates
MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the National
Treasury. This prevents MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.
5. Furthermore, Section 88 of the Corporation Code provides that non-stock
corporations are "organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional,
cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or
similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers."
6. MIAA is not organized for any of these purposes. MIAA, a public utility, is
organized to operate an international and domestic airport for public use.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its governmental functions. Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality" as
“an agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.”
7. MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and
the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers
of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order." 
 However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private
8. Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The
MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and
autonomous body" will make its operation more "financially viable."
9. Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do
not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition
before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC.
Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax
10. Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private
ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized
for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. The ports
included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When
properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.
11. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion.
Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international
travel and transportation.
12. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for
regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of
MIAA as part of the public dominion.
13. As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the
commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to
public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public
dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use
the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.
14. The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed
by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any
real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
15. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec 133 of the LGC, which provides
that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the
levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities.
16. As discussed earlier, MIAA was held by the Court as an instrumentality of the
Government and NOT a GOCC. Thus, MIAA should not be subject to real
property tax.
17. These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax
the national government, which historically merely delegated to local
governments the power to tax.
18. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in
the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax
exemption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities.
entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the
beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person.
(Cross-checked & Revised Block 3 AEF digests)
 004 FUNA v. MECO (See derived from Vicencio’s digest)
February 4, 2014 | Perez, J. | MECO is a sui generis entity
PETITIONER: Dennis Funa
RESPONDENTS: Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), the
Commission on Audit (COA)
SUMMARY: To act as an unofficial body to maintain economical ties with
Taiwan while still respecting the PH’s Joint Communiqué with PROC, the MECO,
a non-stock, non-profit coporation, was organized. Petitioner Funa, after Asst.
Commissioner Naranjo admitted thru a memorandum that MECO was not being
audited, filed a petition for mandamus to compel COA to exercise its
constitutional duty to audit GOCCs or government instrumentalities. For Funa,
MECO must classified as a GOCC or gov’t instrumentality since ot is vested with
consular functions, and is controlled by the President by indirectly appointing its
Board of Directors. COA raised the defense of mootness due to BIR’s Office
Regulation, and MECO stood firm that it operates as a corporation and uses private
funds. The issue is WoN MECO is a GOCC. The SC held that MECO is not a
GOCC or government instrumentality. It lacks the third attribute needed in a
GOCC: it is not government owned or controlled as it is incorporated under the
Corporation Code and governed by a Board of Directors who are not government-
officials. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government
with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without
jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China policy of the
PROC. However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles
government funds in the form of the verification fees and consular fees. Hence,
under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such
"verification fees" and "consular fees" should be audited by the COA.
DOCTRINE:
Three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or
non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third,
government ownership over the same.
The MECO was organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under the
Corporation Code, not owned or controlled by the Republic of the Philippines.
The “desire letters” that the President transmits is merely recommendatory and
not bindingon the corporation. In order to qualify as a GOCC, a corporation must
also, if not more importantly, be owned by the government. Mere performance
of functions with a public aspect are not by themselves sufficient to consider the
MECO a GOCC. From its over-reaching corporate objectives, its special duty
and authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to the oversight by the
executive department over its operations—all the while maintaining its legal
status as a non-governmental entity—the Manila Economic and Cultural Office
is, for all intents and purposes, sui generis
FACTS:
1. Note: The case starts with an “Interlude.” A brief summary:
a. The Chinese civil war divided China into the communist People’s Republic of
China (PROC), which controls the mainland, and the nationalist Republic of
China (ROC) which controls the island of Taiwan.
b. After a monumental resolution of the UN General Assembly, a number of states,
like the Philippines, recognized just PROC as the legitimate government of
China, and terminated official relations with ROC (Taiwan).
c. The Philippines (PH) formally ended its diplomatic relations with the
government in Taiwan when the country and PROC expressed mutual
recognition thru the Joint Communiqué of the Gov’t of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Gov’t of the People’s Republic of China.
d. In the Joint Communiqué the PH Gov’t obliged itself to remove all its official
representations from Taiwan within 1 mo. from the date of signature.
e. PH however, despite ending diplomatic ties, maintained an unofficial
relationship with the former, facilitated by the offices of Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office, for the side of Taiwan, and Manila Economic & Cultural
Office (MECO), for the side of the PH.
2. The MECO was organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under the
Corporation Code as corporate entity "entrusted" by the Philippine
government with the responsibility of fostering "friendly" and "unofficial"
relations with the people of Taiwan, particularly in the areas of trade,
economic cooperation, investment, cultural, scientific and educational
exchanges.
3. MECO oversees the rights and interests of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) in Taiwan; promotes the Philippines as a tourist and investment
destination for the Taiwanese; and facilitates the travel of Filipinos and
Taiwanese from Taiwan to the Philippines, and vice versa.
4. Petitioner Funa sent a letter to the COA requesting for a copy of the latest
financial and audit report of the MECO invoking his constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern.
5. Funa made the request on the belief that the MECO, being under the
"operational supervision" of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is
a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
6. Asst. Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum and revealed that MECO
was not among the agencies audited.
7. Taking this memo as an admission that COA had never audited the accounts
of the MECO, Funa filed the instant petition for mandamus. He filed in his
capacities as "taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar
and law book author."
8. Funa posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA
is neglecting its duty under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution
to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC or government
instrumentality.
9. He substantiates that:
a. MECO is vested with government functions. It acts like an embassy or
consulate. A reading of the authorized functions of the MECO as found
 in EO No. 15, s. 2001, reveals that they are substantially the same
functions performed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
b. The MECO is controlled by the government. It is the President of the
Philippines that actually appoints the directors of the MECO, albeit
indirectly, by way of "desire letters" addressed to the MECO’s board of
directors. An illustration of this exercise is the assumption by Mr.
Antonio Basilio as chairman of the board of directors of the MECO in
2001, which was accomplished when former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, through a memorandum expressed her "desire" for
the election of Mr. Basilio as chairman.
10. MECO prays for the dismissal of the petition first, procedurally on the ground
that it was prematurely filed, and substantially on the ground that it is not a
GOCC or a government instrumentality because it is not owned or controlled
by the government, and operates on private funds.
11. The COA, as co-respondent, on the other hand, advances that the petition
The MECO Is Not a GOCC
must be dismissed on the ground of mootness.
12. COA argues that the petition already became moot when COA Chairperson
Maria Gracia M. Pulido-Tan issued Office Order No. 2011-698 which
directed a team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan, specifically for the purpose
of auditing the accounts of, among other government agencies based therein,
the MECO.
13. But COA concedes that MECO may still be audited with respect to the
"verification fees" for overseas employment documents that it collects from
Taiwanese employers on behalf of the DOLE.
14. COA classifies MECO a non-governmental entity "required to pay xxx
government share" subject to a partial audit of its accounts under Section 26
of the PD No. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the instant mandamus petition is rendered moot by the COA’s issuance
of Office Order No. 2011-698 – NO, transcendental importance.
2. WoN MECO is a GOCC – NO, it is not owned or controlled by the
government. It is a sui generis entity.
3. WoN the COA, under prevailing law, is mandated to audit the accounts of
the MECO – YES, but only with regard to verification fees and consular fees.
RULING: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The MECO is hereby declared a
non-governmental entity. However, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to: the
verification fees contemplated by Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1022 that the
former collects on behalf of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the fees it
was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of Executive Order No. 15 are subject to
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
RATIO:
The Mandamus Petition Cannot be Dismissed for Mootness
1. Issuance by the COA of Office Order indeed qualifies as a supervening event that
effectively renders moot and academic the main prayer of the instant mandamus
petition. A writ of mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO
would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to
do the same.
2. However, there is paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue concerning
the failure of the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO. The propriety or
impropriety of such a refusal is determinative of whether the COA was able to
faithfully fulfill its constitutional role as the guardian of the public treasury, in which
any citizen has an interest.
3. Also, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order appears to be entirely dependent
upon the judgment of the incumbent chairperson of the COA; and dangerously
capable of being repeated yet evading review.
4. Note: Procedural issues on Locus Standi and Hierarchy of Courts were also briefly
discussed. On locus standi: Funa had already established his cause of action against
COA when he alleged that COA neglected its duty in violation of the Consitution. On
Heirarchy: the petition to the SC is warranted in vew of its transcendental importance.
1. The Administrative Code, as replicated in RA 10149 or the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011, defines a GOCC: Government-owned or controlled
corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of
its capital stock:.
2. GOCCs, therefore, are "stock or non-stock" corporations "vested with
functions relating to public needs" that are "owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities."
3. By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its
organization as stock or non-stock corporation; second, the public
character of its function; and third, government ownership over the
same.
4. In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and
second attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.
5. First attribute:
a. Records disclose that the MECO was incorporated as a nonstock corporation
under the Corporation Code.
b. The purposes for which the MECO was organized also establishes its non-profit
character. The purposes are somewhat analogous to those of a trade, business or
industry chamber, but only on a much larger scale i.e., instead of furthering the
interests of a particular line of business or industry within a local sphere, the
MECO seeks to promote the general interests of the Filipino people in a foreign
land.
c. None of the income derived by the MECO is also distributable as dividends to
any of its members, directors or officers.
6. Second attribute:
a. The functions of the MECO can even be said to partake of the nature of
governmental functions and thus undoubtedly of public character. As earlier
intimated, it is the MECO that, on behalf of the people of the Philippines,
 currently facilitates unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan. The MECO Is Not a Government Instrumentality; It Is a Sui Generis Entity
b. Consistent with its corporate purposes, the MECO was "authorized" by the 1. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that,
Philippine government to perform certain "consular and other functions" relating by reason of some "special function or jurisdiction" they perform or exercise,
to the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan. are allotted "operational autonomy" and are "not integrated within the
7. Third attribute: department framework.
a. The 2 attributes, however, are not by themselves sufficient to consider 2. The other government instrumentalities i.e., the regulatory agencies,
the MECO as a GOCC. In order to qualify as a GOCC, a chartered institutions and GCE/GICP are all, by explicit or implicit definition,
corporation must also, if not more importantly, be owned by the creatures of the law.
government. 3. The MECO cannot be any other instrumentality because it was, as
b. The government owns a stock or non-stock corporation if it has mentioned earlier, merely incorporated under the Corporation Code.
controlling interest in the corporation. In a stock corporation, the 4. “It is clear that the MECO is uniquely situated as compared with other private
controlling interest of the government is assured by its ownership of at corporations. From its over-reaching corporate objectives, its special duty
least fifty-one percent (51%) of the corporate capital stock. and authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to the oversight by
c. In a non-stock corporation, like the MECO, jurisprudence teaches the executive department over its operations—all the while maintaining its
that the controlling interest of the government is affirmed when "at legal status as a non-governmental entity—the MECO is, for all intents and
least majority of the members are government officials holding such purposes, sui generis.”
membership by appointment or designation" or there is otherwise
"substantial participation of the government in the selection" of the The Accounts of the MECO Pertaining to the Verification Fees and Consular Fees
corporation’s governing board. May Be Audited by the COA
d. In this case, the petitioner argues that the government has controlling
1. The SC agrees that the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of
interest in the MECO because it is the President of the Philippines that
"verification fees" is subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. However,
indirectly appoints the directors of the corporation.
they digress from the view that such accounts are the only ones that ought to
e. MECO, however, counters that the "desire letters" that the President
be audited by the COA.
transmits are merely recommendatory and not binding on it.
2. The SC finds that the accounts of the MECO pertaining to the consular fees
f. MECO maintains that, as a corporation organized under the Corporation
it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are
Code, matters relating to the election of its directors and officers, as well
likewise subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
as its membership, are ultimately governed by the appropriate provisions
3. Section 14(1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to
of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its by-laws.
audit accounts of non-governmental entities "required to pay xxx or have
g. The SC sides with MECO. The fact of the incorporation of the MECO
government share" but only with respect to "funds xxx coming from or
under the Corporation Code is key. The MECO was correct in
through the government." This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO:
postulating that, as a corporation organized under the Corporation Code,
4. The MECO receives the "verification fees" by reason of being the collection
it is governed by the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles
agent of the DOLE—a government agency. Out of its collections, the MECO
of incorporation and its by-laws.
is required, by agreement, to remit a portion thereof to the DOLE. Hence, the
h. In this case, it is the by-laws of the MECO that stipulates that its
MECO is accountable to the government for its collections of such
directors are elected by its members; its officers are elected by its
"verification fees" and, for that purpose, may be audited by the COA.
directors; and its members, other than the original incorporators,
5. Like the "verification fees," the "consular fees" are also received by the
are admitted by way of a unanimous board resolution.
MECO through the government, having been derived from the exercise of
i. Also, none of the original incorporators of the MECO were shown to be
consular functions entrusted to the MECO by the government. Hence, the
government officials at the time of the corporation’s organization. None
MECO remains accountable to the government for its collections of "consular
of them were established as government appointees or public officers
fees" and, for that purpose, may be audited by the COA.
designated by reason of their office. There is, in fact, no law or executive
order that authorizes such an appointment or designation. Disclaimer: long case; Hence, long digest. Decreased the font-size of less relevant topics.
j. Hence, from a strictly legal perspective, it appears that the presidential
"desire letters" pointed out by Funa—if such letters even exist outside of
the case of Mr. Basilio—are, no matter how strong its persuasive effect
may be, merely recommendatory.
 005 City of Manila v. IAC (Sarmiento)
November 15, 1989 | Paras, J. | Proprietary functions
PETITIONER: City of Manila
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appelate Court
SUMMARY: The widow and children of late Vicencio Sto. Domingo (died in
1971), brought the present action against City of Manila as the remains of the late
Vicencio has been exhumed from its tomb by the authorities from the North
Manila Cemetery. They allege that the lease contract was to expire in 2021. The
respondents, in their defense, did such act of exhuming the remains, in
accordance with Administrative Order of 1975. According to the said order, was
leased to the family for five (5) years only, subject lot was certified on January
25, 1978 as ready for exhumation. The RTC and CA both ordered the North
Cemetery to provide the family a lot to bury the remains of their loved one. The
SC, in determining the liability of the City of Manila, determined whether the
maintenance of cemeteries is a governmental or proprietary function. It found
that it was indeed a proprietary function; as such, the City of Manila is liable for
such tortious act of its employees through the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The SC also foundt that the administrative order issued by the City of Manila
does not apply to the subject lease contract as the administrative order was
enacted in 197 while the lease contract was entered into in 1971.
DOCTRINE:
Maintenance of parks,golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also
recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.
FACTS:
1. The widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. brought this
present action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangelina Suva of
the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of
the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-
in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City
Government of Manila.
2. Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto.
Domingo and father of the litigating minors, died on June 4, 1971and buried
on June 6, 1971 in the Lot No. 159 of Block 194 North Cemetery which lot
was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6,
1971 to June 6, 2021.
a. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the
said receipt which appears to be regular on its face.
b. Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no other document was
executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question.
c. In fact, the burial record for the subject matter lot of Manila North
Cemetery in which subject Lot No. 159 is situated does not reflect
the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of
the Sto. Domingos.
3. "Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No.
5, Series of 1975, of the City of Mayor of Manila prescribing uniform
procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and
for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery,
etc., subject lot in which the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were
laid to rest, was leased to the family for five (5) years only, subject lot was
certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.
4. On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery then
headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation from
subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., and kept
the remains in the depository of the cemetery.
a. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another
lessee which put the plaintiffs herein in their shock,
b. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding,
Irene Sto. Domingo inquired from the officer-in-charge of
the North Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the
remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in
question which was given to another lessee.
5. Trial court: ordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use
of another single lot within the North Cemetery
6. CA: modified the judgment and ordered North Cemetery to bury the same in
the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs.
7. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a
corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila to make the city
liable—YES.
RULING: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively
devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of
the Ordinances of the City of Manila.
a. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the
 performance of its governmental function, it is immune from
tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and
subordinate employees.
b. Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila
exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or
any other laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions. They allege that the Revised Charter of
Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the Human
Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.
2. Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the
City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of
proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city
and its officers therefore can be sued for any violation of the contract of lease.
3. Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and
as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised
by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper
corporate name.
a. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.
4. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the
one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
a. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the
powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political.
b. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special
benefit and advantage of the community and include those which
are ministerial, private and corporate
5. A municipal corporation proper has a public character as regards the state at
large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar
as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community.
a. In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may
acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private
or proprietary capacity.
b. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public
use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates
the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades,
and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities
or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws.
6. In Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be
held liable to third persons ex contractu.
a. "Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and
in tort.
b. The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must
answer civilly for
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant
in the course or line of his employment. Municipal corporations un
der
the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of
law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when t
he requisite elements of liability coexist.
c. While the following are corporate or proprietary in
character, viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter houses,
markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and
fisheries. Maintenance of parks,golf courses, cemeteries and ai
rports among others, are alsorecognized as municipal or city ac
tivities of a proprietary character.
7. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law,
the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which
was created by resolution of the Municipal Board
a. The administration and government of the cemetery are
under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery
the opening of graves are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery.
b. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that
the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City
of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
8. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the
private respondents.
a. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties.
b. Thus, a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as
the law between them.
9. All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the
unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting
place and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed
for by them lacking in legal and factual basis.
a. Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that
plaintiffs can ask for is the replacement of subject lot with another
lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which
substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to
the city government for a period of (43) years, four (4) months and
 eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term
of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978 when the remains of
the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed
from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest
for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to
bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs
hereunder.’"

10. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, petitioner City of Manila is liable
for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the
duration of the contract of lease.
a. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of
the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6,
1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new
leases.
b. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for
exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full
force and effect.
 006 Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme (Santos)
April 8, 1991 | Medialdea, J. | Suability of a Municipal Corporation
PETITIONER: Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, Juana Rimando-Baniña,
Iaureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marieta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña, and
Lydia Baniña
SUMMARY: A collision happened between a dump truck owned by the
Municipality, a jeepney and a gravel and sand truck, causing physical injuries and
death some passengers of the jeep, including Laureano Baniña. The Baniñas filed
a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeep and a third party
complaint against the Municipality and the driver of the dump truck. The
Municipality raised defenses such as (1) lack of cause of action, (2) non-suability
of the State, (3) prescription of cause of action and the (4) negligence of the owner
and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. Judge
Firme ruled in favor of the Baniñas, ordering the Municipality and the driver to
pay them P30k moral damages and attys fees. The Municipality committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in rendering a decision.
The issue in this case is WON the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee and the court held that the municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions since under Sec.3(m) of Rule 131, ROC, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed and in this case, the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
DOCTRINE: Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant
them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are GENERALLY
not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity.
FACTS:
1. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing
under and in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
2. Judge Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the
CFI of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union.
3. Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano
Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano
Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in a Civil Case in the CFI.
4. A collision occurred involving a jeepney, a gravel and sand truck driven by
Manandeg and owned by Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality
of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Bislig. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a
result of the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered physical injuries.
5. Private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of
Nieveras and Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the jeepney.
6. The defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality of San
Fernando and the driver of a dump truck of the Municipality.
7. The case was transferred to Branch IV, presided over by Judge Firme.
8. The private respondents amended the complaint wherein the Municipality
and its regular employee, Bislig were impleaded for the first time as
defendants.
9. The Municipality filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as (1)
lack of cause of action, (2) non-suability of the State, (3) prescription of cause
of action and the (4) negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger
jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
10. Judge Firme:
a. dismissed the cross-claim against Balagot;
b. admitted the Amended Answer of the Municipality and set the
hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the
supposed lack of jurisdiction;
c. deferred there resolution of the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss
until the trial;
d. denied the MR filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having been
filed out of time;
e. Reiterated the denial of the MR
f. declared the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing that
parties have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite
the court's direction; and
g. denying the Municipality’s MR and/or order to recall prosecution
witnesses for cross examination.
h. Ordered Municipality and driver Bislig to pay jointly and severally
Baniñas P30k as moral damages, and P2,500 as attys fees.
i. Denied the MR for having been filed out of time.
11. Judge Firme issued an order providing that if the Municipality and Bislig
further wish to pursue the matter, such should be elevated to a higher court
in accordance with the ROC
12. The Municipality:
a. Judge Firme committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering
a decision.
b. While appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
13. Baniñas:
a. Petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is
indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
b. stress that the Municipality has not considered that every court,
including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss – NO but the judge
was acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he held the municipality liable
for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
2. WoN the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee – NO
because the the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office so, regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed (RoC, Sec 3 (m), R131)
RULING: Petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby
modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private
respondents.
RATIO:
1. 1st Issue: Judge Firme deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability
of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial without resolving such
defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against
the municipality and its driver.
2. Judge Firme DID NOT commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise
of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability
of the State in the guise of the municipality.
3. Judge Firme acted in excess of his jurisdiction he held the municipality liable
for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
4. Art. XVI, Sec. 3, Consti: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
5. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
6. Express consent: embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability
arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed
to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands
7. Implied Consent: gov’t enters into business contracts, descending to the
level of the other contracting party; also when the State files a complaint,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim
8. Municipal corporations like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
the sovereign immunity from suit; BUT are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued.
9. Suability vs. Liability: "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable;
on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
10. 2nd Issue: the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental
or proprietary functions.
11. Torio vs. Fontanilla: distinction of powers becomes important for purposes
of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which
result in an injury to third persons
12. City of Kokomo vs. Loy: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity:
a. Sovereign
b. Private, proprietary or corporate
13. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are GENERALLY not
liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity.
14. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the
right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under
the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
15. Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on
his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair
of San Fernando's municipal streets."
16. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Sec. 3(m) of Rule 131
of the ROC. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.
17. The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions.
18. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be
–– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
19. All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's
dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount
to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when it ruled on the issue of liability.
 FACTS:
007 LINA, JR. v. PAÑO (SALDUA)
July 8, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Rule 16: Motion to Dismiss
PETITIONER: Hon. Jose D. Lina, Jr., Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, and
Hon. Calixto Cataquiz
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Francisco Dizon Paño and Tony Calvento
SUMMARY: Private respondent Tony Calvevnto applied for a mayor's permit to
operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro, Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an
ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 dated September 18, 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province,
including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, Calvento filed
an action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Calvento
enjoining Lina & Mayor Cataquiz from implementing or enforcing the subject
resolution. Motion for its reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse. Lina
et.al contended that "the resolution is a policy declaration of the provincial
government of Laguna on its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation
of and/or all forms of gambling including the lotto operation" and thus it is valid.
On the other hand, Paño et.al argued that the same curtailed the power of the state
since the legislature itself had declared lotto as legal and permitted its operation
around the country.
SC found that the questioned ordinance merely stated the "objection" of the council
to all forms of gambling including lotto. It is a mere policy statement and could not
serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of lotto, which is a legitimate
business activity duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. In our system of government, the power of the local government units to
legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming
from Congress and these should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress as the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. Petition was denied and the assailed order was
affirmed.
ISSUE/s:
DOCTRINE: The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means "decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state or an "imperium in imperio." what the national legislature expressly allows by
law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
1
Reproduced on the last page of this digest.
1. Private respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to
install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto
outlet. But this was denied by Mayor Cataquiz.
2. Said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 19951 prohibited gambling in the
province, including lotto.
3. RTC ruled in favor of private respondent Calvento, enjoining petitioners
Lina, Jr. and Cataquiz from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
4. They filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence this petition.
5. Petitioner Lina, Jr. et.al’s arguments:
a. Assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of
lotto and all forms of gambling.
b. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police
power under the General Welfare Clause of RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC).
c. That the lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and
approval by the local government were sought before it was
implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and
27 of R.A. 7160.
6. Private Respondent Calvento’s arguments:
a. Subject resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state
since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared
lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country.
b. Re. no prior consultation and approval: that this is not mandatory
since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy
and not a self-executing provision of the LGC.
c. That his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the
authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted
a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.
1. WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid = YES
2. WON prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are
needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit
= NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
1. Subject ordinance merely states the "objection" of the council to the said
game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which
is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the
operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna.
2. As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto,
such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to
air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's.
3. However, it does not mean that LGUs may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a
measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
4. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national
government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO
and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today
5. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it
wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna, an LGU, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek
to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature
expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not
disallow by ordinance or resolution.
6. PH still has a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any
form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited
and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within
the state or an "imperium in imperio".
SECOND ISSUE
1. Petitioners Lina, Jr. et.al erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27
of Republic Act 7160 which requires that prior consultations and approval
of the Sanggunian must be obtained before national projects or programs
be implemented by gov’t authorities, apply mandatorily in the setting up of
lotto outlets around the country.
2. From a careful reading of said provisions, SC finds that these apply only to
national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a
particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the
national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO.
3. Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those
enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
a. May cause pollution.
b. May bring about climatic change.
c. May cause the depletion of non-renewable resources.
d. May result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover.
e. May eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the
planet.
f. Other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will
be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced
by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
4. Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by Lina et.al is
clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no indication in the letter of
Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a
permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions
of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna.
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING"
LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa
mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at
Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at
buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano
mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng
Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo
sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng".
 008 MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES (Sabaupan)
July 20, 1994 | Cruz, J. | Purpose of Local Governments
PETITIONER: Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas and The City of Cagayan de Oro
RESPONDENTS: Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. and Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation
SUMMARY: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations in Cagayan de Oro City.
This was opposed by several groups in the society. Nevertheless, PAGCOR leased
a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., and
prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season. The Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted an ordinance which prohibited the
issuance of business permits to establishments which uses or allows its premises
to be used for the operation of a casino. Subsequently, it enacted another ordinance
which prohibits the operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de
Oro. Pryce assailed these ordinances before the CA and the CA declared the
ordinances invalid. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code,
they have the power to enact ordinances that prohibits the operation of casinos and
that the Local Government Code modified PAGCOR’s charter. The issue is
whether the ordinances are valid. The Court ruled that the ordinances are void
because it violates PD 1869 (PAGCOR’s charter) which has the character and
force of a statute. Ordinances should not contravene a statute because Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under
our previous Constitutions.
DOCTRINE: Local Governments are agents of the State in the exercise of
government or public powers and are agents of the community and people in the
exercise of proprietary or private powers.
FACTS:
1. PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
Several groups in the society opposed this describing that the casino is an
affront to the welfare of the city.
2. PAGCOR leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
3. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinance
2
SEC. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
3353 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and
Cancelling Existing Business Permit to any Establishment for the Using and
Allowing to be used its Premises or Portion thereof for the Operation of
Casino.”
4. Subsequently, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 entitled “An Ordinance
Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation
therefor.” This Ordinance prohibited the operation of gambling CASINO in
the City of Cagayan de Oro.
5. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement.
6. Hence, Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the ordinances enacted by Cagayan de Oro is valid. NO because the
ordinances are in contravention with a statute.
RULING: The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by PD 1869 to help centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements
and Gaming Corporation, the Court sustained the constitutionality of the
decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the
third highest revenue-earner in the government.
2. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to
enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code.
It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause.2
3. Section 458 of the Local Government Code further provides that the
Sangguniang Panglungsod has the power to enact ordinances intended to
prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness
in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of house of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance x x x
4. Petitioner’s argues that:
a. By virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation and casinos because they involve games of
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
 chance, which are detrimental to the people.
b. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may
be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over “illegal
gambling.”
c. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under PD
1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to
prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted
to it by the Local Government Code.
d. This interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy
as mandated by the Constitution. n giving the local government units
the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social
problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the
competence of such communities to determine and adopt the
measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their
inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.
5. Furthermore, petitioners pointed out that the adoption of the Local
Government Code had the effect of modifying the charter of PAGCOR. The
Code is not only a later enactment than PD 1869 and so is deemed to prevail
in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the
PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as
they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to its repealing
clause.
6. The Court emphasized that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allows others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient.
7. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. An ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:
a. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
b. It must not be unfair or oppressive.
c. It must not be partial or discriminatory.
d. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
e. It must be general and consistent with public policy.
f. It must not be unreasonable.
8. The Court ruled that Section 458 of the Local Government Code which
authorizes LGUs to prevent or suppress gambling and other prohibited games
of chance, among others, excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law.
9. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in
relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that since the word "gambling" is
associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited
games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
10. On the assumption of a conflict between PD 1869 and the Code, the proper
action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the instant case. The proper
resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government
Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress
all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like PD 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read in
the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and
mutually complementary.
11. In light of all the above considerations, the Court found no way of arriving at
the conclusion urged by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are
valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate PD 1869, which
has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed
in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the
prohibition of gambling in general.
12. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute. Municipal corporations are mere tenants at will of the legislature.
13. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to
detract from that policy, the Court confirmed that Congress retains control
of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree
now than under our previous Constitutions.
14. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant
still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify
or violate it.
15. The Court held that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been
modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling
prohibited by law.
16. Casino gambling is authorized by PD 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
 to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation
of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to PD 1869
and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and
void.
17. Padilla, concurring: Gambling in any form runs counter to the government’s
own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character. The
national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate
its decision of imposing gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro
City for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much
against it.
18. Davide, Jr., concurring: The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the
challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to PD 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not
necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances
can still stand even if they be conceded as offending PD 1869. They can be
reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances
should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
 009 BASCO v. PAGCOR (Rosales)
May 14, 1991 | Paras, J. | Purpose of Local Government
PETITIONERS: Attorney’s Humberto Basco, Edilberto Balce, Socrates
Maranan and Lorenzo Sanchez
RESPONDENT: Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
SUMMARY: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile
granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos
on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s
operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded
PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869.
PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games
of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Atty. Humberto
Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because it violates the
equal protection clause and it violates the local autonomy clause of the
constitution. Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other
vices. Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced
cities like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as
PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle. Issue is WoN PD
1869 is valid? SC held that it is. It does not violate local autonomy (particularly
on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are
subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power. Further still, local governments have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869.
All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere local
government. This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National
Government over local governments.
DOCTRINE: The purpose of Local Governments is two-fold; i.e local
governments are agents of the State in the exercise of government or public
powers and are agents of the community and people in the exercise of proprietary
or private powers.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter - PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because:
a. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's
right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
b. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph,
the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
c. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR - conducted gambling, while most other forms
of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices;
d. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
2. Petitioners also claim that PD 1869 for having a "gambling objective" and
therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article
VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution.
3. The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A and was granted a franchise under PD 1067-
B to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well-known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The
operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of
revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399
was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
4. Subsequently, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law.
5. To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over
the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are
accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
6. It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue,
next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN PD 1869 is valid – YES, because it is a valid exercise of police power.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny
and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the
exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function
which belongs to the judicial department of the government."
2. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks
a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt. If any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports
the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis;
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or
expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
3. Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But
the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot
regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
4. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has
been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
5. As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace.
6. P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate
and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized
by existing franchise or permitted by law. In regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity, the PAGCOR, was beneficial
not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of
much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds
for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny,
regulation, supervision and control of the Government."
7. Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City
of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D.
1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring
to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
8. Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following
reasons:
a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it". Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to
a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"
b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by
Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress" which has the power to "create and
abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative
powers.” Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.
c. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has
long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local
governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise,
licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested
exclusively on the National Government
9. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation
with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by
the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II,
PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers.
10. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The
latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government
over local governments.
11. The power to tax as a "power to destroy" cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to
wield it.
a. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the
Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless
argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy)
provides:
i. "Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation
as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government."
12. The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject
to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law.
13. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or
revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause"
remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments
to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is
consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
14. Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of
local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be
an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
 an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only
mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government.
15. As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be
delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which
concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question.
16. What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise
dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
17. "As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or
express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local
corporation to deal with the subject. In the absence of express grant of power
to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the
state laws are void."
18. Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR - conducted gambling,
while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices"
a. The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same
b. Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR
is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the
petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like
cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P.
42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.
 010 GSIS v. Province of Tarlac (Rayos)
December 1, 2003 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Corporate Succession Applies to Local
Governments
PETITIONER: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
RESPONDENTS: THE PROVINCE OF TARLAC (TARLAC)
SUMMARY: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Tarlac passed a resolution that
authorized the conversion of Athletic Field into a Government Center. GSIS
decided to construct an office at the site. Tarlac and GSIS then entered into a MOA
stating the conditions for the donation of the lot. A Deed of Donation (DOD) was
executed to that effect. Pursuant to the MOA, GSIS donated 2M to Tarlac as
financial assistance (condition for the donation of the lot). Gov. Yap was elected.
He opined that the provisions of the MOA were unfair to the province. As such,
the Provincial Administrator demanded P33,590,000 more from GSIS as balance
of the lot donated which GSIS refused to pay. So Tarlac filed a complaint to declare
the MOA and DOD void. RTC ruled in favor of GSIS. CA reversed, ruling that an
appraised valuation must first be obtained from the local committee on awards
before the execution of the MOA and the DOD. Issue: W/N an appraised
valuation from the local committee on awards should be first secured before
executing the Deed of Donation and the MOA – NO. SC ruled that the appraised
value was not necessary. Moreover, the donation is onerous so the rules on
contracts will apply. The transfer in this case is not included in the NCC 1409
enumeration of void contracts. Moreover, the LGC 381 does not prohibit such
transfers.
DOCTRINE: A transfer of real property by a local government unit to an
instrumentality of government without first securing an appraised valuation from
the local committee on awards does not appear to be one of the void contracts
enumerated in the afore-quoted Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Neither does
Section 381 of the Local Government Code expressly prohibit or declare void such
transfers if an appraised valuation from the local committee on awards is not first
obtained.
FACTS:
1. March 26, 1996 - the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Tarlac passed Resolution
No. 068-96, which authorized and approved the conversion of Urquico
Memorial Athletic Field into a Government Center, as well as the segregation
and donation of portions of said land to different government agencies for the
purpose of constructing or relocating their office buildings.
2. After receiving 2 letters of invitation regarding the project, GSIS decided to
put up an office at the site.
3. Tarlac Governor Margarita Cojuangco issued a Notice of Construction on
December 13, 1996, for the building of the GSIS office on the designated lot.
4. Tarlac & GSIS executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on December
13, 1997, whereby Tarlac donated the said lot to the GSIS subject to the
conditions stipulated therein.
5. On the same date, the Province executed a Deed of Donation over the subject
lot in favor of the GSIS, which was duly accepted by the latter. As stipulated
in the MOA, the GSIS donated P2,000,000.00 to Tarlac as financial
assistance.
6. City of Tarlac issued a building permit to the GSIS for the construction of its
office. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan then passed Resolution No. 013-97,
which reiterated the authority granted to Gov. Cojuangco by Resolution No.
068-96
7. Gov. Jose Yap was elected as the new chief executive of Tarlac. He wrote a
letter to the GSIS, inviting the latter to reevaluate their respective positions
with respect to the MOA of December 13, 1997. Gov. Yap stated that Deed
of Donation were unfair to the Province.
8. Later, the Provincial Administrator wrote the GSIS, demanding the payment
of P33,590,000.00 representing the balance of the value of the lot donated,
which the GSIS refused to pay.
9. Tarlac then filed a Complaint against the GSIS for declaration of nullity of
donation and MOA, recovery of possession and enforcement of Article 449
in relation to Articles 450 and 451 of the Civil Code, and damages, before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 63.
10. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the validity of the donation to
the GSIS and dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of donation
and memorandum of agreement, recovery of possession and enforcement of
Article 449 in relation to Articles 450 and 451 of the Civil Code, and damages
filed by the Province of Tarlac.
11. Respondent Province of Tarlac appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled
in favor of Tarlac.
12. Hence, Petitioner GSIS filed this petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N an appraised valuation from the local committee on awards should be
first secured before executing the Deed of Donation and the MOA – NO. The
appraised value was not necessary. Moreover, the donation is onerous so the
rules on contracts will apply. The transfer in this case is not included in the
NCC 1409 enumeration of void contracts. Moreover, the section 381 of the
LGC does not prohibit such transfers.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2002 and its Resolution dated
April 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City, Branch 63, dated August 25, 1999 is REINSTATED. No costs.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner GSIS insists that the donation is perfectly valid, stating that there
is nothing in the Local Government Code which expressly states that the lack
 of an appraised valuation renders the subject transfer void. Further, it consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
contends that at best, an appraised valuation is merely a formal and faith, usage, and law.
procedural requisite, the lack of which cannot overturn substantive and vested 10. The contract has the force of law between the parties and they are expected
rights. to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments. Just as
2. Considering that the assailed donation is clearly onerous, the rules on nobody can be forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a
contracts will apply. Pertinently, the Civil Code expressly defines the contract is entered into, no party can renounce it unilaterally or without the
different kinds of void and inexistent contracts, to wit: consent of the other.
a. ART. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from 11. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change his
the beginning: mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary
b. (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.
good customs, public order or public policy;
c. (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
d. (3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction;
e. (4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
f. (5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
g. (6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal
object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
h. (7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
3. These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense
of illegality be waived.
4. A transfer of real property by a local government unit to an
instrumentality of government without first securing an appraised
valuation from the local committee on awards does not appear to be one
of the void contracts enumerated in the afore-quoted Article 1409 of the
Civil Code. Neither does Section 381 of the Local Government Code
expressly prohibit or declare void such transfers if an appraised
valuation from the local committee on awards is not first obtained.
5. The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right and to
uphold this right, courts should move with all the necessary caution and
prudence in holding contracts void.
6. Furthermore, a duly executed contract carries with it the presumption of
validity.
7. In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals simply ruled that the
absence of a prior appraised valuation by the local committee on awards
rendered the donation null and void. This, to our mind, did not
sufficiently overcome the presumption of validity of the contract,
considering that there is no express provision in the law which requires
that the said valuation is a condition sine qua non for the validity of a
donation.
8. There being a perfected contract, the Province of Tarlac, through Gov.
Yap, cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the
other party.
9. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
 011 Atienza v. Villarosa (Punsalan)
May 10, 2005 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Power to appoint officials
PETITIONER: Ramon Atienza as Vice-Governor of Occidental Mindoro
RESPONDENTS: Jose Villarosa as Governor of Occidental Mindoro
SUMMARY: A Memorandum (Memo 2) was issued by Gov. Jose Villarosa of
the Province of Occidental Mindoro terminating the contract of services of the
casual/job order employees and reappointment of the respective recommendees,
terminating the jobs of clerks, x-ray technicians, messengers, etc. Vice Governor
Ramon Atienza invoked the principle of separation of powers as applied to the
local government units, which he pertains to his authority over the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. However, Gov. Villarosa insisted that the Memos issued by him
should be strictly complied with. So Vice Gov. Atienza filed a petition with the
2.
CA citing grave abuse of discretion on Gov. Villarosa’s part but it was dismissed,
affirming that the authority remains with the Governor and not with the Vice
Governor under RA 7160 (LGC of 1991).
NOTE: moot na ‘tong case since tapos na terms nila pero niresolve ng court as a
guide to the bench, bar, etc.
Issue: WoN authority to appoint casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan lies with the Vice Governor – YES
3.
According to Sec 465 (Governor powers) and Sec 466 (Vice Governor powers) of
RA 7160, while the Governor has authority to appoint officials and employees
whose salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the
4.
officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such
authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority
to appoint casual and job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
5.
belongs to the Vice-Governor. The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the
officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is anchored on the fact
that the salaries of these employees are derived from the appropriation
specifically for the said local legislative body.
DOCTRINE: With the enactment of RA 7160, either department now comprises
different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and
balance between the two. Such law shifted the authority to appoint Sangguniang
Panlalawigan employees from the Governor to the Vice-Governor with the intent
6.
to vest the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its
functions.
FACTS:
1. In the Province of Occidental Mindoro, Ramon Atienza (Vice-Governor)
received a Memorandum (Memo 1) issued by Jose Villarosa (Governor)
concerning the Authority to Sign Purchase Orders of Supplies, Materials,
Equipment, Including Fuel, Repairs, and Maintenance of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Said Memorandum reads:
a. For proper coordination and to ensure efficient and effective local
government administration particularly on matters pertaining to supply and
property management, effective immediately, all Purchase Orders issued
in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials and equipment[s]
including fuel, repairs and maintenance needed in the transaction of public
business or in the pursuit of any undertaking, project or activity of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, this province, shall be approved by the
undersigned in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province.
b. The provision of DILG Opinion No. 148-1993 which states that the
authority to sign Purchase Orders of supplies, materials and equipment[s]
of the Sanggunian belongs to the local chief executive, serves as basis of
this memorandum. For strict compliance.
Vice-Governor Atienza replied by stating:
a. We are of the opinion that purchase orders for supplies, materials and
equipment are included under those as authorized for signature by the Vice-
chief executive of the Sanggunian on the basis of the DILG Opinion No.
96-1995 as affirmed by the COA Opinions on June 28, April 11 and
February 9, 1994 and coursing it to the Governor for his approval is no
longer necessary, the fact that [Secs.] 466 and 468, RA 7160 already
provides for the separation of powers between the executive and
legislative. Such authority even includes everything necessary for the
legislative research program of the Sanggunian.
Unimpressed, Governor Villarosa issued a Memorandum (Memo 2)
terminating the contract of services of the casual/job order employees
and reappointment of the respective recommendees. (28 clerks, x-ray
technicians, 30 messengers, utility workers and drivers were terminated)
In addition, Gov. Villarosa issued another Memorandum emphasizing the
enforceability of Memo 1, Memo 2, and an earlier Memo (which indicated
issuance of a permit to travel)
Through a Letter, Vice-Gov. Atienza invoked the principle of separation of
powers as applied to the local government units, i.e., the Governor, as the
head of the executive branch, and as the Vice-Governor, as the head of the
legislative branch, which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
a. Vice Gov. Atienza reiterated his request for the Gov. Villarosa to
make a deeper study on the matter before implementing his
memoranda.
b. The request, however, went unheeded Gov. Villarosa insisted on
obliging the department heads of the provincial government to
comply with the memoranda.
Thus, Vice Gov. Atienza filed with CA a petition for prohibition against Gov.
Villarosa for issuing Memos 1 and 2 with grave abuse of discretion. Said
memos excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of
the pertinent provisions of RA 7160 (LGC of 1991) and its IRR.
a. The CA dismissed the petition, citing Sec. 344 of RA 7160,
upholding the authority of Gov. Villarosa to issue Memo 1. Sec 344
states that approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief
 exec himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
b.
The CA also explained Sec. 466(a)(1) relied upon Vice Gov.
Atienza, speaking of the authority of the Vice-Governor to sign
all warrants drawn on the public treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. The CA stated that it is inapplicable since the
approval of purchase orders is different from the power of the
Vice-Gov to sign warrants drawn against the public treasury.
c. Sec 361 was also held inapplicable, stating the definition of
requisitioning3 and that in the procurement function, it is the
submission of written requests for supplies and materials and the
like which can be inferred that the approval of purchase requests is
different from approval of purchase orders.
(NOTE: when the SC took this case, the two parties already ended their term for their
respective positions; di tumakbo si Atienza tapos si Villarosa natalo sa election;
MOOT na dapat ‘tong matter pero the Court still resolved in order to guide the bench,
the bar and the public)
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the Vice Governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in
connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, etc. of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan – YES, because.
2. WoN Gov. Villarosa has the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments
of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan members
and the Office of the Vice-Governor – NO
RULING: Petition granted. Memo 1 and Memo 2 issued are NULL and VOID.
RATIO:
With regard to purchase orders in connection with supplies of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
1. (I’ve decided to place definitions first para clear sa lahat)
a. Warrants – orders directing the treasurer of the municipality to pay
money out of funds in city treasury which are or may become
available for purpose specified to designated person/s.
b. Warrants of a municipal corporation – are generally orders
payable when funds are found. They are issued for the payment of
general municipal debts and expenses subject to the rule that they
shall be paid in the order of presentation.
c. Voucher – is a document which shows that services have been
performed or expenses incurred. It covers any acquittance or receipt
discharging the person or evidencing payment by him. When used
in connection with disbursement of money, it implies some
instrument that shows on what account or by what authority a
3
the act of requiring that something be furnished
particular payment has been made, or that services have been
performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment.
d. Purchase order – is an authorization by the issuing party for the
recipient to provide materials or services for which issuing party
agrees to pay; it is an offer to buy which becomes binding when
those things ordered have been provided
2. RA 7160 (LGC of 1991) was enacted to give flesh to the constitutional
mandate to provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. (Principle of
Decentralization)
3. The Vice-Governor has authority to approve purchase orders related to
procurement of supplies, among others, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
a. Under RA 7160, the local legislative power for the province is
exercised by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and the Vice-
Governor is its presiding officer.
b. Vested with legislative powers, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
enacts ordinances, resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the province.
c. The law also states that the presiding officer (who is the Vice-
Governor) has the power to sign all warrants drawn on the
provincial treasury for expenditures
4. Reliance by the CA on the clause approval of the disbursement voucher by
the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are
disbursed of the above section (Section 344) to rule that it is the Governor
who has the authority to approve purchase orders for the supplies, materials
or equipment for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
misplaced.
a. This clause cannot prevail over the more specific clause of the same
provision which provides that vouchers and payrolls shall be
certified to and approved by the head of the department or office
who has administrative control of the fund concerned.
5. The Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, has administrative control of the funds of the said body. In
addition, the Vice-Gov has the authority to approve disbursement
vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
a. Portion of Sec 39 of Manual on the New Govt Accounting System:
Disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the Sanggunian shall be approved by the provincial
 Vice Governor…” order, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and restricted such authority to one
b. It can then be implied that RA 7160’s grant regarding authority of of recommendatory nature only. This clearly constituted an encroachment on
Vice Gov to sign all warrants drawn on provincial treasury for the appointment power of the Vice-Governor under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep.
expenditures of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan necessarily includes Act No. 7160.
the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same (doctrine
of necessary implication). HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LGC
10. With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the
Authority to terminate or cancel appointments of casual/job order employees of the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Office of the Vice Governor lies with the Vice so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling
Governor official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of
6. Even if the terminated employees may no longer be reinstated, still, similar public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two.
memoranda may be issued by other local chief executives. Hence, it Court 11. NOTE: BP 337 was the LGC prior to RA 7160 and the former stated that the
still resolved this issue. Governor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, but the
7. The Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and enactment of the latter code, the Vice-Governor is now the presiding officer
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no authority. Checking of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
RA 7160, Sec 465 states the powers of the Governor while Sec 466 states the a. The intent of RA 7160 is to vest the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
powers of the Vice Governor independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-à-vis the
a. While the Governor has authority to appoint officials and employees discharge by the Governor of the executive functions.
whose salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not
extend to the officials and employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the Vice-
Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual and
job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs
to the Vice-Governor.
b. The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is anchored on the fact
that the salaries of these employees are derived from the
appropriation specifically for the said local legislative body.
c. Indeed, the budget source of their salaries is what sets the employees
and officials of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan apart from the other
employees and officials of the province.
d. Accordingly, the appointing power of the Vice-Governor is limited
to those employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as well as
those of the Office of the Vice-Governor, whose salaries are paid
out of the funds appropriated for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
e. As a corollary, if the salary of an employee or official is charged
against the provincial funds, even if this employee reports to the
Vice-Governor or is assigned to his office, the Governor retains the
authority to appoint the said employee pursuant to Section 465(b)(v)
of Rep. Act No. 7160.
8. In this case, it does not appear whether the contractual/job order
employees were paid out of the provincial funds or the funds of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
9. Nonetheless, the validity of Memo 2 cannot be upheld because it
absolutely prohibited the Vice-Governor Atienza from exercising his
authority to appoint the employees, whether regular or contractual/job
 012 UMALI v. COMELEC (Pleyto)
April 22, 2014 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Specific Topic in Syllabus
G.R. No. 203974
PETITIONER: Aurelio M. Umali
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC, Julius Cesar V. Vergara and the City
Government of Cabanatuan
G.R. No. 204371
PETITIONER: J.V. Bautista
RESPONDENT: COMELEC
SUMMARY: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan
City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva
Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of
1991." COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0797, only those registered
residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. Umali filed
an MR maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and
directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that
Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not
involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the
Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote
in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC
should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly
affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
upgraded. Vergara, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X
does not apply to conversions. He argues that a specific provision of the LGC,
Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote
in the plebiscite. COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan
City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and that the
political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. ISSUE:
Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebicit not only those in
Cabanatuan City. RULING: Yes. "Political units directly affected" defined In
identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite,
what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire
to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. Umali elucidates that the
phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only
Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered
voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City. On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453
of the LGC to support their claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be
allowed to take part in the voting. The provision makes it ministerial for the
President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and
measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall"
used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion. In so doing,
Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes
of conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary
before the city proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC
through ratification, as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is
the very LGC. The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision
should equally apply to conversions as well. While conversion to an HUC is not
explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe
that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of
boundaries. ALSO, read doctrine.
DOCTRINE: Under the Nature of Local Government Units: Conversion to a
HUC is a substantial alteration of boundaries. Under Types of Local Government
Units: An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and
varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic
activity require greater autonomy. The provincial government stands to lose the
power to ensure that the local government officials act within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions, to review executive orders issued by the city
mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The
province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning
the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative
case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be modified
accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled
to vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials
FACTS:
1. This is a consolidated case for (1st case) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with prayer for injunctive relief assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925, both promulgated by COMELEC, and (2 nd
case) Petition for Mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to implement
the same
2. On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
a resolution, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan
City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC)
3. Presidentail Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaimed it as an HUC
subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
 provided for in Sec. 4534 of the LGC of 1991”
4. COMELEC issued the Minute Resoltion No. 12-0797, which said that only
registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the plebiscite
a. This was based on Sec. 453 again and the conversion cases of Puerto
Princesaa, Tacloban, and Lapu-lapu, where only residents of the city
proposed to be converted were allowed to vote
5. Gov. Aurelio M. Umali of Nueva Ecija filed a Verified MR, maintaining that
the proposed conversion will necessarily and directly affect the mother
province of Nueva Ecija
6. Thus, Umali argued that Sec. 453 should be interpreted in conjunction with
Sec. 105, Art. X of the Constitution. He said that while the conversion in
question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an
existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of
the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material
change in their rights and responsibilities
7. He contends that “qualified voters” in Sec. 453 should be interpreted to refer
to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion
8. He enumerated the various adverse effects of the conversion
9. Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara of Cabanatuan interposed an opposition on the
ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions; and that Sec. 453
is a specific provision only allowing the qualified voters of Cabanatuan
a. Also cited the case of Santiago City
10. COMELEC En Banc by a vote of 5-2 ruled in favor of Vergara through the
Minute Resolution 12-0925
11. Umali filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief.
COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained in its Comment that Cabanatuan
is merely being converted to an HUC and this wil only affect the city itself
a. Argument of COMELEC: no political unit will be created, merged
with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no
boundaries will be altered and it will only reinforce the powers and
prerogatives already being exercised by the city
b. Private respondent adopted the comment of the COMELEC
12. Meanwhile, on Oct. 25, 2012, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543,
which adopted a calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in
connection with the conversion. It set the plebiscite on Dec. 1, 2012
13. Then, a certain Dr. Rodolfo Punzalan, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the RTC. He prays that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be declared
unconstitutional and that it be decreed that all qualified voters of the province
be included and that a TRO be issued to enjoin the implementation of the
resolution
14. RTC: issued a TRO so COMELEC suspended the preparations for the event
15. It was rescheduled again to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local, and
4
SEC. 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. - It shall be the duty of the President to declare a
city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein
ARMM elections
16. JV Bautista filed a case before the SC for mandamus on Dec. 3, 2012, praying
that COMELEC be ordered to schedule the plebiscite either on Dec. 15 or 22,
2012 because the TRO already expired and so the duty to hold the plebiscite
has become mandatory and ministerial
a. Also alleged that the delay is inexcusable given that the requirement
is that it be held within a period of 120 days from the date of the
President’s declaration
b. COMELEC justified its position by arguing tha mandamus will not
issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. It also relied
on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus Election Code to justify the
postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the
locality during the plebiscite period
17. After the 2013 elections, COMELEC scheduled the plebiscite to Jan. 25,
2014 but a TRO was again issued to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for
Cabanatuan City’s conversion
ISSUEs:
1. WoN the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or
only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC – YES,
because.
RULING: The two minute resolutions are declared null and void.
RATIO:
Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution
1. Umali argues that the phrase “political units directly affected” in Sec. 10, Art.
X, necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan but the entire province.
Hence, all registered voters in the province are qualified to vote
2. COMELEC takes the phrase “registered voters therein” in Sec. 453 as
referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted, excluding
in the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija
3. General principle: legislative power cannot be delegated.
4. Exceptions:
a. Delegation by congress to the president of the power to fix “tariff
rates, import and expert quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imoposts within the framework of the national
development program” under Sec. 28, Art. VI of the Consti
b. Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President “to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
5
Section 10, Article X. — No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
 national policy” in times of war and other national emergency under
Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI of the Consti
5. The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries
of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case
at bar, is essentially legislative in nature.
6. The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of
such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria
prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition
or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a
majority vote in a plebiscite.
7. Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/
Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 6 of the LGC
8. Also, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has
also been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10 7
9. With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to
LGUs of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative powers.
10. Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453
11. In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a
determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 452 of the LGC
are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon
proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized once the
minimum requirements
a. The mandatory language "shall" used leaves the President with no
room for discretion.
12. In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a
plebiscite for purposes of conversions once the requirements are met. No
further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be converted
becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the
delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.
13. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source
of the delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the
President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution.
14. COMELEC, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the
ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion
of a component city to an HUC is not "creation, division, merge, abolition or
substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said constitutional
provision. – This is without merit
6
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. — A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in
the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the
sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within
its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code."
7
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. — No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
15. First, the Court's pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre may be applied by
analogy. This case actually involves downgrading rather than upgrading. But
the Court held that the downgrading of an independent component city into a
component city comes within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution. Ratio of this case:
a. Sec. 10, Art. X reveals that the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs involve a common
denominator—material change in the political and economic rights
of the LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein.
b. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people "in the political units directly affected."
c. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the
past whereby LGUs were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people was required to serve as a
checking mechanism
d. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide
on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as
opposed to democracy thru people's representatives.
e. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of
the Constitution granting more autonomy to LGUs
16. Given the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, SC
17. held that the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should
equally apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528 was declared
unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago
City in Isabela without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in
contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
18. Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution SC observed that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
19. "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a
change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units
20. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical
one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political
boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between
political subdivisions, where the LGU's exercise of corporate power ends and
that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial"
for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional provision.
21. Pertinent is Art. 12 (c) of the LGC's IRR8. The upward conversion of a
component city, like Cabanatuan, into an HUC will come at a steep price.
of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purposein the political unit or units directly affected.
8
(c) Effect of Conversion — The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make
it independent of the province where it is geographically located
 22. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan
City's gain of independence.
23. With the city's autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter.
24. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to
supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to
lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City, which
is almost 5% of Nueva Ecija's 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies
the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."
25. In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an
HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and
resultantly, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
26. Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular
provision should be interpreted with the other relevant provisions
27. The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is the applicable
provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision itself,
"Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious.
28. On the other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly
Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a city as highly urbanized.
It mandates the Office of the President to make the declaration after the city
has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application and
ratification in a plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement
before a declaration can be made. Thus, the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the
LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite requirement.
29. Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the
judiciary has the power to act beyond the Constitution's mandate.
30. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond the Constitution
is ultra vires and a nullity. Applying this orthodox view, a law should be
construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.
31. Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict
with the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats this phrase to mean the qualified
voters to include also not only in the city to be converted to an HUC but also
the voters of the political units directly affected by such
32. With regard to the conversion of Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and
Lapu-Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered voters in
said cities alone, the issue of who are entitled to vote in said plebiscites was
not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy.
a. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no
materiality or relevance to the instant petition.
9
The share of LGUs in the internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the ff. manner: (a) Provinces
— Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities — Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays — Twenty percent (20%)
b. The conversion of said cities prior to this will not be affected or
prejudiced in any manner following the operative fact doctrine (that
"the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.)
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly affected by the conversion
A. Political Units Directly Affected – Defined
1. SC held in Tan v. COMELEC that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be
altered and whose economy will be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite.
2. What is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As
reflected in the journal of the Constitutional Commission:
a. In the 1973 Consti: “…plebiscite in the unit or units affected”
b. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the
words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must
involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
3. Same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberation on Senate
Bill No. 155. Senator Pimental and Guigona said (siya na lang lagay ko kasi
ito lang point):
a. Sen. Guingona: In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two
municipalities, let us say, in a province with 10 municipalities — the
entire province — will the other municipalities although not affected
also have to participate in the plebiscite?
b. Sen. Pimentel: Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within
the territorial boundaries of the province itself, it will have to be
altered as a result of the two municipalities
4. Miranda modified this by including political rights in the criteria for
determining whether the unit is directly affected
B. Impact on Economic Rights
1. Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan City's conversion to the
province of Nueva Ecija to justify the province's participation in the plebiscite
to be conducted. Often raised is that Cabanatuan City's conversion into an
HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the
LGC9.
2. ANG MEMA NG CASE NA OKAY SIGE
3. Taking the decrease in territory and population, it is conceded that Nueva
Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the
basis of the following formula:
(a) Population — Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area — Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing — Twenty-five percent (25%)
 multipliers' values. (may assessment ng Dept. of Budget and Mgt sa case)
a. Basically: reduction of more than P125.5M
4. Umali’s claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed
in Cabanatuan is also well-founded based on Sec. 15110 of LGC
5. Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to
this, the province enjoys the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as
those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, professional taxes, and
amusement taxes over the component city.
6. The conversion will still reduce the province's taxing jurisdiction, and
corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local
tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a
material and substantial change to the province's economic rights
7. Sec. 452 (a) (requisite to be a city) and 461 (a) of the LGC (requisite to be a
province) also discussed the impact – we discussed this sa consti:
a. A component city's conversion into an HUC and its resultant
autonomy from the province is a threat to the economic viability.
b. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be
converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for
the creation of a province.
c. The ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly
leave a crippling effect on the province's operations as there would
be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray
overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of services being offered by
the province may suffer because of looming austerity measures
d. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline
Impact on Political Rights
1. political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its residents will also be affected
by Cabanatuan's conversion into an HUC. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the
Constitution read:
a. Sec. 4. The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
b. Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective of cials, shall
be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,
whose charters captain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote
for elective provincial officials.
2. Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to
Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right
to be outside the general supervision of the province and be under the
direct supervision of the President.
3. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and
varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater
economic activity require greater autonomy.
4. The provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the
local government of officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of
its prescribed powers and functions, to review executive orders issued by
the city mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by
the city council. The province will also be divested of jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC,
and the appeal process for administrative case decisions against
barangay officials of the city will also be modified accordingly. Likewise,
the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and
be voted upon as provincial officials.
5. After the conversion, the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction
of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will no
longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents'
benefit. Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no
longer cover the city. Projects queued by the provincial government to be
executed in the city will also be suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU
from performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction,
and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.
6. Their fear that provinces will always be expected to oppose the conversion in
order to retain the city's dependence is speculative at best.
7. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the
conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic
processes are designed to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of
the motive behind the vote.
8. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and
seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes
of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.

10
“…Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of
this Code”
 013 ABBAS v. COMELEC (PERRAL)
November 10, 1989 | Cortes, J. | Local Government
PETITIONER: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections
SUMMARY: These consolidated petitions pray that the Court enjoin the
COMELEC to conduct the plebicite and declare RA 6734 or parts thereof,
unconstitutional or in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. The Tripoli Agreement
provided for "the establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within
the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines" and enumerated the 13 provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy.”
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for
regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall
be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.” Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734
was enacted and signed into law. The issues now before the Court are: (1) WoN
the provisions of RA 6734 are in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement and (2) WoN
RA 6734, or parts thereof, are unconstitutional. The SC held that RA 6734 is not
in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement, nor is it unconstitutional. The SC finds it
unnecessary to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement because it is now the
Constitution itself that provides for the creation of the autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao. Furthermore, what is required by the Constitution is a simply
majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not
a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units.
DOCTRINE: Supreme Court finds that it is not necessary to rule on the nature of
the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine government whether
under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the
Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of RA 6734 would
therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the
provisions of RA 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have
the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.
The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend not on the total majority
vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units
and the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they would
have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, ie. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for that purpose.”
FACTS:
1. The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in 13 provinces and 9 cities
in Mindanao and Palawan in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734,
entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.
2. These consolidated petitions pray that the Court enjoin the COMELEC to
conduct the plebicite and declare RA 6734 or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
3. The petitioners contend that RA 6734 may be categorized into either of the
following: that RA 6734, or some parts thereof, violates the Constitutional;
or that certain provisions of RA 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
4. The Tripoli Agreement provided for "the establishment of Autonomy in the
southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the 13 provinces
comprising the "areas of autonomy.”
5. In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided
for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that
"[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
6. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and
signed into law.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the provisions of RA 6734 are in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement –
NO. The SC finds it unnecessary to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement because it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the
creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
2. WoN RA 6734, or parts thereof, are unconstitutional - NO. What is required
by the Constitution is a simply majority of votes approving the Organic Act
in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. 1st issue: The provisions of RA 6743 are not in conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
2. Petitioners assume that the Tripoli agreement is part of the law of the land
being a binding international agreement.
3. Supreme Court finds that it is not necessary to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine government whether
under public international or internal Philippine law.
4. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation
of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
a. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of RA 6734 would
therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any
conflict between the provisions of RA 6734 and the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act.
b. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a
binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute
part of the law of the land. But as internal law, it would not be
superior to RA 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter.
c. Thus, if at all, RA 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli
Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this
Court that RA 6734 contravenes the Constitution would result in the
granting of the reliefs sought.
5. 2nd issue: RA 6734 is constitutional.
6. Petitioners argue that RA 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region
in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on
the autonomous region which make the creation of the region dependent upon
the outcome of the plebiscite.
a. In support of his argument, he cites Article II, Section 1(1) of RA
6734 which declares that “there is hereby created the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and
cities voting favorably in the plebsicite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.”
7. The tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region
absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor autonomy, the
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces
where the favorable votes were obtained. The matter of the creation of the
autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
8. SC: First, the questioned provision itself in RA 6734 refers to Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the
creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional
provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of
the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory
Provisions of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details.
9. Thus, under the Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebicite, and only those provinces and cities
where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region.
a. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the 13 provinces and 9 cities
mentioned in Article II, Section 1(2) of RA 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and
RA 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall
be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in RA 6734, shall
comprise it.
10. On the meaning of “majority”: As provided in the Constitution, the creation
of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the
approval “by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for that purpose”.
11. It will be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of
the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores
this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they would have simply adopted
the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution,
ie. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for that
purpose.”
12. It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simply
majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent
units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
13. Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of
R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states: . . . Provided, That only the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that
the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
14. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to
merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the
President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant
to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section
10 of the Constitution which provides that “No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
15. What is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes
[Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the
law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative
regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution].
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the
Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring
a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
 014 DISOMANGCOP v. DPWH (Peliño)
November 25, 2004 | Tinga, J. | Regional Autonomy
PETITIONERS: Arsadi M. Disomangcop and Ramir M. Dimalotang
RESPONDENTS: The Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways Simeon A. Datumanong and The Secretary of Budget and Management
Emilia T. Boncodin
SUMMARY: RA 6734 was enacted and this served as the Organic Act for
ARMM (one of several others). So not all provinces voted for inclusion. Only 4
actually voted in favor (pls see footnote). When ARMM was formed, Pres. Aquino
signed Eos which devolved powers of several cabinets to ARMM, one of which
is the DPWH. So the former Sec. of DPWH, Vigilar, issued DO 119 which created
a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which in essence has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects in Marawi and Lanao del Sur. 2 years after,
Erap signed RA 8999 which created a new Engineering district in Lanao del Sur.
Eventually RA 9054 was also enacted and another province also joined in ARMM.
All the laws which pertain to ARMM are collectively known as ARMM Organic
Acts. Disomangcop and Dimalotang, in this case, assail the constitutionality of
RA 8999 and DO 119 claiming that these issuances contravene the essence of the
Constitution and the organic acts and likewise prayed for several reliefs. Hence,
this petition. The issue in this case is whether or not RA 8999 and DO 119 were
issued with grave abuse of discretion and are constitutionally infirm. The SC held
in the affirmative, but RA 8999 has already been repealed by RA 9054 and DO
119 has already become functus officio. But what is important in this case is that
they defined what a regional autonomy is. The issuances actually do contravene
the autonomy granted to ARMM because by issuing them, the national
government is still controlling them as what has been done before, totally contrary
to what the Constitution wants to achieve when it included the provisions on
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. ARMM Organic Acts are deemed part of
the regional autonomy scheme. They are more than ordinary statutes because they
enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Provisions cannot be amended by an ordinary
statute such as RA 8999; the amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and
unequivocal answer to cry for a meaningful, effective, and forceful autonomy. The
need for regional autonomy is more pressing for Filipino Muslims and Cordillera
people. Regional autonomy is a means toward solving existing serious peace and
order problems and secessionist movements; degree of self-determination
exercised by the LGU vis-à-vis central government.
DOCTRINE: ARMM Organic Acts are deemed part of the regional autonomy
scheme. They are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a
11
Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Sur and Norte, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte and Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga.
plebiscite. Provisions cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA 8999;
the amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. The 1987 Constitution
mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to cry for a
meaningful, effective, and forceful autonomy. The need for regional autonomy is
more pressing for Filipino Muslims and Cordillera people. Regional autonomy is
a means toward solving existing serious peace and order problems and secessionist
movements; degree of self-determination exercised by the LGU vis-à-vis central
government.
FACTS:
15. Philippines ordained the establishment of regional autonomy. Secs. 1 and 15
of Art. X of the Consti mandates the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and Cordilleras.
a. Pursuant to such, RA 6734 was enacted (Organic Act for ARMM) and
called for a plebiscite in several provinces. 11
b. Out of the several provinces which were included, only 4 voted for the
creation of the autonomous region12 and these provines became part of
the ARMM.
c. Pres. Aquino issued EO 426 which is an order regarding the placing of
control and supervision of offices of DPWH in ARMM.
16. When ARMM was formally organized, Pres. Aquino flew to Cotabato and
she already ssigned 7 EOs devolving to ARMM the powers of 7 cabinet
departments.13
17. After 9 years, the DPWH Sec. Vigilar issued DO 119 which in essence
created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities in Marawi
and Lanao del Sur.
18. 2 years after DO 119, Pres. Estrada signed RA 8999 which established an
engineering district in the 1st district of Lanao del Sur.
19. Congress passed RA 9054 which is an act expanding the previous organic
act.
a. RA 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite and Basilan and Marawi voted to
join ARMM.
b. RA 6734 and RA 9054 were referred to as ARMM Organic Acts.
20. Arsadi Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir Dimalotang (Dimalotang)
addressed a petition to DPWH Sec. Datumanong since they wanted to revoke
DO 119 and sought non-implementation of RA 8999, but no action was done.
21. Disomangcop etc. filed the petition in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and
District Engineer in the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. They seek the
following reliefs:
a. Annul and set aside DO 119.
b. Prohibit DPWH Sec. from implementing DO 119 and RA 8999 and
12
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.
13
Local government, labor and employment, science and technology, public works and highways, social
welfare and development, tourism, and environmental and natural resources.
 releasing funds for projects in Lanao del Sur and Marawi to the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office and other admin regions of DPWH.
c. Compel Sec. of DBM to release all funds for public works projects
intended for Marawi and the 1st District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-
ARMM in 1st Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only.
d. Compel DPWH Sec. to let DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur to
implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area.
e. Urgen application for issuance of a TRO, preliminary injunction to
enjoin DBM from releasing funds.
22. Disomangcop claims that:
a. DO 119 was issued with GAD and that it violates the constitutional
autonomy of the ARMM since the DO has tasked Mawari Sub-District
Engineering Office with functions that have already been given to the
DPWH-ARMM 1st Eng. District.
b. RA 8999 is a legislation not intelligently studied; there was also no
sponsorship of the law, no public hearing, or consultation with DPWH-
ARMM was made and that during the hearings on this, House Committee
on Public Works failed to invite anyone from their agency.
23. Court required DPWH to comment, and in their comment, SolGen said that:
a. DO 119 was issued in accordance with EO 124.
b. Powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power
of Congress (in relation to RA 8999).
c. Disomangcop etc. have no locus standi.
24. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON RA 8999 and DO 119 are unconstitonal and were issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
RULING: WHEREFORE, considering that RA 9054 repealed RA 8999 and rendered
DPWH DO 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari
and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition ISSUE
commanding respondents to desist from implementing RA 8999 and DO 119 and
maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the 1st
Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi
and the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the petition
insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against respondents is DENIED.
RATIO:
On RA 8999
1. SC said that it is not necessary to declare RA 8999 unconsti since the accepted
rule is that the Court will not resolve a constitutional question unless such is
the lis mota of the acse.
2. The law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a
subsequent enactment.
3. ARMM Organic Acts are deemed part of the regional autonomy scheme.
a. They are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy
affirmation by a plebiscite.
b. Provisions cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA
8999; the amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
c. Although RA 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of
the plebiscite requirement.
4. The first ARMM Organic Act, RA 6074, devolved the functions of the
DPWH in ARMM to the Regional Government.
a. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999 in
essence sought to amend RA 6074.
b. Amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the
people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect.
c. Absent compliance, RA 8999 did not even become operative.
5. But looking at a different view, RA 8999 was repealed by RA 9054.
a. If a statute of later date clearly reveals an intent on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect.
b. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency – when 2 statutes cover
the same subject matter, they are clearly inconsistent and incompatible
that they can’t be harmonized, both can’t be given effect.
c. RA 9054 is anchored on the Constitution. It advances the constitutional
grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering Lanao
del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional
urban and rural planning.
d. But in RA 8999, they wanted to reestablish the National Government’s
jurisdiction over insfrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur, so it is
inconsistent with RA 9054.
e. RA 8999 is antagonistic and can’t be reconciled with the ARMM
Organic Acts.
6. The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and
unequivocal answer to ctry for a meaningful, effective, and forceful
autonomy.
a. Reason for consti provs for autonomous regions: allow separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.
b. Autonomy – recognizes the wholeness of the PH society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It also strives to
free PH society from the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist
approach.
c. The need for regional autonomy is more pressing for Filipino
Muslims and Cordillera people.
d. Regional autonomy – Means toward solving existing serious peace
and order problems and secessionist movements; degree of self-
determination exercised by the LGU vis-à-vis central government.
e. Creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a
sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic.
f. Right to self-determination – complex net of legal-political relations
 between a certain people and the state authorities; ensures the right of
peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would guarantee the
support of their own cultural identity.
i. End in itself – incapable of universal application without massive
disruption.
ii. Means to an end – Continuing validity is more easily perceived.
g. Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal
government powers to the people of a particular area or region with
least control and supervision from the central government.
i. Objective: permit determined groups with a common tradition and
shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their wasy of
life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own
business.
ii. It implies the cultivation of more positive means for national
integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims,
increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the
unhampered implementation of the development programs in the
region.
h. Necessary prerequisite of autonomy decentralization.
i. Decentralization – decision by the central government authorizing tis
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise
authority in certain areas.
i. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but
unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs
intrinsically from federalism in that sub-units that have been
authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of
right against the central government.
ii. Involves decision-making by subnational units
iii. Typically delegated power.
iv. Comes in 2 forms:
1. Decconcentration – admin in nature; involves the transfer
of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility
from the national office to the regional and local offices.
(Admin)
2. Devolution – Transfer of powers, responsibilities, and
resources for the performance of certain functions from the
central government to LGUs. (Political)
v. Cordillera Broad Coalition v COA – The Court ruled without any
dissent that the creation of autonomous regions contemplates
the grant of political autonomy – an autonomy which is greated
than the administrative autonomy granted to LGUs.
j. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended for regional autonomy to
mean meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.
k. Sec. 16 of Art. X limits the power of the president over autonomous
regions.
i. Curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions.
ii. Congress will have to reexamine national laws and make sure that
they reflect the Consti’s adherence to local autonomy.
iii. Ganzon v CA – omission of “as may be provided by law” signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from
Congress and to break the control of Congress over local
government affairs.
iv. Area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reseved for the
National Government.
v. EO 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of DPWH in
ARMM to the ARG.
vi. Congress, through RA 9054, transferred and devolved the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for
public works to the ARG.
l. Aim of the constitution: extend to autonomous people the right to self
determination.
i. With RA 8999, the freedom is taken away and the national
government takes control again.
ii. The said law creates an office with functions and powers by virtue
of EO 426.
iii. EO 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of
the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM.
m. RA 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional
autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructure projects.
On DO 119
1. DO 119 is violative of the provisions of EO 426.
2. EO 426 was issued pursuant to RA 6734 which initiated the creation of the
constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and which defined the basic
structure of the autonomous government.
On whether the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
1. Yes, they did. They implemented RA 8999 despite its inoperativeness and
repeal and they also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office in accordance with DO 119 which has been
rendered functus officio by ARMM Organic Acts.
Conclusion
2. The repeal of RA 8999 and the functus officio state of DO 119 provide the
necessary basis for the grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition sought
by petitioners.
a. But there is no similar basis for the issuance of mandamus to compel the
DBM Secretary to release funds appropriated to public works projects in
Marawi and Lanao del Sur since RA 9054 provides that appropriations
should be done through a Regional Public Works Act, but since there
was none, there is no basis for such.
 015 IMBONG v. OCHOA (MERILLES)
April 8, 2014 | Mendoza, J. | Principle of Autonomy of LGU/ARMM
PETITIONER: James M. Imbong and spouse Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Executive Secretary Hon. Paquito Ochoa
SUMMARY: Upon the enactment of the RH Law, several petitioners for
certiorari and prohibition were filed requesting to maintain the status quo. Of the
different rights that the petitioner claim that the RH Law violates, they claim that
RH Law violates the equal protection clause for discriminating against the poor.
Petitioners claim that the RH law seeks to introduce contraceptives to the poor to
reduce their number. Another argument is that the RH Law violates the principle
of autonomy of LGUS and of the ARMM.
SC declares that the RH Law is not violative of the due process clause because
there is a distinct necessity in the constitution to address the needs of the
underprivileged. RH Law is constitutional, with exceptions.
SC also declared that there is no violation of principle of autonomy. A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic
facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself
weighs against it.
DOCTRINE: Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary
power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern
or common interest
FACTS:
1. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
2. The RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved.
3. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive
health education.
4. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts ofrefusals to carry out
its mandates.
5. Shortly after the President signed the law, 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-
intervention were filed. These petitions are mostly for certiorari and
prohibition.
6. Petitioners allege that the RH Law violates the right to equal protection of
the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 

7. In the petitions, RH Law was also alleged to violate: right to life of the
unborn, right to health, right to religious freedom, involuntary servitude, due
process, right to privacy, non-delegation of legislative authority, local
autonomy.
8. IMPORTANT TO PUBCORP: Another contention is that the RH Law
violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs)
and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is
contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures
at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code
and R.A . No. 9054.
9. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR was promulgated and took effect.
10. Petitioner ALFI assails that the author of the RH-IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
11. After considering the issues, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation
for 120 days. After the lapse of time, the SQAO was ordered extended.
Petitioners claim the maintenance of the status quo.
ISSUE/s:
2. WoN the RH Law is unconstitutional – No, but the IRR is unconstitutional
3. WON the RH Law infringes on the powers devolved to LGUs and the
ARMM – NO, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT
RELINQUISH THEIR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POWERS TO
THE LGUS.
RULING: Petition is partly granted. The Court declares the RH Law as constitutional
except with the enumerated provisions (no relation to EPC).
RATIO:
1. The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use.
2. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor,
the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.
3. They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law
renders it unconstitutional.
4. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It, however, does not require
 the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction.
5. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development ofthe people.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
6. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law
only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
7. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement
of reproductive health."
8. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane
way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is
to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
9. With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice
it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision.
10. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational
institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is
a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
11. As for the argument regarding the RH-IRR:
a. The IRR allows “contraceptives” and recognizes as “abortifacient”
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.
b. The addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR made these sections of the IRR 
ultra vires. With
such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be 
considered as an "abortifacient" if its
sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the 
prevention
of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. 

c. For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit
the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism. 

12. IMPROTANT TO PUBCORP:
13. As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH
Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs)
under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. – (a) Local government units shall
endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall
also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions
and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the
national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in
their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by
the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other
special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases
where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.
14. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government
is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency,
it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.
15. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.
16. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as
making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For
said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed
by the local governments.
17. The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy.
18. Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and
 plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest
19. Del Castillo and Reyes, Concurring and Dissenting: I agree with the
ponencia that the RH Law does not violate the equal protection clause insofar
as it is claimed to single out the poor to reduce their numbers and that the
poor may be the subject of government subsidy for the programs under the
RH Law for reasons stated in ponencia.
 016 PANDI v. CA (ARMAND) ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary), as OIC of the IPHO-APGH14 in
April 11, 2002 | Carpio, J. | Local Governments Lanao del Sur. Dr. Macacua also designated Dr. Sani (then the Provincial
health officer of the IPHO-APGH) to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office.
2. September 15, 1993: Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor issued Office Order
PETITIONER: DR. LAMPA I. PANDI and DR. JARMILA B. MACACUA
NO. 07 designating Dr. Saber as the OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
RESPONDENTS: THE COURT OF APPEALS, and DR. AMER A. SABER
3. Dr. Sani challenged the Memorandum transferring him in a complaint filed
SUMMARY: Dr. Macacaua (Regional Director and Sec. of Health of DOH-ARMM)
with the RTC claiming therein that he was appointed as provincial health
appointed Dr. Pandi as OIC of IPHO-APGH in Lanao del Sur and Dr. Sani to the
officer of the IPHO-APGH in a permanent capacity.
DOH-ARMM Regional Office. Subsequently, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor
4. Dr. Saber filed a petitioner for quo warranto with a prayer for preliminary
designated Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGH. Dr. Sani challenged the desgination
injunction, claiming that he is lawfully designated OIC of IPHO-APGH,
claiming he was appointed as provincial health officer in a permanent capacity. Dr.
Lanao del Sur. The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi from further
Saber filed a petitioner for quo warranto with a prayer for preliminary injunction
discharging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH.
claiming that he was lawfully designated as OIC of IPHO-APGH. CA issued TRO
5. Dr. Sani filed a Motion for Intervention.
enjoining Pandi from discharging his functions as OIC of IPHO-APGH. Dr. Sani
6. November 6, 1993: After President Ramos issued E.O. 133 transferring the
filed motion for intervention. President Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers
powers & functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of
and functions of the DOH to the Regional Government of ARMM. Dr Macacaua
ARMM, Dr. Macacua issued a 2nd Memorandum reiterating the designation
issued a second memorandum reiterating the designation of Dr Pandi and Dr Sani.
of Dr. Pandi as OIC of the IPHO-APGH and the detail of Dr. Sani to the
Dr. Pandi and Dr. Sani sought the dismissal of Dr. Saber’s petition on the ground
Regional office in Cotabato City.
that the issues therein had become moot and academic due to the enactment of the
7. Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the dismissal of Dr. Saber’s petition on the
ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the MOA between DOH-National
ground that the issues therein had become moot & academic because of the
Government and the ARMM Regional Government. CA upheld the designation of
enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the execution
Dr. Saber and that the Provincial Governor has the power to appoint the provincial
of the Memo of agreement between the DOH-National Government and the
health officer under the LGC of 1991. The issue is WoN the Provincial Governor can
ARMM Regional Government.
designate the OIC of the IPHO-APGH (or WoN the appointement of Dr. Saber was
8. CA: designation of Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGH upheld; the Provincial
valid at the time) - No. When Saber was appointed by the provincial governor on
Governor has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the
September 15, 1993, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national
LGC of 1991; Dr. Sani cannot claim to have permanent designation as
government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer
provincial health officer because he was not appointed by the Provincial
was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a
Governor.
province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the
provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by
ISSUE/s:
law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region.
1. WoN the Provincial Governor can designate the OIC of the IPHO-
Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to
APGH (WON the appointment of Saber is valid) at that time – No. When
designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently,
Saber was appointed by the provincial governor on September 15, 1993, the
the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void. As Regional Secretary of
provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government
Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise
official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was
supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM.
still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a
DOCTRINE: The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power
province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the
to "exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and
provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official
activities of the provincial government." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local
authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province
Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed
within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor
from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor.
Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such
FACTS: Officer-in-Charge is void.
1. August 9, 1993: Dr. Macacua, Regional Director & Sec. of Health of the
DOH-ARMM issued a Memorandum designating Dr. Pandi (then DOH-

14
Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative
the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET ASIDE. authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge
The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as Officer-in-Charge of if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on
the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declared void. On the other November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health
hand, the designation on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in- office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial
Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional
assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.
Regional Office in Cotabato City, are declared valid. 6. Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the
first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by
RATIO: the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The
1. The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to
government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, "exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects,
which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and services, and activities of the provincial government." Upon the
approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and
ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional
Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on the Provincial
Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an
within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of
even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health office. a permanent provincial health officer.
2. Reliance on Section 478, LGC is misplaced - not a grant of powers to
governors and mayors to appoint local health officers but simply a directive
that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so;
LGC did not amend the Organic Act of 1989
3. Sani: his first appointment was void. When he was detailed in Cotabato City,
the powers and functions of the DOH were not yet transferred to the Regional
Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still
exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM.
Thus, the regional Director/ARMM Secretary of Health’s directive assigning
Sani to Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. As regards the November
6, 1993 Memorandum reiterating Sani’s detail, since it was issued after
the issuance of EO 133 which expressly transferred “supervision and
control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of
Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health, and since it is
within the authority of the ARMM Secretary of Health, it is valid.
4. Pandi: August 9, 1993 designation by the ARMM Secretary of Health is
VOID since at that time, the latter did not exercise yet supervision and control
over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, November 6,
1993 designation is valid. The designation of Pandi as OIC, however,
while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or
a permanent appointment is made.
5. As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the
official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial
health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of
Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and
functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with
respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official
 017 BADUA v. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION Benesa.
(MATSUMURA) 3. Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, so he filed a
Feb. 14, 1991 | Griño-Aquino, J. | Local Government case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute. Thereafter
Quema filed a case in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. The tribe ruled that
the land should be given to Quema.
PETITIONER: Sps Leonor and Rosa Badua
4. Sps badua did not immediately vacate the land. In June 1989, they received
RESPONDENTS: Cordillera Bodong Administrtaion, Cordillera People’s
a “warning order” from Ka Blantie, Zone Commander, Abra Zone-I of the
Liberation Army, Manuel Tao-il, Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques, Juanito
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army.
Gayyed, Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem, and David Quema
5. Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. Meanwhile, his wife Rosa
was arrested by the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army and was detained
SUMMARY: Quema owned 2 parcels of land in Villaviciosa, Abra which was
for two days.
mortgaged to Dra. Valera. Quema was abel to redeem the property 22 years later
6. On April 1990, Sps Badua (Rosa and Leonor) filed a petition for “special and
by paying Valera’s heir (Valera died). However, Sps Badua allege that the same
extraordinary relief” praying that:
land was sold to them prior to Valera’s death. Because Quema was being
a. A writ of preliminary injuction be issued to stop the Cordillera
prevented from cultivating in the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council
People’s Liberation Army from enforcing the decision of the
but they failed to reach a settlement, so he filed a case with the Maeng Tribe. The
Cordillera Bodong Administrtaion.
tribe subsequently ruled in favor of Quema and ordered Sps Badua to vacate.
b. The Army be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing
However, the Sps did not vacate, so the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
cases, and
(People’s Army) sent them a warning order. Rosa Badua was thereafter arrested
c. The legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and
by the People’s Army and detained for two days. Sps Badua filed a petition for
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army be clarified.
special and extraordinary relief claiming that the decision of the Cordillera
7. In this case, Sps Badua allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong
Bodong Administration (Maeng tribe) is null and void because it had no judicial
Administration is null and void because:
power nor jurisdiction over the Sps and Quema. The issue in this case is whether
a. Sps. Badua was denied of due process or formal hearing, and
or not the Maeng tribe has judicial power.
b. The Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor
jurisdiction over the Sps nor over the Quema because neither of
The SC ruled that NO it does not have judicial power. During the plebiscite, the
them are members of the Maeng Tribe.
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces
8. Meanwhile, the Cordillera Bodong Administration through their counsel
and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province. Hence, the Cordillera
allege that:
Autonomous Region did not come to be. Consequently, the Maeng Tribal Court
a. the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians
was not constituted into an indigenous or special court, and is only a tribal court
inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The
which does not form a part of the Philippine Judicial system. Meaning, it does not
tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or
possess judicial power.
Administration. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more
speedily than the regular courts, without the intervention of lawyers.
DOCTRINE: The Autonomous Region of the Cordilleras has not been
b. the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected and
incorporated since in the plebiscite held, the creation has been rejected by all the
obeyed by the parties, the municipal and barangay officials, and the
covered provinces and city, save one province. There can be no autonomous
people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for disobedience
region consisting of only one province.
of, or non-compliance with, the decisions of the council of elders in
the areas where tribal courts operate.
FACTS: c. SC has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a
1. Quema was the owner of 2 parcels of land in Villaviciosa, Abra, evidence by part of the judicial system.
Tax Declarations No. 4997 and 4998. This was mortgaged for P6,000 to Dra. d. If the Sps wish to texst the wisdom of the decision of the council of
Erotida Valera. Quema was able to redeem the land 22 years later (long after elders, they should file a suit in the trial courts and not in the SC.
the mortgagee had already died) by paying the redemption price to Valera’s
heir. ISSUE:
2. On the other hand, Rosa Badua alleged that the same land was sold to her by 1. WoN the Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration has judicial
Dra. Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa Badua cannot produce power – NO, because the Maeng tribal court is not a part of the Philippine
the deed of sale because it was allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor
 judicial system since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into
legal existence.

RULING: WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby

GRANTED. The decision rendered on February 18, 1989 by the Maeng Tribal Court
in Case No. 0, entitled “David Quema vs. the Leonor Badua,” is hereby annulled for
lack of jurisdiction.

RATIO:
1. In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Or-dillo, et al. vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al. the Court en banc, found that in the
plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766,
the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the
provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province,
hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.
2. As a consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
communities of the Cordillera region, and the Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army, as a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines do not legally exist.
3. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence,
the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special
court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary
tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous
cultural community.
4. Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which
consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been
established by law. They do not possess judicial power.
5. Similar to pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the
barangays, the Maeng Tribal Court is an advisory and conciliatory body
whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and
persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
6. An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered
by a pangkat
a. if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court15,
b. but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal
court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise
settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to
annul or repudiate it.16
c. Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or
arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set
aside, in and through the regular courts today.

15 16
Sec. 11, P.D. 1508 Sec. 14, P.D. 1508
 018 ORDILLOS v. COMELEC (Marcos) Region . . ." It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province
Dec. 4, 1990 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Cordillera Autonomous Region may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
PETITIONER: Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers
(Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member Corazon Montinig, (Mayoyao), over exactly the same small area.
Former Vice-Mayor Martin Udan (Banaue), Municipal Councilors Martin Gano,
(Lagawe), And Teodoro Hewe, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman Pedro W. DOCTRINE: The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more
Dulag (Lamut); Aguinaldo Residents Sandy B. Changiwan, And Donato Timago; provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which
Lamut Resident Rey Antonio; Kiangan Residents Orlando Puguon, And Reynand the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
Duldulao; Lagawe Residents Tomas Kimayong, Gregorio Dango, George B. provinces.
Baywong, And Vicente Lunag; Hingyon Residents Pablo M. Dulnuan And
Constancio Gano; Mayoyao Residents Pedro M. Baoang, Leonardo Igadna, And
Maximo Igadna; And Banaue Residents Puma-A Culhi, Latayon Buttig, Miguel
FACTS:
Pumelban, Andres Ordillo, Federico Mariano, Sandy Binomnga, Gabriel
1. The peopke from Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-
Limmang, Romeo Tongali, Ruben Bahatan, Mhomdy Gabriel, And Nadres
Apayao, and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant
Ghamang
to RA 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.”
RESPONDENTS: The Commission on Elections; The Honorable Franklin M.
2. The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the CAR was approved
Drilon, Secretary of Justice; Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Executive Secretary; The
by a majority only in the Ifugao Province and was rejected by the rest of the
Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. Guillermo Carague, Secretary
provinces and city mentioned.
of Budget and Management; And Hon. Rosalina S. Cajucom, OIC, National
3. Since the plebiscite already ended, the Executive Secretary issued a
Treasurer
Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly, created under EO
SUMMARY: The people from Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra,
220.
Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City had a plebiscite in pursuant to the Organic Act
4. The COMELEC then issued a Resolution stating that the Organic Act for the
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region or RA 6766. The results showed that the
Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only
creation of CAR was approved by the Ifugao Province only, while the rest of the
in the province of Ifugao.
provinces and city rejected such. The COMELEC therefore issued a Resolution
5. The Secretary of Justice issued a Memorandum reiterating the COMELEC
stating that the Organic Act for the Region had been approved and/or ratified in
resolution and provided that the province of Ifugao, alone, legally and validly
the province of Ifugao. The Secretary of Justice issued a Memorandum reiterating
constitutes the CAR.
the COMELEC resolution and provided that the province of Ifugao, alone, legally
6. Congress then enacted RA 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera
and validly constitutes CAR. Ordillo et. al. however filed a petition with
Autonomous Region of Igugao.
COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The
7. Petitioners Ordillo et. al. filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare the
petition was merely noted by the COMELEC, therefore they come before the SC
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region.
maintaining that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
8. The COMELEC however merely noted said petition.
province, as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said Region be
9. The President then issued AO 160 abolising the Cordillera Executive Board
composed of more than one constituent unit. The issue before the Court is WoN
and Cordillera Regional Assembly in view of thr ratification of the Organic
the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the
Act.
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
10. Ordillo et. al, then comes to the SC maintaining that there can be no valid
constitute such Region. – NO because the Constitution explicitly state that a region
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province, as the Constitution and
should be composed of more than one constituent unit. The keywords from the
RA 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
Consitution which says, “provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas”
constituent unit.
connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. Aside
11. They then pray that the Court:
from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
(1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259,
shows that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province. It uses states
the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
that “all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous
the memorandum of the Executive Secretary,
 Administrative Order No. 160,
Republic Act No. 6861, and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose
(2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in
force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall
have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in
the constituent units.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably
for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such Region. – NO because the Constitution explicitly state
that a region should be composed of more than one constituent unit.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of
the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous
region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February
5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is
declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
9. The Sec. 2 of RA 6766 provides:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
10. It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials
and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area. (ex: 1 set of regional official from
Ifugao governing the whole Region, and another set of provincial officials
from Ifugao governing Ifugao only)
11. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of
Ifugao constituting the Region.
12. To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only
violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
but would also be impractical and illogical.

RATIO:
1. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
2. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
3. The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit.
4. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
5. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces.
6. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
7. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics.
8. Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6766 shows that the Region cannot be constituted from only one
province.
 019 Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (LOYOLA)
January 29, 1990 | Cortes, J. | autonomous and administrative region
PETITIONER: Cordillera Broad Coalition (GR 79956) and Lilia Yaranon and
Bona Bautista, assisted by their spouses Braulio D. Yaranon and Demetrio D.
Bautista, Jr; Kames Brett and Sinai C. Hamada (GR 82217)
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Audit (GR 79956) and COA, Hon. Catalino
Macaraig, Executive Secretary, Hon. Vicente Jayme, Secretary of Finance, Hon.
Guillermo N. Carague, Secretary of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalino S.
Cajucom, OIC National Treasurer (GR 82217)
SUMMARY: The constitutionality of EO 220 (creation of CAR) was assailed on the
ground that it preempts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the
creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
the act through a plebiscite. The Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) was
created by the President under Executive Order No. 220 and its main function is to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region.
The issue is WoN EO 220 is unconstitutional and WoN it created a new political and
territorial subdivision. The SC held no for both issues. The Executive Order does not
create the autonomous region for the Cordilleras. See doctrine
DOCTRINE:
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region, it merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. The CAR:
1. is not a territorial and political subdivision;
2. is not a public corporation;
3. does not have a separate juridical personality;
4. is subject to control and supervision of the President; and
5. is merely a regional consultative and coordinative council
FACTS:
1. In the two petitions, the constitutionality of EO 220 (creation of CAR) was
assailed on the ground that it preempts the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Historical background:
 After the EDSA revolution, Fr. Conrado Balweg broke off from the
Communist Party of the Phil. (CPP) and the NPA.
 President Aquino called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue.
 President Aquino and Fr. Balweg, as commander of the Cordillera’s People
Liberation Army (CPLA), signed a ceasefire agreement that signified a
cessation of hostilities.
 EO 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the
representatives of the Cordillera people.
 On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into
law, known now as E.O. 220.
2. EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under
Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the CAR which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Mt. Province and Baguio.
3. The main function of CAR is to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the region.
4. During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region,” was
enacted and signed into law which recognizes the CAR and its offices and
agencies created under EO 220.
5. Petitioner argues that the issuance of EO 220 preempted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.
ISSUES:
1. WoN EO 220 is unconstitutional – NO, EO 220 does not create an autonomous
region for the Cordilleras
2. WoN the CAR is a political and territorial subdivision – NO, it did not create a
new territorial and political subdivision
RULING: Viewed in the light of the entire record, the judgment under review must
be, as it is hereby, affirmed.
RATIO:
First Issue
1. The Court held that what EO 220 envisions is the consolidation and coordination
of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution.
2. Procedure for creation of an autonomous region in Cordillera:
a. Creation of regional consultative commission.
b. Appointment of members of the regional consultative commission by the
President.
c. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and
enacted into law.
d. Plebiscite
3. The President saw it fit to provide some measure to address the urgent needs of
the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and
the autonomous region created.
Second Issue
4. Petitioners assert that EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new
territorial and political subdivision.
5. The Court held that the CAR:
a. did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing
ones into a larger subdivision
b. does not have a separate juridical personality
c. not vested with powers that are normally granted to public corporations
d. is subject to the control and supervision of the President
e. is merely a regional consultative and coordinative council

6. The CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional

development council.
7. CAR was only created to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the covered areas.

Gutierrez, J. Concurring Opinion:

1. EO 220 has already been superseded by RA 6658 and RA 6766, thus making the
issue moot and academic.
2. The Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and the Cordillera
Autonomous Region have taken over the functions of the Cordillera
Administrative Region.
3. However, he believes that the CAR could not be made by mere executive fiat but
must be created by statute.
4. It was a de facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully valid
creation.
 020 RAMA VS. MOISES (ARIELLE)
December 6, 2016 | Bersamin, J. | Local Government; Highly urbanized city
PETITIONER: Hon. Michael L. Rama (Mayor of Cebu City)
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Gilbert P. Moises (Judge of RTC Branch 18 in Cebu
City) and Hon. Gwendolyn F. Garcia (Gov. of Province of Cebu)
SUMMARY: PD 198 was issued, which prompted Cebu City to create the Metro
Cebu Water District (MCWD). Nearby cities and municipalities in Cebu turned
over their waterworks services to MCWD and thereafter, the latter distributed and
sold water services to said cities and municipalities. From 1974-2002, the Cebu
City Mayor was the one authorized to appoint all the members of the MCWD
Board of Directors, by virtue of Sec 3(b) of PD 198 which stated that if there are
more than 75% of the total active water service connections of a local water
district within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority
shall be the mayor of that city or municipality; otherwise, it shall be the governor
of the province within which the district is located. With this, Gov. Garcia
asserted his authority and intention to appoint MCWD BoD because according to
him, the active water service connections in Cebu City was below 75%. MCWD
sought to declare Sec 3(b) unconstitutional or, if it is valid, the appointing
authority should be the Cebu City Mayor. RTC dismissed the action without
ruling on the issue as to the appointing authority. Thereafter, there were two
vacant positions in the MCWD. Because of this, Cebu City Mayor Osmeña
appointed Yu to the position. Gov. Garcia filed a complaint to declare the nullity
of Yu’s appointment because Mayor Osmeña allegedly had no authority to
appoint him because according to Sec 3(b), it should be the governor. The issue
is who between the mayor and the governor is authorized to appoint MCWD
board members.
The SC held that it is the mayor because as Cebu City became a highly urbanized
city, it became independent from the province, as provided for by the LGC. The
intervening reclassification of the City of Cebu into a Highly Urbanized City
and the enactment of the Local Government Code rendered the continued
application of Sec 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable and
unfair. The provision no longer provided for substantial distinction because
it ignored that the MCWD was built without the participation of the
provincial government and failed to consider that MCWD existed to serve the
community that represents the needs of the majority. The decree was enacted to
provide adequate, quality, and reliable water services. Hence, it is inconsistent
with the objectives of the decree to still leave to the provincial governor the
appointing authority if the provincial governor had administrative
supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for
16.92% of the active water service connection in the MCWD.
DOCTRINE: Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
FACTS:
1. In 1973, President Marcos issued PD 198 also known as the Provincial Water
Utilities Act of 1973. By virtue of PD 198, Cebu City formed Metro Cebu
Water District (MCWD) in 1974.
2. Thereafter, the cities of Mandaue, Lapu-Lapu, and Talisay, and the
municipalities of Liloan, Compostela, Consolacion, and Cordova turned over
their waterworks systems and services to MCWD. Since then, MCWD
distributed water and sold water services to said cities and municipalities.
3. From 1974-2002, the Cebu City Mayor appointed all the members of the
MCWD Board of Directors, in accordance with Sec 3(b) of PD 198, which
provided that: In case there are more than 75% of the total active water
service connections of a LWD within the boundary of any city or
municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or
municipality; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the
province within which the district is located.
4. In 2002, Cebu Provincial Governor Garcia wrote to MCWD asserting his
authority and intention to appoint the members of the MCWD BoD.
5. Garcia stated that since 1996, the active water service connections in Cebu
City had been below 75% so he has the authority to appoint the members.
6. The MCWD commenced in the RTC its action for declaratory relief seeking
to declare Sec 3(b) of PD 198 unconstitutional or if it is valid, the sole
appointing authority should be the Cebu City Mayor.
7. RTC dismissed the action without any finding and declaration as to the proper
appointing authority.
8. Meanwhile, the terms of two members of the MCWD BoD ended, resulting
in two vacancies. However, the position of Atty. Sitoy was deemed vacated
upon his election as the Municipal Mayor of Cordova, Cebu.
9. Garcia then commenced an action for declaratory relief to seek the
interpretation of Sec 3(b) of PD 198 on the proper appointing authority for
the MCWD members.
10. In 2008, the Cebu Provincial Legal Office, upon being informed that Mayor
Osmeña would be appointing Joel Mari Yu to replace Atty. Sitoy as MCWD
member, formally advised the MCWD Board Secretary to defer the
submission of the list of nominees to any appointing authority until the RTC
rendered its final ruling on the issue of the proper appointing authority.
11. However, Mayor Osmeña still appointed Yu. The RTC dismissed the action
for declaratory relief on the ground that it became improper once there was a
breach of the provision.
12. Garcia then filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the appointment of Yu
as member of the MCWD BoD alleging that appointment by Mayor Osmeña
was illegal because under Sec 3(b), it was the governor of Cebu who was
vested with authority to appoint members of the MCWD BoD.
13. Mayor Osmeña argued that the authority to appoint the members solely
belonged to him. That since the creation of the MCWD, it was the mayor who
 had been appointing the members. Moreover, Mayor Osmeña said that the
conversion of Cebu City to a highly urbanized city, it was independent from
the Province of Cebu.
14. Osmeña also argued that Sec 3(b) should not be read literally; and that the
Mayor of the city or municipality having the majority of water connections
had the power to appoint MCWD members.
15. RTC declared the appointment of Yu illegal and void because the active water
service of Cebu City was at 61.28%. Reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
1. WoN it is the Provincial Governor who should have the appointing authority to
appoint members in the MCWD BoD – NO, it is the MAYOR because Cebu City
became a highly urbanized city independent from Cebu Province.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari; and DECLARE
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sec 3(b) of PD 198.
RATIO:
1. Petitioners assert that Sec 3(b):
a. Violated substantive due process
b. That Gov. Garcia could not determine the water needs of each of the LGUs
within the MCWD;
c. That the provision allowed inequality of treatment of the cities and
municipalities in relation to the province, violating the equal protection
clause;
d. That the provision deprived Cebu City of the power to determine the
membership in the MCWD despite Cebu City having the majority of
the water service connections;
e. That the Province of Cebu was given unreasonable and unwarranted
benefit despite Cebu City being independent from the Province of
Cebu;
f. That the provision did not distinguish whether the province contributed any
resource to the water district or not;
g. That if two or more provinces contributed to the water district, they were
not subject to the 75% requirement, indicating that the power to appoint
devolved only in the provinces.
2. The Court opines that Section 3(b) of PD 198 should be partially struck down
for being repugnant to the local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution
to LGUs, and for being inconsistent with R.A. No. 7160 (1991 Local
Government Code) and related laws on local governments.
3. Cebu City became an HUC, which immediately meant that its
inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the officials of Cebu Province. In
accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, cities that
are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials,
shall be independent of the province, but the voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
4. Hence, all matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were
exercised through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the
President's retained power of general supervision over provinces, HUCs, and
independent component cities pursuant to and in accordance with Section
2529 of the 1991 Local Government Code, a law enacted for the purpose of
strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in accordance with the 1987
Constitution.
5. The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units
are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver
basic services to their constituents. These considerations must be given
importance as they ensure the success of local autonomy. It is accepted that
the LGUs, more than the National Government itself, know the needs of their
constituents,
6. Substantive due process requires that the law itself is fair, reasonable, and
just. It demands the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to life, liberty, or property.
7. What is to be determined is whether the law has a valid governmental
objective.
8. The Court finds that although Sec 3(b) provided for substantial
distinction and was germane to the purpose of PD 198, the intervening
reclassification of the City of Cebu into a Highly Urbanized City and the
enactment of the Local Government Code rendered the continued
application of Sec 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable
and unfair.
9. The provision no longer provided for substantial distinction because it
ignored that the MCWD was built without the participation of the
provincial government and failed to consider that MCWD existed to serve
the community that represents the needs of the majority.
10. The Whereas Clauses state the reason of its enactment, which is due to the
existing domestic water utilities not being able to meet the needs of the
communities they serve.
11. The decree was enacted to provide adequate, quality, and reliable water
services. Hence, it is inconsistent with the objectives of the decree to still
leave to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the
provincial governor had administrative supervision only over
municipalities and component cities accounting for 16.92% of the active
water service connection in the MCWD.
12. The City of Cebu had 61.28% of the active water service connections.
Although it is impermissible to inquire into why the decree set 75% as the
marker for determining the proper appointing authority, the provision has
become unfair for ignoring the needs and circumstances of Cebu City as the
LGU accounting for the majority of the active water service connections.
13. The classification has truly ceased to be germane to the main objective for
the enactment of PD 198.
 021 CAMID V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT(HIRANG)
January 17, 2005 |J. Tinga | Local Government – De Facto Municipalities FACTS:
1. (BACKGROUND) In 1965, former President Diosdado Macapagal issued
several Executive Orders creating 33 minicipalities in Mindanao and among
PETITIONER: SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID
them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created through Executive
RESPONDENTS: THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF
Order No. 107
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION
2. However, these Executive Orders were declared by the court to be null and
IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of
void in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General stating that Section 68 of the
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the
Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.
3. (CASE AT BAR) Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents
SUMMARY: In 1965, President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive
himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen and
Orders creating 33 minicipalities in Mindanao and among them was Andong in
taxpayer whose locus standi is of public and paramount interest especially to
Lanao del Sur which was created through Executive Order No. 107. However, the
the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur. He
Court ruled that these issuances were void as the President has no power to create
alleges that despite the fact that the EO which made Andong a municipality
municipalities through executive issuances. Before the Court now is petitioner
was declared null and void in the case of Pelaez, the court must already treat
Camid, who alleges that the Municipality of Andong has continued its exitence
Andong as a Municipality because:
despite the fact that the EO which created it was declared void by the court in the
a. Andong has already turned into a full blown municipality with
case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. He contends that despite not having funds from
a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services
the government and not having elected officials, the municipality is getting by and
for the municipality and its constituents.
that it has its Interim Officials and different establishment such sa DECS office,
b. Andong already has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a
schools and barangays. He provided several documents to prove the existence of
Department of Education, Culture and Sports office and at least
the municipality. Furthermore, he assails the the Certification issued by the DILG
17 barangay units with their own respective chairmen.
enumerating 18 of the 33 municipalities declared in the case of Palaez to be void
4. Camid admitted that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or
but was certified as existing. He contends that Andong should also be in that list.
qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong,
Moreover, he claims that Pelaez case has already been modified by supervening
however they have been getting by despite the absence of public funds and
events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence and among these was the
with the Interim Officials serving their constituents.
case of Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez (See Facts #8). The issue in
5. To support his claim, Camid presented before the court
this case is WoN the municipality of Andong can be considered as a de facto
a. A Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment
municipality. Court ruled that it cannot be considered as a de facto municipality.
and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment
The court found differences in the cases of those municipalities which were
and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the
considered as de facto and those which are not. Because of the differences in these
Municipality of Andong
cases, the court could not apply Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code.
b. a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi
Basically, the Court ruled that those municipalites which were already
City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at
existing before the effectivity of the Code and that the executive issuance
fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong.
which created them were not declared by the court to be void or was not in
c. A list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly
anyway challenged can be considered as a de facto municipality. (GUYS
recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have
PLEASE SEE RATIO MASYADONG MAHABA KASI YUNG DISCUSSION
recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly
NG SC DITO CAUSE THEY CITED SEVERAL CASES)
for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment
of Andong
DOCTRINE: Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code provided for the
6. Moreover, Camid also assails the Certification made by the Bureau of Local
existence of de facto corporations. This provision, as applied in this case,
Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local
recognizes that though the President has no power to create municipalities through
Government. Such certification enumerates 18 minicipalities certified as
Executive Issuances, such municipalities may be deemed to be a de facto
existing by the DILG. These 18 municipalities are among the thirty-three
municipality provided that such already existed prior to the effectivity of the Code
(33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court
and that the Executive Issuances which crated the municipalities are not ruled by
in Pelaez
the Court to be void.
 7. Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG in not
classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality and in not including
said municipality in its records and official database as an existing regular
municipality. He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment
to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition
given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason
of Pelaez.
8. Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No.
107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events
consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence such as:
a. Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez - affirmed the unique
status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as
a de facto municipal corporation which was also first created
through an Executive Order and was subsequently declared
unconstitutional.
b. Moreover, Camid relied on Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code as a basis to recognize Andong as a municipality
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities
ISSUE:
1. WoN Andong is entitled to be a de facto municipal corporation just like the
municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. – NO, Andong cannot
be considered as a de facto municipality just like the others because the court
found critical differences between the said de facto municipalities and
Andong. (PLEASE SEE RATIO ABOUT THE REASONS)
RULING: The Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
1. The court stated several jurisprudences in order to differentiate why some
municiplalities which were created through an Executive Order by the
President are considered as de facto municipalities while others were not:
NOT CONSIDERED AS DE FACTO MUNICIPALITIES:
a. Pelaez v. Auditor General: 33 municipalities were created during
the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 through several
Executive Orders however the court ruled that these issuances were
void as the President is not empowered to create the municipalities
through executive issuances thus, making the 33 municipalities void
from the very beginning. (SEE RATIO 7&8 TO SEE WHY 18
AMONG THE 33 BECAME MUNICIPALITIES)
b. Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva: The municipality of Lawigan
was created through Executive Order No. 431 in 1961. The court
ruled that EO 436 as void from the very beginning. This case cited
Palaez as jurisprudence.
c. Municipality of Malabang v. Benito: The municipality of
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur was created through an Executive Order
however the court ruled that such cannot be considered as a de facto
corporation as the Executive Order creating Balabagan is void.
d. Municipality of Kapalang v. Moya: The municipality of Santo
Tomas was created through an Executive Order issued by President
Carlo P. Garcia. Ultimately, the court held that such cannot be
considered as a de facto corporation as the President has no power
to create a municipality. The Executive Order issued by the
President was void.
CONSIDERED AS DE FACTO MUNICIPALITIES:
e. Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez: Municipality of San
Andres was created in August 1959 through Executive Order 353
issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. The legal status of the
Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989,
however the court ruled that San Andres be considered as a de facto
corporation. Court said that the case of Pelaez cannot be applied in
this case as there are differences in the two cases.
i. San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years
before its legality was challenged.
ii. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San
Andres null and void
iii. Court applied Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to sustain their holding that San Andres is considered
as a de facto corporation
f. Municipality of Candijay v. CA: The municipality of Alicia was
also considered as a de facto corporation. It upheld the doctrine of
San Narciso. In this case, Alicia was created in 1949 and its status
was only challenged in 1984. The situation of Alicia was the same
as that of San Andres.
g. Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz: The municipality of Sinacaban
which was created in 1949 was considered to be as a de facto
corporation. This is the case where the court ruled that a
municipality created as such by executive order which is later
impliedly recognized, and its acts are accorded legal validity then its
creation can no longer be questioned. In this case, the municipality
of Sinacaban has been:
i. Exisiting for nearly 40 years before its status was
challenged
ii. That no suit was filed to challenge the validity of the
executive issuance 258 which created it.
iii. And that it was later on classified as a fifth-class
municipality
Thus, Sinacaban in entitled to be a de facto corporation under the provision
 of Section 442(d) of the LGU Code. elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for
2. SUMMARY OF RULES: Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four
President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this existence of the town.
Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 6. 4th reason: The 18 other municipalities presented by Camid to have been
1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created nullified in the case of Palaez but was certified as existing by the DILG was
by executive order but not judicially annulled. because of the fact that legislation was enacted to reconstitute these
municipalities.
REASONS OF THE COURT ON WHY ANDONG CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS A DE FACTO MUNICIPALITY: 7. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly
then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation
3. 1st reason: The Executive Order creating Andong was expressly annulled recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord
by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other
by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would municipalities.
in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court decisions
cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties 8. The municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San
aggrieved. Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18)
4. 2nd reason: Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their
442(d) of the Local Government Code. legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders
Requisites for Creation. – which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the
(a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos
respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.
(P=2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant
prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified
9. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the
by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original
kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and
thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original Tubaran. These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del
municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
Sur, and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly which once belonged to Andong.
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where
the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund
of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring
income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive
order may receive recognition, they must have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal
officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially
annulled in 1965.

5. The national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong,

depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal
 022 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz (HILARIO)
December 2, 1996 | Mendoza, J. | Local Autonomy
PETITIONER: MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ
RESPONDENTS: HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., Presiding Judge REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, 10th JUDICIAL REGION, OROQUIETA
CITY, and MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN
SUMMARY: The municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental was created
by EO 258 of President Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. A portion of Jimenez was included in this new
municipality of Sinacaban, and Sinacaban asserted its right over the affected
portion of Jimenez before the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental. Provincial
Board set common boundary between Sinacaban and Jimenez in its Resolution.
It issued a decision declaring the disputed area to be part of Sinacuban and not
Jimenez, saying that the agreement between the municipalities was void because
the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacuban as fixed in EO 258.
Pursuant to Pelaez v. Auditor General, Jimenez filed for certiorari prohibition
and mandamus in RTC against Sinacuban, alleging that the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative, and consequently, since Sinacuban was
created by EO, it has no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.
RTC ruled in favor of Sinacuban and said that it shall continue to exist and
operate as regular municipality. It held that Sinacuban is a de facto corporation
since it had completely organized itself and exercised corproate powers for 40
years before the existence was questioned.
Issue before SC is WoN Sinacuban has legal personality to file the claim – YES,
ISSUES:
because it is a de facto corporation. Where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal
validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. Also, local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which provides that municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
RULING: Judgment in question is affirmed, Jimenez’s petition is denied..
DOCTRINE: Where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its
RATIO:
creation can no longer be questioned. the power of provincial boards to
settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature involving as it does,
the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities.
FACTS:
1. The municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental was created by EO 258
of President Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917.
2. A portion of Jimenez was included in this new municipality of Sinacaban,
and Sinacaban asserted its right over the affected portion of Jimenez before
the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental.
3. The municipality of Jimenez in its Answer asserted its jurisdiction over the
contested area on the basis of an agreement it had with municipality of
Sinacaban.
4. Provincial Board set common boundary between Sinacaban and Jimenez in
its Resolution.
5. It issued a decision declaring the disputed area to be part of Sinacuban and
not Jimenez, saying that the agreement between the municipalities was void
because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacuban as
fixed in EO 258.
6. Pursuant to Pelaez v. Auditor General, Jimenez filed for certiorari prohibition
and mandamus in RTC against Sinacuban, alleging that the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative.
a. consequently, since Sinacuban was created by EO, it has no elgal
personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.
7. RTC ruled in favor of Sinacuban and said that it shall continue to exist and
operate as regular municipality.
a. Sinacuban is a de facto corporation since it had completely
organized itself and exercised corproate powers for 40 years before
the existence was questioned.
b. Jimenez has no locus standi to question the existence of Sinacuban.
8. Jimenez filed Motion for Reconsideration, RTC denied. Thus, Jimenez brings
this case before the SC.
1. WoN Sinacaba has legal personality to file the claim – YES, because it is a
de facto corporation.
2. If yes, which boundary is to be used (the one in EO 258 or Resolution of
Provincial Board)?- Case did not explicitly answer this question, but this is
the rule: As long as Resolution is not contrary to technical description of
boundaries in EO 258, ir can be used.
1. Where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation
can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated
the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallity of
Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the
validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged;
 (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was
filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified
as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit
court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was
held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the
municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which provides that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
2. Sinacaban had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez v. Auditor
General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No.
258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only
40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had
laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue.
3. Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country.
4. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement.
5. As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power of provincial boards to
settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature involving as it
does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities. It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a
municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in
accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into
effect of that law but its amendment
 023 THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP PEACE PANEL
(GUSTILO)
October 14, 2008 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Local Governments
PETITIONER: The Province of North Cotabato et. al
RESPONDENTS: Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domains
SUMMARY: The Philippine Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Malaysia. Howevever, respondent GRP
was enjoined from fomally signing it by virtue of a TRO issued by the Court at the
issuance of the petitioners prior to the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD. There was
a long process of negation and agreements between the two parties. The GRP and
MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. Then,
they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent. However, the MILF
attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and took control of the town
hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Estrada declared and
carried out an all-out-war against the MILF. When President GMA assumed office,
the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a
resumption of the peace talks. Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted
to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement
2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect;
and c.) ancestral domain aspect.
Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to
be signed last August 5, 2008.
In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The
latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and
traderelation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government
and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor
of the BJE.
The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It
describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing
the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the
other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and
BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative‖.
With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and
finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They
further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the
petition.
The issues are:
PROCEDURAL: 1) W/N the case if ripe for adjudication? – Yes. The case was ripe
for adjudication for it was held that any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. 2) W/N the petitions
have become moot and academic? – No, the controversy was an exception to the “moot
and academic” principle due to tis nature.
SUBSTANTIVE: 1) WoN the respondents violated constitututional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and right to information when they negotiated and
later initiated the MOA-AD – Yes. 2) W/N the signing of the MOA, the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself a) to create and recognize
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law; - Yes. b) to revise or amend the
Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; - Yes. c) to concede to or
recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
DOCTRINE: The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely,
the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
FACTS:
1. On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
2. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not
materialize due to the motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their
cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD. Thus, this Court issued
a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
3. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the
concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in
1996.. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
4. Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth
sailing in the GRP- MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early
2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao
and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an
all-out-war against the MILF.
5. When President GMA assumed office, the military offensive against the
MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace
talks. President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the
negotiating table. MILF lyeventual decided to meet with the GRP.
 6. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June
20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and
agenda on security, rehabilitation and acenstral domain.
7. In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala
Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
form, which was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
8. The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely:
Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.
9. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any
economic cooperation and traderelation with foreign countries. ―The
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.
10. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the
Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was
provided. The relationship was described as ―associative‖.
11. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation
and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3,
and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution
and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
Procedural
1. W/N the petition is ripe for adjudication? – Yes.
2. W/N the petitions have become moot and academic? – No
Substantive
1. W/N the respondents violated constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and right to information when they negotiated and
later initiated the MOA-AD – Yes.
2. W/N the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself
a. to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law; - Yes
b. to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA; - Yes.
c. to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act)- Yes
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-
4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
RATIO: SUBSTANTIVE
The respondents violated constitututional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and right to information when they negotiated and later initiated
the MOA-AD
1. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in
the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
2. (Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self- executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
3. The contents of the MOA-AD are matters of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
4. E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-
building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice,
and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
By signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself to (a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
1. Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at
any rate, a status closely approximating it.
2. The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with
the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
 Philippine territory for independence.
3. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the
ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
4. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed
itself by its use of the international law concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
5. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the
MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
(b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
1. The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA- AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA- AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
2. It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
3. The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-
discussed standards.
4. Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals
as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.
(c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997) particularly Section 3(g)
& Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
1. This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
2. Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-
AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims,
but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-
AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected.
What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue
of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge
that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
3. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the
free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
4. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project
or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of
a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
 024 Republic vs. Bayao (Gueco)
July 5, 2013 | Leonen, J. | Power of the president to transfer a regional center
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines, represented by Abusama M. Alid,
Officer-in-charge, Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII
(DARFUXII)
RESPONDENTS: Abdulwahab A. Bayao, Osmena I. Montaner, Rakma B.
Buisan, Helen M. Alvarez, Neila P. Limba, Elizabeth B. Pusta, Anna Mae A.
Sideno, Udtog B. Tabong, John S. Kamenza, Delia R. Subaldo, Dayang W.
Macmod, Florence S. Tayuan, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other
officials and employees of DARFUXII
SUMMARY:
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the
regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides, among others,
that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in the
SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to
Koronadal City (It’s not stated in the case but I think it was President GMA who
issued the said EO). Pursuant to this law, a memorandum was issued which
directed the Officer-in-charge and the regional executive director of the DA-RFU
XII to transfer the operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to Koronadal
City. Respondents Bayao et. al opposed this transfer. Among others, they claim
that rent in Koronadal is expensive and that there is already a building in Cotobato
City which could accommodate the entire staff of DA-RFU XII. They also claim
that the government would be able to save money if they were to stay in Cotobato
City.
The Officer-in-charge, nevertheless, ordered the transfer of the regional office to
Koronadal City, so Bayao et. al filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC granted this. Petitioners
appealed but CA dismissed their petition. Hence, this case. ISSUE: WON the
issuance of a preliminary injunction by the RTC against the directive of the OIC
to transfer the regional office to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers
between the executive and judiciary—YES. RULING: In Chiongbian v. Orbos,
the Court held that the power of the President to reorganize administrative regions
carries with it the power to determine the regional center. It may be true that the
transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no
buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on
the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already
enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was
not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsod, through a resolution,
requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern
issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is
basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the
wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department,
for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon
the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or
decisions made by the other departments. In this case, the transfer of the
regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is an
executive function. Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to have granted the writ of
preliminary injuction against the directive of the OIC to transfer the regional
office to Koronadal City.
DOCTRINE:
While the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments.
FACTS:
1. Parties to this case are: Department of Agriculture—Regional Field Unit XII
(“DA-RFU XII”) is the petitioner. It is a government office mandated to
implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the
Department of Agriculture in its regional area. Meanwhile, respondents are
officials and employees of DA-RFU XII (“Bayao et. al”)
2. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as
the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides,
among others, that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national
government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional
seat of operations to Koronadal City (It’s not stated in the case but I think it
was President GMA who issued the said EO).
3. Pursuant to the above law, a memorandum was issued in which the
Department of Agriculture Undersecretary for Operations directed the
Officer-in-Charge and Regional Executive Director of the DA-RFU XII to
transfer the administrative, finance, and operations base of RFU XII from
Cotobato City to Koronadal City.
4. Bayao et. al opposed the implementation of the said memorandum. They
argue that former President GMA made a pronouncement that the regional
seat of SOCCSKSARGEN shall remain in Cotobato City. They also appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture to hold in abeyance the implementation of EO
304. They justified their appeal by saying that a building was constructed in
Cotabato City and the same was meant to accommodate the whole staff of
DA- RFU XII. Whereas there is no building in Koronadal City and rent there
is very expensive. Moreover, if the regional office remains in Cotabato City,
the government need not spend over P7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well
as other expenses for equipment hauling and construction. Finally, they
alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan has a
sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a certificate of occupancy by
the City Engineering Office of Koronadal City as per information from an
auditor
5. The Officer-in-charge then conducted a meeting and ordered the transfer of
 the regional office to the ATI building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm
(both of these are located in Koronadal City).
6. As such, Bayao et. al filed a complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
7. RTC granted their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
8. Petitioner appealed with the CA and the CA dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration
of the assailed trial court Order.
9. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the issuance of a preliminary injunction by the RTC against the
directive of OIC to transfer the regional office to Korondal City violates the
separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary—YES.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated March 21, 2007 and August 16, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 0 1457-
MIN, as well as the Decision dated October 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14 of Cotabato City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
1. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has been traditionally lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. This power of supervision is found in the
Constitution as well as in the Local Government Code of 1991, to wit:
Section 25 – National Supervision over Local Government Units –
reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the
wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form
of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for
each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of
action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into
or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures
taken or decisions made by the other departments.
5. In this case, the transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN
region to Koronadal City is an executive function. Hence, it was wrong for
the RTC to have granted the writ of preliminary injuction against the directive
of the OIC to transfer the regional office to Koronadal City.
6. Similar to DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees, the issues in the present
case are addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality.
Some of these concerns are the lack of a proper and suitable building in
Koronadal to house the DA regional office, the inconvenience of the transfer
considering that the children of respondent-employees are already enrolled in
Cotabato City schools, and other similar reasons.
7. In this regard, the Court ruled that the judiciary cannot inquire into the
wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive.
8. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
government branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns
falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. The judiciary as
Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive
[or legislative] action”

(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the

President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions.
2. Note that the power to transfer a regional center is an executive function. In
Chiongbian v. Orbos, the Court held that the power of the President to
reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the
regional center.
3. The President has the duty to exercise supervisory authority directly over
provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities;
through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and
through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.
4. It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering
that: (1) there are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal,
(2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected
employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional
Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to
 025 League of Cities v. COMELEC (Gonzales)
April 12, 2011 | Bersamin, J. | Creation of LGUs
PETITIONERS: League of Cities et al.
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC, LGUs (which are subject of the cityhood laws)
SUMMARY: During the 11th Congress, 24 cityhoood bills were not acted upon.
RA 9009 then amended LGC, which provided for the 100 million income
requirement for a city. In the 13th Congress, 16 laws were passed, exempting the
municipalities (which are the subject of the 24 bills not acted upon) from the 100
million requirement. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the cityhood laws.
The issues are:
1. WoN the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10 Art. X of the Constitution – NO, it
was the intent of the Congress to exempt the 16 municipalities from 100
million requirement, as seen from the legislative deliberations
2. WoN the cityhood laws violate equal protection clause – NO, there is
substantial distinction (they complied with the income requirement in the
old LGC when their bills for conversion were passed – based on the 2009
decision)
3. WoN the cityhood laws violate LGU’s right to just share in national taxes –
NO, the share in IRA is not a specific amount but a percentage
DOCTRINE: Congress, by special law, can provide for different requirements
other than those specified in the 1991 LGC. (Because the 16 municipalities became
cities by virtue of special laws (Cityhood laws), not by virtue of the LGC. That is
why in dissent of Carpio, he says that under the Constitution, a city can be created
ONLY in accordance with the LGC. Since the Cityhood laws are not amendments
to the LGC, the 16 municipalities cannot be converted into cities.)
FACTS:
1. During the 11th Congress, 57 cityhood bills were led before the HoR. 24 of
which were not acted upon (because this was the time of impeachment of
Erap, EDSA II)
2. RA 9009, amending LGC, was passed. Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now
provides that "a municipality may be converted into a component city if it has
a certified locally generated average annual income of at least PhP100 million
for the last 2 consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.
3. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress
adopted in House (H.) Joint Resolution, which sought to exempt from the
income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress.
The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving said Resolution.
4. Then came the 13th Congress. HoR re-adopted H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as
H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
5. The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution.
6. During the Senate session, Senator Pimentel asserted that passing H.
Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the
income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. He then
suggested the filing by the HoR of individual bills.
7. 16 laws were passed, exempting the municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement.
8. Petitioners League of Cities argue that the cityhood laws are unconstitutional,
as they violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in
the national taxes.
9. THIS IS AN MR. In the previous decision, SC granted the petitions and
nullified the 16 cityhood laws. Respondent LGUs filed this MR. (Actually
there were many MRs and they were dismissed.)
ISSUE:
1. WoN the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10 Art. X of the Constitution – NO, it
was the intent of the Congress to exempt the 16 municipalities from 100
million requirement
2. WoN the cityhood laws violate equal protection clause – NO, there is
substantial distinction
3. WoN the cityhood laws violate LGU’s right to just share in national taxes –
NO, the share in IRA is not a specific amount but a percentage
RULING: MR GRANTED. Cityhood laws are CONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:
1. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the
Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
2. After speech of Senator Pimentel regarding the filing of individual bills to
exempt municipalities from the P100 million requirement, the conversion
bills of the respondent LGU were individually filed in the HoR, and were all
unanimously and favorably voted upon by the Members of the HoR. The bills
were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate.
3. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations
of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
4. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to
comply with the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No.
9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the
petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult
to comply with.
5. The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners
as having generated the threshold income of P100 million from local sources,
including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in
provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered
 by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the
Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are
considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the
danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the
metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city
compared to the farflung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or
whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income
requirement.
6. LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They
have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of
their respective provinces.
7. Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from
local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the
law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account
the after-effects that were likely to arise.
8. The petitioners' contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a
just share in the national taxes is not acceptable.
9. The share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section
285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. The allocation by the National
Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease.
SUMMARY (from Dec 21, 2009)
1. Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to
apply to the cityhood bills, which became the cityhood laws in question. In
other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted
from the income requirement of PhP100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
2. The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of
the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP100 million
income requirement;
3. The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
4. The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each
had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that
substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood.
On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP20 million income level exacted
under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.
Carpio, dissenting:
1. There is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority
decision that the Cityhood Laws further amended the Local Government
Code, which exclusively embodies the essential requirements for the
creation of cities, including the conversion of a municipality into a city.
2. On the contrary, each Cityhood Law contains a uniformly worded
Separability Clause. In case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall
prevail over the Cityhood Law.
3. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code itself and not
in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.
4. The increased income requirement of P100 million is neither arbitrary nor
difficult to comply.
5. As long as the increased income requirement is not impossible to comply,
such increase is a policy determination involving the wisdom of the law,
which exclusively lies within the province of the Legislature.
6. The majority do not find the increased income requirement of P100 million
unconstitutional or unlawful. Unless the P100 million income requirement
violates a provision of the Constitution or a law, such requirement for the
creation of a city must be strictly complied with. The majority just did not
want to apply the 100 million requirement to the respondent LGUs.
7. The reduction of the share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
will adversely affect the cities' economic situation.
8. The majority gravely loses sight of the fact that "the members of petitioner
League of Cities are also in need of the same resources, and are responsible
for development imperatives that need to be done for almost 40 million
Filipinos, as compared to only 1.3 million Filipinos in the respondent
municipalities."
9. Compliance with the old requirement is an outright violation of the
Constitution which expressly commands that "no . . . city . . . shall be
created . . . except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code."
Abad, concurring:
1. I fully concur in the resolution that Justice Lucas Bersamin wrote for the
majority. I would want, however, to reply briefly to the charge that the
Court has been guilty of "flip-plopping" in this case.
2. But the charge is unfair as it is baseless.
 026 NAVARRO v. ERMITA (Fordan)
April 12, 2011 | Nachura, J. | Criteria for creation of province
PETITIONERS: Rodolfo G. Navarro, et. al
RESPONDENTS: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, representing the
President of the Philippines, et. al
INTERVENORS: Cong. Francisco T. Matugas, et. al
SUMMARY: This is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment filed by
intervenors to recall the entry of judgment declaring RA No. 9355 as invalid and
unconstitutional. On Oct. 2, 2006, the President approved into law RA No. 9355
(creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On Dec. 3, 2006, the COMELEC
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both provinces, the President
appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on
Jan. 26, 2007 and during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on
July 1, 2007. Meanwhile, on Nov. 10, 2006, Navarro, et. al and other former
political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed a petition before the SC challenging
the constitutionality of RA No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as
a new province would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly
deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory,
Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. The petition
was initially denied but when they raised the population and land area requirement
was not met, the Court reversed its decision and declared RA No. 9355 as invalid
and unconstitutional as well as Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Subsequently,
intervenors, as the duly elected officials of Surigao Norte, filed their motion and
alleged that with the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, they would be
greatly affected since the election results would be nullified if the decision of the
Court would not be reversed. The issue in this case is whether or not Art. 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR is valid since it exempts from land area requirement where the
proposed province is composed of 1 more islands.
The Court held that both Art. Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and RA No. 9355 are
valid. It must be pointed out that when the LGU to be created consists of 1 or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Secs.
442 (for municipality) and 450 (for component city) of the LGC. This exemption
is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under
Sec. 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Art. 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to
cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that
the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Sec. 442 (for
municipalities) and Sec. 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Sec. 461 of the LGC—and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
DOCTRINE: The genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Sec. 442
(for municipalities) and Sec. 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Sec. 461 of the LGC—and to reflect the true
legislative intent.
(I think the doctrine written in the reviewer pertains to the 2010 Decision of the
Court which declared Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR as invalid)
FACTS:
1. On Oct. 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic
Act (RA) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
2. On Dec. 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes.
3. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao
del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President
appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office
on Jan. 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office
on July 1, 2007.
4. On Nov. 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro (Navarro), et. al., former
political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of RA No. 9355. Howver, the Court dismissed the petition
on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
5. Undaunted, Navarro, et. al., as taxpayers and residents of the Province of
Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A.
No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat
as a new province would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would
unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources
from the area.
6. Navarro, et. al pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
area of 802.12 km2 only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply
 with Sec. 1017, Article X of the Constitution and of Sec. 461 18 of the LGC,
on both counts.
7. On Feb. 10, 2010, the Court rendered its decision granting the petition and
declared RA No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under
the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the
election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as
null and void the provision on Art. 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, “the land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1 or more
islands” for being beyond the ambit of Sec. 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as
such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
8. Subsequently, the Republic, represented by OSG, and Dinagat filed
respective motions for reconsiderations which was also followed by the
intervenors Cong. Francisco Matugas, et. al wherein they alleged that the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 879019 is relevant to the case since, as the
duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected
by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010
Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and
would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of RA No. 9355.
9. The motions filed were all denied and so the decision of the Court in this case
had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the current Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.
ISSUE (I only included the issue related to our topic): Whether or not Art. 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR is valid since it exempts from land area requirement where the proposed
province is composed of 1 more islands. – YES, it is valid since it is the true
legislative intent of the Congress in creating LGUs.
RULING: The Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-
17
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
18
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.—(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than P20,000,000 based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
i. a continuous territory of at least 2,000 km2, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
ii. a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
 SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation.—(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income of
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by a chartered
city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
19
Kindly see last page for the details.
intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT
the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR stating, “The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID. Accordingly,
RA No. 9355 is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the
officials thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units
(LGU) are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the
LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish
these results. However, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is
the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
2. In the the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of
viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component
cities, and provinces, the 3 indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
3. But it must be pointed out that when the LGU to be created consists of 1 or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Secs. 44220 (for municipality) and 45021 (for component city) of
the LGC. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Sec. 46122 of the LGC, although it is
20
SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation.—(a) an average annual income of at least P2,500,000 for the last 2
consecutive years; a population of at least 25,000 inhabitants; and a contiguous territory of at least 50 km2
(b) x x x. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created
is composed of 1 or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands.
(c) x x x (simplified version)
21
SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation.—(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city if it has an average annual income of at least P20,000,000 for the last 2 consecutive years,
and if it has either of the following requisites: a contiguous territory of at least 100 km2; or a population of
not less than 150,000 inhabitants. (b) x x x. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of 1 or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises 2 or more islands. (c) x x x (simplified version)
22
not less than P20,000,000 and either of the following requisites:
 (i) a contiguous territory of at least 2,000
km2 or
 (ii) a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province.
 (c) x x x (simplified version)
 expressly stated under Art. 9(2)23 of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither
rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces.
4. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago,
there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part
of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities.
5. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Sec. 442 (for municipalities) and Sec. 450 (for component cities)
of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461 (for provinces). Thus,
when the exemption was expressly provided in Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Sec. 461 of
the LGC—and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order
for the Court to uphold the validity of Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
6. Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units
genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area
requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results.
7. Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids
of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant
to this principle, Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in
the basic law, the LGC.
8. It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight
Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative
departments, pursuant to Sec. 533 of the LGC which provides that the
Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any
and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the
principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also
mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted
by Congress.
9. The inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land
area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of 1 or
more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly
stated in Sec. 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express
provision in the LGC-IRR.
10. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically
insert such an exemption in Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight
Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all
23
Population or land area—Population which shall not be less than 250,000 inhabitants or land area which
must be contiguous with an area of at least 2,000 km2. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
2 or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1
the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of
local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated.
Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to
great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative construction as
well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of
local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.
11. With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive
and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the
LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be
impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct
amendments to the LGC.
12. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a
full-fledged province, enacted RA No. 9355, following the exemption from
the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces,
can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant
to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted RA No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
13. The bill that eventually became RA No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted
upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts definitively show the clear
legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land
area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists
of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby,
and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of RA No.
9355.
14. What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a
LGU, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time
of its creation which is 4 times more than the minimum requirement of
P20,000,000 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to
its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking
at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence
as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready
and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental
in stunting such capacity.
15. J. CARPIO, dissenting:
a. Legitimizing the creation of a province in blatant violation of the
Constitution and the LGC, opens the floodgates to the proliferation of
pygmy provinces and legislative districts, mangling sacred and
fundamental principles governing our democratic way of life and
or more islands. x x x (simplified version)
 exacerbating the scourge of local dynastic politics.
b. The LGC contains no exception to the income and population or land area
requirements in creating provinces. What the Code relaxed was the
contiguity rule for provinces consisting of “2 or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.” The minimum land area of 2,000 km2 in the
Code for the creation of a province was never changed, and no exception
was ever created by law. Hence, the exception created LGC-IRR,
exempting provinces “composed of 1 or more islands” from the minimum
land area requirement, is void for being ultra vires, granting a statutory
exception that the LGC clearly withheld.
c. The IRR, being a mere administrative regulation to implement the LGC,
cannot amend the Code but must conform to the Code. Only Congress,
and not any other body, is constitutionally empowered to create, through
amendatory legislation, exceptions to the land area requirement in Sec.
461 of the Code.
d. Further, the majority argues that since the exception of island provinces
from the minimum land area requirement was inserted in the
implementing rules by the congressional Oversight Committee, the Court
should extend great weight to this “legislative construction” of the Code.
This is gross error.
e. First, in Macalintal v. Comelec, we ruled that a congressional oversight
committee has no power to approve or disapprove the implementing rules
of laws because the implementation of laws is purely an executive
function. The intrusion of the congressional Oversight Committee in the
drafting of implementing rules is a violation of the separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution. This Court cannot allow such intrusion
without violating the Constitution. Second, Congress has no power to
construe the law. Only the courts are vested with the power to construe
the law. Congress may provide in the law itself a definition of terms but
it cannot define or construe the law through its Oversight Committee after
it has enacted the law because such power belongs to the courts.
f. In the creation of a province neither Congress nor the Executive can
replace the minimum population requirement with a land area requirement
because the creation of a province necessarily creates at the same time a
legislative district, which under the Constitution must have a minimum
population of 250,000.
16. J. PERALTA, dissenting:
a. Movants-intervenors’ argument is unmeritorious. As cited in Yakazi
Torres Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, legislative power is the
power to make, alter, and repeal laws; thus, the authority to amend,
change, or modify a law is part of such legislative power. However, in this
case, RA No. 9355, is not a law amending the LGC on the criteria for the
creation of a province. Instead, RA No. 9355 is a statute creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, subject to the constitutional provision
on the creation of a province. The constitutional provision on the creation
of a province found in Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution.
b. Contrary to the contention of the movants-intervenors, Art. 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR, which exempts a proposed province from the land area
requirement if it is composed of 1 or more islands, cannot be deemed
incorporated in RA No. 9355, because rules and regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
c. Thus, in the decision dated February 10, 2010, the Court held that Art.
9(2) of the LGC-IRR is null and void, because the exemption is not found
in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said
law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
d. Although the political units directly affected by the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands approved the creation of the said province,
RA No. 9355 failed to comply with the criteria for the creation of the
province contained in Sec. 461 of the LGC; hence, it was declared
unconstitutional.
e. Furthermore, the LGC provides that it is “the general welfare provisions
in this Code which shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people in the community.” Nowhere is it stated therein that the
provisions for the creation of a LGU, the province in particular, should be
liberally interpreted. Moreover, since the criteria for the creation of a
province under the LGC are clear, there is no room for interpretation, but
only application.
*Note: I did not include other Justices’ opinions since they did not have any
comments relating to creation of LGUs.
COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 8790
xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of the
Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line
with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of
Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte. But because of
the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat Islands will, for the positions
of Member, House of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates for the said positions. Conversely, the ballots for
the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del
Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the candidates for
the said position[s]. Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote
 for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives,
First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for
Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be
able to vote for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat
Islands. Also, the voters of the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the
Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the
elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del
Norte, because the election will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates
for Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and
Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del
Norte.
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of
the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item “b” above. A special election
for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat
Islands) will have to be conducted.
xxx

SO ORDERED.”
 027 PADILLA v. COMELEC (Escalona)
October 19, 1992 | Romero, J. | Plebiscite in Local Governments
PETITIONER: Hon. Roy Padilla Jr. as Governor of Camarines Norte
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections
SUMMARY: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2312, which provided for
the guidelines for the plebiscite in certain municipalities to be created by RA 7155.
The plebiscite failed in the Municipality of Labo for the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The Governor of Camarines Norte filed to have
another plebiscite on the ground that the Municipality of Labo was segregated
from the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, thus no need for their participation in
the plebiscite. It is only the voters in the area to be segregated that should be
counted. The issue is WoN the plebiscite should have included the Municipality
of Labo. The Court ruled that they should be included. Based on the discussion
during the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the inclusion of the phrase “in the
political units directly affected” in the 1987 Constitution precisely seeks to include
those areas who are not to be segregated, but will be economically affected should
be included in the vote towards the plebiscite.
DOCTRINE: When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the
political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity
who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof
have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
FACTS:
1. RA 7155 was enacted into law, which created many municipalities in the
province of Camarines Norte. Pursuant to this COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2312, which provided for the guidelines for the plebiscite,
which is mandated under the Constitution for the creation of the
municipalities.
2. In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of
Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against
the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day
after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the
rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
by a majority of votes.
3. Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of
Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December
15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite
be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that
the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid
and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No.
2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit,
Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses
that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother
unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
4. In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the
ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC relied upon by respondent COMELEC
is now passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive
Secretary which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent
unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the
plebiscite.
ISSUES:
1. WoN COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312 – NO. It was well within the boundaries of the
Constitution to do so.
2. WoN the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo is valid – YES. Based on the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission, it was the same thought to include them as they
would be directly affected as a political unit
RULING: Petition is denied.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner's contention that the Court’s ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been
superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating the
earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that
since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution and that the Court’s ruling in said case is no longer applicable
under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the
latter provision deleted the words "unit or."
2. The Court did not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI
of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as
explained by then CONCOM Commissioner:
a. Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of
"unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under the
formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used
are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the
implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no
substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about
this.
b. Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will
there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the
floor?
 c. Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the
words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must
involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
3. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that
residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by
the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly
affected," is the plurality of political units, which would participate in the
plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
 028 MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE (Eleazar)
September 16, 1999 | Puno, J. | Local Government
PETITIONERS: JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H.
AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO
RESPONDENTS: HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as
Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary
of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela,
THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA,
ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR.
ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer
SUMMARY: In 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality
of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720
was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. In 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. The issue in
this case is whether of not the subsequent law, RA 8528 is constitutional? The SC
said it is unconstitutional. This is because the law failed to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. A close
analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator - material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein.
It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people in the political units directly affected.
DOCTRINE: Purposes of the requirements of the Constitution: (1) Criteria fixed
by the Local Government Code on income, population and land are designed to
achieve an economic purpose. (2) The people’s plebiscite is required to achieve a
political purpose - to use the people’s voice as a check against the pernicious
political practice of gerrymandering
FACTS:
1. In 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720
was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
2. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city.
3. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of
provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.
4. Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the
said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago
is unnecessary.
ISSUE: W/N the RA8528 is constitutional – NO, because the law failed to provide
the downgrade of the city subject to a plebiscite which is a Constitutional requirement.
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is
declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to desist from implementing said law.
RATIO:
1. No. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional for its failure to provide that
the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite.
2. The Court holds that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
a. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
3. This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
a. Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
4. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls
within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
5. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units involve a common denominator - material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein.
6. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people in the political units directly affected.
7. It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago
City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the
 approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither
rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the
will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the
status of their city.
8. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially
diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in
accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
a. (f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected.
b. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless
said law or ordinance fixes another date.
9. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character,
so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit
directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of
its people.
10. Changes that will result in downgrading:
a. Independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished
b. The city mayor will be placed under the supervision of the provincial
governor
c. Taxes collected by the city will be shared with the province
d. Santiago city will revert to the Province of Isabela geographically,
politically, and administratively.
e. Territorial land area of Santiago will be added to the Province of
Isabela.
f. Reduced funds for local operations of the city government because
of reduced shares in Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
11. Purposes of the requirements of the Constitution:
a. Criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population
and land are designed to achieve an economic purpose.
b. The people’s plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose -
to use the people’s voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering
 026 City of Pasig v. COMELEC (Dim)
Sept. 10, 1999 | Justice Ynares-Santiago | Territorial boundaries
PETITIONER: City of Pasig
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Election, and Municipality of Cainta, Province of
Rizal
SUMMARY: The City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta have an ongoing
territorial boundary dispute ongoing with the RTC of Antipolo. In the interim, the City
of Pasig scheduled a plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Karangalan and was able
to complete a plebiscite for Barangay Napico, both of which were within the disputed
boundary claimed by the Municipality of Cainta. The Municipality of Cainta filed a
petition to the COMELEC, which suspended the planned plebiscite for the proposed
Barangay Karangalan for having a prejudicial question in the form of the boundary
dispute with the RTC of Antipolo, however, it considered the plebiscite for Barangay
Napico moot and academic for being approved and ratified. The City of Pasig appealed
to the SC stating that there is no prejudicial question for the plebiscite, while the
Municipality of Antipolo appealed to the SC so that they could declare the plebiscite
for Barangay Napico to be declared null and void. The ISSUE was WoN the plebiscites
could be suspended or cancelled in light of the pending boundary dispute between the
two LGUs. The SC dismissed the petition of City of Pasig stating that there was a
prejudicial question, but it affirmed the petition of the Municipality of Cainta, and
invalidated the ratification of Barangay Napico. The SC also explained that a requisite
for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Because
territorial jurisdiction is an issue in a pending civil case, the plebiscites could be denied
application if such cases ended against the claimants.
DOCTRINE: The territorial boundaries of an LGU must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction. An LGU can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its
acts are ultra vires.
FACTS:
[This case involves two petitions: One filed by the City of Pasig, the other filed
by the Municipality of Cainta]
1. Both of these petitions question the suspension of plebiscite proceedings
pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
2. The residents of Karalangan Village wanted to be segregated from their
mother barangays (Manggahan and Dela Paz). The City of Pasig approved an
ordinance for a proposed Barangay Karangalan. The plebiscite was set for the
creation of the barangay on June 22, 1996.
3. The City of Pasig also issued another ordinance for the proposed Barangay
Napico. Plebsicite for the proposed barangay was set on March 15, 1997.
4. The Municipality of Cainta filed petitions to the COMELEC, claiming that
there was a pending boundary dispute, hence the scheduled plebiscites should
be suspended or cancelled until the end of the case.
5. COMELEC ruled that the plebiscite for Barangay Karangalan be held in
abeyance, but dismissed the petition for being moot in the plebiscite for
Barangay Napico, since in the latter barangay, there was ratification and
acceptance by a majority of the votes.
6. As a result, two cases were filed. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part
of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these
proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.
ISSUE:
(1) WoN the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan
and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments. - YES. It would be
futile to conduct plebiscites without knowing the extent of the territorial
boundaries of the two LGUs.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition of the City of Pasig is DISMISSED, while
the petition of the Municipality of Cainta is GRANTED. The plebiscite creating
Barangay Napico is declared NULL and VOID.
RATIO:
[Existing boundary dispute is a prejudicial question]
1. In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the RTC of Antipolo.
2. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays .
3. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction
to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries.
4. Because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case,
until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial
jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility.
5. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of
a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
 government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare.(Mariano Jr. v.
Comelec)
6. Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it
is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final
determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are
truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.

[Plebiscite does not render case moot and academic]

7. Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non­
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had
been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the
case before the Court cannot truly be viewed as already moot and
academic.
8. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and
indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who
strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives,
create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions,
either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from
entertaining future challenges to their acts.
 030 MA. SALVACION BUAC v. COMELEC (Cruz)
Jan 26, 2004 | Puno, J. | Local Government
PETITIONER: Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections and Alan Peter S. Cayetano,
resondents, Dante O. Tinga, Sigfrido R. Tinga, Milagros Valencia-Rodriguez,
Marisse Balina-Eron, Henry Duenas, Jr., Allan Paul C. Cruz, Arnel M. Cerafica,
Deliosantos, Gamaliel San Pedro, Roberto Dionisio, Elpidio Javier, Henry
Duenas, Sr., Nicanor Garcia, Pacifico Santos, Ricardo Natividad, Gabriel
Victoria, Romeo G Santos, George A. Elias, Daniel Valdez, marianito Miranda,
Rolando C. Paac, Wilfredo C. Villar, Menandro O. Tinga, Julian Maria Tegui,
Bernardino Elias, Hermina C. Perez and Ricardo Jordan; petitioners-in-
Intervention, Ricardo Papa, Jr., respondent-in-Intervention, Alan Peter S
Cayetano, respondent-in-Intervention
SUMMARY: a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig
Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig
from a municipality into a city. Without completing the canvass of sixty-four
(64) other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the
"NO" votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a city.
The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the COMELEC en banc to
reconvene and complete the canvass. The Board did and in due time issued an
Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.
Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the results of the
plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast
therein. Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The issue in this case is WoN the
jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with
the COMELEC. The Sc ruled in the affirmative. The core controversy in this
case is conduct of the Taguig plebiscite which involves the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution which
gives it the power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x." the power of the COMELEC is not
limited to the mere administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. To
remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the
plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally
mandated power to "enforce" laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.
DOCTRINE: The COMELEC, not the regular courts, has jurisdiction over
plebiscite protest cases.
FACTS:
1. In April, 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the
Taguig Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of
Taguig from a municipality into a city.
2. Without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, the
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the "NO" votes won and that the
people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a city.
3. The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the COMELEC en
banc to reconvene and complete the canvass.
a. The Board did and in due time issued an Order proclaiming that the
negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.
4. Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the results of the
plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast therein.
a. They alleged that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and
counting of votes.
5. Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
a. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
protest.
b. He averred that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the
conduct of a plebiscite is lodged with the RTC.
6. The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to the petition and
ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case.
7. Cayetano moved for reconsideration which was granted.
8. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd Division.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally
vested with the COMELEC – YES, Section 2(1), Article IX (C) vests
COMELEC to decide plebiscite protest
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC is
directed to reinstate the petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and
to decide it without delay.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as including
"the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
a. According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, "the first part of the authority
represents the traditional concept of judicial power involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law."
i. The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the
Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for
the exercise of judicial power.
1. It does not involve the violation of any legally
demandable right and its enforcement.
2. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar
for it merely involves the ascertainment of the
 vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they
approve or disapprove the conversion of their
municipality to a highly urbanized city.
3. There is no invocation of a private right conferred
by law that has been violated and which can be
vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an
adversarial proceeding.
ii. The issue in the case at bar is the determination of the
sovereign decision of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose
of this determination is more to protect the sovereignty of
the people and less to vindicate the private interest of any
individual.
1. Such a determination does not contemplate the
clash of private rights of individuals and hence
cannot come under the traditional jurisdiction of
courts.
2. A plebiscite involves the expression of the public will on a public issue which
is a subject that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts are
established essentially to resolve controversies between private persons.
3. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results can
lead to jumbled justice.
a. Consider for instance where the plebiscite is national as it deals
with the ratification of a proposed amendment to our
Constitution. Snap thinking will tell us that it should be the
COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over a petition to annul its
results. If jurisdiction is given to the regular courts, the result will
not enhance the orderly administration of justice. Any regional trial
court from every nook and corner of the country will have
jurisdiction over a petition questioning the results of a nationwide
plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these courts is
limited only within their respective judicial regions, the difficulties
that will attend their exercise of jurisdiction would be many if not
unmanageable.
4. Our Constitution and related laws will reveal that only contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials are subject to the
exercise of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial power of our
administrative agencies.
5. However, the intent of our Constitution and election laws to
subject only contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of elected officials from the barangay to the President of the Philippines to
the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative
tribunals.
6. Contests which do not involve the election, returns and qualifications of
elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of the judicial or quasi-
judicial powers of courts or administrative agencies.
a. Controversies concerning the conduct plebiscite appertain to this
category. This is a matter that involves the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite.
b. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1),
Article IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the power "to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x."
7. The Court agrees with the following submissions of the Solicitor General:
a. The test and intent of the constitutional grant of powers to the
COMELEC is to give it all the necessary and incidental powers for
it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest and peaceful and
credible elections.
b. Hence, the all encompassing power endowed the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall) includes the power to cancel proclamations.
c. The COMELEC also has the power to supervise and control the
proceedings of the board of canvassers, suspend and/or annul illegal
and void proclamations, declare a failure of elections and
promulgate rules and regulations concerning the conduct of
elections.
d. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit that the COMELEC has
the power to "enforce administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall."
i. To enforce – to cause to take effect or to cause the
performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into
actual effect or operation, a plan or measure.
ii. the power of the COMELEC is not limited to the mere
administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. It
is also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the
conduct of the plebiscite.
iii. Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to
correct or check what the Board of Canvassers erroneously
or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or
ascertain the true results of the plebiscite either through a
pre-proclamation case or through revision of ballots.
iv. To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain
the true results of the plebiscite through revision of
ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally
mandated power to "enforce" laws relative to the
conduct of plebiscite.
8. From our earliest Constitution and election laws, the conduct of plebiscite
and determination of its result have always been the business of the
COMELEC and not the regular courts.
 a. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the
power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable
expertise in the field of election and related laws.
b. COMELEC should be given enough latitude in the exercise of its
expertise, for to straightjacket its discretion in the enforcement and
administration of laws relating to the conduct of election, plebiscite
or referendum may render it impotent.
9. Justice, Carpio Morales; dissenting: Neither the Constitution nor any law
confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to order the revision and recount
of ballots in plebiscites or any contests arising from plebiscite results, it is the
judicial branch that can take cognizance thereof. Moreover The case at bar
does not simply involve "the determination of whether the electorate of
Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality of
Taguig into a highly urbanized city" as seen by the majority. For petitioners
are alleging that there have been fraud, anomalies and irregularities in the
balloting and counting. Whether there was fraud or there were anomalies or
irregularities is a legal question which is determinable by a judicial or quasi-
judicial body calling for the exercise of judicial power or quasi-judicial power
as the case may be.
10. Justice, Carpio: The COMELEC can exercise its quasi-judicial jurisdiction
only if there is an election contest involving an elective official. A plebiscite
on whether a municipality should become a city does not involve the election
into public office of any official. Such a plebiscite does not involve any
election contest as no one is running for any public office. Thus, the
COMELEC has no quasi-judicial jurisdiction over any dispute involving the
results of such plebiscite. |||
031 Municipality of Nueva Era v. Municipality of Marcos (Coscolluela)
February 27, 2008 | Reyes, J. | Local Government
PETITIONER: Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte, represented by its
Municipal Mayor, Caroline Arzadon-Garvida
RESPONDENTS: Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, represented by its
Municipal Mayor, Salvador Pillos, and CA
SUMMARY: Municipality of Marcos was created by virtue of RA 3735. A
paragraph in the law states that the east boundary of Marco was Mt. Province –
now province of Apayao. Marcos contends that since Nueva Era was in between
said boundary and Marcos, it should extend its territory to the middle portion of
Nueva Era and its isolated northern part because the LGC requires a compact and
contiguous territory. Nueva Era argues otherwise, using expressio unius est
exclusion alterius. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled in favor of Nueva Era.
On appeal the RTC affirmed the SP. However, the CA reversed the decision. The
issue is WoN the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion
of Nueva Era. The SC held NO. Only the barrios of Dingras from which Marcos
obtained its territory are named in RA 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras
are enumerated, Nueva Era’s territory is excluded. Had the legislature intended to
include other barangays from Nueva Era, it could have easily done so by clear and
concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The omission
must be held to have been done intentionally.
DOCTRINE: Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos
under the law is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in the light of the
legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application. We this uphold the legislative intent to created Marcos
out of the territory of Dingras only. In construing a statute, the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statue should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose.
FACTS:
1. Nueve Era was created from various settlements which were organized as
rancherias controlled by a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison,
united the rancherias by virtue of a resolution passed by the provincial
government of Ilocos Norte. Thus, the township of Nueva Era was created.
2. Marcos on the other hand was created by virtue of RA 3735. From the said
law, Marcos was to be composed of several barangays from the Municipality
of Dingras but it did not include any barangays of Nueva Era. So, based from
the law alone, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of
territory of Marcos.
3. However, a separate paragraph in the which describes Marcos’ boundaries
states that “on East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.” This part is
now the province of Apayao; meaning it’s the Ilocos-Norte-Apayao
boundary.
4. Based on this paragraph, marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva
Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. This is because
Nueva Era was between marcos and Ilocos Norte-Apayao.
5. However, it is only after 30 years that Marcos claims this part of Nueva Era’s
territory. It submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte.
6. Nueva Era argues that since time immemorial its entire land was an ancestral
domain of the “tinguians”. Since the lnd must be protected, it must be
preserved as part of Nueva Era. It also argued that Marcos’ territory should
not go beyond the 7 barrious specifically provided by law creating Marcos
7. The SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era by applying the rule of
expressio unius est exclusion alterius. It also reasoned that if it was to be
bounded by Mt. Province, it would also encroach upon Abra.
8. On appeal the RTC affirmed the SP. Marcos appealed to the CA again. It
argues that:
a. It is entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the
description in the law and that it was also entitled to the northern
portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era
in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion. It said
that the northern portion must be included because the local
government code required that a municipality must hve a compact
and contiguous territory.
9. The CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of
Nueva Era – NO, because the law specifically enumerates the barangays that
shall compose Marcos and the spirit of the law must be prevail in the
interpretation of the ambiguous provision of the law.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos
Norte is Reinstated.
RATIO:
1. The Supreme Court agrees with Nueva Era. However, the reason is not the
lack of the required plebiscite under the constitution and the local government
code.
2. Only the barrios of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are
named in RA 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated,
Nueva Era’s territory is excluded.
3. Had the legislature intended to include other barangays from Nueva Era, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or
construction be extended to other matters. The omission must be held to have
been done intentionally.
4. Furthermore, this conclusion is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill
which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note
mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
5. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos
under the law is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in the light of
the legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation,
to preclude absurdity in its application. We this uphold the legislative
intent to created Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
6. In construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statue should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.
 TOBIAS V. ABALOS (CASTRO) 12. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.
December 8, 1994 | Bidin, J. | Local Government Nevertheless, 18,621 vited yes and 7911 voted no. by virtue of these results
the law was deemed ratified
13. Petitioners now assign various issues as to the constitutionality of RA 7675
PETITIONER: Robert Tobias, Ramon Guzman, Terry Lim, Gregorio Gabriel and
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Roberto Tobias, Jr.
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
RESPONDENTS: Hon. City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, City Treasurer William
1. It violates the one subject-one rule
Marcelino, and the Sangguniang Panglungsod, all of the City of Mandaluyong,
2. That the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong increases the
Metro Manila
number of the house of representatives
3. Not pursuant to the census that the subject municipalities have
SUMMARY: This case talks about the constitutionality of RA 7675 or also nown
attained the minimum population
as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
14. Hence this petition
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.". Then incumbent Cong. Zamora
sponsored the bill which was then signed into law. Pursuant to the LGC a
ISSUE/s:
plebiscite was conducted, afterwhich the said law was ratified. Petitioners are now
2. WoN RA 7675 violates the “one-subject-one-title-bill” – No, it does not
assailing the constitutionality of the law before the SC. Issues are: 1. WoN RA
violate the said rule aside from a liberal interpretation the said title
7675 violates the “one-subject-one-title-bill” – No, it does not violate the said rule
3. WoN the said law violate the constitution for it increases the number of the
aside from a liberal interpretation the said title, 2. WoN the said law violate the
members of the house of representatives– No, because the 250 rule of the
constitution for it increases the number of the members of the house of
constitution is not absolute as qualified by the provision “unless provided
representatives– No, because the 250 rule of the constitution is not absolute as
by law”
qualified by the provision “unless provided by law”, 3. WoN the law violated the
4. WoN the law violated the census requirements – No, there is a presumption
census requirements – No, there is a presumption of constitutionality and
of constitutionality and regularity as to such
regularity as to such. SC upheld the constitutionality of the said law and mainly
anchored on the fact that the law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and
RULING: Petition dismissed. Constitutionality of the law was upheld
the petitioners failed to discharge their burden to overcome said presumption.
RATIO:
Other issues as to preemption of Congress’ right to reapportion, gerrymandering,
IT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE TITLE, ONE SUBJECT RULE
and irregularities in the plebiscite were also debunked by the Supreme Court.
1. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
DOCTRINE:
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into
The law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and its enactment the
a highly urbanized
presumption of regularity. Hence, the petitioner has the burden of discharging the
2. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
proof of the law’s unconstitutionality.
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
3. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
FACTS: invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
9. Prior to the enactment of the law that converts the Municipality of 4. The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, the municipalities of elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged only to one legislative district. a. Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
10. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of the in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
said lone legislative district sponsored the bill which was then signed into mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
law. details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
11. Pursuant to the Local government code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion of persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
the Municipality Mandaluyng into a highly urbanized city.
 nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
operation contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the
IT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTI PROVISION AS TO THE NUMBERS plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOR The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto.
5. The court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General that the Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains Mandaluyong.
compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the 10. GERRYMANDERING: As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it
Constitution: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
6. A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1)24, shows Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished,
that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The
inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
COMPLIANT TO THE CENSUS REQUIREMENT
7. Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the
effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts,
the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws
emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws
OTHER ISSUES
8. PREEMPTION OF RIGHT: As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook
the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
9. PLEBISCITE PARTICIPATION: Petitioners contend that the people of
San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.

24
Sec. 5(1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
 033 Samson v. Aguirre (Castillo, I)
September 22, 1999 | Quisumbing, J. | Failure to state the seat of government in the
charter is not fatal
PETITIONER: Moises S. Samson
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Alexander Aguirre, in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, COMELEC and the Department of Budget
SUMMARY: RA No 8535 created the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of
Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first
district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8535. Petitioner bases his petition on the facts that RA No.
8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the LGC particularly,
Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and
land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon
City, respectively. Issue related to our topic is WoN RA No. 8535 is
unconstitutional for not providing for a seat of government. The Court ruled in
the negative stating that such omission is not fatal. The Court agrees with the
respondents that under Section 12 of the LGC, which applies to the proposed City
of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of Novaliches
can still establish a seat of government after its creation.
DOCTRINE: The omission of the charter to provide for the seat of government
is not fatal. Under Section 12 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the city
can still establish a seat of government after its creation.
FACTS:
1. On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic
Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon
City.
2. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of
Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8535.
3. Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the
implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for
the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of Budget and
Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
through a motion we duly noted.
4. Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:
a. R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the
Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a),
as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of
government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City,
respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article
11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council
of barangay resolution; and
b. The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.
5. Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area
were not presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to the
passage of R.A. No. 8535.
6. This, he argues, is clear from the minutes of the public hearings conducted
by the Senate Committee on Local Government on the proposed charter of
the City of Novaliches. Petitioner particularly cites its hearings held on
October 3 and 27, 1997. He is silent, however, on the hearings held by the
appropriate Committee in the House of Representatives.
7. Likewise, petitioner points out that there is no certification attesting to the
fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be
adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of
income, population, and land area.
8. In their Comment, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General,
traversed all the allegations of petitioner. They claimed he failed to
substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. In their memorandum,
respondents argued that petitioner had the burden of proof to overcome the
legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under
the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535.
9. Further, respondents stated that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent
document supporting petitioner’s claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional.
Respondents pray that the present petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. WoN RA No. 8535 is unconstitutional for not providing for a seat of
government – NO, because this omission is not fatal to the validity of RA No.
8535
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, we had occasion to stress
that: “All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one
who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which suports
the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible
bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.”
2. Local Government Code of 1991, SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion.—
As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of
 viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
a. Income.—It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and
special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as
expected of the local government unit concerned;
b. Population.—It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned; and
c. Land Area.—It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
3. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the
Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
4. Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide: ART.
11. Cities.—(a) Requisites for creation—A city shall not be created unless
the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
a. Income—an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by
DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
b. Population or land area—Population which shall not be less than
one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least
one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
c. The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation
to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
25
SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices, and Facilities.—(a) The law or
ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the seat of government from where
governmental and corporate service shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to geographical
centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation,
development and economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into account.
26
SECTION 12. Government Centers.—Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish a
government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the National Government, local government
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.”
5. Petitioner argues that no certifications attesting compliance with the
foregoing requirements were submitted to Congress, citing in particular
public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government.
6. However, we note that the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535
originated in the House of Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong.
Dante Liban of Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only
allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee on
Local Government, as is the usual practice in this regard.
7. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays
that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310.
This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules.
8. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under
the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with
requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other than the
income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of
inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to
income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now
highly urbanized.
9. (TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS) Petitioner then argues that R.A. No.
8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of
Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local Government Code 25
10. Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide
for a seat of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal
to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it to be.
11. We agree with respondents that under Section 12 of the Local Government
Code26, which applies to the proposed City of Novaliches by virtue of Section
54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of
government after its creation.
12. While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can very
well also be the seat of government, “from where governmental and corporate
service shall be delivered.
13. With regard to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation of
the City of Novaliches, petitioner again failed to present any concrete
evidence on this point. Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present
during the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local Government, and
made no mention of anything concerning such adverse effects.
14. The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a
prohibited amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner’s
contention. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions
units, or government-owned or-controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating
such a center, the local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national
and local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section.
The National Government, local government unit or government-owned or-controlled corporation
concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government
center.
 the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts
in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be
composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner.
15. Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present
clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality
being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the Court
with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he
seeks.
 034 ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA (Callueng)
January 31, 1996 | Hermosisima, J. | Local Governments
PETITIONER: Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr., Mr.
Nicasio B. Bautista, Mr. Jesus P. Gonzaga, Mr. Solomon D. Maylem, Leonora C.
Medina, Casiano S. Alipon
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., In His Capacity As Executive
Secretary, Hon. Rafael Alunan, In His Capacity As Secretary Of Local
Government, Hon. Salvador Enriquez, In His Capacity As Secretary Of Budget,
The Commission On Audit, Hon. Jose Miranda, In His Capacity As Municipal
Mayor Of Santiago And Hon. Charito Manubay, Hon. Victorino Miranda, Jr.,
Hon. Artemio Alvarez, Hon. Danilo Vergara, Hon. Peter De Jesus, Hon. Nelia
Natividad, Hon. Celso Caleon And Hon. Abel Musngi, In Their Capacity As
Sangguniang Bayan Members, Mr. Rodrigo L. Santos, In His Capacity As
Municipal Treasurer, And Atty. Alfredo S. Dirige, In His Capacity As Municipal
Administrator
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled,
“An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” mainly because the Act
allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners claim
that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual
income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
order to be converted into a component city., HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to
be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives with
Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Meanwhile, a counterpart of
HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, “An Act Converting the Municipality
of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City
of Santiago,” was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto
III, as principal sponsor. On February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the
said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the
recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be
included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for
purposes of its conversion into an independent component city. (2) Whether or
not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives. SC held that (1) YES. Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) form
part of the income of Local Government Units. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government
unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the
source of much needed funds. Department of Finance Order No. 3593 correctly
encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL
INCOME to be “revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and
municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the
internal revenue allotment and other shares. (2) YES. Although a bill of local
application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic
Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is
untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. HB No. 8817
was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB
No. 8817. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that
a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
DOCTRINE: Income under the 1991 LGC pertains to all funds of the LGU
including the Internal Revenue Allotment 

The IRA of LGUs: (1) forms part of the income of local government units; (2)
forms part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government units; (3)
regularly and automatically accrues to the local treasury without need of further
action on the part of the LGU; (4) is a regular and recurring item of income; (5)
accrues to the general fund of the LGUs; (6) is used to finance local operations
subject to modes provided by the 1991 LGC and its implementing rules; and (7)
is included in the computation of the average annual income for purposes of
conversion of LGUs
FACTS:
1. In this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of
Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the
City of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum
average annual income (only P13,109,560.47) required under Section 450 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a
component city.
 3. HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was
filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as
principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor,
Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy.
4. On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993,
public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on
Local Government.
5. On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on December 17, 1993.
6. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed
in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal
sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives
had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
7. On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said
committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the
recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No.
1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated
his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on
Local Government.
8. On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994.
On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of
the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
9. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed
by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a
plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion
of Santiago into a city.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of
its conversion into an independent component city. YES, because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
2. WoN considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB
No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House
of Representatives. YES, because HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. HB No.
8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to
the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
its public hearing on HB No. 8817.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with
costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
First issue
1. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must,
among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.
2. Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges
on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal
revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local
government unit and the principles of local autonomy and
decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified
empowerment of the local government system.
3. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly
centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and
discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
4. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government
system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its
broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit
must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and
accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a
provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and
effectively carry out its functions.
5. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local
government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of
revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such
share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the
right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
6. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly
and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
 constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading
as the source of much needed funds. on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a
7. For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate
Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243.
average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the
Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
income. anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
8. Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in
the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring until it receives the House bill.
income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there
a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have
a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local
Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-
controlled corporations.
9. Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 3593 correctly encapsulizes the full
import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities
from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal
revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and
291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other
national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets,
and similar others.

SECOND ISSUE:

1. Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by

constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the
same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817
was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993.
The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus pre-cursive not only of the said Act in
question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic
Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution
is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
2. Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate
when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public
 035 Latasa v. COMELEC (Buenaventura)
Dec 10, 2003 | Azcuna, J. | Creation of LGUs
PETITIONER: Arsenio A. Latasa
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections and Romeo Sunga
SUMMARY: Latasa has been the mayor of the Municipality of Digos for 3
consecutive terms. The municipality was declared a City and he ran again as mayor
of the City of Digos. The COMELEC cancelled his certificate of candidacy saying
it violates the three-term rule in the constitution. He then filed an MR, while the
MR was being processed, Latasa won the elections. Latasa claims that there is a
difference between the municipality and the city and he is not in violation of the
three term rule. The issue is WoN he can still run as Mayor of the City. The SC held
that substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one,
there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor, thus Latasa cannot be
elected as mayor.
DOCTRINE: When a municipality is converted to a city, the latter acquires a
distinct legal personality from the former. There is material change in the
political and economic rights of the two LGs
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared
a component city, to be known as the City of Digos.
2. A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798
entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos or the
Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioners
tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53,
Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over
capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the
city mayor.
3. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running
for the first time for the position of city mayor.
4. private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the
said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course,
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against
petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged that Latasa falsely represented
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor
of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three
consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
5. Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that this will be the first time that he will be
running for the post of city mayor.
6. COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution, saying that Latasa’s
certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three
(3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.
7. Latasa filed an MR but it was not acted upon by the COMELEC
8. Despite this petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001,
having garnered the most number of votes. Sunga sought the annulment of
petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects.
9. On July 1, 2001, Latasa was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly
elected mayor of Digos City.
10. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Latasa now file
a petition for certiorari in the SC
ISSUE:
1. WoN Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. -No, even if there
is a difference between the municipality and the city, the constituents
remained the same.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely
to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice
of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
 interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
2. An elective local official is not barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government
post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
3. In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have
separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single
entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific
provisions of the Local Government Code. Thus when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same
local government post.
4. Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For
one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and
undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this
reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
5. On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
6. Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be
converted into a component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The territorial
jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of
the Municipality of Digos.
7. Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
8. Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and
functions until such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected
officials shall have already qualified and assumed their offices.
9. As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the
delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality
of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city officials.
10. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct
from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the
same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters
who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
11. This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
12. Finally, respondent Sunga claims that he should be deemed the mayoralty
candidate with the highest number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held
that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle
the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner
of the elections.
13. This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of
the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a
candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared
elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidates election
a nullity.
14. In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent
Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa. The second
placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that particular election. In
any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created
which should be filled by succession.