OSG Reply - Republic V Sereno

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
En Banc
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY
SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSE C. CALIDA,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. NO. 237428
MARIA LOURDES P.A.

SERENO,
Respondent.
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REPLY
(to the Comment dated March 16, 2018)
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by

Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, in compliance with the
Resolution dated March 20, 2018,1 respectfully states:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
I shall be telling this with a sigh

Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference
— The Road Not Taken, Robert Frost
For the first time in the country’s history, the Solicitor

General is asking this Honorable Court to remove a Chief
Justice from office. That this recourse has not been taken
before does not make it wrong. Although the quo warranto
1
The OSG received the Resolution requiring the petitioner to file a Reply on March 23, 2018.
1
Republic represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida vs. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
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petition is unprecedented, the Solicitor General is vested with

authority to institute it.
Respondent naturally disputes the action taken by the

Solicitor General. In her comment, she contends that the
Court has no jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the quo
warranto petition against her. Allegedly, she is a
constitutional officer who may be removed only by
impeachment.
To be sure, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

provides that impeachable officers may be removed on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. The same impeachable
officers may, however, be ousted from office through quo
warranto proceedings pursuant to Section 5(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, which does not exclude such officers from its
coverage.
The use of quo warranto as a remedy against

impeachable officers like the instant case has precedents.
In Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,2 this Honorable

Court exercised jurisdiction over a Quo Warranto petition
against an impeachable official, no less than the President of
the Republic. The ruling made a full determination on the
inquiry whether to oust said impeachable official, or find that
she was unlawfully holding office in this wise, “In view
whereof, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Esrada challenging
the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th
President of the Republic are dismissed.”
In an earlier case in 1986, this Honorable Court

likewise ruled on the legitimacy of the President’s dominion
over her office viz, “ … President Corazon C. Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de
jure government3.”
2
Estrada vs. Desierto and Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & G.R. No. 146738 (2
March 2001)
3
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
2
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The inapplicability of statute of limitation on quo

warranto as in the instant case has a precedent in Frivaldo
vs. Comelec4 where this Honorable Court ruled that
dismissal of the quo warranto on the ground of tardiness, as
argued by Frivaldo, is not well-taken.
Beyond cavil, the riddance of a public officer is the

ultimate legal relief sought in both impeachment and quo
warranto proceedings. Other than this similarity, the two
proceedings diverge like a fork on the road, and the Solicitor
General has chosen the path that until now has not been
taken, that is to remove the Chief Justice from office.
This case stands on terra firma. The Constitution does

not include ineligibility to public position as a ground for
impeachment. No one can be convicted for ineligibility. The
sole purpose of impeachment proceedings is to hold a public
officer accountable for wrongdoings committed in office. On
the other hand, the quo warranto proceedings instituted by
the Solicitor General seeks to oust Respondent because she is
ineligible to be the Chief Justice.
In other words, the Solicitor General is not asking the

Court to remove Respondent for impeachable offenses: it is
not the concern of the petition. Instead, the Solicitor General
has good reason to believe that Respondent has no authority
to occupy the esteemed office of the Chief Justice of the
Republic of the Philippines: she had not shown that she
possessed proven integrity, an indispensable qualification for
appointment to the Judiciary pursuant to Section 7(3), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Surely, the Solicitor General cannot just sit idly by and

allow an unqualified person such as Respondent to continue
occupying the highest seat in the highest court of the land:
that would be a dereliction of his duty under the Constitution.
In the same manner, the Honorable Court cannot

abdicate its role of applying the Constitution. In the final
analysis, the Filipino People deserve a Chief Justice who
possesses proven integrity because that is what the
4
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989.
3
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Constitution—the People’s contract with the Government—

demands. It behooves the Honorable Court to enforce that
social contract, and in view of Respondent’s failure to
establish her integrity, declare the office of the Chief Justice
of the Republic of the Philippines vacant.
ARGUMENTS
A. Procedural
1. The Constitution does not exclude

quo warranto as a remedy to assail the
validity of Respondent’s appointment as
Chief Justice and cause her ouster from
office.
a. The text of the

Constitution allows the ouster
of an impeachable official
through other modes than
impeachment.
2. The Solicitor General, in the exercise

of his sound discretion, can institute an
action for quo warranto when he has
good reason to believe that he has a
case against Respondent.
3. This petition for quo warranto

against Respondent is not time-barred.
a. The one-year
prescriptive period under
Section 11, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court applies only to
a petitioner in a quo warranto
proceeding who is claiming a
right to the public office and
not to the State which has an
interest to ensure that only a
qualified individual occupies
the highest position in the
Judiciary.
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b. Even assuming,
arguendo, that a State-
initiated action of quo
warranto is subject to
prescription, the period has
not yet tolled against the
State.
c. Assuming arguendo that

the petition for quo warranto
is subject to prescription and
the one-year period for filing
the same had lapsed, it
involves a matter of
transcendental importance
that this Honorable Court is
duty-bound to resolve.
4. The direct resort to the Honorable

Court is justified.
b. Substantive
5. The JBC’s determination of whether

Respondent is a person of “proven
integrity” during her application for
Chief Justice is not a political question.
6. Respondent is not a person of

proven integrity.
a. Respondent failed to
prove her integrity before the
JBC.
b. Religiously complying
with the requirement of filing of
SALNs is implied from, and not
in addition to, the qualification
of proven integrity for Members
of the Judiciary.
c. Respondent failed to
religiously file her SALNs
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casting her integrity in grave

doubt.
DISCUSSION
a. Procedural Arguments
1. The Constitution does

not exclude quo warranto
as a remedy to assail the
validity of Respondent’s
appointment as Chief
Justice and cause her
ouster from office.
1. In her Comment, Respondent predictably argues

that she may be removed from office only through
impeachment, to the exclusion of all other remedies like the
present petition for quo warranto.5 She claims that the
phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI
of the Constitution6 does not signify that members of the
Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than
impeachment,7 instead, the word “may” qualifies only the
penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal
from office.8
2. Contrary to Respondent’s stance, quo warranto is

the proper remedy to question her eligibility to her current
position and cause her removal from office.
3. A petition for quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by

which the Government can call upon any person to show by
5
Comment, pp. 11-33.
6
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
7
Id. at 23.
8
Id. at 26.
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what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public

franchise.”9 It is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-
founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the
privilege.10 Impeachment, on the other hand, refers to the
power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct, as provided in the Constitution. A
mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment
has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States
through the influence of English common law on the framers
of the US constitution.11 It is a method of national inquest to
protect the State. It does not intend to prosecute; it is not
intended for its retributory or restitutory effects. Rather, it is
in the nature of an exemplary act by which the State infuses
the highest sense of responsibility to public service.12
4. Under Article XI of the Constitution dealing with

Accountability of Public Officers, the removal of impeachable
officials by means of impeachment relates only to the
commission of impeachable offenses, i.e., culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.13
5. There are ways to differentiate these proceedings.
6. As to the grounds, a petitioner in a quo warranto

proceeding seeks the ouster of a de facto public officer on
the ground of ineligibility or failing to meet the qualifications
for such office, while a complainant in impeachment
proceedings wants a validly-appointed impeachable officer to
be removed from office upon conviction of any of the
impeachable offenses.
7. In the present petition, what is assailed is

Respondent’s unlawful occupation of the position of Chief
Justice because of her ineligibility. She failed to fulfill the
general qualification for members of the judiciary that an
9
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Hon. Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994.
10
Velasco v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016.
11
Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.
12
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 354, July 28, 1986.
13
Id. at Section 2.
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applicant must be a person of proven integrity. This petition

does not involve issues or matters relating to impeachable
offenses that Respondent may have committed, nor does it
accuse her of committing such offenses, which fall squarely
within the ambit of impeachment proceedings pending
before the House of Representatives.
8. Another distinction concerns the jurisdiction to hear

and decide these proceedings. Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution vests the Congress with the exclusive power to
initiate and try impeachment cases against impeachable
officials, while Section 5(1), Article VIII thereof grants the
Court the power to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for quo warranto as provided for in Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court. They are exclusive and distinct proceedings
anchored on different premises. An impeachment case
against a Supreme Court Justice for an impeachable offense
presupposes a valid appointment of that Justice. In contrast,
the quo warranto petition asserts that the appointment of
Respondent is void. Since her appointment is void,
Respondent may therefore be removed by another legal
process, i.e., through a petition for quo warranto initiated by
the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.14
9. To iterate, the removal through impeachment is

proper when what is involved is the commission of
impeachable offenses by impeachable officers. On the other
hand, quo warranto is proper when what is assailed is the
public officers’ qualifications or the validity of their
appointments.
10. Respondent contends that the word “may”

qualifies only the penalty imposable after the impeachment
trial. Following Respondent’s proposition, the Senate sitting
as an impeachment court can, after finding an official guilty
of an impeachable offense, impose a penalty lower than
removal from office, like suspension or reprimand. This is
absurd.
14
See Sections 1 and 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
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11. The penalty which the Senate may impose in an

impeachment case shall be limited to removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of
the Philippines.15 Particularly, considering that the grounds
for impeachment are serious offenses, the Senate, sitting as
an Impeachment Court, in case of conviction, is left with no
other option but to order the official’s removal from office
and disqualification to hold any public office. Conversely, if
the Senate finds the official not guilty of any of the offenses
contained in the Articles of Impeachment, although the acts
may comparatively constitute some lesser offenses, it must
acquit the official and not impose any lesser penalty. To hold
otherwise would result in a situation where the Senate may
possibly impose upon an impeached President the penalty of
suspension, say, for two years. This could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution because
vacancy in the office of the President occurs only in case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, in which event the Vice-
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term.16
12. The grounds for impeachment are serious crimes

which should be penalized heavily. It is specious to argue
that the Senate can provide for a lower penalty than
removal and disqualification. It is unthinkable to imagine
that culpable violation of the Constitution be punished with
suspension; treason with censure; betrayal of the public
trust with reprimand. No, a judgment in cases of
impeachment compels the Senate to remove the erring
official and disqualify such official from public office.
13. Also, Respondent argues that the Honorable Court

has no disciplinary power over incumbent members of the
Supreme Court.17 She is mistaken.
14. Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC18 dated May 4,

2010 provides for the creation of a permanent Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards (“Ethics Committee”), which
15
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 ed.,
p. 1156.
16
See Section 8, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
17
Comment, p. 16, par. 2.8, pp. 19-20, par. 2.13.
18
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
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shall have the task of preliminarily investigating against all

complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of
ethical standards filed against members of the Supreme
Court, to wit:
Section 13. Ethics Committee. – In

addition to the above, a permanent Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards shall be
established and chaired by the Chief Justice,
with the following membership:
(a) a working Vice-Chair appointed by the

Chief Justice;
(b) three (3) members chosen among

themselves by the en banc by secret
vote; and
(c) a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen

by the Chief Justice as a non-voting
observer-consultant.
The Vice-Chair, the Members and the

retired Supreme Court Justice shall serve for a
term of one (1) year, with the election in the
case of elected Members to be held at the call
of the Chief Justice. The Committee shall have
the task of preliminarily investigating all
complaints involving graft and corruption and
violations of ethical standards, including
anonymous complaints, filed against Members
of the Court, and of submitting findings and
recommendations to the en banc. All
proceedings shall be completely confidential.
The Committee shall also monitor and report to
the Court the progress of the investigation of
similar complaints against Supreme Court
officials and employees, and handle the annual
update of the Court’s ethical rules and
standards for submission to the en banc.
15. In In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,

etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo,19 the Honorable Court exercised its disciplinary
power over its members, when it referred a charge of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics
Committee. Earlier, in In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Luis
19
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 15, 2010.
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C. Biraogo,20 the Court investigated Justice Ruben T. Reyes,

among other persons, for the leakage of confidential
documents from the Court En Banc. Although Justice Reyes
already retired from the Supreme Court when its decision
finding him liable for the leakage was promulgated, this does
not negate the fact that the Court took cognizance of a
disciplinary case against one of its members.
a. The text of the

Constitution allows the ouster
of an impeachable official
through modes other than
impeachment.
16. Unlike the wordings of Section 1, Article IX of the

1935 Constitution and Section 2 of Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which both state, “shall be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of,” the present
phraseology of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides “may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of.” The use of the word may in the provision
is construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion. It cannot be construed as having mandatory
effect.21 Where the words of a statute (or the Constitution,
for that matter) are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
they must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.22
17. Plainly stated, the 1987 Constitution does not state

anywhere that impeachment is the sole means of removing
an impeachable officer. In determining legislative intent,
statutes are, where possible, construed in harmony with
statutes existing at the time of enactment, so that each is
afforded a field of operation.23
18. Applying the verba legis principle, the Honorable

Court can readily opine that Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution does not prohibit other legal means to remove
impeachable officers beside impeachment. When such issue
20
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, February 24, 2009.
21
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
22
Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005.
23
Sullivan v. State Ex. Rel. Atty. General of Alabama, 472 So. 2d 970 (1985).
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of ineligibility arises of an impeachable public officer, the

Court can rule that a quo warranto petition is proper.
19. In fact, in the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission, Commissioner Rodrigo stated that members of
the Judiciary may not be removed except by impeachment
or some very difficult process:
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is

recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I ask a

question for clarification? The section says, "The
Congress shall establish an independent central
monetary authority." My question has reference
to the word "independent." How is independence
of this authority supported by the Constitution?
In the case of the judiciary, the Members

are independent because they have a fixed
term and they may not be removed except
by impeachment or some very difficult
process. This applies to the different
constitutional commissions. But in the case of
this central monetary authority which we call
"independent", how is this independence
maintained? 24
20. Nonplussed, to support her claim that she can only

be removed by impeachment, Respondent mistakenly
invokes Cuenco vs. Fernan,25 In re: Gonzales,26 Jarque
vs. Desierto,27 Marcoleta vs. Borra,28 and In re:
Vizconde.29 These cases unwittingly give the impression
that impeachable officers may only be removed from office
through impeachment. Actually, the Court held in these
cases that public officers who are required under the
Constitution to be members of the Bar and who may be
removed from office by impeachment cannot be charged
with disbarment during their incumbency. This is because to
disbar the public officer would effectively strip off a condition
24
See III Records, Constitutional Commission 611 (22 August 1986), cited in Gonzales III vs. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012 (Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio).
25
A.C. No. 3135, February 17, 1988.
26
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988.
27
A.C. No. 4509, December 5, 1995.
28
A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009.
29
A.M. No. 12-8-4-SC, August 10, 2012.
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precedent and a continuing requirement warranting their

appointment and continued assumption in office.
21. In other words, the cases relied upon by

Respondent presuppose a valid appointment of an
impeachable officer who has purportedly committed an
impeachable offense. The validity of the Respondents’
qualifications in the adverted cases was not even at issue.
22. Respondent also places undue reliance on Serafin

vs. Cruz.30 She avers that “a public officer who had already
entered upon the performance of his duties after he had
qualified acquires a vested right in the office and cannot be
removed nor dismissed therefrom, except for any of the
cause designated and in accordance with the proceedings
established by law.”31 She omits mentioning that Serafin
referred to “a duly appointed and qualified [public officer],
thus:
The principal question to decide in the

present appeal is not whether or not a
provincial board but whether or not a duly
appointed and qualified chief of municipal
police who has entered upon the performance
of his duties as such, may be dismissed
therefrom in order to reinstate another who
had been dismissed from such office pursuant
to a legal, valid and conclusive decision.
….
In view of the foregoing considerations,

we are of the opinion and so hold that the
extraordinary legal remedy of quo
warranto does not lie against a duly and
legally appointed chief of municipal police
who has duly qualified for and has entered
upon the performance of his duties, in order to
reinstate another who has been legally
dismissed from the office in question.32
23. Curiously, Respondent feigns ignorance of

instances wherein the Court assumed jurisdiction in cases
seeking the ouster of impeachable officers. Estrada v.
30
G.R. No. L-39224, October 24, 1933.
31
Comment, p. 32, par. 2.21.
32
Emphasis supplied.
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Desierto,33 is a consolidated petition for prohibition and a

petition for quo warranto against then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court gave due course to the quo
warranto petition against an impeachable officer in the
person of Macapagal-Arroyo and subsequently upheld her
assumption of office as President.34 In Lawyers League
vs. Aquino, the Supreme Court likewise entertained a
Petition questioning the legitimacy of a sitting President. 35
There is nothing that should prevent the Court from acting
on the present petition.
2. The Solicitor General, in

the exercise of his sound
discretion, can institute an
action for quo warranto
when he has good reason
to believe that he has a
case against Respondent.
24. In her comment, Respondent hints that the

Executive Department had a hand in the filing of this petition
by asserting that the Office of the Solicitor General is an
office attached to the Department of Justice, which in turn is
under the control and supervision of the President.36
25. Respondent’s assertion is baseless. The OSG is an

independent and autonomous office attached to the DOJ.37
Although it is attached to the DOJ, the OSG is not a
constituent unit of the DOJ.38 The DOJ's authority, control,
and supervision over the OSG are limited only to budgetary
purposes.39
26. Certainly, Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court

provides the authority of the Solicitor General to file a quo
warranto petition:
33
G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.
34
Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. 146738, March 2, 2001.
35
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
36
Comment, pp. 22-23.
37
Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 300, July 26, 1987.
38
Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV, Executive Order No. 292, July 25, 1987.
39
Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013.
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Section 2. When Solicitor General or

public prosecutor must commence action. —
The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,
when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe
that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof, must
commence such action.40
27. The institution of a quo warranto action need not

be at the behest of the President, as in the present case.
The Solicitor General on his own can institute the
proceedings if has good reason to believe that he can
establish by proof that (a) a person is usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office,
position or franchise, (b) a public officer did an act which, by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office, or (c) an association is acting as a corporation
within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or
without lawful authority so to act.
28. Conversely, the Solicitor General may opt not to

prosecute an action for quo warranto where there are
justifiable reasons.41 The pronouncement of the Court in the
case of Topacio vs. Ong42 is instructive:
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor

General may suspend or turn down the institution of an
action for quo warranto where there are just and valid
reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court ruled:
Like the Attorney-General of the United

States who has absolute discretion in choosing
whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to
abandon a prosecution already started, our own
Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon,
discontinue or compromise suits either with or
without stipulation with the other
party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not
mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it
without any legal and valid reasons, for the
discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise
must be, not only within the parameters get by law
40
Emphasis supplied.
41
See Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008; Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos.
103752-53 November 25, 1992; Amante v. Hilado, G.R. No. 45536. April 14, 1939.
42
G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008.
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but with the best interest of the State as the

ultimate goal.
Upon receipt of a case certified to him,

the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in
the management of the case. He may start the
prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may opt not
to file the case at all. He may do everything
within his legal authority but always
conformably with the national interest and the
policy of the government on the matter at
hand.
It appears that after studying the case,

the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-
litigating the same issue of Ong’s citizenship in
the quo warranto case simultaneously with the
RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk
of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did
not totally write finis to the issue as it merely
advised petitioner to await the outcome of the
RTC case.
29. Simply put, the Solicitor General can institute the

present action for quo warranto, even without being directed
by the Executive Department.
3. This petition for quo

warranto against
Respondent is not time-
barred.
30. While there are instances where the State has

waived, for the benefit of its citizens, its right to take legal
action against them (i.e. criminal laws), the general rule is
that prescription does not run against the State. Nullum
tempus occurrit regi (no time runs against the king).43
31. Prescription of actions is intended to suppress

fraudulent and stale claims.44 In Caltex (Philippines),
43
The latin maxim "nullum tempus occurrit regi" and its variant were adverted to in Agcaoili vs. Suguitan,
G.R. No. L-24806, February 13, 1926 and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Aquino in Mindanao
Development Authority, now the Southern Philippines Development Administration vs. The Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-49087 April 5, 1982.
44
See Caltex (Philippines), Inc., v. Singzon-Aguirre, 787 SCRA 82 (2016).
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Inc., vs. Singzon-Aguirre,45 the Supreme Court explained

the rationale for extinctive prescription in this wise:
The rationale behind the prescription of

actions is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of
time when all the proper vouchers and
evidence are lost or the facts have
become obscure from the lapse of time or
defective memory or death or removal of
witnesses.46
32. Article 1108(4), however, in no uncertain terms,

provides that extinctive prescription does not run against the
State:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive

and extinctive, runs against:
xxx
(4) Juridical persons, except the State
and its subdivisions.
33. Actions by the State to defend or recover its

property do not prescribe.47 In Republic vs. Grijaldo,48 the
Supreme Court explained:
Firstly, it should be considered that the

complaint in the present case was brought by
the Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal
party but in the exercise of its sovereign
functions, to protect the interests of the
State over a public property. Under
paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code
prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive,
does not run against the State. This Court has
held that the statute of limitations does not run
against the right of action of the Government
of the Philippines.
45
787 SCRA 82 (2016).
46
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. et al v. Ma. Flor Singzon-Aguirre et al., 787 SCRA 82 (9 March 2016);
emphasis supplied.
47
Article 1112, Civil Code of the Philippines. See Philippines vs. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., G.R. No. 146030, 3
December 2002, where the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that despite a Torrens Title becoming
incontrovertible after one year, this rule does not apply to actions for reversion by the State.
48
Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Grijaldo, 15 SCRA 687 (31 December 1965); citation omitted.
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34. There can be no quibble that government funds49

are part of the property of the State. Thus, in Tiro vs.
Hontanosas,50 the Honorable Court ruled that a salary of
government officer or employee, while still in the hands of
the government, is considered government property:
The salary check of a government officer

or employee such as a teacher does not belong
to him before it is physically delivered to him.
Until that time the check belongs to the
government….
35. One of the necessary consequences of the

granting of a petition for quo warranto initiated by the
government is that it stems the further release of salaries
and other monetary benefits to a person who is unlawfully
holding a public position and, therefore, not entitled to
continued receipt of government funds.
36. By filing the present quo warranto petition on

behalf of the Republic, the Solicitor General, as the principal
legal defender of the Republic, is also seeking to protect
the public coffer in line with his sworn duty of seeing to it
that the best interest of the government is upheld.
37. Logically, if the right of the State to protect its

interests over a public property is imprescriptible, then so
must the right of the State to defend itself from usurpers
and unlawful holders of office. The State has continuous
interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign
powers are qualified to do so.
38. The State cannot be deprived of its right in ousting

public officials who are not qualified to hold the office in the
first place. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure.51
49
Section 3(2) of P.D. 1445 defines "government funds" as including "public moneys of every sort and other
resources pertaining to any agency of the government."
50
G.R. No. L-32312, November 25, 1983.
51
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989.
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39. Consistent with this rationale, there is greater

reason to give due course to the quo warranto petition
considering that evidence is not lost and in fact has just
been recently discovered and facts regarding Respondent’s
nonfeasance has recently surfaced.
a. The one-year
prescriptive period under
Section 11, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court applies only to
a petitioner in a quo warranto
proceeding who is claiming a
right to the public office and
not to the State which has an
interest to ensure that only a
qualified individual occupies
the highest position in the
Judiciary.
40. Respondent nevertheless posits that under Section

11 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the one-year
prescriptive period accrues from the time a public officer
gives cause for ouster from office and not from “discovery”
of the disqualification.52 She equates “cause of ouster” with
“cause of action,” arguing that Petitioner’s cause of action is
time-barred because Petitioner had only one year reckoned
from her appointment as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012 to
file an action for quo warranto.53
41. Prescription is an affirmative defense; the burden

of proof is upon the party claiming it.54 Respondent failed to
discharge this burden.
42. Section 11, Rule 66 provides:
Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing

contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or
employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year
52
Comment, p. 43, par.2.38.
53
Id.
54
Alfredo Bollozos v. Court of Tax Appeals and Collector of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 475 (31 March
1965).
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after the cause of such ouster, or the right

of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose, nor to authorize an action for
damages in accordance with the provisions of
the next preceding section unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the entry
of the judgment establishing the petitioner's
right to the office in question. (emphasis
supplied)
43. On the other hand, Section 16, Rule 68 of the

1940 Rules of Court on the prescriptive period for filing quo
warranto provides:
Section 16. Limitations. – Nothing

contained in this rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a corporation for
forfeiture of charter unless the same be
commenced within five years after the act
complained of was done or committed; nor to
authorize an action against an officer for
his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one year after the
cause of such ouster, or the right of the
plaintiff to hold office arose; nor to authorize
an action for damages in accordance with the
provisions of the last preceding section unless
the same be commenced within one year after
the entry of the judgment establishing the
plaintiff’s right to the office in question.
44. This provision was taken from Section 216 of Act

No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure, which was published
in English and Spanish.55 The Spanish version of the
provision reads:
Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara la

iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion
por la perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a
menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de
los cinco años siguente a la comision u omision
del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampocose
podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un
cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, a
menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del año
siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho
55
Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926.
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que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso

en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo.56
45. Translated into English, the Spanish version reads:
Nothing herein contained shall authorize

an action against a corporation for forfeiture of
its corporate rights, unless the same be
commenced within five years after the
commission or omission complained of took
place. Neither may an action be brought
against an officer to oust him from office,
unless the same is commenced within one year
after the commission of the act which
caused the deprivation thereof, or after
the right to hold the office arose.57
46. Thus, in Agcaoili vs. Suguitan,58 the Supreme

Court construed “cause of such ouster” as “commission of
the act which caused the deprivation thereof.” Noteworthy,
the Court’s interpretation contemplates “deprivation” of
office. Recall at this point that an action for quo warranto
may be commenced at the instance of two parties only: (1)
private individual59 and (2) Solicitor General or public
prosecutor.60 When instituted by a private individual in
his/her own name, he/she must claim entitlement to public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another for there to be a cause of action.61 These requisites
do not apply when the action is commenced by the Solicitor
General. Under the Rules of Court, the Solicitor General
must commence an action when:
(1) directed by the President of the

Philippines, or
(2) when upon complaint of otherwise he
has good reason to believe that any case
specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof.62
56
Id..
57
Id..
58
Supra.
59
Section 5, Rule 66.
60
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 66.
61
Section 5, Rule 66; see also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon et al v. Hon. Antonio V. Mendez, 239
SCRA 18 (6 December 1994).
62
Section 2, Rule 66.
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47. To establish a cause of action for quo warranto,

the Solicitor General is not required to aver that the Republic
has been deprived of office—and rightfully so because it is
brought by the State to enforce a public right. In fact, the
Court ratiocinated:
As general principle it may be stated that

ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal,
have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right.63
48. It is therefore when quo warranto is instituted by a

private individual under Section 5 of Rule 66 that the Rules
contemplate “deprivation of office.” Thus, in Castro vs.
Solidum,64 the Court said:
A private person who claims to have

been deprived of a public office in a complaint
for quo warranto must prove that he is entitled
and has the right to the position which he
alleges the respondent usurped or unlawfully
holds; and when it does not appear that
petitioner has a valid right or title to the public
position allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
by the respondent, he has no cause of action
and his petition must be dismissed.
49. When an action is filed by the Solicitor General,

the lis mota of the case is not whether there is deprivation
of office—for the Solicitor General cannot so assert that the
Republic is deprived of office—but rather whether
respondent is unlawfully holding, usurping, or intruding into
a public office on the ground that, among others, respondent
failed to meet all the qualifications therefor. By parity of
reasoning, the one-year prescriptive period should only
apply when the action is commenced by a private individual
and not when instituted by the Solicitor General to enforce a
public right.
50. Significantly, Section 216 of Act 190 has been

interpreted by the Supreme Court to pertain to two criteria
63
Supra; citation omitted.
64
Democrito M. Castro v. Manuel Solidum, 97 Phil. 281 (30 June 1955) citing Adante v. Dagpin, 96 Phil.
789.
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from which the one-year period of prescription is to be

reckoned, viz:
The portion of section 216 here material

reads as follows:
Nor shall an action be brought against

an officer to be ousted from his office
unless within one year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right to hold the
office arose.
This provision states two criteria by

reference to which we are supposed to
discover the date from which the period of
prescription is to be reckoned. One is the
ouster, or unlawful exclusion, of the right
claimant from the office; the other is the
right of the lawful claimant to hold the
office.”65
51. There is no gainsaying that the second criteria

(i.e. the right of the lawful claimant to hold the office)
contemplates the existence of a claimant who has a clear
right to the contested office. As to the first criteria, eminent
author and former Chief Justice Manuel Moran opined:
As to ouster from office, the one year

begins to run from the date when the
petitioner might lawfully have assumed
office, and not from the date the incumbent
began to discharge the duties of the office.66
52. Both reckoning points for the one-year

prescriptive period contemplate a private party claiming a
right to public office and thus will not apply when the quo
warranto proceeding is commenced by the Solicitor General
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This is
consistent with the policy behind the one-year prescriptive
period, viz:
[I]n actions of quo warranto involving

right to an office, the action must be instituted
within the period of one year. This has been
65
Catalino Bautista v. Paulino Fajardo, 38 Phil. 626 (1918); emphasis supplied.
66
Manuel Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 178 (2 ND ed. 1947).
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the law in the island since 1901, the period

having been originally fixed in Section 216 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We
find this provision to be an expression of policy
on the part of the State that persons
claiming a right to an office of which they
are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said
office and that if they do not do so within
a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right
thereto by abandonment.67
53. The preceding discussion shows that the one-year

prescriptive period serves a second purpose: the reckoning
point for determining whether the petitioner is deemed to
have abandoned the right to the office. The policy behind
the prescriptive period, once again, contemplates—and
therefore applies only when— quo warranto is commenced
by individuals.
54. The rationale behind this policy is explained in this

wise:
[T]he Government must be
immediately informed or advised if any
person who claims to be entitled to an office or
a position in the civil service as against another
actually holding it, so that the Government
may not be faced with the predicament of
having to pay two salaries, one, for, the
person actually holding the office, although
illegally, and another, for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so.68
55. The one-year prescriptive period is, therefore,

provided by law for the benefit of the Government. To apply
the prescriptive period against the Government, and thus to
dismiss the quo warranto petition filed by the Solicitor
General on the ground of prescription, is to force the
Government to accord benefits to and spend its resources in
favor of a person whom it believes is illegally holding the
office. This is against the very spirit, purpose, rationale
behind the one-year prescriptive period.
67
Saturnino LL. Villegas v. Victoriano De La Cruz, 15 SCRA 721 (1965); citations omitted.
68
Saturnino LL. Villegas v. Victoriano De La Cruz, 15 SCRA 722 (1965).
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56. In fact, in the State of California, questions over

title to public office are considered questions of
governmental legitimacy. Thus, with one exception, quo
warranto proceedings are initiated solely by the State acting
through the Attorney General, viz:
An action may be brought by the

attorney-general, in the name of the people of
this state, upon his own information, or upon a
complaint of a private party, against any
person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any public
office, civil or military, or any franchise, or
against any corporation, either de jure or
de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any
franchise, within this state. And the
attorney-general must bring the action,
whenever he has reason to believe that any
such office or franchise has been usurped,
intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised
by any person, or when he is directed to do so
by the governor.
57. As a remedy, quo warranto is vested in the People

with the purpose of ending continuous exercise of authority
unlawfully asserted. For this reason, no statute of limitations
apply to the action and the Attorney General may file
Information in behalf of the State at any time.69 The
rationale behind the imprescriptibility of the action was
explained in this manner:
The law, in thus permitting the attorney-

general, either upon his own information or
upon the information of a private party, to file
an information at any time against one who
has unlawfully intruded into and is holding a
public office, does not place the courts or
private parties in much danger of having to
deal with stale claims. The action can only be
brought with the consent and permission of the
attorney-general of the state, and, it is to be
assumed, he will not permit the institution of
such a suit, if by reason of a great lapse of
time the claim has become stale, or for any
69
People v. Bailey 158 P. 1036 (Cal. Ct. App. 1916).
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other reason the state has ceased to have a

present interest in it.70
b. Even assuming, arguendo,

that a State-initiated action of
quo warranto is subject to
prescription, the period has not
yet tolled against the State.
58. Respondent argues that “[e]ven assuming that

the one-year prescriptive period may be counted from the
petitioner’s ‘discovery’ of the disqualification, the Petition
would still be time-barred.”71 She avers that if she failed to
file her SALNs for several years, Petitioner “through U.P.
which is a State University” would have known about it
already when she was appointed Chief Justice on August 24,
2012.72 Respondent cites Presidential Commission on
Good Government vs. Carpio-Morales73 as authority for
the statement that “prescription cannot be counted from
discovery of the offense when ‘the necessary information,
data, or records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public.”74
59. Her reliance on PCGG is misplaced. She may have

forgotten that the present Petition is one for quo warranto
under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. It is a special civil
action and not a criminal action. As she herself admits,
PCGG is about “determining the reckoning point for
prescription of criminal offenses under Act No. 3326.”75 On
that score alone, PCGG obviously does not apply to the
present case.
60. Indeed, in PCGG, the Court held:
An evaluation of the foregoing

jurisprudence on the matter reveals the
70
Id.
71
72
Id. at par. 2.39.2.
73
G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014.
74
Id. at 44-45, par. 2.39.3; italics in the original.
75
Id. at 44, par. 2.39.3; emphasis supplied.
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following guidelines in the determination of the

reckoning point for the period of prescription of
violations of RA 3019, viz:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins

to run from the date of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the
violation is not known, it shall be counted
form the date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the
general rule or the exception that should apply
in a particular case, the availability or
suppression of the information relative to the
crime should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or

records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public,
the general rule applies. Prescription shall,
therefore, run from the date of the commission
of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent

the filing thereof or should information about
the violation be suppressed, possibly through
connivance, then the exception applies and the
period of prescription shall be reckoned from
the date of discovery thereof.76
61. Verily, PCGG applies only to cases which require

the determination of the reckoning point for the prescription
period of violations of special acts, such as R.A. No. 3019,77
i.e., criminal offenses, pursuant to Section 2 of Act No.
3326.78
62. PCGG was even an occasion for the Court to carve

out an exception using the “blameless ignorance” doctrine,
viz:
Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We

ruled that the “blameless ignorance” doctrine
applies considering that the plaintiff therein
76
Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra; emphasis supplied.
77
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
78
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Section 2 thereof provides: “Sec. 2.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment. xxx.”
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had no reasonable means of knowing the

existence of a cause of action. In this particular
instance, We pinned the running of the
prescriptive period to the completion by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee of
an exhaustive investigation on the loans. We
elucidated that the first mode under Section 2
of Act No. 3326 would not apply since during
the Marcos regime, no person would have
dared to question the legality of these
transactions.
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our

2006 Resolution in Romualdez v. Marcelo,
which involved a violation of Section 7 of RA
3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not
the offenses charged in the said cases have
already prescribed, We applied the same
principle enunciated in Duque and ruled that
the prescriptive period for the offenses therein
committed began to run from the discovery
thereof on the day former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the
PCGG.
This was reiterated in Disini v.

Sandiganbayan where We counted the running
of the prescriptive period in said case from the
date of discovery of the violation after the
PCGG’s exhaustive investigation despite the
highly publicized and well-known nature of the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project therein
involved, recognizing the fact that the
discovery of the crime necessitated the prior
exhaustive investigation and completion
thereof by the PCGG. (citations omitted)
63. To support her stance, Respondent also contends

that petitioner “Republic of the Philippines cannot reasonably
assert that it was only in December 2017 that it discovered
that (she) had not submitted her SALNs to the JBC or that she
had allegedly failed to file her SALNs when she was a
Professor the U.P. College of Law.”79 She reasons that
Petitioner could and should be deemed to have known about
the matter of her SALNs as early as July 20, 2012 when the
JBC En Banc met to deliberate on the applicants to include in
the short list for the position of Chief Justice.80 This is
79
Comment, p. 47, par. 2.39.6.
80
Id. at 45-47.
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because, according to her, “[b]oth the JBC and U.P.—to whom

the SALNs were to be submitted—are instrumentalities of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.”81
64. Her argument is misleading. While it is true that a

quo warranto petition is “brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines,”82 the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor is specifically directed to commence the action.83
65. Certainly, the Solicitor General is not synonymous

with the Republic of the Philippines. Even if the two are
considered as one and the same for purposes of the present
case, Respondent engages in oversimplification when she
argues that knowledge of or notice to the JBC and the UP,
they being “instrumentalities of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines,” is tantamount to knowledge of or
notice to Petitioner.
66. Indeed, if the Solicitor General “upon complaint or

otherwise…has good reason to believe that any case specified
in (Sec. 1) can be established by proof, [he] must commence
such action.”84 The law’s use of the word “must” means it is
the Solicitor General’s legal duty to commence such action
against the unlawful holder of the office if he finds “good
reason to believe” that such action “can be established by
proof.”85
67. The rule is clear: it refers to the Solicitor General or

the public prosecutor and not to any other “instrumentality of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.” The
matter of determining whether “he has good reason to believe
that any case specified in [Section 1] can be established by
proof” is addressed to the Solicitor General or the public
prosecutor. It cannot be delegated to any other government
instrumentality.
68. In Amante vs. Hidalgo,86 the Court stressed:
81
Id. at 47, par. 2.39.6.
82
Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 1.
83
Id. at Sections 2 and 3.
84
Id. at Sec. 2; italics supplied.
85
Id.
86
G.R. No. L-45536, April 14, 1939; emphasis and underlining supplied.
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(T)he duty enjoined upon the Solicitor-

General to institute quo warranto proceedings
involves the exercise of discretion. This is so,
because the institution of the action is
expressly made to depend upon whether
he has good reason to believe that he can
establish by proof that the case is one of
those specified in sections 197 and 198 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
69. Truly, under Section 2, Rule 66, the Solicitor

General must commence action “when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case
specified in the preceding section can be established by
proof.” The hearings conducted by the House of
Representative's Committee on Justice on the impeachment
complaint against Respondent only took place in December
2017.
70. Said provision presupposes that the Solicitor

General had: (1) actual notice through a complaint or
otherwise, and (2) had opportunity to investigate the matter
so as to be able to form good reasons to believe that a case
must be filed. Thus, the Solicitor General himself (and no
other) must have had both factual and legal bases before
the period runs. Apropos, knowledge of or notice to the JBC
and to UP cannot be equivalent to notice to the Solicitor
General.
71. Accordingly, Section 7 of RA 3019 states that:
Section 7. Statement of assets and

liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty
days after the approval of this Act or after
assuming office, and within the month of
January of every other year thereafter, as
well as upon the expiration of his term of
office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file
with the office of the corresponding
Department Head, or in the case of a Head
of Department or chief of an independent
office, with the Office of the President, or
in the case of members of the Congress
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and the officials and employees thereof,

with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House,87 a true detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before
the end of the calendar year, may file their
statements in the following months of January.
72. Under Section 8 of RA 6713, the SALN must be

filed:
1. within thirty days after assumption of office;

2. on or before April 30, of every year
thereafter; and
3. within thirty days after separation from the
service.
….
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and

Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections shall be
filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective
officials, with the national office of the
Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the
Secretaries of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively; Justices, with
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court;
Judges, with the Court Administrator; and
all national executive officials with the Office
of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and
employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in
their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, with the
Office of the President, and those below said
ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their
respective regions; and
87
Emphasis supplied.
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(5) All other public officials and employees,

defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, with the Civil Service
Commission.
73. The law provides for an exhaustive listing where

the SALNs should be submitted. Executive Order 292 or the
Administrative Code of 198788 discusses the functions of the
OSG and nowhere does it include monitoring of the
compliance in SALN submissions of other government
agencies.
74. Even if these SALNs are public documents as they

are notarized, these SALNs are not published. Hence, there
is no feasible way for the OSG to take cognizance of the
submission or non-submission of the SALNs.
75. There is no law requiring the Solicitor General to

monitor the SALNs of ALL government officials and
employees. The Solicitor General, as head of office, is only
tasked to monitor the SALNs submitted by the employees of
the OSG, not those from other agencies.
76. Appropriately, Section 31 of the Civil Service

Resolution No. 060231 states that:
Sec. 3. Ministerial Duty of the Head of

Office to issue Compliance Order.—
Immediately upon receipt of the
aforementioned list and recommendation, it
shall be the ministerial duty of the Head of
Office to issue an order requiring those who
have incomplete data in their SALN to
correct/supply the desired information and
those who did not file/submit their SALNs to
comply within a non-extendible period of three
(3) days from receipt of said order.
77. Since Respondent is not connected with the OSG,

the Solicitor General has no supervisory role in monitoring
her deficient SALNs.
88
Dated 25 July 1987.
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78. In any event, the Solicitor General is tasked to

work on the cases and letters actually received and known
by his office. Respondent’s non-submission or deficient
SALNs was only brought to the attention of the Solicitor
General through the hearings conducted by the House of
Representatives.
c. Assuming arguendo that

the petition for quo warranto
is subject to prescription and
the one-year period for filing
the same had lapsed, it
involves a matter of
transcendental importance
that this Honorable Court is
duty-bound to resolve.
79. Assuming without conceding that the one-year

period under Section 11 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is
applicable, there are stronger policy considerations in favor
of excepting suits initiated by the Republic from its
application. The balance of interests militates against
applying this period to bar action when it is filed by the
government in its sovereign capacity.
80. Consider the foregoing scenario: an impeachable

officer such as, for example, the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, is elected to his position. Over a year later, it
is discovered that the President is not a natural-born
Filipino. This fact is established with certainty, and the
President had no hand in this mistake. In this scenario, the
President cannot be impeached, as there is no ground under
the Constitution to do so.89
81. If Madrigal vs. Lecaroz90 is applied to the

theoretical case above, the Philippines would have a
President who is not constitutionally qualified and yet cannot
be removed from office. It is unimaginable that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution did not contemplate the remedy of
quo warranto to resolve this anomaly.
89
The grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.
90
G.R. L-46218, October 23. 1990.
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82. The situation of Respondent is identical. Assuming

that she acted in good faith when she submitted an
insufficient number of SALN’s to the JBC, this does not
change the fact that she has not proven her integrity. She
lacked, at the inception, as she continues to lack now, an
indispensable qualification for her position,91 as much so as
a President who is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
83. The more compelling policy is to allow the removal

of the unqualified public officer. Prescription should not be a
bar for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of a quo
warranto petition in such a situation. The Court had done so
in the past.
84. In Frivaldo vs. Comelec,92 a petition for the

annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation was filed
with COMELEC by the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter. Frivaldo filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order to keep the COMELEC from
conducting a hearing on the petition, partly on the ground
that the ten-day period for quo warranto under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code had expired. The Supreme
Court ruled:
The argument that the petition filed

with the Commission on Elections should
be dismissed for tardiness is not well-
taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to
discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. If, say, a female
legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or
91
“We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements.
They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but
during the officer's entire tenure.” Atty. Isidro Q. Lico vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, 29 September
2015.
92
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989.
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omission acquires his nationality, would

she have a right to remain in office simply
because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established,
and not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered
only eight months after his proclamation
and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.
This Court will not permit the

anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
85. The Court on numerous occasions eschewed

technicality to render just and equitable relief.93 Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and
not on technicalities.94 Thus, in the League of Cities vs.
COMELEC95 cases, the Court decided the cases on the
merits despite entry of judgment. In Estipona vs.
Lobrigo,96 the Court disregarded technical defenses
particularly the failure to implead an indispensable party,
failure to file a declaratory relief petition in the proper court,
93
League of Cities vs. COMELEC, citing Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468; Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and
183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402; Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 290; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; and Province of
Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
94
Heirs of Zaulda vs. Zaulda, G.R. No. 201234, March 17, 2014.
95
G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499, G.R. No. 178056, 21 December 2009 Resolution.
96
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017.
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and the collateral attack to the constitutionality of a penal

law, and decided the merits of the case in view of the
importance of the issues being decided upon.
4. The direct resort to

the Honorable Court is
justified.
86. Respondent contends that she cannot be ousted

via the present quo warranto because such action would
have to be filed, at the first instance, with the Regional Trial
Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. She
further insists that such case would create an absurd
situation wherein a judge of a lower court would have to
exercise disciplinary power and administrative supervision
over a member of the Supreme Court.97
87. Her contention is untenable. Section 21 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts can
issue writs of quo warranto which may be enforced only in
their respective regions. Section 21 provides:
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other

cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors
and other public ministers and consuls.
88. The present petition for quo warranto against

Respondent should not be filed, in the first instance, before
the Regional Trial Court. Otherwise, an absurd situation
would be created wherein a writ of quo warranto may be
issued by an RTC against the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines but it could only be enforced within
the region under such RTC’s jurisdiction.
89. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court

provides that a petition for quo warranto may be filed before
97
Comment, p. 19.
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the Honorable Court, among other venues. Section 7, Rule

66 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 7. Venue. — An action under

the preceding six sections can be brought only
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the
respondent or any of the respondents resides,
but when the Solicitor General commences the
action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial
Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of
Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a)
90. As a general rule, the doctrine of hierarchy of

courts precludes direct resort to the Honorable Court as it is
a court of last resort.98 The rule, however, admits exceptions
under well-defined circumstances.
91. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on

Elections99 explained the necessity of the exceptions to the
general rule in this wise:
In other words, the Supreme Court's role

to interpret the Constitution and act in order to
protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent should not be emasculated by
the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of
courts. That has never been the purpose of
such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full
discretionary power to take cognizance and
assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions
for certiorari ... filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition.
92. The petition at bar involves a matter of

transcendental importance and of first impression and
therefore falls under the provided exceptions. Still in the
Diocese of Bacolod, the Court said:
98
Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013.
99
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015.
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A second exception is when the issues

involved are of transcendental importance. In
these cases, the imminence and clarity of the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The
doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when
clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection.
….
Third, cases of first impression warrant a

direct resort to this court. In cases of first
impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that
will guide the lower courts on this matter. In
Government of the United States v. Purganan,
this court took cognizance of the case as a
matter of first impression that may guide the
lower courts.
93. The present petition involves a matter of

transcendental importance100 because at issue is the
constitutionality and legality of Respondent’s appointment as
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the highest position
in the Judiciary. It is also of first impression because no
jurisprudence is on all fours with the controversy. No court
can better resolve the issue than the Honorable Court.
94. The presence of these compelling circumstances

warrants that the doctrine of hierarchy of court must be
relaxed. Therefore, while the Regional Trial Court, the Court
of Appeals, and the Supreme Court have concurrent original
jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto, direct resort to
the Honorable Court is justified.
b. Substantive Arguments
100
Please see Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017;
Cruz v. Secretary of Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000; Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004; Page-
Tenorio v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004; Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. Nos.
199082, 199085 & 199118, September 18, 2012.
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5. The JBC’s determination

of whether Respondent is
a person of “proven
integrity” during her
application for Chief
Justice is not a political
question.
95. Respondent argues that the Court has no

jurisdiction over the present quo warranto proceedings
which involves political questions beyond the pale of judicial
review.
96. Petitioner disagrees. The issues raised before this

Honorable Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve.
97. The Constitution vested the Supreme Court with

judicial power - the power and duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.101
98. The “limitation on the power of judicial review to

actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that
“the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.”102
99. Considering that Justices of the Supreme Court are

not elected by the people, the framers of the Constitution
did not see it fit to give the courts dominion over matters of
policy. As expressed by Justice Arturo Brion in Ocampo vs.
Enriquez103, “[w]ith respect to matters of policy, we have
no right to substitute our wisdom over that of duly elected
political branches. They carry the mandate of the popular
will - we do not.”
101
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
102
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. 166910, 169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19,
2010, 633 SCRA 470.
103
Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in Ocampo et al v. Enriquez et al, G.R. No.
225973.
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100. Equally instructive is the discussion by

Willoughby104 on political questions, to wit:
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known

and well-established principle is considered
that it is not within the province of the
courts to pass judgment upon the policy
of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore, discretionary powers are granted by
the Constitution or by statute, the manner in
which those powers are exercised is not
subject to judicial review. The courts,
therefore, concern themselves only with the
question as to the existence and extent of
these discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial,

the legislative and executive departments
are spoken of as the political departments
of government because in very many
cases their action is necessarily dictated
by considerations of public or political
policy. These considerations of public or
political policy of course will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions,
or the executive to exercise authority not
granted him by the Constitution or by, statute,
but, within these limits, they do permit the
departments, separately or together, to
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or
that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the
consequences that flow therefrom, may not be
traversed in the courts.105
101. In re McConaughy106 characterizes a political

question, viz:
. . . What is generally meant, when it is

said that a question is political, and not
judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the
104
Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.
105
Id.
106
119 N.W. 408.
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government, with discretionary power to

act.107
102. The political question bar essentially rests on the

separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the
Constitution.108
As the Court explained in Javellana vs.
Executive Secretary:109
One of the principal bases of the non-

justiciability of so-called political questions is
the principle of separation of powers —
characteristic of the presidential system of
government — the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature,
into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those
involving the making of laws, which are
allocated to the legislative department; 2)
those concerning mainly with the enforcement
of such laws and of judicial decisions applying
and/or interpreting the same, which belong to
the executive department; and 3) those
dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable, which are
apportioned to courts of justice. Within its
own sphere — but only within such sphere
— each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach
upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other departments,
but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts
performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments —
provided that such acts, measures or
decisions are within the area allocated
thereto by the Constitution.110
103. In Vera vs. Avelino,111 the Court expounded on

when a question is political or justiciable:
107
See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19
L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41,
37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220.
108
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73-77 (2009).
109
50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
110
Emphasis supplied.
111
77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946].
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It is a well-settled doctrine that political

questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to
deal with such questions has been conferred
on the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions. It is not so easy,
however, to define the phrase political
question, nor to determine what matters fall
within its scope. It is frequently used to
designate all questions that is outside the
scope of the judicial power. More properly,
however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the
government.112
104. In Tañada vs. Cuenco,113 the Court also stated:
[T]he term "political question" connotes,

in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.114
105. Thus, for a political question to exist, there must

be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the
President or Congress, the exercise of which the court
should not examine or prohibit.115
106. Even Respondent herself adheres to this test in

determining whether a political question exists. In her
112
Emphasis supplied.
113
103 Phil 1051 [1957].
114
Emphasis supplied.
115
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez Jr. in Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 September 15,
1989.
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Dissenting Opinion in Ocampo vs. Enriquez,116 she argued

that the threshold test which must be satisfied is “whether
indeed the question is one addressed to purely political
exercises internal to the workings of the legislature;117 or
whether, on the part of the President, there are no legal
standards against which his particular action can be
evaluated.118”
107. Interestingly, in the same Dissenting Opinion,

Respondent herself even admitted that “[t]here was a time
when this Court hid under the "political question" doctrine
and evaded constitutional and moral responsibility for the
long period of suppression of the people's basic rights.”
108. This time, however, Respondent argues that the

determination of her integrity is a political question.
Respondent cannot now be allowed to hide beneath the
cloak of the political question doctrine merely because it is
convenient for her and her losing cause.
109. The nature of the question for determination is not

purely political because it is not incumbent upon the people
of the Republic to decide whether the respondent had
proven her integrity before the JBC to become the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. At the same
time, the determination of whether Respondent is a person
of proven integrity is not left to the discretion of the
executive or legislative branch of the government. It is the
JBC that is mandated to nominate appointments to the
Judiciary, including the post of the Chief Justice.
110. Respondent is patently mistaken in claiming that

the issue of whether she is a person of proven integrity had
been committed under our Constitution to a coordinate
political department – either the executive or legislative
department. The JBC is not under the executive or
legislative department of the government. The Legislative
Department is composed of the Senate and the House of
116
G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016.
117
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 343 Phil. 42 (1997).
118
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006); Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392
Phil. 618 (2000); llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 (1991).
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Representatives upon which legislative power is vested.119

On the other hand, the executive power is vested in the
President of the Philippines.120
111. Additionally, Section 8(1)121 and (5)122 of Article

VIII provide that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court…. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.” The JBC is a body
subordinate to the Supreme Court although the Chief Justice
who is primus inter pares within the Court also heads the
JBC as its ex oficio Chair.123
112. Accordingly, it is not factually correct to argue that

the JBC is a coordinate political department of the judiciary.
The JBC does not concern itself with questions of policy of
which a political question constitutes. Instead, it is an
independent constitutional body created pursuant to Section
8, Article VIII of the Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council

is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress
as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
113. The creation of the JBC was meant to insulate the

appointments in the judiciary against political influence.124
119
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
120
Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
121
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
122
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
123
Concurring opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015.
124
Constitutional Commission Deliberations, p. 490, July 14, 1986
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As the Court held in Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

et al:125
Long before the naissance of the present

Constitution, the annals of history bear witness
to the fact that the exercise of appointing
members of the Judiciary has always been the
exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like
their progenitor of American origins, both the
Malolos Constitution and the 1935 Constitution
had vested the power to appoint the members
of the Judiciary in the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. It was during these times that
the country became witness to the deplorable
practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of
their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate
themselves with the members of the legislative
body.
Then, with the fusion of executive and

legislative power under the 1973 Constitution,
the appointment of judges and justices was no
longer subject to the scrutiny of another body.
It was absolute, except that the appointees
must have all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the

process of appointments to the Judiciary from
political pressure and partisan activities, the
members of the Constitutional Commission
saw the need to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend
nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived
of a body representative of all the stakeholders
in the judicial appointment process and called
it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)…
114. The late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion justified

the creation of the JBC in this wise:
The Judicial and Bar Council is no doubt

an innovation. But, it is an innovation made in
response to the public clamor in favor of
125
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012; citations omitted.
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eliminating politics from the appointment of

judges.126
115. It is evident that the framers of the Constitution

intended the JBC to be an innovative solution in response to
the public clamor to eliminate politics in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence,
they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating
JBC, the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary.127
116. The creation, history, and mandate of the JBC

indisputably show that it is not a political body.
Consequently, the political question doctrine finds no
application in the present case.
117. While it is an independent constitutional body, the

JBC’s independence and discretion is not without limits.128
The Constitution did not leave the matter of nominating a
Chief Justice to the sole discretion of the JBC. The exercise
of its power thereon is subject to various constitutional
limitations which are mandatory in nature, to wit:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction

over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus…
Section 7. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must

be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.
126
Record, Vol. 2, p. 487
127
Chavez vs. JBC, et. al., supra.
128
Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017.
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Section 8. (1) The Council shall have the

principal function of recommending appointees
to the judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it.
118. The principal issue – whether Respondent is a

person of “proven integrity” when she applied for Chief
Justice – in this case may be resolved through a proper
interpretation of the above provisions in the Constitution,
Canons of Judicial Ethics, pertinent JBC rules, and other
laws. These are enough judicially discoverable and
manageable standards which can aid the Honorable Court in
resolving the case.
6. Respondent is not a
person of proven integrity.
a. Respondent failed to prove

her integrity before the JBC.
119. The JBC’s role in recommending appointees to the

Judiciary cannot be downplayed, that is the JBC’s principal
constitutional mandate. The JBC is the first gatekeeper in
assessing an applicant’s compliance with the constitutional
requirements for eligibility. While the requirements in the
first two paragraphs of Article VIII, Section 7 are
measurable, the third paragraph is couched in general
terms, and the JBC, in the exercise of its principal function,
can provide for the details and the manner of carrying out
Article VIII, Section 7(3) of the 1987 Constitution.
120. Accordingly, when the JBC prescribes rules and

regulations that gives shape to the qualification of “proven
integrity”, such rules and regulations must be deemed as
having the force and effect of law. This is because the rules
of the JBC are actually “rules implementing the constitution.”
It therefore follows that failure to comply with the JBC’s
requirement to submit SALNs pursuant to the JBC
announcement June 4, 2012 as failure to comply with
Section 7(3) of the Constitution.
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121. Respondent argues that the JBC may dispense

with the submission of SALNs before it,129 especially when,
according to her, there is sufficient justification for such non-
submission.130 Finally, she posits that “requiring the
submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement would be
tantamount to creating a new qualification for the position of
Chief Justice.”131 These arguments are bereft of merit.
122. Instead of submitting the SALNs, Respondent

wrote the JBC an explanation letter dated July 23, 2012
stating that most of the requested records during her stint
with the academe were more than fifteen years old; hence
“it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of
those files.”132
123. By allowing substantial compliance for several

applicants, including herself, Respondent concludes that the
JBC exercised its sound discretion in finding her a person of
proven integrity, and such discretion should not be
interfered with by Petitioner.133
124. Such assertion is clearly delusional. During the

hearings before the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives relative to the impeachment complaint
against Respondent, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta,
the JBC Chairman at the time of Respondent’s application for
Chief Justice, categorically stated that Respondent’s letter
dated July 23, 2012 was never submitted for consideration
during the JBC deliberations and could not have been
properly objected to by Justice Peralta,134 to wit:
Mr. Peralta: May I say something, your

Honor?
The Chairperson: Yes, Your Honor.
Mr. Peralta: I was not informed because

the letter of the Chief
Justice and the
attachment to that were
129
Id. at p. 68.
130
Id. at p. 70, emphasis omitted.
131
Id. at p. 71, par. 2.71.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Annex “I” of the Petition; emphasis supplied.
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not… never placed in the

deliberation, your Honor. I
think I was not the one who
asked that question about
the … about the non-
submission of SALN. I
believe that the members
then were… the one who
brought this one but I was
not fully aware of the issue,
Your Honor, because had
there been really an issue on
the non-submission of the
SALN, then I could have
objected to. xxx xxx
125. Simply put, the letter dated July 23, 2012 cannot
serve as a valid reason to excuse Respondent’s non-
submission of her missing SALNs. Neither can it also be even
considered as substantial compliance to the SALN
submission. Without having been deliberated upon by the
JBC, the letter cannot be considered anything more than a
mere scrap of paper.
126. Besides, Respondent committed a gross

misrepresentation before the JBC when she explained that,
the reason for her non-submission of SALNs was that she
could no longer retrieve all her SALNs.135 From Respondent’s
explanation, it can be implied that she did file her SALNs.
127. Yet, as shown by the Certifications136 from the

UPHRDO and the Ombudsman, Respondent did not actually
file her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992,
1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
128. Truth be told, such representation before the JBC

is belied by Respondent’s own allegation in her Comment
that “she has recovered most of the missing SALNs and will
continue to look for the others.”137 Had Respondent exerted
earnest efforts to locate her SALNs during the time that she
was required by the JBC to do so in 2012, instead of
advancing the reason that these SALNs are no longer
135
See Respondent’s Letter dated 23 July 2012 attached as Annex “E” of the Petition.
136
See Annex “B,” Petition dated March 2, 2018; See Annex “O”.
137
Comment, p. 6, par. 1.8.1.
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retrievable, the JBC would not have been misled in

exercising its discretion to accept Respondent’s explanation.
129. Aggravating her previous acts of

misrepresentation, Respondent stated in her Comment that
“a UP Professor would not file his or her SALN with the Office
of the Ombudsman.”138 Yet, a copy of her SALN exists in the
records of the Office of the Ombudsman.139
130. Respondent’s dishonesty before the JBC is self-

evident and seriously discredits any claim of integrity.
131. In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge

Estacion,140 the Court held that “it behooves every
prospective appointee to the judiciary to apprise the
appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness
for judicial office, including such circumstances as may
reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the judiciary by Sec.
7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.”
132. In said case, Jose M. Estacion, Jr. was appointed

as judge of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Prior
to his appointment, he was charged with homicide and
attempted homicide but he failed to disclose these facts
before the JBC. In his defense, Estacion claimed that he had
not yet been convicted of the crimes, and thus, had not
obligation to disclose the same to the JBC. Unsatisfied with
his defense, the Court held that:
The argument that he had not yet been

convicted and should be presumed innocent is
beside the point, and so is the contention that
the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide
do not involve moral turpitude. The important
consideration is that he had a duty to
inform the appointing authority and this
Court of the pending criminal charges
against him to enable them to determine
on the basis of his record, eligibility for the
position he was seeking. He did not
138
139
See Annex “B,” Petition dated March 2, 2018.
140
A.M. No. RTJ-87-104, January 11, 1990.
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discharge that duty. His record did not

contain the important information in
question because he deliberately withheld
and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor
is as obvious as his reason for the suppression
of such a vital fact, which he knew would have
been taken into account against him if it had
been disclosed.
133. In the same vein, Respondent had the legal

obligation to disclose before the JBC that she failed to file
her SALNs eleven times during her tenure as a professor at
UP. Had she informed the JBC of this fact, she would not
have been included in the shortlist in the first place.
Respondent clearly had no reasonable justification for non-
submission of the SALNs before the JBC, and as such, the
JBC could not have made a complete assessment of her
integrity as a qualification for the position of Chief Justice.
134. Respondent also brings to the attention of the

Honorable Court the alleged non-submission of complete
SALNs by other candidates to the Chief Justice position.141
135. Whether the other candidates complied with the

submission of SALNs before the JBC is absolutely of no
relevance to this case. The fact remains that these other
candidates were not appointed to the position of Chief
Justice, Respondent was. She must, therefore, rely on the
merits of her own defense and show to the satisfaction of
the Honorable Court that she indeed proved her integrity
before the JBC despite her non-submission of complete
SALNs as required by the recommending body. At any rate,
it might interest Respondent to know that Acting Chief
Justice Antonio Carpio and Associate Justice Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro have made public JBC certifications that
they have submitted all their SALNs.142
136. All told, the submission of SALNs before the JBC is

crucial in the determination of whether an applicant for a
judicial post possesses integrity. Through the submission of
complete SALNs for the entire time that she was in
141
Id. at. 68.
142
Annex “N,” JBC Certification dated March 23, 2018; Annex “N-1,” JBC Certification dated March 26,
2018.
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government service, the JBC is given the opportunity to

examine whether an applicant has faithfully complied with
the law. The JBC, through these SALNs, would have been
able to determine whether Respondent performed her duty
to file SALNs in accordance with the manner and frequency
stated in RA 6713, and ultimately, assess whether she
possessed the integrity required of members of the
Judiciary.
137. Indeed, Respondent’s position that the JBC did not

require the submission of SALNs as evidence of an
applicant’s integrity is nebulous at best. It begs the question
why the JBC required the submission of these documents to
begin with. In fact, even Respondent herself pointed out that
the JBC required her to submit complete SALNs as part of
her application and, in case of inability to do so, there must
be a reason for failing to comply with such requirement,
evincing that the submission of SALNs was not an empty
and meaningless imposition. As already explained,
Respondent’s explanation was a gross misrepresentation
before the JBC and could not have been the basis for her
recommendation for appointment by the President.
b. Religiously complying with

the requirement of filing of
SALNs is implied from, and
not in addition to, the
qualification of proven
integrity for Members of the
Judiciary.
138. Respondent also asserts that her failure to file

SALNs has no bearing on or relationship to her integrity or
lack thereof.143 She claims that for her integrity to be
properly assailed, there must be an allegation that she had
committed graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained
wealth.144
139. These arguments are preposterous. Her failure to

file her SALNs in accordance with the requirements of the
143
144
Ibid.
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Constitution and relevant laws shows that she is not of

proven integrity.
140. It is elementary that all parts of a statute, and

this should be more so of the Constitution, should be given
effect and made to serve its own distinct purpose, as no
useless provision or one without any purpose at all could
have been intended to be made part of, or incorporated in,
the law.145 As such, every word or phrase in the Constitution
must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all
its provisions.146 The language used in the Constitution,
must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a
definite purpose.147
141. Inasmuch as qualifications for the position of Chief

Justice and other Members of the Judiciary are fixed by the
Constitution itself and cannot be the subject of a waiver, the
proper interpretation of the term integrity in Section 7(3),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution must be that which
gives full effect to the mandate of the provision. On this
point, it is not true, as Respondent alleges, that the term
integrity under the Constitution “eludes precise
definition.”148
142. The first principle of constitutional construction

requires the application of the verba legis rule, that is, that
the term must be given its ordinary meaning.149 The
Constitution, after all, is not primarily a lawyer’s document,
but is essentially that of the people.150 As such, the
interpretation of the term integrity must be one that a
layperson can reasonably accept and understand.
143. In its generic sense, the term integrity pertains to

a person’s “firm adherence to a code of especially moral or
artistic values; incorruptibility.”151 In other words, integrity,
in its ordinary conception, speaks of a person’s fulfillment of
145
Malacora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042, September 30, 1982.
146
Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
147
Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013.
148
Comment, p. 62.
149
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
150
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
151
"Integrity." Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed February 27, 2018. https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/integrity, emphasis supplied.
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and compliance with appropriate codes of conduct, such as

those set forth in the Constitution and statutes passed by
Congress.
144. Consistent with the generic definition of integrity,

the Solicitor General already pointed out in the Petition that
integrity “is closely related to, or if not, approximately
equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound
moral and ethical standards,”152 citing the Court’s ruling in
Francis H. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno.153 Even Respondent herself adopts this
definition of integrity in her Comment.154
145. Similarly, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics,155

the provisions of which served as the foundation for the
inclusion of the term integrity as a qualification for
membership in the Judiciary,156 it is stated that a “judge
should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to
others.”
146. Under these standards, the test by which

Respondent may be considered to possess the qualification
of integrity is whether she has exhibited faithful adherence
to the law.
147. More importantly, the test of integrity laid down

above does not require allegation, much less proof, of
commission of graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained
wealth.
148. Petitioner is aware of the Court’s rulings in cases

such as Navarro vs. Ombudsman157 and Ombudsman vs.
Racho158 to the effect that “mere misdeclaration of the
SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only
when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly
152
Id., citing JBC-009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, promulgated on September 23, 2002.
153
G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.
154
Comment, p. 66.
155
Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946 of the Department of Justice.
156
See IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 440 (July 10, 1986); p. 484 – 485 (July 14, 1986).
157
G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016.
158
G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011.
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disproportionate to the income or other sources of income of

the public officer/employee and he fails to properly account
or explain his other sources of income, does he become
susceptible to dishonesty.”159 Respondent claims that, if at
all, the submission of SALNS vis-à-vis the qualification of
integrity must be measured against these same standards.
149. These cases, however, involved administrative

charges for dishonesty for which the existence of
unexplained wealth is indeed relevant. None of these cases
attempted to furnish the public with a definition of integrity
as a qualification for public office.
150. That the qualification of integrity simply demands

faithful adherence to the law is likewise more in consonance
with our obligations towards the family of nations. As
explained by Petitioner, the Judicial Integrity Group that
forged the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct affirmed
that “scrupulous respect for the law is required”160 of all
Members of the Judiciary. The Group was emphatic that “[a]
judge is obliged to uphold the law.”161 Expounding on the
concept of integrity, the Group stated in its Commentary on
the Bangalore Principles that:
Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and

righteousness. The components of integrity are
honesty and judicial morality. A judge should
always, not only in the discharge of official
duties, act honourably and in a manner
befitting the judicial office, and be free from
fraud, deceit and falsehood, and be good and
virtuous in behaviour and in character. There
are no degrees of integrity as so defined.
Integrity is absolute. In the judiciary, integrity
is more than a virtue; it is a necessity.
151. In any event, a perusal of Respondent’s submitted

SALNs reveals that she did, in fact, commit a litany of
falsehoods. Her SALN as of December 31, 1998, which was
filed only in 2003, or five years beyond the period required
159
Navarro v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016 citing Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho,
G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011.
160
Commentary, p. 76, emphasis and italics in original.
161
Id.
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by law, uses the prescribed form for later years.162 The 1998
SALN shows that Respondent did not only file it late, she
also belatedly accomplished it. This is also true with her
2009 SALN, which was also belatedly filed on June 22, 2012.
The 2009 SALN reflects that she was holding the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, when in fact, she
was only appointed on August 16, 2010.163 When
Respondent resigned in June 2006 as a UP professor, she
should have submitted a SALN as of 2006. Her 2006 SALN,
however, bears no stamp receipt from UP, was only signed
on July 27, 2010, the same day that she submitted it to the
JBC and was not notarized.164 It appears that she fabricated
her 2006 SALN in an attempt to submit a SALN to the JBC
during her application for Associate Justice in 2010. Her
2011 SALN was not signed by her husband.165 Aside from
these facts, her 1990 and 1991 SALNs reveal a discrepancy
as to her pieces of jewelry valued at PhP15,000.00.166 In her
1991 SALN, she declared them as personal properties
acquired from 1986 to 1991, but her 1990 SALN does not
contain any declaration that she has pieces of jewelry. These
are perjurious acts that bolster her utter lack of integrity.
152. Respondent undermined the sanctity of the SALN

by regarding it as mere formality. Her acts of non-
declaration and misrepresentation in her SALNs evince a
disturbing defiance of the constitutional and statutory
requirement to submit SALN and demonstrates her lack of
integrity and moral fitness to hold the office of the Chief
Justice.
153. Above all, defining integrity simply as a person’s

faithful adherence to the law obviates Respondent’s difficulty
of having to interpret the filing of SALNs as an additional
qualification imposed for the position of Chief Justice.
Considering that the SALN requirement is imposed by no
less than the Constitution and RA 6713, compliance with
such legal obligation is implied from, and is not in addition
to, the constitutional qualification of integrity under Section
7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
162
Annex “C”, Petition dated March 2, 2018.
163
Annex “E”, Petition dated March 2, 2018.
164
See Annex “E” of the Petition dated March 2, 2018.
165
See Annex “E” of the Petition dated March 2, 2018.
166
Annexes “N-2” and “N-3”.
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154. The nagging question before the Court, then, is

this: Did Respondent, prior to her appointment as Chief
Justice, exhibit faithful and scrupulous adherence to the law?
The answer is no.
c. Respondent failed to
religiously file her SALNs
casting her integrity in grave
doubt.
155. The SALN is not a mere formal requirement that

Respondent can just choose to lightly brush aside. It is
demanded by no less than the 1987 Constitution.
156. Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution reads:
Article XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 17. A public officer or employee

shall, upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by
law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of
the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in
the manner provided by law.
157. Under Section 8(A)(1) of RA 6713,167 all other

public employees should file their SALN with the Office of the
Civil Service Commission. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 6713 issued on April 21, 1989 mandates
the filing of the SALN with their respective departments,
offices or agencies and the legally designated repositories. For
167
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. XXX
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections shall be filed by:
…
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission.
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uniform implementation of the provisions of RA 6713, the CSC

issued Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1991
specifying the Office where public officials and employees
should file their SALN. This Memorandum Circular directed the
employees of state colleges and universities to file their
SALNs with the Deputy Ombudsman of their respective
region. Thereafter, on March 24, 2004, CSC issued
Memorandum Circular No. 07, Series of 2004 which directed
public officials and employees to accomplish their SALNs in
triplicate and submit the original and duplicate to the
Administrative or Personnel Division or Unit in their respective
agencies.
158. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in

the Constitution to promote transparency in the civil service,
and to operate as a deterrent against government officials
bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means.168
Consistent with these purposes, Section 8 of RA 6713 or the
“Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees” which was enacted on February 20, 1989,
specified the following details, inter alia, who are required to
file a SALN; what are the contents of a SALN; when should a
SALN be filed; and where should a SALN be filed. By
mandate of the law, it behooves every government official or
employee to accomplish and submit a sworn statement
completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth,
and financial and business interests, including those of
his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households, in order to suppress
any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter
usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.169
159. The Constitution and the pertinent laws contain

the compulsory requirement for public officers to submit a
SALN. As a public officer, Respondent cannot ignore this
directive. Assumption of public office is impressed with
paramount public interest, thus persons involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest
clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity,
probity, uprightness, honesty, and diligence in the public
168
Casimiro vs. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014.
169
Daplas vs. Department of Finance, G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017.
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service.170 It is established that the judges, being visible

representations of the law, should set a good example to the
bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity
imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of
the average person for it is their integrity that gives them
the right to judge.171
160. In this case, Respondent refuses to prove that she

had filed her SALNs, hiding under the cloak of presumption
of regularity. She claims that she must be “presumed
innocent and to have regularly filed her SALNs when she
was still a Professor at the UP College of Law.”172 She is
mistaken.
161. Public officers are presumed to have regularly

performed their official acts of duties. In People vs. De
Guzman, the Honorable Court discussed the nature and
reasons for the presumption of regularity:173
A disputable presumption has been as a

species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other
evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable
presumption is that an official act or duty has
been regularly performed. Presumption of this
nature is indulged by the law for the following
fundamental reasons: first, innocence, and not
wrong-doing, is to be presumed; second, an
official oath will not be violated; and third, a
republican form of government cannot survive
long unless a limit is placed upon controversies
and certain trust and confidence reposed in
each governmental department or agent by
every other such department or agent, at least
to the extent of such presumption. Thus, this
presumption evidences a rule of convenient
public policy universally applied and without
which great distress would spring in the affairs
of men.
170
Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document: Benjamin R. Katly,
A.M. No. 2003-9-SC, March 25, 2004.
171
Samson vs. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009.
172
173
G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994.
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162. The presumption of regularity attaches only to

official acts and not to all acts of officials. Just because a
public officer performed the act does not necessarily mean
that such act is clothed with the presumption of regularity.
“Official acts” are those specified by law as an official duty or
as a function attached to a public position.174 In Reyes vs.
Belisario,175 the Court held:
As a general rule, "official acts" enjoy the

presumption of regularity, and the
presumption may be overthrown only by
evidence to the contrary. When an act is
official, a presumption of regularity exists
because of the assumption that the law tells
the official what his duties are and that he
discharged these duties accordingly. But not all
acts of public officers are "official acts," i.e.,
acts specified by law as an official duty or as a
function attached to a public position, and the
presumption does not apply when an official’s
acts are not within the duties specified by law…
163. The filing of a SALN is neither an official duty nor

a function attached to the Respondent’s previous post as a
professor of the UP College of Law. To be sure, the
accomplishment and filing of a SALN is a duty required by
law. Nevertheless, such duty is not imposed on a specific
position to make it an official duty or function of its holder.
Rather, it is an obligation of public officers in general. Thus,
the presumption cannot attach to the fact of filing a SALN.
164. In any case, assuming arguendo that Respondent

may benefit from the presumption of regularity, such
presumption is disputable and may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.176 The Republic has already submitted clear and
convincing evidence to show that Respondent failed to file
her SALNs as required by law.
165. Based on the UPHRDO Certification dated

December 8, 2017 and the Certification from the
Ombudsman Central Records Division dated December 4,
174
Reyes v. Belisario, G.R. No. 154652, August 14, 2009.
175
G.R. No. 154652, August 14, 2009.
176
See People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994.
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2017, Respondent failed to file her SALN eleven times from

1986 to 2006. This fact remains unrefuted. The certification
issued by Director Angela Escoto of the UP Human
Resources Development Office, the value of which is being
downplayed by Respondent, clearly shows Respondent’s
failure to submit her SALNs.
166. Also, in a letter dated March 6, 2018, Director

Escoto responded to the OSG’s letter dated February 28,
2018,177 attaching copies of the SALNs of Respondent for the
years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
and 2002.178 This corroborates the earlier Certifications
secured from the UPHRDO and the Office of the
Ombudsman.
167. Unlike Respondent’s mere allegation of her filing

of all her SALNs, the Certifications offered by the Solicitor
General as proof of her non-filing do enjoy the presumption
of regularity. Likewise, the record keeping of Respondent’s
201 file should be presumed to be free from irregularities,
meaning all documents submitted are duly preserved. Thus,
if upon examination of Respondent’s 201 file, her SALNs for
several years cannot be found, it is presumed that she did
not file those SALNs.
168. Respondent categorically states that she is not

submitting the issue of non-filing of SALNs to the Court.
While she may do as she pleases, her non-submission of
copies of all her SALNs certified to be not on record by
Director Escoto will result in the disputable presumption of
the regularity of such certification to become conclusive.179
169. Further, contrary to her position that she complied

with SALN laws, Respondent claims that she is exempted
from filing SALN during the time she took a leave of absence
without pay from UP. She anchored her claim on Section 1,
Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 6713 exempting those who serve in an “official honorary
177
See Annex “B-1,” OSG’s Letter Request dated February 28, 2018, Petition dated March 2, 2018.
178
Annex “O,” Letter of Director Angela D. Escoto dated March 6, 2018; Annex “O-1,” Respondent’s 1985
SALN; Annex “O-2,” Respondent’s 1990 SALN; Annex “O-3,” Respondent’s 1991 SALN; Annex “O-4,”
Respondent’s 1993 SALN; Annex “O-5,” Respondent’s 1994 SALN; Annex “O-6,” Respondent’s 1995
SALN; Annex “O-7,” Respondent’s 1996 SALN; Annex “O-8,” Respondent’s 1997 SALN.
179
Id.
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capacity, without service credit or pay, temporary laborers

and casual or temporary and contractual workers” from filing
their SALN.
170. Respondent’s interpretation is flawed. Section 8(a)

of R.A. No. 6713 enumerates the government employees
who are exempted from filing SALN, to wit:
Section 8….
Statements of Assets and Liabilities and

Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and
employees, except those who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or
temporary workers, shall file under oath their
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
and a Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections and those of their
spouses and unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
171. Under Section 8, the public employees who are

not required to file SALN are: (a) those who serve in an
honorary capacity; (b) laborers; and (c) casual or temporary
workers. In short, under R.A. No. 6713, a government
employee who serves without service credit or pay is not
among those who are not required to file their SALN. At
most, the phrase “without service credit or pay” is a mere
description of an employee who serves in an honorary
capacity.
172. The implementing rules and regulations of a law

cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power
to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature.
Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere
administrative issuance — an administrative agency
certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.180 The phrase
“without service credit or pay” is not included in Section 8.
180
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014.
62
G.R. No. 237428
Reply
x----------------------------x
173. At any rate, Respondent cannot justify not filing

her SALN on the basis that she did not receive any pay from
the government because she was only on leave without pay
for several months within a year. In her Comment, she
stated that she was on leave without pay in UP during the
following periods: a) July 1, 1998 to October 16, 1998; b)
June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2001; c) June 1, 2001 to May 31,
2002; d) November 1, 2003 to May 31, 2004; e) June 1,
2004 to October 31, 2004; f) February 11, 2005 to October
31, 2005; and g) November 15, 2005 to May 31, 2006.181
Following her logic, she should have filed her SALN during
the periods that she was not on leave without pay because it
is presumed that she was receiving pay from the
government, particularly on:
i. October 17, 1998 to May 31, 2000;

ii. June 1, 2002 to October 31, 2003;
iii. November 1, 2004 to February 10, 2005; and
iv. November 1, 2005 to November 15, 2005.
174. As if the right hand does not know what the left
hand is doing, as shown in Director Escoto’s letter dated
March 6, 2018 and attachments,182 Respondent has a SALN
for 2002, when she claims to have been on leave without
pay on June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002.
175. All premises considered, Respondent was not able

to prove her integrity before the JBC by her non-submission
of SALNs. Her failure to file her SALNs in compliance with
the Constitution and RA 6713 mars her integrity. Viewed
from any perspective, Respondent lacks one of the
indispensable qualification for the office of the Chief Justice
of the Republic of the Philippines. Her ouster from office
should follow as a matter of course.
181
Comment dated March 16, 2018, p. 61.
182
See note 178.
63
G.R. No. 237428
Reply
x----------------------------x
PRAYER
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines consequently

prays that this Honorable Court: (1) DECLARE as void Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno’s appointment on August 24, 2012
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines; and
(2) OUST Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno from the position of
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
64

OSG Reply - Republic V Sereno

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Republic of the Philippines

- versus - G.R. NO. 237428

MARIA LOURDES P.A.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by

I shall be telling this with a sigh

— The Road Not Taken, Robert Frost

For the first time in the country’s history, the Solicitor

petition is unprecedented, the Solicitor General is vested with

Respondent naturally disputes the action taken by the

To be sure, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

The use of quo warranto as a remedy against

In Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,2 this Honorable

In an earlier case in 1986, this Honorable Court

The inapplicability of statute of limitation on quo

Beyond cavil, the riddance of a public officer is the

This case stands on terra firma. The Constitution does

In other words, the Solicitor General is not asking the

Surely, the Solicitor General cannot just sit idly by and

In the same manner, the Honorable Court cannot

Constitution—the People’s contract with the Government—

1. The Constitution does not exclude

a. The text of the

2. The Solicitor General, in the exercise

3. This petition for quo warranto

c. Assuming arguendo that

4. The direct resort to the Honorable

5. The JBC’s determination of whether

6. Respondent is not a person of

casting her integrity in grave

1. The Constitution does

1. In her Comment, Respondent predictably argues

2. Contrary to Respondent’s stance, quo warranto is

3. A petition for quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public

4. Under Article XI of the Constitution dealing with

5. There are ways to differentiate these proceedings.

6. As to the grounds, a petitioner in a quo warranto

7. In the present petition, what is assailed is

applicant must be a person of proven integrity. This petition

8. Another distinction concerns the jurisdiction to hear

9. To iterate, the removal through impeachment is

10. Respondent contends that the word “may”

11. The penalty which the Senate may impose in an

12. The grounds for impeachment are serious crimes

13. Also, Respondent argues that the Honorable Court

14. Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC18 dated May 4,

shall have the task of preliminarily investigating against all

Section 13. Ethics Committee. – In

(a) a working Vice-Chair appointed by the

(b) three (3) members chosen among

(c) a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen

The Vice-Chair, the Members and the

15. In In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,

C. Biraogo,20 the Court investigated Justice Ruben T. Reyes,

a. The text of the

16. Unlike the wordings of Section 1, Article IX of the

17. Plainly stated, the 1987 Constitution does not state

18. Applying the verba legis principle, the Honorable

of ineligibility arises of an impeachable public officer, the

19. In fact, in the deliberations of the Constitutional

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I ask a