LTD Case Digests

Chapter 1

C. LEDESMA VS. MUN. OF ILOILO et al

G.R. No. L-26337
Dec. 17, 1926

FACTS:

-Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a PART of said lot, now numbered 537 and 703, payable in
10 years

– a TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (The inclusion of said lots in said TCT was evidently an error on
the part of someone connected with the office of the registrar of titles)

– Lopez sold to Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703 evidently by mistake. It is said that the inclusion of said
lots 537 and 703 was a mistake because Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of the fact that said lots were included
in that TCT.

– Lopez, representing. Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to J. Ledesma, which sale was ratified by the couple. Later a
TCT was issued in favor of J. Ledesma. According to the admissions of J. Ledesma lots 537 and 703 were included by mistake
– J. Ledesma sold a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-A and 228-B. Lot 228-A remained the property of J.
Ledesma. Said lots 537 and 703, according to said TCT, remained the property of J. Ledesma.
– J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703. Again, according to J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703 were
included in the transfer of lot No. 228-A to C. Ledesma by mistake.
This action was commenced in CFI of Iloilo. Its purpose was to recover from defendant the municipality of Iloilo a sum as the
value of the two lots Nos. 537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally appropriated,
together with damages and costs.
The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that the plaintiff and appellant was not and never
had been the owner of said lots Nos. 537 and 703. The other defendants answered the petition and supported the contention
of the municipality.
After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the defendants from all liability under the complaint.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed. The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537 and 703
had been included in the registered title of Lopez in 1915, and Lopez included in each succeeding transfer of title to him said
lots, that he was the indisputable owner thereof, and because the City of Iloilo had appropriated said lots, that he was entitled
to recover the value of said lots together with damages.

ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of C. Ledesma made him the owner of such properties

HELD: NO. An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots had been turned over by Lopez to the
City of Iloilo under a contract of sale for street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots had been included as a part of
the streets in the City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally included, in accordance with the provisions of section 39 of
Act No. 496, in the certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact was recognized by Lopez as well as by each of the subsequent
purchasers of said lots.

The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner
of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by mistake or
oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, becomes
the owner of the lands illegally included.
The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give to the holder of such certificate said
public highways. The appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had been included in the
original certificate of title and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become the owner of said lots and is not therefore
entitled to recover their value from the City of Iloilo nor the damages prayed for.

Caragay-Layno and Prieto vs CA,

DOCKET NO. / CASE NO. : G.R. No. L-52064
DATE: December 26, 1984

PETITIONER: Juliana Caragay-Layno

RESPONDENTS: Honorable Court of Appeals, Salvador Estrada, Mariano de Vera

FACTS: Mariano de Vera died in 1951. His intestate estate was administered first by his widow
and later by her nephew, respondent Salvador Estrada. Prior to the widow’s death, she made an inventory showing that De
Vera’s property located located in Calasiao, Pangasinan, measuring 5,417 sq. m. however noticed that the Torrens title under
de Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3,732 sq. m. being occupied by
Juliana Caragay – Layno. Estrada sued to evict Caragay-Layno. Petitioner were asked to vacate the property to which the
petitioner refused claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA's father Juan Caragay since 1921.
ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery of the Disputed Portion (Civil Case No. D-2007), which she
resisted, mainly on the ground that the Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in OCT No. 63, so that
an implied or constructive trust existed in her favor. She then counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the sense that
title be issued in her favor.

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered judgment ordering JULIANA to vacate the Disputed Portion. On appeal respondent
Appellate Court affirmed the Decision in toto. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juliana Caragay-Layno can properly seeks reconveyance of the disputed portion of the land?
HELD: YES. The court held that The evidence discloses that the Disputed Portion was originally possessed openly,
continuously and uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased father of JULIANA, and had been
declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 28694 beginning with the year 1921. JULIANA, whose property had been
wrongfully registered in the name of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can properly seek
its reconveyance.
The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one
year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open
to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

Trader’s Royal Bank vs. CA and Patria Capay(315 SCRA 190)

Facts
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Maximo and Patria Capay was mortgaged to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed
by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction
alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending)
was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with
the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRB’s name without the
notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision
declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s title and issued a new cert. of title for the
Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Emelita Santiago, who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers
who were issued title to the land. The RTC of Quezon City ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers
for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the said court.
Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land
and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the property.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Quezon City Regional Trial Court in toto and TRB was held to be in bad faith
upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in
dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

ISSUE:
Who has the better right over the land in dispute in the present case?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that purchasers in good faith were held to have better rights to the land in dispute. However, Trader’s
Royal Bank (TRB) was ordered to pay the Capays fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago.
Also, since the bank took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of the certificate of title and sold the
property to an unwary purchaser, the Court held Trader’s Royal Bank liable for damages.

The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties.

“The main purpose of the torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need
of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate
of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later
that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,
public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder
once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.”

When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the
registered title. Therefore. the same was not annotated in the TRB title.

However, the Capays are guilty of latches as they and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the banks name following the lapse of the one-year
period of redemption, and that they did not bother for the next fifteen years or so to find out the status of their title or whether
the liens noted on the original certificate of title were still existing considering that the property had already been foreclosed,
the Capays were guilty of laches noting that they assert ownership over the property that has undergone several transfers
made in good faith and for value and already subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their
owners. Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the doctrine that that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day
book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim.

Secretary of DENR vs. Mayor Yap, GR. 167707, 8 October 2008.

(GR 167707)

Facts
In 1976, DENR approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island which identified several lots occupied or claimed
by certain persons. In 1978, Then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1801, which declared Boracay Island as a tourist zone
and marine reserve under the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). PTA issued PTA Circular 3-82 to implement PD 1801. Then
Mayor Yap, Libertad Talapian, Mila Sumndad and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief stating that the issuances
(Proc. 1801 and PTA Circ. 3-82) precluded them from filing their application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes.

Yap and his co-parties claimed that they or their predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in Boracay Island since June 12, 1945 or since time immemorial. They also claimed that
they have declared the lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes. The contested issuances did not put Boracay beyond the
commerce of man and since it was classified as a tourist zone, it is susceptible of private ownership. Thus, they argued that
under CA 141, they can register the lands under their names.

Meanwhile, the DENR argued that Boracay is an unclassified land of the public domain, as it formed part of lands classified as
“public forest” which are not available for disposition pursuant to PD 705. Since it is inalienable, whatever possession cannot
ripen to ownership. Right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA 141 and PD 705

The Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan upheld the right of Yap, et al. to register the lands under their names. It ruled that the
issuances did not pose legal obstacle for Yap and co-claimants to claim title over the lands they occupied in Boracay. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the said trial court.

Issue
W/N the private claimants have rights to secure titles (judicial confirmation of title under CA 141) over their occupied
portions in Boracay Island?

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, that the private claimants do not have rights to secure titles over the lands they
occupied in Boracay Island.

Under CA 141, the requisites for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title are: (1) The applicant or his/her predecessor-in-
interest is in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945. (2) The land has been classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

In the present case, the private claimants (Mayor Yap, et. al. and Dr. Orlando Sacay and Wilfredo Gelito, et. al) were not able to
show any proclamation, executive order administrative action, report or statute to support to establish the status of the land
they are claiming. Thus, their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must fail because the 2nd requisite is lacking.
Since the land is not alienable or disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
ßpossessory rights. They cannot also claim under Proclamation 1064 as to the lands classified as agricultural lands. They failed
to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lands since June 12, 1945. The tax declarations are
insufficient to prove such fact.

The Court ruled that a positive act of the government (an official proclamation declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural and other purposes) declaring lands as alienable and disposable is required. Sec. 8 of CA 141
limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been “officially delimited and classified.

Phil. Bill of 1902 and Proclamation 1801 did not convert Boracay Island into an agricultural land. Thus, it remained
unclassified land of the public domain and under the Regalian Doctrine, it is considered property of the State.

Mateo Carino vs. Insular Government

(212 US 449, 594)

Facts
Mateo Cariño, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 50 years before the 1898 Treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had
held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and
maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to
Igorot custom. No title was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish
occupation, but to no avail. In 1901, he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory
title.

The Insular Government argued that the State remains the owner of the land Cariño occupies, as the US became the legal
successor of the Spanish Crown (after the 1898 Treaty of Paris took effect). Invoking the Regalian doctrine, it reasoned that
since the land Cariño occupies is a public land, the government is still the land’s absolute owner.

The Philippine Supreme Court ruled earlier in favor of the Insular Government (in Mateo Carino vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil.
132), that Cariño is not deemed as owner of the land in his possession because Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant, because one has lived upon that land for many years and the land
was never used for anything but pasturage of animals. Thus, since the land was classified as public land, the State is the
absolute owner of the land Cariño occupies.
Thus, the case was elevated to the US Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not Mateo Cariño is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for a long time?

Ruling of the US Supreme Court

The US Supreme Court REVERSED the ruling of the (Philippine) Supreme Court, stating that Carino is entitled to register the
land that he occupies. Thus, every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and
against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently-enacted
registration act. The US Supreme Court ruled although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1902
of the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property
in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago. The US Supreme
Court also quoted the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 (cited in 3 Phil. 546): “Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.”

It reasoned that “the acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants,
and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the
benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with
certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law. The Organic Act of the
Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards
to all.”

Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915

Facts
A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is
registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in
favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of
the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where
two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will
prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

Amelita Dolfo vs. Registry of Deeds of Cavite

25 September 2000

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The petition of Amelita Dolfo is DENIED and the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Land Registration – The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of
ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

In the present case, petitioner Amelita Dolfo anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is
indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the
evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report dated May 24, 1996[14] that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal
basis and the NBI report dated June 20, 1996[15] that the signature of Antonia Cabuco was a forgery. Although she submitted
documents purporting to show the genuineness of Antonia Cabuco's signature, she has not refuted the findings contained in
the LRA report that her certificate of title has no legal basis.

Thus, in its report, the LRA stated: “Verification conducted in the Registry of Deeds of Cavite Province on 21 May 1996
disclosed that there is no document on file in the registry vault to support the issuance of TCT No.T-320601 in favor of Amelita
Dolfo. Even the Primary Entry Book for Act 496 under the date 18 November 1991 does not indicate that a document was
presented for registration in favor of Amelita Dolfo affecting TCT No. 11520 which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. T-
320601. Instead, page 232 of the Primary Entry Book, Volume 47 (Annex "B") shows that under the date - 18 November 1991
there appears no document entered therein at 11:05 a.m. in favor of Amelita Dolfo or in her behalf affecting the parcel of land
described in TCT No. T-320601.”

Thus, Amelita Dolfo cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does
not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as she argues,
that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true
that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.

CHAPTER III

Natividad Victoria vs Republic and the Hon. C.A., 8 June 2011.

Facts
Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied to have a 1,729-square meter lot (Lot 5176-D, Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral
Mapping) in Bambang, Taguig registered in her name on 2 November 2004 before MeTC Taguig City. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which represents Republic of the Philippines, opposed her application.

Victoria testified and offered documentary evidence showing the subject lot is a portion of a 17,507-sq. m. parcel of land
originally owned by her father Genaro Sta. Ana and previously declared in his name for tax purposes. Upon her father’s death,
Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and divided it via a deed of partition among themselves.

The Conversion/Subdivision Plan that Victoria submitted as documentary evidence showed that the land is inside the
alienable and disposable area certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on 3 January 1968 (under Project 27-B as per L.C.
Map 2623). She also testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest possessed that property continuously, uninterruptedly,
openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s (or for more than 30 years) and have been
declared as owners for taxation purposes. The Republic did not present any evidence in support of its opposition.

The MeTC Taguig City granted Victoria’s application via its 25 January 2006 decision, finding that Victoria sufficiently
established her claim and right under the land registration law to have the property registered in her name.

The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), as they pointed out that Victoria failed to: first,
establish continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession in the concept of owner; second, the subject property is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The CA reversed and set aside the judgment of MeTC Taguig via its 19 June 2007 decision. The Appellate Court upheld the
second argument/point of the OSG, as Victoria failed proving the property as alienable and disposable land. They said that she
could not rely on the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan submitted before the MeTC.

Issues
1. Whether Natividad Victoria amply proved the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain?
2. Whether she has amply proved her claim of ownership?

Legal Provisions
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for registration of title: (a) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Held and Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court upheld the MeTC Taguig City’s decision and granted Natividad Victoria’s petition. The Court ruled that
Victoria was able to establish continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession in the concept of owner since the
early 1940’s. More so, she has also submitted tax declarations way back in 1948 in her father’s name covering the said land,
contrary to the OSG’s contention.

Moreover, the Court said that to prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Land’s investigators; and a legislative act or statute.

The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the
certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification
of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.

The Court also ruled that the certification obtained by Victoria from the DENR CENRO declared the land to be alienable and
disposable.