01 CEASE v.
CA properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company now
G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Doctrine: [in BOLD letters in the Held part]
Facts:
1. Forrest L. Cease together with five (5) other American citizens organized the
Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company and in the course of its corporate
existence, the company acquired various properties. However, at the same
time, all the other original incorporators were bought out by Forrest L. Cease
together with his children
2. The charter of the company lapsed in June 1958. On 13 August 1959, Forrest
L. Cease died and by extrajudicial partition, his shares were disposed of.
However, it would appear that Benjamin and Florence (Defendants) wanted an
actual division while the other children wanted reincorporation; and proceeding
on that, these other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and other
stockholder Bonifacia Tirante (Plaintiffs) proceeded to incorporate themselves
into the F.L. Cease Plantation Company.
3. In view of that, Benjamin and Florence for their part initiated a Special
Proceeding No. 3893 in the CFI for the settlement of the estate of Forest L.
Cease, and one month afterwards on 19 May 1960 they filed Civil Case No.
6326 against Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia Cease together with Bonifacia
Tirante asking that the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Corporation be declared
Identical to F.L. Cease and that its properties be divided among his children as
his intestate heirs.
4. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 6326 and the eve of the expiry of the
three (3) year period provided by the law for the liquidation of corporations, the
board of liquidators of Tiaong Milling executed an assignment and conveyance
of properties and trust agreement in favor of F.L. Cease Plantation Co. Inc. as
trustee of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co. Upon motion of the plaintiffs
trial Judge ordered that this alleged trustee be also included as party
defendant.
5. Note that there were thus two (2) proceedings pending in the CFI of Quezon
namely Civil Case No. 6326 and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of
these were assigned to the Hon. Respondent Judge Maddela and the case
was finally heard and submitted upon stipulation of facts. Judge Maddela then
held for the plaintiffs Benjamin and Florence, establishing that the assets or
appearing under the name of F.L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is
part of the estate of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided
among his six children.
6. The trial judge also ordered for F. L. Cease Plantation Company to surrender
the properties to the appointed receiver. More importantly, the judge ordered
the termination and dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893 for
administration.
7. Defendants appealed to the CA. CA ruled in favor of defendants. Hence, this
appeal by certiorari.
8. Plaintiffs argue among others that there was an irregular and arbitrary
termination and dismissal of the special proceedings for judicial administration
simultaneously ordered in the lower court’s decision in Civil Case No. 6326
adjudicating the partition of the estate, without categorically, reasoning the
opposition to the petition for administration.
Issue: W/N the trial court correctly dismissed the special proceeding in its order for
the civil case
Held: Yes!!
1. The dismissal and termination of the special proceedings for judicial
administration is correct despite of its rendition in another related case in view
of the established jurisprudence which favors partition when judicial
administration becomes unnecessary. The dismissal at first glance is wrong,
since what was actually heard was Civil Case No. 6326. However, judicial
rulings consistently held the view that where partition is possible, either
judicial or extrajudicial, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reason. When
the estate has no creditors or pending obligations to be paid, the beneficiaries
in interest are not bound to submit the property to judicial administration which
is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator
by the court, especially when judicial administration is unnecessary and
superfluous.
2. In the records of this case, there was no indication of any indebtedness of
the estate. No creditor has come up to charge the estate within the two-
year period after the death of Forrest L. Cease, hence, the presumption
under Section 1, Rule 74 that the estate is free from creditors must apply.
Neither has the status of the parties as legal heirs, been raised as an issue.
Besides, there was a stipulation of the parties to submit the pleadings and
 contents of the special administration proceedings for the cognizance of the
trial judge in adjudicating the civil case for partition.
3. As defendants observe, the parties in both cases are the same, so are the
properties involved; that actual division is the primary objective in both actions;
the theory and defense of the respective parties are likewise common; and
that both cases have been assigned to the same Respondent judge. This
unifying effect of the foregoing circumstances invites the wholesome exception
to the structures of procedural rule, thus allowing room for judicial flexibility.
Respondent judge's dismissal of the administration proceedings is a judicious
move, appreciable in today's need for effective and speedy administration of
justice.
4. One last consideration. Parties are brothers and sisters. By all rights in law
and jurisprudence, each is entitled to share and share alike in the estate,
which the trial court correctly ordained and sustained by the appellate court.
Almost 20 years have lapsed since the filing of Special Proceedings No. 3893
for the administration of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease and Civil Case No.
6326 for liquidation and partition of the assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling
and Plantation Co., Inc. A succession of receivers were appointed by the court
to take, keep in possession, preserve and manage properties of the
corporation which at one time showed an income of P386,152.90 and
expenses of P308,405.01? In the meantime, ejectment cases were filed by
and against the heirs in connection with the properties involved, aggravating
the already strained relations of the parties. A prudent and practical realization
of these circumstances ought and must constrain the parties to give each one
his due in law and with fairness and dispatch that their basic rights be enjoyed.
liquidation. It may no longer persist to maintain ownership over the
corporate assets.
2. Petitioners argue that no evidence was adduced to support the conclusion
that Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest Cease.
- SC held that RTC correctly applied the rule on piercing the corporate
veil, in the sense that the legal fiction of distinct and separate
personality is disregarded, and regarded the corporation and individual
member as on and the same. The BoD and stockholders belong to
one family, where Forrest Cease always retained majority stocks. Only
the members of the family benefited from the cororation. The
corporation also never had any account with any banking institution.
Allowing petitioner’s argument would allow Tiaong Milling to be able to
extend its corporate existence beyond the perios of its charter under
the guise of F.L. Cease Plantation.
3. Petitioners argue that the decision of the lower court in the partition case is
not interlocutory, but rather a final order.
- SC held, according to Miranda v CA, that such decision for recovery of
property with accounting (as was filed in this case) is not final but
merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the

judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the plaintiffs.

Other Issue/s and Ruling:

1. Plaintiffs argue that the action for partition should not have prospered in
view of the repudiation of the co-ownership by Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Company when it already asserted ownership and title over the
properties
- SC held that petitioner’s theory is more apparent than real. When
Tiaong Milling adduced its defense and raised the issue on ownership,
its corporate existence already terminated. It had no corporate
existence and is dissolved ipso facto except for winding up and
02 PEREIRA v. COURT OF APPEALS (CLEMENTE) 1. W/N there exists an estate of the deceased for purposes of administration.
G.R. No. 81147 JUNE 20, 1989 (SC ruled that it should be the probate court.)
2. W/N a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no
TOPIC: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates debts left by the decedent. (NO)

DOCTRINE: Judicial administration and the appointment of a judicial administrator
are superfluous when a deceased died without debts.
FACTS:
1. Andres de Guzman Pereira (Andres) was an employee of the Philippine
Airlines when he passed away without a will. He was survived by his
legitimate spouse, Victoria (petitioner), and his sister, Rita (respondent).
2. Rita instituted before the RTC a Special Proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of her brother.
In her verified petition, she alleged the following:
a. That she and Victoria are the only surviving heirs of the deceased;
b. That the deceased left no will and that he left no creditors;
c. That he left several properties: death benefits from different
associations connected to PAL and the SSS, savings deposits from
different banks, and a 300 square meter lot;
d. That since Victoria had been working as an auxiliary nurse in London,
half of her salary forms part of her brother’s estate.
HELD 1: (Could not be resolved by the SC, but by the probate court)
● The resolution of these two issues are better left to the probate court before
which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the
best position to receive evidence on the contentions of the parties as to the
assets of the decedent’s estate, the valuations and the rights of the
transferees of some of the assets. However, the court’s determination is
only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
HELD 2:
● Assuming, however, that there exists assets of the deceased for purposes
of administration, the SC found that the administration proceedings
instituted by the respondent to be unnecessary.
RULE 78, SECTION 6 RULE 74, SECTION 1
General Rule Exception

3. To this, Victoria opposed via a motion to dismiss alleging that there exists When a person dies leaving
no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the property, the same should be
alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating judicially administered and the
to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in case
4. RTC: ruled for Rita in appointing her as the administratrix upon a bond the deceased left no will, or in
posted by her. case he had left one, should he
failed to name an executor.
5. CA: affirmed for Rita.
When all the heirs are of lawful
age and there are no debts due
from the estate they may agree in
writing to partition the property
without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.

● DOES THE EXCEPTION PRECLUDE THE HEIRS FROM INSTITUTING

ISSUES: ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS, EVEN IF THE ESTATE HAS NO
DEBTS OR OBLIGATIONS? NO.
 The said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. Thus, it has been repeatedly
held that that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that
in such a case, the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.

What constitutes good reason would depend on the circumstances of each

case.

● DOES THE SITUATION IN THE CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE GOOD

REASON? NO.

It was found that the reason why Rita decided to institute administration
proceedings is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties for her
own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of Victoria
who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently.

● SO WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE INSTEAD?

The claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the

RTC are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed.
04 AVELINO v. CA
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000 By: Wenceslao
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Doctrine:
1. When a person dies intestate or testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor so named is incompetent or refuses the trust, or fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules, then the decdent’s estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoit a qualified
administration in the order established in Sec. 6 of Rule 78.
2. The exceptions to the Rule requiring appointment of administrator are found
in Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 74: (a) extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between parties; and (b)summary settlement of estates of small value.
3. Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs,
then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings, and the court may convert an heir’s action for
letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition upon motion of the
heirs.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the
late Antonio Avelino Sr. and his first wife private respondent, Angelina
Avelino. Other private respondents are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino,
Sr. and siblings of petitioner.
2. Records reveal that Socorro filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr. who died intestate on
April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the
estate.
3. Angelina and the siblings of petitioner filed their opposition by filing a motion
to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition. This
was duly opposed by Socorro.
4. Lower court granted the opposition of Angelina et al and converted into
judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr.
5. Socorro filed a petition for CPM R65 before the CA for the GADALEJ
committed by the trial court in converting the judicial proceedings for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. This
petition was DENIED.
6. Thus, this petition before the court submitting the ff. contentions:
(a) No partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no
drtemrination has yet been made of the character and extent of the
decedent’s estate.
(b) Petitioner insists that the ROC does not provide for conversion of a
motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was procedurally
inappropriate.
Issue:
W/N the conversion of the judicial proceeding of a motion for the issuance of letters
of administration to an action for judicial partition was proper?
Held: YES.
1. Refer to doctrines 1 and 2. Section 1 Rule 74 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being
dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his
heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration nor
apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.
2. The basis for trial court’s order is Section 1 Rule 74, hence, such order was
not procedurally infirm. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as
to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then
an ordinary action for partition may be resported to, as in this case. (REFER
TO DOCTRINE 3). Thus, the trial court appropriately converted petitioner’s
action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition upon motion
of the private respondents.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
05.) LETICIA ARIENDA v. EVELYN MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER, RTC
LEGAZPI CITY
AM No. P-11-2980 June 10 2013
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Facts:
7. This is an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a court
employee and abuse of authority filed by Leticia against Evelyn.
8. Leticia (complainant) alleged that:
a. Evelyn and Atty. Zaldy Monilla, her husband, offered their services
in settling the estate of Evelyn’s deceased mother. They would
prepare an extrajudicial settlement, while Evelyn’s brother Engr
Arquero would conduct the survey of the estate.
b. Leticia had paid the spouses P49,800 and when they repeatedly
demanded the approved survey plan, they were asked to pay for
another P20K.
c. Leticia subsequently learned that the spouses had no authority to
settle her deceased mother’s estate as Atty Molina was an
employee of DAR and Evelyn was an ordinary court employee.
9. Evelyn (respondent) in her comment:
a. It was complainant who came to respondent’s house and
requested that she convince her brother to partition the 4 lots left
by her parents. After Engr. Arquero conducted the survey,
complainant was nowhere to be found and respondent shouldered
the expense.
b. Without her knowledge, complainant filed for partition of estate
before the RTC but when it was dismissed, complainant asked
respondent to intervene so they met at respondent’s house where
she pleaded for Evelyn to prepare the extrajudicial settlement.
c. As respondent agreed to help, she called her brother to bring the
plan he had previously done. In the presence of Engr. Arquero,
complainant and her siblings chose their respective shares in the
property.
d. In 2003, complainant, Ester, and a sales agent came to
respondent’s house asking for a resurvey for the boundary lines
were no longer visible and because the new (2 nd) buyer wanted to
see the exact location and boundaries of the lot.
1 Any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
e. Admits receiving P49,800 and that she had turned over the
notarized extrajudicial settlement, blueprint of the plan, deed of
sale between complainant and Rubio.
f. Complainant knew that Atty Molina was a DAR employee and that
Evelyn was not a lawyer since they are neighbors and are related
to each other.
10. VICE EXECUTIVE JUDGE, RTC LEGAZPI CITY
a. Evelyn committed simple misconduct. Fine of 2mos of salaray
deducted from retirement benefits.
b. Evelyn’s liability of P49,800 to Leticia can be properly ventilated in
a separate judicial proceeding.
11. OCA
a. Simple misconduct, fine of 4mos salary deducted from retirement
benefits.
12. In her Manifestation, respondent informed the Court that a case against
complainant for a sum of money + damages was filed against her in the
MTCC and the court ruled in favor of Dominguez (first buyer of land).
Respondent wanted the Court to note that neither complainant nor
Dominguez mentioned the participation of respondent or her brother in the
transaction involving the lot.
Issue: W/N respondent is guilty of simple misconduct?
Held: YES
3. It bears to note that respondent admitted in her comment that she
prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement of the estate – which
constitutes practice of law1. Not being a lawyer, respondent had no
authority to do so. Worse, she also admitted receiving money for her
services.
4. It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement
of estate pursuant to a private agreement between her and complainant.
However, respondent is an employee of the court whose conduct must
always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion that may taint the
judiciary.
Dispositive Portion: GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. FINE of 4 mos salary to
be deducted from her retirement benefits.
06 Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Doctrine: Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial
admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court,
which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
Facts:
- There is a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate
which needed to be subdivided among heirs.
- Pedro Sr, ancestor of petitioners and respondents owned several parcels
of land.
- Pedro Sr. upon his death, was survived by his 6 children one of which is
Pedro Constantino Jr (grandfather of respondents).
- Respondents Asuncion and Josefina (great grandchildren of Pedro Sr.)
filed a complaint against petitioners Oscar, Maxima and Casmira
(grandchildren of Pedro Sr.) for nullification of document ‘Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman’
- Respondents alleged that the petitioners asserted their claim over the
whole parcel of land while respondents were occupying a portion of it.
Respondents learned that in Tax Declaration was in the name of
petitioners Oscar and Maxima and that it was unlawfully issued
- Respondents alleged that the petitioners misrepresented themselves as
the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr.
- Petitioners avvered that Pedro Sr. left several parcels of land and that the
‘Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman’ was a product of mutual and
voluntary agreement among the descendants of Pedro Sr.
- Petitioners allege respondents have no cause of action because
respondets lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr has been transferred
as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial settlement with waiver.
- A pre-trial conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be
litigated.
- RTC: As a result of “Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” executed by the
heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr. and the subsequent execution of another
deed denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” executed by
the heirs of Santiago and Bruno Constantino (sons of Pedro Sr.) to the
exclusion of the other heirs, both plaintiffs and defendants acted equally at
fault. They are in pari declito.
- CA: In favor or the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr., declaring that the
“Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” covering the lot actually belongs to
Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. It is erroneous for the
trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.
- (Plaintiff -heirs Pedro Constantino Jr, Asuncion, Josefine are not parties to
the extrajudicial settlement with waiver but are considered ‘privies’ to the
deed so are bound by the extrajudicial settlement)
Issue: WON the CA erred in disregarding the stipulations and admissions during
the pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of pari delicto was
based
Held: YES.
Substantive part
- Both RTC and CA erroneously applied the doctrine of in pari delicto. It
applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to
contracts rendered void for being simulated,28 or those in which the parties do
not really intend to be bound thereby.
- In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the
signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor common to them and
another set of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves portions of the
same estate.
Procedural part:
- The CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the
respondents during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the
land belongs to Pedro Sr.
This is what it says:
- ‘That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by
Pedro Constantino, Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax
Declaration No. 9535;’
 - The respondent’s admissions is an admission against the respondent’s Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of
interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. which was transferred to Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa
respondent’s mother, the daughter of Pedro Sr. Judicial admissions are Labas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared
legally binding on the party making the admissions. void without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr. with
the full participation of all the latter’s heirs.
- Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial
admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the
issues to be tried. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and
signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the
parties who made them.

- They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if

placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the
disadvantage.

- As contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule
regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits two exceptions:
(1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake;
(2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.

- The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he

made such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admissions/stipulation before and during the trial.

- While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq. m lot, respondent Asuncion,
when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of
land was acquired by Pedro Jr.

- The respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based
their right over the property subject matter thereof. Therefore, both acted in
violation of laws. Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention of
the laws as contemplated by the parties in the case, we must declare both
contracts void. Indeed, any circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.
07 REPUBLIC V. FRANKLIN M. MILLADO
G.R. No. 194066 June 4, 2014
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Facts:
1. Respondent Millado filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate
of Title claiming that he and his wife are the vendees of the property
covered in the title by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate with Sale executed by the heirs of spouses Sixto and Elena
Bautista. He further claimed that the owner’s duplicate OCT was in his
possession while he was securing clearances for the transfer of title but he
misplaced the same.
2. Despite efforts exerted, he was unable to find it. Upon verification with the
Registry of Deeds, the original copy was likewise not found in the files of
said office.
3. The trial court ordered respondents to submit the names and addresses of
the occupants in possession of the property, those in adjacent lots, and
anyone who may have an interest. Respondent only submitted names of
the occupants of the adjoining lots.
4. RTC: Granted reconstitution.
5. Petitioner, through the Solicitor General appealed to the CA, arguing that
the reconstitution was granted despite non-compliance with the statutory
notice requirements by not notifying all interested parties, particularly the
heirs.
6. CA: affirmed RTC. It held that the respondent had satisfactorily complied
with the statutory notice requirements so that the adjoining owners and
other persons may be duly notified
Issue: W/N respondent complied with all the jurisdictional requisites for
reconstitution
Held: NO.
The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument
which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the
same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the
loss or destruction occurred.
R.A. 26 provides for the special procedure and requirements for the
In this case, the source of reconstitution is an authenticated copy of Decree No.
295110 under Section 2(d), which as certified by the LRA, was issued on October
8, 1927 in favor of Isabel, Sixto and Apolonia, all surnamed Bautista, covering Lot
4616,San Narciso Cadastre in Cad. Case No. 9, GLRO Cad. Record No. 371. The
said co-owners pro indiviso are supposedly the registered owners named in OCT
No. 2108. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale stated that
Apolonia and Isabel died single and without any children and only the alleged heirs
of spouses Sixto and Elena Bautista executed the said document conveying the
7,594-square meter lot to respondent. These supposed vendors claiming to be
heirs of one of the registered owners were not notified of the judicial reconstitution
proceedings.
The registered owners appearing in the title sought to be reconstituted, or in this
case, their surviving heirs, are certainly interested parties who should be notified of
reconstitution proceeding under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of R.A. 26.
Indeed, for petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e),
2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement aside from
publication and posting of notice of hearing: that the notice be mailed to occupants,
owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in the
property.17 Notwithstanding the sale supposedly effected by vendors claiming to be
heirs of the registered owners, they remain as interested parties entitled to notice
of judicial reconstitution proceedings.
It is settled that the actual notice requirement in Section 13 in relation to Section 12
of R.A. 26 is mandatory and jurisdictional
It is clear from section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 that notice by publication is not
sufficient under the circumstances. Notice must be actually sent or delivered to
parties affected by the petition for reconstitution. The order of reconstitution,
therefore, having been issued without compliance with the said requirement, has
never become final as it was null and void.
For non-compliance with the actual notice requirement to all other persons who
may have interest in the property, in this case the registered owners and/or their
heirs, in accordance with Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over L.R.A. Case No. RTC-237-I. The
proceedings therein were therefore a nullity and the January 14, 2009 Decision
was void.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The Decision dated October 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 93056 is hereby SET ASIDE. We ENTER a new judgment declaring
the reconstitution proceedings in L.R.A. Case No. RTC-237-1, as well as the
January 14, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71
granting the petition for reconstitution, NULL and VOID.

8. Virginia Garcia Fule and Hon. Severo Malvar (Presiding Judge CFI Laguna)
vs. CA, Preciosa Garcia and Agustina Garcia
G.R. No. L-40502 & 42670 | 29 Nov 1976
DOCTRINE: The ROC however purposely fixed the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. The place of residence of the deceased in settlement
of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not
constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue.
FACTS: (NOTE: sorry guys I tried pero nakakaloka talaga. Basically, nag-
aagawan si Fule and Garcia kay Amado Garcia. Fule contends na sa Laguna nag-
reside si Amado before death based sa death cert saka ConCon delegate chuchu,
tapos Garcia contends na sa QC based sa residence certificate)
1. In 1973, Virginia Fule (illegitimate sister ish – #9) filed with the CFI
Calamba, Laguna, presided over by Judge Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration alleging:
- Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in Manila
- Garcia left real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of the said
court
2. At the same time, Fule moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratrix over the estate, which was granted
3. A MR was filed by Preciosa Garcia contending that the issuance of Fule as
special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction since no notice was
served upon all persons interested in the estate, that she should be
preferred as a special administratrix.
4. Pending resolution of the MR, Garcia filed a motion to remove Fule as
special administratrix on the ground that her appointment was obtained
through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations.
5. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator" filed by Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects:
- the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at
Calamba, Laguna
- the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as
heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado
G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Fule
6. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for
letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of
interest of Fule in the estate and disqualification as special administratrix.
7. (not that important) An omnibus motion was filed by Fule praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the
hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge
Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, which is just making
inventories.
8. Judge Malvar issued an order denying MR of Garcia (#3) appointing Fule
as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition.
9. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Fule as special
administratrix, reasoning that Fule admitted before the court that she is a
full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcaide, an illegitimate son of Andrea
Alcaide, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
10. Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved
because the supplemental motion of Fule in #5 cured the failure of Fule in
the original petition to indicate the place of residence of the decendent.
MR denied.
11. During the hearing, Fule presented the residence certificate to prove the
residence of Amado Garcia. She also testified that Amado was a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. On
the other hand, Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent
for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in
Quezon City.
12. Preciosa Garcia and Agustina Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before CA to annul
the proceedings before Judge Malvar or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court against them. CA annulled for lack of
jurisdiction.
13. Garcia filed a petition for letters of administration before CFI Rizal, QC and
urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
Judge Ericta granted. Garcia only informed Judge Ericta later of the
 pendency of the SpecPro before Judge Malvar. Judge Ericta ordered the
suspension of the proceedings before his court until CA Decision becomes
final.
14. Fule instituted a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to
annul the proceedings in CFI QC and to restrain from further acting in the
case.
ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction over the probate proceedings?
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases. The ROC however purposely fixed the venue or
the place where each case shall be brought. The place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue.
The SC laid down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed.
"Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
In this case, the SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not
at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of
the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Fule herself and also by Garcia,
shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City.
Other proof presented to prove that the last residence was in QC:
1. The deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months
before his death;
2. the Marketing Agreement and Power turning over the administration of his
two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.;
3. the Deed of, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina Garcia;
4. and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Fule's petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid in CFI Calamba, Laguna. The long-
settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. HOWEVER, in
asking to substitute Fule as special administratrix, Garcia did not necessarily waive
her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by CFI Calamba, but availed of
a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of
the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of
petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L-42670 are
hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
09) FIGURACION-GERILLA v. VDA. DE FIGURACION
FACTS:
Sps. Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had 6
children: petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla and respondents Elena Figuracion-
Ancheta (deceased), Hiliria Figuracion, Felipe Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin
Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
23 August 19455 Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in
favor of his 6 children.
When Leandro died in 1958, he left behind 2 parcels of land which he inherited
from both his deceased parents as evidenced by its respective Original Certificate
of Titles:
1. Lot 2299 with TCT in the name of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina
Adviento
2. Lot 705 with TCT also in the name of Leandro married to Carolina
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, hence, its TCT was
cancelled and a new one was issued to the latter.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between
petitioner Elena and her sister, respondent Mary over the eastern half of Lot 707.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento  when Eulalio died, his two daughters,
Agripina (daughter by his 1st wife) and respondent Carolina (daughter by 2nd wife),
succeeded him to it.
28 November 1961 Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner Emilia over
the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707.
Agripina died single and w/o any issue  before her half sister’s death, however,
respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself via affidavit under R47 of ROC, the
entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria
Felipa and Hilaria immediately had its respective OCT cancelled and a new title
was issued to their names.
February 1971 petitioner Emilia and her family went to the US where they stayed
for 10 years  upon returning to the PH, she built a house on the eastern half-
portion of the lot and continued to pay her share of realty taxes
Petitioner Emilia sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common
by her and respondents.
24 May 1994 Petitioner Emilia filed a complaint in RTC for partition, annulment of
documents, reconveyance, quieting of title, and damages against respondents
praying for:
1. Partition of Lots 2299 and 705
2. Nullification of affidavit of self-adjudication by respondent Carolina
3. Declaration that petitioner Emilia was the owner of ½ of Lot 707
4. Damages
Respondents took the position that Leandro’s estate should first undergo
settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And
they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was
necessary for such settlement.
RTC rendered the ff. judgments:
1. Nullified Carolina’s affidavit if self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale
of Lot 707
2. Declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro and
Figuracion, and therefore part of his estate
3. Dismissed complaint for partition, reconveyance, and damages on the
ground that it could not grant reliefs prayed for by petitioner Emilia without
any prior settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of properties
should first be effected
CA UPHELD dismissal of petitioner’s action for partition being premature but
upheld the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to
Carolina’s ½ pro indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707.
ISSUE: WON there need to be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate
(accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705) before the properties can be
partitioned- YES
RULING:
-Section 1, Rule 69 ROC: Winner: Respondents

SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person

having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of
his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property.

-There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by
agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement
cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6

-Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the

decedents estate  While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an
accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and profits) in the course of an
action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which
property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court

-In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the
estate, partition is inappropriate  while petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only
legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses
including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been
properly settled

-Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to
settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an
action for partition

-In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting
of all expenses for which the estate must answer
 If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the
properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as
long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.

10 Volataire ARBOLARIO et al. v. Court of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates; how do you initiate probate proceedings
Doctrine: Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of
filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should
be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted
for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of ownership and possession.
Facts:
13. The original owners of the controverted lot, Spouses Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan (Spouses Baloyo) had 5 children: Agueda, Catalina,
Eduardo, Gaudencia, and Julian. (All are dead)
14. Agueda Colinco (1st child) was survived by her 2 children: Antonio and
respondent Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, herein respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina.
15. Catalina Baloyo (2nd child) was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was
blessed with the birth of one child, Purificacion Arbolario (died in 1985)
a. Juan Arbolario consorted with another woman (Francisca Malvas)
by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born
the petitioners Voltaire, Lucena, Fe, Exaltacion, and Carlos
(Arbolarios). All the petitioners were born well before the year 1951.
16. In 1946, it appears that Eduardo Baloyo (3rd child) sold his entire interest in
Lot 323 to his sister, Agueda Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document.
17. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and
between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the
late Spouses Baloyo
a. Gaudencia (4th child) conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor
of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to 1/2 and Purificacion Arbolario
to the other half.
18. Respondents Irene, Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina (Colincos) believing
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
2 Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her
cousins and nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her, because
she had half-brothers and half-sisters.
3 When Juan Arbolario cohabited with another woman, the union was extramarital. Consequently, their children
(respondent Arbolarios) are illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion and thus barred by Article
Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition (Irene Colinco, ½
while the surviving daughters of her late brother Antonio namely Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining
½). This forthwith brought about the cancellation of the OCT and the
issuance of a TCT in their names and conformably with the aforesaid
distribution.
19. 1st case = Colincos filed against Spouses Salhay a case seeking to recover
possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by the latter since 1970.
The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees
of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978. And that they
purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor in
1978.
20. 2nd case = Before the abovementioned case was heard and tried on the
merits, the Arbolarios) and Spouses Salhay filed for Cancellation of Title
with Damages, against Colincos. Petitioners contend that the Declaration of
Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective
and thus voidable as the Arbolarios were excluded therein.
21. RTC = In favor of ARBOLARIOS…and in the 2nd case, DISMISSED the
case filed by Colincos.2
22. CA = REVERSED.3
Issue:
1. WON the CA erred when it declared petitioners as illegitimate children and
were not entitled to inherit (NO)
2. WON the CA erred when it declared that the court a quo had no right to
distribute the property (NO)
Held:
5. Petitioners’ maintain that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before the
notarized declaration of heirship was ever executed, thus conclude that the
Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion.
The SC said: The 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalina’s death
was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are
992 from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. There is no
impediment for respondents to declare themselves as the sole and forced heirs. Also, there is no clear evidence
to support the allegation of the Salhays that they purchased the lot.
 legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a 0. The
paragraph (in the declaration) quoted by petitioners should show a
chronological progression in the heirs years of death. If Catalina had indeed
died in 1903, why then was her name written after Aguedas and not before
it? Moreover, it does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a
man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to
establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially

established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are
legitimate. Petitioners failed to prove the fact of marriage between their
parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a
presumption of legitimacy in their favor.

6. Petitioners contend that the CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot since respondents did
not raise the issue of partition on appeal. The CA (as agreed by the SC)
held that the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the
parties, because respondents merely sought recovery of possession of the
parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition respondents had entered into. The purpose of partition is
to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual
interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific
property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or
interference

Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition,

because they had failed to establish that they were legitimate half-brothers
and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion (read doctrine after).

Note: The SC in agreement with the CA ruled that the acquisition of the property by
the Salhay’s was improper as there was no clear and reliable evidence introduced
to prove such allegation. Also, no favorable supporting evidence was cited by
petitioners in their Memorandum.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
FELIX AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO
substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
 G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
Doctrine: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not
signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most
importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is
fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
FACTS:
1) The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981.
Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
 The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular

Pilipino,
 o If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the
 The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on
 the
left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the
attestation clause.
 The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and
devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene
Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed
that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the
designated executor, Vart Prague.
. 2) The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the
decedent.
- claimed that the will is a forgery.
- asserted that the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs,
namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.
- also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the
second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These
twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
 should necessarily lead to its rejection:
. 3) RTC admitted the will to probate but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of
probate.
 after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
. 4) Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
"the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation
clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to
what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."

ISSUE: WON the will of Eugenia E. Igsolo is valid even if the attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in the will and could therefore be admitted to
probate.
RULING: Invalid. The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the
attestation clause is obvious;
 the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet
would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and
in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the
numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages.
attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve
the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of
the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with
much greater difficulty.
Case at bar: the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will.
The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of
pages of the will should be stated
o The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number
of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the
number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the
part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted
the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed
and subscribed to.
An examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that
1. The attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
 witnesses. While
the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin
of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which
o The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among
 others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing
forms part of the will.
o On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish
that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself.
 The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly
attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the
attestation clause.
2. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been
complied with.
- An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed
in
 going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to 
 be his
act or deed.

- It might be possible to construe the averment as “a jurat” which is

that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
o Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a
jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and
not merely subscribed and sworn to.
- A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public.
3. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign
each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to
sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing
at the so-called "logical end" of the will on its first page.

4. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but
instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has
disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as
mandatory.
12 ALABAN v. CA
G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005
Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Doctrine: [those in bold at the Held portion]
Facts:
23. On May 2001, Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of Soledad Provido. Francisco
alleged that he was the heir of Soledad and the executor of her will. RTC
Dumangas allowed the probate of the will, and directed the issuance of
letters testamentary to Francisco.
24. More than 4 months later, petitioners Cynthia Alaban, et.al. filed a motion
for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition
to the allowance of the will of Soledad and the issuance of letters
testamentary to Francisco. Petitioners claimed that they were intestate
heirs of Soledad, and that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition due to non-payment of docket fees, defective publication and lack
of notice to the other heirs.
25. Petitioners also alleged that the will could not have been probated
because of formal defects (signature was forged, no signature below the
attestation clause), as well as lack of testamentary capacity of Soledad.
Petitioners prayed that the letter testamentary issued to Francisco be
withdrawn and the estate be disposed under intestate succession.
26. RTC denied petitioners’ motion, holding that they were sufficiently notified
by publication, and that non-payment of docket fees is not a ground for
outright dismissal.
27. Petitioners filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with
the CA. Petitioners alleged that they drafted a compromise agreement but
Francisco refused to sign. Petitioners opined that Francisco feigned
interest in the agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to
probate the will. Petitioners claimed that because of this, they only knew of
the probate proceedings in July 2001, which made them file their motion to
reopen proceedings and admit opposition only on October 2001. They
argued the RTC decision should be annulled on the ground of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
28. CA dismissed the petition, finding that petitioners failed to resort to the
ordinary remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, and others. CA also
held that petitioners claim of extrinsic fraud was baseless.
29. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners impute grave abuse of
discretion to the CA. Petitioners argue that they were not made parties to
the case, and thus, they could not have availed of the remedies. They also
argue that respondent’s false offer of compromise and his failure to notify
them constitutes extrinsic fraud.
30. Respondents however maintain that petitioners should have availed of the
ordinary remedies, and that extrinsic fraud does not exist as they failed to
prove that they were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made
parties as they were not instituted as Soledad’s heirs.
Issue: W/N CA erred in denying the claims of petitioners on the ground of failure to
avail of the ordinary remedies
Held: NO. The CA was correct in dismissing the petition.
1. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a
will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, a proceeding for the
probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition, the court's jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the
decedent.
2. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar all who might be minded to make an objection against the
right sought to be established. Thus, even though petitioners were not
mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
3. As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly
availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and
petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to
reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying
for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings.
However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long
 after the Decision became final and executory. Also, petitioners could have
still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to
reopen, as it was only 4 months from finality.
4. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies
available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for
annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own
inaction or negligence.
5. Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of
judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites.
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged
failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute
extrinsic fraud.
6. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the
will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are
neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of
the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
personally notify them of the same.
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all,
personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and
not a jurisdictional requisite. Petitioners were not denied their day in court,
as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and
presenting their case before the probate court.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against

petitioners.
13. FLEUMER V. HIX (CLEMENTE) witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930 other as the law of West Virginia seems to require.

Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates
Doctrine: Where it is desired to prove the probate of a will in another jurisdiction
and the appointment in that jurisdiction of an administrator for the estate of the
deceased, the moving party must comply with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure by requesting a hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to
have been proved and allowed in another jurisdiction.
In a nutshell, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no
hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and
allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased
left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention
that he left any in West Virginia.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, judgment affirmed.

Facts:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix sought to probate a
will in another jurisdiction and the appointment of an administrator also in another
jurisdiction in the Philippines. It must be taken into consideration that the alleged will
was executed in Elkins, West Virginia. The Court of First Instance denied said
application upon the failure of the special administrator to comply with the
requirements laid out by our Code of Civil Procedure. Undaunted by this, the special
administrator comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.
Issue: W/N probate proceedings of the deceased who is a citizen of another country
and domiciled there can prosper on Philippine soil. (NO)

Held:
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in Philippine courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such
laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met:
1. There was no printed or published law under the authority of the State of
West Virginia, as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer
having charge of the original, under the State of West Virginia, as provided
in the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
4. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only
evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner.
5. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged
by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these
14. ALONZO ANCHETA v. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON
G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006
Doctrines: (underlined)
Facts:
(1) Sps. Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were
American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. Their
adopted daughter is Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
(2) Audrey died on July 29, 1979 and left a will wherein she bequeathed her
entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will was
admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, USA.
The court also named Atty. Alonzo Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
(3) In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with
whom he has 2 children: Kimberly & Kevin.
(4) On Oct. 12, 1982: Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the CFI of
Rizal in Special Proceeding No. 9625. As administrator, Ancheta filed an
inventory and appraisal of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate in Forbes
Parks, a current account in Audrey’s name with cash balance, and 64,444
shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
(5) On July 20, 1984: Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to Candelaria, save for his rights & interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to
probate by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, USA.
(6) Richard’s will was submitted for probate before the RTC of Makati docketed
as Special Proceeding No. M-888.
(7) On Oct. 19, 1987, Ancheta filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625 a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Ancheta also filed a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the 3/4
undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the 1/4
undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash. This was granted by the trial court. The
Register of Deeds of Makati issued a TCT in the names of the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and Kyle.
(8) Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888
also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s 3/4 undivided interest
in the Makati property was allocated to Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof were
allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by Candelaria on
the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, “a legacy passes to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy.” Since Richard left his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 3/4
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to her.
(9) The trial court found merit in the opposition, thus, it disapproved the project
of partition as to the Makati property. It also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property to Candelaria.
(10) On Oct. 20, 1993, Candelaria filed an amended complaint with the CA for
the annulment of the trial court’s order on Spec. Pro. 9625, contending that
Ancheta willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws
of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance
with her will.
(11) Candelaria argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely 3/4 thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to Candelaria, then the entire
Makati property should now pertain to her.
(12) Ancheta alleged that he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws
on testate and intestate succession.
(13) CA: annulled the trial court’s Orders. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
(1) WON Ancheta did not commit fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in the
performance of his duties as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate in the
PH -> YES.
(2) WON Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by
Ancheta -> YES.
Held:
Issue 1: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a
timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may
be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court
ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Under BP 129, an annulment of judgment may be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual, and must be brought within 4 years from discovery of fraud. In
this case, Candelaria alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of RTC
Orders. This fraud being complained of refers to the failure to introduce in evidence
the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Ancheta is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise
reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust.
Ancheta’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according
to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic
fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
Issue 2: Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the
State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 1039 of the
Civil Code further provides that “capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.”
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will
Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator
in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will
may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants
of another state or country.
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, Ancheta, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty­bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence. As held by the CA, While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under
ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position,
as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to
create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888
noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
“Under Section 1­301, Title 3, Sub­Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public
General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, “all property of a decedent shall
be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to
the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and
distribution,” while Section 4­408 expressly provides that “unless a contrary intent is
expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy.” Section 7­101, Title
7, Sub­Title 1, on the other hand, declares that “a personal representative is a
fiduciary” and as such he is “under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate
of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents
law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances.”
When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then
passed on to Candelaria. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of
the State of Maryland which allows “a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate
of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy,” was sufficiently
proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective
wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by Ancheta.
Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to Candelaria.
Note: (Addt’l Ruling)
As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was
made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. In
this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a
Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of
the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties

as an official of the court