NAVA
speedyand public trial; to meet the witnesses face to face; and to have compulsory
v.
GATMAITAN
G.R. No. L-4855|11 October 1951
FACTS:
On 22 October 1950, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was decreed by virtue of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by
President ElpidioQuirino. The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No.
210, was theapprehension and detention of lawless elements in whose possession
strong andconvincing evidence was allegedly found showing that they are engaged
in rebellious,seditious and otherwise subversive acts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 which has beenformally
charged with rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies, may beentitled to
bail.
RULING:
Yes.
Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the 1935 Constitution,“all persons shall
before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.”
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainlynot a capital offense, because it is
penalized only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceedPhp20,000.00. The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteedunder the Bill
of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of
theConstitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus carriesor implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have
very easily provided thatall persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those chargedwith capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong
and except when the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus is suspended.The right to
bail; along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel;to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to have a
process tosecure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, tends to aid the accused
to prove hisinnocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct
right to bail or to beprovisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension
of all his other rights(even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for him
ultimate acquittal and, hence,absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted
upon for being patently untenable.
Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
GR Number 188550
Petition: Petition for Review
Petitioner: Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Ponente: Sereno, C. J.
Date: August 28, 2013
Facts:
Pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, on October 21, 2003, the
petitioner remitted to the respondent the amount of Php 67,688,553.51, representing
fifteen (15) percent of the branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking
unit (RBU) net income remitted to the Deutsche Bank of Germany (DB Germany)
for 2002 and prior taxable years.
Believing that they made an overpayment of the BPRT, on October 4, 2005, the
petitioner filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation Division
an administrative claim for refund or a tax credit certificate representing the alleged
excess BPRT paid (amount of Php 22,562,851.17). The petitioners also requested
from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) for a confirmation of its
entitlement to a preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Because of the alleged inaction of the BIR on the administrative claim, on October
18, 2005, the petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), reiterating its claim for refund or tax credit certificate representing the
alleged excess BPRT paid. The claim was denied on the ground that application for
tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment of BPRT, thereby
violating the fifteen-day period mandated under Section III, paragraph 2 of the
Revenue Memorandum Order No. 1-2000. Also, the CTA Second Division relied on
an en banc decision of the CTA that before the benefits of a tax treaty may be
extended to a foreign corporation, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the
tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation (Mirant Operations
Corporation v Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
Hence this petition.
and could not be made equal and that they were therefore deprived of equal
protection of the laws.
ISSUE:Is the race-based segregation of children into “separate but equal” public
schools constitutional?
RULING: No. The race-based segregation of children into “separate but equal”
public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and is unconstitutional.

Issue: Segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies to
black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with the provisions of RMO No. 1-2000 Amendment, even though the physical facilities and other may be equal. Education
will deprive persons or corporations the benefit of a tax treaty. in public schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

Ruling: Separating black children from others solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
No. The constitution provides for the adherence to the general principles of and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater
international law as part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 2).Every treaty is when it has the sanction of law. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
binding upon the parties, and obligations must be performed (Article 26, Vienna child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law tends to impede the educational
Convention on the Law on Treaties). There is nothing in RMO 1-2000 indicating a and mental development of black children and deprives them of some of the
benefits they would receive in an integrated school system.
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty for failure to comply with the fifteen-day
period. The denial of availment of tax relief for the failure to apply within the
prescribed period (under the administrative issuance) would impair the value of the
tax treaty. Also, the obligation to comply with the tax treaty must take precedence
over the objective of RMO 1-2000 because the non-compliance with tax treaties
would have negative implications on international affairs and would discourage
foreign investments.

Dispositive:

The petition was granted, the CTA en banc decision was set aside and reversed.The
respondent was ordered to refund or issue a tax credit certificate (the amount of Php
22,562,851.17) in favor of the petitioner.

BROWN.v.BOARDOFEDUCATIONOFTOPEKA
347U.S.483| 17 May 1954.

FACTS:Several black children, through their legal representatives, sought admission

to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on race. They alleged
that segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners contended that segregated schools were not
 JANE ROE v. HENRY WADE
410 U.S. 113|22 January 1973
FACTS:Petitioner Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant District
Attorney Henry Wade from enforcing the statutes. Petitioner alleged that she was
unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a
licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to
obtain a legal abortion. Petitioner sued on behalf of herself and all other women
similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and
abridged her right of personal privacy.
ISSUE: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial,
and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the
rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
RULING:The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in
the case of a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based
upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of
abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest,
such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The right to personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.The Court, however,
declined to address the question of when life begins.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion
laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by
neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure
is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However,
modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being
relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the
fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician and may not be criminalized by statute. For the stage subsequent to the
approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways
reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting
the health of the mother. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may
regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation
of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential
life of the unborn child.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 188550|19 August 2013
FACTS: On 21 October 2003, petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent
Php67,688,553.51, which represented the 15% branch profit remittance tax (BPRT)
on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany
(DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years in accordance with the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC),
On 4 October 2005, believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner
filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit
certificate in the amount of Php22,562,851.17. Petitioner also requested a
confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty.
Alleging the inaction of the BIR, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA
on 18 October 2005.
After trial on the merits, the CTA denied the claim of petitioner for a refund on the
ground that the application for a tax treaty relief was not filed with the BIR prior to
the payment of the BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany,
or prior to its availment of the preferential rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty. The CTA also held that petitioner violated the 15 day period mandated under
Section III paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000.
ISSUES: Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive
persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.
RULING: No. The constitution provides for the adherence to the general principles
of international law as part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 2). Every treaty
is binding upon the parties, and obligations must be performed (Article 26, Vienna
Convention on the Law on Treaties). There is nothing in RMO 1-2000 indicating a
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty for failure to comply with the fifteen-day
period. The denial of availment of tax relief for the failure to apply within the
prescribed period (under the administrative issuance) would impair the value of the
tax treaty. Also, the obligation to comply with the tax treaty must take precedence
over the objective of RMO 1-2000 because the non-compliance with tax treaties
would have negative implications on international affairs and would discourage
foreign investments.
The petition isGRANTED, the CTA decision was SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The
respondent was ordered to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in favor of the
petitioner.
ARTICLES 4 AND 5
PEOPLE VS CASIO (G.R. NO. 211465 DECEMBER 3, 2014)
People of the Philippines vs Casio
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental
organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in
human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino
Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as
decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM
provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter. The
team went to Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team.
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the accused noticed them and called
their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the signal, the accused was arrested
and the two minors were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons
have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when
their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at
the time that accused peddled her services.66 to work as a prostitute because she
needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s
vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of
the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child
for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in
persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in
Persons.— The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
1. When the trafficked person is a child;
2. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise
known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for
the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group;
4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person
who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is
committed by a public officer or employee;
5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any
member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
 6. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
and
7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the
offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
People V. Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro
Dionisio, a person who is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games
and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for the Special Daily Double
Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati and for that
purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing
Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet
of Daily Double receipt. He was thereby charged in violation of Republic Act
No. 3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes the
Constitutional provision that “Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19, of the
Constitution of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel
and unusual punishment, for the Constitutional structure has been
interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, or
shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in
this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
“The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out. The laws against
gambling must be enforced to the limit.” (Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)
Articles 6-7
Aurora Land Project Corp vs. NLRC and Dagui
GR No 114733, 02.01.1997
By Richard Troy A. Colmenares
USA College of Law
6/17/14 10:24:23 AM
Nature of the Case
A petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC decision which modified
petitioner’s liability for separation pay and attorneys fees as ruled by the labor
arbiter.
Facts
Private respondent worked as maintenance and repairs man for almost 40 years in
the apartments and buildings owned by petitioner. The daughter of the owner, the
petitioner, alleged that his work was unsatisfactory and so dismissed private
respondent. Private respondent filed a complaint of illegal dismissal to the labor
arbiter, who in turn ruled in favor of private respondent for separation pay and
attorneys fees. Petitioner appealed before the NLRC which affirmed the decision of
labor arbiter, but lowered the separation pay and deleted the attorney’s fees.
Petitioners thus filed petition for certiorari implicating NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for four reasons.
Issue(s)
(1). Whether private respondent is an employee petitioner?
(2). Whether private respondent has been illegally dismissed?
Held
(1). Yes. In fact, private respondent is a regular employee.
The Court, consistent with the labor arbiter and NLRC’s ruling, is not
convinced that private respondent is only a contractual employee. To qualify as
a contractual one employee, one must have substantial capital investment (Sec.8,
Rule VIII, Book III of the IRR of the Labor Code). Petitioners showed no proof that
private respondent was a contractual employee. The same ruling based on fact is
within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and NLRC.
All the elements of the four-fold test in identifying employer-employee relationship
(E2e; power to hire, payment of wages, power to fire, and power of control over
conduct of employee) are present in the instant case. The fact the private
respondent was paid on a daily basis admits that he is an employee compensated by
way of wages and not by profit. The petitioner had indeed the power of dismissal
over private respondent.
 The mere existence of the power of control is enough to show its compliance with
the four-fold test. This is the case with petitioner and the same is not negated by the
fact the petitioner does not directly supervise the performance of the private
respondent. He works between 7AM to 4PM within the premises of the petitioner,
and thus, naturally has to receive supervision over his work from the petitioner.
There are two ways to determine a regular employee, and whichever is applied does
not negate the fact that private respondent is a regular employee by definition -
“an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer” and that “any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee” (Art. 280, Labor Code).
The petitioners contest that private respondent is not a regular employee by
reason that he performs a specific job function and only while the same exists,
falling as an exception 1 to Art. 280. The same argument is disproved by petitioners
act of not submitting a mandatory “report of termination” for their alleged project
employee, private respondent.
(2). Yes.
Due process requires the right to be heard and to defend himself with the option of
counsel, noted as procedural and substantive due process. The mandatory notice of
hearing and notice of dismissal was absent in the instant case, making private
respondent an illegally dismissed employee.
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting
to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police
power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism

To correct is the plain error committed by the labor arbiter and NLRC by not providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
awarding backwages. The Court relaxes strict construction of procedural protection of the Filipino workers.
requirements (private respondent’s failure to appeal for backwages) in pursuit
of justice. Thus, the decision of the labor arbiter and NLRC are modified to include
backwages reckoning from the time private was re-employed until the day he was
illegally dismissed, as well as other benefits entitled to him by law.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the
PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988] challenged Department Order No. 1.

Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid
 C A S E D I G E S T: L A C S O N V S . E X E C U T I V E
classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in S E C R E TA RY
a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their 9:45 PM
class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies
only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an 301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999

undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of Facts:
classification, provided that:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included
in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-

distinctions. out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended
not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal,
things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided
and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.
by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid
After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal charged only as an accessory.
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is
The accused filed separate motions questioning the
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
code vest the DOLE with rule making powers. the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have
been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-
post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members
of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is
too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all
cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which
is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not
a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws
of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed
into law RA 7227. This was for the conversion of former military bases into
challenged as unconstitutional.
industrial and commercial uses. Subic was one of these areas. It was made
into a special economic zone.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There
was also tax incentives and duty free importation policies under this law.
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. It
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the said that
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free importations shall apply
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was enterprises into the SSEZ
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties
On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to
not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No.
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense privilege was operative.
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former
his office was not established.
Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the
SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners)
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free.
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers,
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being
the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was due to the
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the entire area of Olongapo.
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
Sandiganbayan.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not
claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the
validity of RA 7227.
Tiu v Ca G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine
J. Panganiban the coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire
Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
Facts:
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application
of R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone
outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not owing to a violation of the
equal protection clause.
Held. No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ
encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in
Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.
However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval
base only.
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.
Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class.
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be
germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations
into productive uses. This was really limited to the military bases as the law's
intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked the BCDA to specifically develop
the areas the bases occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the
zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on
business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5)
liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident
status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives
and workers. The target of the law was the big investor who can pour in
capital.
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured
area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of
the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the
tax incentives in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require
territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material
differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause.
Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital
into it.
RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center”. There will really be differences
between it and the outside zone of Olongapo.
The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and
businesses in the zone. They are similarly treated to contribute to the end
gaol of the law.
Article 8
Binay v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 120681-83 October 1,
1999 Article III Section 16 – Right to speedy disposition of
cases
FACTS Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the
Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of Makati
for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’(RPC A220) and ‘Violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act’(RA 3019) on September 1994. The
informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by
the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.The petitioner
filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6
years constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due
process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance
pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB
issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash and
further the latter’s motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused ⠀˜pendente
lite’ (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and
claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension
was ordered even before he could file his reply to the
petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file
said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions
and order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975
redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so
much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his
cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no
jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and
suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution
denied the petitioner’s motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal
cases.
ISSUE (issue relevant to our discussion on Sec. 16) Whether or
not the petitioner’s€™ right to speedy disposition has been violated. “
HELD:
No. The Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the
subject cases. The prosecution is not bound by the findings of
the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own
independent judgment in the determination of probable cause.
Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review of
the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the
cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of
time for their resolution. Whether or not there is probable cause
to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best left
to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of
such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise
thereof. Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such
abuse on the part of the Ombudsman. The right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed,
and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of
speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.