1. Judge Baculi v.

Battung
Parties:

 Petitioner: Judge Rene Baculi

 Respondent: Atty. Melchor A. Battung
Case no: A.C. 8920
Facts: On July 24, 2008, during a hearing on the motion for reconsideration of a case, Atty. Mechor A.
Battung acted disrespectfully by shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Rene Baculi, had advised
respondent to tone down his voice but the respondent consistently kept shouting, even when he was warned
that he would be cited for direct contempt. After eventually being cited for direct contempt and was imposed
a fine of P100.00, the respondent left. However, while other cases were being heard, respondent re-entered
the court and shouted “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” He was
escorted out of the courtroom and was again cited for direct contempt for the second time. Battung also
uttered the same lines when he saw petitioner at the hall of the courthouse afterwards and even challenged
the latter to a fight. He was then escorted out of the building.
Charges: Complaint for Disbarment for violating Canons 11 and 12
Answer: Atty. Battung claimed it was Judge Baculi who shouted at him.
Recommendations of IBP: Based on the tape of the incident and the transcript of stenographic notes,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigative Commissioner Jose dela Rama, Jr. found that the
Battung was the one who shouted first at Judge Baculi.
The Commissioner further stated that the respondent failed to observe Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Melchor A. Battung is guilty of violating Rule 11.03,Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for insulting a judge in his courtroom
Decision of SC: YES. The Supreme Court agrees with the finding of the IBP that the respondent did violate
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By shouting at the petitioner, Atty.
Battung clearly disrespected the former in the presence of litigants and their counsels and court personnel.
Furthermore, the respondent even threatened the judge that he will file a case of gross ignorance
of the law against the latter. The respondent’s actions are found not only against the person, the position
and the stature of petitioner but also against the court whose proceedings were disrupted.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of Atty. Battung to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts.
A lawyer who insulted a judge inside a courtroom completely disregard’s the latter’s role, stature and
position in our justice system. Respects for the courts guarantee the stability of the judicial institution and
without such, the courts would be resting on very shaky foundations and will thus, lose the confidence from
the people. By threatening to a file a case against the judge, Atty. Battung seems to erode public confidence
in the petitioner’s competence. However, incompetence is a matter that, even if true, should be handled
with sensitivity in the manner that is provided under the Rules of Court, and not how the respondent handled
the situation.
CPR Violated: Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.

2. Chavez v. Viola
Parties:

 Petitioner: Teodoro I. Chavez

 Respondent: Atty. Escolastico R. Viola
Case no: A.C. 2152
Facts: In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a petition against Teodoro Chavez
where he sought to have Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. be declared as bona
fide lessees in a land controversy against Teodoro Chavez, Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz and Eugenio
dela Cruz in Barrio Baluarte, Bulacan. Said petition was dismissed because of nonappearance by the
Alvendias.
In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an original registration of title over the same land
in controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted that his clients were the true owners of said
land because they acquired it by sale from Teresita Vistan way back in 1929.
Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez. He said that because of the conflicting
claims that Viola prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit,
promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath
of office as a member of the Bar.
Charges: Disbarment of or other appropriate penalty upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola for gross
misconduct or malpractice
Answer: Viola alleged that the Application for Original Registration of Title was originally instituted by
one Atty. Montesclaro, and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance therein, respondent filed the
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title; that he believed his clients had the right to apply
for the registration of the land; and that assuming his clients did not in fact have any such right, the court
where the Application for Original Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this
complaint for disbarment was filed prematurely.
Recommendations of OSG: “In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his clients, i.e.,
the Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of the land in question.
However, respondent does not deny that he prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original
Registration of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the Alvendias are the owners
of the land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to why his
submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his allegations in the complaint in the earlier
Civil Case No. 3330-M that the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the same property.
It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in the land registration
case. As proven by complaint, respondent has willingly aided and consented in the filing and prosecution
of a groundless, if not false, application for land registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member
of the bar.”
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
Decision of SC: YES. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the
property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same
property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one. Worse, he offered no
explanation as regards the discrepancy.
A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards
the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Atty. Viola was
suspended for 5 months.
CPR Violated: Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

3. Paluwagan ng Bayan v. King

Parties:

 Petitioner: Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank

 Respondent: Angelo King (with Ken Suy Wat Jose Ferrer, Jr., Quintin Calderon, Fe Sarino and
Domingo K. Li)
Case no: G.R. 78252
Facts: Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private respondents, as directors and
officers of MFC, for the recovery of money market placements through certain promissory notes. They
were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5 which provides
as follows:
Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and
other persons.
Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents.
The law firm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion for extension of time to file a
responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss. The said motion was signed by Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones
as counsel for the defendants. The motion was granted giving the defendants an extension of 20 days from
the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the responsive pleading and/or motion to
dismiss. Said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of the action for a period of 60
days on the ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of the case between
the parties. The motion was denied. Counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in default for
failure to file an answer. This motion was granted.
The parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. A
decision was rendered by the trial court approving the said Compromise Agreement and enjoining the
parties to comply with the terms and conditions embodied therein. Upon failure of private respondent to
make the other payments, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The
trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification" thereby seeking a correction of the
compromise judgment on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all
the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. Such motion was denied.
Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and
Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set aside the decision, Compromise Agreement and writ of execution
on the ground that there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the
corporation was not their address as they were no longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones had no
authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were not served copies of
the decision of the court; that they learned about the same only when it was being executed; and that they
did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in (1) completely ignoring the basic question of whether the motion to
set aside the compromise agreement and quash execution were filed out of time and (2) ruling that the
respondents were not properly served with summons.
Decision of SC: NO. Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of
MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under
the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in that
summons must be served personally on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by
tendering it to them.
It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC and private respondents, sought
an extension of time to file an answer or a responsive pleading, and a suspension of the proceedings pending
a possible settlement of the case; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise Agreement in behalf of MFC and
private respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis of which a compromise judgment was
rendered; that said judgment was partially complied with but upon default in the payment of the balance, a
writ of execution was sought from and granted by the trial court; and that it was only then that Atty.
Aragones informed the court that he committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreement in
behalf of private respondents when it was only MFC which hired his services.
Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the performance of his responsibility as
counsel of record in said case. He represented himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the
private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the Compromise Agreement he submitted.
It was only after the writ of execution of the compromise judgment was being enforced that he perked up
by saying that he committed an oversight and that he was not authorized by the private respondents to
represent them as counsel, much less in the Compromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal
requirement of the practicing lawyer. To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a transgression of
this imperative. Counsel should be made to account before his peers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for an appropriate administrative investigation, report and recommendation on Atty. Guillermo
E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floor of the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.
CPR Violated: Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

4. Comelec v. Noynay
Parties:

 Petitioner: COMELEC
 Respondent: Hon. Tomas B. Noynay, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Allen, Northern Samar
Case no: G.R. 132365
Facts: In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain individuals for violations
of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by
Judge Tomas Noynay. Judge Noynay however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the said cases because said criminal offenses were punishable with less than six years
imprisonment. He said that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELEC’s legal department, filed a motion for reconsideration. He
cited a case entitled: “Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996
(245 SCRA 286)”. According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme Court has already
settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his motion.
Charges: Special civil action - public respondent “has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
election offenses”
Answer: Public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in
sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.
Recommendations of OSG: It is “adopting” the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders
of public respondent “are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.”
Issue: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
Decision of SC: NO. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the same
was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts except certain cases (which were not the cases filed by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine EXCEPT
otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a special law which provides that election
offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judge’s duty to be studious of the principles of law,
to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the
law, and to maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases. The Supreme Court
said that the passage cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the actual decision of the Supreme Court in
the said case cited but rather the memorandum of the court administrator which was quoted in the said case.
Further, his citation of “Naldeza vs Lavilles, Jr.” was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the
correct spelling was NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and
not 245 SCRA 286.
CPR Violated: Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.

5. Pepsi Cola v. CA
Parties:

 Petitioner: Pepsi Cola Products Phils. Inc.

 Respondent: Court of Appeals, Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr.
Case no: G.R. 122629
Facts: The case is a petition for review and certiorari by the petitioner upon the denial by the lower and
appellate court on their motion for reconsideration for the postponement of the hearing due to unavailability
of their witnesses and for declaring that the petitioner waived its right to present evidence in support to its
defense. The case began from the civil action filed by private respondents who won from the Pepsi Number
Fever Promotion" sponsored by petitioner Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., wherein numerous holders
of the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored and paid by petitioner due to an alleged mistake
in the security codes in the crowns.
From its inception, the case was fraught with cancellations of scheduled hearings by reasons of the absence
and/ or illness of the presiding Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. and the postponements sought by Pepsi. While
private respondents (SPS. Edgardo De Vera, Salvacion Locsin De Vera and Anna A. Locsin) commendably
finished the presentation of evidence on the scheduled dates of hearings. However, Pepsi has repeatedly
sought and was granted postponements due to unavailability of its witnesses.
With frequent postponement, the court issued a warning to the petitioner’s counsel that the scheduled
hearing on January 20, 1995 shall be intransferrable in character. Notwithstanding said warning, petitioner
moved for postponement again which motion was denied by the court for unreasonable delay on the case.
The court of appeals affirmed the said decision hence this petition for certiorari.
Charges: That Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders denying both petitioners Motion for Postponement and Motion
for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Hon. Marella, Jr. acted with grave abuse of discretion
Decision of SC: NO. A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, nd its action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the
absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. The records
would show that petitioner not only failed to allege and prove the materiality of the testimonies of its
witnesses, it even refused to make such an averment contending that the materiality of testimonies of its
witnesses can only be appreciated after they are presented in court.
It would not be amiss to point out that the case below was instituted in the trial court on or about June 11,
1992, and private respondents formally rested their case on February 5, 1993. Petitioner had already been
allowed several postponements due to unavailability of its witnesses and the case dragged on for a period
of almost two (2) years. Yet on the next scheduled hearing on January 20, 1995, petitioner brazenly sought
another postponement due to the absence of its witnesses who were then allegedly testifying in similar cases
elsewhere - a contingency which counsel could have easily foreseen and avoided by a careful scheduling
of the hearings of its witnesses. Petitioner blithely explained that it did not file a written Motion for
Postponement because it was hoping that even at the last hour, a witness would be available for that days
hearing.
How can petitioner make this preposterous claim when it knew fully well that its intended witness, Ms.
Valera was already in Iriga City even two (2) days before the hearing, and that Atty. Madarieta was likewise
in Iriga City on the day of the hearing itself, while Atty. de Jesus had a hearing on the same day in Pasig
City? The granting of a motion to postpone, especially one made on the day of the hearing itself, is
discretionary upon the courts and a litigant should not act on the assumption that it would be automatically
granted.
Counsel for petitioner has shown a reprehensible propensity for dilatory schemes which we have always
viewed with grave concern and utmost disfavor.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They
do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary,
especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations
that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
CPR Violated: Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.