LEGAL MEDICINE CASES

Gherold Benitez

1. Continental Steel Mfg Corp vs. Montano 603 SCRA 621, 2009 -Balmores 2. Republic vs. Kagandahan 565
SCRA 72, 2008 -Benitez 3. Republic vs. Silverio -Bungay 4. People vs. Paraso 310 SCRA 146, 1999 -Caparas 5.
Suazo vs. Suazo 615 SCRA 154, 2010 -Capiendo 6. Antonio vs. Reyes 484 Scra 353, March 10, 2006 –De Leon 7.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA G.R. No. 119190, 1997 -Dungca 8. People vs. Aquino 322 SCRA 769 -Halili 9. People vs.
Genosa GR No. 135981, 2004 -Lanuza 10. People vs. Velarde 384 SCRA 646, July 18, 2002 -Matias 11. People vs.
Yatar G.R. No. 150224, 2004 -Muli 12. People vs. Seranilla 348 SCRA 227, December 15, 2000 -Nogoy 13.
People vs. Vallejo G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002 -Paladan 14. Herrera vs. Alba G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005 -
Paraso 15. People vs Cajumocan G.R. No. 155023, May 28, 2004 -Perez 16. People vs. Adoviso G.R. Nos.
116196-97, June 23, 1999 -Ramos 17. Lumanog et.al vs. People G.R. No. 182555 -Santos 18. Ricalde vs People
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015 -Sumat 19. Solidum vs People G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014 -Tan 20.
Professional Services, Inc vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 126297 -Tumaliuan 21. People vs Hangdaan, G.R. No. 90035 -

Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan case brief summary

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth but while growing up developed secondary male characteristics and eventually diagnosed with
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it was
discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
diminished, stopped growing and had no breast or menses. For all intents and purposes, as well as in
disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim, respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical certificate stating that respondent is genetically
female but her body secretes male hormones, has two organs of which the female part is undeveloped.

RTC granted respondent’s petition but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court
invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: Can a genetically female but predominantly male person request for change of name and gender?

RULING:
The Court ruled that the governing law with respect to change of name and gender is RA 9048. Respondent,
indisputably, has CAH, as such, is characterized by inappropriate manifestations of male characteristics,
although are genetically female. CAH people also have ambiguous private parts, appearing more male than
female but have internal female reproductive organs which may become undeveloped.

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons,
like respondent, is fixed.

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The Supreme Court made use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male.

The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

Republic’s petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is affirmed.

Silverio v. Republic
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”
and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a
female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of
justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no
law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will
avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not
prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a male
body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful – he
(she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from

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Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila
RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé.

The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that Silverio’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him;
that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point);
that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé
and the realization of their dreams.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be changed on
the ground of gender re-assignment.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME
OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law provides
that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not
the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm.
Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is
based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name
may only be grounded on the following:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.

Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.

Issue on the change of sex

This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local civil
registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there
is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his
birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error, is immutable.

But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?

No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on

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employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy
in relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.”

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montaño

603 SCRA 621 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Death Benefits for the Death of a Dependent – A Fetus is a
Dependent
Civil Law – Civil Personality – When does civil personality start – When does life begin

Facts:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their unborn
child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death benefits claim from
his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue
was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the
arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of Montaño.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death benefits are
awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death” has occurred
because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality because it was
never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA
nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question,
hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the
moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to
discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life
inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate
miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to
death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

People vs. Parazo [G.R. No. 121176 July 8, 1999]

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Facts: (As to how the complaint got to RTC, there is no info in the case. The facts just presented evidence to
show that Parazo deserves a re trial because he was sentenced to death without an interpreter even though
he is deaf and mentally retarded)

RTC decision: Parazo (28 years old) is guilty of rape (sentenced to death) and homicide

May 29, 1997-Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the Court facts and
circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant the setting aside of
his judgment of conviction.

February 10, 1998- the Court resolved to grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in abeyance
consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to allow a supplemental
motion for reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for examination by
a physician of the Supreme Court.

The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is really a deaf-mute,
a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only.

Parazo’s mother testified that he was born deaf and mute and she has no money for medical lintervention.
Barangay captain that Parazo was known as pipi since childhood. His school teacher says he was never active in
class and he never finished grade I. DSWD says that he was a beneficiary of their projects relative to "Persons
with Disability." During his early childhood, he was an active participant of the project. As he grew older
however, he did not anymore bother to visit their office.

Issue: Whether he deserves a re trial for he was sentenced to death without the aid of a language expert
although he is deaf and mentally retarded.

Held: Yes he deserves re trial.

Based on the collateral information's (sic) gathered from persons who have known the patient since childhood,
together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and evidenced by the psychological report, it is now
established that Marlon Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss,
right ear; (3) Mental Retardation, Mild.

Criteria for Mental Retardation as follows:

1. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning: an IQ. of approximately 70 or below on an
individually administered IQ. test.
2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person's effectiveness in
meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the
following skill areas: communication, self-care, home-living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety).
3. Onset before age of 18.

Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. He
deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may
he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber

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Jocelyn Suazo vs Angelito Suazo

615 SCRA 154 – Civil Law – Persons and Family Relations – Family Code – Article 36; Psychological Incapacity –
Drunkenness, Indolence, Physical Violence Not Necessarily Psychological Incapacity

Facts:
In 1985, Jocelyn and Angelito Suazo met each other. They were just 16 years old at that time. In 1986, they got
married before the Mayor of Biñan, Laguna. But their marriage did not turn out to be ideal. It was Jocelyn who
had to work while Angelito was lazy. When confronted by Jocelyn, Angelito would beat her. Angelito was also
constantly drunk. And in 1987, Angelito left Jocelyn for another woman.

In 1997, Jocelyn filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated.

In court, Jocelyn presented Dr. Nedy Tayag who testified that based on her interview with Jocelyn and the
description fed to her by Jocelyn, she concluded that Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.

The RTC voided the marriage but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage should be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD: No. The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party (Jocelyn), could
not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion
or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.

Further, habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity,
do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations that cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity
in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.

Anent Angelito’s violent tendencies, physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, however, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. In this case, the psychologist failed to link the
violence to psychological incapacity. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings
she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its
related jurisprudence, specifically the requisites provided for in the case of Santos vs CA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs AQUINO

(G.R. No. 87084, June 27, 1990)

Facts:
Juanito Q. Aquino, the accused-appellant was charged with rape with homicide before the RTC Branch 57 in
San Carlos, Pangasinan. Aquino willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with Carmelita alias
Carmen Morado, 18 years old, and then struck her with a stone which directly caused her death afterwards.

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Armando Frias, a police officer of PNP Pangasinan was able to secure a statement from Morado before she
died. She positively identified and named Juanito Aquino as the same person who raped and struck her.

Before the preliminary investigation, Aquino said he had no access to a lawyer, so Atty. Liliosa Rosario of the
CItizend Legal Assistance Office was called upon to assist him. However, before the accused could be
arraigned, they filed a Motion to Commit the accused-appellant to the National Center for Mental Health
which was then granted by the Court.

Aquino was then arraigned after being released and pleaded “not guilty” and put up insanity as his defense. He
was later on sentenced to life imprisonment and pay P 35,000.00 as damages.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant, who has invoked insanity as his defense, had overcome the
presumption of sanity.

Ruling:
Although Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez diagnosed the accused-appellant with a condition described as “organic
mental disorder with psychosis”, he stated that an insane person may still know what he is doing is wrong.
Furthermore, he testified that there is no possibility of the accused-appellant to have lucid intervals.

The law presumes that everyone charged with crime is sane and thus, the burden of proof is on the defense.
As no man can look into the mind of another, the state of mind of a person can only be measured by its
external acts. According to several testimonies from persons closely acquainted with Aquino, he always
appeared to be normal, responsive to conversation, did not exercise any queer behavior, and was
appropriately dressed during the time of his arrest. He also admitted that during his time in the Mental Health
Institution that he had consumed 120cc (mL) of cough syrup and 3 sticks of Marijuana. It was therefore,
appropriate that the Court ruled that there was not enough evidence to support his defense, for he was even
able to recall such details, which shows he wasn’t deprived of his reasoning faculties and sound judgment.

The Supreme Court modified the term used in the RTC decision from “life imprisonment” to reclusion
perpetua, under the scheme of penalties in the revised penal code, and reduced the civil indemnity from P
35,000.00 to P 30,000.00.

Landmark Case: People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004 (Digested Case)
Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome

The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight years. She was 8 months pregnant when,
one evening, her husband came home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting that his wife "might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun, but was not
able to open the drawer because it was locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She was
able to hit his arm with a pipe and escape into another room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her
husband had been inflicting on her, and thinking that he might really kill her and her unborn child, distorted the
drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband, who was by then asleep on the bed. She was tried and
convicted for parricide, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to 40 years) to death. On
appeal, she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense.

FACTS:

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That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home
that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant
had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension,
and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was
violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome.

The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of
Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the
aggravating circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown
to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.

In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently
ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant
complete or incomplete self-defense.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is
the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific
means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might

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make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the
doubt should be resolved in her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her
penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require
the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in
previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior
or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the
existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

People v Crispen Velarde

2002 | Panganiban, J.

Doctrine:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and independent counsel qualified to assist a person
under custodial investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the accused with His Honor as
counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this confession, the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial,
fails the test of moral certainty.

Facts:
Velarde was found guilty of rape with homicide by the RTC of Malolos Bulacan and was sentenced to death.
Hence, automatic review by SC.

Version by Prosectution (as summarized by OSG)

Sometime in 1997, Brenda Candelaria (8 years old) together with her friend Melanie (7 years old) was on board
a pedicab driven by appellant. Upon reaching Melanie’s house, appellant told Melanie to alight saying her
mother might look for her. Melanie obeyed.

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In the afternoon of the same day, appellant and Brenda were seen together by one Bonganay in front of the
latter’s store. Later, one Robles, while waiting for a ride, saw appellant alone emerging from a place near a
subdivision. Robles noticed appellant was uneasy, haggard looking with his hair dishevelled.

The next day, Brenda’s lifeless body was found in a grassy vacant lot along Cagayan Valley Highway. The
medico legal officer concluded that Brenda was raped and strangled to death. According the doctor, the victim
died of asphyxia by manual strangulation.

Based on the leased furnished by witnesses, appellant was tagged as suspect and was brought to the Malolos
Bulacan Police Station for investigation. During the investigation, appellant, after having been informed of his
constitutional rights in the presence of Atty Danilo Domingo whom he agreed to act as his counsel, voluntarily
admitted having raped and kille Brenda. Accordingly, his extrajudicial confession was reduced to writing which
was signed by him.

Version of defense.
He mainly denied he raped and killed the victim and says he was only suspected (napagbintangan).

A long paragraph with lots of grammatical errors is reproduced. It says appellant and Brenda are cousins. On
the night of the incident, he was arrested while selling ballot in Tikay, Malolos Bualacan by 4 barangay official.
He was asked where he brought Brenda. He responded he ‘he don’t know. He was brought to the Barangay
Hall. He was kicked and mauled by the victim’s father and brothers. The father was his uncle and was the one
who hurt him. He was boxed. Inside the Hall he was ‘nilusob, was stabbed by the eldest son and said ‘Tabla
table na lang kami’ meaning ‘manos na lang kami sa nangyari’. He couldn’t answer because he didn’t know
anything about the incident. Besides, he was already ‘bugbog sarado’. His hands were even tied at his back
with a handkerchief by a former neighbour.

He was made to sign by one of the Barangay Officials. He signed without reading because he can’t read very
well. After signing, the members of the Barangay including the Barangay Captain brought him to the Municipal
building on the midnight of day after the incident. Later he was brought to the Provincial Hospital but wasn’t
given medicine. He was returned to the Municipal Building and was placed in jail. He was tortured for several
days, 6 times a day.

Appellant admitted that the signature in his extrajudicial confession was his; that Atty. Domingo is known to
him because he was then the Mayor of Malolos; that he hired the services of Atty. Domingo; that he was
candid enough to testify that ‘wala akong alam diyan’. His educational attainment was up to grade 4 only. He
claims he doesn’t know the police investigator who typed the ‘Sinumpaang Salaysay’ marked Exh. M.

W/N Atty Domingo, then municipal mayor of Malolos, could act as counsel for appellant. No.

Held and Ratio:

On Extrajudicial Confession
SC: inadmissible in evidence
Article III Section 12(1)1 of the Constitution cited

1
“Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own

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The victim’s vody was found in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan but appellant (a resident of Tikay,
Municipality of Malolos) was brought and detained in the Malolos Police Station, where he was investigated by
the Malolos Police;

Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel.

He was the mayor of Malolos at the time.

As such, he exercised “operational supervision and control” over the PNP unit in that municipality.

His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the
prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice

As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was
already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case.

Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of “operational supervision and
control” over the police.

“What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.”
Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as
counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant

People vs. Bandula: Court held that a municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by
the Constitution.

Reason: as legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the
municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace
and order.

Right to Counsel
The fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused;

The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present “at all stages of the
interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain
silent or terminate the interview

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer
merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning

choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”

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At case: Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the
Constitution.
 He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant.
 The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an extrajudicial confession.

On circumstantial evidence:
 For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction:
 There is more than one circumstance,
 The facts from which the inferences have been derived are proven, and
 The combination of all the circumstances is such that it produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt

The following were presented by prosecution to prove appellant was the perpetrator of the crime:
1) Appellant and Brenda were together in the morning of the day of the incident; that they were also
together between 3-4 o’clock of the same day, aboard a pedicab;
2) Around 5 30pm of the day of the incident, appellant was seen alone emerging from an Auto Repair
shop; that he looked haggard and had dishevelled hair;
3) Victim’s body was found at 6am the next day on a vacant lot in Doña Pilar Homes;
4) SC: the circumstances are too general; it is also consistent with appellant’s innocence; he cannot be
faulted for being seen with Brenda on a pedicab since they are first cousins who live in the same
house; he cannot be faulted, either, for emerging near Dona Pilar Homes since he lives in Barangay
Tikay, at the back of which is Dona Pilar Homes; As Prosecution Witness Robles testified, she also lived
in Barangay Tikay, yet she waited for a jeepney in front of Doña Pilar Homes; Evidently, it is natural for
residents of Barangay Tikay to emerge in Doña Pilar Homes and wait for a ride from there;
5) Evidence of prosecution is too full of holes; the approximate time of death was not established, other
than she died less than 24 hours before the autopsy; it shows she died on the night of the day of the
supposed incident or in the early morning of the next day; by that time, appellant was already in
custody; there was a supposed tee shirt found in the crime scene yet the prosecution failed to present
it;
6) In case of doubt, the scales must be tipped in favour of the accused;
PEOPLE VS. YATAR (2004)

FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel Dawang’s) house, despite her intention to
go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am, accused-
appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30
pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn
didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn,
telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed
that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latter’s eyes were
“reddish and sharp”. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former
purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In the evening,
when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground floor
opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second
floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied with rope.
When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second

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level of her house, she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it.
Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes
and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also
found 50-meters away from Isabel’s house.

Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyn’s cadaver. When subjected under DNA
testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is identical to Yatar’s genotype.
Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the
Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in
order to assail the court a quo’s decision.

On appeal, Yatar avers that:

1. the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on
him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal;
2. the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination;
and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

MAIN ISSUE
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence for Yatar’s
conviction?

HELD
Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3) years before the Rules on DNA
evidence took effect.

The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the
said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.

RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on
DNA evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative
weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
1. The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were
handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
2. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid
standards in conducting the tests;
3. The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited,
the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly
established; and
4. The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

APPLICATION – DAUBERT TEST:

The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of the DNA test result yielded from the
analysis of Yatar’s blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from the cadaver’s vaginal canal.
Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and relevant.

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In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be determined whether or not the same
directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the evidence
is relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime;

In giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatar’s blood sample from
that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court considered the
qualification of the DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been performed, and
the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the said case, the DNA test was done at the UP National
Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to be
replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be made easier even with
small DNA samples at hand. The analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de
Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.

CONCLUSION:
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly appreciated by the trial court, the said
DNA evidence is sufficient to be admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-appellant’s conviction of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.

ANNOTATIONS – WHAT IS DNA? – culled from this case

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same
in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as
the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and
vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins;

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of
criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It
can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in
the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime
scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s
body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.

Justice Pardo, First Division, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEOFILO SERANILLA y
FRANCISCO, LEO FERRER y PADILLA, EDMUNDO HENTOLIA y RETAA, DANIEL ALMORIN y BALBIN AND CARLOS
CORTEZ, JR., accused.TEOFILO SERANILLA y FRANCISCO, LEO FERRER y PADILLA, EDMUNDO HENTOLIA y RETAA
and DANIEL ALMORIN y BALBIN, accused-appellants [G. R. Nos. 113022-24. December 15, 2000]

NATURE

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The prosecution of the complex crime of rape with homicide is particularly difficult since the victim can no
longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime.i[i]18 People v. Gallarde, G. R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000;
People v. Robles, 305 SCRA 273, 281 (1999).18

CIRCUMSTANCES
Conspiracy
Carlos Cortez, Jr. also revealed the manner by which accused-appellants acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective, indicating a conspiracy among them. They performed specific acts with such coordination that
would indicate a common purpose or design.ii[i]19 People v. Flores, 195 SCRA 295 (1991).19 While one
accused-appellant would have sexual intercourse with the victim, the others would keep her at bay by holding
her thighs or arms.
xxx

Consequently, the trial court did not err in convicting accused-appellants of rape with homicide. Considering
that each of the accused-appellant was shown to have conspired and mutually helped each other in
committing the crime, and that the victim was killed on the occasion thereof, each shall be criminally liable for
each count of rape with homicide.iii[i]23 People v. Diño, 160 SCRA 197 (1988).23

DEFENSES
Aside from being uncorroborated, the various places which accused-appellants claimed they were staying were
not of such distance as to preclude them from being at the place of the incident at the probable time of death
of the victim. In order for alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof
that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else.iv[i]21 People v. Magana, 328 Phil. 721, 734
(1996).21

Furthermore, the testimony of Rolando Franco adequately established the presence of accused-appellants at
the scene of the crime immediately before the incident. Franco saw accused-appellants drinking in the vicinity
of the scene of the crime on the night in question.

Also, prosecution witness Carlos Cortez, Jr. positively identified accused-appellants. Alibi cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear identification of the accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime.v[ii]22 People v. Mangat, 310 SCRA 101, 113 (1999).22

EVIDENCE
Regarding the killing of the victim, circumstantial evidence points to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of
the killing of the victim. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.vi[i]20 Rule 133, Section 4, Revised
Rules of Court.20 The following circumstances, when taken together, point to accused-appellants as the
culprits:
1. Accused-appellants admitted that they all knew each other and would drink together.
2. Accused-appellants were together immediately preceding the incident and at the scene of the
crime on the night itself.
3. Carlos Cortez, Jr. gave an eyewitness account of how accused-appellants took turns in having
sexual intercourse with the unconscious victim.
4. The position of the naked body of the victim indicated she had been raped.

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5. The body of the victim was found in a grassy area near the place where accused-appellants were
last seen.
6. Accused-appellant Teofilo Seranilla admitted that there were no other persons in the area, as it
was slightly raining that night and it was late in the evening.
7. The medico-legal expert estimated the time of death of the victim to be about five days prior to
date of examination, which coincided with the date of the commission of the offense on
September 20, 1992.

DAMAGES
As to their civil indemnity, we note that the trial court merely awarded the amount of fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos. This amount must be increased to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos for each
count, in line with current jurisprudence involving cases of rape with homicide.vii[i]24 People v. Laharto, G. R.
Nos. 118828 & 119371, February 29, 2000; People v. Quisay, G. R. No. 106833, December 10, 1999.24 In
addition, the Court has ruled that the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages must be awarded to the victims
of rape without need of proof nor even pleading the basis thereof.

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