Admin Law Doctrines Racel

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY.
PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
DOCTRINES
GENERAL CONSIDERATION:
MALAGA v. PENACHOS
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY
DEFINED: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions, and governmentowned or controlled corporations.
DE LA LLANA v. ALBA
Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."
POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
U.S. v. ANG TANG HO

THE LAW MUST BE COMPLETE, IN ALL ITS TERMS AND PROVISIONS, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a
law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
YNOT v. IAC
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
CARINO v. CHR
FACT FINDING IS NOT
ADJUDICATION, AND CANNOT BE LIKENED TO THE JUDICIAL
FUNCTION OF A COURT OF JUSTICE, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
LLDA v. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUANCE OF CEASE & DESIST ORDER IS IMPLIED POWER TO THE
POWOER TO REGULTE AND
ADJUDICATE. In the exercise of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect
to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce,
implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CO.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
v. NLRC
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies
to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
QUASI- LEGISLATIVE POWER:
CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG
The true distinction between the delegation of power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of law. First cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN
Even without the Executive Order, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the
law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal
prosecution of those who violate his instructions.
PEOPLE v. MACERAN
All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes. In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not
strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued.
BAUTIS TA v. JUINIO, EDU,
RAMOS
While the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of
Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only
be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
PHIL. CONSUMERS
FOUNDATION v. DECS
If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due
process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasijudicial function, prior notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORP
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law
as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law
because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF
METRO MANILA v. BOT
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process are constitutionally required for the protection of life, right, or
property when its limitation of loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi- judicial proceeding.
US v. PANLILIO
A violation of the orders of the BOA is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the BOA while they may
possible be said to have the force of law, are statutes and not penal statutes, and a violation of such order is not a penal
offense unless the statute itself somewhere make a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION v.
DEFENSOR
1. A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative
function. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.
2. Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented,
that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. In subordinate legislation all that is required is that
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the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
OPLE v. TORRES
It cannot be simplistically argued that

A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
PSDSA v. DE JESUS
The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The
provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent
has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as
all employees in the division, both teaching and nonteaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person
responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division
superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools and learning centers.
CAWAD v. ABAD
Publication is not necessary for interpretative regulations which Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural
due process, is required by law in order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective. 24 There are, however,
several exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which "need nothing further than their bare issuance
for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." 25
EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT INC. v.
DFA
As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."
QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER
SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER &

WATER WORKS
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants
(in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character
that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the
respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts.
GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
The jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond
such jurisdiction is void.
PHIL. ASSOC. OF LAWYERS v.
AGRAVA
Members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved;
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
COMELEC, as an incident of its power to try, hear, and decide any controversy, may also punish for contempt. However,
to come under this jurisdiction, the question should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election
SEC. OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
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affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial."
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL
AFFAIRS SERVICE- PDEA
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements
the hearing and decisionmaking due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a
decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record AND disclosed to the parties affected," was not complied with
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY
JURISDICTION: The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts
cannot or will n6t determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statue administered.
BERNARDO v. ABALOS
The petitioners should have exhausted all the remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level. A motion for reconsideration gives the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. Rule
65 requires that there must be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v. CA
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
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GSIS v. CSC
Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should
normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders.
PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES: However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. It is disregarded:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) urgency of judicial intervention
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only
a question of law is involved.
PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE LILAGAN

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence. Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies.
ARROW TRANSPORTATION v. BOT
It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or not
the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due process
requirement.
KBMPBM v DOMINGUEZ
EXHAUSTION DOES NOT APPLY IN CASE OF PRESUMED APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE ALTER
EGO DOCTRINE: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not
apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v.
HERVILLA
FAILURE TO ASK FOR
RECONSIDEATION OR APPEAL TO ADMINSITRATIVE SUPERIOR IS FATAL TO CAUSE OF ACTION.
Records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did
he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the
President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is
fatal to a court review.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING v. FACTORAN
FINDING OF FACT BY
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED IF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. A question
of fact is best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the implementation of the law they are
entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by
evidence.
Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Finding of fact in administrative decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is
justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the
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administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
CARPIO v. EXEC. SECRETARY

NAPOLCOM RETAINS POWER OF
CONTROL DESPITE THE CREATION OF PLEB. Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction,
thru the regional appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under Section 20(c).
Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by
the PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of
the PLEBs.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS INC v. IAC
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES NOT REQUIRED IN CASE OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION. Public respondents undeniably had knowledge prior to the issuance of the license to Guillermo
Roxas and/or MJBFS that the subject restaurant was owned by petitioner and presently leased to Valley Resort
Corporation, and that Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS' right to possess and operate the restaurant was the subject of a
pending litigation.
The grant is arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES v. SINSUAT
AXIOMS GOVERNING JUDICIAL
REVIEW BY CERTIORARI: first, that before said actions may be entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that
all the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that the administrative
decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

WHEN DUE PROCESS IS
DISREGARDED, EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED. While as a rule, exhaustion of
administrative remedies must be done before court’s jurisdiction may be invoked, the same is not necessary if there is an
utter disregard of the principle of due process.
In such case, an appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs is not in reality a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC
QUESTIONS INVOLVING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS PURELY LEGAL
AND IS OF URGENT CHARACTER, EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT NECESSARY. The circumstances
emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allege that the assailed issuances violated
their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question.
Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then
on the RH Law as well as the upcoming election
DIGEST
GENERAL CONSIDERATION:
MALAGA v. PENACHOS
FACTS:
Iloilo State College of Fisheries caused the publication of an invitation to bid for the construction of a Micro Lab Bldg. The
Notice announced that the last day of submission of the prequalification bids was 2 Dec 1988. Petitioners submitted their
pre-qualification documents. However, they were not allowed to participate on the ground that they passed the requirements
late (beyond 10am cut off time).
Petitioners filed a petition seeking a restraining order against the conduct of the bidding process. A restraining order was
issued to which defendants filed a motion to lift on the basis of PD1818.
Respondents contend that PD1818 prohibits any court to issue any restraining order against project of the government.
Petitioners contend that PD1818 is not applicable because ISCOF has its own charter and is not a part of the national
government.
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RTC lifted the order prompting petitioner to file a petition with the SC.
ISSUE:
Is ISCOF a government instrumentality? (Yes)
Is it protected by the prohibition under PD 1818? (No) RULING:
ISCOF is a government instrumentality. However, PD 1818 is not applicable since the prohibition from issuing restraining
orders contemplates an administrative body’s exercise of discretion in technical cases only and does not apply to questions
of law.
In this case, what is involved is noncompliance with procedural rules on bidding which requires strict observance.
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY
DEFINED: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations.
DE LA LLANA v. ALBA
VALID ABOLITION OF OFFICE IS NEITHER REMOVAL NOR SEPARATION OF INCUMBENTS FROM
OFFICE.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case for declaratory relief with the SC assailing the constitutionality of BP 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act.
Petitioner contends that the provisions of BP 129 which abolish some inferior courts collide with the security of tenure of
incumbent judges and justices.
ISSUE:
Is there removal from office by virtue of a reorganization law? (No)
RULING:
Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant
who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

CONFERMENT OF AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE LAW IS NOT A DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of PD 1987 creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was promulgated.
The assailed law among others empower the VRB to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board.”
Petitioner contends that this power is an undue delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Is there an undue delegation of legislative power?
RULING:
It is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation.
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
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Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited
period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant
of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should
the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
U.S. v. ANG TANG HO

A LAW WHICH DELEGATES THE POWER TO FIX PRICE WITHOUT ANY STANDARD IS AN INVALID DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
FACTS:
Act No. 2868 was passed which authorized the Gov-Gen to issue necessary rules to prevent the monopoly and hoarding
of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn, inter alia. The law also defines what constitute a monopoly or hoarding but does
not specify the price or defined any basis for fixing the price.
Thereafter, the Gov-Gen issue a proclamation fixing the price for the sale of rice. The controversy began when a
Petitioner was charged with sale of rice at an excessive price. He was found guilty by the lower court prompting petitioner
to appeal to the SC. ISSUE:
Is there a valid delegation of legislative power to the Executive? (No) RULING:
The law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgement of delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details
in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the GovernorGeneral which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay
or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of
the proclamation no crime was committed.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
YNOT v. IAC
A ROVING COMMISSION WHICH
GRANTS UNLIMITED DISCRETION IS AN INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER FACTS:
Petitioner transported 6 carabaos in a pum boat from Masbate to Iloilo. They were confiscated by the station commander
of Barotac for violation of EO 626-A.
EO 626-A, was issued by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power. In gist, it amended EO 626 to the effect that
it also prohibited inter-provincial movement of carabao (not just carabeef). The Order also provides that the carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The RTC sustained the confiscation which was affirmed the CA prompting petitioner to appeal to SC.
ISSUE:
Is the standard may see fit sufficient to be a valid delegation of legislative power? (No) RULING:
No. It is an invalid delegation of legislative power because they are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of
properties arbitrarily taken.
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
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MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS EXERCISE OF PRESIDENT’S RESIDUAL POWER IS NOT AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER FACTS:
In February 1986, former President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power"
revolution and was forced into exile. Corazon C. Aquino was then declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government.
Marcos signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. Considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return
at a time when the government was still threatened and unstable and the economy was just beginning to rise and move
forward, Aquino decided to bar the return of Marcos and his family.’ ISSUE:
Is the President empowered to prohibit the return of Marcos in the country despite the absence of an express power to do
so under the Constitution? (Yes) RULING:
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty
of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President
but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand.
CARINO v. CHR
CHR IS NOT EMPOWERED TO
ADJUDICATE, IT IS ONLY EMPOWERED TO INVESTIGATE FACTS:
Several teachers including private respondents in this case undertook a mass concerted actions on a Monday (class day)
as a response to the alleged failure of the authorities to act upon their grievances.
The private respondents were administratively charged. This prompted respondents to file a complaint with the
CHR. Petitioner, Secretary of Education, intervened and moved that the complaint be dismissed.
Pending determination of motion to dismiss, Carino promulgated a decision dismissing Esber from service and suspension
for Babaran, Budoy, and Del Castillo.
CHR denied the motion to dismiss prompting Carino to file a petition with the SC.
ISSUE:
Is the CHR empowered to adjudicate on controversies? (No) RULING:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
Fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
"Adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn...
implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
LLDA v. COURT OF APPEALS

POWER TO ISSUE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER BY LLDA IS AN IMPLIED POWER GRANTED BY ITS CHARTER
FACTS:
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite filed a lettercomplaint with the LLDA seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage
dumpsite due to its harmful effects. Following an investigation conducted by LLDA, it issued a Cease and Desist Order
against Caloocan City to desist from dumping any form of garbage.
Caloocan filed with the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the C&D Order. RTC decided in favor of Caloocan
City. LLDA then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC which remanded the same to CA. CA ruled that RTC had no
jurisdiction to try and hear LLDA’s C&D Order and that LLDA has no power to issue a C&D Order.
ISSUE:
Is LLDA authorized to issue a Cease and Desist Order absent an express provision in its charter? (Yes)
RULING:
LLDA as a specialized administrative agency is mandated to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans proposed by
LGU within the region etc. It exercises a quasi-judicial function.
9
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it
is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers.
In the exercise of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases
in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CO. v.

NLRC
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT BY COURTS FACTS:
Private Respondent Coria was initially hired as a casual employee and eventually promoted to Inspector of the Fire Division
by Rizal Empire.
Sometime thereafter, he was dismissed from work on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Coria filed a
complaint with the Labor Dept. The Labor Arbiter order his reinstatement. Petitioner appealed to NLRC which dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
The focal point of the case is the provision under NLRC Rules which provides that no motion or request for extension to
perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
ISSUE:
May the court allow the appeal contrary to the rules promulgated by an administrative body? (No) RULING:
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies
to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
QUASI- LEGISLATIVE POWER:
CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE LAW IS VALID, NOT UNDUE DELEGATION FACTS:
Petitioner sought that Act No. 3155 prohibiting the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippines be
declared as unconstitutional.
Among others, it contends that the power given by Act No 3155 to the Governor- General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition provided in the act constitutes unlawful delegation of the legislative powers. ISSUE:
Is the power to suspend the application of the law at his discretion a valid delegation of legislative power? (Yes) RULING:
The delegation is an authority as to the execution of the law. No objection can be made.
The true distinction between the delegation of power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of law. The first cannot be
done; the latter no valid objection can be made.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN
A REGULATION IS VALID IF THE LAW IS COMPLETE. THE FISHERIES LAW IS COMPLETE SO AS TO EMPOWER
THE SEC TO PROHIBIT TRAWLING.
FACTS:
President issued an EO prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, CamSur. A group of Otter Trawl Operators filed a
declaratory relief with the CFI. The CFI declared the assailed orders as invalid.
It is contended that EO expanded the Fisheries Law. They contend that trawl fishing is not expressly prohibited by the law,
thus the EO cannot prohibit what the law does not prohibit.
They also contend that the law unduly delegated the legislative power.
ISSUE:
Did the EO expand the law where the law does not expressly prohibit trawling? (No)
Is there a valid delegation of legislative power? (Yes) RULING:
Even without the Executive Order, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the
law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal
prosecution of those who violate his instructions.
Under the Fisheries Law, the Sec. of
10
Agriculture is authorized to promulgate rules restricting the use of any fish net or fishing device for the protection of fry or
fish eggs. The law likewise authorizes the Secretary to create refuges and sanctuaries for fishes.
The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If the law is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more
than to authorize the delegate to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law.
There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
delegate, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
Insofar as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned the law is complete in itself, leaving to the Sec. of Agriculture
the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.
PEOPLE v. MACERAN
THE LAW MUST EXPRESSLY PENALIZE ELECTROFISHING, OTHERWISE, ANY REGULATION DOING SO IS
INVALID FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries.
This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the
old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this
appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Did the administrative order expand the Fisheries Law? (Yes, Note that the fisheries law was amended, including
electrofishing as a prohibited act)
RULING:
Administrative agents are clothed with rulemaking powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not
impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the
law.
All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and
is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative, powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of
"the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails
because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which
the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
BAUTISTA v. JUINIO, EDU, RAMOS

PENALTY IMPOSED IN A REGULATION MUST BE REFLECTED IN THE LAW
ITSELF.
FACTS:
Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued in response to the protracted oil crisis, pursuant thereto, reespondent Juinio issued
Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed penalties of fine, impounding of vehicle, and cancellation of registration
on owners of the above-specified vehicles such letter of instruction.
The memorandum is being assailed as unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative
power. It is to be noted that Memorandum Circular No. 39 does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of
impounding, fine, and for the third offense, that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for
ninety days whichever is longer.
ISSUE:
Did the MC unduly expand the law when it imposed a penalti of impounding?
11
RULING:
The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they
are valid
Administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.' It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides,
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to
the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative."
While the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid
under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that
portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if
warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION v.

DECS
NOTICE AND HEARING NOT
MANDATORY IN THE EXERCISE OF QUASI LEGISLATIVE POWER FACTS:
The Department of Education, Culture, and
Sports issued an order authorizing the 15 to
20% increase in school fees, in light of the recommendation submitted by the Task Force on Private Higher Education
created by the DECS. The petitioner sought reconsideration arguing that the increase is too high, so the DECS issued DO
No. 37 lowering the ceiling of 10 to 15% increase. Despite the reduction, the petitioner opposed the increases. Petitioner
urged the president to suspend its implementation but he obtained no response.
Petitioner filed an instant petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department
Order unconstitutional on the ground that the Department Order is issued without legal basis.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for a prior notice and hearing in the application of new rates for tuition fee hike for all private schools? (No)
RULING:
QUASI JUDICIAL VS QUASI
LEGISLATIVE, WHEN NOTICE AND HEARING MANDATORY: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative
agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function.
If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due
process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasijudicial function, prior notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function
is quasijudicial in character.
CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN REGULATION AND LAW WILL RENDER THE FORMER
VOID.
FACTS:
12
Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the mentioned cigarette brands were subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to then
Section 142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended. However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect whereby a
shift from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific tax system was made and subjecting the aforesaid cigarette
brands to specific tax under [S]ection 142 thereof, now renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of 1997, pertinent
provisions of which are quoted thus:
The rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and (4) hereof, shall be increased by twelve
percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.
To implement the provisions for a twelve percent (12%) increase of excise tax on, among others, cigars and cigarettes
packed by machines by January 1, 2000, the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, issued Revenue Regulations No.
17-99, dated December 16, 1999
For the period covering January 1-31, 2000, petitioner allegedly paid specific taxes on all brands manufactured and
removed in the total amounts of P585,705,250.00.
On February 7, 2000, Fortune filed with respondent’s Appellate Division a claim for refund or tax credit of its purportedly
overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000 in the amount of P35,651,410.00, granted and ordered CIR to refund
the same.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend
or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must
always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always
be resolved in favor of the basic law.
By adding the qualification that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes effective shall not be lower than the tax actually
paid prior to 1 January 2000, Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 effectively imposes a tax which is the higher amount between
the ad valorem tax being paid at the end of the three (3)-year transition period and the specific tax under paragraph C, sub-
paragraph (1)-(4), as increased by 12%—a situation not supported by the plain wording of Section 145 of the Tax Code.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO

MANILA v. BOT
AN ORDER IN THE EXERCISE OF QUASI LEGISLATIVE POWER NEED NOT COMPLY WITH PRIOR
NOTICE AND HEARING FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who
are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience.
Respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which provides for the phasing out old
and dilapidated taxis.
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating
as public utilities in Metro Manila.
Petitioners take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness
of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance, they also contend that they were not given the opportunity to be
heard.. ISSUE:
Is there a need for prior notice in the promulgation of an administrative
regulation? (No) RULING:
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process are constitutionally required for the protection of life, right, or
property when its limitation of loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi- judicial proceeding.
Conversely, since the assailed order was made pursuant to quasi-legislative powers, no prior hearing is required.
US v. PANLILIO
THE PENAL LAW MUST EXPRESSLY STATE THAT VIOLATION OF ORDERS OF DELEGATE WILL ALSO AMOUNT
TO A CRIME
FACTS:
Accused was convicted of violation of Acr 1760 re quarantine of animals suffering contagious disease. The accused
contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of law.
13
ISSUE:
Can accused be penalized for the order of the Bureau of Agriculture? (No) RULING:
Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the BOA prohibited or made unlawful, not is there a penalty for its
violation. The law expressly provides for acts which shall be prohibited or unlawful, the case does not fall within any of
them.
A violation of the orders of the BOA is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the BOA while they may
possible be said to have the force of law, are statutes and not penal statutes, and a violation of such order is not a penal
offense unless the statute itself somewhere make a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION v. DEFENSOR

FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 9207 aka National Government Center Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003, the NGC Administration
Committee formulated the IRR of said law. In assailing the provisions of the law, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition
with the SC.
OSG contends that the petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is an improper remedy because a writ of prohibition does
not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Petitioners contends:
1. That while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide
for the price.
2. That the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a procedural flaw.
ISSUE:
Is prohibition a proper remedy to assail a body’s exercise of quasi-legislative power?
RULING:
3. A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an
action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
4. Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented,
that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. In subordinate legislation all that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 1
Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate
the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative
agencies. In case of a delegation of ratefixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe
for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
OPLE v. TORRES
PRESIDENT MAY NOT ENACT A LAW THROUGH AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OTHERWISE HE WILL ENCROACH
UPON
CONGRESS’ LEGISLATIVE POWER FACTS:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on important constitutional grounds, among others, viz: it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate.
1
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered
by the law.
14
Petitioner claims that AO 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence beyond the power of the President to
issue. ISSUE:
Did AO308 encroached upon the legislative power of Congress? (Yes) RULING:
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy.
beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O.
No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc.
PSDSA v. DE JESUS
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the “Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,” became a law on August 11,
2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is
mandated to “promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act,
provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2) years” after such approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd,
in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that the implementing
regulation is inconsistent with the intent and letter of the law.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The
provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent
has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as
all employees in the
conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law.
division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the
administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other
hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.
CAWAD v. ABAD
PUBLICATION NOT NECESSARY FOR INTERPRETATIVE REGULATIONS
WHERE NOTHING IS NO CHANGE IN THE LAW
FACTS:
RA 7305 aka Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into law. Subsequently, Congress issued Joint Resolution
No. 4 authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian
Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for other Purposes,
Thereafter, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series
of 20122. Shortly thereafter respondents DBM and DOH then circulated the other assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012.
In a letter9 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget and Management and
Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed their opposition to the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same
diminishes the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.
2
to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step Increments due to meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service, it provided that "an official or employee
authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service."
15
Petitioners contend that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to comply with Section 35 23 of RA No.
7305 providing that its implementing rules shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the University of the Philippines Law Center-Office
of the National
Administrative Register (UP Law CenterONAR), jurisprudence as well as the circumstances of this case dictate otherwise.
ISSUE:
Is publication necessary for interpretative regulation? (No) RULING:
Publication is not necessary for interpretative regulations which Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due
process, is required by law in order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective. 24 There are, however, several
exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which "need nothing further than their bare issuance for they
give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." 25 These regulations need not be published
for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person. 3
basis of PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions were already prescribed and authorized by pre-existing law.
There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely reiterated those embodied in RA No.
7305 and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised IRR, the validity of which is
undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly published and filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR is necessarily
immaterial to its validity because in view of the pronouncements above, interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH
circular herein, need not be published nor filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR in order to be effective. Neither is prior
hearing or consultation mandatory.
EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT INC. v. DFA
A REGULATION IS VALID AS LONG AS THE LAW PROVIDED SUFFICIENT STANDARD.
FACTS:
Petitioner Equi-Asia recruited and deployed Manny Razon and was sent to South Korea. Thereafter, while in South Korea,
Razon died of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of Samsung Textile. Pertinent communications were
made with the appropriate government agencies. POEA sent a telegram-directive to Equi-Asia, ordering petitioner to
provide Prepaid Ticket Advice (PTA) for the repatriation of the remains and belongings of deceased Razon.
Petitioner declined to follow the directive on the ground that the deceased violated his employment contract when he
unlawfully escaped from the company assigned to him. Another letter-directive was sent to petitioner. The letter
cited Secs. 52 to 55 of the IRR of RA 8042 aka Migrant Workers Act of 1995.
CA dismissed the petition. petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the
scope of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 by: first, imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the remains of
the deceased Razon including the duty to advance the cost of the plane fare for the transport of Razon's remains; and
second, by ordering it to do so without prior determination of the existence of employeremployee relationship between itself
and Razon.
OSG contends that Sec. 15 of RA 8042 leaves no doubt that a recruitment agency shall bear the primary responsibility and
that the requirement of prior notice and hearing are not essential.
ISSUE:
Is there an unlawful expansion of the law? (No)
RULING:
While Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport back here to
the Philippines the remains of the deceased Razon, nevertheless, such duty is imposed upon him as the statute clearly
dictates that "the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs
attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local agency." That the concerned government agencies opted
to demand the performance of said responsibility solely upon petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law
plainly obliges a local placement agency such as herein petitioner to bear the burden of repatriating the remains of a
deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal abroad. In this regard, we see no reason to invalidate Section 52
of the omnibus rules as Republic Act No. 8042 itself permits the situation wherein a local recruitment agency can be held
exclusively responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW.
As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 4
3
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence more than what the law itself had already prescribed. As previously discussed, the qualification
of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the
4
Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for allegedly contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall
not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the statute merely
states the general principle that in case the severance of the
16
employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her
homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from
establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such
determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at
the soonest
QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER
SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER &

WATER WORKS
BOARD OF POWER HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ON MATTER PURELY CIVIL IN CHARACTER FACTS:
Private respondents (tenants) filed a complaint with respondent charging petitioner (administrator of apartment) with the
offense of selling electricity without permit. Respondents contend that petitioner billed them for the electricity consumption
on the common areas of the apartment administered by petitioner.
Petitioner moved for dismissal on the ground that the Board has no jurisdiction. Respondent, however, denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Does the Board have jurisdiction to rule on the conditions of lease between the landlord and the tenant? (No) RULING:
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her
tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants
(in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character
that is to be adjudged under the applicable
possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment agency contests
its liability for repatriation.
provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction
but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION
QUASI JUDICIAL BODY TASKED WITH POWER TO ADJUDICATE RATES DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
RULE ON NEGLIGENCE FACTS:
Private respondent Arnaiz filed a complaint with PSA against petitioner following an incident wherein the message
supposed to be transmitted to Madrid Spain did not reach the addressee.
Petitioner question PSC’s jurisdiction. PSC ordered petitioner to pay a fine and refund the sum for the undelivered message.
This prompted petitioner to file an appeal to the SC.
The jurisdiction of the respondent is provided in Sec. 5: The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over
the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments
made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Does the Commission have the power to decide on the imputed negligence of
petitioner? (No) RULING:
The alleged negligence of Globe is not within the ambit of PCA’s jurisdiction which is limited to the RATES WHICH THE
GRANTEE MAY CHARGE.
The jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted
or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
PHIL. ASSOC. OF LAWYERS v.

AGRAVA
A LAWYER NEED NOT PASS ANOTHER EXAMINATION TO PRACTICE BEFORE QUASI-JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS
FACTS:
17
Agrava is the Director of the Patents Office. He issued a circular scheduling an examination for the purpose
of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorney before the Patent Office.
Petitioner filed this petition contending that those who passed the bar examinations etc. is already qualified to practice
before the Patents Office.
ISSUE:
Is a lawyer required to undergo another examination to practice before quasi-judicial bodies? (No) RULING:
Members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much
so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
QUASI JUDICIAL BODIES MAY NOT PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT IN THE
EXERCISE OF ITS MINISTERIAL DUTIES FACTS:
COMELEC initially awarded the manufacturing of ballot boxes to ACME,
NASSCO and ASIATIC. However,
COMELEC withdrew the award to ACME for failure to sign the contract and awarded its portion to the two others. Following
COMELEC’s denial of ACME’s 3rd Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner published in the Sunday Times an article entitled
“Ballot Boxes Contract Hit.”
This impelled COMELEC to summon petitioner to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for influencing the
COMELEC in the adjudication of the controversy.
Petitioner argues that COMELEC has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt said publication.
ISSUE:
May COMELEC issue contempt order in the exercise of its ministerial duties? (No)
RULING:
COMELEC, as an incident of its power to try, hear, and decide any controversy, may also punish for contempt.
However, to come under this jurisdiction, the question should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election.
The requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is an imperative ministerial
duty. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us
In this case, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not
exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
SEC. OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

EVALUATION STAGE OF EXTRADITION PROCEEDING IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING. DUE PROCESS IS
OBSERVED.
FACTS:
DOJ received from the DFA a US Note Varbale requesting for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
US. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by DOJ, private respondent requested copies of the official extradition
request.
Petitioner denied the request on the ground that it was premature and that it is only when the petition is filed in court will
the copies of the petition be furnished by the court.
Jimenez filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish the extradition documents and a
prohibition to enjoin the SOJ from filing the extradition petition in court.
RTC ruled in favor of Jimenez and ordered that the status quo be maintained. SOJ filed the instant petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
May a possible extradite request for paper and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition proceeding with the
DOJ? (Yes) RULING:
The Evaluation Stage sets in motion the extradition proceeding and is akin to an investigation proceeding. The notice and
hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. Inquisitorial
power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative
body which better enables
18
it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable
to prosecution.
The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it
based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR

A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY MUST
SUPPORT ITS DECISION WITH FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH TO PREDICATE A CONCLUSION OF LAW FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Toribio Teodoro and ANG TIBAY by National Labor Union for unfair labor practice with the
Court of Industrial Relations. CIR ruled in favor of ANG TIBAY.
NLU prays for the vacation of the first judgment of the SC and prays for a new trial.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for a new trial? (Yes) RULING:
A new trial is necessary. The proceedings in the CIR did not comply with the Cardinal Principles of Due Process in
Administrative Proceedings. The record is barren and does not satisfy the need for a factual basis upon which to predicate
a conclusion of law.
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial."
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SERVICE- PDEA
19
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO THE PARTIES EVIDENCE USED AS BASIS VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENT IN ADMINSITRATIVE PROCEEDINGS FACTS:
An anonymous complaint was filed against petitioner et. al. They were charged with Grave Misconduct for alleged extortion
done to the mother of the anonymous complainant.
Special Investigator Enriquez recommended their dismissal. Accordingly, they were dismissed. Petitioner filed a MR with
the IASPDEA where he raised the fact that his name never came up in the sworn statements submitted to the hearing
officer.
The same was denied, prompting him to appeal to CSC which also denied his appeal. The CA likewise denied his appeal
and affirmed the dismissal from service.
ISSUE:
Did the proceedings in the IAS-PDEA comply with the cardinal principles of due process? RULING:
Citing Ang Tibay v CIR: The first of the enumerated rights pertains to the substantive rights of a party at the hearing stage
of the proceedings.10
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing
and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision maker decides on the evidence presented
during the hearing.11 These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material
and substantial components of decision making.12
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements
the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a
decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record AND disclosed to the parties affected," was not complied with. Magcamit was not
properly apprised of the evidence presented against him, which evidence were eventually made the bases of the decision
finding him guilty of grave misconduct and recommending his dismissal.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ

DISPUTES BETWEEN STOCKHOLDERS IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE AND
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SEC FACTS:
This stemmed from a dispute between principal stock holders of Pocket Bell Ph. Abejos sold its minority shares to
Telectronic Systems including some shares registered in the name of Bragas (majority stockholders) which results in
Telectronic becoming the majority stockholder at 56%.
Asserting that the Bragas claim a preemptive right over the 133,000 shares of Abejo, the corporate secretary refused to
register the aforesaid transfer of shares. This trigerred several actions.
Abejos contend that the SEC has jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Bragas contends that it is the civil court that has jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Which tribunal has jurisdiction over dispute between stockholders? (SEC) RULING:
The law provides that SEC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies
arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates inter alia.
The complaint of Bargas for annulment of sales and transfer questions the validity of transfer claiming alleged pre-emptive
rights. Such dispute clearly involves disputes between and among stockholders.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION:
The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will n6t
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered "
BERNARDO v. ABALOS
PETITIONERS MUST EXHAUST ALL REMEDIES IN QUASI-JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS FACTS:
A complaint was filed against respondents with COMELEC for vote buying. COMELEC conducted an investigation. The
COMELEC En Banck dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence. Petitioner immediately filed a petition for certiorari with
the SC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
20
The COMELEC Rules provide that as a general rule Motion for Reconsideration is a prohibited pleading except in cases of
election offense cases.
ISSUE:
Is the petition valid?
RULING:
The petitioners should have exhausted all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level.
A motion for reconsideration gives the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. Rule 65 requires that
there must be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v. CA
BED HAS EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING ENERGY FACTS:
Petitioner was granted a coal operating contract by Bureau of Energy Development. Thereafter, it executed a MOA with
MMIC whereby it assigned to MMIC all its rights and interest. The controversy began when petitioner filed an action for
rescission of the MOA before the RTC.
RTC ordered the rescission of the MOA. CA reversed the RTC decision and held that RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action since BED has the power to decide on the issue.
This prompted petitioner to appeal to SC.
ISSUE:
Which tribunal has jurisdiction over cases involving energy resources?
RULING:
The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view"
The question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating
contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter.
GSIS v. CSC
POWER TO EXECUTE IS INCLUDED IN THE GRANT F ADJUDICATORY POWER FACTS:
GSIS dismissed 6 employees for being notoriously undesirable. 5 of them appealed to the Merits System Board which
found the dismissal to be illegal due to lack of formal charges and opportunity to answer. CSC also denied the appeal. In
the SC, the appeal was also dismissed but it modified the CSC resolution ordering that the payment of back salaries to the
employees be eliminated pending the outcome of the proceedings in the GSIS.
2 of the concerned employees passed away. When the decision of the SC became final, the heirs of the employees filed a
motion for execution. The ME with respect to back wages was granted by CSC despite the opposition of GSIS.
GSIS appealed to the SC contending the CSC has no power to execute its judgment and final orders aside from the
allegation that the execution of CSC is contrary to the resolution of the court.
ISSUE:
May the CSC execute its judgment and resolutions? (Yes) RULING:
CSC is a constitutional commission. It also exercises quasi-judicial powers, as such it has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases originally instituted or on appeal. Corollary to such power is the authority to promulgate
rules concerning practice before it.
21
The CSC rules provide that decision in administrative disciplinary cases shall be immediately executory UNLESS a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed.
Tthe authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried
out.
Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally
and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the
law otherwise provides.
PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS

A REPLEVIN PENDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING VIOLATES THE EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES FACTS:
Private respondent’s truck was seized by DENR personnel due because of the unexplained forest products concealed in
the truck. An order of confiscation was issued by the CENRO officer. The order was appealed to the Regional Director
which affirmed the confiscation. Pending appeal to the Sec. of DENR, private respondents instituted a civil action for
replevin with the RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of the principle of exhaustion of remedies. RTC, however,
denied the motion. The same was appealed to the CA which also dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
May a court entertain a civil action for replevin pending an administrative proceeding concerning the same property? (No)
RULING:
The invocation of court’s jurisdiction without exhausting all administrative remedies renders the action premature. The
exceptions to the principle of exhaustion does not come into play. There is no violation of due process because respondents
were given opportunity to be heard. There is neither lack of authority to seize, the laws expressly and broadly give DENR
officers the power to seize and confiscate.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES: Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court's
judicial power can be sought,
RATIONALE BEHIND EXHAUSTION: This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give
the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES: However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. It is disregarded:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
22
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
A QUESTION INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION IS PURELY LEGAL AND
NEED NO EXHAUST ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FACTS:
Valmonet wrote to GSIS Gen. Manager
Belmonte requesting for the list of names of opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of 2M on guaranty
of Mrs. Marcos.
The counsel of GSIS denied the request on the ground that the list is confidential. This prompted petitioner to file a petition
with the SC.
Petitioner invokes the Right to Information under the Constitution. Respondent opposes on the ground that petitioner failed
to exhaust the remedies when it did not seek a review from the Board of the GSIS, hence no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Is exhaustion of remedies necessary in cases of purely legal question? (No) RULING:
Before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only
a question of law is involved.
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is
one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees.
MANGUBAT v. OSMENA
FACTS:
PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE LILAGAN

AN ACTION FOR REPLEVIN MUST BE
DISMISSED PENDING AN
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE PROPERTY FACTS:
M/L Hadija docked at Tacloban where it intended to unload 100 tons of tanbark. NBI agents found the documents irregular
thus the cargo, the boat and the cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
An criminal complaint was also filed against the appropriate parties. Thereafter, complainant also directed the
seizure of the aforementioned properties pending preliminary investigation (an administrative proceeding).
The consignee filed with RTC a case for replevin. Respondent judge issued a writ of replevin.
ISSUE:
May a judge issue a writ of replevin pending a preliminary investigation? (No) RULING:
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel on which it was loaded were
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. This, inter alia, allegations would have been sufficient to alert
respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already
been commenced concerning the shipment.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence. Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him.
ARROW TRANSPORTATION v. BOT

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEED NOT BE EXHAUSTED IF THERE IS AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS FACTS:
Petitioner is a holder of a certificate of public convenience for a line from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport. Private
respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car applied for the same certificate. Without the required publication, the public respondent
(BOT) issued a provisional permit to operate such service.
23
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its final resolution, petitioner filed an action with the SC on
the ground that only a legal question was involved.
ISSUE:
Is the petition ripe for judicial determination absent a resolution on the MR?
RULING:
Ordinarily, an MR’s resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity can be raised.
This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the
issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.
It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or not
the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due process
requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes apparent.
KBMPBM v DOMINGUEZ
THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DECISIONS MADE BY A QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENT
SUCH AS THE SECRETARY FACTS:
Petitioner and Muntinlupa entered into a contract granting the former the management and operation of the New Muntinlupa
public market. When a new mayor assumed office, he declared that the Municipality was taking over the management and
operation of the market. The controversy began when an order was served upon petitioners. The order was made by the
respondent Secretary of
Agriculture. This prompted the petitioner to file a petition with the SC alleging that the respondent acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction. Bunye claims that petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for petitioner to appeal to the
President before invoking court’s jurisdiction?
RULING:
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him.
This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need
then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question
involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. HERVILLA

COURT MAY NOT NULLIFY A TITLE GRANTED BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY PENDING PROCEEDINGS IN
COURT
FACTS:
Hervillla filed an action for recovery of possession against Dole Philippines involving several parcels of land in possession
of Dole Philippines as administrator of the petitioner, NDC. The RTC ruled in favor of NDC. CA reversed the decision.
Pending CA proceedings, however, Bureau of Lands issued free patents in favor of NDC’s predecessor-in-interest.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that the finding of the BOL must bind the court and the court cannot declare the
title issued as null and void.
ISSUE:
May the court nullify a title issued by an administrative body pending proceeding in said court? (No)
May court interfere with the decision of the Director of Land? (No.) RULING:
The action of respondent became moot and academic when the BOL issued title to petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest.
Records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did
he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the
President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is
fatal to a court review.
24
The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer interfere with such decision.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING v. FACTORAN

FINDING OF FACTS BY ADMNISTRATIVE
BODIES SHOULD NOT BE DISTRUBED IF
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE FACTS:
A dispute began between Atlas Consolidated and Private respondent Buqueron regarding the registration of mining claims.
A petition for an adverse claim was filed by petitioner against private respondent due to overlapping mining claims. The
Director of Mines ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Minister of Natural Resources reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Atlas. On further appeal to the Office of the
President, the Deputy Executive Secretary reversed the decision and reinstated the decision of the Mines and Geo Science.
ISSUE:
Is the decision of the Director of Mines supported by substantial evidence? (Yes) RULING:
A question of fact is best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the implementation of the law
they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported
by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence
is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Finding of fact in administrative decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is
justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the
administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally
instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned, the
findings of fact in this case must be respected.
CARPIO v. EXEC. SECRETARY

THE NAPOLCOM RETAINS CONTROL OVER THE PNP MEMBERS DESPITE THE CREATION OF PLEB FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of RA 6975 which established the PNP under the
DILG.
Among others, petitioner contends that the grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the People’s Law
Enforcement Boards (PLEB) and city and municipal mayors derogates the NAPOLCOM’s power of control over the PNP.
ISSUE:
Is the law unconstitutional?
RULING:
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional appellate boards, over
decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission
which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct of
its hearings, and it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the
PLEBs.
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against erring officers and members of
the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city, and municipality would all the more help professionalize the police
force.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS INC v. IAC

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEED NOT BE EXHAUSTED IN CASE TRIBUNAL ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION FACTS:
A protracted litigation ensued between petitioner corporation and Guillermo Luis Roxas over the ownership of Hidden Valley
Springs Resort. During the pendency of the proceeding, Guillermo Roxas doing business under the name MJB Food and
Services obtained a license from the DOT to operate the restaurant at the Hidden Valley Springs Resort.
25
This prompted petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. Petitioner contends that the public respondents acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the license contrary to the rules and regulations concerning the operations of
resorts in the country. Respondent contends that was not required to submit a contract of lease.
ISSUE:
Can an administrative body issue license, pending litigation concerning the ownership of the subject of the license? (No.)
RULING:
It is a recognized principle that courts of justice will generally not interfere in executive and administrative matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies, such as, the grant of licenses, permits, leases, or the
approval, rejection or revocation of applications therefor.
Public respondents undeniably had knowledge prior to the issuance of the license to Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS that
the subject restaurant was owned by petitioner and presently leased to Valley Resort Corporation, and that Guillermo
Roxas and/or MJBFS' right to possess and operate the restaurant was the subject of a pending litigation.
The grant is arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES v. SINSUAT

ADMINISTRATIVES REMEDIES NEED NO BE EXHAUSTED IF THE BODY WAS IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Bureau of Supply advertised Invitations to
Bid calling for 8 trucks which are factory-built. The invitation was subsequently amended, this time including local
manufactured trucks.
Petitioner and another bidder DELTA participated in the process. It was awarded to IPSI. DELTA protested the award on
the ground that they were not factory built. The dispute reached the Sec. of General Services which ruled in favor of DELTA.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the CFI. Respondent contends that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Did the Secretary acted in excess of jurisdiction thereby excluding the case from the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies?
RULING:
There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies when the office from which appeal is taken acted in excess of
jurisdiction. In this case, respondent Secretary totally disregarded that fact the DELTA was in estoppel when it participated
in the bidding despite knowledge of the alleged fault in petitioner’s bid. It also disregarded the law conferring preferential
status to locally manufactured supplies.
AXIOMS GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CERTIORARI: first, that before said actions may be entertained in the
courts of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted;
and second, that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the
administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies, these being: (1) where
the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
latter's implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. COLLECTOR

OF CUSTOMS
THERE IS NO NEED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS FACTS:
National Devt Co. is the owner of a steamship which was apprehended by the Collector of Customs due to the alleged
violation of customs law. A correspondence ensued between plaintiff and defendant. The controversy began when the
Collector of
Customs imposed a fine of PHP 5,000 on the vessel and ordered its payment otherwise the vessel will be detained.
26
This prompted plaintiff to file a petition for certiorari with the CFI on the ground that there was neither an investigation nor
hearing conducted by the defendant. Defendant argued that plaintiff failed to exhaust all remedies (appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs).
CFI ruled in favor of NDC.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to exhaust administrative remedies when no investigation or hearing was conducted by the administrative
body prior an imposition of fine? (No)
RULING:
Even in administrative proceeding due process should be observed. By imposing a fine without exercising due process
(investigation and hearing), respondent acted improvidently.
While as a rule, exhaustion of administrative remedies must be done before court’s jurisdiction may be invoked, the same
is not necessary if there is an utter disregard of the principle of due process.
In such case, an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is not in reality a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

CASE INVOLVING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS A PURELY LEGAL QUESTION, THERE IS NO NEED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FACTS:
Pursuant to a COMELEC resolution limiting the size of election posters, Election Officer wrote to the Diocese of Bacolod
concerning their Team Patay/ Buhay poster allegedly in excess of the limit imposed by the resolution.
COMELELC Law Dept. issued a letter ordering its immediate removal otherwise an election protest will be filed.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution, petitioners initiated a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the COMELEC Rules.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to exhaust remedies in case of alleged violation of a constitutional right? (No)
RULING:
The principle of exhaustion of remedies yields in order to protect the fundamental right of free speech. Moreover, it is a
settled rule that exhaustion is not necessary when what is involved is purely legal question or there is an urgency of judicial
intervention.
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allege that the assailed
issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely
legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering
the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies
in this case would be unreasonable.
27

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY.

U.S. v. ANG TANG HO

LLDA v. COURT OF APPEALS

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CO.

QUASI- LEGISLATIVE POWER:

It cannot be simplistically argued that

QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER

SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER &

ANG TIBAY v. CIR

ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ

(1) when there is a violation of due process,

PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE LILAGAN

CARPIO v. EXEC. SECRETARY

NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

U.S. v. ANG TANG HO

LLDA v. COURT OF APPEALS

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CO. v.

QUASI- LEGISLATIVE POWER:

BAUTISTA v. JUINIO, EDU, RAMOS

PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION v.

CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO

HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION v. DEFENSOR

QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER

SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER &

GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC

PHIL. ASSOC. OF LAWYERS v.

SEC. OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

ANG TIBAY v. CIR

MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ

PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS

(1) when there is a violation of due process,

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ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING v. FACTORAN

CARPIO v. EXEC. SECRETARY

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INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES v. SINSUAT

NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. COLLECTOR

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