06/03/2018 Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer — A Summary – Clueless Political Scientist

Clueless Political Scientist

by a clueless student for other clueless students

Famine, A uence, and Morality by Peter Singer —

A Summary

Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, A uence, and Morality.” Philosophy & Public A airs
1 (3). Wiley: 229–43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052.

Assumption: Su ering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care
are bad.

[If you disagree with that assumption, stop reading.]

Principle: “[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,

without thereby sacri cing anything of comparable moral importance, we
ought, morally, to do it.”

Principle in operation: “[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child
drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting
my clothes muddy, but this is insigni cant, while the death of the child would
presumably be a very bad thing.”

1st Objection to P: What if the bad is very far from us?

Reply: That a person is physically near to us “may make it more likely that we
shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than
another who happens to be far away.” Perhaps, it can be contended that we will
know better how to or if we should help a person if he near to us. However, in
the globalised village of instant communication and swi transportation,
discrimination on geographical grounds is untenable.

2nd O to P: If I am the only one who can do anything to alleviate the situation,
the attachment of moral obligation appears justi ed. But what if I am just one
among millions who can?

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06/03/2018 Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer — A Summary – Clueless Political Scientist

Reply: The view that numbers lessen obligation is simply an “ideal excuse for
inactivity”. Would I be less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if
there are other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the
child but are doing nothing?

2nd O amended: If everyone in my position gave 5 dollars each, the plight of

the su ering would be alleviated. Therefore, I have no obligation to give more
than 5 dollars.

R: A hypothetical premise cannot be taken to give a concrete conclusion. The

conclusion would be acceptable if indeed everyone gave 5 dollars. If not, then,
giving more will prevent more su ering and, therefore, it ought to be done.

O to previous R: But wouldn’t there be the paradox of unnecessary

contributions if everyone assumed that not all would give and therefore gave
more than 5 dollars each i.e., did what they ought to do?

R: If such contributions from were expected from everyone, one would not be
obliged to give more than 5 dollars. Also, if the contributions are not
simultaneous, those giving later would know how much more is needed and
would not be obliged to give more than that. The fact that others have given, or
may be expected to give, is a relevant circumstance. However, the
contributions by all are rarely expected and never simultaneous, therefore the
paradox will not arise.

To sum up, neither our distance, nor the number of people who are in our
position, lessens our obligation to do our bit in mitigating su ering.

What this does is to upset the moral categories that we are familiar with. It
becomes no longer a matter of “charity” — good if we do it but not wrong if we
don’t — but a matter of moral obligation, a “duty” — good if we do it and
wrong if we don’t — for us to give money to help remove su ering. To put it
more precisely, it is wrong, and not simply uncharitable, for a man living at the
level of a uence, which most people in the “developed nations” enjoy, to not
give money to save someone else from starvation.

O: This revision is too drastic. People simply do not judge in the way that is
being suggested. Moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of society. While it is
a duty to condemn violation of moral norms like murder, for example, in
order to organise a tolerable society, it is only an act of charity — i.e., it is quite
inessential in that it doesn’t ful l the needs of society — to help people from
other societies.

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06/03/2018 Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer — A Summary – Clueless Political Scientist

R: That is an explanation, but not a justi cation for the distinction between
duty and charity. And given the collapse of distances and the increasing
interconnectedness in this globalised world, this explanation is becoming less
applicable. Also, moral standards cannot be set at a certain level. While our
society may view a wealthy man who gives 5% of his income to charity as most
generous, there might be others that view that 5% as utterly inadequate. The
thinking that making what we usually consider charity a duty would bring
about a breakdown of moral behaviour is unfounded.

O: It appears to follow from the conclusion that “we ought, morally, to be

working full time to relieve great su ering of the sort that occurs as a result of
famine or other disasters.” Can this be accepted?

R: This is not so much a criticism against the argument as it is against our

prevailing moral standards. It is likely that most people would not work “full
time to relieve great su ering”. However, it does not follow that, therefore, we
ought not to work “full time to relieve great su ering”.

O: “[O]verseas aid should be a government responsibility, and that therefore

one ought not to give to privately run charities. Giving privately … allows the
government and the noncontributing members of society to escape their
responsibilities.”

R: The assumption here seems to be that if more private individuals give, the
government will abandon its responsibilities. The opposite is more likely. If
private individuals do not give, the government will assume that its citizens are
not interested in giving money for relief and will be encouraged to remain
inactive. The onus of showing how not contributing for aid will bring about
government action is on those who refuse to give.

O: But giving relief is only a temporary solution. In fact, it will exacerbate the
situation. The millions starving today will translate into more millions in
future needing aid.

R: The argument is sound and supported by evidence. But that cannot lead to
the conclusion that to provide aid is not a duty. There are lots of organisations
that work on the issue of population control. Aid can be directed to those
organisations.

O: How much do we ought to give anyway?

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06/03/2018 Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer — A Summary – Clueless Political Scientist

R: One possibility is until we reach the level of marginal utility. This

possibility, which follows from the principle established in the beginning —
that nothing of “comparable moral importance” be sacri ced — seems to be
the correct one. However, there must be a limit. And that limit, in the case of
overseas aid, may be determined by considering if giving a certain percentage
of the Gross National Product slows down the economy so much that a lower
percentage would have turned out to be in absolute terms more than the initial
amount.

“[T]aking our conclusion seriously means acting upon it. The philosopher will
not nd it any easier than anyone else to alter his attitudes and way of life to
the extent that, if I am right, is involved in doing everything that we ought to
be doing. At the very least, though, one can make a start. The philosopher who
does so will have to sacri ce some of the bene ts of the consumer society, but
he can nd compensation in the satisfaction of a way of life in which theory
and practice, if not yet in harmony, are at least coming together.”

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