The Lawyer and the Client

Canon 14

Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 – DINGLASAN

Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent
from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that
since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been
superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so
authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent
wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This
include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was
asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and
asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to
dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that
the SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country,
especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big
fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not
be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media.
Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution
of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked
the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass
on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that
respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of
judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his
freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
"visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."

Issue :
Whether or Not Gonzales may be suspended from the practice of law.

Held:
Yes. The court held that its ruling is not addressed to the fact that the respondent has
criticized the court but rather to the nature of the criticisms made and the manner in which it was
carried out. The court was compelled to hold that the statements made by Gonzales clearly
constitute contempt and called for the exercise of disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Respondent’s charge that the court deliberately rendered erroneous and unjust decision implied
that the Justices betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon him.

The court resolved to suspend Atty. Raul Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely
until further orders .

Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Amado, 24 SCRA 402 – CASTRO

Facts:
Rufino Abuyen works as a foreman for the petitioner Samar Mining Co. While he was
employed to said petitioner he allegedly contracted a disease. Thereafter he filed a civil case
against herein petitioner the decision was referred by Pompeyo V. Tan, an officer of the Regional
office of the Department of Labor sentencing the petitioner to:
1) To provide continued medical treatment and hospitalization to Abuyen.
2) To pay Abuyen the lump sum and a weekly compensation until he is completely healed.
3) To pay to the workmen compensation fund as administrative costs.

Because of this, Samar Mining’s lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for
certiorari contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said case because he was a
“mere labor lawyer” who had no authority to render the award being complained of. CFI Cebu
dismissed the petition of Arcinas. Despite the judgment of the court in the previous case of
Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining, counsel for the petitioner still pursued the action contending
that the lower court committed an error in their judgment.

Issue:
WON Atty. Arcinas delayed the the proceddings of the case?

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner succeeded in prolonging the litigation of the case especially regarding
the payment of compensation for Abuyen which must have been given 12 years ago. It is a
manifestation that the purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been merely to delay, a
policy "often resorted to" "as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party", in this case
a tuberculosis patient — "and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion." Thus, the
conduct of petitioner’s counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the
Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. Let certified copy of this decision
be attached to the personal record of the latter, as a Member of the Bar.

Canon 15
CANON 15

Rosacia v. Bulalaco, A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995, 248 SCRA 664 – TITO
Facts:
Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint
for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao.
On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement respondent Bulalacao was hired as retained
counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc.
 On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma
Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date

On July, 1991, or after almost 9 months from the date respondent's retainer agreement
with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the
respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to
handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before
the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf.

Issue:
WON respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former
client.

Held:
Yes. Respondent breached his oath of office. The Court reiterates that an attorney owes
loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards
to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is
distinct from, and independent of the former case

Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3 months

Sattar v. Lopez, 271 SCRA 290 – ANARNA

FACTS:
Abdul A. Sattar filed on September 24, 1974 an administrative case against lawyer
Percival Lopez. Respondent is now a regional trial court judge in Quezon City. He was first
appointed to the judiciary as municipal trial court judge in April 1983.
Complainant charged respondent with having failed to file an appeal brief with the Court
of Appeals resulting in the dismissal of complainant’s appeal from a conviction by the trial court
in a criminal case.

Complainant alleged that on November 16, 1973, in consideration of respondent’s

preparing and filing an appeal brief in the Court of Appeals, he paid: P200 as retaining fee;
P1,500 for printing expenses; and P1,500 in the event of complainant’s acquittal by the appellate
court. Respondent also asked to buy 2 bottles of liquor, and if he cant find the same brand, just
asked for P120 instead.

On October 28, 1974, respondent filed his answer, stating that the complainant promised
to give the complete records for the preparation of the brief, but failed to do so, since the records
were already with the Solicitor General. Also, he added that from the time he was hired by the
complainant, the case was already dismissed and that the P120 was given voluntarily for him to
use in exploring the revival of the appeal.

In a Resolution dated November 15, 1974, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.4 Upon the effectivity of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court on June 1, 1988, the case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for disposition.

Roughly twenty years from the filing of the case, on March 15, 1993, the IBP
Commission on Discipline, through Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas, rendered a report
(Commissioner’s Report) recommending the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for a period of three months. The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. 01-94-067
resolved to adopt and approve the Commissioner’s Report.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Lopez violated CANON 15 for lack of candor?

HELD:
No, Atty. Lopez did not violate CANON 15, thus, acted with candor in dealing with the
case of Sattar.
As an attorney, it was respondent’s duty under Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of
Court: (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. We do not here
consider the wisdom of respondent’s opinion not to pursue the revival or reinstatement of
complainant’s appeal.
We, however, note that respondent was not lacking in candor when he promptly counseled
complainant that in respondent’s assessment a revival or reinstatement of the appeal would be
unavailing, giving complainant ample time and opportunity to seek other legal opinions.

Canon 16

Canons 17 and 18

Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202 – MOGELLO

FACTS:
Nadayag seeked for notarization from Atty. Grageda on a PACTO DE RETRO of an
Original Certificate of Title. The same document was confiscated by the Register of Deeds, Atty.
Baguio upon application of Nadayag’s PACTO DE RETRO. It was found out that several cases
of stolen original certificate of land titles have taken place in the said office. Only the Register of
Deeds has the authority to keep the Original Certificate of Land Title.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is liable for violation of CANON 16
HELD:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The
trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA
1 [1992]). Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs.
Javier, Sr., supra).

Javellana v. Lutero, 20 SCRA 717 – GALICINAO

Facts
The Roman Catholic Archbishop filed a detainer complaint against Eplidio Javellana with
the MTC of Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing was postponed twice
because Javellana did not receive the summons, and another three times because his lawyer, Atty.
Hautea, said he had business at Manila and that he hurt his right foot toe. The last postponement
was granted with the warning that no further postponement would be entertained.
When the case was called for trial again, both Javellana and his lawyer were absent. The hearing
proceeded and a decision was rendered against javellana. Javellana filed a petition for relief with
the CFI. His counsel on the other hand, tried to justify his absence. The trial court however,
dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Hautea served his client with utmost Competence and diligence.

Held
No. A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal
ethics, and with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for
trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer
case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is
obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.

The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said
counsel. The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition
by the judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's
time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business
transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant
appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other
supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from appearing in
court.

In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give
preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere
marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals
more than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.

Ramos v. Jacoba, et al., A.C. No. 5505, 27 September 2001 – DINGLASAN

FACTS:
 Complainant Severino Ramos and his wife were defendants in a civil case for a collection
of money before RTC-Cabanatuan City. As judgement was against the spouses, they engaged the
services of Atty. Ellis Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco – Jacoba as counsel for their appeal before
the CA. However, despite extensions totalling 135 days, their counsel failed to file the appelant’s
brief, resulting in the dismissal of their appeal, motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Spouses Ramos then filed a verified complaint against counsels before the Commission
of Bar Discipline (CBD) and prayed for disbarment of Atty. Ellis and admonishment of Atty.
Olivia. Respondents were required to answer the complaint but neither complied.

It was also found out that this is not atty. Ellis’ offense. A similar instance where he failed
to file an action of recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years.
He was suspended for 6 months and to return of the sum he received from his client, Liberato
Soriano.

ISSUE :
WON Atty Ellis Jacobo violated the CPR

HELD:
The court held that Atty. Ellis has not learned his lesson. He was found to be in violation
of:
Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not , after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so; and

18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Thus, the recommended 6 month suspension was increased to 1 year and he was ordered
to return the payment Spouses Ramos gave him.

As regards to Atty. Olivia, the records show that her participation was limited to the
assistance she rendered in filing the notice of appeal before the trial court. The court did not find
basis for sanctioning her.

Canon 19

Phil. Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 175- SANTILLANA
Facts:
The controversy of this case revolves upon the CA in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on
the ground that the Appellant’s Brief was (a) filed out of time and (b) without a motion for leave
for its admission.

The RTC branch Makati rendered a decision against petitioner in a civil case involving an
auction sale over a parcel of land. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, then Petitioner received a
Notice to file Appellant’s Brief from the CA, which was due within 45 days notwithstanding the
fact that the last day was a Sunday and the day after it was a legal holiday. Still, Petitioner filed
for a Motion for Extension of Time praying for an additional 60 days to file. Petitioner filed the
Appellant’s brief on the last day of the alleged extension, but the CA dismissed it because it was
not accompanied by a motion for leave to admit the same that was required under the Rules of
Court.

Petitioner explained that the reason the brief was not accompanied by a Motion for Leave
to Admit, was because its counsel had assumed that the CA granted the Motion for Extension and
thought that he had time within the extension to file the brief. But petitioner found out that the
CA did not receive a copy of the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellant’s Brief.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is justified in his assumption that the Appellant’s brief was
filed on time.

Ruling:
No timely motion for extension of time to file the appellant’s brief was mailed on the date
in question and addressed to the CA and opposing counsel. A careful trace made of the registry
receipts presented by petitioner as the ones issued to it reveals that these receipts correspond to
documents sent on a different date and addressed to different people no copy of such motion was
received by them. Thus, the CA found the appellant’s brief to have been filed out of time.
Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that any inadvertence was caused by the Post Office.
Moreover, no conclusive proof could be shown that a motion for extension was indeed filed at
any time. All these create a doubt that petitioner’s counsel has been candid in his dealings with
the courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by ethical principles in the conduct of cases
before the courts at all times. (Canon 19 CPR)

Choa v. Chiongson, 260 SCRA 477 – SIDLACAN

Facts:
In the resolution of February 9, 1996, the Court dismissed the instant complaint for want
of merit and directed Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, to show cause
within fifteen days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for his apparent
failure to comply with the duties and responsibilities of a member of the Bar. Atty. Quiroz allows
the filing of charges against respondent judge even though he is aware for its lack of merit. Atty.
Quiroz asserts that he never had the intention to prosecute or sue any groundless, false, or
unlawful suit or to file the instant complaint in addition to the appeal or in lieu thereof; that he
assisted the complainant in the honest belief that the latter has really a cause of action against the
respondent; and that he was not ventilating in the instant case the complainants grievances
relative to the respondents judgment finding [the complainant] guilty of perjury but was only
raising the matter to show that indeed the respondent was biased because of such next-door-
neighbor relationship.

The upshot of these allegations is that the complainants (Mr. Choas) conviction of the
crime of perjury is baseless or unfounded in law and in fact and is nothing but the product of the
respondents prejudice against Mr. Choa because the respondent happens to be a next-door
neighbor of Mr. Choas wife, the private complainant in the perjury case. Considering that Mr.
Choa seasonably appealed from the judgment of conviction, Atty. Quiroz knew or ought to know
that all the matters which he may find relevant or material for the reversal of the judgment and
the consequent acquittal of his client, Mr. Choa, may be raised with the appellate court, and that
this Court, not being the venue for such appeal, cannot resolve the appeal even by way of an
administrative complaint against the judge who convicted Mr. Choa.

Issue:
WON Atty. Quiroz is liable for violation of canon 19 of the code of professional
responsibility.

Held:
If Atty. Quiroz then assisted Mr. Choa in the preparation of this case, he had nothing in
mind but to harass the respondent Judge and to unduly influence the course of the appeal in the
criminal case by injecting into the mind of the appellate judge that, indeed, something was
definitely wrong with the appealed decision because the ponente thereof is now facing a serious
administrative complaint arising from his improper conduct therein. It might even be said that
the filing of this case was to send a signal to the appellate judge in the criminal case that an
affirmance of the challenged decision would clearly be erroneous, if not equally baseless and
unfounded as that of the trial court below.

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. Any
criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under
his duty of fidelity to his client. As we stated in Ng vs. Alfaro,lawyers, as officers of the court,
should not encourage groundless administrative cases against court officers and employees. The
time of the latter should not be wasted in answering or defending groundless complaints; every
minute of it is precious and must be reserved for the enhancement of public service. Our precious
time too should not be diverted to such cases.

A fine of P5,000 is impose upon Atty. Quiroz and he is warned that a commission of the
same similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Cosmos v. Foundry Shop Workers Union v. Lo Bu, 63 SCRA 313 – LUCINARIO

Facts:
After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop
where he and his family resided in the premises. After several attempts to settle a pending unfair
labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business, including equipment and
rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000.

On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the
third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor.
Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personal properties of the
Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the
public auction sale.
 Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23, 1973,
denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration.

Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July
17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Manila covering the same properties.

Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a
second motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower court,
decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court
while sustaining the dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu.

Held:
A legal counsel is expected to defend a client’s cause but not at the expense of truth and
in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws.—For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente
had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his client’s cause with zeal, but
not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to
remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession,
requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and
eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into
serious question his good standing in the bar.

Canon 20

Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 39 – RIEGO

Facts:
A case was filed against De Dios Marikina Transportation Company Inc. filed by the
herein petitioner for the damages the latter sustained from the physical injuries resulted from the
dragging of the petitioner along the asphalted road by the bus operated by the transport company.
The incident occurred when the bus driver bolted forward at high speed while petitioner was still
clinging on the bus door’s handle bar that causes the latter to lose his grip and balance. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court but lowers the attorney’s fee. An appeal for the decision of the
CA was filed but then denied. Thus, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the reduction of attorney’s fee by the appellate court is an error on latter’s
part.

Held:
 Yes, the reduction of attorney’s fee by the appellate court is an error on latter’s part. The
Supreme Court found the trial court’s reward of attorney’s fee reasonable due to the time
difference from the initiation of the complaint to the rendering of decision which took four years
and six months. Also, the appearances, no less than twenty, is considered.

IMPORTANT:
Criteria determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees:
a. The quantity and character of the services rendered;
b. the labor, time and trouble involved;
c. the nature and importance of the litigation;
d. the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;
e. the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;
f. the responsibility imposed on counsel;
g. the skill and experience called for the in the performance of the service;
h. the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
i. the customary charges of the bar for similar services;
j. the character of employment, whether casual or for established client;
k. whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly
charge a higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and
l. the results secured.

PNB v. Pardo y Robles Hermanos, 67 Phil. 570 – EUGENIO

Facts:
On January 28, 1930, plaintiff's share or interest in the firm was liquidated and found to
be P80,000 and the method of payment was agreed upon as set forth in Exhibit B. Later, the form
of payment was changed as shown by Exhibit E. Payments not having been made, this suit was
duly brought, and after trial it was given for plaintiff, and defendants bring this appeal.

It is claimed that the settlement of January 28, 1930, was not a final settlement but was
contingent upon securing a loan. This is based upon the fact that the managing partner was
authorized at the same meeting where the share of plaintiff was determined, to negotiate a loan if
possible: But the value of plaintiff's interest in the partnership was not contingent upon whether
the loan was secured or not. The securing of the loan might have made it easier for the
partnership to liquidate the share of the retiring partner, but his rights as of that date were not
contingent upon the future action of the partnership. Nor would he have to wait three years after
the settlement then made before he was entitled to payment, which would mean an amendment to
the articles of incorporation that a partner could not enforce liquidation of his account for six
years. His right of action accrued as provided for in the contract. Nor is Exhibit E invalid
because one of the defendants signed it "Salvo mi opinion". Nor would such a statement relieve
the signer from his responsibility, which had become fixed on January 28, 1930.

Issue:
Whether or not PARDO Y ROBLES HERMANOS et al has a right to appear in court

Held:
 Yes. The present contention of some of the defendants that they at all times had a right to
have served on them individually a copy of all motions and decisions of the trial court, is entirely
without foundation. They received summons and they had a right to appear in court if they saw
fit. They did appear in court in a possibly irregular way, but they cannot take advantage of their
own action to defeat or thwart the legal rights of plaintiff-appellee. The judgment appealed from
is therefore affirmed with costs against appellants.

Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 – ANARNA

FACTS:
Sixty-eight cases were brought about by more than two hundred plaintiffs to recover
damages from the Manila Railroad Company, who opened the dam when an unusual heavy
rainfall occurred to prevent destroying the bridge that led to the damages of the surrounding
properties.

There were a lot of cases filed, represented by Atty. E. G. Turner for the property owners.
The first case was filed under consolidated complaints, Turner vs. Manila Railroad Co. This
demurrer was interposed for the railroad company alleging that it is not permissible for an
attorney to accumulate distinct causes of action in himself, and to sue in his own name for the
benefit of the clients directly interested. This was sustained by the trial Judge and the order was
affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court. In this regard, seventy-one separate actions were
instituted against Manila Railroad Company.

The first case to be tried was that of Ambrosio Erfe vs. Manila Railroad Company, but
decision was in favor of the defendant railroad company. After which, the second case won
against Manila Railroad Company. Sixty-nine cases won and one was dismissed because of
failure of the plaintiff to appear.

The plaintiffs, issued an agreement with Erfe, authorizing him to secure lawyers to
prosecute the claims and to pay them fifty per cent of the proceeds and to retain twenty per cent
for Erfe’s services. Ambrosio Erfe got the services of Atty De las Alas to represent the plaintiffs
using the special power of Attorney given and authorized by the plaintiffs to Erfe. Atty Turner,
contended and said that the power of attorney given to Erfe was fraudulent and has been dressed
up, added to and change in many ways. That the substitution of lawyer, from Atty Turner to Atty
De las Alas as well as the special power of Attorney is to be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty De las Alas can be recognized as the substitute lawyer by the special
power of Attorney?

HELD:
Yes, after all the investigation and confessions of the petitioner’s, the special power of
attorney was valid. The power of attorney created the relation of principal and agent. It was a
contract which should be enforced unless vitiated by fraud or found to be an agreement contrary
to public policy. It attempted, among other things, to dismiss the lawyer and substitute another,
which may be done at any time by the client with or without cause (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
32). The power of attorney further attempted to compromise pending cases, and in this
connection, it is well to recall that, as provided by section 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
lawyers "cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of the client's claim but the full amount in cash."

The Supreme Court concluded this distasteful ul and arduous task by making the findings
which follow. We find that the power of attorney of June 21, 1923, in connection with the prior
authorization in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia and subsequent ratification, is valid and
controlling. We find further that as the power of attorney is valid and controlling, there has been
a proper substitution of attorneys in this court, and that Attorney Antonio de las Alas must be
recognized as counsel f or the plaintiffs.' We find f urther that Attorney E. G. Turner and
associate counsel have liens on the judgments for professional services the reasonable value of
which we fix at P30,000. Inasmuch as there only remains a balance of P20,000 available for the
purpose of paying Attorney Turner and associate counsel, inasmuch as this happened through no
fault of Attorney Turner, and inasmuch as to make him look to the plaintiffs for further payment
would be unfair, the compromise agreement is modified and approved as of the amount of
P100,000. Subject generally to the conditions above stated, and subject specifically to proof by
the Manila Railroad Company that Attorneys Turner, Rheberg, and Sison have been paid P30,000
in satisfaction of their liens, the motion to dismiss the appeals in these sixty-eight cases, is
approved. So ordered.

Canon 21

Canon 22

Tumbagahan v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 485 – CASTRO

FACTS:
The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte, Branch II,namely: (1) for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of lots of
the IliganCadastre; and (2)for the review of the decree of registration issued by the Land
RegistrationCommission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias and cancellation of her titles to the same
lots. When the cases were called for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the petitioner relieved Atty.
Salise as his counsel. Atty. Salise filed his withdrawal ofappearance which was approved by the
court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for trial. This time, the petitioner personally
appeared and filed a written motion for postponement on the ground that he still had no counsel
and was not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other party, the motion for postponement was
denied and the court issued an order dismissing the two cases. A copy of the order was sent to
Atty. Amarga which he received on April 26, 1968. The petitioner received his copy of the order
on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the motion was
denied, he filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for being filed
out of time, counting the period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order
of dismissal. The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of Atty. Amarga nor
authorized the latter to represent him in his two cases.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly terminated the services of
his counsels of record -Attys.Melvyn Salise and Jose Amarga — such that service on them of
processes and notices would no longer bind him.
HELD:
NO There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of record may be
considered relieved of his responsibility as such counsel. The withdrawal as counsel of a client,
or the dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the case.
In this case, the termination of the attorney-client relationship between the petitioner and Atty.
Salise does not automatically severe the same relations between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga.
Only Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made with regard to the other
counsel. The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made
of record; at least so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until
the end of the Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case.

Quilban v. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 – EUGENIO

FACTS:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel
of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father
Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City
General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site.
Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. Sometime in 1970, the Colegio,
through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved
site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the
crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the idea of
donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters
to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler.
Following that advice, the squatters formed the a Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala"
(Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President, who was entrusted with the task of
negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them. But instead of working for the welfare
of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain
the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at P15 per square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P100 to P120 per square meter. It was
evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the
property.

In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed a case against Rivera with a
prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs
after reimbursement by the latter of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their
counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8
October 1975. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject
matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a
verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979.

On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers;
on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the
sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00. After almost a year, the five officers discovered that
no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an
intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been issued by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention
had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.

The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who
agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the
consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty.
Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the
latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00
deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the
same tenor, dated 31 March 1980, was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.

On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this
Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and
praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to
practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint Affidavit executed on
14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Robinol should be disbarred.

RULING:
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that
make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had
rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he
had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land
equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary
value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients'
money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the
circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who
could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of
P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who,
after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.

Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he
had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for
his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in
dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly,
even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his client's funds
intended for a specific purpose — the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners. The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is
employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to
receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there
was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on
quantum meruit, therefore, is inapplicable.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue
in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into
disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-
time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.

ACCORDINGLY, In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby

DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the
fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the
practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his
rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned Administrative Case

respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years affective immediately.