ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
ICJ REPORTS 1951 delimitation was or was not contrary to
FACTS:
The United Kingdom requested the
court to decide if Norway had used a legally
acceptable method in drawing the baseline
from which it measured its territorial sea. The
United Kingdom argued that customary
international law did not allow the length of a
baseline drawn across a bay to be longer than
ten miles. Norway argued that its delimitation
method was consistent with general principles
of international law.
In past centuries British fisherman had made
incursions in the waters near the Norwegian coast. As
a result of complaints from the King of Norway,
they abstained from doing so at the beginning
of the 17th century and for 300 years. But in
1906 British vessels appeared again.
These were trawlers equipped with improved
and powerful gear. The local population became
perturbed, and measures were taken by Norway with
a view to specifying the limits within which fishing was
prohibited to foreigners.
Incidents occurred became more and more
frequent, and on July 12th 1935, the Norwegian
government delimited the Norwegian fisheries
zone by decree. Negotiations had been entered
into by the two governments; they were pursued
after the decree was enacted, but without success.
A considerable number of British trawlers
were arrested and condemned in 1948 and 1949. It
was then that the United Kingdom government
instituted proceedings before the court.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland against Norway brought the
fisheries case before the court.
By a Decree of July 12th 1935,
the Norwegian government had, in the northern
part of the country (North of the Arctic Circle)
delimited the zone in which the fisheries were
reserved to its own nationals. The United Kingdom
asked the Court to state whether this
international law.
In, its judgment the court found that
neither the method employed for the
delimitation by the decree, nor the lines
themselves fixed by the said decree, are contrary to
international law; the first finding is adopted by
ten votes to two, and the second by eight
votes to four.
ISSUE: WON the delimitation was contrary to
international law (Whether the lines laid down by
the 1935 Decree for the purpose of delimiting the
Norwegian fisheries zone have or have not been
drawn in accordance with international law).
HELD:
NO. The judgment concludes that
the method employed by the Decree of 1935 is
not contrary to international law; and that the
baselines fixed by the Decree are
not contrary to international law either. (These lines,
called base-lines, are those from which the belt of the
territorial sea is reckoned)
The first principle put forward
by the United Kingdom is that the base-
line must be low-watermark. This indeed is
the criterion generally adopted in the practice of
States. The parties agree as to this criterion, but they
differ as to its application.
Drawn between appropriate points
on this low-water mark, departing from the physical
coastline to a reasonable extent, the base-line can only
be determined by means of a GEOMETRIC
CONSTRUCTION. Straight lines will be drawn
across well-defined bays, minor curvatures of the
coastline, and sea areas separating islands, islets and
reefs, thus giving a simpler form to the belt
of territorial waters. The drawing of such lines
does not constitute an exception to a rule; it is this
rugged coast, viewed as a whole, that calls for
the method of straight base-lines.
 Thus the court, confining itself to the
conclusions of the United Kingdom, finds that
the 1935 delimitation does not violate international
law. But the delimitation of sea areas has always an
international aspect since it interests States
other than the coastal State; consequently, it
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the
latter.
In this connection certain basic
considerations inherent in the nature of the
territorial sea bring to light the following criteria
which can provide guidance to Courts:
1. Since the territorial sea is closely
dependent upon the land domain, the
baseline must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coast: certain waters are
particularly closely linked to the land
formations which divide or surround
them (an idea which should be liberally
applied in the present case, in view of
the configuration of the coast);
2. It may be necessary to have regard to
certain economic interests peculiar to a
region when their reality and importance
are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
Norway puts forward the 1935 Decree as the
application of a traditional system
of delimitation in accordance with international law.
In its view, international law takes into account the
diversity of facts and concedes that the
delimitation must be adapted to the special
conditions obtaining indifferent regions.
ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION
ICJ REPORTS 1979
FACTS:
The purpose of the arbitration was to
draw the seabed boundary between the United
Kingdom and France in the English Channel
area, the two States having failed to reach
agreement despite negotiations lasting over a
decade. The boundary to be delimited more
specifically layoff the entire southern coast of
England and Cornwall, from just east of the
Isle of Wight, and thence westwards into the
Atlantic as far as the 1000 meter isobath. For
various reasons, the Tribunal found it
convenient to break the delimitation into three
components:
1. the areas to the immediate east and
west of the Channel Islands (as there
was substantial agreement between the
parties as to the method of delimitation
in those areas);
2. the area to the north and north-west
of the Channel Islands (there being a
dispute as to whether the islands were
'special circumstances'). The parties had
agreed to exclude the area to the
immediate east and south of the Islands
from the Arbitration; and
3. the Atlantic sector (where there was
again a dispute as to the effect of
islands in the justification of a boundary
other than one based on equidistance).
 Both the United Kingdom and France
are parties to the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf (hereafter referred to as the
1958 Convention).
However, France had made a number of
reservations 3 (which the Tribunal in this case
adjudged to be valid) to the delimitation
provisions of that Convention (Art 6). The
United Kingdom had in turn lodged various
objections to the French reservations and the
Tribunal thus found it necessary not only to
judge the validity of the reservations but also
the effect of objections to reservations.
Without going into the substantive law on
which this decision was based, it should be
noted that the Tribunal founds that the effect
of the reservations and objections was to
render some parts of the delimitation area
subject to the regime of Article 6 of the 1958
Convention and others to the equitable
principles of customary international law.
Equidistance/Special Circumstance Rule
One of the ultimate effects of this case was
perhaps to stress the paramountcy of equitable
principles in delimitation, both under
multilateral treaty law and customary
international law. It was this fundamental
principle which enabled the Tribunal to
minimize the arguments for and against strict
application of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention
to the area to be delimited. It will also
probably be this finding of the Tribunal which
will be taken as firm support for the current
delimitation provisions in the ICNT (Arts 74,
83), though it will receive criticism from those
nations wishing to see the primacy of a clear
equidistance rule incorporated into the future
Law of the Sea Convention. In reaching its
conclusion, the Tribunal first noted that, if
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention was
applicable, the use of an equidistance line or
another boundary justified by 'special
circumstances' did not imply that there were
two separate rules. They were only the two
aspects of a single rule,7 and this meant 'that
the question whether "another boundary is
justified by special circumstances" is an
integral part of the rule providing for
application of the equidistance principle'. After
referring to the records of the 1958 U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea which
produced the Continental Shelf Convention, the
Tribunal noted that Article 6 was so worded as
to avoid inequitable delimitations through rigid
application of equidistance in situations of
peculiar configurations.
In short, the role of the "special
circumstances" condition in Article 6 is to
ensure an equitable delimitation; and the
combilled "equidistances-special circumstances
rule", in effect gives particular expression to a
general norm that, failing agreement, the
boundary between states abutting on the same
continental shelf is to be determined on
equitable principles'. 8 Although equidistance is
only one of many possible ways of equitably
delimiting a boundary under customary law,
the Tribunal noted on several occasions that it
was the method most readily applicable where
the geographical conditio,ns of the states were
generally comparable. However, other
considerations might require another method
or combination of methods to achieve an
equitable result. 9 So too with Article 6, the
Tribunal held. Lack of definition of 'special
circumstances' in Article 6 indicated that even
under the 1958 Convention, 'the question
whether the use of the equidistance principle
or some other method is appropriate for
achieving an equitable delimitation is very
much a matter for appreciation in the light of
the geographical and other circumstances'. 10
Time and· again the Tribunal emphasized that
use of equidistance was not a controlling legal
norm but was only one element amongst other
relevant considerations to be taken into
account.
ISSUE: The applicability of the equidistance
principle in the delimitation of the shelves of
the United Kingdom and France.
HELD:
Article 6, does not formulate the
equidistance principle and special
circumstances as two separate rules. The rule
there stated in each of the two cases is a
single one, a combined equidistance-special
circumstance rule.

Article 6 makes the application of the

equidistance principle a matter of treaty
obligation for Parties tothe Convention. But
the combined character of the equidistance
principle-special circumstance rule means
that the obligation to apply equidistance
principle is always one qualified by the
condition unless another boundaryline is
justified by special circumstances...
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES of LAW RECOGNIZED
BY CIVILIZED NATIONS
Restatement as
general principles of law recognized by or
common to the worlds majorlegal systems.
This has reference not to principles
of international law but to principles of
municipal lawcommon to the legal system of
the world.

In maritime boundary claims, the equidistance

principle or principle of equidistance is a legal
concept that a nation's maritime boundaries should
conform to a median line equidistant from the shores
of neighboring nation-states. This concept was
developed in the process of settling disputes where
the borders of adjacent nations were located on a
contiguous continental shelf.
An equidistance line is one for which every point on
the line is equidistant from the nearest points on the
baselines being used. The equidistance principle is a
methodology that has been endorsed by
the UNCLOS treaty, but predates the treaty and has
been used by the Supreme Court of the United
States, states, and nations to equitably establish
boundaries.[1]