G.R. No.

L-3891 December 19, 1907

ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee.

Agoncillo and Ilustre, for appellant.

Agustin Alvares, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not
marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any
portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining
thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located,
which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix.
Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of
the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in
which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him
above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the
procedure followed by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper
and from that holding the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the
petitioner, Elena Morente, appealed.

In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, as we understand
it, that the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and
that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third
thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the court below is
not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost
all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the
husband since the death of the testatrix. lawphil.net

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and
article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly
imposed upon the widow or widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to
impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is to be
observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is
provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the
second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that
if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is
nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in
the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it
anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly
provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of
the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall
pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.

We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such
consideration we can not say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married
again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition
attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we can not say that any condition can
be implied from the context of the will. In the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vano (8 Phil. Rep.,
119), we held that the legacy contained in the will therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true
that case arose under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this
case, but we think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a
testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the
will.

Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural children or legitimate
children we do not decide, for no such question is before us, the contingency mentioned in that part
of the clause not having arisen, and we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent
marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will. That
was the only question before the court below. the judgment of that court, denying the petition, is
accordingly affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978

PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and ADOLFO FORTAJADA, the

deceased Pedro Gallanosa being substituted by his legal heirs, namely his above-named
widow and his children, ISIDRO GALLANOSA and LEDY GALLANOSA, and grandchildren
named IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA and ROSARIO BRIGIDA GALLANOSA, children of the
late SIKATUNA GALLANOSA, son of Pedro D.H. GALLONOSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, Judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon
and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, CASIANO G. HITOSIS, TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, VICTORIO G.
HITOSIS, EMILIA G. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN
R. HITOSIS, FLORENTINO R. HITOSIS, VIRGINIA R. MITOSIS, DEBORAH R. HITOSIS,
EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, LEONOR R. HITOSIS, NORMA R. HITOSIS-VILLANUEVA, LEONCIO
R. HITOSIS, minors ANGEL R. HITOSIS and RODOLFO R. HITOSIS, represented by their legal
guardian and mother LOURDES RELUCIO VDA. DE HITOSIS, PETRONA HITOSIS-BALBIDO,
MODESTO HITOSIS-GACILO, CLETO HITOSIS, AGUSTIN HITOSIS-FORTES, TOMASA
HITOSIS-BANARES VDA. DE BORRAS, CONRADA HITOSIS-BANARES FRANCHE,
RESTITUTO HITOSIS-BANARES, DAMIAN HITOSIS-BANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS-BANARES,
SUSANA HITOSIS-BANARES RODRIGUEZ, JOSE HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA, minors
MILAGROS HITOSIS-BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA AND ELISA HITOSIS-BANEGA,
represented by their legal guardian and father ERNESTO BANEGA, FELICITAS HITOSIS-
PENAFLOR, GENOVEVA HITOSIS-ADRIATICO, MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO HITOSIS, LIBRATA
HITOSIS-BALMES, JUANITA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GABAS, MAURA HITOSIS-GABITO
VDA. DE GANOLA and LEONA HITOSIS-GABITO GAMBA, respondents.

Haile Frivaldo for petitioners.

Joaquin R Mitosis for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners seek to annul the orders
of respondent Judge dated May 3 trial June 17, 1968, wherein he reconsidered his order of January
10, 1968, dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.

The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis, with an
estimated value of P50,000, trial claims for damages exceeding one million pesos. The undisputed
facts are as follows:

1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was eighty years
old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he as survived by his
brother, Leon Hitosis. His other brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito), Leoncio (Aloncio) trial
Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.

2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of hearing was duly published. In that will,
Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his one-half share would be assigned to the
spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first
marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro
has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate
properties consisting of three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege
(sasacuyang ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.

3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, namely, his
surviving brother, Leon, trial his nephews trial nieces. After a hearing, wherein the oppositors did not
present any evidence in support of their opposition, Judge Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of
October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera
specifically found that the testator executed his last will "gozando de buena salud y facultades
mentales y no obrando en virtud de amenaza, fraude o influencia indebida."

4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses trial Adolfo Fortajada,
submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels of land located in various parts of
Sorsogon, large cattle trial several pieces of personal property which were distributed in accordance
with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed the obligations of the estate amounting to P7,129.27 in the
portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo Fortajada and P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of
partition was approved by Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming
the heirs' possession of their respective shares. The testator's legal heirs did not appeal from the
decree of probate trial from the order of partition trial distribution.

5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis trial the heirs of Florentino's deceased brothers trial sisters
instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for the
recovery of the said sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous possession of those lands en concepto de
dueño trial that Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 trial asserted ownership over the lands. They
prayed that they be declared the owners of the lands trial that they be restored to the possession
thereof. They also claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696).

6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of action trial on the ground of
bar by the prior judgment in the probate proceeding. Judge Anatolio C. Mañalac dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res judicatain his order of August 14, 1952 wherein he said:

It also appears that the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-interest had intervened
in the testate proceedings in Civil Case No. 3171 of this Court for- the purpose of
contesting the probate of the will of (the) late Florentino Hitosis; trial had their
opposition prospered trial the will denied of probate, the proceedings would have
been converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960 Civil Code) and the settlement of the
estate of the said deceased would have been made in accordance with the
provisions of law governing legal or intestate succession ... , in which case the said
plaintiffs, as the nearest of kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Mitosis, would have
succeeded to the ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question
forming part of his estate (art. 1003, Civil Code).

However, the derision of the Court was adverse to them, when it their opposition trial
ordered the probate of his will. From this decision (Annex K) legalizing the said will,
the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period fixed by law, despite the fact
that they were duly notified thereof, so that the said decision had become final trial it
now constitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of
a redetermination of their rights to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.

In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case special ) No. 3171, in
which the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest had intervened as parties
oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of the issue that the said
plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal rights to succeed to any of the properties of
the late Florentino Hitosis; consequently, their present claim to the ownership trial
possession of the 61 parcels of land in question is without any legal merit or basis.

7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should have set the matter at rest.
But the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the probate of the will, trial their heirs, with a persistence
befitting a more meritorious case, filed on September 21, 1967, or fifteen years after the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 696 trial twenty-eight years after the probate of the will another action in the same
court against the Gallanosa spouses trial Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of
Florentino Hitosis trial and for the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They prayed for
the appointment of a receiver.

8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud trial deceit,
caused the execution trial simulation of the document purporting to be the last will trial testament of
Florentino Hitosis. While in their 1952 complaint the game plaintiffs alleged that they were in
possession of the lands in question, in their 1967 complaint they admitted that since 1939, or from
the death of Florentino Hitosis, the defendants (now the petitioners) have been in possession of the
disputed lands (Par. XIV of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch, which
was transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial Civil Case
No. 696 were decided trial which was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233).

9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants, now the petitioners, was
dismissed by respondent Judge. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration Respondent Judge.
granted it trial set aside the order of dismissal. He denied defendants' motion for the reconsideration
of his order setting aside that dismissal order.

The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate trial the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No.
696 trial that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondents' 1967
complaint.

The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private respondents have a cause of action
the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial for the recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land
adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.

We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsideration its order of
dismissal trial in ignoring the 1939 testamentary case trial the 1952 Civil Case No. 696 which is the
same as the instant 1967 case.

A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for an ordinary lawyer to
conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967 complaint that it is baseless trial unwarranted.

What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament duly probated in 1939 by the
lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the
defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a resuscitation of
The complaint of the same parties that the same court dismissed in 1952.

It is evident from the allegations of the complaint trial from defendants' motion to dismiss that
plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription,
acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile trial the jus
gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872,
December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).

Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may
take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules
of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).

The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of the testator's estate. A
special proceeding is distinct trial different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1 trial 2, Rule 2 trial sec. 1,
Rule 72, Rules of Court).

We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of plaintiffs' 1967 complaint, is
a two-pronged defense because (1) the 1939 trial 1943 decrees of probate trial distribution in
Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 of the lower
court constitute bars by former judgment, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
 SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the

probate of a will or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or
his relationship to another, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be
prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties trial their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating of the same thing
trial under the same title trial in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually trial necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.

The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will (Sec.
625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code).

That means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he executed the will
and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him
in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a
criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition,
p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be
raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).

In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was not entertained after the
decree of probate had become final. That case is summarized as follows:

Wills; Probate; Alledged Fraudulent Will; Appeal.— V. died. His will was admitted to
probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said order. It was admitted that
due trial legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of
said order, a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared null
and void, for the reason that fraud had been practised upon the deceased in the
making of his will.

Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties who are
displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the time given
for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not an order
admitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an
appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs
can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to
 its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution trial as to
the testamentary capacity of The testator. (See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla. 99
Phil. 1069).

On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the testate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been rendered in a
proceeding in rem, is under the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon the whole world (Manalo
vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerna vs. Potot, 120 Phil.
1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil. 142).

It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to
private respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of dismissal rendered by Judge Mañalac in Civil
Case No. 696, a judgment in personam was an adjudication on the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old
Rules of Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the aforequoted section 49(b)
(Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).

The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of the
testamentary proceeding trial the proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they realized that the
final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res judicata and that there is no ground,
nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders trial judgments in those two cases.

It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that,
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed
by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object for which the courts were constituted
was to put an end to controversies." (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield and O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Peñalosa vs.
Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la Cerna vs. Potot, supra).

After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction
or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or
collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four years from the
discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246;
Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159).

To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting the theory of plaintiffs'
counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not prescribed because the rule in
article 1410 of the Civil Code, that "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of
a contract does not prescribe", applies to wills.

That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills trial testaments. The trial
court trial plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case of Dingle vs. Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410, allegedly
decided by this Court, which cited the ruling in Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, that mere lapse of time
cannot give efficacy to void contracts, a ruling elevated to the category of a codal provision in article
1410. The Dingle case was decided by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains
to verify the misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel that the Dinglecase was decided by this Court.
An elementary knowledge of civil law could have alerted the trial court to the egregious error of
plaintiffs' counsel in arguing that article 1410 applies to wills.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are reversed trial set aside trial
its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is affirmed. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Santos, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Philip M. Alo and Crispin M. Menchavez for petitioners.

Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division
(C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-
3819) and ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.

The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4):

It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca,
executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two
parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be
given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God
did not give us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and
that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the
two lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and
Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of
Cebu. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to
probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which,
after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence,
and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el
documento Exhibit A como el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Serna
con derecho por parte du su viuda superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al propio
tiempo segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los frutos de los terranos descritos en dicho
documents; y habido consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes, se decreta la distribucion
sumaria de los mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot previa
prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza en la sum de P500.00 para responder de
cualesquiera reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del finado Bernabe de la
Serna de los años desde esta fecha" (Act Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la
Serna) Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the
probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952,
being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for
failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the
hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R,
In the matter of the Probate of the Will of Gervasia Rebaca).

The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for
being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889
and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of
Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate
jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals
declared that:

... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). prohibits the making
of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a
third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has
continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and
testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction,
there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not
contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein
our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying,
"assuming that the joint will in question is valid."

Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.

The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his
last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of
joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old
Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have
been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the
conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for
the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates
of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finis set litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).

Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939
decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated,
overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here
they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of
their action for partition was correct.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that
the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la
Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then
still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to
the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be,
on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of
each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is
one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the
properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87
Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs
intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is
shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not
make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only
repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their
observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).

WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista, Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L.
VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA
Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933.
He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael
describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada

a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
 La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in
the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion
was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary
civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three
daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales'
petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second
degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six
children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty
in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust
and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado
a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes
que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes
proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede
the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and
her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth
degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed.,
1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro
Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and
without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was
reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in
the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel
of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in
1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-
half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo.
When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura
vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by

affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return
such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that
if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties
from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father.
Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her
daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's
estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine
of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon
his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives
within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has
been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors,
the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the
other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-
existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.
The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with
all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of
Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.

Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.

G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.

Jose B. Dealca for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos. 1798
and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and
posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two
parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation
of the order of general default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152,
known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their
improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow
and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall
be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of
the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within
the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
 So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)

The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in
the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955,
counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the
death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of
movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservistaMaria
Cano, who contended that the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated
in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to
grant the motion.

In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of
registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason
that the death of the reservistavested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the
sole reservatorio troncal.

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the
ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496,
but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as
the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants
argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of the
following facts:

(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from
a brother or sister;

(2) Said descendant dies without issue;

(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and

(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said
property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)

We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared
to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were
expressly recognized:

From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was
acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes
Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls
squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of
the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.

It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia
Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his
former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private
oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code;
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from contesting
the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the
title from the reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that
the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere
questioned.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that
the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not
true. The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property
part of the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined
no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest
to theprepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings,
since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable
property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like
appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property,
without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further
proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia
Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are
other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are
merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the
party lawfully entitled thereto.

We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against
appellants in both instances. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.

DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to
pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made
on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made,
the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants,
the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the
death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that
on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the
said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and
Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale
of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and
Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale
made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that
the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang
as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.

From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey
of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by
Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to
inherit said land.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the
properties left by Saturnino upon his death — the date of which does not clearly appear of record —
were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton,
Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of
the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in
the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single
and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter
said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the latter refused, thus
giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).

Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-
sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).

As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection
with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he
may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that
the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso
in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the
line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this
event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a
position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in
question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not
appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and
Paredes, JJ.,concur

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellees.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each
parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan —
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)

The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which
is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).

However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
 The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:

The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).

The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced
that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character
by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889,
and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14,
1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but
in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required
to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:

The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.

Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when
their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court
of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
 That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature
of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.

Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required
by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of
the chapter in which they are found."

From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:

Legal mortgage is established:

1. . . .

2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."

Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by
law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation
of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of
the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
 What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could
not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code,
and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of
that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will
enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has
no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to
that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes
this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary,
depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the
father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they
might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:

Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
 no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."

If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.

In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.

But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:

The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order
to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and
in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and
the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in
law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to
the following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent
is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided
that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without
special findings as to costs.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

DIONISIA PADURA, ET AL. , PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VERSUS MELANIA BALDOVINO, ET

AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Special
Proceedings No. 4551.

The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and with his
second, Benita Garing; he had two children named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.

Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated in Special
Proceedings No, 664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his properties
among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing.
Under the probate proceedings, Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree
No. 25960 issued In Land Registration Case No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this appeal.

Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not having
any issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita Garing. She
applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition
that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which said property came, in accordance with the applicable provision of law, under a decree of
the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case No. G. L. R. O. No. 10818.

On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children,
the appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on
October 6, 1940, Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa,
Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.

Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants and appellees took
possession of the reservable properties. In a resolution, dated August 1, 1953, of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings No. 4551, the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel
Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to
the reservable properties (the original reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having
predeceased the reservista). The instant petition, dated October 22, 1956, filed by appellants
Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that one-half of the same be adjudicated
to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition, appellees filed
their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in
their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.
Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees
(without distinction) “co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land” subject matter of the
suit.

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews
of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews
of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the
nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property under Art, 891
of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are
entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.

“Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of
the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.(949)n

“Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stripes, in
accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)”

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After
mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code
provides:

“Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (811)”

It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of Castile. The President
of the Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez, explained the motives for the
formulation of the reserva troncal in the Civil Code of 1889 in his book “El Codigo Civil en sus
relaciones con las Legislaciones Forales” (Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the following
words:

“La base cuarta, á más de estar en pugna con la legislacion española, es una desviacion del antiguo
derecho romano y del moderno derecho europeo, perfectamente conformes ambos con el tradicional
sistema de Castilla. En qué se fundó, pues, la Comision para semejante novedad? Que razones
pudieron moverla á establecer la sucesion lineal, separándose del cáuce secular?

“Lo diré en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el sentimiento de cuantos lo
imaginan ó lo ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate sucede á su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues
mayorazgos, tocando á sus hermanos un lote modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna; aquel
hijo se casa y fallece al poco tiempo dejando un tierno vástago; la viuda, todavia jóven, contrae
segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de perder al hijo del primer matrimonio heredando toda su fortuna
con exclusion de la madre y los hermanos de su primer marido. No hay para qué decir que, si hay
descendientes del segundo matrimonio, á ellos se trasmite en su dia la hereticia. Por donde resulta
el irritante espectáculo de que los vástagos directos del magnate viven en la estrechez y tal vez en la
miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas extrañas á su familia y que, por un órden
natural, la son profundamente antipáticas. Esta hipótesis se puede realizar y se realize, aunque por
lo general en menor escala, entre propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes,
sin necesidad de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.

“Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de esto, considerando el principio de

familia como superior al del afecto presumible del difunto. A esta impresion obedecia la propuesta
del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para que á los ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan sólo en usufructo: en
idéntica razon se apoyaba el Sr. Franco para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si un ascendiente
tenia hecha una donacion á su descendiente, bien fuese al contraer matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera
otro motivo, y muriese el donatario sin sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio
de la legitima que pudiera corresponderle en su calidad de ascendiente. La Comision no se atrevió a
ir tan allá como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las consecuencias que á las veces produce
el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que he puesto de relieve poco há, proclamó, no sin
vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal.” (pp.226-227)

“Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la Comision Codificadora, norabrando
una Sub-comision que redactara las bases é que habia de sujetarse esta especie de reversion de los
bienes inmuebles al tronco de donde procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en la
intestada, sin perjuicio del derecho sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la herencia de sus hijos
malogrados prematuramente.

“Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durán y Bás y Franco como defensores del régimen f
oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en representacion de la legislacion castellana,
sometieron á la deliberacion de la Comision Codificadora la proposicion siguiente:

‘El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo
lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente ó de un hermano, se halla obligado á reservar los que hubiese
adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes del difunto que se hallaran comprendidos
dentro del tercer grado y que lo sean por la parte de donde proceden los bienes.’

“No voy á discutir ahora si esta fórmula es más ó ménos feliz, y si debe aprobarse tal cual está
redactada ó si há menester de enmienda ó adicion. Aplazo este examen para cuando trate de la
sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene mayor aplicacion. Por el momento me limito á reconocer. primero:
que con esta base desaparece el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y de muertes prematuras;
segundo: que sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del derecho de Castllla, tiene en rigor en su
abono la autoridad de los Códigos más niveladores y el ejemplo de las naciones más democráticas
de Europe, si no en la extension en que lo presenta la Comision Codificadora, á lo ménos en el
principio generador de la reforma.” (pp.233-235)

The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to the specified
relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In
the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying
Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court
and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the
descendant (prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentine vs.
Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

“Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are re1atives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code
in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons
who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since
the law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x.” (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and
de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession;
so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers
and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree
and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate
collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom
the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify
otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

“creándose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino más bien
restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepción mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentals del Código
en materia de sucesión, en aquellos extremos no resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera
de la propia esfera de accián de la reserva que se crea.”

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code’s hostility to
successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserve viudal and
the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista’slifetime, the
reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose
they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is
alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is
incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is
likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not
dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil.
237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the descendant prepositus, of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp.
274, 310) Had the nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-
blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and
1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of
the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante) the heirs and
their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished
commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Román (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p.
1008) and Mucius Scaevola (Código Civil, Vol 14, p. 342). The reason given by these authors is that
the reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property because they belong to the line of
origin; and not because of their relationship. But the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the
conclusion that the property should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal
shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola, that later became
known as the theory of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.). But, as we have seen,
the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the
reservable property should be succeeded by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to
the basic rules of intestacy. The refutation of the trial court’s position is found in the following, passage
of Manresa’s Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):

“A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un derecho propio que nace de la
mera calidad de pariente; no un derecho que se adquiere por sucesión. Ciertamente, el derecho se
concede a los parientes lineales dentro del tercer grado; pero se les concede con motivo de la muerte
de un descendiente y en la sucesión de este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los bienes
después de ser éstos disfrutados por el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo lucrativo y por causa de
muerte y ministerio de la ley, lo cual es dificil poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse esos parientes
legitimarios o herederos forzosos, como el mismo autor reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo
que este argumento no es convincente.”

All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a minimum the alterations
introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and
the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large
as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Let the records be remanded to the court below for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.

So Ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia,
JJ., concur