The National Interest Fall 1997 n49 p23(7) Page 1

Four faces of global culture.

by Peter L. Berger

A cultural dimension exists in tandem with the phenomenon of increasing economic globalization.
Some people hope that a global civil society leading to a more peaceful world will eventually
result from the emergence and development of a global culture. Some fear cultural globalization
because of a perceived homogenization to which the world’s otherwise rich diversity of societies
could be reduced. It is hypothesized that there are at least four different processes of cultural
globalization which are simultaneously occurring, of which Protestant evangelicalism is the most
aggressive.

© COPYRIGHT 1997 The National Affairs, Inc. But there is also fear attached to the prospect of cultural
globalization, fear of a worldwide "airport culture" in which
The term "globalization" has become somewhat of a the rich diversity of human civilizations will be
cliche. It serves to explain everything from the woes of the homogenized and vulgarized. This fear has been vocalized
German coal industry to the sexual habits of Japanese in the rhetoric of "Asian values" that has attained a certain
teenagers. Most cliches have a degree of factual validity; political significance in recent years, as well as in the
so does this one. There can be no doubt about the fact of rhetoric of the various movements of Islamic resurgence.
an ever more interconnected global economy, with vast Similar fear, in less virulent form, can be observed
social and political implications, and there is no shortage of elsewhere, for example in the worries about cultural
thoughtful, if inconclusive, reflection about this great homogenization among Euroskeptics. One of the
transformation. It has also been noted that there is a arguments made by those who opposed Austria’s joining
cultural dimension, the obvious result of an immense the European Union was that Austrians would no longer be
increase in worldwide communication. If there is economic able to refer to potatoes as Erdapfel, a homey word that
globalization, there is also cultural globalization. To say was suddenly imbued with the genius of Austrian identity,
this, however, is only to raise the question of what such a but would have to use the High German word Kartoffeln.
phenomenon amounts to. Of course this was silly. But the desire to preserve distinct
cultural traditions and a distinct cultural identity in the
Again, there can be no doubt about some of the facts. One intense economic and political pressure cooker of the new
can watch CNN in an African safari lodge. German Europe is not silly at all. The fear, like the hope, is not
investors converse in English with Chinese apparatchiks. without foundation.
Peruvian social workers spout the rhetoric of American
feminism. Protestant preachers are active in India, while A more nuanced understanding of cultural globalization will
missionaries of the Hare Krishna movement return the have to take account of both the homogenizing forces and
compliment in Middle America. Both hope and fear attach the resistances to them. Benjamin Barber made a move
to these facts. toward such an understanding in his book Jihad vs.
McWorld (1995). Most recently, and in a more subtle way,
The hope is that a putative global culture will help to create Samuel Huntington has discussed the same issues in his
a more peaceful world. If a global culture is in the making, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
then perhaps a global civil society might come into being. (1996), a book to which the present observations are
Ever since John Locke re-emerged from Eastern Europe greatly indebted. Huntington, whose view of the
speaking with a Polish accent, a great amount of hope has contemporary world cannot be accused of being overly
been invested in the notion of civil society, that optimistic, ends his book with a call to search for
agglomerate of intermediate institutions that Tocqueville commonalities between the contending civilizations, a
saw as the foundation of a vital democracy. Civil society dialogue of cultures. One need not agree with every
depends on a consensus on civic virtues, and that, after aspect of his analysis to agree with his conclusion. A
all, is what a culture is supposed to supply. The French dialogue between cultures, however, presupposes a
sociologist Daniele Hervieu-Leger (in her contribution to clearer understanding of all the processes at work, both
the forthcoming volume The Limits of Social Cohesion, those of cultural globalization and of resistance to it. It is
edited by me) speaks of an "ecumenism of human rights." proposed here that there are at least four distinct
The same idea is conveyed in a much cruder form by the processes of cultural globalization going on
advertisements of the Benetton company. Whether the simultaneously, relating in complex ways both to each
idea is couched in sophisticated or crude terms, it too has other and to the many indigenous cultures on which they
an evident factual basis. It is also reasonable to hope that impinge.
a world in which there would be a greater consensus on
human rights would also be a more peaceful world. Davos: From Boardroom to Bedroom
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The National Interest Fall 1997 n49 p23(7)
Four faces of global culture.
First is what Huntington nicely calls the "Davos culture"
(after the annual World Economic Summit that meets in
that Swiss luxury resort). This culture is globalized as a
direct accompaniment of global economic processes. Its
carrier is international business. It has obvious behavioral
aspects that are directly functional in economic terms,
behavior dictated by the accoutrements of contemporary
business. Participants in this culture know how to deal with
computers, cellular phones, airline schedules, currency
exchange, and the like. But they also dress alike, exhibit
the same amicable informality, relieve tensions by similar
attempts at humor, and of course most of them interact in
English. Since most of these cultural traits are of Western
(and mostly American) provenance, individuals coming
from different backgrounds must go through a process of
socialization that will allow them to engage in this behavior
with seemingly effortless spontaneity. This is not always
easy. A growing number of consultants in "diversity
management" are making a good living advising
corporations on how to affect this sort of socialization as
smoothly as possible.
But it would be a mistake to think that the "Davos culture"
operates only in the offices, boardrooms, and hotel suites
in which international business is transacted. It carries
over into the lifestyles and presumably also the values of
those who participate in it. Thus, for example, the frenetic
pace of contemporary business is carried over into the
leisure activities and the family life of business people.
There is a yuppie style in the corporation, but also in the
bodybuilding studio and in the bedroom. And notions of
costs, benefits, and maximization spill over from work into
private life.
The "Davos culture" is a culture of the elite and (by way of
what sociologists call "anticipatory socialization") of those
aspiring to join the elite. Its principal social location is in
the business world, but since elites intermingle, it also
affects at least the political elites. There is, as it were, a
yuppie internationale. Some years ago, while the apartheid
regime was still in power in South Africa, a friend of mine
had lunch with a representative of the African National
Congress at the United Nations. To my friend’s surprise,
this individual spent most of the lunch talking about
apartment costs in Manhattan. While this yuppification of a
representative of what then still understood itself as an
anti-capitalist revolutionary movement might have had an
ironic aspect, it was a cultural trait that turned out to be
very useful a few years later. A number of people from
both sides have reported how, when they first met, young
ANC exiles and young Afrikaners were surprised by their
similar lifestyle preferences and personal values. These
were certainly not derived from their respective historical
traditions; rather, they were, precisely, commonalities
rooted in the "Davos culture." There have been similar
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reports about the first meetings between young Israelis
and Palestinians leading up to the Oslo agreements.
Whether one is edified by this spectacle or not, it may be
that commonalities in taste make it easier to find common
ground politically.
While cultural globalization facilitates interaction between
elites, it creates difficulties between these elites and the
non-elite populations with whom they must deal. Many
moral and ideological conflicts in contemporary societies
pit an elite culture against a resentful mass of culturally
accredited and economically underprivileged people. As
Huntington points out, these resentments may lead to the
emergence of a nationalist or religious counter-elite. Also,
individuals who participate in the "Davos culture" with
reasonable success vary in their ability to balance this
participation with other parts of their lives. While some, as
previously pointed out, may allow yuppie behavior and
values to inundate their private lives, others seek more
complicated compromises. On my last visit to Hong Kong I
happened to stray into a Buddhist temple and came upon
a truly graphic vignette: In front of an altar, facing a large
statue of the Buddha, stood a middle-aged man wearing a
dark business suit over stocking feet. He was burning
incense and at the same time talking on his cellular phone.
Faculty Club International
Both critics and advocates of contemporary global
capitalism mainly think in terms of the "Davos culture" and
its ramifications in popular culture ("Davos" in interaction
with "McWorld"). Yet there are at least two other quite
different types of cultural globalization going on. One of
these is what one might call the "faculty club culture."
Essentially, this is the internationalization of the Western
intelligentsia, its values and ideologies. To put it
graphically, if the "Davos culture" tries to sell computer
systems in India, the "faculty club culture" tries to promote
feminism or environmentalism there - a rather different
agenda.
While this culture has also penetrated the business world
(and in turn has been penetrated by it), its principal carrier
is not business. Rather, it is carried by foundations,
academic networks, non-governmental organizations, and
some governmental and multinational agencies (such as
development agencies with social and cultural missions). It
too is primarily an elite culture, though here again there
are those who aspire to it from the lower echelons of
cultural enterprises (say, schoolteachers or social workers
who read the books and periodicals that reflect the views
emanating from the great cultural centers).
More importantly, the "faculty club culture" spreads its
beliefs and values through the educational system, the
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The National Interest Fall 1997 n49 p23(7)
Four faces of global culture.
legal system, various therapeutic institutions, think tanks,
and at least some of the media of mass communication. If
this culture internationalizes the Western intelligentsia, it
also internationalizes the conflicts in which this
intelligentsia has been engaged on its home territories.
James Hunter has written very insightfully about the
American "culture wars" (first in his 1991 book with that
title). These conflicts can now be observed worldwide,
though always of course subject to local modifications.
A good example of this second process of cultural
globalization is the anti-smoking movement, arguably one
of the most successful movements in developed societies
over the last twenty years or so. Before then it was a
small, marginal sect, hardly noticed in public discourse;
today, especially in North America and Western Europe, it
has largely achieved the goal proclaimed early on by one
of its spokesmen - to make smoking an activity engaged in
privately by consenting adults. The reasons for this
stunning success need not concern us here. The point is
that this movement, clearly a product of Western
intellectuals, was disseminated worldwide by an alliance of
governmental and non-governmental organizations. In a
series of conferences, the World Health Organization
propagated the anti-smoking cause internationally. At one
of the early conferences the travel expenses of all
participants from developing societies were paid by the
Scandinavian development agencies (the conference was
held in Stockholm). These participants, mostly from health
and education ministries, came from countries with
horrendous health problems and the campaign against
smoking was not high on their list of priorities. As was to
be expected, they re-ordered their priorities given the
incentives to do so. Ironically, the concepts of net-Marxist
dependency theory, which have not been very good at
interpreting the transformations of advanced capitalism, fit
rather well in the globalization of the "faculty club culture."
Here there is overwhelming "dependency", with an
indigenous "comprador class" carrying out the agendas
devised in the cultural centers of the "metropolis."
There are obvious tensions between the first and second
processes of cultural globalization. Clearly, the
anti-smoking movement collides with the interests of the
tobacco industry. More generally, both feminism and
environmentalism collide with notions of economic
efficiency held by the international economic elite. At this
time, the most visible conflict is between the "ecumenism
of human rights", carried out by a multitude of
nongovernmental organizations, and the belief of the
"Davos culture" that all good things, including human
rights, will eventually result from the global establishment
of successful market economies. And of course there are
also tensions between the "faculty club culture" and
various indigenous movements of cultural revitalization.
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The recent women’s conference in Beijing pitted mostly
Western feminists against an odd alliance of Islamists and
the Vatican. Most significant politically, the
Western-centered human rights community is meeting with
strong opposition in a sizable number of non-Western
countries.
The McWorld Culture
Third, of course, is popular culture. Here Barber’s term
"McWorld" fits best. And it is this culture that is most
credibly subsumed under the category of Westernization,
since virtually all of it is of Western, and more specifically
American, provenance. Young people throughout the
world dance to American music, wiggling their behinds in
American jeans and wearing T-shirts with messages (often
misspelled) about American universities and other
consumer items. Older people watch American sitcoms on
television and go to American movies. Everyone, young
and old, grows taller and fatter on American fast foods.
Here indeed is a case of cultural hegemony, and it is not
surprising that others, such as French ministers of culture
and Iranian mullahs (not to mention the now defunct Soviet
Komsomol functionaries), greatly resent the fact.
These critics of "cultural imperialism" also understand that
the diffusion of popular culture is not just a matter of
outward behavior. It carries a significant freight of beliefs
and values. Take the case of rock music. Its attraction is
not just due to a particular preference for loud, rhythmic
sound and dangerously athletic dancing. Rock music also
symbolizes a whole cluster of cultural values - concerning
self-expression, spontaneity, released sexuality, and,
perhaps most importantly, defiance of the alleged
stodginess of tradition. The consumption of American
popular culture has, as it were, sacramental character.
Paraphrasing the Book of Common Prayer, these items of
consumption are visible signs of an invisible grace - or
curse. The hegemony becomes clear by the asymmetry of
consumption. Mexicans eat hamburguesas, Americans eat
tacos. But the Mexicans are consuming whole chunks of
American values "in, with, and under" the American
hamburgers; the Americans are certainly not absorbing
non-culinary aspects of Mexican culture by eating tacos.
A couple of years ago, I met a representative of Hallmark
greeting cards for the Chinese province of Guandong (a
market of some sixty million people). He was happy to
report that his product was selling very well. When asked
which greeting cards were most popular, he said Valentine
cards. "You see, young Chinese men are quite shy with
members of the opposite sex. It is difficult for them to
express their feelings. It is much easier to send a
Valentine card." I did not know what to say to this and
mumbled something about how there must be a lot of work
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Four faces of global culture.
translating the texts into Chinese. "Oh no", he said, "they
want the cards to be in English."
The people in charge of the globalization of popular culture
are, of course, members or aspiring members of the
"Davos" elite. The aforementioned Hallmark representative
evinced all the characteristics of a successful, with-it
yuppie. But the consumers of these cultural exports are a
vastly broader population. The indigenous reactions once
again vary from complete acceptance to complete
rejection, with many degrees of compromise in between.
Complete acceptance generally leads to a conflict between
the generations, and presumably an important motive for
such acceptance among young people is to outrage one’s
parents. Complete rejection is difficult, even under
repressive regimes (the Komsomol functionaries, after
trying repression, finally had to compromise by inventing
something they would call "Soviet rock"). There are many
and complex degrees of compromise, some of them
puzzling to the outsider.
A few years ago I visited the Meiji Grand Shrine in Tokyo. I
was in the company of my hosts, who were pious
adherents of Shinto. When inviting me to go to the Shrine
with them, they asked me solicitously whether my religious
feelings would be offended by their venerating the Meiji
Emperor; I replied courteously (and perhaps rashly) that
this would be quite all right. I then stood with them, holding
incense sticks in my hands and bowing to the deafening
accompaniment of drums being beaten by a row of Shinto
priests lined up behind us. I re-emerged from the Shrine
somewhat dazed, reflecting that I had just been praying to
a dead Japanese potentate. Outside the Shrine was a
large park filled with hundreds of young people, fervently
dancing to rock music blaring from numerous portable
radios. I had noticed some young people inside the Shrine
and wondered whether they were now joining the crowd in
the park. I asked my hosts whether they saw any
contradiction between what was going on inside and
outside the Shrine. They were actually puzzled by my
question. Certainly not, they replied after a moment of
reflection, "Japanese culture has always been successful
in integrating elements coming from abroad." One of the
most interesting questions about contemporary Japan is
whether my hosts were correct in their sanguine view
about the absorptive capacity of Japanese culture.
Evangelical Protestantism
Fourthly (though perhaps not finally), a distinctive process
of globalization is provided by Evangelical Protestantism,
especially in its Pentecostal version (which accounts for
something like 80 percent of its worldwide growth). Its
globalizing force is best seen by comparing it with the
other dynamic religious phenomenon of our time, that of
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the Islamic resurgence. While the latter has been limited to
countries that have always been Muslim and to Muslim
diaspora communities, Evangelical Protestantism has
been exploding in parts of the world to which this religious
tradition has always been alien, indeed, mostly unknown.
The most dramatic explosion has occurred in Latin
America (it was magisterially described in David Martin’s
1990 book, Tongues of Fire). But the same variety of
Protestantism has been rapidly growing in East Asia (with
the notable exception of Japan), in all the Chinese
societies (including, despite repression, the People’s
Republic), in the Philippines, the South Pacific, and
throughout sub-Saharan Africa. There are recent, as yet
vague, accounts of an incipient growth in Eastern Europe.
And while the origins of this religion are in the United
States (the "metropolis"), its new incarnations are
thoroughly indigenized and independent of foreign
missionaries or financial support.
Evangelical Protestantism brings about a cultural
revolution in its new territories (in that respect it is very
different from its social function on its American
homeground). It brings about radical changes in the
relations between men and women, in the upbringing and
education of children, in the attitudes toward traditional
hierarchies. Most importantly, it inculcates precisely that
"Protestant ethic" that Max Weber analyzed as an
important ingredient in the genesis of modern capitalism -
a disciplined, frugal, and rationally oriented approach to
work. Thus, despite its indigenization (converts in Mexico
and Guatemala sing American gospel songs in Mayan
translation), Evangelical Protestantism is the carrier of a
pluralistic and modernizing culture whose original location
is in the North Atlantic societies.
It is not clear at this point how this startlingly new
phenomenon relates to the previously enumerated
processes of cultural globalization. It certainly enters into
conflicts with indigenous cultures. Most of the persecution
of Christians recently publicized by human rights
organizations - notably in China, in the Islamic world, and
(sporadically) in Latin America - has been directed against
Evangelical Protestants. What is clear is that this type of
Protestantism is creating a new international culture,
increasingly self-conscious as such (here the relation to
American Evangelicals is relevant), with vast social,
economic, and political ramifications. While the new
Protestantism should not be misunderstood as a
movement of social protest or reform (its motives are
overwhelmingly personal and religious), it has large and
unintended consequences. These are decidedly favorable
to pluralism, to the market economy, and to democracy. It
should be observed here that there may be other
globalizing popular movements, but Evangelicalism is
clearly the most dynamic.
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The National Interest Fall 1997 n49 p23(7)
Four faces of global culture.
Four faces of globalization: each is distinctive, each relates
to the other three in complex ways. Yet they have
important common features. The two perhaps most
important features have already been mentioned - their
Western, principally American, provenance, and related to
this, their relation to the English language.
The Western provenance of these processes has given
credibility to the frequent charge that they are part and
parcel of Western imperialism, with the United States
being the core of this malevolent phenomenon. The
charge will not hold up. The "Davos culture" is today fully
internationalized. It is centered as much in Tokyo and
Singapore as it is in New York and London. One could
more plausibly speak of an imperialism of the global
capitalist system, but that is simply to attach a pejorative
term to the fact of an immensely powerful global reality.
The concepts of neo-Marxist theory simply do not fit it. As
already mentioned, those concepts are somewhat more
apt in describing the globalization of the "faculty club
culture." Feminist or environmentalist agitators in
Bangladesh can indeed be described as agents of a
Western-based "cultural imperialism", but it is difficult to
see how their activity benefits global capitalism.
Multinational corporations do indeed make large profits
from the distribution of popular culture, but there is no
coercion involved in their success. No one is forcing
Japanese teenagers to enjoy rock music or young men in
China to express their emotions in terms derived from
American romanticism.
Claudio Veliz (in his 1994 book The New World of the
Gothic Fox) has made this point very tellingly in his
description of the collapse of Latin American tradition
before the onslaught of "Anglo-Saxon" values and
lifestyles, notably those connected with a pluralistic
society. He has used a good metaphor to denote this
process, proposing that "Anglo-Saxon" culture is now in its
"Hellenistic" phase. That is, it is no longer diffused by
means of imperial power, British or American; rather, it has
become a cultural force in itself, with large numbers of
people clamoring to share it. As to Evangelical
Protestantism, both leftist intellectuals and Roman Catholic
bishops have portrayed it as a gigantic CIA plot, especially
in Latin America, but a look at the empirical evidence
presents a very different picture, one of a vital,
autonomous movement no longer dependent on support
from the outside.
If cultural globalization today represents the "Hellenistic"
phase of a civilization originating in the northern parts of
Europe and America, the English language is its koine (the
"basic Greek" that served as the lingua franca of late
classical antiquity and that, among other things, became
the language of the New Testament). We live, as Veliz
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puts it, in "a world made in English", and he points out that
no other language appears to be a viable successor to
English in the foreseeable future. By now there are very
straightforward practical reasons for this hegemony of the
English language. However much this may enrage
intellectuals in certain places (France, for example, or
Quebec), English has become the medium of international
economic, technological, and scientific communication.
The millions of people learning English all over the world
do so in order to participate in this global communication,
not (with few exceptions) because they want to read
Shakespeare or Melville in the original. However, one does
not use a language innocently. Every language carries a
freight of values, of sensibilities, of approaches to reality,
all of which insinuate themselves into the consciousness of
those who speak it. It makes sense to assume that the
attractiveness of English, especially in its American form,
is due at least in part to its capacity to express the
sensibilities of a dynamic, pluralistic, and rationally
innovative world. This is even true of Evangelical
Protestantism, which mostly expresses itself in languages
other than English, but whose leaders and young people
learn English in order to be in touch with the Evangelical
centers in the United States. In doing so, they may get
more than they bargained for. The road from the Christian
Broadcasting Network to Oprah Winfrey is disturbingly
straight.
The picture I have sketched is huge and exceedingly
complex. There are many aspects of it that are not yet fully
understood. There is a very large research agenda here.
But one conclusion can be ventured: If one is to heed
Huntington’s call for a dialogue between cultures, one
must pay as much attention to the manner in which the
different processes of cultural globalization relate to each
other as to their relation with many indigenous cultures.
This then will not just be a dialogue between "the West
and the rest", but a considerably more complicated
enterprise.
Peter L. Berger is professor of sociology and director of
the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston
University.
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