S0975312

Reducibility of Self-interest in Plato’s Republic

Introduction

In the first book of Plato's Republic, moralists personified by Socrates, state that justice
is both necessary and sufficient for happiness (354a) and a virtue for any human being (348c-
352c). Opposed, Thrasymachus’ anti-theorist account of justice (338c-347e) holds that justice
bears no virtue at all. Going so far as to assume that all any human being ever wanted, at the
lowest level, was gratification or happiness, as much as possible. On such an assumption, justice
in conjunction with the value of voluntary restraint seems like the height of folly, nothing to
pride oneself on at all: 1

Thrasymachus' three premises can be explained as follows:

1) Justice is not only the advantage of the stronger, i.e. the ruler(s) (338C-341A)

2) Justice is obedience to laws (339b)

3) Justice is the 'advantage of another’ (343C-344C).

There seems to be a major inconsistency in Thrasymachus' reasoning. The weak might

find (1) as synonymous with (3) and consider both parties unjust. If true, these premises can
simply be reducible to the same virtue. Accordingly, what does this difference say about the
profitability of justice and injustice (343-344) for the rulers? I will support G.B. Kerferd’s
interpretation: (3) and (1) are not synonymous. Accordingly, this is true because (3) can be
reduced to (1). He bases his claim on the need for everyone to pursue their own self-interest as
just.2 Thereby, justifying the strong who make the moral rules for ‘everybody other than the
ruler’ (342C). Leo Strauss objects to the soundness of this interpretation and says that,
although consistent, Thrasymachus’ reasons are irreducible to the will of the strong. 3 He finds
society disposed by the strong’s predestinated natural right to make moral rules.

1
Cooper 6
2
Nicholson 1-2
3
Harlap 353
 Beginning with an example, the microcosm of Thrasymachus’ function argument, I will
briefly tabulate (1) and (3) relevant to self-interest. Conditionally, I will further show
Thrasymachus’ premises reducible to (1) are also consistent, enabling me to interpret the
Herdsman analogy in Plato’s Republic and what it proves about the main interest of the ruler
(343). Secondly, I will define Strauss’ objection: Thrasymachus’ premises do not need to be
reduced to (1). This is eminently plausible, if Thrasymachus believed society is predesigned to
obey laws (2). Thirdly, diagnose Thrasymachus’ problem, assuming Strauss is correct by
stressing its unsound moral peculiarities, specifically, for rulers.

Part I.

In the function argument, Socrates replies that crafts invariably, of any kind, are
supposed to produce some type of external goal. The good practitioners for each craft are
always supposed to act for the sake of that goal. For example, Socrates explains in his doctor
analogy ‘“no one in any position of rule, in so far as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is
advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subject” (340a). 4 After defining the
advantage for another, in another example, he defines the advantage of the stronger if justice
or injustice is more advantageous for the rulers who, like shepherds of a flock, are entrusted to
rule over the weak. Socrates finds good rulers, like good shepherds, do what is best for those
who have been entrusted to them, rather than seeking their own welfare (342e). If Socrates
does happen to be right about the nature of justice, than it follows that a life devoted to justice
is more to one's advantage than a life devoted to injustice for oneself.

Socrates’ doctor analogy tries to negate Thrasymachus’ notion that injustice is immoral.
However, Socrates for the most part agrees that self-interest is a key motive in the intrinsic
virtue of justice. Where Socrates objects: that it is unjust for the interest of (1) to be imposed
on (3) -- also implies that they are distinct functions. Both men agree that the strong have an
entirely different set of functions or responsibilities then those who function for another and
thus are altogether distinct categories. Through this consistency, Thrasymachus categorizes
justice for society into four summated propositions:

“Injustice for one’s own good, so for the ruler the interest of the strong

for the ruled the interest of the weak

Justice for another’s good, so for the ruler the interest of the weak

for the ruler the interest of the strong reveals the nature of
5
justice." That justice is based on self-interest. This motive, by the proof as Theodore Scaltsas

4
Kemerling, the privilege of power subsecton
5
Hourani 116, attributes to Kerferd
writes (by “X,” I mean the strong), ‘“Socrates thesis on craft be formulated as follows “X fought
for a just cause"; and that of Thrasymachus “X claimed to be fighting for a just cause." 6 The
difference between the two statements is that in the second it is possible to add, but he was
actually pursuing his own interests."’ However semantic the trivial the duplicity nature seems, I
claim that Thrasymachus’ emphasizes (3) because it is subordinated to rules of (1).

For Kerferd, justice for the ruler follows that by reducing (3) to (1), it subordinates
society for the sake of self-interest. Just like the sheepherder leading his flock, the strong must
keep power over their flock by making rules. This is where Strauss later objects. A proof, modus
pones or : if the shepherd analogy shows us that it is in the interest the
strong to rule the weak, than the strong’s self-interest gives them the right to rule over the
weak. The shepherd analogy shows this; therefore the strong can make rules to rule over the
weak. An example of the strong’s rule, Thrasymachus tells Socrates, is a society where one
would prefer to profit by committing an act of injustice against another then to suffer as the
victim of an act of injustice committed by someone else,7 "Do unto others before they do unto
you." In this case, the ruler’s interest for the weak is overridden by the virtue of justice by the
more important notion of one’s own good. This shows that (3) is clearly reducible to (1), by
subordinating its importance to the ruler’s needs: to hold power by keeping the weak in check.

Part II.

I will use a reductio ad absurdum or to explain Strauss’ objection.

To negate my premise: Thrasymachus’ inconsistency, a logical converse of (3) and (1) is

resolved by clarifying that (3) reduces to (1). I claim the reduction enables Thrasymachus’
inconsistency to be resolved leads to: the strong are obliged to oppress the weak because it is
in their self-interest. The implication, if it is in their upmost self-interest to take advantage of
the weak, then it is in their upmost self-interest to manipulate society and its laws to do so.
However, this premise implies that it also follows that (2) also reduces to (1), i.e., the strong
create rules for society in their self-interest, but do not obey the rules they create for society
because it may not be in their self-interest.

Assuming this is true, it seems like a contradiction in terms -- there are two different
sets of rules: one for the strong and another for the weak.
What follows is a seemingly ridiculous conclusion, a double standard, as Voltaire writes “there
are truths which are neither for all men, nor for all time." Thus, the intrinsic value of justice is
not the same for both parties, for “servants,” and for “kings,” then such double standards
evidently reveal the absurdity of obeying the same laws set by the strong.

6
Balaban 274, attributes to Scaltsas
7
Kemerling, the privilege of power subsecton
 So, Strauss’ solution is plausible, it avoids double standards. Society’s laws are the same
for the strong and the weak – society is predesigned or naturalistic, and becomes irreducible to
the whims of the rulers. The rulers cannot change society’s rules, and thus not even their own,
but are obliged to (2) since it is in their advantage. Rulers can simply act with obvious intentions
as the weak can as well. For example, rulers do not have to act hypocritically, i.e., rulers oppress
the weak but try to appear benevolent – a common trait. This underlying feature of this
argument presents the irreducibility of (2) gives rulers, as Strauss asserts, their unyielding
‘natural right’ to act unjustly and without logical contradiction. 8

Part III.

Despite my argument’s double standard, my counter, counter-objection will stress the

very unsound conclusion Strauss’ objection relays in terms one of specific moral dilemmas. If
Strauss’ reasoning, that natural right gears society in a way that leads the strong to keep power.
Then it follows that society cannot change, it is naturalistic. Those who justify injustice will
occur again and again power forever. For example, although Strauss was the one who coined
‘Reductio ad Hitlerum,’ I will still mention Adolf Hitler. If correct, then there is no way to stop an
evil genocidal dictator like Adolf Hitler from taking power. In fact, there will continue to be
more Adolf Hitler-like figures. Furthermore, there will be no limit in their number since the
weak have no power to fundamentally change the intrinsic value of justice for rulers in the
future.

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8
Harlap 353
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