Jaigest Poli8

Funa v.
CSC Chairman (2014) – independence of the Commission
Article IX-A.
Sec 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither
shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way
be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or
in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Sec. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
Sec. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law.
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
Sec. 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
DOCTRINE: Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly mandated under Section 1,1 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Additionally, Section 2,2 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits its Members, during their tenure, from holding any other office
or employment.
FACTS
• Jan 2010: PGMA appointed Francisco Duque III (Duque) as CSC Chairman.
•
1
Feb 2010: PGMA issued EO 864 – “Inclusion of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in the Board of
Trustees/Directors of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC), Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)”

1
WHEREAS, Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution mandates, among others, that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), as
the central personnel agency of the government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, and shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive
to public accountability;
WHEREAS, Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) expressly states
that the Chairman of the CSC shall be a member of the Board of Directors or of other governing bodies of government entities whose
functions affect the career development, employment, status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees,
such as the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for
Teachers, and such other similar boards as may be created by law;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 24, 1972, explicitly empowers the President of the Republic of the Philippines
to reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the National Government, as a vital and priority measure to effect the desired changes
and reforms in the social, economic and political structure of the country; WHEREAS, Section 18 (a), Article IV of Republic Act
No. 7875 (An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program For All Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation For The Purpose) or otherwise known as the “National Health Insurance Act of 1995”, Section 42 (G) of Republic Act No.
8291 (An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, Expanding and Increasing the Coverage of Benefits of the
Government Service Insurance System, Instituting Reforms Therein and For Other Purposes) or otherwise known as “The
Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, Article 176, Chapter 3 of Presidential Decree No. 626 (Employees’ Compensation
and State Insurance Fund), and Presidential Decree No. 1530 (Instituting a System of Voluntary Contributions for Housing Purpose[s])
or otherwise known as the “Pag-ibig Fund” reveal that while the Chairman of the CSC is not included in the list of those who could sit
as a member of the Board of Directors of the Philhealth or of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and the Pag-ibig Fund, said
laws did not expressly repeal Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Presidential Decree No.
1;
Jaigest – PoliRev - 1

o Pursuant to this EO, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GOCCS: GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF.
•
2
Apr 2010: Dennis Funa filed this petition challenging constitutionality of EO 864, Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V
of the 1987 Administrative Code, and the designation of Duque as member of the Board/Trustees of the GOCCs. His
arguments:
o EO 864 and the Admin Code provision violate the independence of the CSC; CSC is not part of the Executive
Branch, and the concerned GOCCs (GSIS etc) are part of the Executive
§ This enables the President to exercise his power of control over CSC
o The Admin Code provision unduly and unconstitutionally expands the role of the CSC, which is primarily centered
on personnel-related concerns involving government workers, to include insurance, housing and health matters
of employees in the government service.
o Charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF do not mention that the CSC Chairman sits as a member
in an ex officio capacity. As such, the President cannot amend the charters.
o EO and Admin Code violate prohibition imposed upon members of ConComissions from holding any other office
or employment.
• Duque insists that the appointment is an appointment in ex officio, pursuant to the Admin Code provision.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the designation of Duque impair the independence of the CSC? – YES!
*Court here partially grants the petition. EO unconstitutional, but Admin Code provision still constitutional.
• Underlying principle for the resolution of this case rests on the correct application of Sections 1 and 2, Art. IX-A. (See
provisions above)
• Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
“independent.”
o Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions.
• Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in
the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as
provided by Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
• To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,31 imposes under Section 2,
Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their
integrity, to wit:
o (a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure; (relevant in this case)
o (b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
o (c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office; and
o (d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or –
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries
• Such disqualification (holding any other office) must be read with Section 7, par 2, Art. IX-B

WHEREAS, it is settled that repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on the subject;
WHEREAS, a scrutiny of the mandated functions and duties of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and HDMF and the Board of
Directors of the PhilHealth shows that the same are all geared towards the advancement of the welfare of government officials and
employees, which functions fall within the province of the CSC; NOW,
THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, do hereby order and direct:
Section 1. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission shall sit as an Ex-Officio member of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System, Employees’ Compensation Commission and the Home Development Mutual Fund and the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation pursuant to Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
Section 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

2
Section 14. Membership of the Chairman in Boards.—The Chairman shall be a member of the Board of Directors or of other
governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and
welfare of government officials and employees, such as the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign
Trade Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such other similar boards as may be created by law

o Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
o In this case, Duque is covered by this general rule; that he can hold other office if such holding is allowed
by law/by primary functions of his position. (compared to the stricter rule for appointive public official who
occupies a Cabinet position, Art. VII)
• So ex officio ba yung function ni Duque? – NO.
o “Ex officio” - “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment
or authority other than that conferred by the office.” An ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.”
o The Admin Code provision is clear that the CSC Chairman’s membership is dependent on the condition that the
functions of the govt entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges and welfare of govt officials and employees. (so no problem with
this; Constitutional yung provision na to)
o However, the court here looked into the charters of the different GOCCs, to determine whether Duque’s
designation is in accordance with the Constitution.
o IMPT! (on why the designation is not in ex officio) These GOCCs, while their powers and functions are associated
with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights
privileges and welfare of government officials and employees, are also tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions NOT personnel-related.
§ These powers are carried out by the respective BOARDS.
§ If CSC Chairman sits as a member of the Board, he may exercise these functions, which are
NOT anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman,
§ Some of these are:
• imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions
• Issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers or
• Approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortization.
o Provided all those, Duque’s designation as member of the boards entitles him to receive per diems, which
are disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position.
o This designation, then, is violative of the prohibition against holding multiple offices.
• ON VIOLATION OF INDEPENDENCE: Under Art. VII, the President exercises control over all government offices of the
Executive.
o An office not legally under the control is NOT part of the Executive branch.
o PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a GOCC, deemed attached to the Department of Health and of Labor.
o GSIS and HDMF are both under the Office of the President
o Undoubtedly, these agencies and their boards are under the control of the President.
o As such, the CSC CANNOT be a member of these boards without impairing the independence vested in
the CSC.

Gualberto Dela Llana v. The Chairperson (decision and orders of the COA reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari refer
to the COA’s quasi-judicial capacity not its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers)
(Edited A2015)
Art IX-A, Sec. 7 Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
DOCTRINE: Petitioner is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari.
However, these refer to decisions and orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity not under its rule-making
powers.
FACTS
• In 1982, COA issues Circular No. 82 – 195, lifting the pre-audit system of government financial transactions.
o The circular affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized
in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper
disposition.
o It was also designed to further facilitate or expedite government transactions without impairing their integrity.
• After the 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were uncovered.
o Hence, the pre-audit was reinstated thru Circular No. 86-257.  
• When the political system and government operations stabilized, COA issued Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the
pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and GOCCs.  
o It reaffirmed the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines;
o It also contributed to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving government operations by curbing
undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions.
o It also mandated the installation, implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control system.
• Circular No. 89-299 further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA shall no longer be a pre-requisite to
the implementation or prosecution of projects and the payment of claims.
o The COA aimed to focus its efforts on the post-audit of financial accounts and transactions, as well as on the
assessment and evaluation of the adequacy and effectivity of the agency’s fiscal control process.
• The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 on 17 February 1994 and Circular No. 95- 006 on 18 May 1995 to include LGUs
in the lifting of pre-audit activities.  
• It also issued COA Circular No. 89-299, as amended by Circular No. 89-299A, which in Section 3.2 provides that when the
internal control system of a government agency is inadequate, COA may reinstitute the pre-audit system or other control
measures necessary to protect the funds and property of the agency.  
• On 18 May 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002, which reinstituted the selective pre-audit due to the rising incidents
of irregular, illegal, wasteful and anomalous disbursements of huge amounts of public funds and disposals of public property.
This was again lifted on 22 July 2011 (CN 2011-002) because of the heightened vigilance of government agencies in
safeguarding their resources.  
• In the interregnum, on 3 May 2006, petitioner Dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service.  
o On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299. It also
emphasized the required observance of AO 278 dated 8 June 1992, which directed the strengthening of internal
control systems of government offices through the installation of an internal audit service (IAS). 
• On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the pre- audit duty on the part of the COA
cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
o Further, because of the lack of pre-audit, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed,
such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the
Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
• On 22 February 2008, public respondents filed their Comment, arguing for the dismissal of the Petition because of its
defective form (failure to allege material dates such as receipt of a copy of the circular, to attach certified true copy of the
assailed Order, etc) and that certiorari is not the proper remedy considering that:
1. there is no allegation showing that the COA exercised judicial or quasi- judicial functions when it promulgated
Circular No. 89-299; and
2. there is no convincing explanation showing how the promulgation of the circular was done with grave abuse of
discretion.
• Public respondents aver that the circular is valid, as the COA has the power under the 1987 Constitution to promulgate it.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was a petition for certiorari the proper case to file? – NO.

• Public respondents aver that a petition for certiorari is not proper in this case, as there is no indication that the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, as required in certiorari proceedings. 
• Conversely, petitioner for his part claims that certiorari is proper under Section 7,
• Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part: 
o Section 7. x x x. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
• SC: Petitioner is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari.
o However, these refer to decisions and orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity.
o Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the COA under its quasi- legislative or rule-making powers.
o Hence, it is not reviewable by certiorari.
• A petition for prohibition is also not appropriate in this case because it only lies  against judicial or ministerial functions, but
not against legislative or quasi-legislative  functions.  
• The SC decided to set aside the technical procedure including the defects of the  Petition to resolve the merits of the case
due to the seriousness of the allegation of a grave deficiency in observing a constitutional duty if proven correct.  
o Rules of procedure were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle
the hand that dispenses it.
• In this case, petitioner avers that the conduct of pre-audit by the COA could have prevented the occurrence of the numerous
alleged irregularities in government transactions that involved substantial amounts of public money.
Substantive ISSUE
• The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property.  
• Its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.  
• Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit.  
o A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their consumption or payment.
o It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present:
1. the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law  or other specific statutory authority;  
2. sufficiency of funds;  
3. reasonableness of the proposed expenditure, and the  unexpended balance of appropriations to which
it will be charged  is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and  
4. approval of the proper authority of the transaction and the  claim is duly supported by authentic
underlying evidence.  
• Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which gives COA the power to
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of public funds
and on a post- audit basis.
o It also states that should the internal control system of audited agencies is inadequate, COA may adopt measures
to correct the deficiencies.
o Thus, he claims  that pre-auditing is mandatory and that it cannot be lifted by a mere circular.  
• The SC disagreed with the petitioner as such allegations find no support in the  Constitution  
o COA is not required by the Constitution to conduct pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies.
o The only reference of a pre-audit requirement is when there is an inadequacy in the internal control system of an
audited entity and such may be resorted to as a measure to correct the deficiencies.
• Hence, the conduct of pre-audit is not a mandatory that the SC may compel the COA to perform. It is within COAs discretion
to do so in line with its vested exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC (2015)
FACTS:
• February 21, 2013 - Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
of Bacolod.
• Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’) in size. (They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view.)
o The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354.
o The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
§ This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
§ The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
§ Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,”
7
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela
Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna
Party List Anak Pawis
• During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
o Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
• February 22, 2013 - Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice
8
to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra.
o The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).
• February 25, 2013 - Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that
o (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and
o (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
• February 27, 2013 - COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise,
it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
o The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent on the remedies available to petitioners. The letter provides
as follows:
Dear Bishop Navarra:

It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already given you notice
on February 22, 2013 as regards the election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or
against the candidates and party list groups with the following names and messages, particularly described as
follows:

The three (3)-day notice expired on February 25, 2013.
Considering that the above mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615
promulgated on January 15, 2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division of the said tarpaulin
into two), as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’), please
order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material, otherwise, we shall be constrained to
file an election offense case against you.
We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections in ensuring the
conduct of peaceful, orderly, honest and credible elections.
Thank you and God Bless!
[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV
• Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through
this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
• They question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013.
o They pray that:
o (1) the petition be given due course;
o (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents
from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and
o (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as
unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.
• After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013.
• March 13, 2013 - Respondents filed their commentarguing that
o (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the
proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and
o (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under
Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution.
o Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Does the COMELEC have any jurisdiction with its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful
political speech? NO.
• It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This does
not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution.
• The use of the word “affecting” in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to
decide any and all questions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should
not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.
• The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.
o This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
o This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
• Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
• During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with
unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC.

o Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people against government’s infringement of
their fundamental rights.
o This constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
• It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
Did the petitioners violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before
the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions? NO.
• The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
• Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication.
o Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in
this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”
• Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially
during the elections.
o COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable
infringement of this right.
o The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
• In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs
the violation of their freedom of speech.
Does the COMELEC have the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during
elections?NO, COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens
• Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
o Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a noncandidate
in this case.
Did the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression? YES.
• The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
• Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
• he Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration”
by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
• By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
• The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
o Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.”
o On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.”
o The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
Was the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation? Content-based regulation
• Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.”
o In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place,
or manner of the speech.
• The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the
size of its medium.
• Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure.
o Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’”
o “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
• Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
o There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.

o There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property.
o The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Was there a violation of petitioners’ right to property. YES.
• The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners.
• Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
o Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary
or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection of the laws.
Are the tarpaulin and its message considered religious speech? NO.
• The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
• The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one
of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
• The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Fortune Life Insurance Company v. COA (2015)
DOCTRINE the fact that Sen. Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the LGC in the Legislature, expressed an opinion
on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and
decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally [sic] officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose.
FACTS:
• This is an MR to an earlier resolution promulgated by the Court dismissing its petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
• The Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and Fortune executed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) concerning the
life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod.
o LGU obligated P4M for the premium payment and subsequently submitted the corresponding disbursement
voucher to the Commission on Audit (COA) Antique for pre-audit.
• But COA disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under RA 7160 (Local Govt Code).
o LGU appealed but was denied.
• Consequently, LGU filed its petition for money claim in the COA.
• COA denied the petition, holding that under the LGC, only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the
power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers.
o It also noted the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under the Govt Procurement Reform
Act.
• The LGU received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012 and filed its MR on January 14, 2014.
o However, COA denied the motion.
o The decision was received by the LGU on July 14, 2014.
• Hence, the LGU filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014 but it was dismissed for:
o Late filing of the petition
o Non-submission of proof of service and verified declaration
o Failure to show GAD on part of COA.
• The LGU now submits that
o it filed the petition for certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period enunciated in Neypes v.
CA
o the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service
o It admits having overlooked the submission of a verified declaration but claims substantial compliance by
previously submitting a CD containing the petition and its annexes.
ISSUES/HELD:
Did the LGU comply with the rule on proof of service? – NO
• The LGU obviously ignores that Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns 2 types of proof of service:
o The affidavit
o The registry receipt.
• Section 13 requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person
effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served.
• A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.
Did the Fresh Period under Neypes apply to the petition? – NO
• There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
• As to the nature of procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
o Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only
upon a prima facie showing that the RTC committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification
of the challenged judgment or final order.
• In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a
judgment or final order of the COMELEC, or the COA.
• The petition is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
• Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of GADALEJ.
• The reglementary periods are also different.
o Under Rule 42, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
o Under Rule 64, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed.

• The filing of a MNT or MR, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the
period;
o Hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file within the remaining period, which shall not be
less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
• HERE: the LGU filed its MR on January 13, 2014 which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on
December 14, 2012.
o Pursuant to Sec.3, Rule 64, it had only 5 days from receipt of the denial of its MR to file the petition.
o Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19 to file the petition.
o HOWEVER, it filed the petition on August 13, which was 25 days too late.
• Pates v. COMELEC: belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should
apply was fatal for the recourse.
Did the COA commit GADALEJ? – NO
• The LGU claims that it was able to show that the COA committed GADALEJ:
o The decision was rendered by a divided COA proper
o COA took almost a year before promulgating its decision and more than a year in resolving the MR, in
contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution
o The resolution denying the MR was made up of only 2 sentences
o The matter involved a novel issue that called for interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the LGC
o In issuing the resolution, the COA Commissioners made it appear that they knew the LGC better than former Sen.
Pimintel who offered an opinion on the matter.
• Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
• The petition for certiorari did not sufficiently disclose how the COA committed GAD.
o FIRST, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its
part.
o SECOND, the mere terseness of the denial of the MR was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
o LASTLY, the fact that Sen. Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the LGC in the Legislature,
expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the
latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the
Constitutionally [sic] officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose.
• It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the LGU for the further reason of lack of sufficient
publication as required by law.
o In that light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the LGU’s claim.
*the last portion of the case was the Court ruling that the LGU and its counsel exhibited harshness and disrespect towards the SC,
hence the SC required them to fully explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court/disbarred (for
Atty. Fortaleza).

Querubin v. COMELEC (2015)
DOCTRINE: The Court has consistently held that the phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional commissions, the COMELEC
included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those
rendered in the commissions exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the
provision’s coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all
controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices.
FACTS:
• This is a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, assailing the validity and seeking to restrain
the implementation of the COMELEC En Banc’s Decision for being against the Corporation Code and the Government
Procurement Reform Act.
• Antecedent Facts:
o The COMELEC released the bidding documents for the “Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for the Lease of Election
Management System (EMS) and Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN)
System”
o Under the Invitation to Bid are the details for the lease with option to purchase, through competitive bidding, the
ff:
§ Twenty-three thousand (23,000) new units of precinct-based OMRs or OP-SCAN Systems, with a total
Approved Budget for Contract of P2,503,518,000, to be used in the 2016 National and Local Elections.
o The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and Jarltech
International Corporation (collectively referred to as “Smartmatic JV”) responded to the call and submitted bid for
the project on the scheduled date.
§ It informed the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) that one of its partner corporations, SMTC, has a
pending application with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend its Articles of
Incorporation (AOI), attaching therein all pending documents
o Smartmatic was able to participate in the bidding process, particularly the testing of their initial technical proposals.
o However, after the post-qualification evaluation, Smartmatic was disqualified based on two grounds:
§ Failure to submit a valid Articles of Incorporation
§ The demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system shall be capable of writing all
data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot images simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.
o Smartmatic filed a protest, seeking permission to conduct another technical demonstration.
o This was granted by the COMELEC.
o After the testing, COMELEC En Banc Resolution was issued finding that the testing complied with the
requirements of the terms of reference.
• Petitioners now go before the court through a Rule 64, questioning the sufficiency of the documents submitted. They also
argue that:
o Smartmatic cannot be eligible since one of its proponents, SMTC no longer has a valid corporate purpose. SMTC
was created solely for the automation of the 2010 National and Local Elections, not for any other election. Having
already served its purpose, SMTC no longer has authority to engage in business, so petitioners claim.
o SMTC misrepresented itself by leading the BAC to believe that it may carry out the project despite its limited
corporate purpose, and by claiming that it is a Philippine corporation when it is, allegedly, 100% foreign-owned.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the petition through a Rule 64 the proper remedy to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc? – NO
• Rule 64 is not applicable in assailing the COMELEC En Banc’s Decision granting Smartmatic JV’s protest.
o Under Rule 64 of the RoC: “[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections x x x may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65.”
• Petitioners argue that the Decision of the COMELEC En Banc declaring Smartmatic JV as the eligible bidder with the lowest
calculated responsive bid is a “judgment” within the contemplation of the rule, and is, therefore, a proper subject of a Rule
64 petition.
• SC: Rule 64 does not cover rulings of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative powers.
o DOCTRINE: The Court has consistently held that the phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional
commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-
encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions’ exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers.
o In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision’s coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued
pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of elective offices.
• In this case, the instant petition revolves around the issue on whether or not Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate in the
bidding process for the COMELEC’s procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers.
o The case does not stem from an election controversy involving the election, qualification, or the returns of an
elective office. Rather, it pertains to the propriety of the polling commission’s conduct of the procurement process,
and its initial finding that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate therein.

o More particularly, it arose from the electoral commission’s exercise of Sec. 12 of RA 8436, otherwise known as
the Automated Elections Law, as amended by RA 9369.
• The subject matter of the case does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELECÊs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers that could properly be the subject of a Rule 64 petition, but is, in fact, administrative in nature.
• The proper recourse of the petitioners should have been through a petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the COMELEC En Banc’s June 29, 2015 Decision granting the protest.
• NOTE, as will be discussed later, that despite of this wrong recourse, the petitioners were able to establish a
meritorious case for the relaxation of the rules, relieving them from the rigid application of procedural
requirements. We therefore treat the instant recourse as one filed not merely in relation to, but under Rule 65.
Who has jurisdiction over procurement protests, as in this case? – RTC
• To reiterate, the COMELEC En Banc was not resolving an election controversy when it resolved the protest, but was merely
performing its function to procure the necessary election paraphernalia for the conduct of the 2016 National and Local
Elections. This is based on Section 12 of RA 8436 (Procurement of equipment and materials under the automated election
law)
• The proper remedy under said law to question the ruling of the head of the procuring entity is through a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
o The remedy of certiorari filed before the is intended as a continuation of the motion for reconsideration filed before
the BAC, and of the subsequent protest filed with the head of the procuring entity.
o Under this rule, it is only the failed bidder that can turn the cogs of the protest mechanism by first moving for
reconsideration of the assailed BAC ruling. The party concerned, the bidder adversely affected by the resolution
of the motion, shall then have seven (7) days to file a protest with the head of the procuring entity.
Should the hierarchy of courts be followed? – Generally YES, but this falls under the exceptions
• Under Rule 65 of the RoC, the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition are the available remedies for determining
and correcting such grave abuses of discretion. This power is given, not only to the SC, but concurrently with the CA and
the RTC.
o Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts recourse must first be made to the lower- ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
o The petitioners do not have the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application
for certiorari will be directed
• However, in the case of Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the court enumerated instances when direct resort to the SC is
allowed:
o (a) When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
o (b) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
o (c) Cases of first impression;
o (d) When the constitutional issues raised are best decided by this Court;
o (e) When the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored;
o (f) When the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
o (g) When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
o (h) When public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictates, or when demanded by the broader
interest of justice;
o (i) When the orders complained of are patent nullities; and
o (j) When appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
• In this case, B, E and F are grounds applicable:
o (B) - There is a compelling significance of the issue at hand which is the nationwide automation project. The
Court, in the growing number of cases concerning government procurement of election paraphernalia and
services, has consistently exhibited leniency and dispensed of procedural requirements for petitioners to
successfully lodge certiorari petitions.
o (E) - The time element is also relevant with the 2016 polls visible in the horizon, the post-haste resolution of this
case becomes all the more imperative.
§ It would be the height of absurdity to require petitioners to undergo scrutiny through the lens of the RTC
first, considering that the acquisition of 23,000 OMRs would, at the minimum, affect the clustering of
precincts.
o (F) - As to the last ground, the rulings of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body, can immediately be reviewed
by the Court on proper petition.
• In sum, there exist ample compelling reasons to justify the direct resort to the Court as a departure from the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts not in relation to but under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on certiorari and prohibition, and to brush aside
the procedural issues in this case to focus on the substantive issues surrounding the procurement of the 23,000 additional
OMRs for the 2016 elections.

Gaminde v. COA – Term of CSC
DOCTRINE: The term of Commissioners is set at 7 years. Of the first Commissioners appointed, the Chairman serves for 7 years,
another for 5 years, and the third for 3 years. The intent in staggering the terms of the first appointees is to achieve continuity by not
allowing the term of all Commissioners to expire. In order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution, the
rotational plan requires two conditions: [i] The terms of the first commissioners should start on a common date; and fill Any vacancy
due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
FACTS:
• On June 11, 1993, Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as CSC Commissioner by the President.
o June 22 – she assumed office
o Sept 7 – Commission on Appointment confirmed her appointment.
o Appointment letter: says she is “appointed ad interim for a term expiring on February 2, 1999.
• Feb 1998 – She sought clarification from the OP as to the expiry date of her term of office
o Chief Presidential Counsel opined that her term will expire on Feb 2, 2000.
• Feb 4, 1999 – Chairman de Leon requested opinion from COA whether Gaminde may be paid their salaries notwithstanding
expiration of appointments.
o COA disallowed the salaries and emoluments pertaining to her and her co-terminous staff effective Feb 2, 1999.
o Gaminde appealed the disallowance to COA en banc, but was dismissed
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the term of office of Atty. Thelma Gaminde, as CSC Commissioner, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993,
expire on Feb 02, 1999 (as stated in the appointment paper) or on Feb 2, 2000 as claimed by her? – Feb. 2, 1999.
• The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the
first 3 Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before
the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
o Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the
1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should
lead to the regular recurrenceof the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.
• Applying these conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
o In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
• The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent.
o Term -- the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another.
o Tenure -- represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not
affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.
• The SC considered the plain language of the Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term
of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven,
five and three years, without reappointment.
o In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
o There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the
effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).
• What Sec. 15, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution contemplates is “tenure” not “term” of the
incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit, who shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of the Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder
o the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year
rotational interval for the first appointees under the Constitution.
o The term “unless” imports an exception to the general rule.
o Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall
continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the
discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2)
their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term
thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the
Constitution.
• Gaminde’s term expired on Feb 2, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and
thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on
Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

MWSS v. Hernandez (1986) – GOCC’s with charter and created by special law
Article IX, Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
DOCTRINE: Employees of GOCC’s are governed by civil service law. Civil service law governs monetary claims as well.
FACTS:
• MWSS was charged for willful failure to pay wage differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits to its 2,500 or so
contractual employees. The case was filed with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC.
• MWSS answered that:
o It was a GOCC therefore NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case;
o Assuming the NLRC has jurisdiction, the terms and conditions of the complainants, who are all contractual
employees, are governed by their respective contracts.
• Labor Arbiter Hernandez ruled against MWSS.
o On the issue of jurisdiction: if the employees were regular MWSS employees and MWSS being a GOCC, then
NLRC has no jurisdiction and is governed by the civil service law. HOWEVER, the complainants are NOT regular
employees of MWSS. They are hired employees for a limited period, that upon completion of the project they
were hired for, they can be removed by MWSS because there is no more work or the contract has been
terminated.
o On the issue of contractual employment: MWSS cited Art. 277 of the Labor Code. However, the provision refers
to the governance of the Civil Service Law on the terms and conditions of government employees. The present
complaint does not fall under the purview of the case. This case is for monetary claims. The last provision of Art.
277 shows the workers' right to due wages and other benefits by enjoining not to reduce the privileges they enjoy.
• Labor Arbiter ultimately held that the Civil Service Law applies to employees in government corporations in all matters,
EXCEPT “monetary claims” such as the present case where the Labor Code governs.
o Basically, Labor Arbiter ruled that it has jurisdiction of the monetary claims against MWSS.
• Hence, MWSS filed this petition with the SC.
ISSUE/HELD:
Are the employees of MWSS covered by the Labor Code or the Civil Service Law?—CIVIL SERVICE LAW.
• In the case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco, SC held that:

o NHC was 100% government-owned corporation;
o GOCC are governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations;
o Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.
• The character of MWSS as a GOCC is not contested. RA 6234 created it as a “government corporation to be known as the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System.
o Like the NHC case, MWSS’ employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, NOT by the Labor Code. Hence,
all controversies are NOT cognizable by NLRC.
• As to the Labor Arbiter’s contention that only regular employees of MWSS are outside the jurisdiction of NLRC, SC held
this to be untenable.
o There is no legal or logical justification for such a distinction. Positions in the civil service are classified as career
or non-career service. Contractual personnel fall under “non-career service”.
• As to the contention of Civil Service Law governs employment in the MWSS in all aspect except “monetary claims”, SC also
held this to be illogical and deserves no confutation.
• Private respondents also contended that the complainants "are not employees of MWSS, hence, it lies within the NLRC
through Labor Arbiter Hernandez. SC held that such a contention is untenable.
o The "existence of employer-employee relationship between the MWSS and an individual is not per se equivalent
to being a government employee."

BLISS v. Calleja (1994) – GOCC’s with charter and created by special law
DOCTRINE: A corporation is created by operation of law under the Corporation Code while a government corporation is normally
created by special law referred to often as a charter. Government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law is governed
by the Labor Code while a government corporation created through a charter is governed by the Civil Service Law, and not the Labor
Code.
FACTS:
• Bliss Development Corp. Employees Union (BDC EU) a duly registered labor union, filed with the Department of Labor a
petition for certification election of private respondent Bliss Development Corporation (BDC).
• Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando, in an order dated January 26, 1987, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction stating
that the majority of BDC’s stocks is owned by the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-owned
government corporation.
o Therefore, BDC is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
• On June 1, 1987 Executive Order No. 180 was issued by President Corazon C. Aquino extending to government employees
the right to organize and bargain collectively. Government employees are now given the right to organize and bargain
collectively
o Section 1. This Executive Order applies to all employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
o Section 7. Government employees’ organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment
which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
• BLR’s Order:
o Bliss Development Corporation which is under the then Ministry of Human Settlement, is a government
corporation where the workers are prohibited from organizing and joining labor unions.
o In determining whether a corporation created under the Corporation Code is government-owned or a controlled
or not, this Ministry has consistently applied the ownership test whereby a corporation will be deemed owned by
the government if all or a majority of its stocks are owned by the government, and it will be deemed controlled by
the government, if the majority of its voting stocks are owned by the government.
• BCD EU basically argues that it is not under the Civil Service Law and therefore, the requirements under Section 7of EO
180 does not apply to it.
ISSUE/HELD:
Is BCD a GOCC governed by the Civil Service Law such that EO 180 applies to it? – NO. BDC is a government-owned
corporation created under the Corporation Law and is without a charter. It is governed by the Labor Code and not by the
Civil Service Law. Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it.
• National Service Corporation v. NLRC:

o Under the 1973 Constitution, it was provided that:
§ The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporation.
o 1987 Constitution provides that:
§ The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter.
o If the basis or test is mere ownership: permits a circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the
Constitution.
o It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the
Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature.
o A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations which would enjoy the best of two
worlds:
§ Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required
by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit.
§ Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the terms
and conditions of civil service employment.
• Under the 1987 Constitution:
o Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter; and, therefore, by clear
implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized
as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law.

• A corporation is created by operation of law. It acquires a juridical personality either by special law or a general law. The
general law under which a private corporation may be formed or organized is the Corporation Code.
• On the other hand, a government corporation is normally created by special law, referred to often as a charter.
• BDC is a government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor
Code and not by the Civil Service Law hence, Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it.
o Director of Labor Relations was directed to give due course to BCD EU’s application for certification election.

Torres vs. De Leon (2016) – GOCCs under Corporation Code
DOCTRINE: Generally, the PNRC is treated as a sui generis entity and is NOT considered a GOCC. However, if it involves the
enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes like in this case, it CAN be treated as a GOCC.
FACTS:
• Mary Lou Torres was the Chapter Administrator of Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), General Santos City Chapter.
• When the PNRC Auditing Office conducted an audit, it found that Torres incurred a “technical shortage” of P4M.
o Thus, Corazon De Leon (De Leon), as Secretary General of the PNRC charged Torres with Grave Misconduct
(for violating PNRC Financial Policies on Oversubscription, Remittances and Disbursement of Funds)
• In June 2007, De Leon issued a Memorandum suspending her for 1 month and transferring her to the National Headquarters
(NHQ).
o She filed an MR. It was denied.
o She filed a Notice of Appeal with the PNRC, and thereafter she appealed to the CSC.
• The CSC dismissed her appeal and dismissed her from the service.
• CA affirmed.
ISSUES / HELD:
Is PNRC a GOCC? Depends on what is in issue in the case, but in this case, YES
• According to Torres:
o PNRC is not a GOCC, thus the CSC has no jurisdiction / authority to review the appeal which she filed.
o CSC erred in modifying the decision of De Leon.
• In Liban vs. Gordon, the SC ruled that the PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui generis in character. Thus, the SC is to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
• National Societies, such as the PNRC… (part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement)
o Act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field.
§ Auxilliary status means that it is both a private institution and a public service organization.
§ This is because its work implies cooperation with authorities, and linkage with the State.
o Sui generis.
st
§ It is a protected component of the Red Cross movement under Art. 24 and 26 of 1 Geneva Convention.
§ These require staff of a National Society to be respected and protected even in times of armed conflict.
§ National societies are directly regulated by international humanitarian law (IHL), in contrast to other
ordinary private entities, including NGOs.
o Recognized at the international level (distinguishing National Societies from other orgs like NGOs).
• PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof, as
explained in Liban.
o However, this does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation," that must be organized under
the Corporation Code. Remember, it it is regulated by IHL and treated as an auxiliary of the State.
o Again, since it’s sui generis, have to look at case to case basis.
Does the CSC have jurisdiction over this case? YES.
• The CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC because the issue at hand is the enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes,
thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC.
• A such, it is within the ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act 67135, stating that: Section 1.
These Rules shall cover all officials and employees in the government….
• CSC has appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the penalty of suspension of >30 days, or fine >30 days salary. (Source:
Admin Code and Case Law)
• Eh pero 1 month lang ang suspension ni Torres, di yun >30 days.
o Her period of suspension was actually expressly from July 1-31, 2007 = 31 days (kahit Sunday and July 1)
o Even if her suspension was only 30 days she was imposed another penalty of "Transfer to the NHQ”
• Since the CSC has jurisdiction, it can modify the penalty and order the dismissal of Torres from the service.
Did the CSC lose appellate jurisdiction? NO
• Torres alleges that the CSC lost jurisdiction because, she served the 1-month sentence and transferred to the NHQ before
her counsel filed the notice of appeal, thus, the PNRC decision became final even before the filing of the notice.
• SC: Torres’ appeal was properly made with the CSC under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS).
• A decision becomes final even before the lapse of the 15 day period to appeal when there is voluntary service of sentence.
But here, although she served her sentence, she also appealed therefrom.
• Moreover, service of the penalty is pursuant to Sec. 47 of URACCS which provides that an appeal shall not stay the decision.

Samson v. CA (1986) (PoliA2015) – positions in competitive service
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the government,
including those in GOCCs, belong to the competitive service. The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the
non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
The position of “Assistant Secretary” is not among those expressly declared by law as non-competitive; nor is it considered “policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical.” Compared to a Secretary, an "assistant" merely helps, aids or serves in a
subordinate capacity to the person who is actually clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of "secretary." The functions strictly
attributable to a "secretary" and which would repose on such person the trust and confidence of the employer, is not automatically
vested or transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his
duties.
FACTS:
• Feliciano C. Talens, a civil service eligible, was appointed on March 16, 1970 by then City Mayor Macario Asistio of Caloocan
City, as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor.
o His appointment was attested to as a permanent one under Section 24(b) of RA 2260, as amended by the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
o He performed the duties of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor and even twice received increases in salary.
• On January 11, 1972, City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, successor of Mayor Asistio, furnished Talens with AO 3 stating that:
o pursuant to Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law, he has been terminated as Asst. Secretary to the Mayor for
lack and loss of confidence, given that such position is non-competitive and that inherent in the nature
of such position to be primarily and highly confidential.
o Note here that Mayor Samson considered the position of “Assistant Secretary” as a Secretary.
• Talens, acknowledging receipt of said order, demurred on the ground Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law, which specifies as
non-competitive only the positions of "secretaries of provincial city and municipal boards and councils."
o He asked that the AO be recalled as he was permanently appointed to a classified position in the city government
and that in accordance with Section 32, his position as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor was not covered by the
Civil Service Law; thus, he can be removed only for cause and after due process has been observed.
• On January 17, 1972, Mayor Samson declined to recall the AO for the same reasons stated in the AO.
• Talens filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto with the CFI of Caloocan on January 21, 1972
in order to annul the disputed AO, to enjoin the petitioner mayor, treasurer and auditor from enforcing the same, and to
compel all the said public officials to pay to private respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor.
o He also sought the ouster from the disputed position of Hermogenes Liwag, one of the petitioners herein, who
was appointed by Mayor Samson as Assistant Secretary.
• CFIàruled for Talens
• CAàaffirmed CFI decision. Hence the petition.
• According to Samson, the only issue which this Court has to resolve is the legality of the termination of Talens' services.
o He contends that the termination of his services is authorized by Section 5(f) of the Civil Service Act which declares
the position of Secretaries of City Mayors as belonging to the non-competitive service. Further, they aver that
termination of the services of Talens is justified by the fact that the disputed position is inherently and primarily
highly confidential in nature.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is A0 3 valid? – NO; Assistant Secretary to Mayor is NON-competitive
• Section 5 of RA No. 2260, as amended by RA 6040 provides that "That non-competitive service shall be composed of
positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature" and continues with an enumeration of specific officers and
employees embraced within the scope of non-competitive service.
o Among those included in the enumeration are heads of departments created in charters of cities and
secretaries of provincial governors, city mayors and municipal mayors.
• Although the position of assistant secretary to the city mayor is not among those therein expressly declared, Samson argues
that an assistant secretary is also a secretary, and thus comprised within the general term "secretaries" as provided for in
Section 5(f).
• The SC disagreed.
• As may be noted, the general purpose of the Civil Service Law (RA 2260) is "to insure and promote the constitutional
mandate regarding appointment only according to merit and fitness, and to provide within the public service a progressive
system of personal administration to insure the maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and courteous civil
service in the Philippines."
• As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the
government, including those in GOCCs, belong to the competitive service.

o The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
• Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.
o Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding
from its effects all those not expressly mentioned (Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., p. 71 citing Dave's
Place vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269 N.W., p, 504).
• The exceptions provided for in Section 5 should be strictly construed.
o It follows then that on this general governing principle, the position of assistant secretary to the City
Mayor of Caloocan City should be considered as not belonging to the non-competitive service.
• The parties agreed that the nature of the functions ultimately determines whether such position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical.
o It is not the powers and duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor as may be
delegated and assigned by the Mayor that makes the position of Assistant Secretary primarily confidential.
o While duties possibly involving confidential matters are sometimes handled by the Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor, this does not necessarily transform the nature of the position itself as one that is primarily and highly
confidential.
• It should be stressed that the position of Secretary to the Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two
separate and distinct positions.
o While both individuals may be called "secretary," one is certainly of a higher category and rank than the other with
the added distinction that a Secretary must enjoy the confidence of the Mayor.
o However, the position of Assistant Secretary need not carry the requisites attaching to the primarily confidential
position of the actual Secretary to the Mayor.
• Moreover, if it was the intention of Congress to include the Assistant Secretaries within the purview of Section 5(f) of R.A.
No. 2260, the law could have been easily worded "secretaries and their assistance."
• Further, the SC disagreed with petitioners contention that an Asst. Secretary is also a secretary included in the general term
under Sec. 5(f).
o An "assistant" merely helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the person who is actually clothed with all
the duties and responsibilities of "secretary."
o The functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and which would repose on such person the trust and confidence
of the employer, is not automatically vested or transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply
assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
• The rulings of this Court in De Los Santos vs. Mallare and Besa vs. PNB invoked by the petitioners do not provide support
to petitioners' case.
o The case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, relates to a quo warranto proceeding, questioning the legality of the
appointment of the respondent therein to the office of the City Engineer for the City of Baguio which petitioner De
los Santos was then occupying. Said position was in fact declared to be neither primarily confidential, policy-
determining, nor highly technical and petitioner therein was adjudged to be entitled to remain in office and the
respondent's appointment was declared ineffective.
o Neither would the other case of Besa vs. PNB find any application to the instant case because the position therein
involved was that of Chief Legal Counsel which, by its very nature, was rightfully ruled to be both impressed with
a highly technical aspect and confidential character.
o The facts and circumstances in the present case and even the principal issue involved in the case at bar are
distinctly different from the cases cited by petitioners.
Further, in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the SC held that the fact that they, at times, handle 'confidential matters' does not suffice to characterize
their 'positions' as primarily confidential. Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle 'other routine matters,' and it has not
even been shown that their work is, at least, princ

Grino v. CSC (par. 2; security of tenure in confidential positions)
DOCTRINE: The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA No. 5185 which categorized them
together as positions of "trust”. By virtue of RA No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser
and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely categorized by law to be
"trusted services."
FACTS
• Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo.

• When he resigned to become acting Governor, he recommended the elevation of Teotimo Arandela from Senior Legal
Officer to Provincial Attorney.
• OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador later on decided to appoint Arandela as the Provincial Attorney.
o One Cirilo Gelvezon, on the other hand, was promoted from Legal Officer II to Senior Legal Officer.
o Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan were appointed to the position of Legal Officer II.
• Later, Simplicio Griño assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month later, he informed Arandela and
all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about his decision to terminate their services.
o In his letter, Griño made mention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which
appeared in the Panay News and which "undermined that trust and confidence" that he reposed on them.
• Governor Griño reappointed Demaisip as the Provincial Attorney. Griño also arranged the replacements of the other legal
officers, such as Gelvezon and Geduspan.
• Subsequently, Governor Griño formally terminated the services of the Arandela, Gelvezon, Geduspan and Datu-on on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence.
o The 4 apealled to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission.
• The Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring their termination illegal and ordering that they be immediately restored
to their positions with back salaries and other emoluments due them.
• Griño appealed to the Civil Service Commission.
• In Resolution No. 89-the Civil Service Commission affirmed the Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board, and directed
that the four to be restored to their former legal positions and be paid back salaries and other benefits.
• Griño filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CSC resolution and was denied.
ISSUES/HELD:
Are the positions of provincial attorney and his legal subordinates primarily confidential in nature so that the services of
those holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of confidence? --
On Provincial Attorney
• In Cadiente v. Santos, the SC ruled that the position of a city legal officers is undeniably one which is primarily confidential
in the following manner:
o The position of a City Legal Officer is one which is “primarily confidential”
o The SC held in Claudio v. Subido that the position of a City Legal officer is one requiring the utmost confidence
on the part of the mayor be extended to said officer
o The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer is one
that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entails for the counsel selected.
o As stated in Pinero v. Hechanova the phrase “primarily confidential” denotes not only confidence in the aptitude
of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse,
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of the
state.
o The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of
office lasts only as long as confidence in them endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal
o When such confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is separated from the service, such cessation
entails no removal but an expiration of his term.
o In the case of Hernandez vs. Villegas, the termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of
loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration
of the term of office — two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers
o In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayor of Davao terminated the services of the petitioner, he was
not removed or dismissed.
§ There being no removal or dismissal it could not, therefore, be said that there was a violation of the
constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section 1 (3), 1973 Constitution).
o In the case of Ingles vs. Mutuc, when an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure
of the appointing power, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed
from office — his term merely expires.
o The main difference between the former — the primary confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's term
is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or
election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to

the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office —
his term merely expired.
o The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of
office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures, and thus their cessation involves no removal.
• The case of Besa v. PNB, where petitioner, who was the Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice President of the Philippine
National Bank, questioned his being transferred to the position of Consultant on Legal Matters in the Office of President,
o The SC, considering said position to be primarily confidential held — It cannot be denied of course that the work
of the Chief Legal Counsel of the Bank is impressed with a highly technical aspect.
o Where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical and confidential, there can be no insistence
of a fixed or a definite term if the latter aspect predominates.
o The incumbent of a primarily confidential position should realize that at any time the appointing power may decide
that his services are no longer needed.
• BACK TO THIS CASE: The position is imbued with trust.
o Being a legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city they work for.
o Their services are precisely what the law considers “trusted services”
• The cases of Cadiente and Besa apply to this present case
• A city legal officer appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its counterpart in the province a
provincial attorney appointed by the provincial governor.
• The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA No. 5185 which categorized them together
3
as positions of "trust”
• By virtue of RA No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for
the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for.
o Their services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services."
• The fact that position of Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as one under the career service and
certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature.
• As in Cadiente where the position of the city legal officer was duly attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission
before this Court declared that the same was primarily confidential, this Court holds that the position of respondent Arandela
as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily confidential position.
• Following the principle that the tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence,
the Court finds that private respondent Arandela was not dismissed or removed from office when his services were
terminated.
o His term merely expired.
• The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree,
irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government functionary.
o The personal character of the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another attorney without the client's
consent.
• However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the relationship, can be delegated.
o The practice of delegating work of a counsel to his subordinates is apparent in the Office of the Provincial Attorney
wherein it can be gleaned from the power granted to such officer to exercise administrative supervision and control
over the acts and decision of his subordinates.
• It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where lawyers act as counsel in confidential and non-
confidential positions by simply looking at the proximity of the position in question in relation to that of the appointing
authority.
• Occupants of such positions would be considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were chosen by
the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which measures
freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust on confidential
matters of state.
• This implies that positions in the civil service of such nature would be limited to those not separated from the position of the
appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy.
o This is an additional reason why the positions of "City Legal Officer" and "Private Secretary to the President" were
considered primarily confidential by the Court.
• On the other hand, a customs policeman serving in the Harbor Patrol, in relation to the
• Commissioner of Customs, and an executive assistant, stenographer, or clerk in the Office of the President, were not
considered so by the Court.
• There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists the confidential employer above
described.
o Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the appointing authority, the element
of trust between them is no longer predominant.

3
Sec. 19. Creation of positions of Provincial Attorney and City Legal officer. — To enable the provincial and city governments to avail
themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal officers, the positions of provincial attorney and city legal officer may be
created and such officials shall be appointed in such manner as is provided for under Section four of this Act.
For this purpose the functions hitherto performed by the provincial and city fiscals in serving as legal adviser and legal officer for civil
cases of the province and city shall be transferred to the provincial attorney and city legal officer, respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)

o The importance of these subordinates to the appointing authority now lies in the contribution of their legal skills
to facilitate the work of the confidential employee.
o At this level of the bureaucracy, any impairment of the appointing authority's interest as a client, which may be
caused through the breach of residual trust by any of these lower-ranked lawyers, can be anticipated and
prevented by the confidential employee, as a reasonably competent office head, through the exercise of his power
to "review, approve, reverse, or modify" their acts and decisions. At this level, the client can be protected without
need of imposing upon the lower-ranked lawyers the fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship.
§ Hence, there is now no obstacle to giving full effect to the security of tenure principle to these members
of the civil service.
o Their positions are highly technical in character and not confidential, so they are permanent employees, and they
belong to the category of classified employees under the Civil Service Law.
o Consequently, the holders of the said items, being permanent employees, enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed
under the Constitution

CSC v. Salas (1997)
(edited A2017 digest)
1. It is not within the power of Congress to declare what positions are primarily confidential or policy-determining. 'It is the nature alone
of the position that determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily confidential.
2. The occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen
by the appointing authority was, to repeat, the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which
ensures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.
FACTS:
• October 7, 1989 - Respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member
and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
o However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly
for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR.
o The summary of intelligence information claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as
detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as
gunners on different occasions by respondent.
• December 23, 1991 - He submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, requesting
reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard, but the same was denied.
• February 17, 1992 - He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal on the ground
that, as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired. On
appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the decision of the MSPB.
• September 14, 1995 – CA rendered its questioned decision with the finding that herein respondent Salas is not a
confidential employee, hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate
court applied the “proximity rule” enunciated in the case of Griño, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.
• The termination by PAGCOR was grounded on the appreciation of Section 16 of P.D. 1869 which reads:
o “All positions in the corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from
the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel
management policies set by the Board of Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall
be classified as ‘confidential’ appointees.” (In essence, the logic is since he is a confidential employee
pursuant to the P.D., his termination is actually an “expiration of his term”, having been removed for cause, which
is loss of confidence).
ISSUE/ HELD:
Was Section 16 of the PD No. 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution?
Yes.
• On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that “Section 16 of PD 1869
insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been amended, modified
or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)”.
• However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that “all employees of the
casino and related services shall be classified as ‘confidential appointees.’”
• While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the implementing rules of
the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292
or the Administrative Code of 1987.
o This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of the
categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869.
o Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.
• When Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act) was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that “the non-
competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive
or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature.” In the
case of Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., the Court obliged with a short discourse there on how the phrase “in nature” came
to find its way into the law, thus:
o “The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policy-determining, etc.)
to that finally approved and enacted (‘or which are policy-determining, etc.in nature’) came about because of the
observations of Senator Taada, that as originally worded the proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat
of law a certain position as primarily confidential or policy-determining, which should not be the case. The Senator
urged that since the Constitution speaks of positions which are ‘primarily confidential, policy-determining,
or highly technical in nature’, it is not within the power of Congress to declare what positions are primarily
confidential or policy-determining. ‘It is the nature alone of the position that determines whether it is
policy-determining or primarily confidential.’ Hence, the Senator further observed, the matter should be left

to the ‘proper implementation of the laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be filled’, and if the position
is ‘highly confidential’ then the President and the Civil Service Commissioner must implement the law.
• Since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.
o And the court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed that executive pronouncements, such as Presidential
Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict.
o It must be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by
executive fiat, the protection of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the Constitution.
o In other words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent application without
compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to security of tenure.
• The question that may now be asked is whether the Piero doctrine – to the effect that notwithstanding any statutory
classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which
finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical – is still controlling
with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, Book V of which deals specifically with
the Civil Service Commission, considering that from these later enactments, in defining positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, the phrase “in nature” was deleted.
• Basing from the ConCom deliberations, It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for determining merit
and fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered
non-competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for purposes of
determining merit and fitness.
Was Salas a confidential employee? NO.
• It is still the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical. It is thus a question of fact which may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict.
• For instance, we might have a case where a position is created requiring that the holder of that position should be a member
of the Bar and the law classifies this position as highly technical.
o However, the Supreme Court has said before that a position which requires mere membership in the Bar is not a
highly technical position.
o Since the term 'highly technical' means something beyond the ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always
a question of fact.”
o Thus, “if the law of the administrative agency says that a position is primarily confidential when in fact it is not, we
can always challenge that in court. It is not enough that the law calls it primarily confidential to make it such; it is
the nature of the duties which makes a position primarily confidential.”
Was Salas a confidential employee under the Proximity Rule? NO.
• Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position
that is primarily confidential.
o The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings
of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.”
• As applied to this case:
a. Salas merely performs routine functions such as preventing irregularities, misbehavior, illegal transactions and other
anomalous activities among the employees and customers, reporting unusual incidents, and coordinates with CCTV and/or
external security.
b. Salas do not report directly to the Chairman. He is in the lowest chain of command.

Achacoso v. Macaraig (1991) – par. 2; temporary appointments
DOCTRINE: A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or only
as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible. The person
named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so
by the appointing authority. His term is understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
FACTS:
• Tomas Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA.

• In compliance with a request addressed by the President to “all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries,
Bureau Heads,” and other government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation.
• This was accepted by the President on April 3, 1990.
• On April 10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administror as OIC.
• In a letter dated April 19, Achacoso protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his
resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President’s directive.
• On the same date, Jose Sarmiento was appointed POEA Administrator.
• Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was against asked to vacate his office.
o He filed an MR but this was denied.
o He then came to the SC for relief.
• Achacoso filed the petition for prohibition and mandamus, asking to annul the appointment of Sarmiento and to prohibit the
respondents from preventing the him from discharging his duties as POEA Administrator.
• He contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure.
o He cited the Civil Service Decree which provides for the Positions in the Career Executive Service: USec., ASec,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant RD, Chief of Department Service, and
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
• Achacoso argues that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the enumerated officials, it was beyond the prerogatives
of the President to require them to submit courtesy resignations.
o Such resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having been submitted “under duress.”
• OSG concedes that the office of the POEA Administrator is a career executive service position but submits that Achacoso
himself is not a career executive service official entitled to security of tenure because during the time he was appointed
POEA Administrator, he did not possess the necessary qualifications, as shown by a certification from the CSC.
o OSG also made reference to the Integrated Reorganization Plan as approved by several PDs:
§ The President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service
eligible, provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required CES exam and that he shall
not be promoted to a higher class until he qualifies in such examination.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was Achacoso’s appointment permanent? – NO
• A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility required.
• Achacoso did not.
• At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary.
• And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and “at a moment’s notice.”
• The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
• Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility of lack of it.
• A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or only
as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible.
o The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
• The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
• The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
• In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law of
public officers as expiration of the term.
o His term is understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.

o When required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his security of
tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent BEFORE the expiration his term.
• This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as provided by law.
• The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has expired.
• Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
Was his appointment intended to be permanent? – NO
• Achacoso is wrong in contending that it was intended to be permanent since temporary appointments are not supposed to
exceed 12 months and he was allowed to serve in his positions for more than 3 years.
o Even if that intention were assumed, it would not by itself alone make his appointment permanent.
o Such an appointment did not confer on Achacoso the appropriate civil service eligibility he did not possess at the
time he was appointed, nor did it vest him with the right to security of tenure that is available only to permanent
appointees.

Santiago v. CSC (1989) – par.2 –“next in rank rule” not mandatory
DOCTRINE: One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not
necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position.
FACTS:
• Customs Commissioner Tañada extended the permanent promotional appointment of petitioner Santiago as Customs
Collector III. He was previously a customs collector II.
• Jose, a customs collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board against the appointment of Santiago,
arguing that he was next-in-rank to that position.
o The board referred the protest to Tañada.
• Tañada upheld the promotional appointment on the grounds, among others, that:
o (1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory;
o (2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the position and such fact was not questioned by the protestant;
and
o (3) existing law and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the appointing authority provided there is no
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud.
• Jose appealed to the board, which decided to revoke the appointment of Santiago and directed that Jose be appointed.
o The Commission ruled that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs
Collector III, respondent JOSE has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment, civil service
eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a
position which is higher in rank and salary range.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the next in rank rule applicable? – NO it is not mandatory.
• The court has previously ruled that there is “no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first
to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer
or other modes of appointment”
• One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not
necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed.
o The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
promote such person to the next higher position.
• Furthermore, the power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is
best qualified for the position.
o To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the
policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and
prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

Hernandez v. Villegas – loss of confidence as ground for termination; expiration of term not removal from office
(A2015 edited)
DOCTRINE:Persons occupying non-competitive positions are also covered by the guarantee of security of tenure. The
distinction between competitive and non-competitive is significant only for purposes of appointment. The termination of the official
relation of officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions on the ground of loss of confidence can be justified because
in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but expiration of the term of office.  
FACTS:
• Respondent Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed as Director for Security of the Bureau of
Customs on November 1, 1955.
• The following year, he was sent to the US to study enforcement techniques and customs practices.
• June 1957 – he returned and he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service.
o In his stead, James Keefe was designated as Acting Director for Security.
• While serving as Arrastre Superintendent, Villegas still received his salary for being Director for Security. He even got the
corresponding raise.
• In 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent appointment of Villegas
as Arrastre Superintendent and Keefe as Director of Security.
o Arrastre Superintendent is a classified position while Director for Security is a confidential position.
o Executive Secretary Pajo later on informed Hernandez about the approval by the President of the appointments,
effective January 1, 1958.
• Villegas only learned about these permanent appointments on February 28, 1958.
• He thereafter served notice on the Commissioner of Customs that he would resume the duties of Director of Security.
o He also asked the Auditor General, Secretary Hernandez, Commissioner Capapas, the Budget Commissioner and the
Civil Service Commissioner to disapprove the promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of Director of Security, but
they refused.
• Villegas thus filed for quo warranto with the CFI of Manila.
o The court ruled in favor of Villegas, with an award for backpay starting from January 1, 1958.
o The Court of Appeals affirmed this. 
• On appeal to the SC, petitioners allege that since the office of Director for Security performs functions which are primarily
confidential, then the Office of the Director for Security is itself primarily confidential.
o They then allege that the transfer of Villegas to the Arrastre Service is correct because primarily confidential positions
are “excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed
by the Constitution.
o On the other hand, CA held that the position of Director for Security has not been classified as primarily confidential
by the President, such classification being necessary under Section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Villegas entitled to the office of Director of Security? – Yes
• There is no need to consider whether or not the position is primarily confidential because, even assuming the position to be so,
it is nevertheless subject to the constitutional provision that “No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause.”
o In other words, everyone in the Civil Service enjoys security of tenure. 
• In Corpus v. Cuaderno, it was ruled that “the Constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily
confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on
the basis of merit a fitness as determined from competitive examinations, but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions
from the operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enumerated in section 4 of Article XII that ‘No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law’ and which recognizes no
exception.” •
• The statement in De los Santo v. Mallare (as cited by the petitioners) that appointment to any of the three positions (primarily
confidential, policy- determining, highly technical) is terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be deemed a mere obiter. 
• It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as
confidence in them endures.
o The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office — two different causes for the
termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.

Briones v. Osmeña (1958) – abolition in good faith
Article IX, Section 2: (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
DOCTRINE: While abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only where the abolition is made in
good faith; the right to abolish cannot be used to cover the discharge of employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be
exercised for personal or political reasons.
FACTS:
• Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible.

o March 1937, Briones was appointed as Clerk-Stenographer in the Cebu City Treasurer Office.
o August 1937, she was transferred to the Office of the City Mayor, in the same capacity as Clerk-Stenographer,
but with a permanent status.
o She remained in service continuously, receiving repeated promotions and increases in salary.
• Faustino O. Rosagaran is a second grade civil service eligible.
o Since July 1940, Rosagaran was employed in the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu, and was promoted to
Administrative Officer.
o 1955, he was publicly declared and adjudged as a "Model Employee".
• January 1956, the Municipal Board of the City of Cebu passed Resolution No. 21.
o This created 35 positions in the office of the City Mayor Sergio Osmeña Jr.
• February 1956, the Municipal Board issued Resolution No. 187.
o This abolished 15 positions in the City Mayor's office and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board, or a
total of 32 positions in both offices. This included the positions occupied by Briones and Rosagaran.
• Osmeña wrote to Briones and Rosagaran notifying them of the abolition of their positions and advising them of the
termination of their services "effective at the close of business hours on March 15, 1956."
• Briones and Rosagaran replied (1) acknowledging receipt his letters of separation, (2) protesting the abolition of their
positions, and (3) informing him that they will not relinquish their positions "until otherwise determined by higher competent
authorities or courts."
• Osmeña persisted in terminating their services.
o He added to the fact that the City Treasurer and City Auditor refused to pay their salaries.
• Briones and Rosaragan filed a petition for reinstatement, back salaries, moral damages and attorney's fees.
• CFI of Cebu decided in favor of the Briones and Rosagaran and declared the abolition of their offices null and void for lack
of approval of the Department Head. The approval was required by EO No. 506.
o CFI ordered the reinstatement of the two to their former positions and pay their back salaries as well as
the cost of the suit. Osemeña appealed.
• Osmeña contended that the provisions of EO 506 that required the previous approval of the Department Head before
abolition of positions, is NO longer operative since the Commonwealth, in view of the fact that the Constitution vests in the
President, under Art. VII, section 10 (1) that only general supervision, and not control, over local governments.
ISSUES/HELD:
Should Briones and Rosaragan be reinstated?—YES!
• SC held that the case of Pulutan vs. Dizon is of no application.

o The case referred to police officers, whose removal or suspension is governed by entirely different laws (Executive
Order No. 175 and RA 557). Moreover, in the Pulutan case, the validity and constitutionality of the Provincial
Circular and of Executive Order No. 506 was NOT in issue.
• Nevertheless, SC held that the decision appealed from should be sustained, but on different grounds.
o SC held that the evidence on record is convincing that the reasons of economic and efficiency given for the
abolition of the positions of the Briones and Rosaragan are untrue, and constitute a mere subterfuge for the
removal without cause of the said appellees, in violation of the security of Civil Service tenures as provided by
the Constitution.
• A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that a civil service eligible, like Briones and
Rosaragan, who have rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions
of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of political changes.
• In Pulutan vs. Dizon, SC held that:
o It is evident that the mayor could not legally remove the petitioner without cause, for being a member of the Civil
Service, his tenure of office is protected by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, which says: 'No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.'
• The Committee on Civil Service of the Constitutional Convention, in recommending said provision said:
o The merit system will be ineffective if no safeguards are placed around the separation and removal of the
public employees. The Committees' report requires that removal shall be made only for cause' and in the
manner provided by law. This means that there should be bona fide reasons and action may be taken
only after the employee shall have been given a fair hearing. This affords to public employees reasonable
security of tenure.

• SC has always upheld these salutary principles.
o In Gacho vs. Osmeña, SC held that while abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule
is true only where the abolition is made in good faith; that the right to abolish can not be used to discharge
employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.
• Osmeña aver that the petition mandamus should have been dismissed because Briones and Rosaragan have not exhausted
the available administrative remedies.
o However, SC held that in their Stipulation of Facts expressly admitted paragraph 18 of the petition, alleging "that
all administrative remedies have been exhausted by the petitioners for the speedy and ample protection of their
rights." The assignment of error is not only groundless but improper.

Santos v. Yatco (1959) – Electioneering or Partisan Political Activity
DOCTRINE: Secretary of National Defense is not embraced within the terms “officers and employees in the civil service” who are also
prohibited to take part in partisan political activities. The position of Cabinet members are essentially political; they may engage in
partisan political activity. *I can’t find the orig case sa net (Hassle sa muscle, stress sa matres) but the digest below is based on a PLJ
article citing the case and based on Bibbo kids digest as well. L.
FACTS:
• Alejo Santos was the Secretary of National Defense.

• He campaigned for Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nationalista Party in the Province of Bulacan.
• A case was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal under Judge Nicasio Yatco.
o A preliminary injunction was issued by him restraining the Secretary of National Defense to campaign.
• An appeal was made before the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE/HELD:
Can department secretaries/Cabinet members (Secretary of National Defense, in this case) lawfully engage in active political
campaign? – YES
• The SC resolved that the Sec. of National Defense is not embraced within the terms “officers and employees in the civil
service” who are also prohibited to take part in partisan political activities.
*Full text of the SC Resolution:

• "In G.R. No. L-16133 (Alejo Santos. etc. Vs. Honorable Nicasio Yatco. etc .. et al).
o considering that respondent Alejo Santos is Secretary of National Defense and head of the Department of
National Defense, with power of control and supervision over the armed forces;
o considering that the position of Secretary of National Defense is not embraced and included within the terms,
'officers and employees in the civil service' (as disclosed in the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention
wherein the attempt of Delegate Munar to include the heads of executive departments within the civil service was
rejected);
o considering that the presidential form of government set up in the Constitution and the democratic procedures
established therein of determining issues, political, economic or otherwise, by election, allows political parties to
submit their views and the principles and policies they stand for to the electorate for decision;
o considering that respondent in campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nationalista Party of
the Province of Bulacan, was acting as member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and
defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs;
o considering further that the question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such Campaign because of its
deleterious influence upon the members of the Armed Forces who are administratively subordinated to the
Secretary of National Defense, and who are often called upon by the Commission on Election to aid in the conduct
of orderly and impartial elections, is not justiciable by this court:
o The Court hereby resolves to grant the petition and hereby sets aside the order of the Honorable Nicasio Yatco.
Julge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal prohibiting respondent Alejo Santos from campaigning personally or
in his official capacity."
• The position of Cabinet members are essentially political; they may engage in partisan political activity.

GSIS vs. Kapisanan (2006) – no strike
DOCTRINE: Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work. The right
of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
FACTS:
• On October 4-7, 2004, there was a 4-day concerted demonstration, rally and en masse walkout waged in front of the GSIS
Main Office in Roxas Boulevard
o A huge percentage of the participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG) a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
o The mass action's target appeared to have been Winston Garcia, as GSIS President and General Manager, and
his management style.
• While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not
covered by a prior approved leave, thus AWOL (Absence Without Leave).
• On Oct. 10, a memo was issued directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged
administratively for their participation in said rally.
o KMG sought reconsideration on the ground that the subject employees resumed work on Oct. 8, in obedience to
the return-to-work order.
o Said reconsideration was effectively denied by the filing of administrative charges against 110 KMG members
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
• Ignoring the formal charges, KMG filed a suit before the CA.
o KMG faulted the GSIS and Garcia for disregarding Civil Service Resolution No. 021316 (Guidelines for Prohibited
Mass Action)
o Sec. 10 which exhorts government agencies to "harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and
attention to employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of
grievance machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules."
• CA ruled in favor of KMG.
• Garcia filed an MR which was denied. He then brought this petition to the SC via a R45 Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE/RULING:
Was GSIS / Garcia correct in filing administrative charges against the employees? YES.
• The employee's act of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on
strike in the public sector.
• MPSTA v. Laguio: Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of work. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.
• Jacinto v. CA: As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance
with law." [SEE CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 3.]
o This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors
such right.
o Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize,
for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which:
§ "Enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.”
• The events that transpired on October 4-7, partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited
concerted activity.
o The phrase "prohibited concerted activity" refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees,
by themselves or through their employees' organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise.
§ It includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
o Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and
waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office
building.
nd rd th
o Out of 1,756 employees, 851 joined on the first day, 707 on the 2 day, 538 on the 3 day, and 306 on the 4 .
o To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency
at the GSIS main office during those 4 days of massive walkouts and absences would be to understate things.

Gloria v. CA (2000) – temporary employees (supra; Art. VII on immunity)
DOCTRINE: While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees prior consent, it cannot
be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
FACTS
• June 29, 1989, private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City
Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
• October 10, 1994 - Petitioner Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that Dr. Icasiano be
reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
• October 12, 1994 - The President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
• October 13, 1994 - A copy of the recommendation for petitioner’s reassignment, as approved by the President, was
transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation.
• October 14, 1994 - Director Rosas, informed Dr. Icasiano of his reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
• Dr. Icasiano requested Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request.
o The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for a
reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS.
o However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
• October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed for TRO in the CA.
o CA granted and restrained Sec. Gloria from implementing the re-assignment.
• CA issued assailed enjoining Sec. Gloria from implementing the reassignment of Dr. Icasiano.
ISSUE/HELD:
Did the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School
Superintendent of MIST violate his security of tenure? YES.
• Gloria maintains that the doctrine under Bentain v. CA, i.e. "a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in
rank, status and salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the service" does not apply in the present case for the
reassignment in question was merely temporary, lasting only until the appointment of a new Vocational School
Superintendent of MIST.
• The reassignment to MIST “appears to be indefinite.”
o As held by the CA: “the reassignment of the petitioner to MIST appears to be indefinite. No period is fixed. No
objective or purpose, from which the temporariness of the assignment may be inferred, is set. In fact, the
recommendation of respondent Secretary Gloria to the President that the position of superintendent of MIST will
best fit his (petitioners) qualifications and experience.”
o It implies that the proposed reassignment will be indefinite
o The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect
that the reassignment of private respondent will “best fit his qualifications and experience” being “an expert in
vocational and technical education.”
o It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field.
o Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is
temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration.
o Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent.
• “Security of tenure” is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection
extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to
illegal removals
o While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees prior consent,
it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away
from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the
Civil Service.

Flores v. Drilon (supra, Art. 7, Sec. 13; prohibition against designation of elective officer during tenure)
Sec, 7, Art. IX-B No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
st
DOCTRINE: The 1 paragraph of Sec 7, Art. IX-B is more stringent than the second paragraph (which deals with appointive officials)
by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post.
XPN: when the Constitution provides otherwise (i.e. President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President can
be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council)
FACTS:
• This case involves the constitutionality of Sec. 13(d) of R.A. 7227 or the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992”
(BCDA Act). The provision states that:
o (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic
Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex-officio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority.
o The main focus is on the proviso.
• Flores et al. are (1) taxpayers, (2) employees of the U.S. Facility in Subic, and (3) officers of the Filipino Civilian Employees
Association.
o Richard Gordon, the Mayor of Olongapo and appointed Chairman and Chief Executive of Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Drilon as Executive Secretary.
• Flores contend the unconstitutionality of the provision because they go against the ff:
o Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution provides that "the President shall… appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.”
o Sec. 7(1), Art. 9-B, of the Constitution states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.”  (Syllabus topic)
o Sec. 261(g), of the Omnibus Election Code [Prohibited Acts] - "The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:…(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases xxx"
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive
Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
• Basically, the provision in the BCDA appoints someone to be the Chairman of the SBMA. Petitioners contend that (1) this
legislative act encroaches upon the appointing power of the President, (2) allows an elective official to hold another public
position; and 3) violates the Omnibus Elections Code.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the provision in Sec. 13(d) violate the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts? – YES.
• Sec 7, Art. IX-B expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public
officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services.
o It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.
• (Art. IX-B ruling) The provision directs the President to appoint an elective official (Mayor of Olongapo City) to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
o This is precisely what the constitutional provision seeks to prevent.
4
o SC held that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7(1), Art. 9-B, of the Constitution.
nd
o The 2 paragraph of Sec. 7(1), Art. 9-B authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when
allowed

4
Art. IX-B, Sec. 7: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

st
§ The 1 paragraph is more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or
designation of an elective official to the government post.
• Except when the Constitution provides otherwise (i.e. President as head of the economic and
planning agency; the Vice-President can be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of
Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council)
o SC cited constitutional deliberation to emphasize the distinction. Thus, the second paragraph cannot be extended
to elective officials.  
• SC also held that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his office.  
o However, Sec. 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13(d) of the BCDA Act. This is
because no legislative act can prevail over the Constitution.
o Moreover, since the validity of Sec. 94 of LGC is not an issue here, SC did not rule on its validity.
• Gordon argues that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio:
o SC held that Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as ex-officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City w/o need of appointment.
o The phrase "shall be appointed" shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
• On the issue of legislative encroachment of the appointing authority of the president:
o SC held that an “appointment” is the designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority, to discharge
the duties of some office or selection/designation of a person, to fill an office or public function and discharge
the  duties of the same.  
o SC also held that the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
o Appointment  involves an exercise of discretion on whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial  act of issuing appointment
papers to the appointee.  
o Based on the deliberations, Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee  for the first
year of the effectivity of the BCDA Act. The proviso limits the appointing authority to only one option: the incumbent
Mayor of Olongapo City.
o Since only one can qualify, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose. The power of
appointment with no power to choose is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment whom
to appoint.  
• SC held that as long as Gordon is an incumbent and an elective official, he remains ineligible for appointment to another
public office.
o When an incumbent elective official was appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his
elective office nor remove the ineligibility found in the Constitution.
o On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or
designation is invalid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
• On Gordon as a de facto officer: He is ineligible for appointment to be the Chairman of the SBMA.
o However, he remains to be the Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void.
• SC held Sec. 13(d) of the BCDA Act unconstitutional and the appointment of Gordon is invalid.
• However, as the de facto officer, his acts remain valid, as well as his allowances and emoluments received by virtue of the
position.

Sadueste v. Municipality of Surigao (1941)
(edited A2017 digest)
DOCTRINE: There being no law by which the appellant is specifically authorized to receive additional compensation for his services
as Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer, his claim therefor must fail
FACTS:
• Pursuant to the provisions of Sec 1916 of the Revised Admin Code, Saduesta, as district engineer for the Province of
Surigao was designated by the Director of Public Works as sanitary and waterworks engineer for the same province, with
an additional compensation of not more than P60/month. Provincial Board of Surigao approved the designation.
• During the time that Saduesta served as sanitary and waterworks engineer, the municipal council of Surigao failed to provide
the necessary appropriation for his services in the aggregate sum of P2,338.06.
• Sadueste then instituted an action for its recovery with claim for damages. However, complaint was dismissed, the trial court
holding that the provision of law (sec. 1916 of the Rev. Adm. Code, as amended by Acts Nos. 3257 and 3978) authorizing
such additional compensation has been repealed by section 17 of Act No. 4187, otherwise known as the General
Appropriation Act for 1936.
• Under section 1916 of the Revised Admin Code, last sentence thereof provides that,
o “Upon designation of the Director of Public Works, a district engineer may be allowed additional compensation
with the approval of the provincial board not to exceed sixty pesos per month to be paid from the income of the
waterworks system supervised by him for services rendered in his capacity as sanitary and waterworks engineer.”
• Section 17 of Act No. 4187 [repealing law], however reads:
o “Abolition of additional compensation. — Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no full
time officer or employee of the government shall thereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or
extra compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any fund of the government, its
dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards created by law, except (a) officers serving as chairmen
or members of boards of entities and enterprises organized, operated, owned or controlled by the Government,
who may be paid per diems for each meeting actually attended or when on official travel; (b) auditors and
accountants; (c) provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees; (d) employees serving as observers of
the Wheather Bureau; and (e) those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of the
provisions of this Act. This section is hereby made permanent legislation.”
ISSUE/ HELD:
Can Sadueste claim the additional compensation? No. There being no law by which the appellant is specifically authorized
to receive additional compensation for his services as Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer, his claim therefor must fail (as
the GAA expressly repealed sec. 1916 of the Admin Code).
• Under Article XI, section 3, of the Philippine Constitution, "no officer or employee of the Government shall receive additional
or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law." (Emphasis ours.)
• There being no law by which Sadueste is specifically authorized to receive additional compensation for his services as
Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer, his claim therefore must fail.
• The authority granted in the last paragraph of section 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code is a general authority given
to all district engineers.
o The authority required by the Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific authority
given to a particular employee or officer of the Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting
the payment of extra or additional compensation.
• The purpose of the Constitution is to prohibit generally payment of additional or double compensation except in individual
instances where the payment of such additional compensation appears to be not only just but necessary.

Art. 9-C. COMELEC
Sec. 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and 6 Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of 7 years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, 3 Members shall hold office for 7 years, 2 Members for 5
years, and the last Members for 3 years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Cayetano v. Monsod (1991) – meaning of practice of law
FACTS:
• Christian Monsod was nominated by Pres. Cory to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments.
• Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
• The COA affirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
o He then took his oath and assumed office.
• Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the COA of Monsod’s nomination, Cayetano, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the petition, praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC be
declared null and void.
ISSUES/HELD:
What is the practice of law?
• No jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

• Black’s definition:
o The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients.
• A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he, for valuable consideration, engages in the business of
advising persons, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity
as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, etc, constituted by law or authorized
to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act/s for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law.
• The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining
the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
o The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law.
o Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
• [Super haba pa ng mga definitions na copy-pasted with regard to the definition. Check orig na lang]
Was Monsod considered to have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years? – YES
• Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the 1960 bar exams with a grade of 86.55%.
o He has been a dues-paying member of the IBP since its inception in 1972 and has been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years.
o After graduating from the UP College of Law and passing the bar, he worked in the law office of his father.
o During his stint in the World Bank Group for 7 years, he worked as an operations officer for about 2 years in Costa
Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank.
o Upon returning to the PH in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as CEO of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate.
o Also since 1986, he has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or CEO and
as former Sec-Gen and National Chairman of NAMFREL.
o He was also a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body which conducted numerous hearings
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission.

• About the “work of a negotiating team” of which Monsod used to be a member:
o In a loan agreement, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during negotiation.
o After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned.
o In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
o For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty.
o Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
• Interpreted in the lights of the various definitions of the term Practice of Law, particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work
experiences as lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
• An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
• The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, of 4 stages:
o Nomination
o Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
o Issuance of a commission in the PH, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment
o Acceptance (e.g. oath taking, posting of bond, etc.)
• The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC is mandated by Sec. 1(2), Art. 9-C of the Constitution.
• The difference between any other individual advising others on what the law means, is that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing for over 10 years.
o This is different from the acts of persons practicing law without first becoming lawyers.
• The Commission, on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
o The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of GADALEJ.
• If the COA rejects a nominee by the President, may the SC reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? NO
• In the same vein, may the SC reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? NO
• If the US Senate (which is the confirming body in the US Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would
incredible that the US SC would still reverse the US Senate.
• Petition dismissed.

Atienza v. COMELEC (2010)
(A2015)
DOCTRINE: COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
FACTS:
• On July 5, 2005, respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his
party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza,
Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the
announcement without consulting his party.
• On March 2, 2006, Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when
convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with
Atienza as LP president.
• Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections.
o He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO)
and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened.
o Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term
that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.
• On the other hand, Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006
assembly.
o The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to “people power,” wherein the LP majority removed
respondent Drilon as president by direct action.
o Atienza also said that the amendments to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP
officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other
officers already ended on July 24, 2006.
• The COMELEC issued a resolution partially granting Drilon’s petition which considered null and void the March 2, 2006
elections since they did not convene in accordance to the Salonga constitution and that Drilon was only holding the
presidency in a holdover capacity since the amendments to the Salonga constitution was not yet properly ratified.
• On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilon’s petition and denying that of petitioner
Atienza.
o The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute;
that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilon’s term
as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.
• Drilon’s term expired and the LP elected Roxas as their new president. This election was contested by Atienza since as LP
members their rights were violated.
• The COMELEC ruled the Roxas election was proper and that the amendments to the Salonga constitution changed the
NECO membership to incumbent elected officials. Moreover, the COMELEC did not resolve the Atienza, et al. membership
issue since it is an internal party matter. Atienza contests this resolution.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is LP, which was not impleaded in the case, an indispiensable party? – NO
• Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an
indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.’s prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.’s acts and the
reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.
Does the ousted LP members (Atienza et.al) have standing to question the Roxas election? – YES
• It is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.’s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP
members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers
and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.’s allegations were correct,
they would have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled
to recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO
members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, It is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.’s allegations that respondents Roxas,
et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them
to take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If
Atienza, et al.’s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers,
void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of
officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another
election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court’s decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal
standing to pursue this petition. They are real party-in-interest.

Was there GADALEJ when COMELEC upheld the NECO membership that elected Roxas as LP President? – NO
• The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained
in details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders. The explanation is logical
and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the
composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.
o Petitioner Atienza claims that the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman
with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from
that position violated the Court’s resolution. But the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the
party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29 and 46 of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very
well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Was there GADALEJ when COMELEC resolved the issued on the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the
issue on the expulsion of Atienza et.al from the party? – NO
• Petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the
election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under
the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
• The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all
controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference
from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
• The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled
in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts.” The Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.
o The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to
settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination
of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers
to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts.
Was there a violation of due process? – NO
• The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The case of Ang Tibay
v. CIR cannot apply. Furthermore, the right to due process in the Bill of Rights is a limitation of the powers of the state and
not a private entity like the LP.
• The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas’ election as LP president but refused to rule on
the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELEC’s performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said
of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of
party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power
over political parties.

Arroyo v. DOJ – prosecution of election offenses
DOCTRINE: The power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the COMELEC. The grant to the COMELEC of
the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is
intended to enable the COMELEC to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.
FACTS:
• Due to allegations of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections,
on August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
• On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 640 naming three (3) of its prosecutors to the
Joint Committee.
• COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004
and 2007 elections.
• COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ
and the Comelec.
o In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
o The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
• After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of
electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
• Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the creation of the COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid? – Yes.
• Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec.
o The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the
people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.
o The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
• Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec.
The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government.
o Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had
been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the
continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
• In acting jointly with the DOJ, the Comelec cannot be considered to have abdicated its independence in favor of the
executive branch of government. Resolution No. 9266 was validly issued by the Comelec as a means to fulfill its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
• The role of the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation of election offenses has long been recognized by the
COMELEC because of its lack of funds and legal officers to conduct investigations and to prosecute such cases on its own.
o This is especially true after R.A. No. 9369 vested in the COMELEC and the DOJ the concurrent jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.
• While we uphold the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 9266 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, we declare the Joint
Committee’s Rules of Procedure infirm for failure to comply with the publication requirement. Consequently, Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure govern.
Was the conduct of Preliminary Investigation valid? – Yes.
• In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the petitioners basic due process rights such as the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits,
and other supporting documents in her defense.
• Admittedly, GMA received the notice requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit. Yet, she did not comply, allegedly because
she could not prepare her counter-affidavit. She claimed that she was not furnished by Senator Pimentel pertinent
documents that she needed to adequately prepare her counter-affidavit.

• The Joint Committee, however, denied GMA’s motion which carried with it the denial to extend the filing of her counter-
affidavit. Consequently, the cases were submitted for resolution sans GMA’s and the other petitioners’ counter-affidavits.
This, according to GMA, violates her right to due process of law.
• The subpoena issued against respondent therein should be accompanied by a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents. GMA also has the right to examine documents but such right of examination is limited only to the
documents or evidence submitted by the complainants (Senator Pimentel and the Fact-Finding Team) which she may not
have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.
• While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases in the allegations of
significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were no annexes or attachments to the
complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committee’s Order dated November 15, 2011 denying GMA’s Omnibus Motion Ad
.
Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence However, Senator
Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial Report.
Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted
the right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those
were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee.
Does Joint Order No. 001-2011 violate the equal protection clause? – No.
• Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents.
o They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials
linked to the Arroyo Administration.
• While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were
linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of
their official duties.
o Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
• The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege.
o It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
o Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality.
o It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Jaigest Poli8

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Jaigest Poli8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Funa v.

CSC Chairman (2014) – independence of the Commission

Section 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Was a petition for certiorari the proper case to file? – NO.

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo

Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy

Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter

Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie

Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis

Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa

Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren

Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela

Party List Akbayan

Party List Bayan Muna

Party List Anak Pawis

Dear Bishop Navarra:

Was there a violation of petitioners’ right to property. YES.

Did the LGU comply with the rule on proof of service? – NO

Did the Fresh Period under Neypes apply to the petition? – NO

Did the COA commit GADALEJ? – NO

Who has jurisdiction over procurement protests, as in this case? – RTC

• In the case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco, SC held that:

• National Service Corporation v. NLRC:

Does the CSC have jurisdiction over this case? YES.

Did the CSC lose appellate jurisdiction? NO

Is A0 3 valid? – NO; Assistant Secretary to Mayor is NON-competitive

• Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo.

Was Salas a confidential employee? NO.

Was Salas a confidential employee under the Proximity Rule? NO.

• Tomas Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA.

Was Achacoso’s appointment permanent? – NO

Was his appointment intended to be permanent? – NO

Is the next in rank rule applicable? – NO it is not mandatory.

Is Villegas entitled to the office of Director of Security? – Yes

• Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible.

Should Briones and Rosaragan be reinstated?—YES!

• SC held that the case of Pulutan vs. Dizon is of no application.

• Alejo Santos was the Secretary of National Defense.

*Full text of the SC Resolution:

Cayetano v. Monsod (1991) – meaning of practice of law

What is the practice of law?

• No jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Is LP, which was not impleaded in the case, an indispiensable party? – NO

Was there a violation of due process? – NO

Is the creation of the COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid? – Yes.

Was the conduct of Preliminary Investigation valid? – Yes.

You might also like