Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was validly served with
Valmonte v. CA Digest
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Service of Summons
Facts:
1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident.
Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents
of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar,
however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for
this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and
Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A.
Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of
petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband.
She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at
present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri,
U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this
complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit
304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D.
Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds
office and where he can be found.He husband was also her counsel,
who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served
on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to
her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for
her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon
petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte
accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground
that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf.
Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer
with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not
file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare
her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special
appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private
respondent’s motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA
declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by
Alfredo hence this petition.
summons.
NO.
There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.
1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific
property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of
summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to
be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court
may deem sufficient.
2. In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode
of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant
resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not
made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly
was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
3. Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As
provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting
forth the grounds for the application.
4. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such
leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
La Naval Drug Corp v. CA and YaoFACTS:-
Yao is present owner of a commercial bldg a portion of which is leased toP
under a contract of lease which expired year 1989.-
P exercised its option to lease same bldg for another 5 years but P &
Rdisagreed on the rental rate.-
P, to resolve controversy, submitted to arbitration pursuant to RA 876.-
R appointed Alamarez as arbitrator while P chose Sabile as its arbitrator.The
confirmation of the appointment of a third arbitrator Tupang, washeld in
abeyance because P instructed Sabile to defer the same until the
BoD could convene approve Tupang’s appointment. This was accdg to R,P’s
dilatory tactic in violation of the Arbitration Law and the governing
stipulation.-
R prayed that after summary hearing pursuant to Sec. 6 of the A.Law,Sabile
and Alamarez be directed to proceed with the arbitration in accwith Sec. 7 of
the Contract and the applicable provisions of the law; andthat the Board of
Three Arbitrators be ordered to convene and resolvecontroversy.-
P denied the averments of petition theorizing that such petition ispremature
since there was failure of notice on the part of R requiringboth arbitrators to
appoint third member of the BoA. It gave thearbitrators a free hand in
choosing the third arbitrator, thus, R has nocause of action against it.-
R filed an amended petition for “Enforcement of Arbitration Agreementwith
Damages;” praying that petitioner be ordered to pay interest on the
unpaid rents (prevailing interest) and exemplary damages.-
P answered, contending among others, that amended petition should
bedismissed OTG of non-payment of requisite filing fees; and it being in
thenature of an ordinary civil action, a full blown and regular trial is
necessary. P presented a “Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing” of
its special and affirmative defenses which are grounds for a motion
todismiss.-
Resp Court announced that the two arbitrators chose Narciso as
thirdarbitrator. It also ordered the parties to submit position papers re: w/nres
p Yao’s claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary
proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement.-
P argued that respondent court sits as a a special court exercising limited
jurisdiction and not competent to act on R’s claim for damages w
hichposes an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action.-
Appellate court considered P in estoppel from questioning thecompetence of
the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary
proceedings R’s claim for damages, it (P) having itself filed si
milarly itscounterclaim with the court a quo.ISSUE: W/N the submission of
other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of anaffirmative defense in an answer,
would necessarily foreclose and have the effectof a waiver of, the right of a
defendant to set up
the court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant?RULING: Not inevitably. Section 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules provides the grounds for amotion to dismiss. Any of these grounds,
except improper venue, may be pleadedas an affirmative defense (admits
the material allegations of the complaint but hasthe effect of preventing
recovery by plaintiff) may be had as if a motion to dismisshad been filed.It
appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure to
soraise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel.Lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.Whenever it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, theaction shall be
dismissed (Sec. 2, Rule 9). However, jurisdiction over the nature theaction, in
concept, differs from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action is the situation that arises when a court,which
ordinarily would have the authority and competence to take a case,
isrendered without it either because a special law has limited the exercise of
itsnormal jurisdiction on a particular matter or because the type of action has
beenreposed by law in certain other courts or quasi-judicial agencies for
determination.(1)
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it ispleaded
in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in ananswer.
Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense.The
assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructedas an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.(2)
Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matteror the
nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done atany time. It
is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard
hat rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislativein
character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances,such as
hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shallapply.In the case
at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given thenature
of the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court'sauthority
only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreementin
writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that
thecourt shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with
thearbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the
otherhand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be
dismissed." Theproceedings are summary in nature.All considered, the court
a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of thecontending parties for
damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated inseparate regular
proceedings at an opportune time and venue.
Eb villarosa vs. benito
Facts: ·
Eb villarosa is a land developer(principal office at davao city, then may
mga branches siya sa paranaque, cagayan de oro) who entered into
Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to
develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de
Oro belonging to the imperial incorporation into a housing subdivision for
the construction of low cost housing units · Minimal developments were
made · A case for breach of contract was filed by imperial corporation
against eb villarosa at the rtc of makati which was the agreed upon venue
for any action · summons was duly served upon defendant E. B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL
SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo,
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the
face of the original copy of the summons. Note that their principal office is
at davao city. · A special appearance with motion to dismiss was filed
by eb villarosa. It claims dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served
upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not
one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure · Imperial countered by filing a motion to declare
defendant in default · On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an
Order[endnoteRef:2] denying defendants Motion to Dismiss as well as
plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was given
ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading [2: ] · The trial
court reasoned that there was substantial compliance with the rule on
service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. · Eb villarosa filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did
not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on
persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific
and clear in that the word manager was changed to general manager,
secretary to corporate secretary, and excluding therefrom agent and
director. · Since the MR of eb villarosa was denied, they then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the supreme court.
Issue: whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
Sc ruling: NO
Ratio: · Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the
branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro,
instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City
is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner. · The 1997 rules of court states · Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: · When
the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may
be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. · Before it was
simply manager. With the new rules they added general manager. Hence
the intent was to make service of summons restricted to those
enumerated. · Sabi nga sa case: · The designation of persons or
officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now
states general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary
instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent,
or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. · Why
was there a need to change it? · Justice Florenz Regalado,
thus:[endnoteRef:3] [3: ] · x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed
service upon a defendant corporation to be made on the president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. The aforesaid
terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and
sometimes illogical interpretations · there must be strict observance to
those enumerated. · In this case summons should have been served
not in a branch of eb villarosa, but in its main office. · Section 20 of Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now provides that the inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce
strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a
motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his
authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service
of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
ALBERTO G. PINLAC vs CA
FACTS:
1. PETS: WWII veterans filed with RTC Quieting of Title of a forest land acquired
thru prescription. They named as RESP several persons and corporations who
are titled owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject
property. One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma
Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma).
2. Since personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of
the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve
summons by publication- GRANTED. Published in the “Metropolitan
Newsweek”, a periodical edited and published in the City of Caloocan and
Malolos, Bulacan.
3. RESP declared in default : TC DECISION: rendered in favor of petitioners and
against the defaulted respondents
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to
wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes,
Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in fee simple
title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary
prescription, with the exception of the lands covered by the respective
transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents;
4. Pet for annulment of Decision was filed with CA by the titled owners of the
subdivided lots within Vil-Ma, that TC nullified all their titles, lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud:
(2) They were never made parties to Civil Case No. Q-35672,
nor were their lots described in the complaint, published
summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was VIL-MA,
a totally separate and independent entity which had
already ceased to exist way back in January of
1976. Moreover, the summons, as well as the Partial Decision
was not published in a newspaper or periodical of general
circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to said
defendant did not place the individual lot owners under the trial
court’s jurisdiction, nor are they bound by the adverse
judgment.
(3) They were denied due process of law as they were not given
their day in court. They should have been included
as indispensable parties-respondents in Civil Case No. Q-
35672 since the petitioners therein were seeking to annul their
respective transfer certificates of title.
5. CA: GRANTED the injunction: indispensable parties in the case, were not
individually served with summons. So annulled decision: becomes all the
more apparent when petitioners claim or asseverate that the assailed
Partial Decision can not bind Vilar-Maloles (VILMA), the umbrella name,
for the simple reason that said PARTNERSHIP was dissolved on January
26, 1976, for it can no longer be sued as it had no more juridical
personality.
6. Petitioners contend that “the summons and the Partial Decision were
published in a local newspaper edited in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan
known as “METROPOLITAN NEWSWEEK” implying that said summons and
Partial Decision were not published in a newspaper of general circulation
in Quezon City as required by PD 1079, Sec. 1 thereof. Petitioners not having
been duly notified of the hearing/proceedings, the Partial Decision being assailed
is without significance to them or as far as petitioners are concerned said Partial
Decision is null and void.
7. CERTIORARI: PETS Contend that the service of summons by publication was
legal and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of
Court. The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders of the trial court
dated May 5, 1993 and September 29, 1983.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A-QUO HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER RESPONDENT VILMA MALOLES SUBDIVISION BY THE PUBLICATION OF
THE SUMMONS AND PETITION AS ORDERED BY THE COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-
35672 AND SO THE PARTIAL DECISION (ANNEX “B”) WAS LEGAL, VALID AND
PROPER.
HELD: NEGAVOO
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the
approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the “Metropolitan
Newsweek” is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules
strictly require that publication must be “in a newspaper of general circulation and in
such places and for such time as the court may order.” The court orders relied upon by
petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to
be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical
does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the
court a quo coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service
by publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed
in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to
strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication
is a fatal defect in the service of summons.It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory
requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by
publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other
than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the
rules, the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private respondents
are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was filed on November 2,
1983, VilmaMaloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical
entity. VilmaMaloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6)
years earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC dated
January 26, 1976. Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical
personality.
 Summons: Oaminal vs. Castillo
In the instant case, the receipt of the summons by the legal secretary of the
defendants -- respondents herein -- is deemed proper, because they admit the
actual receipt thereof, but merely question the manner of service. Moreover,
when they asked for affirmative reliefs in several motions and thereby
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, whatever defects the
service of summons may have had were cured.
FACTS: Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against
Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC. The complaint prayed that
respondents be ordered to pay P1,500,000.00 by way of liquidated damages
and P150,000.00 as attorneys fees.The summons together with the complaint was
served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of Respondent Mrs. Castillo.Respondents filed
their ‘Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally
Defective’ alleging that the Sheriff’s Return has failed to comply with Section (1),
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court or substituted service of summons but said motion was
not heard due to the Judge’s leave of absence.
Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to
Render Judgment because no answer was filed by the latter.
Respondents forthwith filed the following:
a. Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer
with Compulsory Counter-claim dated 9 November 2000 which was set for
hearing on 27 November 2000 at 8:30 a.m.;
b. x x x Urgent Motion to Dismiss also dated 9 November 2000 which was
also set for hearing on 27 November 2000 at 8:30 a.m. The said motion was
anchored on the premise that x x x [petitioner's] complaint was barred by
improper venue and litis pendentia; and
c. Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim dated 9 November 2000.
The judge denied respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, and admitted their Answer and set
the pre-trial. However after admitting their answer, the judge ruled that respondents’
‘Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with
Counterclaim’ was filed outside the period to file answer, hence he
(1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer;
(2) declared [respondents] in default; and
(3) ordered [petitioner] to present evidence ex-parte within ten days from
receipt of [the] order, [failing] which, the case will be dismissed.
Respondents then filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order (TRO). In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial court had validly
acquired jurisdiction over them. The appellate court issued a TRO to enjoin the
lower court from issuing a writ of execution to enforce the latters decision.
The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them. It based its
finding on the Sheriffs Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had
been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before substituted service
was resorted to. Thus, the appellate court set aside the trial courts Decision and
dismissed, without prejudice, Civil Case No. OZC-00-13.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents? (YES)
HELD: In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance
and submission to the authority of the former. Where the action is in personam and
the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Resort to the
latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in
person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied
with.[7]
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the
following circumstances: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time
was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons
was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or regular place
of business.[8] It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officers return.
 In the present case, the Sheriffs Return failed to state that efforts had been made
to personally serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return indicate that
it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time.

Nonetheless, nothing in the records shows that

respondents denied actual receipt of the summons
through their secretary, Ester Fraginal. Their Urgent
Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and
Legally Defective[11] did not deny receipt thereof; it merely
assailed the manner of its service. In fact, they admitted in
their Motion that the summons, together with the
complaint, was served by the Sheriff on Ester Fraginal,
secretary of the defendants at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City on 30 May 2000.[12]
That the defendants actual receipt of the summons satisfied the requirements of
procedural due process had previously been upheld by the Court thus:

x x x [T]here is no question that summons was timely issued and received by private
respondent. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of such summons but confined
himself to the argument that the Sheriff should prove that personal service was first
made before resorting to substituted service.

This brings to the fore the question of procedural due process. In Montalban v.
Maximo (22 SCRA 1077 [1968]) the Court ruled that The constitutional requirement
of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give
the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes
that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play
are satisfied; due process is served.[13]
Verily, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of
jurisdiction over their persons; they raised only improper venue and litis
pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should be
deemed waived.
SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 144662. October 13, 2003]
Facts:
Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of
land located along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. On March
30, 1993, petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus
Corporation (hereafter Columbus) entered into a lease contract, under
which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth P10M at the end
of the third year of the lease. Because private respondent failed to comply
with this stipulation, the petitioners on November 13, 1998, filed a
complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private
respondent before the RTC of Pasay City. Summons was served upon private
respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of
the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s
return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly
authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive
pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in
default. The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present
evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
RTC: The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners
declaring the contract of lease rescinded, terminated and cancelled. That
decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, private
respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by
petitioners. The trial court denied the motion to lift order of default.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied. Undaunted, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to
lift the writ of execution. It suffered the same fate as the motion for
reconsideration for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to
proceed with the enforcement of the decision.
CA: Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
ruled in its favor. The CA held that the trial court erred when it denied
private respondent’s motion to lift order of default. The appellate court
pointed out that private respondent was not properly served with
summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service of
summons upon domestic private juridical entity shall be made through its
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer or in-house counsel. Since service upon private respondent was
made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private
respondent’s office, as evidenced by the latter’s employment record, such
service cannot be considered valid. Consequently, the subsequent
proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its
execution, were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over private respondent. Besides, judgments by default are not
favored, especially so when there is a prima facie showing that the
defaulting party has a meritorious defense, which in this case was grounded
on the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Issue 1: Whether there was valid service of summons on private
respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, and
Petitioner: On the first issue, petitioners contend that while Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons
authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said
provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial
compliance rule. Petitioners cite Millenium Industrial Commercial
Corporation v. Tan, and maintain that this Court, by referring to E.B
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito, effectively ruled that said
provision is the statement of the general rule on service of summons upon
corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception.
Petitioners claim that this Court, in an array of cases, upheld the substantial
compliance rule when it allowed the validity of the service of summons on
the corporation’s employee other than those mentioned in the Rule where
said summons and complaint were in fact seasonably received by the
corporation from said employee.
Held 1: The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is
still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the
case. new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the
doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by
In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd.
Villarosa, which is the later case.
(hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St.,
Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque,
Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a
Issue 2: Whether private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was in
sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial order.
Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual
Petitioners: On the second issue, petitioners claim that private
obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
respondent’s motion to lift order of default was not in order for it was filed
damages at the RTC of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was
late, contrary to the provision in sub-paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the
served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires filing of the motion after
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
notice but before judgment.
Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was Private respondent, in turn, argues that since service upon it was
substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over invalid, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Hence, all the
Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for subsequent proceedings in the trial court are null and void, including the
certiorari. We decided in Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court order of default. This renders the second issue now moot and academic.
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that there was Held2: We find merit in private respondent’s submissions. Since we
no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a have ruled that service of summons upon private respondent through its
person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that
Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire jurisdiction over
Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings held
to dismiss, namely, private respondent’s substantial compliance with the before it, including the order of default, are null and void. As private
rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner’s assertions respondent points out, the second issue has become moot and academic.
that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and
exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended
to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to
liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to
support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case.
We must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court
 [G.R. No. 159590. April 25, 2005]
HSBC vs. CATALAN
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR
25 2005.
G.R. No. 159590 (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited vs.
Cecilia Diez Catalan) and G.R. No. 159591 (HSBC International Trustee Limited
vs. Cecilia Diez Catalan.)
Catalan filed a complaint against HSBANK and HSBC Trustee for sum of money
and damages for wanton refusal to pay the value of checks issued in her favor
by Thomson. She anchored her cause of action on Article 19 of the Civil Code,
the abuse of rights principle. HSBANK alleged that Catalan has no cause of
action for abuse of rights. HSBC Trustee alleged that the case should be
dismissed against it for improper service of summons.
In a Decision dated October 18, 2004, we held that Catalan has a cause of
action against HSBANK and HSBC Trustee for abuse of rights but dismissed the
case against HSBC Trustee for improper service of summons.
HSBANK and Catalan filed separate motions for partial reconsideration.
HSBANK prays for a fresh second look of the case because the allegations of
the complaint and annexes thereto do not show that HSBANK committed any
abuse in refusing to honor the subject checks. It argues that, as may be
deciphered from copies of the checks attached in the complaint, the checks
were deposited after Thomson was already dead. It adds that another reason
for HSBANK to be wary in honoring the checks is that in a previous
communication, Thomson admitted having previously issued checks to Catalan
without his full signature and in which correction fluid was used. It insists that
HSBANK acted with prudence and in good faith in returning the checks pending
confirmation in view of its failure to communicate with Thomson by phone to
verify if indeed he issued the checks and the signatures are genuine. It submits
that in the absence of any allegations on abuse of right, the complaint against
HSBANK is an ordinary action to compel the bank, as drawee, to honor the
checks, which she cannot pursue because HSBANK did not accept the check.
Under Sec. 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the drawee is not liable
unless and until he accepts the check.
On the other hand, Catalan seeks a reversal of the decision insofar as it
declared the lower court without jurisdiction over HSBC Trustee because of
improper service of summons. She claims that HSBC Trustee effectively waived
the improper service of summons when on June 9, 2004 and August 11, 2004
it conducted its cross examination on Catalan.
In compliance with a resolution of the Court dated January 19, 2005, the
parties filed their respective comments to each party's motion for partial
reconsideration.
Anent HSBANK'S motion for partial reconsideration, we adequately addressed
and resolved its arguments in our decision. We reiterate that in determining
whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the allegations therein
may be properly considered.[1] Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss
cralaw
the complaint on this ground hypothetically admits all the averments
thereof.[2] The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint is
cralaw
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court may render a valid judgment
upon them in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.[3] If the allegations
cralaw
in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it
should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by
the defendants.[4] If the trial court finds the allegations to be sufficient, but
cralaw
doubts their veracity, it must deny the motion to dismiss and then require the
defendant to answer, and proceed to try the case on the merits.[5] In this
cralaw
case, assuming the facts to be true, Catalan's complaint sufficiently establishes
a cause of action. On the basis of her allegations, the trial court may render a
valid judgment. Thus, the complaint passes the test of sufficiency of the facts
alleged. The other matters raised by HSBANK cannot be determined in a
motion to dismiss or the petition before this Court. Those are purely factual
issues that should be the subject of a full-dress trial in the trial court.
With respect to Catalan's motion for partial reconsideration, we stress that only
when a party participated in the trial without objecting to the court's
jurisdiction is he estopped and deemed to have effectively waived the issue of
the trial court's jurisdiction. Stated elsewise, the active participation of a party
against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's
jurisdiction.[6] In this case, since improper service of summons has seasonably
cralaw
been raised, as aptly held in Signetics Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,[7] "there
should be no real cause for what may understandably be its
apprehension, i.e., that by its participation during the trial on the merits, it
may, absent an invocation of separate or independent reliefs of its own, be
considered to have voluntarily submitted itself to the court's
jurisdiction."[8] Thus, HSBC Trustee's cross-examination of Catalan cannot be
cralaw
deemed a waiver of improper service of summons since it has timely raised
said issue before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the separate motions for partial reconsideration of HSBANK and
Catalan are DENIED. The denial is FINAL. No further pleadings from movants
will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147530 June 29, 2005
PABLO B. CASIMINA, then General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMILIO B. LEGASPI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC of Iloilo, Branch
22 and EMMANUEL T. ILLERA, respondents.
Facts:
1. Private respondent Emmanuel T. Illera was the Port Manager of the Iloilo
Fishing Port Complex (IFPC) while petitioner Pablo B. Casimina was the
then General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority
(PFDA) with offices in Quezon City.
2. March 17, 2000 - Petitioner Casimina issued Special Order No. 821 re-
assigning private respondent from Iloilo to the central office in Quezon
City.
3. March 22, 2000 - Private respondent sent a memorandum to petitioner
praying for a reconsideration of the SO. It included that he was surprised
by the SO and was not discussed before him.
4. March 29, 2000 - Petitioner issued a memorandum to private respondent
stating therein the reason for the re-assignment stating that while in the
Central Office, private respondent is expected to help review and
formulate credit and collection policies that would negate the
accumulation of uncollected accounts receivables, in addition to the other
duties that may be assigned to him in the interest of the service. It also
ordered private respondent Illera to cease and desist from the further
performance of his duties as Port Manager of the Iloilo Fish Port Complex
effective 03 April 2000 and to assume duties and responsibilities as stated.
5. After receiving the memorandum, private respondent immediately filed a
case for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction against petitioner in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 22
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-26187, to restrain petitioner from
transferring him to the central office in Quezon City.
6. April 14, 2000 - Petitioner filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over his person and the
subject matter, and lack of cause of action. He averred that he never
received any summons or copy of the complaint against him, hence, the
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. He further contended
that the case involved personnel movement of a government employee in
the public service and should have been appealed to the Civil Service
Commission instead of the regular courts.
7. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint against
him and granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by private
respondent ordering petitioner to "desist from giving effect to the re-
assignment of plaintiff (herein private respondent) from his permanent
station in Iloilo City to the Quezon City office.
8. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: WON Respondent Hon. Legaspi exercised grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the case when the said
trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and the
subject matter of the case
HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, petitioner never received the summons against him,
whether personally or in his office. The records show that petitioner’s official
address as the General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority
(PFDA) was in Quezon City. Yet, the summons, together with a copy of the
complaint, was served not in his Manila office but in PFDA’s Iloilo branch office and
received by the records receiving officer there. We have held that the failure to
faithfully, strictly and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service
renders the service ineffective.
The SC disagreed with Respondent Hon. Legaspi in presuming that the said Records
Receiving Officer (was) authorized to receive the communication or court processes
addressed to the defendant.
SC held that the doctrine of substantial compliance requires that for there to be a
valid service of summons, actual receipt of the summons by the defendant through
the person served must be shown. SC further requires that where there is
substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom petitioner had
a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would receive or would be notified
of the summons issued in his name. None of these was observed in the case at bar.
We cannot infer actual receipt of summons by petitioner from the fact that the
government corporate counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case against him and
Mr. Cosejo appeared on his behalf during the summary hearing for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to ask for the postponement of the case. It is well-
settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalidity of summons, among
others, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. Even the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over such person. PETITION GRANTED.