Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.,

and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of
Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART,
INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER;
SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON
PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES,Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions1 dated
April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87948.

The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,
petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from
January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM
Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace
Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines.
In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant
to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM),
said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were
authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because
payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their
business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the
₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or
Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax,
Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"

which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public

respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on
February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in relation to Section
21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were
violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further
averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent
portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.2

In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents'
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its
Order5 dated October 15, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing
the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC.6

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed

petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its

Resolution dated November 29, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

 I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely

abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners, their agents
and/or authorized representatives from implementing Section 21 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private
respondents.

III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely

abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private respondents to
make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of
Manila.

IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely

abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as
amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City Government.

V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely

abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner City of Manila and its
constituents would result to greater damage and prejudice thereof.
(sic)8

Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant
petition should be denied for being moot and academic.

Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court
discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already been rendered by
the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders

JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax
refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code
of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following
amounts:
 To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34
TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77

Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21,
Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.10

The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above
Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of
Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ
of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of
the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present
petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering
that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has
already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now
final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.13

In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction
raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of
both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.14

However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the

Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which
petitioners committed.

Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the
Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said court
and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute
that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an
assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.15

Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil

action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action
based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 As such, it
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.17

Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of

Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary
period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors
of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify
the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed
within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because
of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper
and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue
in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether or not
the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125)
creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the following:

(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or
other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part
of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving

liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure,
detention or release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other
penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under
the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Customs; and

(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in

cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other
matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and
regulations relative thereto.

On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282
(RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,
enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate
court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act
provides thus:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases

involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
 2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or
other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial;

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts

in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases

involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected,
fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;

5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by
the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases

elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case

of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff
and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic
Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to
impose or not to impose said duties.

b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses
arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or
Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One
million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified
amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the
jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law
or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the
same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be recognized.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional

Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected
territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the

Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving

final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the

Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction.19

A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated
that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no
categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282,
which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed
before it.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari

involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v. COMELEC,23 Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or
tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law
which expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be observed,
however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these
rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now
provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With
respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power
to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is
provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such

power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly

interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory
order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to
the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer
also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer
should only be considered as partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as
the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.29 that "if a case may
be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court
or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed in
De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions
of the lower court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis
v. Nuez.34

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides

that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer.

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over

their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the
exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation
which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court
cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering
that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local
tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power.
Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in
the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an
incident in the very same case.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced

judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the
law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by
giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over
the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the
RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of
the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should
co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review,
by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make
the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental
matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper
exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with
a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable
it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as
powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess
them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of
its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the
same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court
of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be

implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.38

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to
existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court
has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates."39 Hence, demands, matters
or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the
court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to
consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not
be within its cognizance.40

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that

the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari
questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is
included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule
that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue
writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN No part

 Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* No part.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with
Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this
Court) and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring; Annexes "A" and
"B," rollo, pp. 43-48; 49-51.
2
Rollo, p. 44. (Italics and emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
3
Records, vol. II, pp. 476-480.
4
Id. at 481-490.
5
Id. at 513.
6
CA rollo, pp. 2-31.
7
Id. at 321-326.
8
Rollo, p. 20. (Emphasis in the original)
9
Records, vol. II, pp. 761-762.
10
Id. at 762. (Emphasis in the original)
11
Id. at 822.
12
Id. at 837.
13
Garcia v. COMELEC, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996).
14
Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No. 142896, September
12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
15
Republic of the Philippines, represented by Abusama M. Alid,
Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII
(DA-RFU-XII) v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al., G. R . No. 179492,
June 5, 2013.
16
Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA 200, 207.
17
Id.
18
Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552
SCRA 424, 444, citing Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556 (2003);
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000); Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075
(1997); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
19
Emphasis supplied.
20
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, 497
Phil. 313, 322 (2005); Veloria v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94771, July 29,
1992, 211 SCRA 907, 915.
21
189 Phil. 581 (1980).
22
G.R. Nos. 88158 and 97108-09, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 779.
23
Supra note 20.
24
Supra note 20.
25
G..R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 552.
26
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,
supra note 20; Veloria v. COMELEC, supra note 20; Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan, id. at 563-564; Garcia v. De Jesus, supra note 22, at
787-788; Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra note 21, at 587.
27
Supra note 25.
28
An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As
Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, And for Other Purposes.
29
118 Phil. 1022 (1963).
30
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., supra, at 1026.
31
G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA 823.
32
De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 827-828.
33
G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011, 643 SCRA 631, 635-636.
34
G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 241, 246-247.
35
Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement
Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85, 125 (2004).
36
Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, 84 Phil. 618, 623 (1949).
37
4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, §5, p. 536; 2 Am Jur, Appeal and
Error, §9, 850.
38
Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217
SCRA 633, 648.
39
Treasurer-Assessor v. University of the Philippines, 148 Phil. 526,
539 (1971); Amalgamated Laborers' Association v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 131 Phil. 374, 380 (1968); Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 120 Phil. 383, 390 (1964).
(Citations omitted).
40
Id.