Looking for a quick fix

How weak social auditing

is keeping workers in sweatshops

Clean Clothes Campaign

“Auditing is more about securing orders than
improving the welfare of the workers, that is why
the management only make cosmetic changes
to impress the auditors and not to better the
conditions of workers.” Worker, Factory A, Kenya, producing
for Wal-Mart and Sears “Before you came, I have been
interviewed by at least three different people and
they all asked me if I was a contract employee
or a regular one. If they were auditors and have
Looking for a quick fix
not taken any concrete steps about it then it is How weak social auditing
quite useless.” Worker, Factory C, Pakistan, producing for is keeping workers in sweatshops
KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart “Whenever social
auditors come to this factory, we are given holiday.”
Worker, Factory C, India, producing for KarstadtQuelle, Kingel, Derma

Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods “New or young looking

workers would be arranged for paid leave during
the audit lest they did not behave properly during
the audit.” Research on Factory C in China, producing for
Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic Committee “All the
twenty-one workers interviewed ... said that no
improvements had been made in the health and
safety situation in the factory since they joined the
factory.” Research report from SA8000-accredited factory, north
India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC

Clean Clothes Campaign

COLOFON
This report is the result of extensive collaboration between the Clean Clothes
Campaign and the researchers from the countries profiled. Our special thanks go
to the workers who gave of their precious, very limited, free time, and those
managers and auditors who shared their experiences with the researchers.

We are grateful to the research organizations for their contributions: Centre for
Education and Communication (India), Kenya Human Rights Commission (Kenya),
Org. “AUR” - National Association of Human Resources Specialists (Romania), Alter-
native Movement for Resources and Freedom Society (Bangladesh), Pakistan Insti-
tute of Labour Education and Research (Pakistan), Social Awareness and
Voluntary Education (India), Association Attawassoul and Saâd Belghazi (Morocco),
Urban Community Mission (Indonesia) and Labour Action China (Hong Kong).

Principal writer: Duncan Pruett

With contributions from: Jeroen Merk, Ineke Zeldenrust and Esther de Haan.
Thanks for the support and comments from Martin Hearson, Christa de Bruin,
Joel Lindefors and Cliff Ip.
Editor: Nina Ascoly
Designer: Annelies Vlasblom, Amsterdam
Printing: PrimaveraQuint, Amsterdam

This publication was made possible through funding of the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The content reflects the views of the Clean Clothes Campaign,
Table of
not necessarily of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

© 2005 Clean Clothes Campaign

Contents
n
es Campaig
Clean Cloth

Contact information:
Clean Clothes Campaign Phone: + 31 20 41 22 785
PO Box 11584 Fax: + 31 20 41 22 786
1001 GN Amsterdam E-mail: info@cleanclothes.org
The Netherlands Website: www.cleanclothes.org
4 5 Workers not being informed about their labour rights

Complaint mechanisms as a means of redress

Lack of skill and experience of auditing staff

48

49

50
00 Preface 7

04 The social audit industry: not transparent and unaccountable 53

01 Introduction and summary 11
Origin of the the social auditing industry 54

Global financial auditing firms 54

Quality control firms 55

Specialised social audit firms 56

Not-for-profit social audit organisations 57

02 Cheating and sloppy auditing 17
Size and growth: how many social audits are taking place? 58
Advance warning of audits make fraud and deception easier 20
Serious credibility problems 59
Fraud on wages, hours and contracts 24
Difficulties of overseeing a secretive industry 61
Model factories and hidden subcontractors 25

Corruption in some cases 25

Superficial visits by auditors 26

Abandoning the quest for the perfect audit? 28

05 Dumbing down: the trend towards excessive reliance on audits 63

Who is relying primarily on social auditing? 64

BSCI: is the retail industry looking for a quick fix? 64

Misleading claims 66
03 Why basic auditing is never enough 31
Weak multistakeholder round tables 67
Falling below the radar 32
Wrap: another attempt to lower the bar? 67
Freedom of association 33
ICS: french retailers band together 68
Insufficient provision of medical care and sick leave 38
Impressing consumers with claims of compliance 68
Discriminatory hiring practices and sexual harrasment 38
Avoiding the cost of compliance 70
Abuses related to wages and overtime 39
Are we forgetting the lessons learned? 72
Do workers have a real say? 41

The reality of worker interviews 41

Taking into account views of other local players 47

6 7
06 Social auditing that matters 73
Social auditing can be effective – the toolbox approach 74

Why we need more than auditing 74

Partnership with local organisations 75

Grievance and complaint mechanisms 77

Education and training 77

Address purchasing practices 78

A pro-active approach to freedom of association 79

Remediation 81

00
01
Need for transparency to help critique, improve, oversee 82

Don’t go it alone! 82

Building credibility: working in MSI’s 83

Boxes
The context for social auditing 19

What happens in a social audit 23 Titel van

07 Abbreviations 85
A series of admissions of the failure
Preface
het
of social auditing 27

Can you really measure the living wage? 40 hoofdstuk

How labor inspection has failed workers

in Swaziland and Madagascar 54

08 Bibliography 87
Interaction with government labour

inspections 55

Fair Wear Foundation Audit Teams 57

Auditors unwrapped in the Philippines 67

Spectrum disaster: a worst case scenario 71

09 Endnotes 93
8 9
The researchers followed a common research framework though there was some flex-
ibility in choosing factories and designing interview questions.

In addition the views of managers and auditors were sought. The researchers found
it was difficult to obtain interviews with managers and social auditors. Where the
researchers succeeded in interviewing managers in most cases the managers asked
that their names and factories be kept confidential. The few social auditors that grant-
ed interviews to the researchers made the same request.

670 workers from around 40 factories in Bangladesh, China, Kenya, India, Indonesia,
Morocco, Pakistan and Romania, participated in the research through focus groups
and interviews. It should be noted that among workers in the industry, there is a
climate of fear surrounding discussing working conditions.

The workers interviewed often overcame anxieties about revealing workplace informa-
tion and more often than not, in an industry riddled with overtime abuses, used up
precious hours of free time. This note from the Bangladeshi researchers about the
56 workers interviewed gives a flavour of the sacrifice involved:

To have adequate time from the workers was a challenging task in conducting this
study and almost all the time study team members had to hurry to free the respond-
ents as they could give time only after their long working hours. After working for a long
period workers become extremely tired, although the study team noted that workers
tried to provide as much time as they could. Some of the respondents were interviewed
at 9:00 p.m. before going to the factory for night shift work but were quite busy to do
their household work as well as to take necessary preparation to go to the factory for
This report is the result of a collaborative research effort, coordinated by the inter- night work.
national secretariat of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). CCC international part-
ner organisations (trade unions and non-governmental organisations) have strongly
pushed for better information on developments related to “social auditing”, the most
commonly-used tool to determine compliance with codes of conduct in workplaces
where garments and sports shoes are produced. The CCC believes that this informa-
tion is also of value to employers and buyers who have also expressed a need to
break the deadlock surrounding discussions related to social auditing. This need for
better-informed debate comes against a backdrop of only limited progress in improving
conditions for workers in garment and sport shoe industry supply chains, in spite of a
decade and a half of campaigning for change, and the continued use of social auditing
by many companies to help present themselves as socially responsible.

In 2004 terms of reference for a multi-country research project into the state of social
auditing were developed by the CCC International Secretariat. In 2005 research was
commissioned to take place in nine countries where substantial garment and sports
shoe production takes place.

All of the country-level research cited in the following chapters was carried out by local
organisations from the CCC partner network with long-term experience in working with
workers in supply chains. For this reason, the report highlights not only the views and
experiences of workers, but also the expert opinions of the research organisations.
10 11
In this report we have kept the names of the workers, managers and social auditors
confidential as was requested by some of the workers, researchers, managers and
social auditors, out of fear for repercussions, loss of orders or loss of auditing
assignments.

The CCC partner organisations involved in this research were:

3 Centre for Education and Communication (CEC), India
3 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Kenya
3 Org. “AUR” - National Association of Human Resources Specialists (ANSRU),
Romania
3 Alternative Movement for Resources and Freedom Society (AMRF Society),
Bangladesh
3 Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Pakistan
3 Social Awareness and Voluntary Education (SAVE), India
3 Association Attawassoul and Saâd Belghazi, Morocco
3 Urban Community Mission (UCM), Indonesia
3 Labour Action China, Hong Kong

01
The CCC and its partners are confident that this research will contribute to ongoing
reflection on how to improve practice and policy surrounding the use of social auditing,
and more broadly, on approaches to improving life for workers in garment and sports
shoe industry supply chains.

Introduction
and
Summary
12
Workers’
Quotes
“I remember the time when there was a
union in this factory…in the beginning
of 2000… At that time our working
conditions were very bad. Not that they
are any better now. We used to get
absolutely dirty water to drink… we
never had any appointment letter…
we were forced to do overtime. These
were the things that we demand should
be corrected…. But the management
succeeded in breaking the union.”
Worker, Factory A, north India,
SA8000-certified, producing for BCL,
Saki and RCC.
“I have been working (here) for more
than a year. Auditors visit the factory
but there is no visible change in our
working conditions... I have been having
a constant leg pain since I joined. I have
complained to the supervisors but have
not got time off to see the doctor.”
Worker, Factory D, north India, producing
for Wal-Mart, Kellwood and Sears
13
INTRODUCTION
Social audits to check working conditions in production facili-
ties emerged in the mid-1990s after a number of high profile
companies were widely scrutinized for substandard working
conditions in their supply chains. At that time, a growing
number of companies—for example Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss,
and C&A—had adopted codes of conduct that in essence
were pledges to prevent exploitation and abuse of workers
producing their goods. Labour advocates soon challenged
these companies to demonstrate conformity to the standards
they had adopted. Calls for independent, civil society based
forms of workplace assessments were made.
The large majority of companies ignored these calls and
actually did very little to implement or enforce their codes
of conduct. A few companies, however, started to use social
audit firms to inspect workplaces. This was met with little
enthusiasm from labour rights activists who suspected that
social audits were undertaken mainly to deceive the public.
Others questioned the effectiveness of the audits or feared
that social audits were mainly carried out as a form of risk
assessment.
Many of these fears were validated when researchers and
journalists reported on important flaws in social auditing
methods. They found that social audits typically failed to de-
tect important instances of non-compliance with labour stand-
ards. Workplaces that social auditors found to be in compli-
ance with standards were in fact no more than sweatshops.1
One decade down the road much has changed and yet stayed
the same.
Social audits have become a burgeoning practice within the
garment and sportswear industry. Tens of thousands of social
audits are commissioned annually by hundreds of brand-name
companies (“brands”) or retailers. A whole industry of com-
mercial social auditors, self-assigned experts, and quasi-
independent ethical enterprises has jumped on the social
audit bandwagon (see chapter 4).
On the positive side a number of companies have learned
from their own experiences as well as from the critics. They
have started to identify the limitations of social auditing
methods and have moved in the direction of a more com-
prehensive approach to improve working conditions. These
firms recognise the need for an overarching system to evalu-
ate company claims and to rise above the limits of corporate self-regulation. A few
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have been set up that bring together a variety of
business interests, NGOs and/or trade unions to try to develop (more) systematic
approaches to code implementation, monitoring and verification, as well as develop-
ing structures for accountability to civil society. This report will argue that only social
audits embedded in a comprehensive range of actions can be useful. These other
actions are covered in more detail in chapter 6.
Unfortunately, this comprehensive approach stands in sharp contrast with the current
standard practice of social auditing still utilised by many of the biggest players in the
industry.
As this report will show, the non-specialist retail sector (supermarkets, discount and
department stores) and mail order sectors and in particular are developing less strin-
gent models to implement codes of conduct.
It is in those contexts that unbranded retailers have managed to escape scrutiny, and
as a result have felt less pressure to behave in a responsible way toward the workers
employed in their supply chains. The social audit methods used by retailers such as
KarstadtQuelle (Germany) or Wal-Mart (United States). in fact are based on a seri-
ously flawed model largely discredited not only by labour rights advocates but also
by those within the industry who have had a longer-term involvement in this field but
on an extended scale. The impact of these programmes on working conditions is at
best superficial. Their approach seems for the most part to be minimalist—they tend
to invest as little time and money as possible, and more worryingly, they seem to be
promoting a “lowering of the bar”, in order to make it easier to tell consumers that
they are meeting goals for treating workers responsibly. A Chinese NGO identified this
phenomenon in interviews with managers in China:
The level of enthusiasm in implementing CSR among brand-name companies far ex-
ceeds that of retailers. Factory managers said that in the in-house verification person-
nel and independent auditors sent by brand-name companies investigated problems
quite thoroughly and could not easily be fobbed off. Checks by retailers, however, were
generally a little more lax. Workers…could clearly remember investigators from H&M
and New Look coming to their dormitories to interview them. Managers in two factories
said that Wal-Mart’s social responsibility inspection team only spends about three hours
at the factories, during which they verify wages, working hours and personnel records,
make a brief inspection tour of the factory, and meet three or four workers in the fac-
tory office’s reception room. They also said that Wal-Mart inspections were generally
quite easy to bluff, and that because Wal-Mart’s unit prices for orders are extremely low,
their inspection teams were not likely to seriously demand that the factory adhere to
the code of practice.2
In some cases, these companies fail to address, or turn a blind eye, to extreme abus-
es of workers, such as was the case in Bangladesh in April, when Spectrum Sweater
collapsed killing 64 workers. Workers report that their employers had made their lives
hell before the disaster. Workers were held in such low regard that their attempts to
raise the alarm about dangerous conditions prior to the collapse were simply ignored,
14
Workers’
Quotes
“Auditing is more about securing orders
than improving the welfare of the
workers, that is why the management
only make cosmetic changes to
impress the auditors and not to better
the conditions of workers.…”
Worker, Factory A, Kenya, producing for
Wal-Mart and Sears
“Before you came, I have been
interviewed by at least three different
people and they all asked me if I was a
contract employee or a regular one. If
they were auditors and have not taken
any concrete steps about it then it is
quite useless.”
Worker, Factory C, Pakistan, audited
under the AVE scheme, and producing
for KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and
Wal-Mart
“All the twenty-one workers interviewed
… said that no improvements had been
made in the health and safety situation
in the factory since they joined the
factory.”
Research report from SA8000-
accredited factory, north India,
producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
15
not just by factory management but by clients as well. The
factory had undergone at least one social audit by Carrefour
and had undergone a “quality audit” by KarstadtQuelle report-
edly done by international social auditing firm SGS.
This report is a critical assessment of the social audit system
adopted by these kind of companies.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 look at the ways in which factory
owners prepare for audits, worker perceptions of the process,
and the perceived impact of audits on working conditions. It
covers in some detail, using new field research, why social au-
diting is not achieving as much as was hoped, in spite of sig-
nificant discussion over the last 10 years by researchers, jour-
nalists and activists3 about whether social audits can accu-
rately assess labour conditions and encourage improvements.
In spite of this discussion, and in light of the evidence in this
report, it is clear that mainstream social auditing consistently
manages to miss crucial violations of workplace rights, in
particular regarding as “intangible” areas such as freedom of
association, working hours, abuse and harassment.
Chapter 4 looks at the global social auditing industry and as-
sesses its successes and failings over a decade of existence.
Chapter 5 considers current problematic trends toward over-
reliance on social auditing, and chapter 6 makes a series of
recommendations for companies and social auditors.
This research draws a number of key conclusions:
1. Social audits are failing to deliver as a tool for assessing
code compliance, particularly in determining violations of
freedom of association, excessive and forced overtime,
abusive treatment and discrimination of workers.
2. Workers and their organisations are marginalized in the
social audit process. Without their full participation in the
auditing process their concerns, particularly gender-
related concerns, are missed. Relevant local stakehold-
ers outside the factory such as trade unions and wom-
en’s and labour NGOs are rarely consulted or involved.
3. Social auditors are making it too easy for workplaces to
receive positive evaluations, particularly by announcing
audit visits in advance, thereby giving factory managers
time to prepare for audits and convey a false impression
of working conditions.
4. Factory managers are deceiving social auditors in many ways, most notably by
coaching workers before they are interviewed by auditors to convey false or incom-
plete information and by falsifying records.
5. Social audits are usually too short, too superficial and too sloppy to identify cer-
tain types of code violations.
6. Workers are badly informed about their rights, often too scared for their own jobs
to speak up about problems during audits, and generally do not have the possibil-
ity to file a complaint.
7. The vast majority of social audits is conducted by global firms whose staff is
generally unskilled and inexperienced to do the job, and whose business model
conflicts with the requirements for credible, independent social auditing.
8. Audits are often not followed by effective remediation. Improvements at the work-
place are limited to health and safety issues and tend to be superficial.
9. The audit industry is closed and secretive, preventing serious discussion about
its policy and practices and possible improvements to its methods.
10. Certain buyers, particularly well-known brands that have been targeted by labour
rights campaigns, and those cooperating more intensively with labour advocates
are actually doing a better job in developing more comprehensive and participa-
tory social audit models. Others, mainly unbranded buyers and non-specialised
retailers, are promoting the failing audit model described in this report, particu-
larly in the context of fast growing business dominated CSR initiatives.
There are a number of ways in which the CCC believes that companies that are seri-
ous about respecting workers’ rights can get on the right track (described in detail in
chapter 6):
Place workers at the centre of social auditing processes. Recognizing that the majority
of workers in this industry are women all auditing procedures must be gender sensi-
tive. Gender blind auditing is bound to miss out on key input from workers. Workers
are the intended beneficiaries of audits therefore their input is not sought out and
included in auditing and associated processes (remediation) such efforts will not con-
tribute to sustainable improvements to their labour conditions. Training and education
is a precursor for creating an atmosphere where workers are informed of their rights
and can effectively use channels intended for conveying concerns.
Sourcing companies must adopt a more comprehensive “toolbox” approach if they
want to make a credible effort to face up to their responsibilities to workers in their
supply chains. Quality social auditing includes unannounced visits, interviews of work-
ers outside of the workplace and involves skilled local experts and civil society organi-
zations. This alone however is not enough and should be combined with other tools
in a broader and longer-term program to address and remediate violations of workers
rights. Including partnership with local organizations; grievance and complaints mecha-
16 17
nisms; education and training; a pro-active approach to freedom
of association; address existing business or purchasing prac-
tices; effective remediation and increased transparency.

Systematic problems at both the point of production and the

point of consumption can only be successfully addressed

Workers’ through an industry-wide approach. Playing an active role in

credible multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) can also be a valu-
Quotes able step for companies to take in improving their auditing and
other code compliance work.

“The pieces for which workers used to get

rs100 in 1999, we are still getting about
90 or 100 rupees. At present in many
pieces they are reducing the rate to 40 to

02
45 rupees.”
Md Ateeq, president, Delhi Leather
Karigar Sangathan Trade Union, India

“Workers do not see any improvement in

significant areas such as the wage and
working hours despite repeated factory
audits and worker interviews. They have
a sense of distrust and feel that the
standards and auditing is completely
irrelevant to their everyday working life at
the workplace.” Cheating
Researcher reporting on SA8000-
accredited factory in southern China and sloppy
producing for DKNY, Just Perfect and
Michael Kors auditing
18
One standard
today, another
tomorrow
The standards that auditors are asked
to apply tend to be very similar, and are
based on the ILO’s core labour standards,
health and safety requirements, and, in
some cases, a “living wage” requirement.
Many companies have their own codes
of labour practice, and ask auditors to
use these.
Audit firms can be accredited to apply
the SA8000 standard, developed by
Social Accountability International, and
then supplier factories can pay the firms
to audit them according to this standard.
Some buyers prefer to audit according
to codes developed by multi-stakeholder
initiatives such as the Ethical Trading
Initiative (more on MSIs in chapter 6).
The devil is in the details, though. While
standards differ little, the quality and
credibility of applying, monitoring and
verifying the standards varies a lot.
Whenever social auditors come to this factory, we are given
holiday. Worker on a piece rate working under a subcontrac-
tor 4 within Factory C in India, producing for KarstadtQuelle,
Kingel, Derma Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods
Over the last 15 years, the plight of workers in the supply
chains of apparel and sports shoe companies has become a
cause for public concern. In attempts to avoid scandals and
reassure consumers that they take their responsibilities seri-
ously, some companies are relying increasingly, to the tune of
thousands of audits each year, on social auditing to monitor
or investigate the conditions endured by workers in their sup-
ply chains.
Social audits are meant to help identify workers’ rights
violations in production facilities, to assess and evaluate
suppliers’ performance in relation to social standards and
encourage improvements at the work place. They cannot, by
themselves, create change. At the same time, flawed auditing
can have the opposite effect by providing a false or incom-
plete picture of working conditions at a production site. Much,
therefore, depends on the quality and scope of an audit.
This chapter presents information on recent social auditing in
factories in Kenya, India, China, Pakistan, Romania, Bangla-
desh, Morocco and Indonesia gathered by local organisations
in 2005 specifically for this report. This information is sup-
plemented by references to other research. Areas considered
include:
3 the growing practice of factory managers deceiving
auditors
3 the superficiality of audits,
3 items that tend to be missed by auditors, particularly in
relation to freedom of association or discrimination,
3 the numerous ways in which attempts to include the voic-
es of workers in the auditing process, including through
worker interviews, are being undermined,
3 the absence of training and complaints mechanisms,
3 the lack of skill and experience of auditing staff, and
3 the failure to take into account information from other
local organisations outside factories.
In covering these areas the chapter also sheds light on the
problems faced by auditors in carrying out their work. More
importantly, however, the chapter aims to consider to what
extent auditing is actually achieving, or failing to achieve, its
objective of improving workers´ lives. Workers are after all
meant to be the eventual beneficiaries of auditing.
The context for social auditing
The steps taken by companies when assuming re-
sponsibility for labour standards in the supply chain
are often quite predictable. Experience shows that
companies often pass through a series of phases
when developing policies in relation to respect for
workers’ rights in their supply chains. Social auditing
can be used as one tool at a number of points in the
process:
1 Denial: At this stage, a buyer would deny respon-
sibility for the conditions under which workers in
the supply chain are working. Fewer and fewer
buyers adopt this position today, thanks primarily
to labour rights campaigns that began to occur
with increasing frequency in the 1990s.
2 Substance: At this point, buyers adopt “codes
of conduct”, usually following the benchmark of
the ILO’s core labour standards, as laid down
in a set of eight conventions, focusing on child
labour, forced labour, discrimination, freedom of
association and collective bargaining. To begin
with, these codes are not much more than com-
mitments on paper.
3 Implementation, monitoring and verification:
The next step is for a buyer to go from paper to
practice, by implementing the commitments con-
tained in a code of conduct. This has happened
more and more in recent years, as companies
were challenged by critics to demonstrate con-
formity to the standards they had adopted.
a Implementation refers to the steps required
to give practical effect to a code.
b Internal or company monitoring refers to
the management procedures put in place to
ensure internally that the implementation
has indeed taken place in practice among
suppliers.
c (Independent) verification refers to the proc-
ess of establishing the credibility of company
claims of compliance with a code of conduct.
Verification must be carried out by an entity
that is entirely independent of, and not in the
pay of the company itself. In general, multi-
stakeholder initiatives (discussed in chapter
6) have provided a more credible framework
for verification.
4 Workers’ participation: While much progress
has been made since the days when companies
were stuck at the stage of denial, there is still
much to be done to improve labour conditions
on the ground. Labour advocates tend to agree
that without a meaningful role for the intended
beneficiaries of all this—the workers them-
selves—progress is likely to be limited. Many are
concerned that the rising importance attached to
social audits is leading to the exclusion of work-
ers from the process.
Social audits may be one tool used to help a compa-
ny monitor its internal progress in monitoring labour
standards. A company may carry out the audit itself,
or it may engage a social auditing firm to do so. A
supplier may also engage a social auditor to obtain a
certification in order to obtain orders from companies
that require certification according to one scheme or
another, such as SA8000.
The main motive driving the use of social audits is
risk prevention. In other words, factories must be
cleared of child labour, bonded labour and other
extreme labour abuses in case reporters or activists
find out and expose the company to consumers. If
this happens, the company can point to the fact that
it did an audit and that independent experts had
given it the all clear.
In all cases, it is the standards preferred by the buyer
that are likely to be used, since this process is linked
to the internal management system of the buying
firm, even if the supplier pays for the audit.
In the process of verification social audits may be
one tool used by a multi-stakeholder initiative, such
as the Fair Labor Association (FLA) or the Fair Wear
Foundation (FWF). In these cases, the parameters
of the audit will tend to be set by the multi-
to be continued on page 21
20
ADVANCE WARNING OF AUDITS MAKE FRAUD AND
DECEPTION EASIER
The purpose of a social audit is to get a good picture of the labour situation in a
workplace. Clearly, unannounced audits can prevent management from having the
factory cleaned up in advance or other forms of cheating. And while there are certain
instances in which it is appropriate for the date of the visit of auditors to be known
in advance (for example when the accountant needs to be present to provide specific
information), the research for this report suggests that the vast majority of audit visits
are being made with plenty of advance warning for factory managers.5 With so much
advance warning, there are a wide range of steps that are taken by factory manag-
ers to trick auditors even in the more “tangible” areas, such as the practice of only
unlocking medical cabinets and fire exits during the visits of the auditors (and then
locking and closing them afterwards). And naturally, given plenty of warning, there are
many ways in which the worker interview process can be undermined. Unannounced
audits at least give auditors a fighting chance to identify problems.
Every month there are two to three visits by buyers in the factory and the visitors basi-
cally talk with the management. Workers get prior notice for such visit and sometimes
visitors also talk with 10-15 workers who are selected by the management. These work-
ers are instructed by the management what is to be said to the auditors and if there
are any workers who are unable to speak according to the instructions then they asked
not to come till the visit of the auditors ends. Workers at Factory B, Bangladesh, produc-
ing for JC Penny and Wal-Mart
In Factories B and C in Romania, the auditor of Swedish fashion giant H&M has the
right to enter the premises at any time within the working day, without any prior noti-
fication. The H&M auditor, with an interpreter, is allowed to circulate un-accompanied
inside the factory. Under these unannounced conditions, it is easy to see how an audi-
tor has some chance of spotting problems and getting a sense of the real situation
faced by workers. Indeed, in Romania, researchers found that in factories where one
buyer was allowed to make unannounced visits, better labour conditions seemed to
prevail.
In most cases, however, this is the exception, rather than the rule. Auditors tend to tell
factory managers in advance that they are coming to carry out an audit. Factory A in
north India, for instance was last audited in January 2005 by a Social Accountability
International (SAI) accredited auditing firm. After an initial audit, follow-up audits every
six months are compulsory. The audit is announced one week before the due date of
the audit.6
In India there are no unannounced audits by third party as yet. Many of our suppliers
will not be able to meet issues raised in social compliance if unannounced audits take
place. Announced audits are thus in vogue. It will take time for our suppliers to meet
high standards of labour conditions. Employee in India for large global social auditing
firm
21
stakeholder initiative itself, rather than the sourcing nies, it is likely that most audits were in fact linked to
company. In the field research carried out for this internal monitoring programmes.
study, workers themselves were often in the dark It should also be noted that best practices in the field
as to whether social audits were part of monitoring of social compliance are subject to much discussion,
or verification, and whether the audits were ordered testing and experimentation. The aim of this report
by their own employers, the buyers, or third parties. is not to propose a perfect compliance model, but
However, given that verification is still used only to to look at the problems associated with bad social
a limited degree by certain more responsive compa- auditing.
In Factory A in southern China, producing for DKNY, Just Perfect and Michael Kors,
preparatory work for the audit was very evident to workers:
The workplace would be cleaned up, the first aid box at the workplace which is locked
up at normal times would be unlocked for auditing, the supervisors would give brief-
ings to workers about how they should answer questions from the auditors in case they
were picked for interview.
In Factory C in Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart, workers listed the following arrange-
ments made by managers prior to announced audits:
3 Thorough cleaning of the company,
3 provision of towels, soaps and powder to the employees,
workers are forced to say that they are always given milk, which is not true,
3 They are told to quote low targets to impress the auditors while the targets are usu-
ally quite high,
3 they are told to say that they don’t work overtime, especially not on Sundays, and
3 generally, workers are drilled on how to present a good image of the company to
ensure that it receives the order.
Auditors in India said that in the early stages, factories should be given notice in order
to get them used to the process. The picture on the ground, however, is one of manag-
ers who are already experienced at passing audits. They are increasingly sophisticated
in learning how to score well with auditors, taking advantage of the lenient approach
of auditors. Separate departments, dedicated to ensuring compliance during audits,
clearly become expert at responding to news of a forthcoming visit by auditors.
In China, in Factory C, producing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic
Committee, it was reported that the supervisors all have a standard coaching manual
of how to instruct production line workers during the audit. Workers are told to give
standard answers according to the labour law to the auditors. Workers reported that
management is careful not to pass on any “evidence” such as the coaching manual to
workers.
In northern India all factory managers and auditors interviewed confirmed that the vis-
its of auditors are signalled in advance. Researchers said, “According to the manage-
22
ment, there is no special planning for it.”7 But evidence provided to the researchers
from workers showed this is patently untrue.
The day when our factory is cleaned, many dustbins suddenly kept all over the factory,
floor neatly swept, workers being given needle guards. It is a sign that auditors are go-
ing to come. Worker, Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
(Supervisor’s name) is present at the time of the interview so we get to know who
was interviewed and what was asked. We hold meetings with the workers, train them,
before the audit. We tell them what may be asked and what should be answered. Man-
ager, Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
New or young looking workers would be arranged for paid leave during the audit lest
they did not behave properly during the audit. Research on Factory C in China, produc-
ing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic Committee
Among experts, there are different views on whether audits should be announced or
unannounced. Auditors often prefer announced audits because the factory is than
capable of preparing the visit, for example by making sure that the right managers are
available for an interview or that the relevant documentation is accessible.8 The not-
for-profit social audit organisation GMIES, based in El Salvador, argues that announced
visits “are rich in information because they are top to bottom inspections, while unan-
nounced visits are reserved for follow up on specific points so that monitors can count
on the surprise effect”.9 More advanced approaches nowadays use a combination
depending on where they are in the cycle of auditing and remediation (i.e. the initial
audit might be announced, but the follow-up visits might be unannounced).
Another reason why visits are often announced is that “retailers and audit firms do not
want to jeopardize their relationship with their suppliers who tend to see unannounced
visits, part of the so called ‘policing approach’, as impolite and inappropriate interfer-
ence in their business”10. It is worth noting that in this context, unannounced initial
audits would make it harder for factories to earn their certification, or to qualify in
some way to become a supplier. Auditors apparently have an incentive to give advance
warning therefore, especially when the supplier is paying, since a factory is likely to
require regular re-audits, for instance under SA8000 under the BSCI scheme. If a fac-
tory simply fails an audit, it is less likely to need the services of that auditor again in
the future. Of course, ensuring all audits are announced in advance would not solve
the problem of bad quality audits or the problem of the culture of cheating among
factory managers. Managers can easily instruct workers to lie to auditors whenever
they come to the factory or even when they meet them outside. The discussion around
announced versus unannounced visits, therefore, is mainly useful for its demonstra-
tion of the limitations of what can be checked and what can be hidden during a social
audit.
What happens in a social audit?
Social auditors will visit a supplier to check whether
there is conformity with a labour standard laid out in
the code of conduct they have been given. The objec-
tives can include:
3 assessing the problems that exist in a factory,
3 developing a corrective action or remediation
plan.
A social audit typically includes three steps, some-
times referred to as the “circle of evidence” (see
figure), and takes anything from a few hours to a few
days. Please note that chapters 2 and 3 will explore
the reality of such audits in more detail.
A document review is carried out to check wages
and hours, bonuses, personnel management, the
application of internal regulations and collective bar-
gaining agreements. Documents reviewed can include
time cards, content receipts, union declarations, and
personnel files. How useful a document review is de-
pends first of all on how accurate these documents
are (see also section on corruption).
A site inspection—also referred to as a physical in-
spection or factory walk-through—might reveal health
and safety problems. Inspectors might look at emer-
gency exits, fire extinguishers, bathrooms, alleys or
passageways, ventilation, cleaning, safety equipment
and noise levels. A walk-through might also reveal
information on management-worker relations, for
instance whether workers seem uncomfortable and
stop talking when the line supervisor appears.
Interviews should be a key element of an audit. In-
terviews are usually held with workers, management,
and in best practice cases, with local unions and/or
NGOs. It is valuable for auditors to speak directly
with workers about the conditions they work in. Audi-
tors can use the interviews, which can also happen
outside factory premises, to check if workers get paid
the legal minimum wage and the legal overtime rate,
whether management has prevented union activities,
etc.
Who does the audit?
The vast majority of audits are carried out by interna-
tional commercial audit firms, such as CSCC, Intertek
and SGS. These are known as “third party audits”,
because they differ from “second party audits”, which
are carried out by a buyer’s own compliance or CSR
staff, and “first party audits” which are basically self-
assessment exercises carried out by a supplier itself.
In this report, the focus is mainly on third and second
party audits.
Figure 1 Circle of Evidence
Oral
Observation Evidence
Docu-
mentation
Source:
Vie Thorpe Cornell University ILR Training 2005
24
FRAUD ON WAGES, HOURS AND CONTRACTS
Fraud is a major problem in the field of social audits. Elsewhere the practice of docu-
ment-falsification has also been well-researched: double bookkeeping, especially of
payroll documents and time cards have become common practice in a number of
important garment and sports shoe production countries. It has been noted that par-
ticularly in China, ”counter-compliance” has become a sophisticated art.11 In factory
B in southern China, overtime records are routinely falsified to avoid revealing illegal
labour practices:
Sewing workers reporting working as many as 150-200 overtime hours in the peak
season and have only 1-2 days off a month. The factory falsifies the number of working
hours by limiting it to 102 overtime hours a month, the remaining hours are not com-
pensated. Research on Factory B, southern China, producing for 6ixty8ight, No Romeo,
Marie Melli and Onlingerie
Furthermore, these workers are made party to the fraud, to add authenticity:
The factory keeps two sets of wage records. The falsified one shows the number of
working hours, which is never above 102 per month. The workers need to sign their
names on both wage records. Research on Factory B, southern China, producing for
6ixty8ight, No Romeo, Marie Melli and Onlingerie
In Factory F producing for Gloria Vanderbilt, Wal-Mart and Erika in Kenya, the amount
of overtime shown on workers’ timecards is reduced to the meet the national legal
maximum of 60 hours.
Stage-management around the visits is increasingly common in north India also.
No doctor ever comes. There is an instance when auditors have come and helpers have
been asked to act as doctors. Worker, Factory B, north India, producing for Wal-Mart
We (workers) have to work seven days in a week. We are never paid double the wage
for overtime since we are paid on piece rate. We always had complaints about low
wages and working hours but we could not express it. Auditors have interviewed me
once. Before that the management instructed me that we regularly use needle and
pulley guards, that we do not have overtime, that we are all paid very well and that all
the workers are very happy. Worker, Factory D, north India, producing for Wal-Mart, Kel-
lwood and Sears
The failure of auditing is exacerbated further if auditors do not even care about discov-
ering the truth.
I tell auditors that I cannot tell them the truth in relation to some of their questions.
They smile and move on to something else. Manager from a large apparel factory in
China12
25
Others have found that auditors have recommended ways for managers to get round
local laws on overtime hours.13
MODEL FACTORIES AND HIDDEN SUBCONTRACTORS
Another popular method of tricking auditors is to maintain a “model factory”, into
which auditors are welcomed, whilst subcontracting out the bulk of the work to other
factories.. In a group of four commonly-owned factories in China, one has an SA8000
certification and indeed provides relatively good working conditions for workers by all
accounts—this certainly helps it get contracts from a number of international buyers
that have faced international pressure to improve working conditions, including Disney
and M&S. Workers in the other three factories in the same group report however that
work from this model factory is being subcontracted to their factories, in which work-
ing conditions are considerably worse. They produce goods for buyers including Etam
(France) and WE International (Netherlands), who is a member of the SAI advisory
board.
In extremely busy times, they are required to work till two in the morning and even
overnight without being compensated with a day off. There is no day off for consecutive
months in the peak season. Only when less orders are placed can workers have one to
two days off per month. Workers from these two facilities have very strong complaints
about the long working hours, exhaustion and stress. Research on factory D, China.
A consultant in India advising firms on passing audits acknowledged that the practice
of not disclosing subcontractors is very common. At other times, subcontractors need
only fill out self-assessment checklist forms—it’s clear that such practices are wide
open to abuse by unscrupulous employers, who can provide a false impression via the
self-assessment forms. It should be noted, however, that SA8000-accredited auditors
are required to audit all subcontractors as standard procedure, and that if suppliers
are found to be hiding subcontractors from auditors, it can cost them their certification
or even an order from a buyer.
CORRUPTION IN SOME CASES
In China, managers of factories offer bribes to auditors in exchange for a clean bill of
health. This practice, according to observers, appears to have been limited, in Chinese
factories, to “quality control staff from local commercial bodies (who) will usually give
them an all clear for a cash bribe”. In research carried out in 2003, managers from
three separate factories in China alleged that “staff from Wal-Mart’s purchasing de-
partment both sought and accepted bribes”. Although it is unclear to what extent such
practices extend beyond China, the problem should be seen as serious, given the high
volume of orders being placed in China in comparison with other producer countries.
In Kenya, in Factory E, also producing mainly for Wal-Mart, workers claimed that audi-
tors were not only offered cash bribes, but were “given women from the factory”. It
should be noted, however, that workers in the factory viewed the current conduct of
Wal-Mart auditors as quite correct.
26
SUPERFICIAL VISITS BY AUDITORS
Short visits by auditors, not well prepared in advance, short worker interviews (usually
not more than 15 minutes per worker) tend to prevent identification of many problems.
These inspections are often very superficial and basically undertaken as a risk as-
sessment. Not much time is spend on searching for violations that are more difficult
to detect, such as discrimination, harassment or limitations of the right to organise.
Jem Bendell, who critically assessed the SA8000 methodology, argues that a thorough
investigation of a production site cannot be done in a two-to-three day audit, which
seems to be the average amount of time spent in most audits.
To illustrate the size of the task, the SA8000 Guidance Document on how to do a social
audit, which gives very general information, is 67 pages long (GD98-IV). To do a thor-
ough investigation of all issues with on- and off site interviews, focus groups, surveys,
documentary analysis, in ways that respond to results as they arise, is an impossible
task. People who argue that it is possible either don’t know the complexity of the is-
sues, have a very different understanding of the word ‘thorough’, or have a commercial
interest in saying so. 14
27
Sometimes auditors are simply sloppy in their approach, making basic errors, such as
allowing managers from the factory to translate for them during worker interviews, or
allowing managers to select the workers for interview:
As all the auditors coming to this factory are foreigners, they need translators. At times,
they bring their own translator but in some instances they ask a management person to
translate it for them. Research on Factory D, Pakistan, producing for Springfield, Lindex
and C&A
Usually, C&A notifies about a future visit and do not come with their own interpreter—
this is why the auditor is always accompanied by a person assigned by the company’s
management. Manager of Factory B, Romania
Workers … observed that in every month there are two to three visits by the buyers
in the factory and the visitors basically talk with the management. Workers get prior

It is worth noting that Bendell chose SA8000 as one of the highest standards avail-
able among code compliance initiatives, and that, as identified by this report, there is
a growing tendency for companies to opt for less stringent options, such as the BSCI
standard, referred to by some as “SA8000-lite”.15
We have to be practical. All these auditing visits cost money and we cannot afford to
spend more time. Auditors in Romania
Workers interviewed in China (Factory C) had doubts about how certain day-to-day
management practices could be inspected during short worker interviews and one-day
factory audits:
The factory management has a wide range of fines and penalties to discipline workers.
These include a fine of RMB20 for not wearing the factory ID card, a fine of RMB50
for un-authorised leave of one day plus RMB5 for the food subsidy of the day, a fine of
RMB20 for not turning off the lights in the dormitory room and poor sanitation. If work-
ers apply for sick leave, not only are they not paid, they will lose the full attendance
bonus of RMB50. Workers have strong complaint about these practices and cast doubts
about how these day-to-day management practices could be inspected during the short
worker interview and the one-day factory audit. Research on Factory C, southern China
producing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic Committee
Similar doubts were expressed by workers in Factory E in Kenya, which produces for
Wal-Mart:
The auditors are always in a hurry; they sometime only use their eyes and never engage
the workers. They should know that we have a lot of problems, which they can’t know
just by using their eyes; they must talk to us if they truly want to know our problems….
A series of admissions of the failure of social auditing
3 Nike’s 2004 corporate responsibility report
states that falsification of information by Chinese
factories “related to wages and hours of work is
common. This extends to the practice of coach-
ing of workers by factory mangers trying to de-
ceive compliance auditors”
(Nike, 2005).
3 “In China, Indonesia and Vietnam, most payrolls
are falsified, a fact known to auditors who feel
frustrated because in most cases they can hardly
find out what is truly happening in a facility be-
cause they can not crosscheck with information
provided by workers since they have usually been
coached by management”
(Adam et al. 2005: 9).
3 The Financial Times quotes a compliance execu-
tive as saying: “We’re rewarding factories that are
falsifying records (…). We are creating a disincen-
tive to really play by the rules and comply” (April
21, 2005).
3 Gap also admits that “concealment of overtime
and unwillingness to share accurate
documentation” is a major issue in China (cited
in MSN, July 2004).
3 Software been developed to deceive social audi-
tors. They generate false payment and timecard
records, and even include random errors to make
the records look more authentic making it more
difficult to discover irregularities on wages and
excessive overtime (statement made by Neil
Kearney (ITGLWF) at ETI conference May 2005).
3 The China representative of Det Norske Veritas,
an audit firm accredited by SA8000, said that
enforcing labour standards in China is “impossi-
ble”. “You have in southern China all the factors
working against you (…) There are the multina-
tionals, which want low labour costs; the factory
managers, who don’t like us because of fines
for non-conformity, and even the local Chinese
Government in many places, which wants this
business and does not want it threatened. All
this is working against the cause of the workers”
(SabgeHsu Shuaijum cited in South China Morn-
ing Post, December 18, 2000).
28 29
notice for such visits and sometimes visitors also talk with 10-15 workers who are se- in China to organise themselves as subjects that would participate in bottom up moni-
lected by the management. Research on Factory B, Bangladesh, producing for Wal-Mart toring within the legal framework of worker representation at the workplace. General
and J.C. Penney comment from researchers in China

It is no wonder, therefore, that where improvements in working conditions are identi-
fied by workers, they tend to be relatively superficial, such as signposts, presence of
fire extinguishers and toilets, stocking of medical cabinets and provision of drinking
water.
Of course, less superficial social audits are likely to be more expensive, since they
would require more staff and more hours. See chapter 5 for more discussion on the
cost of compliance to good labour standards.
ABANDONING THE QUEST FOR THE PERFECT AUDIT?
The overall picture emerging from the research for this report is that, among buyers
that seem to be relying primarily on social auditing, progress is only being made in
three out of nine key areas:
3 It is contributing partially to reducing the use of child labour, to ensuring forced
labour is not used, and to improvements in the health and safety situation for
workers.
3 It is failing to bring significant improvements in freedom of association and right to
collective bargaining, non-discrimination, wages, working hours, employment rela-
tionship, and abusive treatment of workers.

In a factory in Pakistan, the managers had evolved a sophisticated understanding of The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)17 notes, however, that even this limited progress is
the different styles of auditing: mainly confined to the first tier of the supply chain, and does not stretch, for the most
part, as far as the subcontracting factories that play a big role in filling orders from
Although the guidelines are similar of all the brands regarding social compliance, their buyers.
approach to auditing is quite different. In fact, a lot depends on the auditors. What is a
major non-compliance issue for one is very minor for another. For instance, Springfield
thinks that deduction from wages on disciplinary grounds is a major non-compliance
issue whereas H&M are a lot less stringent on that. During the interview, the manager
said that generally US firms are fussier whereas European retailers such as H&M and
C&A are more accommodating to minor violations…more concerned with major com-
pliance issues such as crossing the overtime limit, harassment in the workplace, gen-
eral working conditions and occupational safety and health issues. Research on Factory
D, Pakistan, producing for Springfield, Lindex and C&A Table 1
The difference in approach between US and European firms was also noted by re-
searchers in Bangladesh, and it complements evidence from field research in Malawi How do social audits score in improving workers’ lives?
from 2003, which noted the tendency of suppliers in the country to accommodate
Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining
differing demands of buyers:
Forced labour
At least two of the factories are considering building an extra factory for production di-
Child labour
rected to the US to accommodate the demands of buyers. This would eventually lead to
a situation where there are two standards of working conditions in the same company Non-discrimination
depending on whether the production is for the US or South Africa. 16 Wages

Working hours
While it is tempting to recommend that auditors go back to the drawing board, and try
again to come up with the perfect methodology for social audits, the sophistication of Health and safety
suppliers trying to cheat their way through audits would no doubt continue to develop
Employment relationship
as it has done already since the widespread growth in the use of social auditing.
Abuse
This research would not conclude with any “technical” recommendations on “improving” Auditing having some impact
the methodology of social auditing in the context of China. Rather the research would Auditing having limited or no impact
like to reiterate the core issue of strengthening the awareness and capacity of workers
30

03
Why basic
auditing is
never enough
32
FALLING BELOW THE RADAR
Auditors are more concerned with physical aspects of audits such as second exits and
regular fire drills but not about things that affect workers most and that is decent living
wages. Sohnia Ali, secretary of Mutahida Labour Federation, Pakistan
An audit-only approach is unlikely to be effective in tackling a number of problems
also intimately linked to the working conditions of workers, particularly in discovering
violations that are intangible such as anti-union policies or forms of discrimination and
harassment. This is confirmed by a Pakistani auditor who has done work for the World-
wide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) initiative described in chapter 5. Accord-
ing to this auditor, buyers tend to be soft on suppliers:
As per law, there is a 48 hour work week but it is violated…(while) workers are to be
paid overtime wages at double rate of their wages… piece rate workers are not paid
those wages…no worker is allowed to work in a factory without providing one day’s rest
in seven days, but at times they ask workers to work for 14 days straight…quite a lot of
factories fail payment of social security…. (violations regarding) workers’ right to form/
join any trade union of their choice Auditor Pakistan
The apparel company Gap (US) has also acknowledged that some violations, for exam-
ple of freedom of association and discrimination, are difficult to uncover.18 And Nike, a
company that has been the subject of much campaigning to improve working conditions
at its supply facilities, knows very well the limits of auditing, stating:
(E)ffective monitoring whether a worker truly has freedom to association and bargain
collectively is (…) a challenge because there are many subtle methods employers
might use to restrict workers’ rights to freely associate. While worker interviews are
probably the most important tool for assessing compliance around this issue, it can
only truly be tested during periods when workers are actively exercising this right.19
Representatives of the GTZ-AVE project in Romania, listed the following improvements
as typical results of audits:20
3 correct illumination,
3 sufficient and clean toilets,
3 proper ventilation,
3 adequate equipment (depending of what kind of products the clients ordered),
3 canteen provision, and
3 proper and appropriate spaces to deposit raw materials.
It is clear that, in spite of limited impact in many cases, the insistence of buyers on
compliance, policed by social auditing, is helping to have a limited but positive effect
on companies, particularly in areas linked to occupational health and safety.
For instance, in Factory D in north India, producing for Wal-Mart, Kellwood and Sears,
workers noted visible improvements in the health and safety situation in the factory in
the last five years such as first aid boxes (albeit containing only expired medicines!)
and clean drinking water through water coolers.
33
The biggest changes since audits have been that the management has installed equip-
ment for occupational safety and health on the machines. Protective gears on machine
wheels were put up. Eye protectors were provided to the workers, which they did not
have before. They have also installed a fuse system with the switches, whereas previ-
ously it was just a plug-in system. The difference would be that in case of short circuits,
the machine will be switched off automatically and will not harm the worker working
on it or be the cause of fire or any other hazard. They have built a new staircase, sepa-
rate restrooms for men and women, 10 new washrooms and extended the dining area
of the canteen. They have also relocated the ladies washroom to the second floor and
closed down the one that was next to the water coolers on the first floor. The manage-
ment have strengthened their human resource department and developed personnel
files of all the workers, which they didn’t have before... Research on Factory A,Pakistan,
producing for J.D. Williams, La Blanche Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann,
Mode & Preis, Zeeman, YDG International and Wal-Mart
While most observers acknowledge that under the right circumstances social audit-
ing can lead to improvements regarding more visible or physical problems there are a
number of more fundamental areas which pass under many auditors’ radars virtually
undetected. These might include:
3 the undermining of freedom of association and collective bargaining by managers,
3 excessive and forced overtime,
3 abusive attitudes to workers on the part of supervisors,
3 withholding of wages owed,
3 insufficient provision of medical care and sick leave, and
3 discriminatory hiring practices.
Overtime abuses, bad management attitudes, withholding of wages and insufficient
provision of medical care and sick leave can, in theory, be checked for qualitatively,
particularly through workers’ interviews. The level of cheating on the part of factory
managers during audits suggests that the additional step of interviewing workers
outside the workplace in relation to these issues should be taken. If workers have a
stronger voice in audits, it is likely that a more accurate picture would be obtained.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Today many codes of conduct in the garment and sportswear industry stipulate
freedom of association, which is the right of workers to be free to join and form trade
unions. Research suggests that only 15% of audits take freedom of association into
account.21 Auditors who spend no more than a couple of hours at most conducting
worker interviews, often in an atmosphere of distrust, are unlikely to be able to dis-
cern whether workers feel they can enjoy the right to join and form trade unions.
Reality is the management does not want (a union) so we shall never have it. When
some people tried in the past the whole system of recruitment in the factory changed,
and we were thrown out as employees and taken in as employees of subcontractors. If
we ever try now, we will be thrown out completely. Worker, Factory A, north India,
producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
34
I have heard of very bad experiences by other workers who were members of unions
and were thrown out of a job because of that. Worker, Factory A, north India, producing
for BCL, Saki and RCC
Managers are traditionally biased against union organising, and it is a well-known tactic
of employers the world over to say that there is no need for a union in a workplace,
and to encourage workers to take the same view. In spite of this, at the ILO social au-
ditors meeting, participants said, “in most cases, even where attention is paid to free-
dom of association, only the managers are asked whether or not they allow unions”.
There is no union in the factory, neither is there any workers representative body, al-
though the management claims that there is no restriction imposed on the workers
from them. The factory manager is of the opinion that the workers are happy with their
management that’s why they don’t want to make a union. Interview with manager, Fac-
tory C, Pakistan, audited under AVE scheme, and producing for
KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart
It is hard to see how an auditor can make a credible assessment of the level of free-
dom of association enjoyed by workers when only a manager’s opinion is sought!
Normally, when outsiders are not around, anti-union attitudes of managers are made
very clear to workers.
Workers … are not allowed to form any union or organisation. The management has
warned them that if any one tries to organise workers and form a union he or she
would be handed over to the police. Workers, Factory B, Bangladesh, producing for JC
Penney and Wal-Mart
The fear of losing one’s job is likely to make trade unions a taboo subject in an audit
interview with a worker, as was the experience of researchers who talked to a group of
workers about union membership in factory F in Romania. Workers from this factory
acknowledged the need for a union. However, they said, that management would not
allow it, and made clear that they should not even be discussing such a topic with out-
siders. In none of the seven countries researched did any workers report being asked
by auditors about freedom of association, although trade unions did operate in some
of the workplaces studied.
Often, when asked about freedom of association factory managers will point to the
existence of some kind of “works council” or “welfare committee” in the workplace, or
at least a suggestion box. This is apparently because they have learned that these are
things that auditors will give credit for, since these are considered to be “steps in the
right direction” towards freedom of association:
A lot of the brands look at the issue of freedom of association as a way to improve
dialogue and communication between management and employees. They therefore
check to see whether or not there are suggestion boxes, complaint mechanisms and/or
worker representatives in the factory. Although they realize that this does not equate
with having union representation (for example, it does not allow for collective bargain-
35
ing or free and fair elections), they nevertheless see it as a step in the right direction to
giving employees a voice and having a more effective workplace.22
The relation between trade unions and other kinds of worker representation needs to
be looked at carefully. Guidance developed by multi-stakeholder initiatives specifically
warns auditors to pay attention to this.
Fundamental to the function of worker representatives is that the employer can-
not designate or control them. There must be a legal framework independent of the
employer in which representatives, for example those in works councils, are selected.
When they are elected outside of a trade union structure, the employer must not
control the election. Works councils and labor-management councils can be consist-
ent with freedom of association if workers are also free to join trade unions and to
engage in collective bargaining.
Even when freedom of association is included in the audit process, auditors generally
have great difficulty in correctly assessing the meaning of various forms and types of
worker representation mechanisms such as welfare committees or works councils.
They often consider the existence of such a committee as evidence of compliance on
freedom of association, while this is by no means always the case—it depends very
much on the legal as well as the practical conditions under which such mechanisms
operate.
For instance, in some countries, where freedom of association is restricted by law,
these committees are seen as so-called “parallel means of representation”. Code
initiatives call on companies to establish parallel means of independent and free asso-
ciation and bargaining for all workers to encouraging nascent forms of worker-represen-
tation only in countries or areas where independent unions are prohibited. If applied
correctly it can provide a certain space for worker representation.
Examples of these structures include the establishment of workers’ councils, welfare
committees, complaints resolution committees, and basic-needs wage committees.
Approaches to parallel means are heavily criticized by some, particularly when the
concept is misused to undermine the position of trade unions or misinterpreted to
justify the employer dominated election of “worker representatives”, or its presence in
countries that otherwise violate human rights (which includes the right to organize).
The existence of a union in the factory also does not automatically imply that workers
are able to exercise their right to freedom of association. In China, where the forma-
tion of independent trade unions is prohibited by law, the existence of a trade union is
unlikely to signal any freedom of association:
A plant level trade union is formed but it is largely composed of management. The in-
terviewed workers do not know how the trade union was formed nor do they think the
union is representing their interests due to over-representation of management in the
union. Research, Factory B, south China, producing for 6ixty 8ight, No Romeo, Marie
Melli, and Onlingerie
36
Freedom of
association and the
right to collective
bargaining
These are referred to as “enabling
rights” because their full implementation
provides mechanisms through which
workers can ensure that other labour
standards are upheld in workplaces.
That is to say, in workplaces with a
functioning trade union, collective
bargaining machinery, and effective
dispute and complaints mechanism,
workers are able to monitor workplace
conditions and protect their own rights.
It is here that many argue that codes
of conduct can play an important role.
By creating a space where industrial
relations structures can take shape, they
can be most effective in ensuring the
implementation of all code standards.
37
In countries where freedom of association is not restricted
by law, non-union structures can be misused as a way to sub-
stitute for unions, or as a management technique to prevent
more active and effective unions from operating. Local unions
in Tirupur commented on the recent tendency of firms to set
up welfare committees:
Most of the companies do not promote trade union activi-
ties but in the place of trade unions, welfare committees
are formed in the factories. The trade unions said that these
welfare committee formations have hampered and sabotaged
their growth and activities.
In Tirupur researchers found that a consultant, providing facto-
ries with tips on how to gain SA8000 accreditation, specifically
advised clients to set up welfare committees as an alternative
to unions. In Bangladesh, a researcher noted a similar trend
when talking to various players involved in the auditing industry:
Retailers do not have strong obligation towards workers’ union
although they encourage workers’ welfare associations among
the workers.
However, in other cases such structures can provide genuine
means for worker-management communication or consultation
or even negotiation and in some cases are even obligatory
under law. It is quite possible for them to co-exist with trade
unions.
The key question is how they are used in practice, just as
trade unions can in reality be management-controlled (com-
monly referred to as “yellow unions”), and not in any way
acting in the interest of workers. With such considerations in
mind, the mention by managers of “works councils”, compris-
ing worker and management representatives, mentioned by
a number of managers in northern India seemed suspicious,
given that workers interviewed were unaware of their function
or even their existence.
In countries where workers are allowed by law to join and form
their own trade unions, as is the case in India and Pakistan,
auditors should be careful about treating any clearly undemo-
cratic mechanism as “a step in the right direction”. Many fear
that this is becoming a common practice among auditors.
The factory does not have a union but they have a workers’ representative ‘Labour
Working Committee’, which is a non-elected body. Research on Factory A, Pakistan, pro-
ducing for J.D. Williams, La Blanche Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Mode &
Preis, Zeeman, YDG International and Wal-Mart
Checking for the presence of freedom of association is a qualitative assessment to
make for an auditor and is easily subject to manipulation. It requires good knowledge
of labour law and practice and a working relationship with trade union bodies and
other labour-related organisations. Organisation such as the Workers’ Rights Consor-
tium (WRC), for example, have developed sensitive methods to assess key indicators,
such as whether representatives are freely elected, when investigating complaints,
and rely on good local knowledge of and long experience with labour relations.
Some codes of conduct also stipulate a positive attitude to collective bargaining
alongside freedom of association. Since collective bargaining is the central tool work-
ers can use to collectively discuss and negotiate improvements in wages and working
conditions with employers, auditors are clearly failing if they are not able to detect
management’s attitude to this tool. The following demonstrates management’s nega-
tive attitude toward collective bargaining:
(There is no collective bargaining agreement) because we are paying the minimum
wage. Minimum wage of the workers is also certified by the auditors. Manager, Factory
A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCL
In factory E in north India, where no trade union was present and no collective bargain-
ing agreement was in force, workers felt that management would not approve of a
trade union. Seven of the workers interviewed said that they would like to form a trade
union in order to put their demands and perspective forward.
In absence of a trade union it is very difficult to talk about a wage hike. Many times we
mustered courage and tried to put our demands forward but we always reverted back
due to the fear of reaction from the management. Worker, Factory E, north India, pro-
ducing for IKEA, Carrefour, Colby and Wal-Mart
Auditors at an ILO technical meeting held in Ankara at 18 May 2005 acknowledged
that no consistent benchmarks exist for auditors on freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, and they argued that audits should be complemented by training
for managers and workers to help explain the potential benefits of respect for these
rights. One of the clear benefits is that the ability to exercise freedom of association
and collective bargaining helps establish effective worker-management communica-
tion, which is key to a good working environment.
38
INSUFFICIENT PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE AND SICK LEAVE
Provision of medical care and sick leave, two things auditors can check for, often exist
on paper only. For example, under Indian law workers have a right to free health care
but in practice this comes at a hefty price.
All the workers have ESIC cards. This means that they can go to ESIC hospitals for their
treatment free of cost. The workers however expressed practical problems in using this
facility. According to them, for a check up in an ESIC hospital it usually takes at least
three to four hours. But the factory allows them maximum an hour to see the doctor. So
in that time workers can only visit a private clinic for which they have to pay. Going to
an ESI hospital would mean losing wage for half a day. Workers from Factory C, north
India, producing for KarstadtQuelle, Kingel, Derma Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods,
audited under the BSCI scheme
DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Discrimination is one of the most difficult labour abuses for auditors to identify, and
it has a strong gender dimension. Take, for example, Factory E in north India, produc-
ing for IKEA, Carrefour, Colby and Wal-Mart, where the management stated that “there
is a provision for maternity leave but presently there is no scope for its implementa-
tion among the workers since all the women labourers in the factory are above the
age of 45 or are unmarried.” Since the situation described by the manager persists,
one must assume that the auditor did not pick this up as an indication as possible
discrimination in hiring—an innocent enough sounding statement can easily hide
a hiring policy that rejects any candidates who seem likely to become pregnant. By
avoiding hiring such people, a discriminatory practice, management can still appear to
be following the rules by providing for maternity leave on paper. As one Indian Labour
Department officer put it:
Companies do not prefer married women, because there is a possibility that they will
take maternity leave and sick leave.
Harassment is a much harder practice to detect, and it is difficult to see how most
auditors, given their methods, can uncover instances of it in a short audit visit. The
CCC believes that participatory auditing, described in more detail later in this report,
address these issues more effectively. Contacts with credible local organisations can
help greatly.
Cases of sexual harassment … seldom come out of interviews or single audits. Also
formal complaints are not made. People are afraid or ashamed to talk about it. Single
cases are best dealt with in a discrete and confidential way, to avoid negative conse-
quences for the victim. Digging into details may be very embarrassing. Especially young
migrant women workers are very vulnerable. Discuss with local organisations how to
gather information about possible sexual harassment at the workplace. Fair Wear Foun-
dation Audit Manual, May 2005
39
ABUSES RELATED TO WAGES AND OVERTIME
According to the information gathered for this report, falsification of factory paperwork
to hide overtime that exceeds legal limits is widespread. When this is combined with
the coaching of workers for interviews, another trail of evidence is easily covered up.
The related violation of forced overtime, is even more difficult for auditors to pin down.
Workers often cannot refuse overtime, since they know it would endanger their jobs:
Workers say that they are not directly threatened or dismissed but when they refuse to
do extra hours they are put on the so-called black list. The consequences of being on
this list are the following: the workers start to be given only very low paid jobs, in case
of restructuring they are the first on the list, the general attitude of the supervisors/
management is very cold and they are very often criticised. According to Romanian re-
searchers, in factory A (producing for ECCE, We, Oliver Grant, Rosner, John Adam, Baker
Street, Kenzo, Givenchy, HOAL, La Redoute and Pellestrom)
In factory F in Romania, producing for Lotto, Diadora, Adam Business, Zara, We, John
Adam, C&A, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Otto, Etam, Coulange, Dolce and Gabbana,
Morobe and Armate de Mare, workers reported that supervisors verbally abuse them to
push them to meet their targets. Since the targets cannot realistically be achieved in
normal working hours, workers need to work overtime just to earn the minimum wage.
By delaying payment of wages, employers are also able to prevent workers leaving
to find better employment elsewhere. Although such practices are not widespread, it
remains a practice that places workers in an impossible situation.
“Yes, I can leave my job with one month prior notice, but my 2 months wage and 3
months overtime is due. I am sure, I will not get these if I resign. So how can I leave?”
Operator, Factory F, Bangladesh, producing for Kohl B
Frequently, delayed payment of wages is even used as a subtle means of punishment
for workers who refuse overtime, as is the case in factory F in Bangladesh. Since this
does not show up in the records, auditors usually overlook this.
Very frequently, workers are paid poverty wages—wages so low that often even basic
needs cannot be met.
Everyone gets paid either minimum wage or more than that, but even that wage is not
sufficient to make ends meet. It is time that buyers determine a living wage and they
should ask the producers to pay a living wage instead of minimum wage. They should
also shoulder part of the costs of the living wages. Sohnia Ali, secretary of Mutahida
Labour Federation, Pakistan
Auditors commonly use the minimum wage as the standard to audit against, even
though it is commonly accepted that in many apparel-producing countries the mini-
mum wage is set at a level that is too low to allow workers to meet basic needs.
Worse still, once minimum wages have been fixed, according to the ILO, they are not
adjusted regularly to take factors such as inflation into account.23
40
Can you really
measure the living
wage?
Only a few codes (including the CCC
code) call for the payment of a “living
wage”. Many claim it is impossible to
come up with a measurable standard
for the living wage, or that wage levels
should be determined through collective
bargaining between trade unions and
management. In fact, there are a variety
of techniques actually available to make
at least a reasonable estimate of the
range in which a living wage would fall,
for example by using the “poverty line”,
the “purchasing power index”, the so-
called “market basket” approach, or a
combination of these methods. Other
benchmarks could include “best practice”
negotiated wage levels elsewhere in the
sector, or the wage levels called for by
unions or labour-related groups active
in the area. The point about collective
bargaining is certainly valid, but when no
union is present in the workplace (which
is the case in most garment industry
workplaces), buyers should ensure that
wage levels allow workers to live. This
can of course be adjusted later when a
collective bargaining process goes into
effect.
41
Even the “prevailing wage”, understood as the going rate
for workers in specific occupations for a particular area or
country, and used by some code initiatives as the “next best
thing”, often fails to bring workers’ wages above the poverty
line. A paper prepared by MIT, argues that “in most of the
major apparel exporting countries, prevailing wages are no
guarantee that workers can cover living expenses”.24
Expecting workers to live off of a wage that simply cannot be
lived off of is unrealistic and seems to contradict any claims
of “corporate social responsibility” made by buyers. The chal-
lenge of earning a living wage is illustrated in the case of a
young woman working in Factory C in Pakistan, producing for
KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart:
Because of the fact that wages are so low and the cost of
living so high, she finds it very hard to make ends meet. At
18, she is the only earning member of her family of three. She
is an only child and both her parents are jobless. She spends
almost 40% of her income on the rent of her one bedroom
house. She recently took a loan from her factory to buy a re-
frigerator, which reduced her earnings considerably as her sal-
ary gets deducted to pay back the loan. When asked she said
she has no idea what social auditing is. When explained she
said that it is good that the working conditions and health and
safety measures are checked through the auditing process but
they should also see that we get better wages. When told that
it is checked that workers should get at least the minimum
wage set by the government, which they all do, she said that
if they think this wage is enough they should all try to live on
this amount for a month and decide if it is ok.
In spite of the evidence, only a few codes call for the payment
of a “living wage” and most continue to claim that it is impos-
sible to come up with a measurable standard.
There should be an audit or monitoring on the workers’ wel-
fare, such as whether the wages received by the workers are
sufficient to fulfil the workers’ basic daily needs such as the
workers do not need to do overtime since the wages have
already covered what they need to pay for food, housing, and
putting their children to school” Textile, Clothes and Leather
Factory Trade Union (SPTSK SPSI), Indonesia, producing for
Fila.
DO WORKERS HAVE A REAL SAY?
A key element of successful auditing is the interviewing of workers— it is a logical way
of cross-checking the claims made by employers about labour conditions.
The table on the next page shows how, when researched carefully, rather shocking
discrepancies regarding working conditions can quite clearly be found. Worker inter-
views, as they tend to be executed at present, are likely to miss much of this level of
detail, because in practice they are done quite superficially. Furthermore, managers,
understandably keen to produce a favourable audit result, often tend to manipulate
the interview process in a number of ways.
THE REALITY OF WORKER INTERVIEWS
To address weaknesses identified by critics early on, most social audit methodolo-
gies now use qualitative as well as quantitative methods (see box on the “circle of
evidence” chapter 1), relying on worker interviews as well as walking through work-
places and checking the books. Workers’ interviews are generally seen as an impor-
tant component of a social audit and therefore they need to be done carefully in an
atmosphere that makes a worker feel they can be frank, and have trust in the auditor.
In practice, interview methods still leave much to be desired. The credibility of worker
interviews is being systematically undermined by employers. Although many social
auditors now claim to be able to tell whether workers have been instructed how to
answer questions, there is no reason to believe that this is true or that auditors have
gotten any better at collecting information through interviews:
3 auditors at the ILO technical meeting said, for instance, that they only tend to ask
managers, and not workers, about freedom of association,
3 in none of the seven countries researched did any workers report being asked by
auditors about freedom of association
3 the information gathered from around the world for this report repeatedly identi-
fied that during interviews which are always short, the questions asked of workers
were relatively superficial, and were related nearly exclusively to wages and hours
worked,
3 auditors often did not explain who they were, nor what their purpose was, nor that
they did not “represent” buyers, and
3 workers are treated as a source of information rather than as the major intended
beneficiaries of the process
Researchers in northern India observed:
No worker who had met the social auditor could be identified. According to the informa-
tion collected…supervisors were interviewed by the social auditors. Factory A, produc-
ing for BCL, Saki and RCC
Even in cases where workers are interviewed, the chances of auditors enjoying an
honest exchange about working conditions are limited. In many cases, such as at
42
factories in northern India, “the interview of the worker is conducted at the shop floor
in the presence of everybody including the management”.
Throughout the interview of the workers conducted by the social auditor, management
kept a strict vigil. I was not comfortable at all while conversing with the auditors. I was
so scared by the management’s presence that under pressure I even gave wrong an-
swers. Worker, Factory B, north India, producing for Wal-Mart
43
When asked if they felt secure when they were interviewed by the auditors in the fac-
tory, they said that they didn’t know who was talking to them; neither did they know
anything about the compliance issue for which they were being interviewed. Research
from factory B, Pakistan, producing for KarstadtQuelle
The auditors never told the workers… their identity…. Nor did the auditors inform the
interviewed workers about how the information they conveyed would be protected and

The same tends to happen elsewhere:

The employees (between eight and 10 employees in every case, the factory’s manager
said) are interviewed inside the factory, with the company manager present” Research
Table 2
on Factory A, Romania, producing for ECCE, We, Oliver Grant, Rosner, John Adam, Baker
Street, Kenzo, Givenchy, HOAL, La Redoute and Pellestrom

The level of sophistication of factory managers in undermining worker interviews dur- In Factories A & B, north India, producing for BCL, Saki, RCC and Wal-Mart…
ing audits in China is impressive:
…managers said… …workers said…

Although they couldn’t tell which buyer did which audit, workers felt that there was
difference in terms of auditing quality. The management would coach them more before
some buyers’ audits and award workers with RMB100 for giving the “right” answers to
the auditors. For other buyers and auditors that are less stringent, the factory would
have relatively relaxed coaching and there is no reward for “good behaviour” either.
Research on Factory C, southern China, producing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the
Beijing Olympic Committee
The interviewed workers say they can all memorize the standard answers and would
not tell the truth to the auditors. Research on Factory B, south China, producing for
6ixty8ight, No Romeo, Marie Melli and Onlingerie
Auditors are clearly also to blame at times for not encouraging a confidential ex-
change. In almost all factories, workers reported that people came to ask them ques-
tions, but they hardly ever knew on whose behalf these auditors had come, what type
of audit was being carried out, or what the objective of the exercise was.
Romanian workers in factory F remembered being asked questions by people they as-
sumed were buyers, but were likely to have been auditors or monitors of some kind. If
auditors do not explain why they are there, it is hard to see how they can establish the
necessary rapport to have a frank exchange with a worker. This is particularly troubling
considering buyers use these worker interviews as the main tool for getting worker
input on workplace conditions.
Most (workers) didn’t realise that they were being interviewed by an auditor and what
kind of impact an audit can make. Research from Factory A, Pakistan, producing for J.D.
Williams, La Blanche Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Mode & Preis, Zee-
man, YDG International and Wal-Mart
3 We have first aid boxes in all departments.
For regular check-up of the workers we have a
contract with a local hospital. Two trained per-
sons are always present in the factory for first
aid and for cases of emergency. Employer pays
only for the first aid and regular check-up.
3 Workers are given training on how to escape a
fire. Maps have been fixed for the fire exits indi-
cating the gate from which they should escape.
3 Workers get all the holidays as per government
rules, i.e. more than 20 in a year
3 Workers are provided with clean drinking water
3 Medical facilities in this factory are limited to
a first aid box that has an old and inadequate
collection of medicines. No nurse or doctor ever
visits the factory. Workers do not have access to
medical facilities in any other form. They are not
allowed to take rest when they are ill. If they do
it their salary is deducted. Only staff from some
departments, like the salaries department (i.e..
higher skilled permanent workers) are entitled to
visit a private hospital nearby—they have a deal
with the factory. But when workers go, they have
to pay for themselves.
3 All workers confirmed that there had never been
any fire drills. There is one emergency exit in the
factory which is locked.
3 According to the workers they get an off only on
Sundays. Beyond that workers are not allowed
off for any government holiday.
3 There is one tap for 350 workers, on the other
hand managers get mineral water.
3 Water is very dirty. The tank is never cleaned.
(Workers reported instances where frogs were
jumping in the tank during rainy season. Also
one worker reported that a dead rat was found
in the tank.)
3 The water is very hot. There is a fridge but it
does not work hence we have to drink water
from tank.
44
how the workers could complain in case of retaliation or reporting of code violation.
Workers at an SA8000-accredited factory, China, producing for DKNY, Just Perfect and
Michael Kors
Although auditors, when talking about their work, tend to refer to efforts they make to
establish a friendly rapport with the workers interviewed, it obviously does not always
succeed. Under conditions of distrust, it is not surprising that workers would feel un-
comfortable reporting social audit fraud to auditors.
Workers are “informed” by the supervisors during the coaching that the minimum wage
in Dongguan city is RMB450…. The management requires all workers to tell the audi-
tors that they would have at least RMB600 a month…. The management had two sets
of wage records—one to be delivered to workers and the other is a fraud to show to the
auditors. The fraudulent wage records show that workers in general receive RMB800-
900 a month whereas in reality, the skilled workers are receiving more than RMB1000
and the less skilled ones get only RMB600-700 a month in the peak season. While
almost all workers know that the management is using fraudulent wage records for au-
diting, none of the interviewed workers have reported or heard anybody reporting that
to the auditors. Research on Factory A, southern China, producing for DKNY, Just Perfect
and Michael Kors
Even the best efforts to keep audits unrehearsed are likely to be flawed. For instance,
even when workers are selected randomly by auditors, it is hard, if the interviews take
place in the workplace, to hide the identity of those being interviewed:
According to the management it does not have any prior knowledge of the workers to be
interviewed by the social auditors. However when the auditing is taking place auditors
ask the management to send the specified workers to the conference room. It is only
during the process of social auditing that management comes to know of the names
of workers being interviewed by the social auditors. Research on Factory C, north India,
producing for KarstadtQuelle, Kingel, Derma Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods
It is generally agreed that interviews are more likely to be open if they take place in
confidence outside the workplace, particularly if the interviewer takes certain steps to
build trust with workers beforehand.
Conduct interviews in a location that makes the worker feel comfortable and which
does not raise the possibility that the employer will subject the worker to retaliation.
Always conduct the interview outside the presence of factory managers. This does not,
and is not intended to, preclude asking routine questions of workers at the factory floor
however. A range of locations can be used. Common sense should be used to determine
specific sites that afford the greatest opportunity for productive, confidential discus-
sions. Onsite interviews may include informal conversations in the production area of
the factory floor, the cafeteria/dining area at meal and rest breaks, the area just out-
side the factory as shifts end, other common areas and locations on site that allow for
workers to be interviewed without observation by factory management. Interviews con-
ducted off site should be conducted in such a way that factory managers do not gain
information about which workers have been interviewed. The monitor should use discre-
45
tion in selecting the location where such interviews take place. Consult local organisa-
tions which are trusted by workers to determine where interviews can take place. Fair
Wear Foundation Audit Manual, Version May 2005
The reality is sadly often far from this good practice. Workers in north India told re-
searchers that “usually auditors interview only the supervisors. If there are workers,
they are those who are senior and close to the management.” In cases where the
selection for interviews is clearly “stage-managed”, workers in India even recall “times
when workers have tried to walk up to the auditors and talk to them but they have
been stopped”.
One of the workers complained to the social auditor about the low wages given by the
export house. After they left he was rebuked by the management and was made to feel
guilty as the buyer cancelled few orders of this export house. He is thus afraid of reper-
cussions if the management comes to know that workers revealed working practices
to social auditors. They are not supposed to reveal anything apart from what is told to
them by the management. Worker, Factory E, north India, producing for IKEA, Carrefour,
Colby and Wal-Mart
Managers often tell workers that the next order from a client depends on them mis-
leading auditors during interviews.
Like many other workers I find it very difficult to participate in the audits. You always
have to lie for the sake of helping the company get the orders otherwise if we were to
tell the truth we would never have any orders and that would mean the end of our jobs.
We would rather lie and receive the orders than to tell the truth and lose our jobs….
Worker, Factory B, Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart
Putting such pressure on workers is not only unethical and unfair, but undermines an
audit—the process that is supposed to be designed to lead to improved conditions
for workers. Social auditing’s main aim should not be to check on whether an order
should be placed or cancelled. In any case, auditors doing their job properly should
make it clear to workers they interview that their job and the future of the factory does
not depend on the answers they provide. By telling auditors the “wrong” thing however
workers and their colleagues feel the repercussions from management.
There are cases where if the management realises that someone from a certain depart-
ment told the auditors the truth the whole department is given a very high target. If
they identify the person who spoke the truth they victimize them on other pretexts….
Worker, Factory C, Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart
The women workers were afraid and don’t want to be interviewed for the auditing be-
cause they fear loss of job. Research on Factory D, Pakistan, producing for Springfield,
Lindex and C&A
Even those involved in research for this report noted the fear instilled in workers when
they speak with outsiders. Researchers in Bangladesh noted workers out of work
following the collapse of Spectrum Sweater were more forthcoming about bad work-
46
ing conditions at the former workplace then were workers interviewed who were still
employed elsewhere (though it was unlikely that conditions at these other workplaces
were much better than at Spectrum).
Workers’ identities in relation to the information they disclose to auditors should be
kept confidential from management. The Kenyan Human Rights Commission, carrying
out the research in Kenya, noted that employer efforts to influence the interview proc-
ess have the result of putting even greater pressure on workers:
The management is usually concerned about the workers chosen by the auditors for
interviews. Their efforts to have their preferred candidates interviewed are sometimes
frustrated by auditors who pick workers at random for the interviews. This notwith-
standing workers are always afraid of the interviews due to the expectations of the
management. Factory C, Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart
Workers who tell the auditors about the failures in the company are always targeted
for expulsion. Workers say that the management is quite concerned about workers who
spoil the name of the company during the audit and will do all that is possible to get rid
of such persons. This has made most workers afraid of the interviews. Factory E, Kenya,
producing for Wal-Mart.
In an audit carried out as part of the AVE-BSCI programme in Romania, when a man-
ager learned of a remark made by an employee in an interview, he said:
Who said this? I will fire him!
Auditors seem, in some cases, to be sensitive to the possibility of recriminations.
In Factory C in Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart, it was reported that auditors make
follow-up visits with the express purpose of ensuring that those interviewed are not
victimised as a result of what they have reported to auditors. The researcher in Kenya
believes this improved behaviour is a result of earlier public campaigning exposing
labour abuses in Kenya in factories where auditors were operating. Unfortunately, this
practice is currently not widely followed by social auditors, nor replicated by Wal-Mart
in other countries.
Research by Fondation des droits de L’Homme au travail that critically assessed
19 audit teams from the private sector, NGOs and brands’ internal auditors in 14
countries found that some workers are penalized when they do not reach the pro-
duction target when they pause just 10-20 minutes from their work in order to be
interviewed.25 The research also found that non-profit labour inspection organisations
tend to conduct more interviews off-site, while commercial auditors tend to interview
only on-site. An auditor for the non-profit organisation COVERCO in Guatemala argues
that it takes six or seven conversations before they can ask a worker deeply personal
questions.26
47
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF OTHER LOCAL PLAYERS
In addition to failing to gather sufficient information fromm workers, researchers found
that most social auditors also did not gather input from relevant local organizations
with knowledge of workplace conditions.
There is hardly any contact between audit firms or buyers and civil society groups in
Bangladesh. There are a number of NGOs and trade unions involved in the movement
to ensure the rights of garment workers. Practically it is almost impossible for the civil
society groups to get in touch with the audit firms or buyers. General comment from the
researchers in Bangladesh
Observers are increasingly concluding that social auditing is not effective if some form
of engagement with credible local organisations does not accompany it.
Our work has shown that code implementation is most successful when it is backed up
by local trade unions and other local organisations. ETI Annual Report 2002/2003
There should be a move away from the current top to bottom pattern, led by internation-
al buyers and commercial verification bodies, to a bottom to top pattern of monitoring,
with the involvement of local interest groups and workers. Institute of Contemporary
Observation, China, 2003
It should be noted that in the few cases researched for this report where trade unions
were operating in the workplaces, researchers noted that auditors can and do tend to
informally cross-check the information they have gathered with local trade unions, as
is the case with those auditing Factory D in Kenya, producing for GV and Wal-Mart.
Overall, though, researchers found very few examples of local stakeholders, such as
trade unions or credible local labour-related NGOs, being involved or even minimally
consulted in social audits.There is clearly a connection between the extent to which
most auditors fail to detect labour rights abuses in workplaces using the traditional
“circle of evidence” (factory documentation—physical observation—management and
worker interviews), and their failure to gather information from these other relevant
local sources.
Generally, guidelines for code implementation, such as those for SA8000-accredited
auditors, advise that auditors seek guidance in their work from local stakeholders.
Final audit reports, however, are the property of the client, and local organisations will
not see it. Given that they will not be allowed to see the report, there is little incentive
for local organisations to work with auditors. In fact, many local labour rights groups,
particularly in Asia, complain that they are just being used or co-opted by commercial
social auditors, and treat the latter with extreme caution. An additional concern is that
commercial auditors tend to apply a different set of standards for different clients.
Such a lack of consistency can imply a certain lack of ethics in the eyes of local or-
ganisations.
48
Some companies have noted the value of gathering information from relevant local
sources. Apparel company Gap, for example, has recognised their “ability to discover
violations (of Freedom of Association) increases when we conduct in-depth interviews
with workers and engage unions and other organizations that are reliable sources in a
factory”.27
WORKERS NOT BEING INFORMED ABOUT THEIR LABOUR RIGHTS
Despite the growing number of companies implementing codes and the number of
audits conducted each year, very few workers are aware that codes exist, even in work-
places where employers are making significant efforts to put them into practice. ETI
Annual Report 2002/2003
While codes of conduct may indeed stipulate that codes be displayed on the walls of
the factory in order to ensure workers are aware of their rights, this doesn’t seem to
be having much of an effect.
The researcher who visited the factory and the sub-contracted units did not see any
codes of conduct displayed in the sections visited. In the… human resource depart-
ment, checking and finishing and cutting department… (and) the sub-contracted units
the researcher did not notice any codes of conduct displayed… eighteen out of twenty-
one workers interviewed were not aware of codes of conduct pasted in the factory. Only
three out of twenty one noticed codes of conduct displayed in the factory. Even these
three… had not read them. Research on Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki
and RCC
In SA8000-accredited factory A in Pakistan, producing for J.D. Williams, La Blanche
Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Mode & Preis, Zeeman, YDG International
and Wal-Mart, the SA8000 code was not displayed because no Urdu translation was
available!
In the same factory, workers claimed that any awareness of their labour rights came
as a result of the memory of a trade union in the factory, ousted by the managers in
2000.
All the twenty-one workers interviewed in the factory and sub-contracted units were
aware of their labour rights and knew how to file complaints… since (the president of a
local trade union) had tried to organise the workers in this factory.
Also in Romania, representatives of the GTZ AVE project noted that workers only tend
to know about the labour standards that brands and retailers ask for in their codes
when trade unions are active in the factories.
The coaching which the workers in the Indian factory received to ensure that they
answer the interview questions of social auditors “correctly” has been having a educa-
tional effect, presumably contrary to the intentions of the managers:
49
Orientation given by the management to the workers for social auditing process are
important, though limited instances of their education on labour rights. Research on
north India, Factory A
By learning from managers the “correct” answers to questions from auditors, workers
can identify their entitlements for themselves, as well as how management is both
failing its employees and flouting the standards demanded by buyers.
Benefiting ironically from the propaganda the factory has launched in the SA8000
process and the management coaching on labour law before the factory audit, workers
in general are aware of the basic legal requirement on the number of working hours,
the minimum wage and the overtime compensation rate in China. The question is
whether the workers would talk about or take action about the gap between the labour
law and the actual working conditions. Research on Factory A, southern China
Similarly, a worker in the dyeing and bleaching unit of a south India factory may learn
about the necessity of wearing protective clothing when his managers need to put on
a show for visitors:
In the dyeing and bleaching unit they are supposed to use gloves, masks, goggles, etc.
On enquiry he said he uses them sometimes and sometimes he forgets to use them.
He said “most of us do not care much about using these security measures such as the
gloves, masks and goggles. The supervisors and the management do not insist on us
to use them regularly except on certain days when we have some outsider visiting the
unit— most of them are foreigners and government officers”.
COMPLAINT MECHANISMS AS A MEANS OF REDRESS
While there is much talk about complaints mechanisms as part of the “toolbox”
system of checks and balances to accompany social auditing, researchers found al-
most no recorded instances of auditors informing workers that there was a means to
bring complaints after the audit. This means buyers or MSIs either had no complaint
mechanisms which auditors could recommend to workers, or if they did auditors were
simply failing to pass on that information, either because they were not instructed to
or did not see this as part of their job It is beyond most auditors’ mandates to explain
to workers how they can file complaints or get help from third parties in the event of
labour rights violations. This means auditors miss an opportunity to obtain information
that workers might not be comfortable to give during a face to face interview. Maquila
Solidarity Network observes that:
Unless workers have the ability to tell their stories without the threat or perceived
threat of management or government retaliation for doing so, it will continue to be
difficult for even well-trained auditors to document real labour practices, as opposed to
those that appear in company records. 28
50
Quote
The ideal monitor would be a
“labor-lawyer-accountant-sociologist-
investigative-reporter-health and safety
specialist under thirty”
COVERCO
Grievance and
complaints
mechanisms
The term “complaint” is often used
interchangeably with “grievance.”
However, in the context of codes
of conduct, the term “grievance” is
usually used with regard to grievance
procedures at the level of the
workplace, while the term “complaint”
is used with regard to code of conduct
complaints mechanisms at the
international level. Workplace-level
grievance systems should deal with
all forms of worker issues— whether
code violations or other issues that
do not relate to code standards (e.g.
disagreements between workers,
issues with management style, etc.).
On the other hand, complaints filed
with code of conduct complaints
mechanisms are limited to alleged
violations of the relevant code.
All issues (whether referred to as
complaints, grievances or otherwise)
should be resolved at as local a level
as possible.
51
If workers know that their comments are going to make it into
audit reports and taken seriously as items that need improve-
ment they would be more forthcoming, they might feel more
confident about bringing complaints or requesting that im-
provements be made. But in the research carried out for this
report, it was rare to find any examples of an auditors’ report
being shared with workers or their representatives.
In most systems in which auditing currently takes place audit
reports are shared with management only and it is left up to
them to share the report with workers (and also relevant lo-
cal NGOs and trade unions. Disclosing the findings with any
stakeholders others than management is not part of the ma-
jority of the existing systems.
Out of over 40 factories, only auditors from DNV at one
workplace in south India are said to “have left their official
and personal contact numbers with workers for further con-
tact”. When asked by researchers, a typical response from
managers would state that “there is no mechanism by which
a worker can contact an auditor or the buyer once the audit-
ing process is completed. The worker however can write to
the management about the working conditions or any other
problem related to factory. For this purpose the company has
placed suggestion boxes at various places.” 29
There is nothing wrong with placing suggestion boxes in the
factory as part of an internal grievance mechanism, but such
a system is not the same as a mechanism to allow workers
to bring complaints to the attention of international buyers,
when internal grievance systems fail them.
LACK OF SKILL AND EXPERIENCE OF
AUDITING STAFF
While companies claim that their inspectors are very quali-
fied, there is much evidence that social auditors have little
relevant work experience and are sent to factories with hardly
any training at all.30
3 In 2000 Dara O’Rourke pointed out that PwC social audi-
tors were in fact trained financial auditors who were given
a short course in social issues.
3 Labor Rights in China (LARIC) criticized a training seminar
for SA 8000 monitors (LARIC 1999) because neither the
trainer nor the trainees had experience in labour or human
rights although this did not prevent them from being certified as capable of verify-
ing working conditions.
After conducting interviews with five compliance firms, Jill Esbenshade (2004) found
that monitoring field investigators often have minimal qualifications and are chosen on
the basis of language skills and overseas experience.
3 Esbenshade noted that the staff of accounting firms are “highly trained in calcu-
lation and bookkeeping, which may facilitate addressing wage and hour issues.
They claim to look beyond surface appearances at systems of operation (i.e. what
procedures a company has in place). However, they have no professional training in
other areas such as health and safety, labor law, worker interviews or human rights
issues. Moreover, most of their business involves helping large corporations best
manage their resources and maximize profit. It could be argued that their operat-
ing principles do not prioritize the needs of workers and are often antithetical to
them”.31
The Fair Wear Foundation and the Fair Labor Association have come to similar conclu-
sions. As a result, the FWF set out to create teams of individuals with a variety of
backgrounds, experiences and skills, while the FLA is shifting the balance of its ac-
credited “independent monitors” away from global firms either to more specialized
firms or to non-profit social auditing organisations, albeit at a very slow pace. One of
these organisations, COVERCO has noted that social audit teams should incorporate
a wide range of different abilities, including knowledge of legal, labour and health
and safety issues, as well as having legal, accountancy, sociology, and investigative
skills.32 Failing that (which is very likely!), COVERCO hires teams of monitors who are
from the same social sphere as apparel industry workers, yet have acquired account-
ing or other professional skills. In general, to have better social auditing or monitoring,
organisations are turning to credible local organisations, most frequently civil society–
based. Such a solution not only implies better quality, but also encourages the promo-
tion of teams made up of local organisations and individuals, which, would seem to be
a step in the right direction in building local capacity to address labour issues.
While it is clear that a number of organisations are developing higher levels of techni-
cal competence there is currently not enough existing capacity among these organi-
sations to satisfy the social auditing needs of the industry. This is usually cited as
the key reason for using, in spite of their inadequacies, the larger quality control or
financial auditing firms. This suggests a need to put greater resources into promoting
monitoring carried out by or with credible civil society-based groups or local labour and
other specialists. One former social auditor describes how he got hired:
Twelve hours ago I was in the southern California offices of an independent monitoring
company that inspects factories for safety violations and human rights abuses through-
out the world. I had been hired over the phone a few days before. My sole qualification
for the job? I speak Chinese and have a friend already working for the company. I as-
sumed that there would be some sort of lengthy training process to teach me how to be
a human rights inspector. There wasn’t. 33
52
While the above example may not be typical, all the research points to frequent fail-
ures of social auditors to identify clear instances of exploitation and abuse of workers.
Lack of adequate training seems to be a part of the reason for this problem.

Gender, language and cultural factors also seem to play a role.

An ETI project for example found that “women workers were only willing to share their
experiences of sexual harassment in the workplace if they were talked to in confi-
dence, in their own language and with someone they could relate to and trust”.34

COVERCO also came to the conclusion that the “monitor’s social class, gender, and
age, are crucial to the success of interview-based monitoring”.35

Observations made by the manager of a Chinese factory that, with around 20 clients,
faces a social audit every month, seem to support this view:

The managers said that factory always sails through the checks because most of the

04
inspection personnel are from Hong Kong, and it is easy to get them to bend the rules
a little. When European teams do come in person, they never understand any Chinese,
and it is short work to ”‘sort out” the translation and fix the problem. Institute of
Contemporary Observation, China, 2003, factory producing for Debenhams

The same researcher said that the conscientiousness of social auditors is not neces-
sarily in question, for the most part, but that “the majority have not received training in
specialised legal knowledge and skills or techniques for interviewing workers”. There
is sense among some observers that the commercial orientation of most auditors is
part of the problem.

Increased competition for contracts among social auditing firms has recently been The social
observed. Commercial audits costing as little as 350 euros are a new phenomenon,
and suggest that younger, less experienced staff are being taken on to do the job. This audit industry
clearly has negative implications for the overall quality of audits, and should be moni-
tored carefully. Not transparent
It is sometimes argued that the ILO should play a key role with regard to the training of and
social auditors. In this context, the Better Factories Cambodia project, run by the ILO,
is generally regarded, including by the international trade union movement, as having unaccountable
used monitoring to address the full range of international labour standards, including
the more difficult issue of freedom of association.
54
ORIGIN OF THE SOCIAL AUDITING INDUSTRY
During the 1990s social auditing turned into a booming
business. With consumers increasingly voicing concern
over sweatshop revelations and faced with ineffective state
labour inspection in developing countries many companies,
laid the foundations for what is now a sizeable industry.
Auditing firms provide services not only to numerous compa-
nies that have adopted ethical standards, but they also play
a central role in a number of broader initiatives developing
codes, such as BSCI, WRAP or SA8000 (discussed in chap-
ter 5). Even though the involvement of for-profit auditing
firms has provoked criticism from some corners, there is no
comprehensive overview available of companies involved in
social auditing. Given the role these firms play, it is strange
that there have been so few studies or evaluations carried
out on their methods, effectiveness and transparency.
How labour
55
global basis and, thus, often already present in many of the apparel-sourcing
countries.
Today, however, the role of financial auditors has decreased significantly. Ernst and
Young and KPMG seem to have minimized their activities in this area, while two of
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ partners started Global Social Compliance in May 2001,
which still plays an important role within the social auditing business. Not coincidently,
this happened after PricewaterhouseCoopers’ auditing practices were heavily criticised
by Dara O’Rourke in his 2002 article, “Monitoring the monitors: a critique of corporate
third-party labour monitoring,”38 which focused particularly on the inadequacies of
PwC. While not providing actual social auditing services, many of these firms continue
to provide clients with advice on corporate social responsibility.
QUALITY CONTROL FIRMS
Quality control firms (known also as testing, inspecting or certification firms) are also
active in social auditing. These companies provide services on a global basis regard-

inspection has There are four kinds of organisation involved in social ing manufacturing, design and sourcing.
auditing:
failed workers
in Swaziland and 1 Global financial auditing firms such as Pricewater-
houseCoopers. Involved early on in social auditing they
Madagascar are now however moving out of this area These are for-

In 2002, the CCC reported on the failure 2

of the government to protect workers
in Swaziland. Employers at that time
were boasting to workers that they
could easily bribe labour inspectors. In
2001, the Swaziland industrial court
had a waiting list of between two and
five years. And the labour ministry said
it was concerned not to “push investors
too hard”.
In Madagascar, resources don’t exist
for factories to be inspected once a
year, though this is required by law.
Instead,as a minimum, inspectors
respond to complaints. But even when
inspectors file complaints, they can
be delayed for years. One unusually
zealous inspector filed 52 cases with
the labour court in 1997, and by late
2001, when interviewed, none had
come to court!
De Haan and Phillips (2002)
profit firms.
Quality control firms (specialised in testing, inspecting
and certification). These are for-profit firms often operat-
ing globally.
3 Specialised, for-profit social audit firms or consultan-
cies. Some operate globally, some operate only in the
locality where they are based.
4 Not-for-profit social audit organisations. Most operate
only in the locality where they are based. Some, but not
all, are closely linked to civil society organisations.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL AUDITING FIRMS
Financial accounting firms, “with their recognized standards
and codes of ethics… well positioned to be trusted judges
of company performance”36 started to offer additional social
auditing services in the mid-1990s. They moved into the
field because of their long-established relastionships with
clients seeking social auditing services and also because
they were seeking to diversity at at time when financial
auditing was experiencing low growth rates.37 Additionally,
these companies, including PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC),
KPMG, and Ernst and Young, were already operating on a
Interaction with government labour inspectorates
Some say there is no need for private companies
to be carrying out social auditing, since it is pretty
similar to the work of labour inspectorates, which are
responsible for ensuring national labour law is imple-
mented properly. While ideally, this is a fair comment,
in reality, labour inspectorates are failing to protect
workers in many of the countries where garments are
being produced because:
3 there is little incentive for governments to effec-
tively implement international labour standards
and they often seem to believe (often wrongly)
that multinationals prefer it if a blind eye is
turned to labour rights violations in apparel facto-
ries,
3 often workers tend to be employed in such a
way that national labour laws do not cover them
as fully as they might—many factories prevent
workers from receiving a permanent contract, for
instance, by laying off workers for a short period
and rehiring them to avoid obligations arising
from employing someone over a long period,
3 they tend to be under-resourced—stories abound
of the travel costs of labour inspectors being cov-
ered by employers because they could not cover
their own costs, and
3 they are reported to be corrupt in some cases,
taking bribes, for instance, in exchange for turn-
ing a blind eye to labour violations.
The ILO recently found that little or no cooperation
exists between national governmental inspections
and social auditors. In recent years, some attempts
have been made to address this issue. The Gap is
sponsoring the training of government labour inspec-
tors in Cambodia. Less convincing initiatives have
included TLS8001, a partnership between SGS and
the Thai Labour Ministry, and The “Humane Produc-
tion” programme involving Intertek and the Philippine
Department of Trade and Industry.
56
The largest three global companies in this business are
Intertek (which owns Labtest), Societé Générale de Surveil-
lance (SGS) and Bureau Veritas. Each of these employs
tens of thousands of people and operates offices and labs
all over the world. These kinds of companies inspect the
production processes of suppliers in order to check whether
they meet specifications concerning quantity and quality
of deliveries, labelling and packaging, as well as whether
products comply with specific safety standards, regulations
or quality and performance criteria set either by the buyers
or the legal safety requirements of the markets in which the
products are sold. Increasingly, these firms now offer social
auditing services.
Providing certification of ISO and other international quality
or safety standards has become a significant global busi-
ness in itself. SGS is the biggest player with over 50,000
customers and 70,000 certificates issued worldwide. With a
market share of about 11%, SGS is ahead of Bureau Veritas
with 11% and Lloyds with 10%.39
Prior to entering the social auditing field they were already
involved in providing services related to quality certification
standards such as ISO 9000 and environmental standards
like ISO 14000.
57
out social responsibility compliance inspections within the apparel industry in 1991.
Another example is A & L Group Inc., a labour inspection firm based in New York with
FLA accreditation. Both companies operate globally.
Esbenshade notes that “(c)onsulting firms have sprung up in Bangladesh, India and
Vietnam to do labor monitoring specifically in those countries and this trend can be
expected to continue” (2004). These include LIFT-Standards in Bangladesh, T-Group
Solutions in India, Global Standards/Toan Tin in Vietnam, and WethicA in Europe.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT SOCIAL AUDIT ORGANISATIONS
Non-profit or not-for-profit organisations are supposed to support some issue for non-
commercial purposes, but even though they don’t operate to make a profit they do
generate revenues to finance their activities. Usually the organisation has to qualify for
this status, though this varies per country. There are a number of non-profit organisa-
tions that provide social audit services . The biggest one is Verité, a US-based organi-
sation that started in 1995 with the mission “to ensure that people worldwide work
under safe, fair and legal conditions”.42 It has done 1,300 factory audits in over 60
countries. However, as Esbenshade (2004:142) notes, “Verité in many respects (…)
actually operates as any other commercial firm. Verité charges standard fees, main-
tains the confidentiality of reports for clients, and conducts one-time or short-term
audits, often temporarily hiring local employees or bringing in staff from the United

The certification business provides companies that offer

these services with recurring revenues since the companies
receiving certifications are subject to regular “re-audits”
General Market (every two-to-three years). It was recently noted that the op-
positions of quality erating margins of Labtest’s code of conduct business are
higher than the company’s average margins.40 SGS writes
control firms that they continue to develop new services in the field of
corporate social responsibility that will allow the company to
enter “new higher value markets”.41
TEXTILE INDUSTRY
Other large companies operating in this sector are Det
Norske Veritas (DNV), which claims to be the number one
Others in SA8000 certification, and Bureau Veritas Quality Interna-
22% tional (BVQI).
Labtest
40%
SGS
13%
SPECIALISED SOCIAL AUDIT FIRMS
BV Group
25%
A number of companies have sprung up specifically to pro-
vide services related to code of conduct compliance and
source: Keusch et al., 2002 social auditing. These include Cal-Safety Compliance Corpo-
ration (CSCC) in the United States, which started carrying
Fair Wear Foundation Audit Teams
Audit team members should be:
3 knowledgeable of local labour relations,
3 knowledgeable of local law and regulations in
his/her field of expertise. The auditor must
assess the labour situation against the FWF
labour standards but also against local law
and regulations, since the audited companies
must abide both,
3 have the social skills to easily relate with the
different parties involved: management, work-
ers, unions, NGOs and local authorities and
to have a balanced view of the interests that
are at stake,
3 able to understand the views of workers and
management. Especially, the auditor who per-
forms worker interviews should have previous
experience in relating with workers,
3 committed to improve the situation for
workers,
3 able to communicate in English preferably in
order to make communications easier. The
writer of the audit report must be able to
write in English,
3 reliable persons and respect the confidential-
ity of the facts and data to which they will
have access. They may under no circumstanc-
es disseminate any piece of information oth-
erwise than through the reporting prescribed
in the FWF manual, and
3 a conflict of roles must be prevented, thus
inspectors should not have any other formal
or informal relation with the factory that they
inspect.
58
The hype from
social audit firms
Intertek: “Our business philosophy is
simple; we go where our clients require
us to go and use our extensive resources
and expertise to ensure that their needs
are fulfilled.”
Cal-Safety Compliance Corporation
emphasizes it has experience in “dealing
with” NGOs, “will coordinate alerts and
breaking information on NGO activity”
and “assist clients and interface with
the NGOs”
A&L Group claims to “provide a
confidential, personalized service
and protect our clients’ interests by
evaluating the social accountability of
their partners.”
WethicA (Worldwide Ethic Alliance)
claims to be dedicated to achieving
“otal Customer Satisfaction”, and to
represent “an international network of
skills concerned with participating in the
generalization of ‘decent’ work, easing
the access of small and medium sized
businesses to this action, encouraging
local initiatives by concomitant
actions on quality and production, and
respecting main regional balances”.
Services offered include a “social audit
express service within 24/48 hours,
even at night if permitted by local
regulations for working hours.”
Verité, works “to ensure that people
worldwide work under safe, fair and
legal conditions”.
59
States. While advertising itself as the only non-profit with a
global monitoring program, Verité actually straddles the line
between commercial firm and local NGO.”
Other non-profit organisations carrying out labour inspec-
tions and monitoring include GMIES, in El Salvador, and the
previously mentioned COVERCO, based in Guatemala but
also operating internationally. They differ from Verite in that
they both have far stronger roots in civil society movements
in their home countries and work intensively with local civil
society organizations through trainings and collaborative initia-
tives.43 The Fair Wear Foundation also seeks to ensure that
the members of their audit teams have a strong linkage with
local civil society groups.
SIZE AND GROWTH: HOW MANY SOCIAL
AUDITS ARE TAKING PLACE?
No comprehensive figure is available on the number of so-
cial audits taking place each year. One specialist estimates
around 30,000.44 Though commercial audit firms generally
do not disclose the number of social audits they carry out in
the garment industry per year, it is clear that the number has
increased dramatically during the last few years. As demon-
strated by the following summary of what is known of recent
social auditing activity or plans for future auditing activity, the
number of audits in this field could easily run into tens of
thousands of audits.45
3 Commercial social audit firm CSCC claims to conduct over
11,000 inspections annually for a variety of industries.46
3 Gertie Knox, the chief operating officer of Global Social
Compliance (formerly part of PricewaterhouseCoopers),
claimed they undertook 25,000 audits between 1996 and
2001.47
3 PwC performed 6000 factory audits in 2000 in 60 coun-
tries in 2000.48
3 Verité claims that since its founding in 1995, it has con-
ducted approximately 1,300 audits in 65 countries.49
3 In 2003, FLA monitors conducted 110 independent moni-
toring visits in twenty countries. An even bigger number of
FLA related audits took place internally, e.g.: Nike did 860
internal audits, Reebok 274 and Adidas 257.50
3 As of March 2005 Social Accountability International (SAI)
has certified 655 facilities in 44 countries and 50 differ-
ent industries. It is not known how many factories were
audited but failed to achieve SA8000 certification.
3 775 factories in over 85 countries have been certified to be in compliance with
WRAP 12 standards. In the last two months of 2004, 12 factories were de-certi-
fied because they failed unannounced follow-up evaluations. It is not clear how
many factories failed WRAP certification.51
3 In 2002, ETI member companies reported a total of 7,731 “evaluations”.
3 Within the Fair Wear Foundation, member companies have to audit labour condi-
tions themselves, while the FWF audits a portion of member’s suppliers. The facto-
ries for external verification are selected randomly. Every three years the FWF will
conduct audits at 10% of each member company’s supplier facilities.52
3 Initiative Clause Sociale announced the completion of 715 social audits.
While this seems like quite a lot of activity it still remains likely that most garment
production workplaces have not been audited. Using the above incomplete information
as a base, one could make a rough estimate that out of a possible total of 200,000-
300,000 clothing workplaces in the world today, around 10% are audited each year.
It is also unlikely that in auditing that 10% that the worst of the rights violations tak-
ing place in the industry are coming under scrutiny. In its 2002-2003 annual report
the ETI noted “companies prioritise the auditing of first tier suppliers. Our experience
shows that serious labour problems are more likely in the further reaches of the sup-
ply chain”.
But even though only a fraction of the total workplaces are being audited, manufac-
turers have complained that the multitude of “audits divert management time and
resources, disrupt workflow, and challenge planning processes”.53 Though these prob-
lems are no doubt real enough for the manager, from a worker perspective, the intend-
ed beneficiaries of this process, having multiple audits is not an issue of concern. The
bottom line is whether audits lead to improvements.
A major concern for the CCC is that the garment industry is tempted to improve ef-
ficiency by minimizing the number of audits, regardless of their effectiveness, rather
than aiming to be more efficient and effective in improving the implementation of their
codes of conduct. The trend that currently emerging is for industry to develop a single
compliance model that is weaker than existing standards and relies heavily on global
audit firms—this is the case with the BSCI and WRAP initiatives, which are discussed
in more detail in chapter 5.
SERIOUS CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS
For-profit monitors have a built-in credibility problem in those systems in which they
are selected, contracted and paid by the factories they inspect. - Sandra Polaski, a
former US State Department official responsible for international labour affairs.54
There is a built-in bias in mainstream social auditing that many companies appear
to be ignoring at their peril. The very parties who already acknowledge responsibility
for abusing and exploiting workers over the years are also commissioning the vast
majority of auditing. It is being done either by sourcing companies themselves, or by
auditors hired either by the sourcing companies or the suppliers. Therefore, in addition
60
Dialogue
“A corporation that thinks that it is
meaningfully engaging workers by
indulging in dialogue with itself, even
if this is disguised by bringing ‘hired
guns’ into the process, is either fooling
itself, seeking to fool others, or both.
Neither the use of professional CSR
enterprises nor a process of creating
rather than recognizing interlocutors is
a viable alternative to engagement with
workers and their organizations.” Guy
Ryder, general secretary, International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions
Independence?
The independence of a social auditor
can be questioned if:
3 they are directly paid by the
company whose facilities or
suppliers are being audited, and/or
3 they provide (or seek to provide)
other commercial services to the
same company.
61
to being unqualified and untrained to the carry out an assign-
ment that is often improperly designed (too short and too
incomplete) as has been shown in chapter 2 and chapter 3,
they cannot be seen as fully independent.
This is one of the reasons the more responsive brand name
companies are unlikely to hold up an audit report as evidence
to consumers that their supply chains are clean. And this is
why merely having a factory audited or certified by one stand-
ard or another is not, on its own, going to protect workers,
and it is not going to protect a sourcing company from the risk
that exploitation and abuse will be uncovered at some stage
in its supply chains.
Verification of audit results by an independent party, not paid
by the buyer or supplier, is one way in which the credibility of
auditing can be improved. Verification is usually done under
the auspices of a multi-stakeholder initiative. For instance,
the Fair Labor Association and the Fair Wear Foundation com-
mission unannounced audits for their member companies, as
part of the verification process.
The Fair Wear Foundation has decided not to work with com-
mercial audit firms but to train its own audit teams as a
means to get closer to the workers than has been achieved
by other auditing approaches.
A number of well-known brand companies using their own
compliance staff, have started to develop better relations with
local groups. For example, as a result of the Play Fair at the
Olympics campaign several sportswear companies have set
up meetings with trade unions and NGOs in Indonesia, Turkey,
Bulgaria and Cambodia.
By contrast, the trend, particularly among retailers, towards
participation in weaker less-demanding initiatives like the
BSCI, which overemphasises the role of audits and weakens
standards in the process (see chapter 5), may mislead buy-
ers into a false sense of security and undermine the progress
being made in the context of other initiatives.
DIFFICULTIES OF OVERSEEING A SECRETIVE INDUSTRY
Stories of corrupt social auditing and superficial audits, referred to in chapters 2 and
3, bring back memories of the complicity of the financial auditing industry in the finan-
cial scandals of the last few years, such as at Enron and WorldCom. It is clearly wrong
to tell consumers and shareholders that international labour standards in supply
chains are met with the help of auditors, while the latter, assumed to be the independ-
ent arbiters of rules compliance, have been connected with corruption scandals. Given
the scale of the industry, and the doubts being raised in this report and elsewhere
about credibility and effectiveness, it seems fair that the industry be subjected to
closer scrutiny. Though there is general consensus about which standards should be
universally respected by employers in supply chains (with the exception of the living
wage—see chapter 3), there are currently no norms or standards set for how social
auditors should test for compliance with these standards. This is in contrast to well-
developed norms for financial accounting.
However, given the current lack of transparency that characterises the social auditing
industry a comprehensive review of its functioning would be a difficult undertaking.
Companies active in this field claim that both audit methodology and results must
remain confidential.
As noted in Chapter 3, in the research carried out for this report it was rare to find any
examples of an auditors’ report being shared with workers or their representatives.
This lack of transparency makes a detailed understanding of social auditing methods
difficult. This note from the Bangladeshi researchers is typical of the challenges faced
by all researchers in trying to probe the auditing industry:
The research team tried to contact several audit firms and the compliance section of
the companies but apart from a few individual informal discussions the team failed to
have formal interviews with most of them.. …Being a vital stakeholder in the ready-
made garments sector, the unwillingness of audit firms to share their views on social
auditing practices reflects their lack of transparency and accountability to consumers.
GTZ AVE programme staff in Romania, when quizzed about the detail of audits, for
instance the checklist that is used during factory visits, revealed very little, saying that
“these details are confidential—every company has to respect the confidentiality con-
cerning some procedures”.
The ILO held a technical meeting for auditors in May 2005, and auditors there referred
to “sensitive” methodologies that they would not share with outsiders, since these
“may tip factory managers on how to pass social audits”. While this may be partly
justifiable, it does not explain the apparently vast numbers of suppliers who are ap-
parently already fooling auditors and passing audits using the various fraudulent tech-
niques described in chapters 2 and 3. The secrecy in which the industry is shrouded
seems instead to be hiding the weakness of current auditing methodologies and pre-
vent the critical review that is seriously needed to improve quality and oversight.
62
One of the few researches evaluating the practice of social auditing lists the following
findings:

3 inconsistencies between second and third party audits within a same facility,
3 third party auditors find less non-compliance than own compliance staff
3 freedom of association is interpreted differently according to auditors and MNEs
are suspicious of definition given by NGOs, and
3 auditors describe problems encountered within facilities but do not try to identify
causes.55

One OECD report56 has argued that these problems could be addressed by developing
institutional supports similar to those in financial auditing but that this would require
that standards and methodologies achieve widespread acceptance by the different
constituencies driving the code of conduct debate. While there are different code com-
pliance initiatives that provide oversight, acceptance of one standard and method is
as yet non-existent.

05
While the OECD report is right that there is no consensus with regard to the institu-
tional structures that define the steps and statements of a social audit when com-
pared with financial audits, critics argue that social auditing should be compared with
financial audits in the first place The assumption of the OECD that data about social
relations (or industrial relations) can be collected and interpreted in a similar way as fi-
nancial data is overlooking important methodological questions concerning the quality
and nature of this data—such as the notion that there would be “objective evidence”
to be interpreted by an “objective auditor”—should be challenged.57 This report also
shows that problems like the violation of freedom of association and discrimination is
far from being objectively measurable.

Transparency is an important tool to improve the quality of auditing, and some initia- Dumbing
tives have demonstrated that more transparency is possible. The Workers’ Rights
Consortium for example makes its investigation reports public (see chapter 6 for more down:
information on MSIs). The FLA produces public tracking charts with the findings of
audits58 and the names of the auditors.59 Sadly, EU-based initiatives are currently the trend
lagging behind in this area.
towards
excessive
reliance on
audits
64
WHO IS RELYING PRIMARILY ON SOCIAL AUDITING?
This chapter focuses particularly on the worrying trend in the growth of retailer-domi-
nated initiatives that rely heavily on social auditing. This development is taking place
in spite of intensified criticism of these models in recent years from labour advocates,
some of the more experienced clothing brands and some suppliers. Three examples
of such initiatives in the garment industry are the BSCI, WRAP, and ICS, discussed
below.
BSCI: IS THE RETAIL INDUSTRY LOOKING FOR A QUICK FIX?
In the last year, efforts have been made by the Foreign Trade Association, a trade as-
sociation which lobbies for freer trade rules to benefit European retailers, to set up a
new initiative aimed at retailers, building upon the AVE/GTZ audit project. This initia-
tive known as the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), relies primarily on
social auditing carried out using a weakened version of the SA8000 auditing standard
(discussed earlier in this report). The BSCI initiative already has approximately 40
member companies.
The BSCI chose to rely predominantly on social audits executed by global quality con-
trol firms. Social audits are also used in other models of code compliance, including
multi-stakeholder initiatives, but rarely so exclusively as in this case. The previous
chapters in this report have laid out the dangers of over-reliance on social auditing,
listing a range of concerns regarding quality and exclusion of workers from the
process.
A credible approach towards code compliance would require that quality in-house
monitoring is accompanied by and complemented with an (independent) verification
system. In such a system, stakeholders would be represented throughout its main
bodies. The BSCI does not meet these requirements. It has developed a weak moni-
toring system based on social audits. The BSCI does not require its members to have
an actual programme of work with a clear target with respect to audits, remediation,
or consultation activities, even though it does mention all these elements. It marginal-
ises the role of stakeholders that are invited to participate in a weak council with only
an advisory role. By comparison, within the Ethical Trading Initiative, member compa-
nies are obliged to carry out a series of steps in a multi-stakeholder way, through pilot
projects, and they have to report on what they do to the MSI board. Both the Fair Wear
Foundation and Fair Labor Association agree on a work plan with their members and
then verify whether the work plan has been implemented. Since the BSCI has margin-
alised the role of stakeholders, it should be seen as a weak and unverified form of
internal company monitoring.
In addition to over-reliance on social audits, the Clean Clothes Campaign has identi-
fied a number of additional weaknesses of the BSCI:60
Minimum (not best!) practice: In the BSCI model, at the level of the labour standards
themselves, there is a distinction made between “Social Requirements” and “Best
65
practice” (based on social auditing standard SA8000). While the BSCI Code includes
all of the important provisions, it is up to individual members to decide if they want
to demand compliance on all of these standards. While the BSCI argues that its code
represents a first step towards SA8000 certification, it is more likely that this set of
minimum standards will become the dominant level that suppliers have to meet. How-
ever, this is not how it is presented by BSCI promotional materials, which constantly
refer to SA8000. In the view of the CCC, it is actually more like “SA8000 lite”.
That the BSCI model implies the minimum necessary to get by is shown in the case
of Factory C in Pakistan, producing for KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart. It
was audited under the GTZ/AVE scheme, and the factory manager noted that while
they have two premises in the same industrial area of Karachi, only one was audited.
When asked why only one unit was audited, the management responded that they
produce for buyers who wanted them to get AVE qualification only in that one unit
(KarstadtQuelle and C&A are both members of BSCI). Not only would this make it
easy for the supplier to subcontract work from the “model” unit to the unaudited unit,
but it also implies that the buyer was more interested in avoiding risk, than in sourc-
ing in a genuinely responsible way. Researchers for this report in Pakistan noted that
among all factories audited under the AVE scheme, factory managers all denied using
subcontractors, and that the entire issue seemed to be ignored during the audits (see
chapter 2 for more information on why subcontracting is an important issue in code
compliance).
Lack of transparency: The BSCI does not disclose information on factory locations or
social audits. The results of an audit are sent exclusively to the audited supplier and
the BSCI member firm. Even Advisory Council members do not receive audit reports.
Unlike other initiatives, the BSCI does not publish an annual report, there is no ag-
gregate reporting from its members, and there is no information about the activities
of member companies, such as the countries where suppliers are located, how many
suppliers they have, how many of them have been or will be audited. It is therefore
impossible for interested parties to compare and/or evaluate what a BSCI member
company is doing. No public information is available on the results of the audits, their
length and their scope.61 And importantly, workers do not have access to the results
of an audit. According to GTZ AVE project representatives in Romania, the BSCI model
stipulates that managers have the responsibility to share the results of an audit with
workers, but they said “that depends on the factory’s management”.
Offloading the cost of compliance onto suppliers: BSCI’s policy regarding the sharing
of costs related to social audits is a cause for concern—the BSCI states that costs
related to audits, and resultant remediation actions (known in BSCI parlance as “quali-
fication”) will be negotiated between BSCI members and their suppliers. The unequal
power relation between buyers and suppliers will in practice mean that suppliers are
likely to put up the overwhelming share of the costs related to the monitoring of com-
pliance. Labour advocates have long argued that suppliers must be adequately com-
pensated for the costs involved in meeting compliance.
The cost issue, moreover, seems to be a big reason for many retailers to join the
BSCI. With the BSCI retailers make a smaller in-house financial and human investment
66
in code implementation and compliance than with other initiatives. Although officially
the cost of getting a supplier qualified according to the BSCI model is to be shared
between buyer and supplier, the reality, according to various sources, is that in virtually
every case, suppliers are made to bear the cost of getting audited, and remediating
any problems found in the audits.
MISLEADING CLAIMS
Officially, the BSCI claims that it is not meant to replace any of the established inde-
pendent multi-stakeholder verification systems, however at the same time, the BSCI
presents itself to companies as if it were a multi-stakeholder initiative, and some
companies have picked up on this message. For example, the Dutch Vereniging of
Grootwinkel Bedrijven (VGT) decided not to participate in the Fair Wear Foundation, in
favour of the BSCI. By assigning functions related to complaints handling to the BSCI
advisory council, and by suggesting that auditors hired by member companies will
“carry out verification” the suggestion is that this model does, in fact, perform such
functions. In reality, the advisory council is too under-resourced to act as a complaints
body, meeting only twice a year (and so far, though the BSCI has 40 members it has
not yet met even once).The GTZ AVE project representatives in Romania were asked
whether there was any mechanism to contact the auditor or buyer with complaints af-
ter an audit. The answer was “Yes, but we cannot give any details”. To date, it seems
that there is no mechanism of redress for workers producing for any of the BSCI retail-
ers. The BSCI also lacks credibility: given its status as a business-controlled initiative,
it does not have the independence to be able to engage in any process of verification
of company compliance claims.
67
WRAP: ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO LOWER THE BAR?
The Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) initiative certifies individual
workplace facilities. It was officially launched in 2000. The organisation describes
itself as “an independent, non-profit corporation dedicated to the promotion and certi-
fication of lawful, human and ethical manufacturing throughout the world”.62 According
to WRAP, over 700 international manufacturers with more than 1,500 factories par-
ticipate in the program, while 775 factories in over 85 countries have been certified.
WRAP also claims that “the WRAP certification is recognized by retailers and manu-
facturers all over the world as the most reliable and economically efficient factory-
based compliance system within the sewn-product industry.” However, the initiative
has received heavy criticism by unions and NGOs from the early beginning, who argue
that WRAP was “set up as an industry-dominated project to avoid outside, legitimate
monitoring.”63 It has accredited most of the global operating audit firms mentioned in
this report, including Intertek, Bureau Veritas, SGS, CSCC, and A & L. This example
of a WRAP-certified factory (see box) in the Philippines shows how this approach has
played out in the field
In the WRAP model:
3 the factory bears all costs association with certification.
3 there is no public disclosure of any information which would allow outside bodies
or consumers to independently evaluate the effectiveness of the auditor’s findings.

Auditors unwrapped in the Philippines

WEAK MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ROUNDTABLES

The BSCI monitoring system has plans to establish local multi-stakeholder roundtable
discussions to involve local stakeholders and inform suppliers. Such meetings were
organized during the AVE project, by the German Ministry of Development Co-operation
(GTZ) in about 10 countries (usually one or two annually). Reports from local NGOs
and unions have tended to indicate that the meetings were little more than informa-
tion-exchange exercises, whose participation and agenda were set unilaterally by the
industry side. While such meetings may be useful, they are not, in themselves, a sign
of credible multi-stakeholder involvement in a monitoring and verification process.
For these reasons, the public will have good reason to doubt whether the BSCI, as it
claims on its website, either “optimises working conditions” or is delivering “higher
satisfaction for workers and consumers” and “more efficient implementation proce-
dures than other monitoring systems”.
Intertek Testing Services Philippines was involved
in a joint project with the Philippines Department of
Trade and Industry represented by the Garments &
Textile Board (DTI-GTEB), in its “Humane Production
Program”. This program, linked to WRAP, sought to
demonstrate the industry’s social commitment. Gar-
ment factories had to participate in order to receive
certain export quotas.
Intertek was one of the monitoring bodies to carry
out the GTEB Re-Accreditation Program for the Gar-
ment Manufacturers and Exporters (GME) (Labtest
News, Vol. 53 Jan 2001). A World Bank report con-
cluded that it has not been possible to assess the
impact of the initiative (as a) number of high-profiled
cases of non-compliance amongst participating com-
panies suggest that the impact has been less than
hoped for.
One of the cases the World Bank seems to refer to is
Anvil Ensembles Inc., a garment company audited by
a team composed of authorized auditors and repre-
sentatives from SGV, Intertek Testing Services and
GTEB, and issued a certificate of compliance.
A newspaper report in July 2003, however, revealed
that workers were being coached to on how to reply
during inspection interviews and that the company
manipulated records on minimum wages and with-
holding remittances of their Social Security System
(SSS) to satisfy periodic audit requirements. In real-
ity, most employees were paid below the minimum
wage. In addition, the company had been overworking
its employees to the point of giving them prescrip-
tion pills to keep them awake for 72 hours at a time.
Anvil’s accreditation was (temporarily) revoked.
68
3 The audits are pre-arranged.
3 Auditors are not required to consult with local workers, trade unions, advocacy
groups, NGOs, religious organisations or human rights organisations.
3 There is no possibility to register complaints to the WRAP “Independent Certifica-
tion Board”.
ICS - FRENCH RETAILERS BAND TOGETHER
Launched in France, in 1998, Initiative Clause Sociale (ICS) is a collaborative effort
among leading French retailers coordinated by the main federation of retailers, the
members of the FCD Fédération des entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution in
France and other large retailers. It is intended to lead to a common system for manag-
ing and sharing social audit information.
Each of the member companies uses its own audit system but companies share a
common framework—“référenciel”—and agree to share information on the results of
the audits conducted among its suppliers.
The majority of large retailers in France (with the exception of Intermarché) are mem-
bers of the ICS: Auchan, Camif, Carrefour, Casino, Cora, Galeries Lafayette, Leclerc,
Monoprix, Okaïdi, Groupe PPR –Conforama, Fnac, Printemps, Redcats, Rexel, and Sys-
tème U.
In 2004, ICS announced the completion of 715 social audits (586 initial audits and
129 follow-up audits) in the following countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, China,
Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Morocco, Maurice, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Paki-
stan, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. The fol-
lowing sectors were covered: garments, hi-fi equipment; bags, home, Christmas deco-
rations, garden, household, office stationary, leather goods, shoes, furniture, sporting
goods, stationary, toys, and groceries.
Typically for schemes heavily reliant on social auditing, there is only a limited amount
of up-to-date and specific information available regarding the audits conducted by ICS
member companies. As a result, this monitoring scheme is excluded from the scope
of this report. It appears, however, that a number of the social audits performed for
these companies are conducted by the same commercial auditing firms covered by our
research.
IMPRESSING CONSUMERS WITH CLAIMS OF COMPLIANCE
While initiatives that are overly reliant on social auditing are clearly found to be insuf-
ficient in meeting the task they set out to do, companies that are members of these
initiatives continue to incorrectly see participation in such schemes as examples of
their commitment to ensuring good standards in the workplace.
69
German BSCI member Peek & Cloppenburg gives a very reassuring message to it’s
consumers:
It is extremely important to us to offer our customers only goods that have been pro-
duced under humane conditions…. As a retail company that procures goods internation-
ally, we are familiar with the problematic working conditions in some production coun-
tries. We live up to our responsibility, trying to be partners in the joint effort to ensure
good working conditions. That is why, as early as 1997, P&C created its own supervision
programme, where specialists control the working conditions and make recommenda-
tions for improvement, where necessary. Wanting to assume even more responsibility,
we participate in a programme of the Export Trade Association of the German Retail
Trade (AVE, Cologne) company website
Finnish retailer and BSCI member Kesko also paints a responsible picture:
The supplier can prove that it fulfils Kesko’s ethical requirements by obtaining a neutral
social certification for its operations….Kesko wants to cooperate with its suppliers and
their subcontractors on a systematic, long-term basis to ensure the ethical quality of
their products. Deviations from Kesko’s ethical principles are handled similarly to devia-
tions from other quality requirements.… The most reliable way for a supplier of proving
that it fulfils Kesko’s ethical requirements is to acquire an SA 8000 certificate from
an independent certification body or another corresponding audit approved by Kesko.
Kesko company website
KarstadtQuelle, one of Europe’s biggest retailer, and one of the founders of BSCI, reas-
sures its customers on its website that what it sells is made ethically:
We conduct cooperative partnerships with our suppliers that require them to meet
quality benchmarks and social standards in their production activities… with purchas-
ing offices in 26 countries, we too must help ensure equilibrium between economic
and social progress. Accordingly, the topic of minimum social standards is also a ma-
jor factor in our sustainability policy.64
Consumers might be surprised, then, to learn that KarstadtQuelle was one of the
companies sourcing from the Spectrum factory, which broke nearly every rule in Kars-
tadtQuelle’s book. In addition to a badly constructed without proper permits, resulting
in a collapse which claimed 64 lives and left many severely injured (see box for the full
story), management at Spectrum paid a poverty wage (even below the national mini-
mum wage), denied workers the right to organise, sexually abused female staff, forced
workers to do more than 100 hours of overtime each month, and
70
AVOIDING THE COST OF COMPLIANCE
What if buyers just make the supplier pay for the audit and for the corrective meas-
ures that need to be taken as a result? An audit itself is likely to cost anything be-
tween 350-3500 euros,65 but corrective action can cost a lot more, particularly if it
involves wage increases or new construction. Ultimately this is not a decision for audi-
tors, but for the buying or sourcing companies who hire them. As noted elsewhere in
this report, some auditors have observed that those who hire them lack do not always
want to really detect violations or solve them. The managing director of PwC Investiga-
tions Asia has also been reported saying that companies did not invest enough money
for social audits to realistically uncover problems and begin to solve them.
The questions are: Does the client want to do this? Is there a budget? Does the auditor
really have the ability to do it? 66
It is clear that for some buyers the cost of compliance, reflected in the increased
price they must pay a supplier to implement reforms and respect labour standards, is
too high, and they decide to place their orders elsewhere, while officially claiming to
source only from the “model supplier”:
The management of (Factory B) is concerned that some buyers are placing orders with
factories which are less socially compliant, and passing off what they produce as com-
ing from (Factory B). The management, in an attempt to maintain good relations with
its clients, does not raise the issue. Factory B, Morocco, producing for George, Dunnes,
Zara, Naf Naf, Marks and Spencer and Prenatal.
Labour advocates have long argued that suppliers and buyers have a shared respon-
sibility for the costs of compliance—if they start sourcing from a factory that is not
compliant with a code, then the buyer should bear some of the costs of bringing the
supplier into compliance. Initiatives such as WRAP and BSCI, however, tend to shift
audit costs to the supplier.
And as has been seen, suppliers tend to do the minimum possible in the process,
particularly when a buyer is not prepared to contribute to the costs. In such a process,
it is the worker who bears the cost, through poverty wages, lack of health care, long
working hours and other forms of exploitation.
If they are serious, companies must invest in compliance. Different sources have indi-
cated67 that, apart from the more responsive companies who have made some invest-
ments in this area, the reality is quite the opposite – companies are tending to try to
spend less and less on social compliance, both by engaging with less stringent audit-
ing programmes, and by transferring the cost of compliance with standards, to their
suppliers. For instance nearly every AVE/BSCI-related audit has had to be paid for by
suppliers, and not by the buyers, although officially the AVE/BSCI promotes a negotiat-
ed sharing of audit and remediation costs between supplier and buyer. Romanian sup-
pliers are reported to have shown little enthusiasm for investing their own money in
the AVE auditing scheme since it is not taken seriously by many buyers, many of whom
have more rigorous social compliance policies and hold them to a higher standard.
Spectrum disaster a worst case scenario
When the system fails, it can fail disastrously. All
that is known about auditing at the Spectrum factory
in Bangladesh is that the French retailer, Carrefour,
carried out at least one social audit, and that Kars-
tadtQuelle carried out one quality audit, reportedly
using the firm SGS. According to workers interviewed
for this report, buyers had indeed inspected the
factory, and the coaching they seem to have received
indicates some kind of social audit took place.
Workers did not have much idea about audits. Some-
times buyers’ representatives visited the factory but
they inspected only the quality. The inspection was
announced earlier and the workers were told to go to
the factory well dressed. They were also directed not
to tell the truth about working hours, wages, over-
time, leave and other issues. The child workers were
given leave while buyers were visiting the factory.
Not only was the factory a health and safety hazard
lacking planning permission and waiting to col-
lapse—prior to the disaster it was also the site of
severe exploitation and abuse of workers.
3 Overtime was mandatory for the workers. A
worker had to do more than 100 hours overtime
in a month.
3 There were no holidays for the workers if produc-
tion ran on; they did not have any leave facilities.
3 Sexual harassment was common in the factory.
Workers stated that one of the directors was
involved in sexual abuse of female workers. The
director had a well-decorated special room for
doing this. If any woman protested she would be
dismissed and those who submitted received
special privileges.
3 There was no maternity leave though women
workers could get a chance to continue work
after leaving the factory for a pregnancy.
3 There was no union in the factory. The manage-
ment did not allow it.
3 Workers were “terrorized” by the management
and staff. This included beating by the security
officer.
3 The minimum wage of the factory was less than
the minimum wage fixed by the government,
which in turn falls far short of a living wage. A
helper’s monthly wage was 700 taka. With over-
time they could hardly earn more than 1300 taka
a month.
3 There was a night shift in the factory from 10
p.m. to 7 a.m. According to Bangladesh law,
women workers cannot work the night shift
though Spectrum regularly violated this law. Two
women workers, Momtaz and Alea, died in the
April 11th collapse. Alea was seven months
pregnant.
3 Workers were not allowed to leave the premises
even if they were sick.
3 There were no health and safety systems or
medical facilities in the factories. There was no
medical leave for the workers. . Even for very
simple problems they had to go to a doctor or
hospital. Workers were the only ones to help any
sick fellow worker, including those hurt in work-
place accidents.
3 Three months before the collapse, a woman
worker, Latifa, was injured by an electric shock
from an 11 KV line which was adjacent to an
exit door. She was under treatment at a clinic in
Dhaka. The company did not take any initiative to
arrange or support her treatment.
3 Dyeing section worker Mohan died from burns ob-
tained from a leaking hot water boiler. The com-
pany did not pay any compensation to his family.
Workers donated some money to his family
3 Worker-management communications were
dysfunctional. For example, five days before the
factory collapsed, a store worker informed an
engineer in the factory that there were cracks in
the wall. He was told he didn’t understand and
should go back to work and not talk about this
with other colleagues. Before it collapsed, the
factory was producing clothes being sold by Zara-
Inditex, KarstadtQuelle, Steillman, Cotton Group,
Wal-Mart and Carrefour. All these companies rely
on various auditing programmes, either in-house
or via the BSCI. Failures of all of these systems
Continue on page 72
72
to identify and remediate the extreme
problems faced by the workers at Spec-
trum show graphically why there is no
quick fix to the issue of ethical sourc-
ing. To date, both Carrefour and Kars-
tadtQuelle have refused to share their
audit reports with the relatives of the
disaster victims, or to others, including
the CCC, campaigning for compensation
for those who died, were injured, or who
lost their jobs as a result of the factory
collapse.

Another cost factor is the in-house staff. There is a wide variety in the investment
that companies make in their social compliance department. Nike and Gap employ
close to a hundred staff, smaller companies like adidas and H&M employ dozens, but
KarstadtQuelle, one of Europe’s largest retailers, employs only six, which seems to be
common among multiple retailers who have invested far less so far into this area.

ARE WE FORGETTING THE LESSONS LEARNED?

06
By increasing reliance on third party auditors, buyers have less and less connection
with their suppliers and their employees. Perhaps the single most important conclu-
sion from the above is that companies using initiatives such as WRAP and BSCI are
placing an ever-greater distance between the buyer and the workers producing their
products. By cutting workers out of the process in this model, they risk turning back
the clock on valuable progress that has been made elsewhere.

At a point in time when there is so much energy to improve the lives of workers in sup-
ply chains, others are missing the chance to help build a sustainable model of code
compliance. Instead, they risk supporting a model that fools consumers and achieves
only limited risk management. It is particularly striking that this is happening in 2005, Social
when so many companies learned their lessons on this issue three or four years ago.
auditing
that matters
74
SOCIAL AUDITING CAN BE EFFECTIVE: THE TOOLBOX APPROACH
Since the “cat and mouse” game between auditors and factory managers is likely to
go on indefinitely, with growing levels of sophistication on both sides, the quest for a
perfect audit methodology is unrealistic. In spite of the thousands and thousands of
audits which are taking place year upon year, the patterns of exploitation and abuse of
workers is continuing.
Given the amount of resources and thinking devoted to tackling the difficulties faced
by workers in supply chains over the last decade and a half, the lack of progress to
date is scandalous. The cases mentioned in this report are merely examples of a
what is a systemic problem.
Currently, many social audits are being over-relied upon by company or company-led
initiatives— for the most part not only are they failing to provide an accurate and
comprehensive picture of working conditions, but they are frequently being used out of
context, particularly in the cases of BSCI and WRAP. An audit, used alone, can never
produce change—it can only produce a “shopping list” of items to be remedied. To
produce change, a more comprehensive approach is clearly needed.
Until audits are used intelligently, as part of a broader more comprehensive approach,
they will achieve little more than superficial change for workers. And until workers, the
intended beneficiaries in the process, are placed at the centre of efforts to improve
workplace conditions—from conception to implementation of those efforts—they will
continue to be the losers.
WHY WE NEED MORE THAN AUDITING
Auditing is a critical first step towards trading ethically, but we also need to look beyond
audits for their own sake. Sourcing companies need to remind themselves that auditing
is only a means to an end, and that it is only one piece in the jigsaw of ethical sourcing.
A supplier’s perspective, ETI Annual Report, 2002-2003
The challenge facing the clothing industry is not to show demonstrate to labour rights
advocates such as the CCC that they are carrying out more audits, but that workers’
lives are improving.
As has been shown by the research in this report, the current emphasis of buyers,
particularly retailers, on social audits comes at the expense of other tools or mecha-
nisms that would help to achieve compliance with ethical standards. One impact of
this is that workers and their representatives remain peripheral to processes meant to
ensure their rights. The Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (HKCIC) questions
the usefulness of audits in general, if they are not part of a broader and more long-
term program. They express serious concerns about the proportion of time spent on
auditing versus worker-oriented programs such as health and safety or worker rights
training. According to the HKCIC, auditing should not be viewed as an end in itself.
Confirmation of violations revealed during workers’ interviews should only be the be-
75
ginning of the process that leads to workplace improvements and worker
empowerment.
Worse still, as has been shown in chapter 3, social auditing can actually transfer pow-
er away from workers. With the setting up of unrepresentative “worker committees” in
order to please auditors, proper industrial relation systems based on collective bar-
gaining and freedom of association can easily be undermined.
The evidence shows that credible efforts to implement codes of conduct cannot rely
on social auditing alone, important though it is. Quality social auditing should be com-
bined with other tools to address and remediate violations of workers rights, including:
3 partnership with local organisations,
3 grievance and complaints mechanisms,
3 education and training,
3 a pro-active approach to freedom of association,
3 addressing existing business or purchasing practices,
3 effective remediation, and
3 transparency.
This more comprehensive “toolbox” approach must be adopted by sourcing compa-
nies if they want to make a credible effort to face up to their responsibilities to work-
ers in their supply chains.
This vision, however, is a far cry from the continuing tendency of many companies to
rely heavily on audits to identify non-compliance, which might even result in an order
being cancelled. An ILO report argues that the threat of order cancellation “cuts to the
core of the whole practice of auditing: If there are no sanctions for non-compliance,
then auditing has little real meaning or material impact. However, if orders are cut to
a non-compliant factory, the factory may be forced to shut down, and the now unem-
ployed workers are likely to be worse off than before”.68
However, referring to initiatives by some of the more responsive companies, the same
ILO report adds that today it is increasingly recognized that buyers and auditors have
to put more emphasis on remediation and dialogue than on “policing”.
Auditing is still seen as a test, but one which increasingly highlights opportunities for
improvement, rather than grounds for the termination of orders.
PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL ORGANISATIONS
I propose that if social organizations, like yours, trade unions and the inspectors of the
buyers audit together, things for the workers may change. But my fear is that when and
if that happens, at the time of the inspection the employers will lock their units and
proper auditing will be made impossible. The system needs to be changed. Md Ateeq,
President, Delhi Leather Karigar S angathan Trade Union, India
76
Code initiatives need to expand the space for dialogue with Southern stakeholders.
Moreover, if local unions and NGOs are to participate effectively in code implementa-
tion, for example, in providing worker education, code initiatives need to support them
with appropriate training. Report on the ETI Biennial Conference 2003
The experiences of workers around the world point to a clear weakness in the cur-
rent approaches to social auditing—they simply are not delivering the quality needed
to identify most code compliance problems. There is a growing realisation, in some
quarters, that unions and NGOs need not only to be involved in all phases of the code
implementation, but they should be better consulted on how best to organise the
entire process.
Labour-related NGOs and trade unions have to be involved in preparing and following
up audits at the production level if good quality monitoring and credible verification is
to take place. The precise role that these groups should play in monitoring and veri-
fication systems is still something that needs considerable attention, as the varied
contexts found throughout the global garment industry mean that what works or is
appropriate in some situations might not be feasible in others.
The only effective way of monitoring the implementation of codes of conduct is by
workers themselves through their trade unions, which of course requires strong indus-
trial relations. Gap Inc. is trying such an approach. They have arranged for a shop stew-
ard in one of their sourcing factories in Kenya to report weekly to Gap on conditions in
the factory. Such an approach is not only sustainable, it should also empower the trade
union concerned and provide a clear channel for workers to voice their concerns over
working conditions. ETI Annual Report 2003/2004
Under the auspices of a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives, and some unilateral
steps taken by larger firms such as Nike, adidas, Reebok and Gap, some significant
improvements have been seen in terms of efforts to build partnerships with local
trade unions and NGOs.
Only in the case of the H&M auditing team did we find that they’d contacted the trade
union in the factory during audits. For the rest of the companies, trade unions are in-
formed about the clients’ codes of conduct in the company, and that is all. There are no
contacts with NGOs. General comment from researchers in Romania
A standard part of the practice of the Fair Wear Foundation is to involve local organisa-
tions in each country in:
3 training of audit teams,
3 advising on how the process is conducted, and
3 priorities for remediation.
77
GRIEVANCE AND COMPLAINT MECHANISMS
Labour advocates have long emphasised the importance of a mechanism to handle
complaints in code monitoring and verification systems.69 A complaints mechanism
would create an opportunity for workers to bring workplace concerns to the attention
of the MSI or sourcing company. Such a mechanism is not only a way to ensure direct
input at any time from workers and their organisations in the monitoring/verification
process, it might also balance and supplement the limitations of “snapshot auditing”
which only allows workers to voice their grievances once every three years, or whenev-
er the auditor sees fit to come by. Setting up a complaints mechanism must be done
carefully because workers must have safe and sound means to register complaints,
with absolutely no fear of retaliation for doing so.
Apart from one exception, on the part of DNV in south India, it proved impossible to
find any evidence of social auditors providing workers with any means of making com-
plaints to auditors or buyers, let alone informing workers of any complaints mecha-
nisms.
Eventually, two components must be in place:
3 a proper worker/employer grievance handling system must be in place at the level
of the supplier, and
3 a means must exist by which workers or their representatives can take a com-
plaint up to the level of the buyer, if it is not solved by the supplier.
Regarding the first point, companies need to create the infrastructure to deal with
complaints by recognising trade unions and providing paid time off for trade union
representatives to be trained in resolving disputes over employment rights, and devel-
oping confidential and accessible means for workers to report exploitation and abuse.
Regarding the second point, MSIs like ETI, FWF and FLA in theory require from their
members that they establish such a mechanism, and also provide an option for fil-
ing complaints to the initiative itself. Although experiences with handling complaints
within MSIs have garnered some results, they have also shown that this requires
huge amounts of resources and professional handling. The Worker Rights Consortium
(WRC) is one of the best developed complaints-based systems, that starts to function
when workers, or organisations representing workers, “pull the fire alarm”.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Codes cannot be effective when workers are not aware that they exist, nor of the
rights enshrined in them, nor of the means available to exercise these rights.
“Awareness of codes is crucial for workers to have faith and fully participate in audits,
and for the benefits of code implementation to be sustainable. Appropriate education
will not only increase workers understanding of the issue, but will also build workers’
confidence to address them.”70
78
First attempts to ensure this largely consisted of translating the codes and pasting
them to the wall, and/or handing out leaflets or cards with the code standards to work-
ers. When realizing that in and of itself this does not create an informed workplace,
more responsive companies have engaged with trade unions and NGOs in developing
more in-depth education and training programmes and pilot projects. Though the scale
of these remains far too small, it is striking that many of the companies named in this
report that have codes do not seem to have taken even the elementary first steps in
informing workers.
Experiences thus far point to the importance of ensuring that workers are provided
with the time necessary to participate in such programmes, and re-assurance that
they will not lose their jobs if they get involved. It is also crucial to provide education
on workers rights in the context of national labour law, not just on codes of conduct.
It is also important to distinguishing between education and training: education is a
process whereby people learn about something in order to draw their own conclusions.
Training, by contrast, provides information and skills for a particular purpose.
Providing for education and training is especially important to ensure freedom of as-
sociation, as was also argued by auditors at the ILO Technical Meeting in Turkey this
year, where participants called for managers as well as workers to be offered training
on workers’ rights.
A real issue of concern among labour rights groups is the extent to which worker edu-
cation and training programmes are conducted independent from management influ-
ence, and the terms should not be developed or set by the buyers. Concerns are al-
ready being expressed that worker education may be seen as another potential growth
industry, and some firms presently involved in social auditing are already positioning
themselves to offer services in this area. Obviously this raised concerns for quality
and credibility. It has also been found that it is extremely important what kind of or-
ganisation gives the training and how it is delivered—workers tend to trust education
delivered by their own peer group.
ADDRESS PURCHASING PRACTICES
The management always finds itself between a rock and a hard place—right now it
can’t see the results of social audits. The changes which need to be made as a result
are expensive, and the prices paid by the buyers don’t cover these costs. Factory B, Mo-
rocco, producing for George, Dunnes, Zara, Naf Naf, Marks and Spencer and Prenatal.
Companies need to address the conflicting logic of simultaneously pursuing lower
prices and shorter delivery times whilst at the same time pursuing compliance with
labour standards.71 In practice, companies often run parallel and often uncoordinated
systems: one to assure the maximizing of profits and one to assure compliance with
ethical standards.72 Current purchasing practices on the part of buyers tend to under-
mine the capacity of the supplier to comply with labour standards. And when buyers
make the ethically questionable choice to source from countries that outlaw or restrict
79
freedom of association, such as China or Vietnam, it is even more likely that workers
and their organisations will be marginalised or excluded from the mechanisms set up
to implement, monitor or verify code compliance. While no boycott of such countries
is being proposed, the choice to move production to these places does have seri-
ous implications, since the ability to join and form unions of their choice is after all a
fundamental workers’ right and in the end, without the ability for workers’ to exercise
such a right code compliance programmes cannot be sustainable in the long term.
Auditors at the ILO technical meeting noted that in order to tackle compliance prob-
lems related to excessive or forced overtime, buyers would need to work with suppli-
ers to fix the problem by giving more lead time on orders, and that third party auditors
may be ill-equipped to address the important issue of the good relationship between
buyer and supplier. It seems that by fully relying on third parties (instead of on their
own compliance staff) to carry out the social audits and organize the remediation or
corrective action as well, buyers are failing to build the very relationship with suppliers
that will help improve compliance.
Echoing the assertions of Oxfam’s 2004 publication, Trading Away Our Rights, this
same group of auditors observed that there is much that a buyer can do to address
the root cause of compliance failure internally, by improving purchasing practices:
Close cooperation between the buying and selling firm may also help in the practical
implementation of the codes of conduct. A common example that was cited is that it is
hard to comply to overtime rules when lead times given by multinationals are so short.
Increased lead time in this case would reduce the pressure on overtime worked to fill
the order, but this requires close cooperation between the selling firm and the people at
the multinationals who are familiar with the buying process and also the procurement
process. A closer integration of the two departments at the level of the multinational
(buying/procurement and compliance/CSR) is therefore recommended to achieve the
objective of code of conduct implementation. ILO, 2005
While buyers need to make their future business with suppliers and sub-contractors
conditional based on their compliance record, they should avoid terminating these
business relationships in order to avoid their commitments under their own codes.
A PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Lacking a true channel of representation of workers’ problems, external auditing con-
ducted by the buyers becomes a management issue between the suppliers and the
buyers only. In all the facilities researched, workers are not informed or involved in any
sense. They are treated as objects to be inspected and questioned during the audit.
General comment from researchers in China.
This report shows once again workers and their representatives remain peripheral to
processes meant to ensure their rights, despite the fact that from an efficiency point
of view alone this makes no sense. It has been pointed out many times that the best
auditors are the workers themselves since they are continually present at the produc-
tion site.
80
Where workers can form independent trade unions and bargain, there may be little
need for a code of conduct. Neil Kearney, ITGLWF and Dwight Justice, ICFTU (2003)
This observation does not come only from the side of the labour movement: a World
Bank consultation among 194 individuals representing a variety of stakeholders, such
as buyers, suppliers, NGOs, unions, and workers, resulted in the observation that
currently, one of the main barriers to effective code implementation is the “absence
of a comprehensive and accountable means of engaging workers as well as their un-
ions.”73
Another important element of the toolbox therefore is a policy of promoting freedom
of association, the right of workers to join and form trade unions and to engage in
collective bargaining. To do this, companies need to undertake concrete activities to
promote freedom of association, collective bargaining and credible worker presenta-
tion. Such positive measures are particularly important in situations where workers
are faced with oppression and can include:
3 provision of clear and country specific guidance on what is expected from suppli-
ers concerning compliance with the standards on freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, and what constitutes appropriate consultative and representa-
tive mechanisms. Such guidance shall be consistent with the meaning of freedom
of association developed through ILO procedures,
3 open communication of this policy to national governments,
3 support for and facilitation of training of management, workers and workers’ repre-
sentatives (separately and jointly) in freedom of association, collective bargaining
and labour-management relations. Such training should take into account the gen-
dered nature of the workforce in the industry. Buyers should ensure the full com-
mitment of suppliers in these initiatives,
3 review supplier policies and procedures (hiring, promotions, termination, discipli-
nary, and grievance),
3 consult with external sources in order to ascertain anti-union behaviour, the history
of labor relations in the area, government policy, and union history in the factory,
and
3 encourage or set up programs to open and improve channels of communication
between workers and management.
Some of the more responsive brands have started to undertake or stimulate pro-
grammes at suppliers to improve worker-management communication. Usually these
involve some type of training, and/or establishing mechanisms for workers representa-
tion or bodies for worker-management dialogue. Though such programmes might lead
to increased space for workers to represent their own interests via organisations that
they own and control, this is by no means certain. They can also have the exact op-
posite effect. Once more, a key issue is who designs and delivers these programmes,
81
and whether they follow the ILO jurisprudence and standard-setting on this topic, for
example regarding the need for worker representatives to be freely elected. The other
key issue is the legal context in which they take place.
REMEDIATION
As the previous chapters have revealed, for the most part social auditing is presently
confined to developing a shopping list of problems. Auditors lack the right skills, and
workers are largely excluded from the process, which makes the shopping list incom-
plete. But even a quality audit in and of itself can never produce change. For this to
happen, a remediation (also known as corrective action) process needs to be devel-
oped, agreed upon and implemented. This means first and foremost to analyse what
causes the violations, and not confine the audit to listing what went wrong. To remedi-
ate something, one needs to understand why it went wrong. This makes it even more
crucial to improve the quality and capacity of the auditors.
Presently, identifying what remediation or corrective action is necessary is largely left
to the auditors, and acting upon it is left to the supplier. Management will be informed
where they fail to “pass” a requirement in the exit meeting, which may be combined
with a few suggestions related to occupational health and safety improvements, but
there is no feedback to the workers, no consultation of workers organizations on
what would constitute effective remediation and often no negotiation with the buyers
on this. It shouldn’t be surprising that the effect is limited. Leaving out the workers
means that the solutions are top-down, unlikely to be effective and difficult to sustain.
As the section on purchasing practices shows, leaving out the buyer means that the
costs of compliance are left fully to the supplier, and no incentives are set. Expecting
results becomes even more unrealistic.
This report shows that, with a few exceptions, workers do not see real improvements
in their situation even when regular auditing takes place. Unfortunately it has been im-
possible for the researchers and for CCC to obtain access to remediation or corrective
action plans developed post-audit, so an analysis of the audit findings, the follow-up
corrective action suggested and the reality could not be made.
The majority of the audit firms described in this report seem to lack not only the skills
but also the legitimacy and the mandate to develop and organise appropriate correc-
tive action or remediation programmes. Even more disturbing, the evidence seems to
indicate that after producing an audit report, the process effectively stops.
Remediation plans should be developed based on an analysis of the root cause of
rights violations and their impact, in a process that involves workers, management and
buyers. Implementing remediation plans, is a joint responsibility of suppliers and buy-
ers. Buyers have a responsibility to create an enabling environment for remediation to
take place (ex. commitment to long-term relationship and not cut and run, cost sharing
when necessary, and to consider their purchasing practices so that improvements can
be implemented and sustained).
82
NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY
Both the garment industry and the auditing industry deeply lack transparency when it
comes to where, how, by whom and for how much they make their products. There of-
ten seems to be no real reason for the extremely high levels of secrecy: why shouldn’t
workers and their organisations have access to audit reports, or remediation plans?
Why can’t brands or retailers publish whom they hire to audit which factory? Or who
pays for the audit? Why shouldn’t audit firms put up a list of their clients, and report
on what methods they use and how they train their staff? Transparency is crucial to
build credibility among stakeholders and the public at large, to improve the quality and
effectiveness of auditing, to make complaints mechanisms work, to minimize the inef-
ficient use of resources and in general to improve the compliance mechanisms pres-
ently under development.
Garment companies should be taking steps to increase transparency regarding the
composition and conditions of their supply chains. Several brands have recently begun
to publish more in-depth social responsibility annual reports, and even details of the
composition of their supply chains. In its recent corporate responsibility report Nike ar-
gues that disclosure of supply chains is key to unlocking greater collaboration among
brands and creating the incentives necessary for factories.
Companies should also provide more in-depth and detailed information about code
implementation activities: the procedures they have adopted and the activities they
have undertaken, including audits, to implement the code. They should provide details
of non-compliance and of remedial action undertaken, as well as of complaints and
how these complaints were addressed.
83
particularly since most suppliers are servicing more than one buyer at a time. System-
atic problems at both the point of production and the point of consumption can only
be successfully addressed through a multilateral, sector-wide approach.
As Doug Cahn, Reebok’s vice president for human rights, argues, “we may be only
20% of a particular supplier’s business and thus have little influence, but when we can
combine with two other companies that each have 20%, we can leverage our influence
over that factory operator”.74
To avoid the dumbing down identified in chapter 5 in relation to the retail industry,
such a sector-wide approach can only be successful if it is based on the highest com-
mon denominator and current best practice. Business-dominated CSR programs tend
to be examples of “lowest common denominator” collaboration. These include the
BSCI, discussed in chapter 5, and the CSR activities in recent years of the World Fed-
eration of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI).75
BUILDING CREDIBILITY: WORKING IN MSIS
Playing an active role in credible multi-stakeholder initiatives can also be a valuable
step for companies to take in improving their code compliance work. In the apparel
and (athletic) footwear industries the most important MSIs are the Fair Labor Associa-

Ensuring feedback to the workers themselves should be a priority. The information

What do multi-stakeholder initiatives do?
provided should be verified.
Soon after companies started to adopt codes of
Audit firms should disclose all information necessary so that their methods and effec- conduct it became clear that there was a need for an
tiveness can be assessed. overarching system for evaluating company claims
about compliance with labour standards. This stimu-
lated the creation of a number of MSIs, which involve
DON’T GO IT ALONE! a variety of companies, NGOs and/or trade unions
trying to develop (more) systematic approaches to
It is increasingly clear that some companies are making some progress by learning code implementation, monitoring and verification, as
from their peer group and building on the lessons learned by others. The lessons tend well as developing structures for accountability to
to revolve around the need to engage the primary beneficiaries of the process— work- civil society.
ers—in the design and implementation of programmes to ensure international labour
standards are respected in supply chains. These initiatives have the following in common. They:
3 bring a wider range of actors into decision-making
The rise of multi-stakeholder initiatives, which allow companies to learn from each procedures,
other at the same time as to listen to representatives of workers, is a sign that com- 3 agree upon a standardized code of conduct
panies are trying to improve, although most still have a long way to go. generally informed by ILO standards, and
3 concur upon follow-up activities designed to
Corporations need to cooperate at a sectoral level on code compliance issues. In the put labour standards into effect.
end, companies cannot unilaterally address the problems that are faced industry-wide,
To a varying degree they might also:
3 use social audits as a mechanism for
monitoring/verifying codes of conduct,
3 authorise or accredit organisations to conduct
the verification process,
3 certify workplaces or branded companies,
3 promote social dialogue and learning between
different stakeholders,
3 facilitate the processing of complaints from
workers, trade unions or NGOs as part of the
monitoring/verification process,
3 stimulate stakeholder participation in code
verification at points of production, and
3 get financial or facilitative support from
governments.
These initiatves have provided new forms of social
dialogue where different stakeholders regularly meet,
exchange views or devise joint projects.
Merk, 2005b
84
tion, the Worker Rights Consortium, the Ethical Trading Initiative, Social Accountability
International and the Fair Wear Foundation.

None of these initiatives should be seen as the definitive answer to a company’s code
compliance problems; and there are varying and serious concerns related to their
programmes and activities. Member companies of the FLA and ETI, to a varying extent,
make use of the global audit firms described above, most of whom have actually been
accredited by SAI. FWF and WRC thus far are the only ones to consistently advocate
a different approach. Having said that, they have proven to be useful as a means of
“raising the bar” of companies, by providing members with a chance to listen to the
experiences of their peers and to advice from trade unions and NGOs.

Participation in an MSI can help get a company with little experience or existing capac-
ity on code compliance onto the right track, since membership of an MSI usually stipu-
lates that a company must take certain first steps.

The MSIs mentioned above have also come together in the “Joint Initiative on Corpo-

07
rate Accountability and Workers Rights” which aims to evaluate and test the different
approaches towards code implementation thus far, and hopes to contribute towards
more collaborative work. The CCC also participates in the steering committee of the
project, which will test the various approaches in trials in Turkey.76

MSIs can also provide a form of independent oversight or verification of code imple-
mentation. This has long been a key demand made by labour rights advocates, includ-
ing the CCC. Because the essence of verification is credibility, it must be performed by
organisations or individuals that are independent of the enterprises or organisations
whose claims are being verified (for instance the claims of sourcing companies, sup-
pliers, trade or industry associations, etc.). This is where the potential role for those
MSIs who have NGO and trade union representation in their boards, comes into play. Abbreviations
Verification can involve the same or similar activities that may have been used to im-
plement a code—inspections, interviews, complaints, social audits, factory audits, etc.
or it may involve the re-examination of evidence acquired from these activities.
Transparency is commonly considered key to effective verification.

Verification can be carried out in relation to a specific situation at a workplace or it

could concern an examination of management systems and other evidence that will
indicate whether an enterprise or organisation (a sourcing company for instance) has
assumed the responsibilities that it claims.
86
AMRF Alternative Movement for Resources and Freedom Society
ANSRU National Association of Human Resources Specialists
AVE Export Trade Association of the German Retail Trade
BSCI Business Social Compliance Initiative
CCC Clean Clothes Campaign
CEC Centre for Education and Communication
COVERCO Commission for the Verification of Codes of Conduct
CSCC Cal-Safety Compliance Corporation
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DTI-GTEB Philippines Department of Trade and Industry represented by
the Garments & Textile Board
ETI Ethical Trading Initiative
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
EU European Union
FCD Fédération des entreprises du Commerce
FFC Fair Factory Clearinghouse
FLA Fair Labor Association

08
FTA Foreign Trade Association
FWF Fair Wear Foundation
GMIES Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente de El Salvador.
GTZ German Ministry of Development Co-operation
HKCIC Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICS Initiative Clause Sociale
ILO International Labour Organisation
ISO International Standardisation for Organisation
ITGLWF International Textile, Garment, Leather Workers Federation
JOIN Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers’ Right
LARIC Labor Rights in China Bibliography
MNE Multinational Enterprises
MSI Multi-stakeholder initiative
MSN Maquila Solidarity Network
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PILER Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers
SA8000 Social Accountability 8000
SAI Social Accountability International
SAVE Social Awareness and Voluntary Education
SEA Social Environmental Affairs
SEDEX Social Ethical Data Exchange
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance
SPTSK Textile, Clothes and Leather Factory Trade Union
UCM Urban Community Mission
VGT Vereniging of Grootwinkel Bedrijven
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09
Endnotes
94 95
1 Workplace with substandard working conditions 28 MSN 2001.
2 Global Purchasing Practices & Chinese Women Workers (2003) 29 North India research (Factory C – Information on Social Auditing – Complaint mecha-
3 Critical articles on the quality of social auditing include: O’Rourke (1997, 2000, nism)
2002); Bendell (2001); Far East Economic Review ( 2001); Ascoly and Zeldenrust 30 Laric, 1999; Brown, 2001; O’Rourke, 2001; Esbenshade, 2004: 90-2
(2003); Oldenziel (2001); de Haan and Oldenziel (2003); Philippine Daily Inquirer, 31 Esbenshade, 2004: 90-1
(2003); Maquila Solidarity Network (2004); Auret and Barrientos (2004); Financial 32 Stern, 2003: 3
Times ( 2005); Esbenshade (2004), Hilton (2005). 33 Brown, 2001
4 According to the workers there are up to three levels of subcontracting within the fac- 34 Ascoly et al. 2001
tory. Workers working under subcontractors are free to get three to four or even more 35 Stern, 2002: 4
workers to work with them and help them meet the target. The subcontractor pays the 36 Esbenshade, 2004
main worker, who in turn pays a part of his salary to the other workers working under 37 OECD, 2001: 9
him. 38 O’Rouke, Dara, 2002
5 Such as when a supplier itself hires an auditor to carry out an audit as part of the 39 Deutsche Bank, 22 October 2004
preparation for some kind of certification 40 Keusch et al, 2002
6 North India research (Factory A Information on Social Auditing—General on Audit and 41 SGS, 2005: 36
Auditors) 52 Verité website: http://www.verite.org/
7 North India research (Factory A Information on Social Auditing—General on Audit and 43 For more information on GMIES see: http://www.gmies.org.sv/gmies/quees.htm. For
Auditors) more information on COVERCO see http://www.coverco.org/eng/about_us/#What.
8 Stern, 2002: 11 44 Personal conversation with Francois Beaujolin
9 Stern, 2002: 35 45 It is not clear, however, how many of these audits are taking place inside the garment
10 Ascoly and Zeldenrust, 2003: 30 industry.
11 Hilton, 2005: 44; New York Times, 2003 46 Company website, http://www.cscc-online.com/faqs/container_faqs.shtml#
12 Financial Times (2005) 47 Esbenshade, 2004
13 O’Rourke 2002 48 O’Rourke, 2002: 196
14 Bendell, 2001: 23 49 http://www.verite.org/services/description.htm
15 http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/05-050bsci_paper.pdf 50 FLA Annual Public Report 2003, FLA website
16 Garment Production in Malawi, 2003, SOMO and Workers’ College 51 WRAP newsletter, January 2005
17 ETI Annual Report 2002/2003 52 FWF, 2002
18 MSN, July 2004 53 World Bank, 2003: 18
19 Nike, 2005: 39 54 MSN 2002/2003
20 The AVE Sector Model Social Responsibility is a CSR initiative that is supported by 55 Adam et al., 2005: 4
German retail companies like Karstadt Quelle, Otto, Metro, Deichmann and Peek & 56 OECD, 2001: 10
Cloppenburg. In a Public-Private-Partnership Project set up by the Society for Technical 57 For example, a “neutral test” might fail to notice the various subtle forms of discrimi-
Co-operation (GTZ) and supported and co-financed by the German Ministry of Eco- nation, including auto-discrimination (Bendell, 2001: 25.
nomic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) the functioning of the AVE Sector Model 58 It is worth noting that some auditing firms find transparency requirements hard to
will be evaluated in 15 countries during a three-year period (2002-2005). During this accept. Verité, the first organisation accredited to monitor for the FLA, has recently
time, 2,500 suppliers of German clothes, shoe, and toys merchants will be audited in pulled out, reportedly due to new requirements to publicly publish reports that conflict
15 countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. with their commitment to client confidentiality.
21 ILO 2005 59 The names of the suppliers are removed
22 Jo-In Project: “Technical meeting of social auditors operating in Turkey” (May 2005) 60 For a full discussion of the BSCI see Merk and Zeldenrust, 2005
23 Saget 2001 61 This in comparison to MSIs: Social Accountability International publicises the names
24 Setrini, Gustavo (2005) “Wages In The Apparel Industry; What Constitutes A Decent and addresses of certified factories on its website, the B SCI keeps the information
Standard?” Background paper prepared for the Jo-In/MIT meeting on Exploring Com- on the results of monitoring internal. The Fair Labor Association provides the following
mon Approaches to Corporate Accountability and Workers Rights, July 10-11, Massa- information:
chusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge. 3 name of the FLA member company whose supply factory is being audited;
25 Adam et al. 2005: 7 3 nature, size, and country/region of the facility;
26 Stern, 2002: 16 3 identity of the external monitoring organisation;
27 MSN, 2004 3 date and length of the external monitoring visit;
96 “I have been working [here] for more than a year.
3 summaries of areas of compliance and non-compliance with the FLA code; and
3 summaries of the remediation instituted and the status of the remediation (MSN,
2000, Codes Memo Update, 11). Auditors visit the factory but there is no visible
62 http://www.wrapapparel.org
63 Terry Collingsworth cited in MSN, 2002 change in our working conditions [...] I have been
64 KarstadtQuelle website (18/8/2005)
65 Informal interviews with members of certification schemes and auditing industry having a constant leg pain since I joined. I have
66 South China Morning Post (2000) December 18
67 The sources preferred not to be named
complained to the supervisors but have not got
68 Mamic, 2004: 205
time off to see the doctor.” Worker, factory D, north India,
69 Ascoly and Zeldenrust, 2003: 4
70 ETI conference report 2003 producing for Wal-Mart, Kellwood and Sears “[Supervisor’s
71 see CCC et al., 2005; Merk 2005a
72 Simon Zadek (AccountAbility) cited in Ascoly, Nina (2003). name] is present at the time of the interview so
73 World Bank, 2003: 2-3
74 Santoro, 2003: 423 we get to know who was interviewed and what was
75 The WFSGI has, in the last year, made some moves to improve its performance in
terms of promoting a sectoral approach across the sportswear industry, partly in
asked. We hold meetings with the workers, train
response to the Play Fair at the Olympics campaign. It is too soon to say, at this junc-
ture, however, whether it is in a position to deliver much in this area.
them, before the audit. We tell them what may be
76 For more information on this project, see www.jo-in.org asked and what should be answered.” Manager, Factory
A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC “No worker
who had met the social auditor could be identified.
According to the information collected...supervisors
were interviewed by the social auditors.” Factory

A, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC “I propose that if social

organizations, like yours, trade unions and the
inspectors of the buyers audit together, things for
the workers may change. But my fear is that when
and if that happens, at the time of the inspection the
employers will lock their units and proper auditing
will be made impossible. The system needs to be
changed.” Md Ateeq, President, Delhi Leather Karigar Sangathan
Trade Union, India