ELECTION LAW BATCH 5

Rasul v Comelec (433)

FACTS:
Private respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta was proclaimed as the 12th winning candidate in the May 1998 senatorial elections.
Petitioner Santanina Rasul questioned the said proclamation. She argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when, acting as a National Board of Canvassers, it declared that the remaining
uncanvassed certificates would no longer affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the twelve (12) winning candidates. She
contends that if the number of registered voters who have yet to cast their votes where special elections have been suspended is
combined with the uncanvassed votes from other areas of the country, there is a possibility that the 12th ranking senatorial candidate,
Teresa Aquino-Oreta could be dislodged by the l3th placer, Roberto Pagdanganan. The petitioner submits that the inclusion of
Aquino-Oreta among the winning candidates was premature and based on incomplete canvass. Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court is proper remedy.
RULING:
NO. Where a senatorial candidate has already been proclaimed winner, the petitioner’s proper remedy is to file a regular
election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The word “sole” in the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.

1. Vinzons-Chato v Comelec (434)

FACTS:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of Camarines
Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of
office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s election protest
against Unico regarding canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of Unico’s proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for
certiorari in the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should take cognizance of Chato’s election protest
RULING:
NO. With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word
“sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of
the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.

3. Panlilio v Comelec (p. 434)

FACTS: The parties herein were 2 contending gubernatorial candidates in the province of Pampanga. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor. Private respondent filed an election protest on the
grounds of alleged irregularities during the elections. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to the election protest, notwithstanding that private respondent failed
to raise her objections first before the Board of Election Inspectors.

ISSUE: Whether filing before the Board of Election Inspectors is required before resort to the COMELEC
RULING: NO. The filing of a protest before the Board of Election Inspectors is not a condition sine qua non before the COMELEC
acquires jurisdiction over the present election protest. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be acquired through, or waived
by, any act or omission of the parties. The COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.
4. Marcos v Comelec (p. 434)
FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that petioner did not meet the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing "seven" months to "since childhood." The provincial election supervisor
 refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's
head office in Manila.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda
thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the
resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended
that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of
the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction

RULING: NO. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections
return and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.

5. Domino vs. COMELEC

Facts: On March 25 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative district
of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year
and 2 months immediately preceding the election. On March 30, 1998, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to
deny due course to or cancel COC. They alleged that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the COC, is not a resident, much less a
registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election. On May 6 1998, the COMELEC 2nd division promulgated a
resolution declaring Domino disqualified as a candidate for the position for lack of the 1 year residency requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his COC.
On the day of the election, the COMELEC issued a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 ordering that the votes cast for
Domino be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the resolution disqualifying him as a candidate had
not yet become final and executory. The result of the election shows that Domino garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents for such position. Domino then filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution which was denied by the COMELEC en
banc. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of the petitioner?
Ruling: Yes. The Electoral Tribunal’s sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress as provided in Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the Senate or the House of Representatives, and a candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office
before he can be considered a member. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate. Considering that Domino has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect, he cannot be deemed a
member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the
issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
6. Perez vs. COMELEC
Facts: On March 26, 1998, private-respondent Aguinaldo filed his COC for representative of the 3rd District of Cagayan in the May
11, 1998 Elections. Four days later, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private-respondent as a
candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least 1 year immediately before the day of the elections as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. On May 10, 1998, the 1st Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,
dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private-respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the said district.
Issue: Whether the SC has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondent’s
eligibility for the office of representative of the said district?
Ruling: No. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private-respondent
barred further consideration of petitioner’s action. Where at that time of the filing of the petition for reconsideration of the denial of
the petition for disqualification, the person sought to be disqualified was already a member of the House of Representatives, the
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility.
7. Lazatin v Comelec (435)
 FACTS: Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he
had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims
that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had become moot and academic
because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987.
In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The
order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply
corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and
Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is impressed
with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his
oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously
ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the
rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

8. Guerrero v COMELEC

FACTS Facts: Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First
District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls,
despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy
substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of
Ruiz for lack of merit.
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas
could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent
candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas’ certificate of candidacy was
fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
Held: NO. There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over the case had
ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is
vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation
and assumption of the position by Farinas is recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.
9. Mutuc vs COMELEC

Facts: Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was given due course by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) but he was prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because that
was an apparent violation of COMELEC’s ban (via a COMELEC resolution) “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was COMELEC’s
contention that the jingle proposed to be used by Mutuc is a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material (falling under and the like’s category), and under the above COMELEC rule, the same is subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s contention is correct.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC ban is valid.
HELD:
1. No. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically
referred to. COMELEC contended that the ban makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made
of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding
with the words “and the like.” For COMELEC, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. The Supreme Court did not
agree. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the said law violated by Mutuc was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. It does not include
campaign jingles for they are not gadgets as contemplated by the law.
2. No. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech.

10. MICHAEL F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 484 SCRA 529 (2006)

FACTS: A Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C.
Cabochan was filed by a registered voter of Quezon City before the Commission on Elections National Capital Region (COMELEC
NCR), alleging that Cabochan’s certificate suffered from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a Notary Public whose
commission had already expired. Consequently, Cabochan withdrew her certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr. filed his
in substitution of Cabochan. Herein petitioner Michael F. Planas (Planas), also a candidate for the same position, filed before the
Quezon City Board of Canvassers a Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor of Defensor who appeared to be
leading the congressional race, citing the memorandum- recommendation of the NCR Acting Director directing that the certificate of
Cabochan be denied due course and that the substitution of Defensor for Cabochan be accordingly declared invalid. Defensor was
proclaimed as the winning candidate for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City. On March 11, 2005, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged Resolution ruling that the COMELEC is already ousted with jurisdiction over the case
thus, the same is already under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that the certificate of
candidacy of Cabonchan is valid, and the subsequent substitution by Defensor is legal. Hence, the present petition of Planas.

ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by virtue of Defensor’s proclamation and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives.

HELD: The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the
HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., the usual remedy of any party
aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid
proclamation. Where the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues.
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution
invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his
proclamation was valid or legal. Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor‘s proclamation the denial of his COC due course
was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as
representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case.

11. Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

Facts: Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of
Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his
failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting
candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack
of merit.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas
could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent
candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas’ certificate of candidacy was
fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

Held: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased
with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested
with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and
assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue
exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.

12. Aggabao v COMELEC GR No. 163756

Facts: Georgidi B. Aggabao and Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela during the May
10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San
Agustin, Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was (1) tampered with (2) prepared under
duress (3)differed from other authentic copies and (4) contained manifest errors.Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by
Miranda are proper only for a pre-proclamation controversy which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of
Representatives.On appeal with the COMELEC, Aggabao asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s
Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that the PBC had jurisdictionover the petition, it still erred in excluding the contested COCVs
as they appeared regular and properly authenticated

Issue: Whether or not WON Aggabao should resort to certiorari

Ruling:The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction overall contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s own jurisdiction begins.It is undisputed that Miranda has
already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office. As such, Aggabao’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest
before the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for certiorari. The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

Sec 249 (page 436)

13. Limkaichong vs Comelec
Facts: Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia Paras, and some other concerned
citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because
when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case, election day came, and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won
over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification,
Comelec issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec.
Issue: WON the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON Comelec should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has
invariably held once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of
Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and disqualification ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the Comelec of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET. The use of the word “sole” in Sec.17 Art. VI of the Constitution and in Sec.
250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to
its members.
14.Antonio vs Comelec
Facts: Privat respondents filed independent petitions with COMELEC, contesting the proclamation of Rufino Antonio, Jr. by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of terrorism practiced by armed men brought to Batanes by candidate Antonio and
strategically distributed in all towns, who destroyed communication facilities and blocked airport landings, thereby effectively
isolating the province; Both petitioners prayed that the proclamation of Rufino Antonio, Jr. by the Board of Canvassers be annulled
and set aside, and that the election returns in all precincts in the towns of Batanes, except Basco and Precinct No. 4 of Sabtang, be
declared null and void. But while candidate Abad also prayed that the canvassing board be directed to make another canvass on the
basis of election returns from Precinct 4 of Sabtang and the nine (9) precincts of Basco and thereafter proclaim the winner, candidate
Agudo, in her turn, asked that the returns from Sabtang, Precinct 4, and Basco be declared not expressive of the will of the majority,
since they represent only 28% of the registered voters of Batanes, and that the holding of a special election be recommended to the
President of the Philippines.
Petitioner Antonio, Jr. answered both petitions traversing the allegations thereof, and pleading the regularity and freedom of the
election held, and, by way of special defenses, urged (1) lack of jurisdiction of COMELEC to determine question involving election
returns regarding members of the House of Representatives; Comelec ruled in favor of Abad and Agudo , dismissed Antonio.
Issue: WON comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance even if petitioner has already been proclaimed.
Held: Negative. The Justices are unanimous in the conclusion that the proclamation of petitioner Rufino S. Antonio, Jr. was correctly
and properly annulled and set aside by the Commission on Elections in view of the large scale and unprecedented terrorism practiced
by armed goons in favor of said candidate, and, therefore, the action of the Commission must be, and is, affirmed in this respect.
Book: Decisions holding that once a congressional candidate has been proclaimed and taken his oath of office, the COMELEC
has no more jurisdiction but only HRET has are inconsistent in this case, where the COMELEC continued to exercise over the
case notwithstanding the facts that Antonio was proclaimed and had taken the oath of office as congressman of BATANes.
This is another example that SC decisions in election cases zig and zag like a ship sailing on the ocean without a ruder and
without a compass. PAK! BOOM!
15. Guingona vs Gonzales
(Proceed to doctrine)
Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments
(CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent
Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation
in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18
Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in
accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To
disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach
of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. DOCTRINE: The provision of Sec. 18 on
proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.
The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it
can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec.
18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under
the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the
parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution,
it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.
16. Daza vs. Singson (437)
Facts: The House of Reperesentatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in
that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.The HOR
revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The
chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the Singson. Daza
contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of
the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered
political party and has not yet attained political stability.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the case
Ruling: Yes. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom,
of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. The term political question refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being the subject to the mandatory
constitutional rule on proportional representation.
17. Pimentel vs. HRET (438)
Facts: In the May 1998 elections, APEC party-list was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while 12 other party-list groups
had one representative each. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and Commission on Appointments (CA) contingent by
electing its representatives belonging to the different political parties. Sen. Aquilino Pimentel assails the composition of the HRET and
the CA and prays that HRET be ordered to “alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure” its composition to include party-list
representatives in accordance with the Constitution and the Party-List System Act.
Issue: Whether the petition to order the alteration, reorganization and reconfiguration of the HRET should be granted
Ruling: The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative to choose from among its district and party-
list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution
explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to HRET, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with the Court.
It appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from the participating in the
election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions,
with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET. As the primary
recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the SC cannot resolve the issues presented by
petitioners at this time.