[ G . R . No . 124360 .

December 3 , 1997 ] paragraph

FRANCISCO S . TATAD , petitioner , vs . THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE , respondents
. paragraph

PUNO , J . :

FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases:
(a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997
through EO No. 372).

Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and
the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of
crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power,
and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF
fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.

HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No.
8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation.

Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President—he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning

to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight
by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow
faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or
addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET

AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and
HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos
issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of
the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638
was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the
pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was
not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the
wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to
overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in
this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its
publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB
16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition
of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices
on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential
treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect
asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be
repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA
are declared valid and subsisting.
G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009

APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board,
provincial mining regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED
SMALL SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE
COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS
COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-BATO GOLD MINERS
COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS GALANG, RENATO
BASMILLO, FRANCISCO YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION, MACARIO
HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY ESPORTONO,
ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN, LETICIA
ALQUEZA and JOEL BRILLANTES Management Mining Corporation, Respondents.

Facts:The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area” (Diwalwal), a rich tract of
mineral landlocated inside the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao del Norte
and Davao Oriental. Sincethe early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed by conflicts
brought about by numerous mining claims over it.On March 10, 1986, Marcopper
Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A long battle ensued between Apex andMMC
with the latter seeking the cancellation of the mining claims of Apex on the ground that
suchmining claims were within a forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve) and thus theacquisition on mining rights should have been through an
application for a permit to prospect with theBFD and not through registration of a DOL
with the BMG. When it reached the SC in 1991, the Courtruled against Apex holding that
the area is a forest reserve and thus it should have applied for a permit to prospect with
the BFD.On February 16 1994,MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast
Mindanao GoldMining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to
be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEM’s Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment. Several
oppositions were filed. The Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity
of EP 133.
During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No. 2002-18 was issued declaring
anemergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the
stoppage of all miningoperations therein.
Issues:
1. W/N EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid.
2.W/N the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the
areascovered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and
open to small-scale mining purposes.

INVALID. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: “That this permit shall
be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized
agents and shall be used for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other
purpose.” While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there
is no showing that the former is the duly authorizedagent of the latter. As such,
theassignment is null and void
as it directly contravenes the termsand conditions of the grant of EP 133.
a.

The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMC’s rights over the permit.
It is not amere grant of authority to SEM as agent. b.

Reason for the stipulation.

Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or
individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. With
out such acondition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict
requirementsunder the law by the simple expediency of acquiring the permit from the
original permittee.c.

Separate personality.
The fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC does notautomatically make it an
agent of MMC. A corporation is an artificial being invested by lawwith a personality
separate and distinct from persons composing it as well as from that of anyother legal
entity to which it may be related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is
aseparate and distinct entity from MMC.d.

Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil inapplicable.

Only in cases where the corporatefiction was used as a shield for fraud, illegality or
inequity may the veil be pierced andremoved. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
cannot therefore be used as a vehicle tocommit prohibited acts. The assignment of the
permit in favor of SEM is utilized tocircumvent the condition of nontransferability of the
exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to approve the
validity of the assignment is tantamount tosanctioning an illegal act which is what the
doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.e.

PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR.

Also, PD 463 (Mineral ResourcesDevelopment Decree), which is the governing law
when the assignment was executed,explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of
mining rights, including the right toexplore a mining area, must be with the prior
approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case.f.

EP 133 expired by non-renewal.

Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months until July 6,1994, MMC never renewed its
permit prior and after its expiration.With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994,
MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold RushArea. SEM, on the other hand, has
not acquired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is
invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired any vested rightover the area
covered by EP 133.2.

NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest
reserves. Such power is
vested with the President. The DENR Secretary may only recommend to the Presidentwh
ich forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No.
66 isnull and void for having been issued in excess of the DENR Secretary’s authority.3.
(Since it’s been held that neither MMC nor SEM has any right over Diwalwal, it is
thusnecessary to make a
determination
of the existing right of the remaining claimants,
petitioners Apex and Balite, in the dispute.)

The issue on who has priority right over Diwalwal is deemedovertaken by the issuance of
Proclamation 297 and DAO No. 2002-18, both beingconstitutionally-sanctioned acts of
the Executive Branch
. Mining operations in the DiwalwalMineral Reservation are now,
therefore, within the full control of the State through theexecutive
branch.
Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either: (1) directly undertake
theexploration, development and utilization of the area or (2) opt to award mining
operations in themineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and
Balite, if it wishes. Theexercise of this prerogative lies with the Executive Department
over which courts will notinterfere.
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners,

vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor, Department of
Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE HONORABLE
LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners, who were civilians, were charged before Military Commission No. 1
with murder and unlawful possession of a pistol. They were acquitted. Two informations
for illegal possession of a firearm and murder were filed against petitioners in the
Regional Trial Court on the basis of the claim of the government that the proceedings
before the military commission were void, since it had no jurisdiction over civilians.

Issue: Whether or not General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No.
9

HELD: The decision nullifying the proceedings in military commissions against civilians
cannot adversely affect petitioners, who were not parties to the case. To apply the ruling
to them will violate their right to due process. In the interest of justice, the decision
should be applied prospectively to future cases and cases where no final decision had
been rendered. It will be a cruel distortion of the decision to reprosecute civilians who
have been acquitted. The trial of civilians by military commission is an operative fact
that may not be justly ignored. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects petitioner from
a second prosecution. To deprive them of the protection of the judgment of acquittal by
retroactively divesting the military commission of its jurisdiction over them will amount
to anex post facto ruling.
N THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY

INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

A. M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippine
sheld on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center, the newly-
elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4,1989 before the Supreme
Courten banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by somemembers
of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in theproceedings and
the adverse comments published in the columns of some news papers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys
NereoPaculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government
planes,and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all
of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the
Supreme Court en banc

, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. Media
reports done by Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and Mr. Locsin
inthe newspapers opened the avenue for investigation on the anomalies in the IBPElectio
ns.

The following violations are,

Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of v o t e s b y t h e c a n d i d a t e s f o r p r
e s i d e n t , e x e c u t i v e v i c e - p r e s i d e n t , t h e o f f i c e r s o r candidates for the
House of Delegates and Board of Governors, Use of PNB plane
int h e c a m p a i g n , G i v i n g f r e e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o o u t - o f -
t o w n d e l e g a t e s a n d a l t e r n a t e s , Formation of tickets and single slates, Giving free
hotel accommodations, food, drinks,and entertainment to delegates
,
Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
,
Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP
B Y - L a w s ) , Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one
page of legal sizesheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws), Causing distribution of
such statement to bedone by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election(Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws) and Inducing or influencing a
member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e],
IBP BY-Laws).
The prohibited acts areagainst the IBP By-Laws more specifically Article I,
Section 4 of the IBP By-Lawsemphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections and
Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: Any
violation of the rulesgoverning elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined inSection 14 [Prohibited Acts and Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of
theIntegrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his
removalfrom office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any
erringmember pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated
Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

Held: It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of
seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to
participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much
interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be
inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress
upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to
restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate,
expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently
concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished
the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession,
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto
Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Facts:

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A.

No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom
and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending
that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under
Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority
to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy
Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.
Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the
position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the “law”
contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as
R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the
City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered
that the case be quashed.

Issue:

whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely

abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari

Held:

Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite
obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The
intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly
than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed
to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of
LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI
No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President
Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted
by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62
SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of the law of the land,
and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the
exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D.
No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both
continue to have the force and effect of law.

Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of

instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
PRUDENTIAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.

Facts: Prudential Bank (Complainant Bank) instituted this administrative case on April
11, 1985, praying this Court to investigate Respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, presiding
over Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City,
(Respondent Judge), and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia (Respondent Grecia), in connection
with their actuations in a civil case (the RTC CASE), tried and decided by Respondent
Judge and where plaintiff was represented by Respondent Grecia. What has been prayed
for by Complainant Bank is the exercise by this Court of its power to discipline
Respondent Judge, and the initiation of proceedings for the disbarment or suspension of
Respondent Grecia.

Issue: Whether or not The Court’s decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks c
ertification by the CJ that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court

Held: As to CJ Teehankee’s voluntary inhibition. Petition denied for lack of legal and
factual basis. After a member has given anopinion on the merits of a given case, he may
not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings because a litigantcannot be
permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort
after decision has already been rendered. It should be made of record that at no time
during the deliberations on the case did the CJ show any ill willnor any sign of
vindictiveness much less any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against Grecia.
As to the lack of certification. This requirement is only present in judicial
decisions, not in administrative cases, like a disbarment proceeding. Even if such
certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its
decision werearrived at after consultation and deliberations and voted attest to that.
G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745 September 17, 2009

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch XVIII;
TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; PROVINCE OF BATANGAS; MUNICIPALITY
OF LAUREL, BATANGAS; and MUNICIPALITY OF TALISAY, BATANGAS, Respondents.

FACTS:

Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two parcels of
land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. For
failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay
offered the properties for sale at a public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was
executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the
properties . The City of Tagaytay filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in
its favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC
appealed to the CA. The subject properties were later purchased by Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera and
Emiliana Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to
the same. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for
nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties
were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority. On the
other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter, said properties are within its
territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.

ISSUE:

WON the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on the subject
properties

HELD:

YES. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the failure of the city
officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same
constitutes gross negligence. The negligence of its officers in the performance of their official
functions gives rise to a an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the necessary and natural consequences of the negligent
acts of its city officials. It is liable for the tortious acts committed by its agents who sold the properties
to the Melencios despite the clear mandate of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan from its
jurisdiction and transferring the same to the Province of Batangas. Decision affirmed with
modification.
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a
diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the Court en banc
had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of
income tax.

HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be
decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be
subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be
subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983

BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL
WARDEN OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL,respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Facts: Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the
same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within
which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz,
Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a
memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision,
his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the
decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court can
no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day
period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus, the
lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.

HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of
last day of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-
month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the
case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of
rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz
was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was
merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not
serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.

Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?

Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of this
constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12
months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme
Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely
directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as
mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned
lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal
construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.