RULES 78 – 82 – SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS
HELD: Rule 81 of the Rules of Court grants discretion to the
[G.R. No. L-5436. June 30, 1953.]
ROMAN OZAETA, ROSA GONZALES VDA. DE PALANCA,
Petitioners, v. HONORABLE POTENCIANO PECSON
1. TESTATE PROCEEDINGS; SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR; COURT’S DISCRETION IN
APPOINTMENT. — Rule 81 of the Rules of Court grants discretion to the probate
court to appoint, or not to appoint, a special administrator. It is silent as to the
person who may be appointed as special administrator, unlike section 6 of Rule 79,
which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons who may be appointed
regular administrator. The appointment of special administrators is not governed by
the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. Roxas v. Pecson, (82
Phil., 407). But the fact that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. And there is no reason why the same fundamental
and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
taken into account in the appointment of the special administrator.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTOR NAMED IN WILL SHOULD BE APPOINTED UPON
PROBATE OF WILL; MANDAMUS. — When a will has been admitted to probate, it is
the duty of the probate court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as
executor in the will upon the latter’s application (23 C. J., 1023), even if the order of
probate is on appeal. Mandamus lies to compel such appointment. As the rights
granted by will take effect from the time of the decedent’s death (Art. 777, Civil Code
of the Phil.) , the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should
be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of
the trust can be interposed.
FACTS: Carlos Palanca died on September 2, 1950; leaving a will
executed by him on May 19, 1945. In the will petitioner Roman
Ozaeta, former associate justice of this Court, was named
executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify. Upon
Palanca’s death, and General Roxas having died previously,
petitioner presented a petition for the probate of the will, at the
same time praying that he be appointed special administrator.
Some of the heirs of the decedent opposed this petition, and the
court on October 6, 1950, appointed the Philippine Trust
Company, a non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings,
special administrator.
On April 20, 1951, the Philippine Trust Company presented a
petition to resign as special administrator on the ground of
incompatibility of interest, as it had granted a loan to heir Angel
Palanca, who had pledged to it shares of the Far Eastern
University allegedly belonging to the estate of the deceased.
Thereupon petitioner reiterated his previous petition, but the
court appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs, to take the
place of the Philippine Trust Company. The court rendered an
order admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as
administrator.
And on October 25, 1951, the court allowed the Philippine Trust
Company to resign, reconsidered its order appointing Sebastian
Palanca special administrator, and appointed instead the Bank of
the Philippine Islands. In its order the court held that it has
discretion to choose the special administrator and is not bound to
appoint the person named therein as executor, because the order
had been appealed. Petitioner claims that the reason why the
respondent judge does not appoint him special administrator is
his personal dislike for him, and that the reasons given by the
judge in not appointing him, namely, alleged partiality to one
group of heirs, less ability and experience in handling estates as
the appointees — the previous and the subsequent one — are not
actually the reasons that impelled him to deny petitioner’s
appointment.
ISSUE: Does a probate court commit an abuse of discretion if,
pending an appeal against its order or judgment admitting a will
to probate and appointing as judicial administrator the person
named therein as executor, it appoints as special administrator any
person other than the executor named in the will?
probate court to appoint or not to appoint a special
administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be appointed
as special administrator, unlike section 6 of Rule 79, which
expressly gives the order of preference of the persons that may
be appointed regular administrator. Appointment of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
appointment of regular administrators. While the choice of the
person lies within the court’s discretion, such discretion should
not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and
in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice. The fact
that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail
over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator,
a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in
the manner he wishes. It has been held that when a will has been
admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters
testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application.
In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate,
and respondent judge himself has expressly appointed petitioner
as administrator. The only reason or ground, therefore, for
suspending his appointment, and for the appointment of a special
administrator, who is not the petitioner himself, is a very
technical one. It also appears that the Philippine Trust Company,
which had acted as special administrator for a period of only a
few months, has submitted a bill for P90,000. This would cut
deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special
administrator appointed by the respondent judge takes office, it
is not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the
same expensive cost of administration. Under these
circumstances, it would seem unreasonable to refuse to appoint
the petitioner as special administrator. To do so would be
delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the testator and
subjecting the estate to unnecessary expense.
G.R. No. L-17091 September 30, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CHUNG
LIU, NGO THE HUA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CHUNG KIAT HUA,
oppositors-appellees, CHUNG KIAT, KANG, oppositor-
appellant, PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, special administrator.
FACTS: On December 7, 1957, Ngo The Hua, claiming to be
surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu, filed a petition to be
appointed administratrix of the estate of aforementioned
deceased. Her petition was opposed Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung
Cho, Bonifacio Chung Sio Pek and Chung Ka Bio, all claiming to be
children of the deceased Chung Liu by his first wife, Tan Hua.
They claim that Ngo The Hua is morally and physically unfit to
execute the duties of the trust as administratrix, and that she and
the deceased have secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan. In this
same opposition they prayed the Chung Kiat Hua, allegedly the
eldest child of the deceased, be appointed administrator instead.
These oppositors prayer was in turn opposed by Ngo The Hua
who claim that the oppositors are not children of Chung Liu.
On January 13, 1957, Chung Kiat Kang, claiming be a nephew of
the deceased, filed his opposition to the appointment of either
Ngo The Hua or Chung Kiat Hu on the ground that to be
appointed they must first prove their respective relationship to
the deceased Chung Li and prayed that he be appointed
administrator. When Chung Kiat Kang's turn to present his
evidence came, he manifested, through his counsel, that he was
waiving his right to present evidence in so far as the appointment
of administrator of the estate is concerned. On December 2, 1959,
after a lengthy hearing, the lower court found that Ngo The Hua
and the deceased were validly divorced by the aforementioned
Taipei District Court, and that Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho,
Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Kiat Bio are children of the
deceased. So it issued the order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as
administrator of the estate of Chung Liu.
Hence only the appeal of oppositor Chung Kiat Kang remains for
the consideration of this Court. Appellant now contends that the
lower court erred in passing upon the validity of the divorce
obtained by the petitioner and the deceased and upon the
filiation of the oppositors-appellees, such being a prejudgment
"since it is well-settled that the declaration of heirs shall only
take place after all debts, expenses and taxes have been paid" in
accordance with See. 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. The
pertinent portion of the section cited by appellant is as follows:.
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — . . When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowances to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court . . shall assign
the residue of the estate of the Persons entitled to the same . .
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided for . . (Emphasis supplied).
A cursory reading of the above-quoted section discloses that
what the court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or
distribution of the residue of the deceased's estate before the
above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first
paid. Nowhere from said section may it be inferred that the court
cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of
these obligations.
On the other hand, it is clear from the facts of this case that is was
deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the
relationship of the parties, as advanced by petitioner and the
oppositors-appellees, to be able to appoint an administrator in
accordance with the order preference established in Section 5,
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. Said section provides that letters of
administration shall be granted to the surviving spouse the next of
kin, or to any principal creditor, in this order. The lower court
necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective
claims of relationship to be able to appoint an administrator in
accordance with the aforementioned order of preference. Let it
be made clear, that what the lower court actual decided and what
we also decide is the relationships between the deceased and the
parties of claiming the right to be appointed his administrator, to
determine who among them is entitled to the administration, not
who are his heirs who are entitled to share in his estate. This
issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution.
It is well-settled that for a person to be able to intervene in an
administration proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased, it
is necessary for him to have interest in such estate. An interested
party has been defined in this connection as one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a certain
claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Appellant Chung Kiat Kang does not claim of to be a creditor of
Chung Liu's estate. Neither is he an heir in accordance with the
Civil Code of the Republic of China (Exh. 28 of Chung Kiat Hua),
the law that applies in this case, Chung Liu being a Chinese citizen
(Art. 16, New Civil Code). The appellant not having any interest in
Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or creditor, he cannot be
appointed as co-administrator of the estate, as he now prays.
G.R. No. L-10560 March 24, 1916
In the matter of the administration of the estate of Tan Po
Pic, deceased. MARTA TORRES, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUAN
L. JAVIER, as administrator of the estate of Tan Po Pic,
deceased, respondent-appellee.
FACTS: This is an appeal in proceeding to appoint an
administrator of the estate of Tan Po Pic, deceased. The trial
court refused to appoint Marta Torres who claimed to be the
lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead, appointed Juan L. Javier
administrator. It appears that two women are claiming to be the
legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese
woman named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to the
appointment of anyone except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo,
on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of
Marta Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who,
if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a
disinterested third person to act as administrator.
HELD: We are of the opinion that the decision of the probate
court is so far correct that it must be affirmed. Section 642 of the
Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration
should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second,
to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving
wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the
administration may be granted to some other person, such as one
of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to
such person as the court may appoint.
The first error assigned is that the court erred in allowing Tan Y.
Soc to appear in the proceeding. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was
appointed administrator of the said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the
Court of First Instance of Manila under the misapprehension that
Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time of his
death. After it had been ascertained that the deceased was a
resident of the Province of Rizal, the Court of First Instance of
Manila transferred the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in taking into
consideration the claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a Chinese
wife in China. It must be remembered that the probate court did
not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his
appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence
of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and
circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and
upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned
to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person,
particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be
litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which
is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of
the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not find the errors assigned
sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this court.
The third error assigned is to the effect that the trial court erred
in not finding that Marta Torres was the lawful wife of the
deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not believe the court erred in this
respect. The court had a right in view of the controversy between
the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator
and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the
administration proceedings at the proper time. The judgment
appealed from is affirmed.
[G.R. No. L-5236. May 25, 1953.]
Intestate estate of the deceased Luis Morales, JOSE TORRES,
Petitioner, PEDRO DE JESUS, administrator-appellee, v.
HERMENEGILDA SICAT VDA. DE MORALES, Oppositor-
Appellant.
1. ADMINISTRATORS, APPOINTMENT OF; ORDER OF PREFERENCE, WHEN MAY BE
DISREGARDED. — The order of preference for the appointment of administrators
provided in Section 6, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court, may be disregarded only if the
person enjoying such preference appears to be unsuitable for the trust, he having an
adverse interest or is hostile to those immediately interested in the estate, to such
an extent as to render the appointment inadvisable.
2. ID.; CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE; EFFECT ON POWER OF COURT TO APPOINT
ADMINISTRATORS. — Under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, the creditors’ claims may
be filed and considered only after the regular administrator has been appointed,
hence in selecting the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord
priority treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute.
3. ID.; ID.; WHO ARE CONSIDERED CREDITORS. — The creditors of the estate are
those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully
established they are not creditors. So it is not improper — it is even proper — for
the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment as such, to oppose, or to
require competent proof of, claims advanced against the estate.
FACTS: On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to
Hermenegilda Sicat, died in the municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac.
Seven days later, Jose Torres alleging to be a creditor of the
conjugal partnership commenced this special proceeding in the
Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. de Jesus, for the purpose
of settling the estate of the deceased. Twelve days afterwards the
widow voiced her opposition, and claimed preference to be
appointed as administratrix. Then the trial judge, disregarding
the preference established by law for the surviving widow,
entered on August 16, 1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. de
Jesus as the administrator. The widow appealed on time.
ISSUE: whether this appointment should be upheld, ignoring the
surviving widow’s preferential right.
HELD: The order making the appointment is undoubtedly
appealable.
Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies intestate,
administration should be granted:
"(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, . . .;
"(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, . . . it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
"(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select."
"The order of preference provided in this section is founded on
the assumption that the persons preferred are suitable. If they
are not, the court may entirely disregard the preference thus
provided. This is the reason for the rule that in the selection of an
administrator courts may exercise discretion, and, as stated
elsewhere, the person appearing in the order of preference may
not be appointed where he appears to be unsuitable for the trust,
he having an adverse interest or is hostile to the interested
parties to such an extent as to make his selection inadvisable. But,
of course, the order of preference may be disregarded only when
the reasons therefor are positive and clear." The trial judge was
cognizant of this statutory preference.
But he expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in
effect: "Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of the
conjugal assets; therefore the interest of the creditors deserves
paramount consideration. Now, inasmuch as the widow has
shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their credits,
she is therefore unsuitable, for having adverse interests."
In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the
administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical
to the interests of the creditors. The administration of the
intestate is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the
creditors. But by creditors we mean those declared to be so in
appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully
established they are not "creditors" within the purview of the
above principle.
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors’ claims may be filed, and
considered, only after the regular administrator has been
appointed. Hence, in selecting the administrator, the court could
not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interests of
those whose credits were in dispute. The appealed order
conceding that the evidence "showed clearly that the surviving
widow is fully competent in a high degree to administer the
intestate of her deceased husband", plainly indicates that except
for her supposed hostility to creditors she was suitable for the
trust. Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per se
constitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily
declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as
administratrix under Rule 79.
G.R. No. L-46134 April 18, 1939
In the Matter of the Intestate of Proceso de Guzman.
NICOLASA DE GUZMAN, applicant-appellee, vs. ANGELA
LIMCOLIOC, oppositor-appellant.
Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a
will. The deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with
whom he had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and
Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a second
marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any
child. The Court of First Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de
Guzman judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Proceso de Guzman.
Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked that this
appointment be set aside and that she had named administratrix
instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow. The court
denied this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not appointing
her administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de
Guzman and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such
administratrix without first setting the case for hearing.
The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of
the administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such
administrator. This is the same consideration which the law takes
into account in establishing the preference of the widow to
administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death,
because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner
in the conjugal partnership.
But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there are
other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator
other than surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what
principally determines the preference in the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under the
circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who
has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the
preference established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment
alleges that during the marital life of the deceased with his first
wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired
all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any
property during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. It is
true that the case was not heard for the purpose of establishing
these allegations, but when Angela asked for the reconsideration
of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations
and merely stated that they do not justify her appointment as
administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations,
thus taking them for granted, the court was justified in
considering them when it denied the reconsideration of its
resolution and when it sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were
acquired during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children,
among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now
widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of
usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the
children who has received no betterment. The appealed decision
is affirmed.
G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE
GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
FACTS: (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a
petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that
he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in
business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the
late Domingo Gabriel. the court below issued an order 3 setting
the hearing of the petition on June 29, 1988, on which date all
persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition
should not be granted. The court further directed the publication
of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition
having been filed despite such publication of the notice of
hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his
evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order
appointing private respondent as administrator of the intestate
estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4
Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against
the estate of the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan
News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private
respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate
Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil
case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that
she thereby had an interest in said estate. Private respondent
filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and
Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent
at P18,960,000.00.
Petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all
surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying
for the recall of the letters of administration issued to private
respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner
Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any
of the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners. Probate
court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on
the ground that they had not shown any circumstance sufficient
to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no evidence was
submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to
show that the person who was appointed administrator is
unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to
make his appointment inadvisable under these
circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was likewise denied.
Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition
for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an
administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the
fact that there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not
a denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional
requisite and petitioners were heard on their opposition; and
that the alleged violation of the order of preference, if any, is an
error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by
appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari.
HELD: Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select. (Emphases ours.)
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the
order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration,
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and
the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in
appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of
discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient
reason therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is
the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.
Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside
from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On this
ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the
deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much
entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since
one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another
who has less. 16
Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her
failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30)
days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules.
However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not
sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the
estate of her husband.
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to
disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as
administratrix of the decedent's estate. On the other hand, we
feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private
respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on
appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however,
have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal.
In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the
deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is
not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent.
We see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those
interested therein, more than one administrator may not be
appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in
practice.
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of
administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and
the next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a
contingency which may arise when there is only one
administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is
co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-
administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the
extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the
creditable services rendered to and which may further be
expected from private respondent for the same estate.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the
appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various
reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 24 (2)
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for
the best interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled
to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office. 28
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just,
equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the
estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and
private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. The purpose of having
co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will
respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of
heirs to the estate.
G.R. No. L-23372 June 14, 1967
IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN.
CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL DURAN, petitioners-
appellants, vs. JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and
appellee.
Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in
Guinobatan Albay. Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers,
executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his
hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina
Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00. A year later, on June 8,
1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay
a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate,
further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefina
Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an opposition, praying for its
dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an
"interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer
and renunciation the estate; in the alternative, she asked to be
appointed administratrix. Replying to this, Cipriano alleged, on
September 11, 1963, alleged in his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife. Anent
the deed of assignment, he contended that the same was
procured thru fraud, with gross inadequacy of price and vitiated
by lesion.
The Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the
petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. Said lack
of interest was premised on the deed of transfer executed by
Cipriano, regarding which the court declared itself without power
to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud,
inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it rescissible or
voidable.
Appeal to Us directly, on questions of law, was taken by Cipriano
and Miguel Duran. The Rules of Court provides that a petition for
administration and settlement of an estate must be filed by an
"interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend that the
deed of assignment executed by Cipriano did not operate to
render him a person without interest in the estate. They argue
that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a co-
heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement
court to be effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his
status as a person interested in the estate, even after said
assignment is approved by the court.
In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no
settlement proceedings were pending. The properties subject
matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a
settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a
partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does
not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An
extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if
the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not
followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding
creditors and non-participating heirs only.
Should it be contended that said partition was attended with
fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to
annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the
meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement
proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or
rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he
is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for
settlement proceedings. Since there was really no settlement
proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be
denied. Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed
administratrix, her doing so did not amount to ratification of the
petition for settlement since she did so merely by way of an
alternative prayer, should her motion to dismiss fail.
G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, respondents.
Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc.
for Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as Shell), filed on 8 January
1973 a petition praying therein that he be appointed judicial
administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. In
their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to
Gonzalez filed on 21 March 1973, 2 private respondents, who are
heirs of Regino Canonoy, allege that: Gonzalez "is a complete
stranger to the intestate estate" of Regino Canonoy; he is "not
even a creditor" of the estate; he is a resident of Davao City and
thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which
is located in Butuan City, "he would not be able to perform his
duties efficiently;" and he is an employee of Shell Philippines, Inc.,
an alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he would not be able to
properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case
of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that since
Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, enjoys preference in
appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
he should "be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate
and the corresponding letters of administration be issued in his
favor."
Trial court appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the
intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, 3 having found him
competent to act as such. Herein petitioner Shell, then known as
Shell Philippines, Inc., filed its claim against the estate of the
deceased Regino Canonoy. The duly appointed administrator,
Bonifacio Canonoy, filed on 9 October 1974 a Motion to Dismiss
the claim of Shell 4 which the latter contested by filing an
Opposition. Shell likewise filed an amended claim against the
estate.
In the said Answer, he interposes compulsory counterclaims for
the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for
land occupied by the Shell Service Station, lighting allowances,
allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants, sales
commission due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable
attorney's fees.
Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim. It alleges that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and
nature thereof because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not
the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court. 12Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on 16
October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the
interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that
needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all, Gonzalez' lack of
interest in the estate of the deceased only affected his
competence to be appointed administrator. Respondent Judge,
finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious, dismissed
the case. 14 The motion for its reconsideration having been
denied.
issues: (a) whether the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated
in a petition for letters of administration under Section 2(a), Rule
79 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the
petitioner therein is an "interested person," and (b) whether the
administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition
for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested
person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as
administrator of the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial a
claim against the said estate
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be
granted.
1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. —
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences
of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and
character of the property of the
estate;
(d) The name of the person for
whom letters of administration are
prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance
of letters of administration.
The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator,
his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, his having left his estate in such province. The fact of
death of the intestate and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was
not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration in any county. A motion to dismiss may lie not on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather
on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings.
An interested party as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not
merely indirect or contingent. Private respondents herein did not
file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the
ground of lack of capacity to sue; 27 they instead filed an
Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of
the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other
reasons, he is a stranger to the estate.
The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the
children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed
administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The failure to move
for a dismissal amounted to a waiver. By proposing that Bonifacio
Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez,
private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of
the petition by the latter.
2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction. Petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional
requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and
service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence
on the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then
appointed him as the administrator and finally directed that
letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his
oath of office after putting up a surety or property bond in the
amount of P5,000.00. 32
It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified
as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to
dismiss petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the
Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and an Answer to the
petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he
interposed a counterclaim.
Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of
the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such
jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favour.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., respondent
FACTS: On March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for the probate of a will
alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting
the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him
as executor; that private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
and/or opposition contending, among others, that all the real
properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue
of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by
Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that a motion
for the appointment of a special administrator 11 was filed by the
petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved
motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will
and the appointment of an executor; that the decedent's estate
consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural rice land,
more or less, yielding fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of
rice harvested twice a year. Respondent judge issued an order
denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied
by the respondent judge.
ISSUE: whether the respondent judge presiding the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V. Gapan, acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the order dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's motion for
the appointment of a special administrator and the order dated
June 9, 1978, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
HELD: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator —
When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay
are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator 15 should there be a delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will.
Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. The basis for
appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to
the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or
where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the
parties cannot agree among themselves. 18 Likewise, when from
any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted,
a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those
incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing
that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the
granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged
necessitating the immediate appointment of a special
administrator. The facts justifying the appointment of a special
administrator are:
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the
probate of the win.
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim
to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and
opposition to the probate of the will is a deed
of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly
executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan and
her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. 19
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the
Torrens system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan
consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It
is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of
palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate
need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the
estate as regards the products. All the facts which warrant the
appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule
80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at
bar.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the
appointment of a special administrator in this case because the
respondents are already in possession of the properties covered
by the will. The respondent judge has failed to distinguish
between the partisan possession of litigants from that of the
neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of
Court. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not
as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and
in fact, as an officer of the court. In view of all the foregoing,
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner's motion for appointment of a special
administrator.
G.R. No. L-4783 May 26, 1952
JULITA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON R. SAN JOSE,
ETC., respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of
the testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr. The Court of First Instance
of Manila issued an order on January 15, 1951, appointing
Rolando Relucio as administrator in substitution of the
petitioner. Rolando Relucio moved for the immediate execution
of the order appointing him as administrator.
The court merely made reference to the letters of administration
issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not pass on the motion
for immediate execution. Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying
that the petitioner be declared in contempt of court for failing to
deliver to him, after demand, all papers, documents, titles and
properties of the estate under her administration. Court of First
Instance of Manila denied this motion for contempt and
appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation as special
administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner.
The court ruled that the appeal suspended the appointment of
Rolando Relucio as administrator; but in the same breath it
justified the appointment of the special administrator by arguing
that, if the petitioner has to remain as administratrix during the
pendency of her appeal, "a removed administrator may easily
nullify such removal by interposing an appeal." The motion for
immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951, was in
effect denied, with the result that the petitioner must be deemed
as having the right to continue as administratrix until her appeal
is finally disposed of. It is noteworthy that the petitioner was
named in the will of Felipe Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated)
not only as administratrix but as executrix, and her substitution
by Rolando Relucio in virtue of the appealed order of January 15,
1951 is not for any cause, but is based solely on the circumstance
that Rolando Relucio is an heir. At any rate, as already noted, the
respondent Judge had not seen fit to order, for any special reason,
the immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951.
The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are
specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which
provides as follows: "When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause,
the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take
charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed." A special administrator
may also be appointed in a case covered by section 8 of Rule 87
which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has a
claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a
special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim,
have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other
claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay
to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such
claim." There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling
under either section 1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. Pending
her appeal from the order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had
the right to act as administratrix. If the respondent Judge had
decreed the immediate execution of the order of January 15,
1951, Rolando Relucio would then be the administrator pending
petitioner's appeal. Consequently, the respondent Judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing the respondent Equitable
Banking Corporation as special administrator.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
2. VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.
MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
(note: see Rule 73 cases)
Xxx 4. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as
surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint
a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly,
the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when
the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new
Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties
cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion
to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such
reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin.
We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. The preference of Preciosa
B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos
executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in
favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is
married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for
the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the
First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote
therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced
with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado
G. Garcia.
G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y
MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special administrator-
appellee, vs. MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-
appellant.
FACTS: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred
to as Mrs. Gurrea — and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain,
where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her
and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he
lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2)
children. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later,
that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental,
Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos
Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality.
Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.
Presently, or on July 29, 1960, she instituted, against Carlos
Gurrea, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations
of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina.
Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document
purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea
and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962,
Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will.
Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed
special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to
the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son,
Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter
of the deceased.
On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed a motion alleging that the
aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had
been suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying
that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it
pending the final determination of the case. This motion having
been denied in an order dated February 2, 1963, Mrs. Gurrea
moved for a reconsideration thereof. Moreover, on February 27,
1963, she moved for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. In an order dated April 20, 1963, said
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court
denying her petition for support, as well as that denying its
reconsideration. Both were predicated upon the theory that,
pursuant to Article 188 of our Civil Code (Article 1430 of the
Spanish Civil Code) the support of a surviving spouse constitutes,
not an encumbrance upon the estate of the decedent, but merely
an advance from her share of said estate, and that Mrs. Gurrea is
not entitled to such advance, there being neither allegation nor
proof that she had contributed any paraphernal property to said
estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the
conjugal partnership between her and the deceased.
HELD: The foregoing view of Manresa is predicated upon the
premise that it has been proven that none of the properties under
administration belongs to the surviving spouse either as
paraphernal property or as part of the conjugal partnership.
Upon the other hand, the lower court denied support to Mrs.
Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the status, nature
or character of the property now under the custody of the Special
Administrator. We are bound by law1 to assume that the estate of
the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership,2 one-half of which belongs presumptively to Mrs.
Gurrea,3 aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said
partnership as may belong to her as one of the compulsory
heirs,4 if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if
probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were nullified.
It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in
denying her petition for appointment as administratrix, for, as
widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the language
of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in
the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of
these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The
deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his
will, seemingly, is still pending probate. Again, said document
names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed
that he is incompetent therefor.
What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also,
expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as
executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has
assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the
preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a
regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within
the discretion of the probate court,5 and is not appealable.
G.R. No. L-10907 June 29, 1957
AUREA MATIAS, petitioner, vs. HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALEZ,
ETC., ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a
petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last
will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on
May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate
of the deceased — except the properties bequeathed to her other
niece and nephews is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias,
likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond.
Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate
of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, the court,
presided over by respondent Judge, issued an order, dated
February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and denying the
petition for probate.
Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the
appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. Rodriguez did not
appear on the date last mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgent
motion praying for additional time within which to answer the
charges preferred against him by Basilia Salud and for another
postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted, and
Basilia Salud introduced evidence in support of said charges,
whereupon respondent Judge by an order, dated February 27,
1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and gross
negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia
Salud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and
advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act
as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."
On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of
February 27, 1956, be set aside and that she be appointed special
co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the
ground that Basilia Salud is over eighty (80) years of age, totally
blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of said
office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the
deceased and the person appointed by the latter as executrix of
her alleged will. This motion was denied.
Basilia Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix
by reason of physical disability, due to old age, and recommended
the appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud. Aurea Matias
sought a reconsideration of said order. She expressed her
conformity to said resignation, but objected to the appointment,
in lieu of Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her
antagonism to said Aurea Matias — she (Victorina Salud) having
been the principal and most interested witness for the opposition
to the probate of the alleged will of the deceased — and proposed
that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the
Philippine National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, or any other similar institution authorized by
law therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant
as special administratrix of said estate. This motion for
reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956. Respondents
Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect
the rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased
and to collect all the produce of her lands, which was granted. On
June 27, 1956, said respondents filed another motion praying for
permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in
different rice mills in the province of Cavite, which respondent
judge granted petitioner instituted the present action against
Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the
purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent
Judge, upon the ground that the same had been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should
have preference in the choice of special administratrix of the
estate of the decedent, she (petitioner) being the universal
heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the alleged
will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance — which has
not, as yet, taken place she has a special interest in said estate,
which must be protected by giving representation thereto in the
management of said estate.
Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction
fully the acts of respondent Judge, for the following reasons:
1. Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the
motion for his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record
shows that petitioner herein received copy of said motion of
February 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing
thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated
February 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27,
1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
2. In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for
the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment
of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner
had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia Salud,
and the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be
considered for the management of said. As a consequence, said
petitioner had no opportunity to object to the appointment of
Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as
her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to
this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
3. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical
disability of Basilia Salud. Otherwise respondent Judge would not
have directed that she "be assisted and advised by her niece
Victorina Salud," and that the latter "shall always act as aide,
interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."
4. Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed three (3) special
administrators — Basilia Salud, Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata.
Indeed, in the order of March 10, 1956, respondent Judge
maintained "the appointment of the three (3) above-named
persons for the management of the estate of the late Gabina
Raquel."
5. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213,
an issue arose between Aurea Matias and Basilia Salud regarding
the person to be appointed special administrator of the estate of
the deceased. The former proposed Horacio Rodriguez, whereas
the latter urged the appointment of Victorina Salud. By an order
dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose
Bernabe, Judge, decided the matter in favor of Horacio Rodriguez
and against Victorina Salud, upon the ground that, unlike the
latter, who, as a pharmacist and employee in the Santa Isabel
Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a practicing
lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the
City of Cavite, is a resident thereof. In other words, the order of
resident thereof. In other words, the order of respondent Judge of
February 27, 1956, removing Rodriguez and appointing Victorina
Salud to the management of the estate, amounted to a reversal of
the aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe of August 11, 1952.
6. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of
Gabina Raquel was denied by respondent Judge, the order to this
effect is not, as yet, final and executory. It is pending review on
appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The probate of said alleged will
being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has — as
the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument —
a special interest to protect during the pendency of said appeal.
Thus, in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson* (46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this
Court held that a widow, designated as executrix in the alleged
will and testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which
had denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same
beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving the
will, which is now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet
final and may be reversed by the appellate court."
7. The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions
among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one, represented by the
petitioner, and another, to which Basilia Salud and Victorina
Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to
appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity
demands that both factions be represented in the management of
the estate of the deceased.
G.R. No. L-2211 December 20, 1948
NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner, vs. POTENCIANO
PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, MARIA ROXAS
and PEDRO ROXAS,respondents.
FACTS: Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The
other respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother
respectively of the deceased, filed on August 3, 1946, a petition
for the administration of the latter's estate, and Maria Roxas was
appointed special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition.
Petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas,
filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased
husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate
designated is said will. In said will the deceased bequeathed one-
half of his estate to his widow, the herein petitioner, and the
other half to Reynaldo Roxas, an adulterous child 9 years old of
the decedent.
In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the
respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, the petitioner was
appointed on September 10, 1946, special administratrix and
qualified as such over the objection of the respondents Maria and
Pedro Roxas, who sought the appointment of Maria as such.
Respondent judge rendered a decision denying the probate of the
will presented by the petitioner on the ground that the attesting
witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of
the testator.
The respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition
for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or
special co-administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the respondent
judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad
I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only of all the conjugal
properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
ISSUE: WON the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the
estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the capital or
properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and another of
his conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the petitioner.
HELD: It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the
prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the
person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is,
not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in
exercising his discretion and appointing the petitioner as special
administratrix, had taken into consideration the beneficial
interest of the petitioner in the estate of the decedent and her
being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the
respondent's subsequent act of appointing her as special
administratrix only of the conjugal or community property, and
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive
property of the decedent, does not seem to be in conformity with
logic or reason. The petitioner has or claims to have the same
beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving the
will, which is now pending on appeal, as she had prior to it,
because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the
appellate court.
Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present
case would have, under the law, the right of usufruct over one-
half of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share
in the conjugal partnership. The beneficial interest required as a
qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of a
decedent is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some
part thereof. The petitioner being entitled to one-half in usufruct
of all the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as
much if not more interest in administering the entire estate
correctly, in order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the state, and not suffer the
consequences of the waste, improvidence or mismanagement
thereof.
According to section 2, Rule 75, taken from section 685 of the
former Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, "when
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse." That is the reason why,
according to section 4, Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or
letters of administration with the will annexed, shall extend to all
the estate of the testator in the Philippines," and section 6, Rule
79, provides for appointment of one administrator in case of
intestacy, except in certain cases in which two or more joint, but
not separate and independent, administrators may be appointed
under section 3, Rule 82.
Therefore the administrator appointed to administer and
liquidate the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall also
administer, liquidate and distribute the community property,
because the estate of a deceased spouse which is to be settled,
that is, administered, liquidated and distributed, consists not only
of the exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of
the assets of the conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain
to the deceased, as determined after the liquidation thereof in
accordance with the provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the
Civil Code.
As under the law only one general administrator may be
appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a
deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special
administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said
estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general
administrator. "When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause,
the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or administrators thereupon
appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and duties are
limited to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator, and
may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders
sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts
of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no
power to appoint two special administratices of the estate of a
deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and
another of the exclusive property of the decedent, and therefore
the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said
order is hereby set aside, with costs against the respondents.
G.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, vs. IDONAH
SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS: Special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956,
by a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate
of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur
Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly
possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value
of P5,000,000. Petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a
urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as
special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the
court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such
special administrator upon his posting of a bond in the amount of
P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse
of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will
presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. The special
administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority
to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution
or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such
as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were
allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to
avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value
migh be obtained in their disposition.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the
proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of
the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of
herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized
removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had
been made. Lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the
proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the
same. Lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be
sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal
authority to sell them. This argument is untenable, because
section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that
the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable"
property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81) But it is not alone the
specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its
value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a
special administrator of perishable property.
Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties
sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal
partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with
a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she
would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed
sale is clearly premature.
RULES 83-85 – INVENTORY/POWERS/ACCOUNTABILITY AND
COMPENSATION OF ADMINISTRATORS
[G.R. No. 45430. April 15, 1939.]
In the matter of the estate of the deceased Paulina Vazquez
Vda. de Garcia. TERESA GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUISA
GARCIA, Defendants-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. TESTATE OR INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION; PROPERTIES INCLUDED
OR EXCLUDED. — A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties
included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although
such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the
right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on
the ownership or existence of the right or credit.
FACTS: After Luisa Garcia was appointed special administratrix
of the properties left by the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de
Garcia, she filed with the competent court an inventory thereof
on May 13, 1936. On May 23, 1936, the heir Teresa Garcia
objected to said inventory. taking exception to various items
therein. On July 28, 1936, Teresa Garcia filed a motion asking
that she be appointed special administratrix of the intestate for
the sole purpose of bringing any actions which she may believe
necessary to recover for the benefit of the intestate the
properties and credits set out in her motion, as well as other
properties which might be discovered from time to time
belonging to the said intestate. After hearing said motion and the
administratrix’ opposition thereto, the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the motion.
ISSUE: whether or not a court has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon the exceptions which an heir takes to an inventory of the
properties left by a deceased referring to the inclusion or exclusion
of certain properties and credits.
HELD: It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or
regular, imposed by section 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to
return to the court within three months after his appointment a
true inventory of the real estate and all the goods, chattels, rights,
and credits of the deceased which come into his possession or
knowledge, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the
prescribed bond.
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a
deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings, has supervision and control over the said
properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see
that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it
contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In
compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to
determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased
should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an
heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person
duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties,
rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise
the court’s duty to hear the observations. with power to
determine if such observations should be attended to or not and
if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in
nature as to the ownership of the said properties.
The lower court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear the
opposition of the heir Teresa Garcia to the inventory filed by the
special administratrix Luisa Garcia, as well as the observations
made by the former as to certain properties and credits, and to
determine for purposes of the-inventor alone if they should be
included therein or excluded therefrom. As Teresa Garcia
withdrew her opposition after evidence was adduced tending to
show whether or not certain properties belonged to the intestate
and, hence, whether they should be included in the inventory,
alleging that the lower court had no jurisdiction to do so, she
cannot be heard to complain that the court suspended the trial of
her opposition.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold, that a
court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings
has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima
facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final
or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the
interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question
bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, reserving to Teresa
Garcia the right to ask for the reopening of the hearing of her
opposition to the inventory, as well as to ask for the appointment
of a special administrator in accordance with law.
[G.R. No. 51291. May 29, 1984.]
FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICATION C.
GUIDO married to TEODORO GUIDO, and JUAN
ARCHE, Petitioners, v. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; PROBATE COURT CAN NOT ADJUDICATE TITLE
TO PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE A PART OF THE ESTATE AND CLAIMED BY
PERSONS NOT PARTIES TO THE CASE; RESORT TO ORDINARY ACTION, REMEDY.
— It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court can not do so.
2. ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER PROPERTY SHOULD OR
SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN INVENTORY. — In Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. C .A.
(91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted
by the parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER TO INCLUDE IN INVENTORY IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
CASE AT BAR. — Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was
in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such persons of their possession and ownership of the property.
Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27,
1979. Thus, it was unnecessary for petitioners to first apply for relief with the
intestate court.
FACTS: Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several
parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City. He distributed his
property between his two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the
property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which
eventually became the subject of this controversy.
On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with
Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of
the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed
Cuizon. At that time, Francisco and Rosita were minors and
assisted by their mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However,
the sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it was
unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in
question was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. The
latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate,
her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself
all the property of the decedent including the property in
question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly
published in a newspaper of general circulation, Rufina
thereafter, executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she
confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of December 29, 1971
executed by the late Irene and renounced and waived whatever
rights, interest, and participation she may have in the property in
question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was duly registered
with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, TCT No. 12665 was
issued in favor of the petitioners.
On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administration
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No.
3864-R) by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by
the heirs of Irene to act as administrator of the estate of the
decedent. The petition was granted. Respondent Antigua as
administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He
included in the inventory the property in question which was
being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June
27, 1979, respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for
authority to sell the salt from the property and praying that
petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the
administrator. The motion was granted.
The thrust of the petitioners’ argument is that the respondent
court, as a court handling only the intestate proceedings, had
neither the authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to
divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in
question and hand over the same to the administrator.
Petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the
respondent administrator is to file a separate civil action to
recover the same.
ISSUE: whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels
of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if
the said parcels have been included in the inventory of properties of
the estate prepared by the administrator.
HELD: It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties
is to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so
For the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties. In the instant case, the property involved is not only
claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven years before the
death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the
vendees who are not party to the proceedings.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important,
covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name such
third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons their
possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court was
clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order June 27, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,
Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Special Sixth Division), respondents.
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as
his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter,
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The
testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and
real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the
cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond
Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedents
will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did
not take any action for the probate of his father’s holographic
will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate
and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed
the petition on the ground that the will was executed under
undue influence.
 On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate -
the house and lot was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third
persons. On January 19, 1993, the probate court
ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing
the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance,
on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount
of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after
deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on
the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of
P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of
the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the
probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18,
1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were
issued on June 23, 1993. On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate
Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds. On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied
petitioners motion for release of funds.
ISSUE: whether the probate court, after admitting the will to
probate but before payment of the estates debts and obligations,
has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order
the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession
of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
HELD: On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the
estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow
and the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right
to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate
proceedings. He contends that the testators three
granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are
not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age,
married and gainfully employed. It is settled that allowances for
support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 18813 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at
the time of the testators death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate
spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the estate.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does
not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate
court to sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance
to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his
estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the
release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
respondents six months after the date of first publication of
notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the
estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may
deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled,
and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in
a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations. In the case at bar,
the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order
speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but
the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must
be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to
their respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time
the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution
and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the question of whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the
intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. The intrinsic validity of Hilarios
holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for
release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of
the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his fathers will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the
lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his
estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the
same as in ordinary cases.26
 Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the
assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all
the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and management of
the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration,27 Section 3
of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and
to administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall have
the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited
with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the
probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real
estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release
of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It
was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an
accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favor.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership
over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he
is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in
his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the
expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court
as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
G.R. No. L-6207 August 4, 1911
SIMON MALAHACAN, administrator of the goods, chattels
and credits of GUILLERMA MARTINEZ, deceased, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JOSEFA IGNACIO, MACARIO IGNACIO, PAULA
IGNACIO and AGUEDA BUÑAG, defendants-appellants.
The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of
the goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased,
against the defendants to recover possession of the real estate of
which the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real
estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before
the commencement of this action.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real
estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death.
Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in
this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows
that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to
the immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the
complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in
this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma
Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon which an
administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the
real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will
be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights
to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of
the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to
the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death.
In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may
enter upon the administration of the said property immediately.
If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they
desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a
petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the
division.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is
certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in
the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When
the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely
to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate,
the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever
in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners
of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the
division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of
the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in
the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have
not received their participation, they have their remedy by
petition for partition of the said estate. The judgment appealed
from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on the merits,
without special findings as to costs.
G.R. No. L-19265 May 29, 1964
MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR., petitioner, vs. ADELO NOMBRE and
PEDRO ESCANLAR, respondents.
FACTS: On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity was judicial
administrator of the intestate estate, leased one of the properties
of the estate (a fishpond identified as Lot No. 1617 of the
cadastral survey of Kabankaban, Negros Occidental), to Pedro
Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for
three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to expire on
May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done, admittedly,
without previous authority or approval of the Court where the
proceedings was pending.
On January 17, 1961, Nombre was removed as administrator by
Order of the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was appointed
in his stead. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt,
allegedly for his refusal to surrender the fishpond to the newly
appointed administrator. On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a
motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the
same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, Moises San Diego,
Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00.
Escanlar was not notified of such motion. Nombre, the deposed
administrator, presented a written opposition to the motion of
Campillanos on April 11, 1964, pointing out that the fishpond had
been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years.
The opposition notwithstanding, the Court on April 8, 1961, in
effect declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar was null and
void, for want of judicial authority and that unless he would offer
the same as or better conditions than the prospective lessee, San
Diego, there was no good reason why the motion for authority to
lease the property to San Diego should not be granted. From this
Order, a petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of the
Orders of April 8 and 24, 1961 was presented by Nombre and
Escanlar with the Court of Appeals. Campillanos insisted on the
invalidity of the contract in favor of Escanlar; the lower court
alleged that it did not exactly annul or invalidate the lease in his
questioned orders but suggested merely that Escanlar "may file a
separate ordinary action in the Court of general jurisdiction."
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition for certiorari. On
September 13, 1961, petitioner herein Moises San Diego, Sr., who
was not a party in the case, intervened and moved for a
reconsideration of the above judgment. Court of Appeals denied
the motions for reconsideration.
ISSUES: "Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease
property of the estate without prior judicial authority and
approval", and "whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on
Agency should apply to judicial administrators."
HELD: The Rules of Court provide that —
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not
disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules).
Lease has been considered an act of administration. The Civil
Code, on lease, provides:
If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the following
persons cannot constitute the same without proper authority, the
husband with respect to the wife's paraphernal real estate, the father or
guardian as to the property of the minor or ward, and the manager
without special power. (Art. 1647).
The same Code, on Agency, states:
Special powers of attorneys are necessary in the following cases:
(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one year.
(Art. 1878)
Petitioner contends, that No. 8, Art. 1878 is the limitation to the
right of a judicial administrator to lease real property without
prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds one year. The
lease contract in favor of Escanlar being for 3 years and without
such court approval and authority is, therefore, null and void.
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that there is no
limitation of such right; and that Article 1878 does not apply in
the instant case. We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct
in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of
Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and
approval. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial
administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in
representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the
provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a
judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by
the Court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also
the heirs and creditors of the estate. A judicial administrator
before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond.
These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is
only answerable to his principal. The protection which the law
gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent,
stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru
agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are
subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing
court.
[G.R. No. 31860. October 16, 1930.]
In the matter of the Estate of Charles C. Rear, deceased. J.J.
WILSON, administrator-appellee, v. M. T. REAR ET AL., heirs-
appellants.
STATEMENT
July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some Moros on
his plantation situate in the interior of the Province of Cotabato at
an isolated place, without communication except by river, about
17 kilometers from the nearest settlement of Pikit, and about 17
70 kilometers from the town of Cotabato. The whole plantation
consisted of public lands. J.J.
Wilson qualified as special administrator of the estate on
November 17, 1925. Later, the property of the estate was
appraised at P20,800, of which the commissioners filed an
inventory and report, which was also signed by Wilson. January
4, 1927, the commissioners made and filed a report of claims
against the estate, but by reason of the fact that it was claimed
and alleged that the administrator did not have any funds to pay,
on March 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a
portion of the property.
April 26, 1927, and with the consent of the heirs, a petition was
made for authority to sell, under sealed proposal, all the property
of the estate, with a view of closing the administration. October
10, 1927, the court granted this petition, and after due notice, the
public sale took place, and the property was sold to Wm. Mannion
for P7,600. April 26, 1927, Wilson submitted a report covering
his administration to that date, which was approved and later set
aside on motion of the heirs of the deceased. March 23, 1928,
Wilson filed his final account which later was amended on June
10, 1928, to which the heirs made numerous and specific
objections, and after a hearing, the court approved the account as
filed. From which the heirs of the deceased appealed and assign
the following errors:
"I. The Lower court erred in approving the final amended account
of the administrator for the following reasons:
"(a) That the alleged disbursements made by the special
administrator and the administrator were far in excess of the
amount required to preserve the estate;
"(b) That no authority being asked for or granted by the court, all
loans or advances, made to the estate, were made contrary to law
and are not legal charges against the estate (Trs., p. 37).
"(c) The court erred in admitting, over objection, Exhibits D, E
and F.
"(d) That Wilson, as special administrator and as administrator,
was neglectful and imprudent and he committed waste. He is,
therefore, liable.
"II. The lower court erred in refusing to allow the cross-
examination and direct examination of witnesses.

"III. The lower court erred in denying the request for a
reasonable continuance in order to obtain depositions."
1. Law Imposes Ordinary and Usual Care. — The law does
not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care
in the administration of the estate, but it does impose
upon him ordinary and usual care, for the want of which
he is personally liable.
2. When administrator is without authority. — An
administrator, without an order of court, even thought
acting in good faith, has no authority to continue the
business in which the deceased was engaged at the time
of his death.
3. Liability of Administrator. — So great is it a breach of
trust for the representative to engage in business with
the funds of the estate that the law charges him with all
the losses incurred thereby without allowing him to
receive the benefit of any profit that he may make.
4. Duty of Administrator. — It is the duty of an
administrator to handle land marshal the assets of the
estate in a business-like manner, and with his
bondsmen, he is liable for any unreasonable or
unnecessary delay in settling and closing the estate.
Rodriguez vs. Silva R 81 2-4 90 Phil 752
This appeal is from an order of the CFI of Manila authorizing
the cancellation of the bond of Pablo M. Silva who had
resigned as joint administrator of the intestate estate of
Honofre Leyson, deceased, and allowing Silva P600 as
compensation for his services. The appellants are the
remaining administrator and an heir of the deceased.
ISSUE: May the court fix an administrator's or executor's fee in
excess of the fees prescribed by section 7 of Rule 86, which follows?
HELD: Yes. It will be seen from this provision that a greater sum
may be allowed "in any special case, where the estate is large, and
the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator." And so it has been held that "the amount of an
executor's fee allowed by the CFI in any special case under the
provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which
will not be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of
discretion." The fact that the appellee is an attorney-at-law has
served the estate in good stead, has served the estate in good stead,
and this ought not be lost sight it. Although being a lawyer is by
itself not a factor in the assessment of an administrator's fee, it
should be otherwise as in this case the administrator was able
to stop what appeared to be an improvidentdisbursement
of a substantial amount without having toemploy outside legal
help at an additional expense to estate.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in cancelling Silva's
administrators bond, inasmuch as few months before his
resignation, he secured the cancellation of a TCT issued in the name of
Honofre Leyson, and in their stead another titles were
issued in the name of Mr. Pablo M. Silva, in a doubtful manner.
HELD: There is no showing tha t De Silva
was guilty of misappropriation or any of the acts of
commission or omission for which his bond could be held
liable under Rule 86. The sole ground for the insistence that
this cancellation should have been withheld is that the appellee is
in possession of a residential lot in Cubao, Quezon City, which
belonged to the deceased Honofre Leyson. But the appellee
claims that this lot was sold to him by Leyson on March 2, 1945.
Certainly it was already in possession when he and appellant
Rodriguez took over the administration from the special
administratrix. This land therefore did not come into
De Silva's hands in pursuance or in the inventory prepared by
or in conjunction with one of the appellants. Even granting then, for the
sake of argument, that De Silva has no valid title to this lot,
the sureties are not chargeable for it on the bond.
De Silva's liability is personal and exclusive of the sureties who
are the parties mostly affected by the third assignment of error.
Moreover, there is a pending suit over this property and that suit
affords the estate ample protection against
the saidproperty being alienated pending final disposition
of thelitigation.Upon the foregoing consideration, the
order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 74618. September 2, 1992.]
ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HONORABLE
RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, Respondents.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ADMINISTRATOR, WHEN TO RENDER ACCOUNTS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The
rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one
year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in
said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise directs because of
extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or for paying the debts or
disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar.
2. ID.; ID.; REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR; JUSTIFIED, FOR NEGLIGENCE TO
RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF HIS ADMINISTRATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW. —
subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her
negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies
petitioner’s removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in
her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. As correctly
stated by the appellate court: "The settled rule is that the removal of an
administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court
appointing him. As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala v.
Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, ‘the sufficiency of any ground for removal should
thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected
by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.’ Consequently, appellate tribunals
are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of
the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of
discretion is shown. In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix
was on the ground of her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was
appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as
required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court. "
FACTS: Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate. Victoria Lim Kalaw filed
an amended petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration
with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. On April 25, 1974,
the trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim
Kalaw as special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a
preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into her
possession as special administratrix of the estate of her late
father on June 3, 1974.
On October 6, 1977, the trial court issued another order
appointing petitioner as the judicial administratrix of said estate
and a Letter of Administration was issued to the petitioner.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render
an accounting of her administration of said estate which was
granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz.
On January 31, 1984, private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw
together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw filed a
motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their father’s
estate and to appoint instead private respondent on the ground
of negligence on the part of petitioner in her duties for failing to
render an accounting of her administration since her
appointment as administratrix more than six years ago in
violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The motion was set for hearing on February 10, 1984. On
February 21, 1984, respondent judge issued another order
requiring petitioner to render an accounting within 30 days from
receipt thereof which she did on March 22, 1984. She likewise
filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion praying for
her removal as administratrix alleging that the delay in rendering
said accounting was due to the fact that Judge Carlos Sundiam,
who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was assigned,
had then been promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala
to be vacated for a considerable length of time, while newly-
appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his
appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to
whom to render an accounting report.
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the appellate court in sustaining respondent Judge Diaz’ order
removing her as judicial administratrix considering that she had
already submitted an accounting report covering the period from
December, 1977 to December, 1983 in compliance with
respondent’s Judge order. Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that:
"SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. — Every executor
or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year
from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the
court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against,
or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and he shall render
such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."
The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his
administration within one year from his appointment is
mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule.
The only exception is when the Court otherwise directs because
of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or
for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which
do not exist in the case at bar.
Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting
report did not purge her of her negligence in not rendering an
accounting for more than six years, which justifies petitioner’s
removal as administratrix and the appointment of private
respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court. As correctly stated by the appellate court:
"The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under
Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court
appointing him.
In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was
on the ground of her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the
time she was appointed as administratrix to render an
accounting of her administration as required by Section 8 of Rule
85 of the Rules of Court. "Petitioner’s contention that her removal
was without due process is certainly not borne out by the
records. There has been a hearing and, in fact, several pleadings
had been filed by the parties on the issue before the order of
removal was issued.
RULE 86 – CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
G.R. No. L-14713 April 28, 1960
Intestate Estate of ARSENIO R. AFAN, deceased. MARIAN
AFAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. APOLINARIO S. DE
GUZMAN, creditor-appellant.
FACTS: De Guzman filed, in this special proceeding for the
settlement of intestate estate of Arsenio R. Afan, a claim for
P1,000, allegedly due from the latter, with interest thereon,
within 30 days from August 16, 1949, as set forth in a promissory
note then issued by Afan. On July 22, 1957, the administratrix of
his estate objected to the consideration of the claim upon the
ground, among others, that it had been filed long after the
expiration of the period for the presentation of claims against
said estate. For this reason, the lower court issued the order
appealed from, refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim.
De Guzman invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, reading:
Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice provided in the
preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims
against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six
months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at
any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a
creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
equitable, allow such claims to be filed within a time not exceeding one
month.
De Guzman maintains that the lower court should have
entertained his claim, the same having been filed prior to the
distribution of the estate of the deceased. The second sentence
thereof clothes the court with authority to permit the filing of a
claim after the lapse of the period stated in the first sentence, but
prior to and distribution, subject to the following conditions,
namely(1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause
must be shown why the permission should be granted; and (3)
the extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not
exceed one (1) month.
De Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim. Again,
whether or not the reasons given — and none were set forth in
De Guzman's claim — are sufficient, rests upon the discretion of
the court, and the record before us does not show that the lower
court has abused its discretion in acting as it did in the present
case. He says, in his brief (p. 6, thereof) that "he had no actual
knowledge of the fact that the estate of the deceased . . . was then
already in the process of settlement . . . . "
In this connection, it appears that, during the lifetime of Afan, or
on May 24, 1950, De Guzman instituted, against him, Civil Case
No. 1148 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to recover the
amount of the promissory note above referred to. On appeal, the
decision of said court in favor of De Guzman was set aside.
Sometime after the records had been remanded to the lower
court, Afan died. On August 15, 1955, that court issued an order
requiring counsel for his heirs "to submit to the court the number
of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Arsenio R.
Afan now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila." This
order was complied with. On January 18, 1956, his counsel filed
in said case a motion for the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased Afan, to substitute him as
defendant therein.
Accordingly, on January 21, 1956, said court gave De Guzman five
(5) days within which to submit the names of the legal heirs of
Afan who may be appointed as his legal representative. Yet, De
Guzman choose not to file his claim in such proceeding until July
27, 1957, one year and a half after the filing of his
aforementioned "compliance."
Instead of furnishing a "cause" for the extension of the
reglementary period for the filing of his claim, this omission on
the part of De Guzman fully justifies the denial of such extension
and the order appealed from. We have already held that failure to
file a claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole
ground that the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for
payment, is not sufficient to justify extension and that, where a
claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four (4) or
five (5) months thereafter he did nothing to present his claim,
this can hardly be considered as a good excuse for such neglect.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
G.R. No. L-8235 March 19, 1914
ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEANDRA MANARANG,
administratrix, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983
ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by
JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MANASES G.
REYES, respondents.
FACTS: the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee
simple of a parcel of land; that in April 1965 herein private
respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation
(SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the
respondent Court of First Instance of Davao against respondents,
Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their
capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11
and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02; defendants Carlos V. Matute
and Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case No. 4623, filed an answer
denying their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of
the claim of SAMCO; Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV,
issued an order directing the administrators to secure the
probate court's approval before entering into any transaction
involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate; parties (plaintiff
and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4623 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an
Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered
by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as
payment of its claim; that the said Amicable Settlement signed by
the herein respondents was not submitted to and approved by
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, nor notice thereof
made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings;
respondent court approved the said Amicable Settlement and
gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in
effect, ceded the property to SAMCO in payment of its claim for
only P19,952.11.
Made to answer, herein respondent SAMCO and respondent
judge, among others, contend that the Amicable Settlement need
not be approved by the probate court, "the same having been
entered into in another independent action and in another court
of co-equal rank. Article 2032 of the Civil Code applies only to
extrajudicial compromise entered into by the administrators of
the estate.
In the alternative, lack of approval of the probate court of the
Amicable Settlement does not render it null and void, but at most
voidable, which must be the subject matter of a direct proceeding
in the proper Court of First Instance." Section 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim
of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract
may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No.
25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo
Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period
prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred
forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the
estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased
persons. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring
presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate
court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata
portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as
upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the
payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any
preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased.
It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in
filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of
Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which
eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than
twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the
deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without
prior authority of the probate court of Manila. Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
(Emphasis supplied). The law is clear that where the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
G.R. No. L-17175 July 31, 1962
RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUCIA
MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, Executrix of the Testate Estate
of the deceased MARIA GERARDO VDA. DE
BARRETTO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto, owner of
hectares of fishpond lands in Pampanga, leased the same to
appellant Gutierrez for a term to expire on May 1, 1947. On
November 1, 1941, pursuant to a decision of Department of
Public Works rendered after due investigation the dikes of the
fishponds were opened at several points, resulting in their
destruction and in the loss great quantities of fish inside, to the
damage and prejudice of the lessee.
In 1956, the lessor having died. Gutierrez filed a claim therein for
two items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00 representing advance
rentals he had to the decedent (the possession of the leased
property is alleged, having been returned to her after the open of
the dikes ordered by the government); and second, the sum of
P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of earned profits, that is,
profits which the claimant failed to realize because of the breach
of the lease contract allegedly committed by the lessor. On June 7,
1957 appellant commenced the instant ordinary civil action in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City branch) against
the executrix of the testate for the recovery of the same amount
of P60,000 referred to as the second item claimed in the
administration proceeding. In July 1957 appellant amended his
claim in the testate proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the
item of P60,000.00, leaving only the one for refund of advance
rentals in the sum of P32,000.00.
ISSUE: whether or not his claim for damages based on unrealized
profits is a money claim against the estate of the deceased Maria
Gerardo Vda. de Barretto within the purview of Rule 87, Section 5.
This section states:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed,
barred; exception. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his
lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against
the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in
such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant,
the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against
the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the
court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
HELD: The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the
presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally
construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which
could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and
could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among
these are those founded upon contract. The claim in this case is
based on contract — specifically, on a breach thereof. The only
actions that may be instituted against the executor or
administrator are those to recover real or personal property
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal. Rule 88, section 1. The instant suit is not one of them.
The denial of the claim was affirmed by this Court on the grounds
that it was not a money claim and that it arose after the
decedent's demise, placing it outside the scope of Rule 87, Section
5. The orders appealed from are affirmed.
G.R. No. L-18107 August 30, 1962
MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO
SALINAS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. HERMOGENES
LLEMOS, deceased defendant substituted by his representatives
On 14 March 1960, Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix
Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar (Civil Case No. 4824), to
recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the
latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a
petition for a writ of possession; that in view of the copy and
notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their
residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to
discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant
Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs'
expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them
mental anguish and undue embarrassment.
On 1 April 1960, before he could answer the complaint, the
defendant died. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their
complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. On 21 July 1960,
the heirs filed a motion to dismiss, the court below dismissed it,
on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs,
should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the
action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate
proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein.
Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that contrasting the
correlated provisions of the Rules of Court, those concerning
claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement
proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that
survive and may be prosecuted against the executor or
administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that actions for
damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the
case at bar) survive the death of the latter. Under Rule 87, section
5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral
expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2)
judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these
includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants; for it is not enough that
the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must
arise from "contract express or implied".
Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that
survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and
they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from
the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present
suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held
that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific
property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate
is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur
unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly
injurious to that party's property.
Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from the
Court of First Instance of Samar that the parties have arrived at
an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have
agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has been approved
and embodied in an order of the Court of First Instance. The case
having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the
questions raised therein. This appeal is, therefore, ordered
dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-32425 November 21, 1984
THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIA
T. DAVID, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: The first two causes of action involve the indemnity
agreements which defendant-appellant and her deceased
husband, Felicisimo V. Reyes, jointly and severally, executed in
favor of herein appellee, for and in consideration of two (2)
surety bonds underwritten by it to lift the writs of attachment in
Civil Case No. 5213 of the Rizal Court of First Instance for the
amount of P60,000.00, and in Civil Case No. Q-5214, also with the
same court for the amount of P40,000.00
The third cause of action involves accrued premiums and
documentary stamps for four (4) years with legal interest therein
from the filing of the complaint also underwritten by appellee.
Records show that Felicisimo V. Reyes and his wife, herein
appellant, executed two (2) indemnity agreements in favor of
appellee jointly and severally to assure indemnification of the
latter for whatever liability it may incur in connection with its
posting the security bonds to lift the attachments. Later,
Felicisimo V. Reyes and his wife, jointly and severally, executed
another indemnity agreement in favor of appellee to assure
indemnification of the latter under a homestead bond for the sum
of P7,500.00 it had executed jointly and severally with them in
favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines. On the same
date, Felicisimo V. Reyes and his wife paid to appellee the sum of
P153.33 covering the premium and other expenses for the
homestead bond on the first year. Felicisimo V.Reyes died. His
wife, herein appellant, qualified and took her oath of office as the
administratrix of said intestate estate.
Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the aforesaid two cases
(Civil Cases Nos. Q-5213 and Q-5214) against the spouses
Felicisimo V. Reyes and appellant Emilia T. David which has
become final and executory. Writs of execution of the decision on
the said cases were returned unsatisfied. As a consequence,
judgment was rendered against the surety bonds. Appellee made
demands on Emilia T. David to pay the amounts of P60,000.00
and P40,000.00 under the surety bonds and arrears in premiums
thereon. When appellant David failed to make payments, appellee
filed Civil Case No. 67713 in the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch 1, for collection of sums of money under three (3)
different causes of action.
A motion to dismiss was filed by herein appellant on the
following grounds. to wit: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action or suit; (2) the complaint states no cause
of action; and (3) the plaintiff's causes of action, if there be any,
have been barred for its failure to file its claims against the estate
of the deceased Felicisimo V. Reyes in due time. The lower court
denied the motion for lack of merit. After trial, the court rendered
judgment ordering defendant Emilia T. David.
ISSUE: whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction over
plaintiff's causes of action.
HELD: We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well
settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the
creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors
obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound
themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death her liability
is independent of and separate from her husband s; she may be
sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the
claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should
be made in the decedent's estate.
In the case at bar, appellant signed a joint and several obligation
with her husband in favor of herein appellee; as a consequence,
the latter may demand from either of them the whole obligation.
As distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the debtor
is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt and the creditor
is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit, in a solidary
obligation the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against
one of the debtors.
G.R. No. L-27701 July 21, 1928
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. V. CONCEPCION E HIJOS, INC., and VENANCIO
CONCEPCION, defendants-appellants. HENRY W.
ELSER, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-13124 February 28, 1919
PATRICINIO BAYOT, as administratrix of the intestate estate
of Francisco Ma. Bayot, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUCAS ZURBITO,
as administrator of the intestate estate of Gaspar
Zurbito, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: This is an action to recover a sum of money, and the
plaintiff appeals from the action of the Court of First Instance
sustaining a motion to dismiss, based on the ground that the
matter in controversy had been determined in a former action.
The plaintiff Patrocinio Bayot, is the administratrix of the estate
of her deceased father, Francisco Ma. Bayot, formerly a merchant
in Masbate, who died intestate many years ago. The defendant,
Lucas Zurbito, is the administrator of the estate of his father,
Gaspar Zurbito, who also died several years ago, but subsequent
to the death of Francisco Bayot. The claim sued on his this case
consists of a debt for P9,694.52, with interest from August 9,
1907. It is alleged to consist of the balance of an account current,
as shown upon the books of Francisco Bayot, resulting from
mercantile operations sustained between the latter and Gaspar
Zurbito, during a period of several years prior to the death of
Bayot.
Gaspar Zurbito presented a claim for P53,602.76 to the
committee act in the estate of Francisco Bayot. According to
Zurbito, Bayot had become indebted to Zurbito's father while the
former was acting as manager or administrator of a cattle ranch
belonging to the latter. Said claim was disallowed by the
committee on claims of the Bayot estate as being wholly without
any merit whatever. An appeal was promptly taken by Zurbito to
the Court of First Instance, which court also disallowed the claim,
and upon appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the Court
of First Instance was affirmed.
When the claim of Gaspar Zurbito was presented to the
committee in the estate of Francisco Bayot, as above stated, the
present plaintiff, as administratrix of Bayot, denied liability and
asked that judgment be given in favor of the estate of Francisco
Bayot upon the indebtedness which is the subject of the present
action. The committee, however, considered that, inasmuch as
the Zurbito claim was disallowed, it had no jurisdiction to allow
the claim in favor of the Bayot estate.
As already stated, an appeal was taken in behalf of Gaspar
Zurbito from the action of the committee in rejecting his claim.
The trial court considered that the action taken by the committee
was effect a disallowance of the debt and that by failing to appeal
the administratrix had placed herself in a position where
judgment could not be given in her favor.
The first observation to be made upon the case as thus presented
is that the committee on claims in the estate of Francisco Bayot
was in error in assuming that it had no authority to allow the
claim which was exhibited by the administratrix by way of set-off.
The provision upon which the committee based its action is
found in the last clause of section 696 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which declares that "the committee shall have no
jurisdiction over claims in favor of the estate, except as offsets to
claims presented against the estate." A creditor who presents a
claim against an estate submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
committee, and the circumstance that his claim is found to be
without merit in no wise defeats the authority of the committee
to allow the set-off against him.
The next point to be considered is whether the disallowance of
the present claim by the committee in the estate of Francisco
Bayot and the final disposition made of the matter upon appeal to
this Court operate as a bar to the present action. Upon this point
it is very plain that the decision in that case does not exhibit the
requisites essential to create the bar of res judicata.
Not only does there appear to be no authority in support of the
proposition that a judgment dismissing a case for want of
jurisdiction will have the effect of a judgment upon the merits, if
it be shown that the tribunal did in fact have jurisdiction; but on
the contrary the authorities show that a person who relies on a
former judgment as a conclusive adjudication of any controversy
must take the prior judgment for what it appears to be on its face;
and if it is not a judgment on the merits, it does not conclude the
right of action. From this it would appear to follow as a necessary
consequence that, by failing to appeal from the action of the
committee disallowing the claim now sued on, the plaintiff herein
has lost all remedy, and cannot now maintain an independent
action.
Nevertheless, the meaning of the entire provision is clear; and it
evidently recognize the right of an executor or administrator, not
only to continue the prosecution of an action already begun, but
also to institute an action upon a cause which accrued in the
lifetime of the deceased but which had not been made the subject
of action by him. This of course supposes that the cause of action
is such as to have survived to the estate.
Our conclusion is that the claim on which this action is based is
not barred by the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with effect
as an offset in the former proceeding; and inasmuch as the
judgment entered in that proceeding cannot, for reasons already
stated, be considered binding as res judicata, the result is that the
plaintiff is entitled to be heard on the merits in this action.
G.R. No. L-11307 October 5, 1918
ROMAN JAUCIAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO QUEROL,
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
Hermenegildo Rogero,defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-7593 December 24, 1957
Intestate Estate of the late Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina
Paras Buan, deceased. BIENVENIDO P. BUAN and A.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, Co-Administrators-appellees, vs. SYLVINA
C. LAYA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants.
FACTS: On December 15, 1953, petitioners herein filed a
contingent claim for more than P500,000 against the intestate
estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina
Paras Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that on
August 3, 1952, a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by
the deceased spouses Buan, collided with a car; that the collision
was caused by the fact that the driver of the bus managed and
drove the vehicle in a negligent manner; that as a consequence of
the collision Juan C. Laya was killed and his companions suffered
physical injuries. The driver of the bus was Ernesto Triguero, and
he was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The
heirs of Juan C. Laya, petitioners herein, reserved the civil action
for damages, and on October 12, 1953, they filed an independent
civil action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
administrator of the deceased spouses Buan.
When the administrators learned of the filing of the contingent
claim in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, they filed an
opposition thereto on the ground that the same was not filed
before the death of the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina
Paras Buan, which took place on January 3, 1953, and that it was
also not filed within the period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4
of the Rules of Court. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac
admitted the claim but denied the prayer that a portion of the
estate be set aside to respond for the amount of the contingent.
A contingent claim is one which, by its nature, is necessarily
dependent upon an uncertain event for its existence or validity. It
may or may not develop into a valid and enforceable claim, and
its validity and enforceability depending upon an uncertain
event.
A 'contingent claim' against an estate within the statute
providing for the settlement hereof, as one where the
absolute liability depends on some future event which
may never happen, and which therefore renders such
liability uncertain and indeterminable. . . It is where the
liability depends on some future event after the debtor's
death which may or may not happen.
A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which
liability depends on some future event which may or
may not occur, so that duty to pay may never become
absolute.
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would
succeed in the action brought in Manila against the
administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio
Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or contingency
upon which the validity of the claim presented in the
administration proceedings depends. A contingent claim does not
follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon which
it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only said final
result can cause its termination. The rules provide that a
contingent claim is to be presented in the administration
proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that
when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim
into a valid claim, the court should then be informed that the
claim had already matured. (Secs. 5. 9, Rule 87.) The order of the
court subject of the appeal should, therefore, be set aside.
The first order of the court admitted the claim but denied the
petition for the setting aside of a certain amount from the estate
to respond therefor. The validity of the contingent claim is
apparent; as the driver of the bus belonging to the deceased
spouses, Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, was found guilty
of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the said
deceased spouses—the employers of the driver—can be made
responsible, as masters of a servant, for damages for the death of
the petitioner's father. A portion of the estate should therefore,
be set aside to respond for such damages as petitioners herein
may subsequently recover in the action they have brought in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. This amount should be fixed in
the court below. For the foregoing considerations, the order of
the court dismissing the contingent claim filed by petitioners is
hereby set aside.
VDA DE JACOB vs CA