G.R. No.
11263 November 2, 1916 in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the
facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order
dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where
they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the
plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant
and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and
induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips,
her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by
any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the
solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are
concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480,
citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16
Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract.
But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it
continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the
legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is
regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for
the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of
no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these
principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing
the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto
vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870,
13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually
assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second
paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when
he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for
just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence
to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the
whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining
in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall
cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the
duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and
support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey
and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support
his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his
wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by
article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of
December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which
article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying
the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered
wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a
preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal
was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted
by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to
receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and
inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental
authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having
been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of
thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him
toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was
obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact
of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother
to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a
nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without
prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other
 questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed
at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil.
Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code
"is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in
each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It
is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child
and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to
support had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case.
Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the
option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme
court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of
certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her
powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the
muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key
to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his
possessions and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this
civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the
revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and
disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband)
was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred
and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia
Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the
action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal,
in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses
are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be
subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family
organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which
duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as
provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted,
the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who
has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as
limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been
decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband,
cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is
culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the
product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible
with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent
therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in
conformity with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are
not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help
and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of
support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal
abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to
dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the
matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need
of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition
of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code
and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that
the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At
least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine
maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the
marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true
basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine
therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was
compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily
abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true
appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case
the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and
voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme
court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for
divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left
the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention,
that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out
of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party
abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his
company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation,
under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural
duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article
143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the
fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be
regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the
first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual
support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy
spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above
described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its
decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the
defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to
support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment
granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or
holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the
substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have
already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in
force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband
and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain
the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for
divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the
husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence
actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in
order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his
wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their
daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a
spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a
divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and
absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive
examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the
reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being
the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in
that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced.
It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting
divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife
has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently,
if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a
separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the
assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a
power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from
the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage
creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is
founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on
the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of
such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his
own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment
for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor
is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from
necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as
where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is
not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and
inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except
in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace
and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage
contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment,
heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21076 March 31, 1965
WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Platon A. Baysa for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding
petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a
non-quota immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July
12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the
Secretary of the Board. However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners,
but composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new decision reversing that
of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the
country. On August 9, 1962, petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an
opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was denied for
lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner initiated the instant petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari.
In due time, respondents filed their answer, and, after the parties had submitted a written
stipulation of facts, attaching thereto some documentary evidence, the court a
quo rendered a decision granting in, toto the relief prayed for. Thus, the court declared
valid the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 while it restrained
respondents from excluding petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed the
present appeal.
It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in
June, 1961, petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time
to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on
January 15, 1929; that they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines;
that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28,
1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that
petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the
country as a non-quota immigrant; that this decision was affirmed by the Board of
Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a
letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28, 1962 the latter found
that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in
evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship"; that said
Board further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on
January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in
1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that
in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929,
1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to
China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in
the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four
years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in
1912.1äwphï1.ñët
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration
authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929,
coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the
lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of
substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the Board of Commissioners motu
proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country
resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. Thus, said Board made the
following comment:
The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a
mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-
wife relationship. She relies on the records of Perfecto Blas in connection with
his cancellation case and the testimony of the supposed children in the previous
admission proceeding. But this claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto Blas
himself, in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry in connection
with his entry on January 23, 1947, that he was married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say,
Chingkang, China in 1936, his first visit there being in 1935; he could not
therefore have been married to herein applicant in 1929.
The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record. Indeed, not only
is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to
Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but
lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This
claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of our
new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known
that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the
peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the
Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in
China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in
Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage
contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which
it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this
contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China.
Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the
law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.
The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same
as any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In
the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be
presumed to be the same as our own. (Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30
Phil. 46).
In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it
will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. (Lim
and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472).
In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867).
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned
therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage, even
if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the petition
for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.
MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as
follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial
letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to
the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on the
last point will affect marriages consummated by not less than one hundred and fifty
thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of
the cause can be realized. We proposed to give to the subject the serious consideration
which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was
claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate
child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate
was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been
lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters,
Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the
evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the
allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese
marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With
reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia,
the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the
deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it
could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and
Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these
conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong
Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to
the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As to
the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can
best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage; and
(2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo
was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year
of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to a
young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been
present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in evidence a document in
Chinese which in translation reads as follows:
One hundred years Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers the
of life and health venerable Chiong Ing, father of the bridegroom,
for both. accepting his offer of marriage, and let this
document serve as proof of the acceptance of
said marriage which is to be celebrated during
the merry season of the flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your
and the spouses much happiness, a long life,
and prolific issue, as noble and great as that
which you brought forth. I consider the marriage
of your son Boo with my sister Lit Chia as a
mandate of God and I hope that they treat each
other with great love and mutual courtesy and
that both they and their parents be very happy.
Given during the second moon of the twenty-first
year of the reign of the Emperor Quang Su.
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his
marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong
Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime
thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910,
Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears from
documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the
son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his native hearth and
seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further
relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the
claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor noted a
strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong
Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the
limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year
1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo,
in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the
trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child
existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not
establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign
marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts
of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then
necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]), 16
Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the Supreme
Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the
estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage
and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme Courts of the
Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the Chinese marriage was
not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court to
be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life, should
not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and administration of
his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong,
and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment."
Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil.,
216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there
is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the
existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty
years and the two cases are the same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an
acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of
Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But
we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the
oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is
fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the
year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands.
There he was married to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the
book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a
marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage, the
Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one
of whom was the father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a
municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry
of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of
the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the Iman
asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was
consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the
Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five
children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora
Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful
wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when
different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo
stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written
consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is
prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend, especially
when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not
be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong
Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in
the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of
the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a
judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister
of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word
"priest," and only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination"
would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. We believe
this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one
especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through
whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being
worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a
priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all
clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a
particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441;
Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the
Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage
Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for
the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The
law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for
the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity
and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts
of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor
do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the
Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders
than to the participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in
fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as husband
and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law
which have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in
our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore
solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for
want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was
celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that
they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the
legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between
Mohammedans. To quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the
Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is
not to be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void
marriages celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which
then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing
could be clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all
embracing words found in this section:
"No marriage" — Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" —
Could any other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase?
"Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such
authority" — Could stronger language than this be invoked to announce legislative
intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission" — Could the
legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the marriage relation
against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them,
that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married" — What was the purpose
of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the marriage, if it was celebrated by any
person who thought that he had authority to perform the same, and if either of the parties
thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any word which would
restrict the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages?
By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such precise
language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the
Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would
ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order No.
68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines
has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law, and executive
proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that "The inhabitants of the
territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured
Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on every branch of the Government of
the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no form of religion and no minister of religion
shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the Islands; that, upon the
other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his
calling, and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and
absolute." The notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission,
"to bear in mind that the Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that,
therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced
the main constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the
same path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain
General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government guaranteed
"with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their
religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect their
customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881.) For
instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of
the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the
parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is deemed wise, may modify the
application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States
applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs. . . ."
(See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the
Legislative Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission;
Cacho vs. Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.) Various responsible
officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government not to interfere with the
customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make quotation of the
same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired
by the governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages of the
Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that a
marriage between two Indians entered into according to the customs and laws of the
people at a place where such customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a
valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will be left to their own
customs and that their marriages will be recognized although they use no solemnization.
The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into before a
proper official by members of that Church competent to contract marriage constitutes a
valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte and
Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs.Memoracion and Uri
[1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to
safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for
denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual
marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render
valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate
marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn, 209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N.
C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution
which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which
will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in
holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in
conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would be far
reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred
fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. We then have it
within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of
the children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim
immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled governmental
policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in
the cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United
States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these decisions to
be controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and two Justice dissented..
In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in question was a tribal marriage
of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the marriage had been performed during the
Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In neither case, in deciding as to
whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law,
was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX of General Order No. 68. We
are free to admit that, if necessary, we would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine
announced in the two cases above mentioned.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the
Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as
validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is
unnecessary to decide. In resume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and
that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and we find
the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow and
the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the law.
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a
partition of the property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings in
accordance with law. Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-1211 January 30, 1947
CHING HUAT, petitioner,
vs.
CO HEONG (alias CO HONG, CO YONG), respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Marcelino N. Sayo for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing any lawful officer to
take from respondent and produce before this Court the person of Maria Ching alias
Avelina Ching, allegedly aged 15 years, and requiring the respondent to justify his right to
the custody of said minor, and, after hearing, to award said custody to petitioner.
It is alleged in the petition, verified by petitioner's oath, among other things, that the said
minor is his legitimate daughter; that up to June 21, 1946, said minor had been living with
and had under the custody of petitioner; that respondent, taking advantage of his
confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather, persuaded and
induced her by means of trick, promises and cajolery, to leave the parental home and to
elope with him in the night of June 21, 1946, to Plaridel, Bulacan, where they were
married on the following day before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality, said
Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old; and that ever since respondent has had the
minor Maria Ching under his custody in Malolos, Bulacan, and has restrained her at her
liberty.
It is further alleged that respondent had been previously married in China to Gue Min,
said marriage being said to be subsisting at the time respondent married Maria Ching.
Petitioner further avers that Gue Min has never been declared an absentee nor generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the time he married Maria
Ching.
Respondent, in his answer, among other things, asserts that on June 21, 1946, he and
Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching were legally married before the Justice of the Peace of
Plaridel, Bulacan. He has attached to his answer a certificate (Appendix 1) of the Local
Civil Registrar of Plaridel, Bulacan, dated July 9, 1946, attesting the celebration of the
marriage above mentioned between the parties above named on June 21, 1946, and
alleges that the essential requisites for such were marriage complied with.
The question to be decided is whether petitioner still retains his right to the custody of his
minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching.
The fact of the civil marriage between respondent and Maria Ching having been
solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, on June 21, 1946, is not
disputed. Petitioner himself alleges in his petition that respondent is of legal age,
meaning 21 years or more old upon the date of the petition, November 28, 1946. June
21, 1946, date of the marriage, was only 5 months and one week earlier. Both man and
woman were, therefore, of marriageable age under section 2 of Act No. 3613.
The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not been proven. There is
no allegation in the petition, much less is there evidence, to show that the said supposed
marriage was performed in accordance with the laws were of China inforce at the time of
its supposed performance, nor even what those laws were (Act No. 3613, section 19).
The cited section of the existing Marriage Law provides:
SEC. 19. Marriages performed abroad. — All marriages performed outside of
the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in these
Islands.
This provision is substantially the same as that contained upon the same subject in the
former Philippine Marriage Law, General Orders No. 68, which is as follows:
SEC. IV. All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid
by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
Islands.
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43, 49), this Court held, after
quoting the aforesaid provision of the former Marriage Law:
. . . To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is
first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the same case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court said (p. 50):
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China
in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the
Encarnacion case (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil., 137; 228 U.S., 335),
there is lacking proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. . . .
Again in that case the United States Supreme Court (228 U.S., 335, 338-339) held:
In these circumstances every presumption was in favor of the validity and good
faith of the Philippine marriage, and sound reason required that it be not
impugned and discredited through the alleged prior marriage save upon proof
so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the
existence of that impediment. . . .
On the other hand, the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria Ching
before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, is undisputed. It is also beyond
question that marriage was contracted by a man much over 16 years old with a girl 15
years old (Act No. 3613, section 2), neither of whom was included in any of the
exceptions mentioned in section 28 of the same Act; nor in those stated in section 29
thereof for the reason that the alleged prior Chinese marriage has not been established.
If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven, then in order that
the subsequent Philippine marriage could be valid, it would have been necessary either
(a) that the Chinese marriage should have been previously annulled or dissolved: or (b)
that the first wife of respondent should have been absent for 7 consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the respondent having news of the absentee being
alive; or (c) that the absentee should have been generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by respondent at the time of contracting the subsequent marriage, in
either of which last two cases the subsequent marriage will be valid until declared null
and void by a competent court, while in the first it will be valid without this limitation. (Act
No. 3613, section 29 [a] and [b]; section 30 [b].) But as already adverted to, the complete
absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes sections 29 and 30 of
the Marriage Law inapplicable.
Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she became emancipated on
that same date (arts. 314 [1] and 315, Civil Code). This emancipation brought about the
loss by the father of the parental authority that he claims. On the other hand, by article 48
of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870, whose articles 44 to 78 were, and are
now partly, in force in the Philippines (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil., 34), the wife
has the duty, among others, of living in her husband's company and of following him to
wherever he transfer his domicile or residence. (Yañez de Barbuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil.,
606, 612.)
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion that the petition should be, as it is
hereby, dismissed, with costs to petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, Hontiveros and Tuason,
JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in this decision.
G.R. No. L-42581 October 2, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MORA
DUMPO, Defendant-Appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and
practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged
that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived
together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of
bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one day of prision mayor and minimum of
two years, four months and twenty one days of prision correccional, with costs. From this
judgment the accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has
been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection
nor evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and
void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his
consent thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the validity of
a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact of which no
judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular case. In the
case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari, an Iman or Mohammedan
priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans, to the effect that the
consent of the bride's father or. in the absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to
which she belongs in an indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the
absence of this requisite did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans
void, it was easy for the prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony
inasmuch as for lack of one there were two other Imans among the State witnesses in
this case. It failed to do so, however, and from such failure we infer that the Iman's
testimony for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that, granting the
absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit compliance therewith may be
presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to
this alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration. But this presumption
should not be established over the categorical affirmation of Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's
father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's alleged second marriage for the
reason that he was not informed thereof and that, at all events, he would not have given
it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was not
dissolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to first been contracted by the accused
with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be
considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the charges
and if she should be in detention her immediate release is ordered, with the costs of both
instances de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21017 February 25, 1924
In re estate of JOSE YAP SIONG, deceased.
MARIA LAO and JOSE LAO, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
DEE TIM, YAP KIM TING, YAP KIM SENG, and YAP HU CHO, respondents-appellants.
Salvador Barrios and Gabino S. Abaya for appellants.
Felix B. Bautista and Jose Gutierrez David for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in the
municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a
considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was
appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and
distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each
claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner
Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to
him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1)
and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore
entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.
Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she
and Yap Siong were joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in
accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting,
Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.
In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a great
deal of proof was presented. Exhibits 1 and 1-A, certificates of marriage, were presented
to show that she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number of other documents
(Exhibits 9 to 13) were presented to show that Yap Siong had admitted that he was a
married man. Exhibits 14 to 17 were presented for the purpose of proving that Yap Siong
had admitted in a public document that Maria Lao was his wife.
The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof to show that she was the
legitimate wife of Yap Siong, lawfully joined to him in holy wedlock in China on the 14th
day of September, 1893. To support that contention she presented what she contended
was a certificate of marriage, marked Exhibit A — Exhibit A-1. She contended that
Exhibit A was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and
practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she
presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of 52 years of age, swore that
he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China, and that Exhibit A was the
ordinary and customary document issued to prove that the ceremony of marriage had
taken place. He described in detail the ceremony of marriage performed in accordance
with the customs and practice in China.
Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age and a
lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the
forms of marriage ceremony. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the
customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the
manner and form in which they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the
purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. He further testified
that Exhibit A was the usual proof or certificate issued for the purpose of proving that a
marriage ceremony had taken place. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual and
ordinary proof, or certificate, if it may be called a certificate, issued to show that a
marriage ceremony had been performed between the persons mentioned therein. Mr. Ty
Cong Ting was, at the time he declared as a witness, the legal attorney of the Chinese
Consul General in the City of Manila.
The respondent Dee Tim presented several witnesses who confirmed her contention that
she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong and that her three children Yap Kim Ting, Yap
Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children, born of her marriage with Yap
Siong. To further sustain her contention she presented Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and
J, documents in which Yap Siong had expressly recognized his marriage to her.
To overcome the proof adduced by Dee Tim in support of her marriage to Yap Siong, the
petitioner presented Exhibits 2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8. Said exhibits are alleged letters
supposed to have been written by an uncle in China of Yap Siong during the years 1900
to 1906, urging him to return to China for the purpose of marrying, thus attempting to
establish the fact that Yap Siong during that period was not a married man. When we first
studied the record in this case we were inclined to give said letters great credit, but upon
a further examination of the record and a further argument by the respective parties, we
are now inclined to believe that said letters were fabricated for the very purpose of
defeating the contention of Dee Tim. They were not identified properly by persons who
had reason to know that they were genuine in character and were actually prepared in
China and sent to Yap Siong in the Philippine Islands. We are of the opinion, and we
believe that was the real opinion of the trial court, that said exhibits should not be
admitted as proof to sustain the fact for which they were presented. We are now
persuaded that said letters are pure fabrications.
The petitioner further presents two or three witnesses for the purpose of showing that the
marriage between Dee Tim and Yap Siong never took place for the reason that Yap
Siong was in the Philippine Islands on the 14th day of September, 1893, and that at that
time he was living in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province of Pampanga, and that
he never left that municipality. A careful reading of their testimony, however, does not
convince us that it is altogether reliable. The testimony which they gave was given in the
month of January, 1923, and they testified positively as to exact dates, times, and places
in the year 1897. Their testimony contains no facts, or data, or peculiar circumstances or
conditions which caused them to remember the particular facts concerning which they
testified. They gave no reason why they were able to remember the exact whereabouts
of Yap Siong during the period to which their testimony referred. Upon the contrary there
is much proof in the record that Yap Siong returned to China a number of times after his
first arrival here. The petitioner further presents some proof to show that Yap Siong had
admitted on several occasions that Dee Tim was his querida and not his wife.
The respondents further attempted to show that Maria Lao and Jose Lao, her son, were
not the legitimate wife and son of Yap Siong, by presenting Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit L is
the baptismal certificate issued by the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles, in
which it is made to appear that on the 5th day of January, 1904, he baptized a child
named Jose Martin, a natural son of Maria Lao, and whose father was unknown. Exhibit
LL is a certificate of birth issued by the secretary of the municipality of Angeles, in which
it appears that Jose Martin Lao, a child, was born on the first day of January, 1904, a
natural son of Maria Lao. There is nothing, however, in Exhibits L or LL, which shows
that Maria Lao was responsible for the facts which they contain. Exhibit LL contains the
statement that the facts therein were not obtained from Maria Lao but from one Isabelo
Lao.
There is a notable conflict between Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit LL certifies that Jose Martin
Lao was born on the first day of January, 1904, while Exhibit L certifies that the baptism
took place on the 5th day of January, 1904, and that the child was then 34 days old. It is
apparent therefore that the facts stated in one or the other of said exhibits are untrue.
And, moreover, when we consider the customs of the Filipino people in their relation with
the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, it is easily understood, in view of the alleged
fact that Maria Lao and Yap Siong had been joined in holy matrimony under the forms of
the Protestant Church, why the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles stated in his
certificate that the father of the child, then Jose Martin, was unknown.
The respondents further attempted to show that Yap Siong and Maria Lao had never
been joined legally in holy wedlock, by the testimony of a number of witnesses to the fact
that Yap Siong had on numerous occassions asserted that Maria Lao was
his querida only. It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions, depending
upon his interest and convenience at the particular time, state that Maria Lao was
his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for the same reason, that he stated
that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the
information, that he was quite able to do, until he had passed to that bourn from which
none returns, and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs
became necessary.
From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the record,
we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence shows the
following:
(1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance
with the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that
Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children
born of that wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the
fact that Yap Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born
of that wedlock; and that they had no reason to believe, until after the death of
Yap Siong, that he was legally married to the petitioner herein.
(2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June,
1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man,
without any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose
Lao is the legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao.
In other words, we are fully convinced that a preponderance of the evidence shows that
both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing
that each was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his
double marriage. They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence
of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been
successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to
the other.
Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between the
two families? Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4), where two women
innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their
children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to
one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of
the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who
innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The
good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved.
(Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65
U.S., 553.)
A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as single and who marries
him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish Law, are
entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none
of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the
continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties
to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. To
remedy that hardship under the common law and following the wise jurisprudence of
Spain, both England and many of the states of the United States adopted statutes.
(Glass vs. Glass, 114 Mass., 563; Spicer vs. Spicer, 16 Abbot's Practice [N. S.], 114;
Dyer vs. Brannock, 66 Mo., 391; Graham vs. Bennet, 2 Cal., 503; Smith vs. Smith, 1
Tex., 621 [46 Am. Dec., 121]; Clendenning vs.Clendenning, 7 Martin [La.], 587;
Patton vs. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann., 98; Abston vs.Abston, 15
La. Ann., 137; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 38 U.S.,
404; Estate of Navarro, 24 La. Ann., 298; In re Taylor, 39 La. Ann., 823.)
The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the decision of this court in the case of
Sy Joc Lieng vs.Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of Adong vs. Cheong
Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the reason that in each of said cases a preponderance of the
evidence showed that no legal marriage had been performed in China, that is, that the
alleged Chines wife and the deceased in each of those cases had never been legally
married.
Therefore the conclusion reached in the decision heretofore announced by this court in
the present case is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
judgment of the lower court be revoked and that the estate of Yap Siong be divided
equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao, and the other one-half to
Dee Tim and her three children. And without any finding as to costs, it so ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case
No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In
said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d)
they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate
of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January
19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased
with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing
and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp.
12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27;
Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp.
65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo
Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp.
105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as
follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun
Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with
his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of
the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been
proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of
China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7,
1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit
"G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and
accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the
deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as
judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp.
11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled
"Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of
Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The
Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration.
Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court
in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give
due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT
HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-
BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY
KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese
law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the
following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931
in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage certificate
because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the
betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the
one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of
her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be
married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that
 the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with
Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook
Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been
living in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several
occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a
written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride
and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in
China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of
the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be,
and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding,
which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19,
1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch
(sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of
the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the document
would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is
known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is
signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents
of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that
the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be
brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride
would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of
the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her
wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were
many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the
carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought
her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the
eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as
to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for
46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if
that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession
of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts
of that document because of the lapse of many years and because
they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites;
that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat
went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year
they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then
came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and
lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with
Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that
no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the
parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court
to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and,
(b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to
Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give
name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of
marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married,
state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the
Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese
were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit
"5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance
with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition
for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil
Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not
one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section
25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
 any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of
a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal,
61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law
and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent
to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound
to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this
Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually
exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to
be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was
left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with
Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial
notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have
not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of
a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there
was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil
Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p.
51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are
entered: "Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and,
"Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five
children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-
11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation
to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's
application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated
that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has
three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she
knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children
but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are
acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook
Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters
of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and
approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for
their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband
and wife and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise
decided to definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they
begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel
Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955;
Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo
Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS
SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture
and equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal
shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall
own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion
Gillego who shall transfer the same to their children,
namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and
Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be
retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his
obligation to give to the aforenamed children an
amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 )
monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the
same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the
real estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of
Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the
 said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to
their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo
Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ...
[Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a
child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao
Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled
"An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal
separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven,
chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished.
Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See
Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12,
1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of
jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act
No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall
be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be
ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal
provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the
same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63]
but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380
Petitioner,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her
to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated
May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child
by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5]Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. [6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39
of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant
case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those
whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered
to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
 Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to
its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse,
should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15]Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., PETITIONERS
14 556 v.
RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.;
VALERIA TANCO, et al., PETITIONERS
14 562 v.
BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, et al.;
APRIL DeBOER, et al., PETITIONERS
14 571 v.
RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et al.; AND
GREGORY BOURKE, et al., PETITIONERS
14 574 v.
STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[June 26, 2015]
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain
specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their
identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of
the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and
conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite sex.
I
These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, States that define
marriage as a union between one man and one woman. See, e.g., Mich. Const., Art. I,
25; Ky. Const. 233A; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Tenn. Const., Art. XI,
18. The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are
deceased. The respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in
question. The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another
State, given full recognition.
Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home States. Each
District Court ruled in their favor. Citations to those cases are in Appendix A, infra. The
respondents appealed the decisions against them to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. It consolidated the cases and reversed the judgments of the District
Courts. DeBoerv. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (2014). The Court of Appeals held that a State
has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages or to recognize same-sex
marriages performed out of State.
The petitioners sought certiorari. This Court granted review, limited to two questions. 574
U. S. ___ (2015). The first, presented by the cases from Michigan and Kentucky, is
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex. The second, presented by the cases from Ohio, Tennessee,
and, again, Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to
recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which does grant that
right.
II
Before addressing the principles and precedents that govern these cases, it is
appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court.
A by his biological mother, required around-the-clock care. The next year, a baby girl with
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the
transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always
has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.
Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to
those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life
that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons.
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound
hopes and aspirations.
The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the
institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history,
marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies
together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li
Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was
echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of
society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller
transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and
philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in
all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the
understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.
That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the end as
well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of
marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its
nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held
and continues to be held in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and
throughout the world.
The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there.
Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners'
claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their
submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the
petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue
marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its
privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex
marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.
Recounting the circumstances of three of these cases illustrates the urgency of the
petitioners' cause from their perspective. Petitioner James Obergefell, a plaintiff in the
Ohio case, met John Arthur over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a life
together, establishing a lasting, committed relation. In 2011, however, Arthur was
diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. This debilitating disease is
progressive, with no known cure. Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur decided to
commit to one another, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their mutual
promise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. It
was difficult for Arthur to move, and so the couple were wed inside a medical transport
plane as it remained on the tarmac in Baltimore. Three months later, Arthur died. Ohio
law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur's death
certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even in death, a state-imposed
separation Obergefell deems "hurtful for the rest of time." App. in No. 14 556 etc., p. 38.
He brought suit to be shown as the surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate.
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are co-plaintiffs in the case from Michigan. They
celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor their permanent relation in 2007. They both
work as nurses, DeBoer in a neonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit. In 2009,
DeBoer and Rowse fostered and then adopted a baby boy. Later that same year, they
welcomed another son into their family. The new baby, born prematurely and abandoned
special needs joined their family. Michigan, however, permits only opposite-sex married
couples or single individuals to adopt, so each child can have only one woman as his or
her legal parent. If an emergency were to arise, schools and hospitals may treat the three
children as if they had only one parent. And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or
Rowse, the other would have no legal rights over the children she had not been
permitted to adopt. This couple seeks relief from the continuing uncertainty their
unmarried status creates in their lives.
Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his partner Thomas Kostura, co-
plaintiffs in the Tennessee case, fell in love. In 2011, DeKoe received orders to deploy to
Afghanistan. Before leaving, he and Kostura married in New York. A week later, DeKoe
began his deployment, which lasted for almost a year. When he returned, the two settled
in Tennessee, where DeKoe works full-time for the Army Reserve. Their lawful marriage
is stripped from them whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing as
they travel across state lines. DeKoe, who served this Nation to preserve the freedom the
Constitution protects, must endure a substantial burden.
The cases now before the Court involve other petitioners as well, each with their own
experiences. Their stories reveal that they seek not to denigrate marriage but rather to
live their lives, or honor their spouses' memory, joined by its bond.
B
The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from
developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both continuity and
change. That institution even as confined to opposite-sex relations has evolved over
time.
For example, marriage was once viewed as an arrangement by the couple's parents
based on political, religious, and financial concerns; but by the time of the Nation's
founding it was understood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman. See
N. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 9 17 (2000); S. Coontz,
Marriage, A History 15 16 (2005). As the role and status of women changed, the
institution further evolved. Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man
and woman were treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 430 (1765). As women gained legal,
political, and property rights, and as society began to understand that women have their
own equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned. See Brief for Historians of
Marriage et al. as Amici Curiae 16 19. These and other developments in the institution of
marriage over the past centuries were not mere superficial changes. Rather, they worked
deep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many
as essential. See generally N. Cott, Public Vows; S. Coontz, Marriage; H. Hartog, Man &
Wife in America: A History (2000).
These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.
Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through perspectives
that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the
judicial process.
This dynamic can be seen in the Nation's experiences with the rights of gays and
lesbians. Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been condemned as
immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a belief often embodied in the
criminal law. For this reason, among others, many persons did not deem homosexuals to
have dignity in their own distinct identity. A truthful declaration by same-sex couples of
what was in their hearts had to remain unspoken. Even when a greater awareness of the
humanity and integrity of homosexual persons came in the period after World War II, the
argument that gays and lesbians had a just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law
and widespread social conventions. Same-sex intimacy remained a crime in many
States. Gays and lesbians were prohibited from most government employment, barred
from military service, excluded under immigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened
in their rights to associate. See Brief for Organization of American Historians as Amicus
Curiae 5 28.
For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was treated as an illness. When
the American Psychiatric Association published the first Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder,
a position adhered to until 1973. See Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil
Rights, 1973, in 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 497 (1974). Only in more recent years have
psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of
human sexuality and immutable. See Brief for American Psychological Association et al.
as Amici Curiae 7 17.
In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural and political developments, same-
sex couples began to lead more open and public lives and to establish families. This
development was followed by a quite extensive discussion of the issue in both
governmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater
tolerance. As a result, questions about the rights of gays and lesbians soon reached the
courts, where the issue could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law.
This Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal status of homosexuals
in Bowersv. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986) . There it upheld the constitutionality of a
Georgia law deemed to criminalize certain homosexual acts. Ten years later, in Romerv.
Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996) , the Court invalidated an amendment to Colorado's
Constitution that sought to foreclose any branch or political subdivision of the State from
protecting persons against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Then, in 2003, the
Court overruled Bowers, holding that laws making same-sex intimacy a crime "demea[n]
the lives of homosexual persons." Lawrencev. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 .
Against this background, the legal question of same-sex marriage arose. In 1993, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held Hawaii's law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny
under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehrv. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this
decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were
concerned by its implications and reaffirmed in their laws that marriage is defined as a
union between opposite-sex partners. So too in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), 110Stat. 2419, defining marriage for all federal-law purposes as
"only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife." 1 U. S. C.
7.
The new and widespread discussion of the subject led other States to a different
conclusion. In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the State's
Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. See Goodridgev.
Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003). After that ruling,
some additional States granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, either through
judicial or legislative processes. These decisions and statutes are cited in Appendix
B, infra. Two Terms ago, in United Statesv. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___ (2013), this Court
invalidated DOMA to the extent it barred the Federal Government from treating same-sex
marriages as valid even when they were lawful in the State where they were licensed.
DOMA, the Court held, impermissibly disparaged those same-sex couples "who wanted
to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends,
and their community." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).
Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United States Courts of
Appeals in recent years. In accordance with the judicial duty to base their decisions on
principled reasons and neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary,
courts have written a substantial body of law considering all sides of these issues. That
case law helps to explain and formulate the underlying principles this Court now must
consider. With the exception of the opinion here under review and one other, see
Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F. 3d 859, 864 868 (CAAdd hyphens
between digits006), the Courts of Appeals have held that excluding same-sex couples
from marriage violates the Constitution. There also have been many thoughtful District
Court decisions addressing same-sex marriage and most of them, too, have concluded
same-sex couples must be allowed to marry. In addition the highest courts of many
States have contributed to this ongoing dialogue in decisions interpreting their own State
Constitutions. These state and federal judicial opinions are cited in Appendix A, infra.
After years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussions that attended these
public acts, the States are now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage. See Office of
the Atty. Gen. of Maryland, The State of Marriage Equality in America, State-by-State
Supp. (2015).
III
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The fundamental
liberties protected by this Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. See Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 149 (1968). In addition these liberties
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadtv. Baird,
405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972) ; Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 486 (1965).
The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial
duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, "has not been reduced to
any formula." Poev. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, it
requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. See ibid. That process is
guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional
provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements. History and
tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.
See Lawrence, supra, at 572. That method respects our history and learns from it without
allowing the past alone to rule the present.
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did
not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted
to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we
learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected
by the Constitution. In Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) , which invalidated bans
on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is "one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." The Court reaffirmed that
holding in Zablockiv. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978) , which held the right to marry
was burdened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from
marrying. The Court again applied this principle in Turnerv. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95
(1987) , which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of
prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that
the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B.v. S.
L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996) ; Cleveland Bd. of Ed.v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 640
(1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinnerv. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535,
541 (1942) ; Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) .
It cannot be denied that this Court's cases describing the right to marry presumed a
relationship involving opposite-sex partners. The Court, like many institutions, has made
assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is a part. This was evident
in Bakerv. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 , a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal
question.
Still, there are other, more instructive precedents. This Court's cases have expressed
constitutional principles of broader reach. In defining the right to marry these cases have
identified essential attributes of that right based in history, tradition, and other
constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U. S., at
574; Turner, supra, at 95; Zablocki, supra, at 384; Loving, supra, at 12; Griswold, supra,
at 486. And in assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex
couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long
protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453 454; Poe, supra, at 542 553 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to
marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex
couples.
A first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding
connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage
bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki, supra, at
384 (observing Loving held "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals"). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation,
and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning
marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.
See Lawrence, supra, at 574. Indeed, the Court has noted it would be contradictory "to
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our
society." Zablocki, supra, at 386.
Choices about marriage shape an individual's destiny. As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has explained, because "it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and
connection that express our common human ity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution,
and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-
definition." Goodridge, 440 Mass., at 322, 798 N. E. 2d, at 955.
The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find
other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons,
whatever their sexual orientation. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 22 23).
There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in
their autonomy to make such profound choices. Cf. Loving, supra, at 12 ("[T]he freedom
to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State").
A second principle in this Court's jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals. This point was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the
Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception. 381 U. S., at 485.
Suggesting that marriage is a right "older than the Bill of Rights," Griswold described
marriage this way:
"Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. " Id.,
at 486.
And in Turner, the Court again acknowledged the intimate association protected by this
right, holding prisoners could not be denied the right to marry because their committed
relationships satisfied the basic reasons why marriage is a fundamental right. See 482 U.
S., at 95 96. The right to marry thus dignifies couples who "wish to define themselves by
their commitment to each other." Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14). Marriage
responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one
there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while
both still live there will be someone to care for the other.
As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex
couples to enjoy intimate association. Lawrence invalidated laws that made same-sex
intimacy a criminal act. And it acknowledged that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring." 539 U. S., at 567. But while Lawrence confirmed a
dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without
criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a
step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
See Piercev. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer, 262 U. S., at 399. The
Court has recognized these connections by describing the varied rights as a unified
whole: "[T]he right to 'marry, establish a home and bring up children' is a central part of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 384
(quoting Meyer, supra, at 399). Under the laws of the several States, some of marriage's
protections for children and families are material. But marriage also confers more
profound benefits. By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents' relationship,
marriage allows children "to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives." Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23). Marriage also affords the permanency and
stability important to children's best interests. See Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional
Rights of Children as Amici Curiae 22 27.
As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their
children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of children are
presently being raised by such couples. See Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae 4.
Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples,
and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents, see id., at 5. This
provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create
loving, supportive families.
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the
right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no
fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue
here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at
___ (slip op., at 23).
That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot
have children. An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a
prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State. In light of precedent protecting the right of a
married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said the Court or the States have
conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate. The
constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.
Fourth and finally, this Court's cases and the Nation's traditions make clear that marriage
is a keystone of our social order. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this truth on his
travels through the United States almost two centuries ago:
"There is certainly no country in the world where the tie of marriage is so much respected
as in America . . . [W]hen the American retires from the turmoil of public life to the bosom
of his family, he finds in it the image of order and of peace . . . . [H]e afterwards carries
[that image] with him into public affairs." 1 Democracy in America 309 (H. Reeve transl.,
rev. ed. 1990).
In Maynardv. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888) , the Court echoed de Tocqueville,
explaining that marriage is "the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress." Marriage, the Maynard Court said, has
long been " 'a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.' " Id., at
213. This idea has been reiterated even as the institution has evolved in substantial ways
over time, superseding rules related to parental consent, gender, and race once thought
by many to be essential. See generally N. Cott, Public Vows. Marriage remains a building
block of our national community.
For that reason, just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to
support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and
nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary the benefits they
confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history made marriage the basis
for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. These aspects
of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical
decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and
death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers'
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules.
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6 9; Brief for American Bar Association
as Amicus Curiae 8 29. Valid marriage under state law is also a significant status for over
a thousand provisions of federal law. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 15
16). The States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by
placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order.
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this
principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are
denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage. This harm
results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned to an
instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives. As the
State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches to it,
exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal
in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a
central institution of the Nation's society. Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the
transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and
just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is
now manifest. With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws excluding same-
sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by
our basic charter.
Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate framing of the issue, the respondents
refer to Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) , which called for a "
'careful description' " of fundamental rights. They assert the petitioners do not seek to
exercise the right to marry but rather a new and nonexistent "right to same-sex
marriage." Brief for Respondent in No. 14 556, p. 8. Glucksberg did insist that liberty
under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with
central reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been
appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is
inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental
rights, including marriage and intimacy. Loving did not ask about a "right to interracial
marriage"; Turner did not ask about a "right of inmates to marry"; and Zablocki did not
ask about a "right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry." Rather, each case
inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right. See also Glucksberg,
521 U. S., at 752 773 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 789 792 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgments).
That principle applies here. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then
received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could
not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected that approach, both with respect
to the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians. See Loving 388 U. S., at
12; Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 566 567.
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not
from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Many who
deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and
honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are
disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and
public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.
Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as
opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their
personhood to deny them this right.
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment's guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit
in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are
not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to
capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the
two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. See M. L. B.,
519 U. S., at 120 121; id., at 128 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Beardenv.
Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 665 (1983) . This interrelation of the two principles furthers our
understanding of what freedom is and must become.
The Court's cases touching upon the right to marry reflect this dynamic. In Loving the
Court invalidated a prohibition on interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Court first declared the prohibition invalid
because of its un-equal treatment of interracial couples. It stated: "There can be no doubt
that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 388 U. S., at 12. With this link to equal
protection the Court proceeded to hold the prohibition offended central precepts of
liberty: "To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Ibid. The reasons why marriage is
a fundamental right became more clear and compelling from a full awareness and
understanding of the hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial unions.
The synergy between the two protections is illustrated further in Zablocki. There the
Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the challenged
law, which, as already noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-support payments
from marrying without judicial approval. The equal protection analysis depended in
central part on the Court's holding that the law burdened a right "of fundamental
importance." 434 U. S., at 383. It was the essential nature of the marriage right,
discussed at length in Zablocki, see id., at 383 387, that made apparent the law's
incompatibility with requirements of equality. Each concept liberty and equal protection
leads to a stronger understanding of the other.
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. To take but one
period, this occurred with respect to marriage in the 1970's and 1980's. Notwithstanding
the gradual erosion of the doctrine of coverture, see supra, at 6, invidious sex-based
classifications in marriage remained common through the mid-20th century. See App. to
Brief for Appellant in Reedv. Reed, O. T. 1971, No. 70 4, pp. 69 88 (an extensive
reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men in marriage).
These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. One State's law, for
example, provided in 1971 that "the husband is the head of the family and the wife is
subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the
law recognizes her separately, either for her own protection, or for her benefit." Ga. Code
Ann. 53 501 (1935). Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection
principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. See, e.g.,
Kirchbergv. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455 (1981) ; Wenglerv. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.
S. 142 (1980) ; Califanov. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979) ; Orrv. Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979)
; Califanov. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld,
420 U. S. 636 (1975) ; Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) .
Like Lovingand Zablocki, these precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to
identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of
liberty and equality under the Constitution.
Other cases confirm this relation between liberty and equality. In M. L. B.v. S. L. J., the
Court invalidated under due process and equal protection principles a statute requiring
indigent mothers to pay a fee in order to appeal the termination of their parental rights.
See 519 U. S., at 119 124. In Eisenstadtv. Baird, the Court invoked both principles to
invalidate a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons but not
married persons. See 405 U. S., at 446 454. And in Skinnerv. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, the Court invalidated under both principles a law that allowed sterilization of
habitual criminals. See 316 U. S., at 538 543.
In Lawrence the Court acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional
safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See 539 U. S., at
575. Although Lawrence elaborated its holding under the Due Process Clause, it
acknowledged, and sought to remedy, the continuing inequality that resulted from laws
making intimacy in the lives of gays and lesbians a crime against the State.
See ibid. Lawrence therefore drew upon principles of liberty and equality to define and
protect the rights of gays and lesbians, holding the State "cannot demean their existence
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime." Id., at 578.
This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. It is now clear that the challenged laws
burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they
abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents
are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to
opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially
against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex
couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this
disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal
Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of
the fundamental right to marry. See, e.g., Zablocki, supra, at 383 388; Skinner, 316 U. S.,
at 541.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Bakerv.
Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in
these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil
marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.
IV
There may be an initial inclination in these cases to proceed with caution to await further
legislation, litigation, and debate. The respondents warn there has been insufficient
democratic discourse before deciding an issue so basic as the definition of marriage. In
its ruling on the cases now before this Court, the majority opinion for the Court of
Appeals made a cogent argument that it would be appropriate for the respondents'
States to await further public discussion and political measures before licensing same-
sex marriages. See DeBoer, 772 F. 3d, at 409.
Yet there has been far more deliberation than this argument acknowledges. There have
been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless
studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings. There has been
extensive litigation in state and federal courts. See Appendix A, infra. Judicial opinions
addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of parties and counsel,
which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its
meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As more than 100 amici make clear in
their filings, many of the central institutions in American life state and local governments,
the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religious organizations, law
enforcement, civic groups, professional organizations, and universities have devoted
substantial attention to the question. This has led to an enhanced understanding of the
issue an understanding reflected in the arguments now presented for resolution as a
matter of constitutional law.
Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights. Last Term, a
plurality of this Court reaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle in Schuettev.
BAMN, 572 U. S. ___ (2014), noting the "right of citizens to debate so they can learn and
decide and then, through the political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of
their own times." Id., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 15 16). Indeed, it is most often through
democracy that liberty is preserved and protected in our lives. But as Schuette also said,
"[t]he freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of
the right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental
power." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Thus, when the rights of persons are violated, "the
Constitution requires redress by the courts," notwithstanding the more general value of
democratic decisionmaking. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). This holds true even when
protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.
The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative
action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation's courts are open to injured
individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic
charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is
harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.
The idea of the Constitution "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Virginia Bd. of Ed.v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943) . This is why "fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." Ibid. It is of no moment
whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in the
democratic process. The issue before the Court here is the legal question whether the
Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry.
This is not the first time the Court has been asked to adopt a cautious approach to
recognizing and protecting fundamental rights. In Bowers, a bare majority upheld a law
criminalizing same-sex intimacy. See 478 U. S., at 186, 190 195. That approach might
have been viewed as a cautious endorsement of the democratic process, which had only
just begun to consider the rights of gays and lesbians. Yet, in effect, Bowers upheld state
action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right and caused them pain and
humiliation. As evidenced by the dissents in that case, the facts and principles necessary
to a correct holding were known to the Bowers Court. See id., at 199 (Blackmun, J.,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id., at 214 (Stevens, J., joined
by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). That is why Lawrence held Bowers was "not
correct when it was decided." 539 U. S., at 578. Although Bowers was eventually
repudiated in Lawrence, men and women were harmed in the interim, and the substantial
effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. Dignitary
wounds cannot always be healed with the stroke of a pen.
A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect and, like Bowers, would
be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners' stories make clear the
urgency of the issue they present to the Court. James Obergefell now asks whether Ohio
can erase his marriage to John Arthur for all time. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse now
ask whether Michigan may continue to deny them the certainty and stability all mothers
desire to protect their children, and for them and their children the childhood years will
pass all too soon. Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura now ask whether Tennessee can
deny to one who has served this Nation the basic dignity of recognizing his New York
marriage. Properly presented with the petitioners' cases, the Court has a duty to address
these claims and answer these questions.
Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals a disagreement that
caused impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal law the Court
granted review to determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.
Were the Court to uphold the challenged laws as constitutional, it would teach the Nation
that these laws are in accord with our society's most basic compact. Were the Court to
stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability of
specific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many
rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.
The respondents also argue allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an
institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages. This may occur, the respondents
contend, because licensing same-sex marriage severs the connection between natural
procreation and marriage. That argument, however, rests on a counterintuitive view of
opposite-sex couple's decisionmaking processes regarding marriage and parenthood.
Decisions about whether to marry and raise children are based on many personal,
romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-
sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.
See Kitchenv. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193, 1223 (CA1Add hyphens between digits014) ("[I]t
is wholly illogical to believe that state recognition of the love and commitment between
same-sex couples will alter the most intimate and personal decisions of opposite-sex
couples"). The respondents have not shown a foundation for the conclusion that allowing
same-sex marriage will cause the harmful outcomes they describe. Indeed, with respect
to this asserted basis for excluding same-sex couples from the right to marry, it is
appropriate to observe these cases involve only the rights of two consenting adults
whose marriages would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures
that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to
teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to
their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The
same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those
who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a
matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their
view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the
State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples
of the opposite sex.
V
These cases also present the question whether the Constitution requires States to
recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. As made clear by the case
of Obergefell and Arthur, and by that of DeKoe and Kostura, the recognition bans inflict
substantial and continuing harm on same-sex couples.
Being married in one State but having that valid marriage denied in another is one of "the
most perplexing and distressing complication[s]" in the law of domestic
relations. Williamsv. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 299 (1942) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain and promote
instability and uncertainty. For some couples, even an ordinary drive into a neighboring
State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event of a spouse's
hospitalization while across state lines. In light of the fact that many States already allow
same-sex marriage and hundreds of thousands of these marriages already have
occurred the disruption caused by the recognition bans is significant and ever-growing.
As counsel for the respondents acknowledged at argument, if States are required by the
Constitution to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the justifications for
refusing to recognize those marriages performed elsewhere are undermined. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 44. The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must
hold and it now does hold that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a
lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex
character.
***
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love,
fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become
something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases
demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would
misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their
plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for
themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one
of civilization's oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The
Constitution grants them that right.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.