NAVA
If the intention of the framers of
v.
GATMAITAN
G.R. No. L-4855|11 October 1951
FACTS:
On 22 October 1950, the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
decreed by virtue of the following Proclamation
No. 210 issued by President ElpidioQuirino. The
immediate cause for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 210, was theapprehension
and detention of lawless elements in whose
possession strong andconvincing evidence was
allegedly found showing that they are engaged
in rebellious,seditious and otherwise subversive
acts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, a person covered by
Proclamation No. 210 which has beenformally
charged with rebellion with multiple murder,
arson and robberies, may beentitled to bail.
RULING:
Yes.
Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the
1935 Constitution,“all persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong.”
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
certainlynot a capital offense, because it is
penalized only by prision mayor and a fine
not to exceedPhp20,000.00. The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail
guaranteedunder the Bill of Rights are separate
and co-equal.
theConstitution was that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carriesor
implies the suspension of the right to bail, they
would have very easily provided thatall persons
shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those chargedwith capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and
except when the privilege ofthe writ of habeas
corpus is suspended.The right to bail; along
with the right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel;to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
to have a speedyand public trial; to meet the
witnesses face to face; and to have compulsory
process tosecure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf, tends to aid the accused to prove
hisinnocence and obtain acquittal. If it be
contended that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus includes the
suspension of the distinct right to bail or to
beprovisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori
imply the suspension of all his other
rights(even the rights to be tried by a court)
that may win for him ultimate acquittal and,
hence,absolute freedom. The latter result is not
insisted upon for being patently untenable.
Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
GR Number 188550
Petition: Petition for Review
Petitioner: Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Ponente: Sereno, C. J.
Date: August 28, 2013
Facts:
Pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1997, on October 21, 2003, the petitioner
remitted to the respondent the amount of Php
67,688,553.51, representing fifteen (15) percent
of the branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its
regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted
to the Deutsche Bank of Germany (DB
Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.
Believing that they made an overpayment of the
BPRT, on October 4, 2005, the petitioner filed
with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and
Investigation Division an administrative claim
for refund or a tax credit certificate representing
the alleged excess BPRT paid (amount of Php
22,562,851.17). The petitioners also requested
from the International Tax Affairs Division
(ITAD) for a confirmation of its entitlement to a
preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty.
Because of the alleged inaction of the BIR on
the administrative claim, on October 18, 2005,
the petitioner filed a petition for review with the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), reiterating its
claim for refund or tax credit certificate
representing the alleged excess BPRT paid. The
claim was denied on the ground that application
for tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD
prior to the payment of BPRT, thereby violating
the fifteen-day period mandated under Section
III, paragraph 2 of the Revenue Memorandum
Order No. 1-2000. Also, the CTA Second
Division relied on an en banc decision of the
CTA that before the benefits of a tax treaty may
be extended to a foreign corporation, the latter
should first invoke the provisions of the tax
treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the
corporation (Mirant Operations Corporation v
Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to strictly comply
with the provisions of RMO No. 1-2000 will
deprive persons or corporations the benefit of a
tax treaty.
Ruling:
No. The constitution provides for the adherence
to the general principles of international law as
part of the law of the land (Article II, Section
2).Every treaty is binding upon the parties, and
obligations must be performed (Article 26,
Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties).
There is nothing in RMO 1-2000 indicating a
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty for
failure to comply with the fifteen-day period.
The denial of availment of tax relief for the
failure to apply within the prescribed period
(under the administrative issuance) would impair
the value of the tax treaty. Also, the obligation to
comply with the tax treaty must take precedence
over the objective of RMO 1-2000 because the
non-compliance with tax treaties would have
negative implications on international affairs and
would discourage foreign investments.
Dispositive:
The petition was granted, the CTA en banc
decision was set aside and reversed.The
respondent was ordered to refund or issue a tax
credit certificate (the amount of Php
22,562,851.17) in favor of the petitioner.
BROWN.v.BOARDOFEDUCATIONOFTOPEKA
347U.S.483| 17 May 1954.
FACTS:Several black children, through their
legal representatives, sought admission to
public schools that required or permitted
segregation based on race. They alleged that
segregation was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Petitioners contended that
segregated schools were not and could not be
made equal and that they were therefore
deprived of equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE:Is the race-based segregation of children

into “separate but equal” public schools
constitutional?

RULING: No. The race-based segregation of

children into “separate but equal” public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and is
unconstitutional.

Segregation of children in the public schools

solely on the basis of race denies to black
children the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
even though the physical facilities and other
may be equal. Education in public schools is a
right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.

Separating black children from others solely

because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of
segregation is greater when it has the sanction
of law. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law tends to impede the
educational and mental development of black
children and deprives them of some of the
benefits they would receive in an integrated
school system.
 JANE ROE v. HENRY WADE
410 U.S. 113|22 January 1973
FACTS:Petitioner Jane Roe sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction
to prevent defendant District Attorney Henry
Wade from enforcing the statutes. Petitioner
alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant,
and that she was unable to receive a legal
abortion by a licensed physician because her life
was not threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to
travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal
abortion. Petitioner sued on behalf of herself
and all other women similarly situated, claiming
that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague
and abridged her right of personal privacy.
ISSUE: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade
a right possessed by the appellant to terminate
her pregnancy embodied in the concept of
personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the
personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras,
or among the rights reserved to the people by
the Ninth Amendment?
RULING:The Court finds that an abortion
statute that forbids all abortions except in the
case of a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the
mother is unconstitutional based upon the right
to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation
and proscription of abortion when the statute is
narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state
interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The right to personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but the right is
not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.The
Court, however, declined to address the
question of when life begins.
Three reasons have been advanced for the
historical enactment of criminal abortion laws.
The first is that the laws are the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit
sexual conduct, but this argument has been
taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the
abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the
State’s concern is to protect pregnant women.
However, modern medical techniques have
altered the situation, with abortions being
relatively safe particularly in the first trimester.
The third reason is the State’s interest is in
protecting the prenatal life. However, this is
somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the
act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of
the first trimester, the abortion decision must
be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman’s attending physician and may not be
criminalized by statute. For the stage
subsequent to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the State may regulate abortion in
ways reasonably related to maternal health
based upon the State’s interest in promoting
the health of the mother. For the stage
subsequent to viability, the State may regulate
and even proscribe abortion, except where
necessary for the preservation of the mother’s
life, based upon the State’s interest in the
potential of the potential life of the unborn
child.
 DEUTSCHE BANK AG v.COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 188550|19 August 2013
FACTS: On 21 October 2003, petitioner withheld
and remitted to respondent Php67,688,553.51,
which represented the 15% branch profit
remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking
unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche
Bank Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior
taxable years in accordance with the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC),
On 4 October 2005, believing that it made an
overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with
the BIR an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate in the
amount of Php22,562,851.17. Petitioner also
requested a confirmation of its entitlement to
the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty.
Alleging the inaction of the BIR, petitioner filed
a Petition for Review with the CTA on 18
October 2005.
After trial on the merits, the CTA denied the
claim of petitioner for a refund on the ground
that the application for a tax treaty relief was
not filed with the BIR prior to the payment of
the BPRT and actual remittance of its branch
profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment
of the preferential rate of 10% under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty. The CTA also held that
petitioner violated the 15 day period mandated
under Section III paragraph (2) of Revenue
Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000.
ISSUES: Whether the failure to strictly comply
with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or
corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.
RULING: No. The constitution provides for the
adherence to the general principles of
international law as part of the law of the land
(Article II, Section 2). Every treaty is binding
upon the parties, and obligations must be
performed (Article 26, Vienna Convention on
the Law on Treaties). There is nothing in RMO 1-
2000 indicating a deprivation of entitlement to
a tax treaty for failure to comply with the
fifteen-day period. The denial of availment of
tax relief for the failure to apply within the
prescribed period (under the administrative
issuance) would impair the value of the tax
treaty. Also, the obligation to comply with the
tax treaty must take precedence over the
objective of RMO 1-2000 because the non-
compliance with tax treaties would have
negative implications on international affairs
and would discourage foreign investments.
The petition isGRANTED, the CTA decision was
SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The respondent was
ordered to refund or issue a tax credit
certificate in favor of the petitioner.
ARTICLES 4 AND 5
PEOPLE VS CASIO (G.R. NO.
211465 DECEMBER 3, 2014)
People of the Philippines vs Casio
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission
(IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated
with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in
human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George
Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe
Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo
Veloso composed the team of police operatives,
Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys,
pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to
entertain their guests. IJM provided them with
marked money, which was recorded in the police
blotter. The team went to Queensland Motel and
rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for
the rest of the police team. PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the
accused noticed them and called their attention.
Negotiation occured and upon the signal, the accused
was arrested and the two minors were taken into
custody by the DSWD officials.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking
of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the
elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring,
providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or
use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person,
or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were
recruited by accused when their services were
peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was
a child at the time that accused peddled
her services.66 to work as a prostitute because she
needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed
Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a
child and as one who need money, as proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense
under Republic Act No. 9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring,
adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any
form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall
also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if
it does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified
trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in
Persons.— The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
1. When the trafficked person is a child;
2. When the adoption is effected through
Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as
the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”
and said adoption is for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation,forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a
syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group;
4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent,
sibling, guardian or a person who exercise
authority over the trafficked person or when
the offense is committed by a public officer
or employee;
5. When the trafficked person is recruited to
engage in prostitution with any member of
the military or law enforcement agencies;
6. When the offender is a member of the
military or law enforcement agencies; and
7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of
trafficking in persons, the offended party
dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency
Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
People V. Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of
August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro
Dionisio, a person who is not duly
authorized in any capacity by the Games
and Amusement Board to conduct a
horse race, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect
bets for the Special Daily Double Race
being then conducted at the Sta. Ana
Racing Club at Makati and for that
purpose has in possession the cash
amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing
Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list
of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of
Daily Double receipt. He was thereby
charged in violation of Republic Act No.
3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty
applied to his offense infringes the
Constitutional provision that “Excessive
fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III
Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution of
the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor
imprisonment constitute in themselves
cruel and unusual punishment, for the
Constitutional structure has been
interpreted as referring to penalties
that are inhumane and barbarous, or
shocking to the conscience and fines or
imprisonment are definitely not in this
category. Nor does mere severity
constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
“The Social Scourge of Gambling must
be stamped out. The laws against
gambling must be enforced to the limit.”
(Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)
Articles 6-7
Aurora Land Project Corp vs. NLRC and Dagui
GR No 114733, 02.01.1997
By Richard Troy A. Colmenares
USA College of Law
6/17/14 10:24:23 AM
Nature of the Case
A petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC
decision which modified petitioner’s liability for
separation pay and attorneys fees as ruled by
the labor arbiter.
Facts
Private respondent worked as maintenance and
repairs man for almost 40 years in the
apartments and buildings owned by petitioner.
The daughter of the owner, the petitioner,
alleged that his work was unsatisfactory and so
dismissed private respondent. Private
respondent filed a complaint of illegal dismissal
to the labor arbiter, who in turn ruled in favor
of private respondent for separation pay and
attorneys fees. Petitioner appealed before the
NLRC which affirmed the decision of labor
arbiter, but lowered the separation pay and
deleted the attorney’s fees. Petitioners thus
filed petition for certiorari implicating NLRC
with grave abuse of discretion for four reasons.
Issue(s)
(1). Whether private respondent is an
employee petitioner?
(2). Whether private respondent has been
illegally dismissed?
Held
(1). Yes. In fact, private respondent is a regular
employee.
The Court, consistent with the labor arbiter
and NLRC’s ruling, is not convinced that
private respondent is only a contractual
employee. To qualify as a contractual one
employee, one must have substantial capital
investment (Sec.8, Rule VIII, Book III of the IRR
of the Labor Code). Petitioners showed no proof
that private respondent was a contractual
employee. The same ruling based on fact is
within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and
NLRC.
All the elements of the four-fold test in
identifying employer-employee relationship
(E2e; power to hire, payment of wages, power
to fire, and power of control over conduct of
employee) are present in the instant case. The
fact the private respondent was paid on a daily
basis admits that he is an employee process. The mandatory notice of hearing and
compensated by way of wages and not by notice of dismissal was absent in the instant
profit. The petitioner had indeed the power of case, making private respondent an illegally
dismissal over private respondent. dismissed employee.

The mere existence of the power of control is To correct is the plain error committed by
enough to show its compliance with the four- the labor arbiter and NLRC by not awarding
fold test. This is the case with petitioner and the backwages. The Court relaxes strict
same is not negated by the fact the petitioner construction of procedural requirements
does not directly supervise the performance of (private respondent’s failure to appeal for
the private respondent. He works between 7AM backwages) in pursuit of justice. Thus, the
to 4PM within the premises of the petitioner, decision of the labor arbiter and NLRC are
and thus, naturally has to receive supervision modified to include backwages reckoning from
over his work from the petitioner. There are the time private was re-employed until the day
two ways to determine a regular employee, and he was illegally dismissed, as well as other
whichever is applied does not negate the fact benefits entitled to him by law.
that private respondent is a regular employee
by definition - “an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer” and that
“any employee who has rendered at least
one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a
regular employee” (Art. 280, Labor Code).

The petitioners contest that private respondent

is not a regular employee by reason that he
performs a specific job function and only while
the same exists, falling as an exception 1 to Art.
280. The same argument is disproved by
petitioners act of not submitting a mandatory
“report of termination” for their alleged project
employee, private respondent.

(2). Yes.

Due process requires the right to be heard and

to defend himself with the option of counsel,
noted as procedural and substantive due