Quasi-delicts Example A broke the window of B's house while playing

softball. The accident would not have happened had A played a little farther
from the house of B. In this case, A has the obligation to pay the damage
caused to B by his act although there is no pre-existing. Background image
of

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Quasi Delict is a French legal term used in some civil law jurisdictions. It
refers to a negligent act or omission which causes harm or damage to the
person or property of another, and thus exposes a person to civil liability as
if the act or omission was intentional. It is a residuary category of private
wrongs, characterized by either vicarious or strict liability. In quasi delicts
the law creates a liability though the defendant may not in fact be to blame.
A quasi-delict is a wrong which occurs unintentionally, as a result of
something like negligence, where as a true delict requires intentional action.
Thus, someone who commits murder has committed a delict, while
manslaughter would be an example of a quasi-delict.

QUASI-DELICT
Q – What are the requisites of quasi-delict?
Answer: The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;

(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;

(c) such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and

(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. (Chan,

Jr. v. Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc., G.R. No. 160283, October 14, 2005).
 Res Ipsa Loquitur; Medical Negligence Cases

Once again, the SC in Dr. Milagros Cantre v. Sps. Go, G.R. No. 160889,
April 27, 2007, had the occasion to say that the Hippocratic Oath mandates
physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients.
If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This
notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical
negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of case and, they
never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is
immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is
proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage
caused. (Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA
584).

In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence
on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury,
provided that the following requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone’s negligence;

2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the

defendant or defendants; and

3. the possibility of contributing conduct would make the plaintiff responsible

is eliminated.

In this case, a woman gave birth. Due to the operation, there was profuse
bleeding inside her womb, hence, the doctors performed various medical
procedures. Her blood pressure was monitored with the use of a
sphygmomamometer. It was observed later on that there was a fresh gaping
wound in the inner portion of her left arm. The NBI-Medico Legal found out
that it appeared to be a burn resulting in the placing of a droplight near her
skin. Despite surgical operation, there was an unsightly mark in her left arm
and the pain remained and her movements were restricted. A complaint was
filed praying for damages where the RTC rendered judgment holding the
doctor liable. The CA affirmed, but modified the judgment. On appeal to the
SC it was contended that the wound was not caused by the droplight but by
the constant taking of her blood pressure.

The SC said that, that is immaterial. The medical practice is to deflate the
blood pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band
can cause injury to the patient similar to what could have happened in this
case. Thus, if the wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the
taking of the blood pressure must have been done so negligently as to have
inflicted a gaping wound on her arm, for which the defendant cannot escape
liability under the “captain of the ship” doctrine.

The argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic
procedure, but rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help
her case. It does not negate negligence on her part.

Based on the foregoing, the presumption that defendant was negligent in

the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. In this connection, the
Civil Code provides:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done…

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,

fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable
of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

Clearly, under the law, the defendant is obliged to pay plaintiff for moral
damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result of her negligence.

On the presumption of negligence under the principle of res ipsa loquitur,

the SC in applying the requirements of the rule said:

As to the first requirement, the gaping wound the plaintiff’s certainly not an
ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm
is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could
not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood
pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the
exclusive control of the physician in charge under the “captain of the ship”
doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for
the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are
under the surgeon’s control. (Black Law Dictionary, 192 (5th ed., 1979). In
this particular case, it can be logically inferred that defendant, the senior
consultant in charge during the delivery of the baby, exercised control over
the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of the
plaintiff’s blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood
pressure cuff is also within her exclusive control.

Third, the gaping wound on the plaintiff’s left arm, by its very nature and
considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to
her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic
shock. Hence, plaintiff could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have
contributed to her own injury.

The defense that the wound was caused not by the droplight but by the
constant taking of her blood pressure, even if the latter was necessary given
her condition, does not absolve her from liability.

Malicious Prosecution and Damages

When someone may be liable for malicious prosecution.

In Antonio Diaz v. Davao Light & Power Corp., et al., G.R. No. 160959, April
4, 2007 (Callejo, J), petitioner unilaterally installed a meter to replace
another one. There was a notice of disconnection and eventually, the
connection was cut. There was a petition for mandatory injunction to restore
connection. It was however settled by way of a compromise agreement
where the parties agreed to reduce the respondent’s claim and to waive the
counterclaim and to install the electric service. There was no agreement to
bar the institution of other action. Thereafter, respondent filed criminal cases
for theft against the petitioner, hence, a complaint for damages for abuse of
right under Article 19, NCC was filed.
Petitioner insisted that the compromise agreement as well as the decision
based on it already settled the controversies between them; yet, DLPC
instituted the theft case against petitioner, and worse, instituted another
action for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. 876. Thus, the only
conclusion that can be inferred from the acts of DLPC is that they were
designed to harass, embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He further averred
that the compromise agreement in civil case completely erased litigious
matters that could necessarily arise out of either Electric Meter No. 84737 or
86673509. Moreover, he asserted that the evidence he presented is
sufficient to prove the damages he suffered by reason of the malicious
institution of the criminal cases. In brushing aside his contentions, the SC

Held: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract

whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to
settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies.
However, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its
own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the
damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed
against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the
criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense.
Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability.

Petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21, and
Article 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code.

The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a
legal right or duty; (b) which is exercise in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corp., Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159591, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA
498, 511-512; Saber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, August 31,
2004, 437 SCRA 259). Thus, malice or bad faith is at the core of the above
provisions. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual concerned. In consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove
the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad
judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive.

There was no malice or bad faith. Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint
that he unilaterally installed a meter after it was removed by DLPC. No less
than the Court, admonished petitioner and reminded him that connections of
electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon
mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption
should also be made promptly whenever due. Based on these established
facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done with
the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him.

Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the

complaints. However, there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. (Far East
Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005,
465 SCRA 372, 384-385). Whatever damages petitioner may have suffered
would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the
filing of the complaints against him.

Concept of malicious prosecution.

On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for
damages brought by or against who a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other
legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. (Yasonña v. De Ramos, 440
SCRA 154 (2004). It is an established rule that in order for malicious
prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must be proven by
petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the defendant
(respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. The
foregoing are necessary to preserve a person’s right to litigate which may
be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious prosecution cases. From
the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice and want of
probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of
damages based on malicious prosecution. (Id. At 158-159; Villanueva v.
UCPB, G.R. No. 138291, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 391, 400; Ponce v.
Legaspi, G.R. No. 79184, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 377, 388).

A claim for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the
three elements aforecited are shown to exist. In this case, the cases were
dismissed by the prosecutor before they could be filed in court, hence, they
did not end in acquittal.

It cannot be likewise concluded that respondent DLPC acted without

probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events which led to the
filing of the complaints are undisputed, and respondent DLPC cannot be
faulted for filing them. In the early case of Buchanan v. Esteban, 32 Phil.
363 (1915) it was stressed that “one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.”
As Justice Moreland explained in that case:

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would

excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that one
cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution
where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in
cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable
cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would
be a very great discouragement to public justice is prosecutors, who had a
tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their
indictments miscarried.

Thus, the element of malice and the absence of probable cause must be
proved. (China Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 94182, March 28, 1994, 231
SCRA 472, 478; Albenson Enterprise Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 88694, January
11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 29). There must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless to
entitle the victims to damages. The two elements must simultaneously exist;
otherwise, the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal
consequence, the absence of malice. (Lucas v. Royo, G.R. No. 136185,
October 30, 2000; 344 SCRA 481). In the instant case, it is evidence that
respondent DLPC was not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister
design to unduly harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in availing
of the remedies provided for by the law.

In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the rule of law in
the forum of the courts of justice. It is one of the virtues of our system of
government that a person who feels aggrieved does not have to take the
law into his or her hands or resort to the use of force for the vindication of
injury. The courts are there to hear and act on the complaint. The right to
litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal
disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical confrontation. It is
necessary not only for upholding one’s claims when they are unjustly denied
but also for the maintenance of peace, if not goodwill, among incipient
antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be
examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of
government, which is to provide for a just and orderly society. Hence, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he or she be
unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate. (Rivera v. Roman, G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005,
470 SCRA 276; Saber v, CA, supra., at 290; China Banking Corp. v. CA,
supra.).

Moral damages.
The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees was
likewise upheld:

“The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of

the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. (Roque v. Tomas, G.R. No.
157632, December 6, 2006). Moral damages are designed to compensate
and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. (PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006).
The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or
means of the offender.

Evidence of moral damages.

Stephen Huang the victim and his parents Richard and Carmen Huang
testified to the intense suffering they continue to experience as a result of
the accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers
almost every night when he relives the accident. He also gets depression
when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels frustration and embarrassment
in needing to be helped with almost everything and in his inability to do
simple things he used to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest of
the family undergo their own private suffering. They live with the day-to-day
uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huang’s condition. They know that the
chance of full recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen Huang’s
paralysis has made him prone to many other illnesses. His family, especially
respondent spouses, have to make themselves available for Stephen
twenty-four hours a day. They have patterned their daily life around taking
care of him, ministering to his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they
had been accustomed.

Exemplary damages.

On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides
that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. At the time of the accident, the
employee was driving without a license because he was previously ticketed
for reckless driving. The evidence also showed that he failed to step on his
brakes immediately after the impact. Had he done so, the injuries which the
victim sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that
committed by the employer need be suppressed; and employers like
Mercury Drug should be more circumspect in the observance of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The award of
exemplary damages is therefore justified.

Attorney’s fees.

With the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney’s fees was
upheld. (Art. 2208(1), NCC). In addition, attorney’s fees may be granted
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest
by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. (Art. 2208(4), NCC).