Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez (private respondent) the due process safeguards in the latter do not
atter do not necessarily apply to the
G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000
Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and
to grant the latter reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice and
hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding
to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
mentioned decision.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process
Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged
in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by
one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the
US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do
not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.”
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation
stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation,
former.
The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances “must
begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.” The concept of due process is flexible for “not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure.”
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses
that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process
at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings.
Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due,
when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior
determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at
all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to
which an individual will be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.”
As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty
affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against
him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know
the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in
court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is
momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process
to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent
escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature
information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less
compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government,
the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater
power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this
balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be
adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to
the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will
come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private
respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to
due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is
no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Cuevaz v. Muñoz (G.R. No. 140520; December 18, 2000)
Facts:
The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for
the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz for seven (7) counts of
accepting an advantage as an agent and seven(7) counts of conspiracy to
defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong. The Department of
Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from
the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong
Kong Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong
Extradition Agreement. Upon application of the NBI, RTC of Manila issued an
Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the
corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested
pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention
cell. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of
Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of
Arrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for
provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of
facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient
to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Thus, petitioner
Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition.
words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition
but not for the request for provisional arrest. The RP-Hong Kong Extradition
Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to be achieved
by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a
formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and
transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming
but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by
criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their extradition.
To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations
for provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for
the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic
cable. Respondent’s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The
proscription against the admission of a pleading that has been transmitted
by facsimile machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious
reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second,
unlike the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and
its accompanying documents must be authenticated.

Held: The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying
documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement
for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its
accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RP-

Hong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents
must be authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while
Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for
provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition
Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of
any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other
Rodriguez v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17
GR. NO. 157977 Feb. 27 2006
QUISUMBING, J
Lessons: Notice and Hearing for Cancellation of Bail in Extradition
FACTS:
After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda
Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001.
They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US
government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail which was
denied. The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled Gov’t of
the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to
resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s ruling on Government of the
USA v. Hon. Purganan. The lower court, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the
reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied. Hence,
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition directed against the
order for cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a warrant of arrest.
and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-
petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never
attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her;
and that she is now in her 60’s, sickly and under medical treatment, we
believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not
be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-
petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her
temporary liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior notice and
hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a
clear and
convincing showing that:
1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the
cancellation of bail

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA
GENER RODRIGUEZ.

The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already
presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had
already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that
under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to
provisional release.

Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to

go on
voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of
P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO 1069 (e) "Foreign Diplomat" Any authorized diplomatic representative of the
requesting state or government and recognized as such by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs.
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE FOR THE EXTRADITION OF PERSONS WHO
HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
(f) "Secretary of Foreign Affairs" The head of the Department of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, or in his absence, any official acting
WHEREAS, under the Constitution the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
on his behalf or temporarily occupying and discharging the duties of that
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
position.
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;

Section 3. Aims of Extradition. Extradition may be granted only pursuant to a treaty

WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the estate where it is
or convention, and with a view to:
committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped,
because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large,
and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished; (a) A criminal investigation instituted by authorities of the requesting state or
government charging the accused with an offense punishable under the laws
both of the requesting state or government and the Republic of the
WHEREAS, is recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded as
Philippines by imprisonment or other form relevant extradition treaty or
extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar
convention; or
treaties with other interested countries;

(b) The execution of a prison sentence imposed by a court of the requesting

WHEREAS, there is need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts
state or government, with such duration as that stipulated in the relevant
in the proper implementation of the extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
extradition treaty or convention, to be served in the jurisdiction of and as a
signatory.
punishment for an offense committed by the accused within the territorial
jurisdiction of the requesting state or government.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the
Section 4. Request; By whom made; Requirements.
following:

Section 1. Short-Title. This Decree shall be known as the "Philippine Extradition
Law".
Section 2. Definition of Terms. When used in this law, the following terms shall,
unless the context otherwise indicates, have meanings respectively assigned to them:
(a) "Extradition" The removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.
(1) Any foreign state or government with which the Republic of the
Philippines has entered into extradition treaty or convention, only when the
relevant treaty or convention, remains in force, may request for the
extradition of any accused who is or suspected of being in the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
(2) The request shall be made by the Foreign Diplomat of the requesting
state or government, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall
be accompanied by:
(a) The original or an authentic copy of either -

(1) the decision or sentence imposed upon the accused by

(b) "Extradition Treaty or Convention" An extradition agreement between the
the court of the requesting state or government; or
Republic of the Philippines and one or more foreign states or governments.

(2) the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by

(c) "Accused" The person who is, or is suspected of being, within the
the authority of the requesting state or government having
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and whose extradition has been
jurisdiction of the matter or some other instruments having
requested by a foreign state or government.
the equivalent legal force.

(d) "Requesting State or Government" The foreign state or government from

(b) A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the
which the request for extradition has emanated.
fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his
 whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these
acts;
(c) The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of
said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the
law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
(d) Such other documents or information in support of the request.
Section 5. Duty of Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Referral of Request: Filing of Petition.
(1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet
the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward
the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of these
case.
(2) The attorney so designated shall file a written petition with the proper
Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place,
with a prayer that the court take the request under consideration and shall
attach to the petition all related documents. The filing of the petition and the
service of the summons to the accused shall be free from the payment of
docket and sheriff's fees.
(3) The Court of First Instance with which the petition shall have been filed
shall have and continue to have the exclusive power to hear and decide the
case, regardless of the subsequent whereabouts of the accused, or the
change or changes of his place of residence.
Section 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as
soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the
day and hour fixed in the order. We may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of
the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding
judge shall hear the ace or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued,
shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case.
Section 7. Appointment of Counsel de Oficio. If on the date set for the hearing the
accused does not have a legal counsel, the presiding judge shall appoint any law
practitioner residing within his territorial jurisdiction as counsel de oficio for the
accused to assist him in the hearing.
Section 8. Hearing in Public; Exception; Legal Representation.
(1) The hearing shall be public unless the accused requests, with leave of
court, that it be conducted in chamber.
(2) The attorney having charge of the case may upon request represent the
requesting state or government throughout the proceeding. The requesting
state or government may, however, retain private counsel to represent it for
particular extradition case.
(3) Should the accused fail to appear on the date set for hearing, or if he is
not under detention, the court shall forthwith issue a warrant for this arrest
which may be served upon the accused anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 9. Nature and Conduct of Proceedings. (1) In the hearing, the provisions of
the Rules of Court insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings, shall apply to extradition cases, and the hearing shall be
conducted in such a manner as to arrive as a fair and speedy disposition of the case.
(2) Sworn statements offered in evidence at the hearing of any extradition
case shall be received and admitted as evidence if properly and legally
authenticated by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Republic
of the Philippines residing in the requesting state.
Section 10. Decision. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a
decision granting the extradition, and giving his reasons therefor upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case. Otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.
Section 11. Service of Decision. The decision of the court shall be promptly served
on the accused if he was not present at the reading thereof, and the clerk of the court
shall immediately forward two copies thereof to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
through the Department of Justice.
Section 12. Appeal by Accused; Stay of Execution
(1) The accused may, within 10 days from receipt of the decision of the Court
of First Instance granting extradition cases shall be final and immediately
executory.
(2) The appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Court of First
Instance.
Section 13. Application of Rules of Court. The provisions of the Rules of Court
governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in appeal in
Extradition cases, except that the parties may file typewritten or mimeograph copies
of their brief within 15 days from receipt of notice to file such briefs.
Section 14. Service of Decision of Court of Appeals. The accused and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, through the Department of Justice, shall each be promptly served
with copies of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Section 15. Concurrent Request for Extradition. In case extradition of the same
person has been requested by two or more states, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
after consultation with the Secretary of Justice, shall decide which of the several
requests shall be first considered, and copies of the former's decision thereon shall
promptly be forwarded to the attorney having charge of the case, if there be one,
through the Department of Justice.
Section 16. Surrender of Accused. After the decision of the court in an extradition
case has become final and executory, the accused shall be placed at the disposal of
the authorities of the requesting state or government, at a time and place to be
determined by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, after consultation with the foreign
diplomat of the requesting state or government.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the
documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be
released from custody.
(e) Release from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently in accordance with the relevant treaty of convention.
Section 21. Effectivity. this Decree shall take effect immediately and its provisions
shall be in force during the existence of any extradition treaty or convention with, and
only in respect of, any foreign state or government.

Section 17. Seizure and Turn Over of Accused Properties. If extradition is granted, DONE in the City of Manila , this 13th day of January in the Year of Our Lord nineteen
articles found in the possession of the accused who has been arrested may be seized hundred and seventy-seven.
upon order of the court at the instance of the requesting state or government, and
such articles shall be delivered to the foreign diplomat of the requesting state or
government who shall issue the corresponding receipt therefor.

Section 18. Costs and Expenses; By Whom Paid. Except when the relevant
extradition treaty provides otherwise, all costs or expenses incurred in any extradition
proceeding and in apprehending, securing and transmitting an accused shall be paid
by the requesting state or government. The Secretary of Justice shall certify to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs the amounts to be paid by the requesting state or
government on account of expenses and costs, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall cause the amounts to be collected and transmitted to the Secretary of Justice for
deposit in the National Treasury of the Philippines.

Section 19. Service of Court Processes. All processes emanating from the court in
connection with extradition cases shall be served or executed by the Sheriff of the
province or city concerned or of any member of any law enforcement agency;

Section 20. Provisional Arrest. (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may,
pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force;
request for provisional arrest of the accused pending receipt of the request for
extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.

(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic
channels or direct by post or telegraph.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting
on his behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant
for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place,
who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting of the result of its request.
TENIO-OBSEQUIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994
Facts:
On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint
in the court a quo against herein petitioners Consorcia Tenio
and her husband, Orlando Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo
Deguro for recovery of possession and ownership, alleging that
sometime in 1964, they mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro
for P10,000.00; that to guaranty the loan they delivered to the
latter the original certificate of title to the land; that in the
meantime, they continued to cultivate the same and, at the end
of the harvest season, they gave two-thirds (2/3) of the harvest
to Eduardo Deguro; that on June 25, 1965, Eduardo Deguro
and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of herein
private respondents, prepared a document of sale and through
misrepresentation and other manipulations made it appear that
private respondents sold the land to them.
This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said
certificate of title as Entry No. 16007. By virtue thereof, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1181 in the name of Eufronio Alimpoos
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1360 was
correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the
death of Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia
Tenio-Obsequio. On September 22, 1970, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1421 was issued in her name. It was allegedly only in
1982, when Eufronio Alimpoos received a Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), that he learned that the land was
already titled in the name of another.
Issue:
May a forged document of sale give rise to a valid title?
Ruling:
Yes. The court has held that a fraudulent or forged document of
sale may give rise to a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name indicated by the forger and while it remained as such, the
land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.
Facts:
Eufronio Alimpoos was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covering OCT No. P-1181 by virtue of homestead application. The
said land is now registered in the name of herein petitioner, Consorcia
Tenio-Obsequio, as evidenced by TCT No. T-1421.
On September 10, 1986, Alimpoos filed a complaint in the court a
quo against Consorcia Tenio and her husband, Orlando Obsequio, and
the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession and
ownership, alleging that sometime in 1964, they mortgaged the land
to Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00; that to guaranty the loan they
delivered to the latter the original certificate of title to the land; that
in the meantime, they continued to cultivate the same and, at the end
of the harvest season, they gave two-thirds (2/3) of the harvest to
Eduardo Deguro; that on June 25, 1965, Eduardo Deguro and his wife,
without the knowledge and consent of herein private respondents
Alimpoos, prepared a document of sale and through
misrepresentation and other manipulations made it appear that
private respondents sold the land to them.
This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said certificate of
title as Entry No. 16007. By virtue thereof, OCT No. P-1181 in the
name of Eufronio Alimpoos was cancelled and TCT No. T-1360 was
correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the death of
Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio.
On September 22, 1970, TCT No. T-1421 was issued in hername.
It was allegedly only in 1982, when Eufronio Alimpoos received a
Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), that he learned that the land was already Nor can we charge said petitioner with negligence since, at the time
titled in the name of another. of the sale to her, the land was already registered in the name of
Eduardo Deguro and the tax declaration was also issued in the latter's
In their answer, the heirs of Eduardo Deguro claimed that respondent
name.
Alimpoos spouses sold the land to their late parents on June 25, 1965
for a consideration of P10,000.00, as evidenced by the deed of
absolute sale.

Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio, on the other hand, maintains that she

purchased the land in question from the heirs of Deguro in good faith,
for valuable consideration and without knowledge of any flaw or
defect whatsoever.

ISSUE: Whether Alimpoos may recover the land from Consorcia

through reconveyance

HELD:

No. Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by

Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner, of
registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the
ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the
rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property
of another, without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property. In consonance with this
accepted legal definition, petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is a
purchaser in good faith. There is no showing whatsoever nor even an
allegation that herein petitioner had any participation, voluntarily or Republic of the Philippines
otherwise, in the alleged forgery. SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3970 October 29, 1952
GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH PABLA,
OJAGAR SINGH, DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG
KIAT, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO, respondents-
appellants.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose N. Buendia for appellants.
Eliseo Caunca for appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal prosecuted by the respondents-appellants against an order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated November 29, 1949,
compelling them to surrender owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 8071 and 8072, so that the contract of lease entered into between
petitioners-appellees and the owner of the land covered by said certificates
of title be annotated thereon.
John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of the land covered by the above-mentioned
certificates of title, he entered into a contract of lease with the petitioner-
appellees.
At the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing
mortgage over the land in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo. This
mortgage in favor of the Calvos was cancelled, and a new mortgage was
executed by the owner in favor of respondents-appellants herein, Honorable
Hermogenes Reyes and his spouse Teodora Tantoco.
The original contract of lease was amended. This amended contract of lease
was also registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On May 25, 1949, counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote respondents-
appellants requesting them to allow him to take the certificates of title to the
office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of the contracts
of lease entered into by the owner with them. The son of respondents-
appellants acknowledged receipt of the said letter but informed counsel for
the petitioner-appellees that the request could not be granted without the
written consent of the owner of the certificates of title.
On June 3, 1949, the petitioners-appellees filed a motion in the Court of First
Instance of Manila praying that an order issue to the owner for the delivery
of the owner's duplicates of transfer certificates of title Nos. 8071 and 8072
to the petitioners in order that the Register of Deeds of Manila may be able
to make the annotation thereon of the contract of lease.
The only issue, therefore, is whether petitioners have a right to have said
deeds registered.
The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all
persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the proceedings for
registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights
over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights
of these parties, who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when
an instrument is subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects
on other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of
registration.
The supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their
registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid
excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not
require that only valid instruments shall be registered. It must follow as a
necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or
effect litigated afterwards.
Wherefore, the opposition to the motion for the surrender of the certificates
of title to the Register of Deeds of Manila is overruled, and the order
appealed from, in so far as it orders the surrender of the certificates of title
for the registration of the contracts of lease, is hereby affirmed, but the
other rulings are reversed, and the other issues raised by respondents-
appellants reserved for determination in a proper proceeding. With costs
against the respondents-appellants.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
CAMPER REALTY CORP. VS. MARIA NENA PAJO-
REYES,ET AL.
Facts:
1. Mar. 27, 1974 -Respondent Rodolfo Pajo caused the
notarization of an SPA purportedly by his four siblings
Maria, Godofredo, Tito & Isais (Atty. Naraval) --- w/c
authorized him to sell a parcel of land in Davao City
covered by TCT under the name of the siblings
2. Mar. 28, 1974 – he sold the land to Ligaya who caused
the cancellation of the TCT & issued a new one for
Ligaya
3. Mar. 30, 1974 – Atty. Naraval observed that the
signatures of the siblings were forged w/c made him
send letters to the other siblings regarding the
cancellation of the SPA from his notarial register
4. July 16, 1986 – Ligaya’s son, Agusto, caused the
cancellation of the TCT in his Mother’s name upon her
death via Partition Agreement
5. 1992 – Agusto caused the division of the property into
2 but before the completion of the technical survey, he
sold the bigger portion to petitioner Camper Realty
although the land was still registered in Agusto’s name
& he retained the smaller portion for himself
6. 1993 – respondent Nena (sister of Rodolfo) filed a
complaint against Agusto, Rodolfo & Godofredo for
declaration of nullity and/or inexistence of contracts,
cancellation of title, quieting of title & possession,
damages, atty.’s fee w/ PI & TRO
7. RTC – issued TRO against Agusto
8. Nena amended the complaint & impleaded Camper
upon knowledge of the sale alleging that no right could
have been transmitted to Ligaya & subsequent
transferees since the SPA had been forged
9. Davao RTC – dismissed the complaint of Nena on the
ground of laches & that the transfer from Rodolfo to
Ligaya could have been invalid for forgery of the SPA
however, the court cannot invalidate the subsequent
transfer of the property to Agusto-to-Camper
10.CA – reversed – Agusto did not acquire any better right
than his mother, Ligaya
Issue: W/N Camper has a better right over the property upon
relying on the title of Agusto?
Held: YES!
1. Although the acquisition of Agusto as his share in his
mother’s estate was on the basis of a forged SPA,
Agusto’s title must be cancelled, however, Camper,
acquired a portion of the said property in good faith &
for value
2. A person dealing with a registered land has a right to
rely on the Torrens COT & to dispense w/ the need of
inquiring further except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts & circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when
the purchaser has knowledge of the defect in title of
the vender (w/c is not true in this case)
a. Nena did not present proff of any circumstance
that could serve as caveat for Camper to
undertake searching investigation
b. Ligaya registed it in 1974, Agusto in 1986 &
there was no encumberance or lien annotated
3. Agusto’s title is defeasible, he having acquired no
better right than that of his mother, however, his title
becomes conclusive & indefeasible in the hands of
Camper, being an innocent purchaser for value & in
good faith.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183448 June 30, 2014
SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO
ABALON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183464
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO
ABALON, Petitioners,
vs.
MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL AND AL, ARNEL AND AL, SPOUSES DOMINDOR
PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, and HEIRS of RESTITUTO RELLAMA,
represented by his children ALEX, IMMANUEL, JULIUS and SYLVIA, all
surnamed RELLAMA.
THE FACTS
The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi,
consisting of 8,571 square meters, was originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon (Abalon). It
appears that a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the subject property in favor
of Restituto M. Rellama (Rellama) on June 10, 1975.
By virtue of such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42108 was issued in the name of Rellama. The
subject property was then subdivided into three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B,
Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold to Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and Ofelia M.
Peralta (Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued in their
names. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio) who
thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil
Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even
date, TCT No. 42482 was issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise
acquired Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the issuance of TCT No. 42821 in their favor on
December 27, 1995.
Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses
Peralta, and the Andals, the herein defendants-appellants and the Bank of the
Philippines Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of
Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further that they acquired the subject
property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of Abalon who died without
issue
It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint, under five
separate causes of action, that Rellama was able to cause the cancellation of OCT
No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name from
which the defendants-appellants derived their own titles, upon presentation of a xerox
copy of the alleged forged deed of absolute sale and the order granting the issuance
of a second owner’s duplicate copy
They averred that the owner’s duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always been with
Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged that
Abalon had always been in possession of the subject property through her tenant
Pedro Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, and then his
son, Godofredo Bellen. On the other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot
on the land he was claiming. They further alleged that after the ownership over the
subject property was transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took
possession thereof and retained Godofredo as their own tenant. However, they
averred that in 1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest possession of the
subject property from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-appellants
are not buyers in good faith as they were aware that the subject land was in the
possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the purchase. They thus
claim that the titles issued to the defendants-appellants are null and void.
In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is
genuine and that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 had been delivered to him
upon the execution of the said deed of transfer.
As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the
complaint, they mainly alleged that they are buyers in good faith and for value.
During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.
After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their own
evidence, the defendants-appellants and the Heirs of Restituto Rellama, on different
occasions, filed a demurrer to evidence.
On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-
appellees and ordered the restoration of OCT No. (O) 16 in the name of Abalon and
the cancellation of the titles issued to the defendants-appellants. The fact that only a
xerox copy of the purported deed of sale between Rellama and Abalon was presented
before the Register of Deeds for registration and the absence of such xerox copy on
the official files of the said Office made the court a quo conclude that the said
document was a mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted that the
duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in the hands of the plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic]
the perforated serial number B 221377, which it held is a convincing proof of its
authenticity and genuineness.
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property
showed badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama.
The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion over the
subject property, because he had not introduced improvements on the property,
despite claiming to have acquired it in 1975. Further, the CA noted that he did not
6
cause the annotation of the Deed of Sale, which he had executed with Abalon, on
OCT No. (O) 16.
The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal standing to
question the sale transaction between Rellama and their predecessor-in-interest. It
concluded that the heirs of Abalon had acquired the subject property by ordinary
acquisitive prescription and thus had every right to attack every document that
intended to divest them of ownership thereof, which in this case was the Deed of
8
Sale that Bernardina executed in favor of Rellama.
ISSUE: The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument
may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is
valid and has not been cancelled.
THE COURT’S RULING
It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to
land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title."
views. In Fule, the original owner relinquished physical possession of her title and
thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of
her title and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument eventually became the
root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The new title
under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent
purchaser for value. Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered
titles.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken
in the case of the Andals. Neither were they proven to have knowledge of anything
that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellama’s ownership over the
subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the Andals were buyers
in good faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of the land bought
from Rellama must be upheld.
Under Article 975 of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the
38

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real
estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further
legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter having had no issue during her marriage. As such,
they succeeded to her estate when she passed away. While we agree with the CA
that the donation mortis causa was invalid in the absence of a will, it erred in
concluding that the heirs acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive
prescription. The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive
prescription is not applicable. Upon the death of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia,
39

inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of being her legal heirs, acquired the subject property by virtue of succession, and not
title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such by ordinary acquisitive prescription.
rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright
cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for
everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly
issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige
him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a
registered parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the title. A person is only
charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title. This20

rule, however, admits of exceptions, which we explained in Clemente v. Razo: 21

Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the

absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate
the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with SPECIAL EN BANC
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.
G.R. No. 204280, November 09, 2016
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title,
the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes EVELYN V. RUIZ, Petitioner, v. BERNARDO F. DIMAILIG, Respondent.
the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the
qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This 30

means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent Respondent Bernardo F. Dimailig (Bernardo) was the registered owner of a
holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-361747 located in Alapan, Imus,
registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary to what Cavite.4 In October 1997, he entrusted the owner's copy of the said TCT to his
the Abalons would like to impress on us, Fuleand Torresdo not present clashing brother, Jovannie,5 who in turn gave the title to Editha Sanggalang (Editha), a
broker, for its intended sale. However, in January 1998, the property was
mortgaged to Evelyn V. Ruiz (Evelyn) as evidenced by a Deed of REM 6 without
Bernardo's knowledge and consent. Hence, Bernardo instituted this suit for
annulment of the Deed of REM.7
In her Answer,8 Evelyn contended that she met Jovannie when she inspected
the subject property and assured her that Bernardo owned the property and
his title thereto was genuine. She further claimed that Jovannie mortgaged the
she was still recuperating from an operation.22 She admitted that she neither
verified from the neighborhood the owner of the property nor approached the
occupant thereof.23
Moreover, Evelyn asserted that when the Deed of REM was executed, the
person who introduced himself as Bernardo presented a community tax
certificate and his picture as proof of identity. 24 She admitted that she did not
ask for any identification card from "Bernardo."25cralawred

property to her. She also insisted that as a mortgagee in good faith and for
value, the REM cannot be annulled and that she had the right to keep the Contrary to the allegation in her Answer that Jovannie mortgaged the property,
owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 until the loan was fully paid to her. Evelyn clarified that she met Jovannie for the first time when he went to her
house and told her that Bernardo could not have mortgaged the property to
Bernardo testified that when he went abroad on October 19, 1997, he left the her as he was abroad.26
owner's copy of the TCT of the subject property to Jovannie as they intended
10
to sell the subject property. However, on January 26, 1998, a REM was Corazon Abella Ruiz (Corazon), the sister-in-law of Evelyn, was presented to
executed on the subject property. Bernardo argued that his alleged signature corroborate her testimony. Corazon averred that in January 1998, she
11 accompanied Evelyn and several others in inspecting the subject
appearing therein was merely forged as he was still abroad at that time.
When he learned in September or November 1998 that Editha mortgaged the property.27 The day after the inspection, Evelyn and "Bernardo'' executed the
subject property, he personally told Evelyn that the REM was fake and Deed of REM in the office of a certain Atty. Ignacio; Evelyn handed
demanded the return of his title. Not heeding his request, he filed a complaint P300,000.00 to Editha, not to "Bernardo;"28 in turn, Editha handed to Evelyn
for estafa through falsification of public document against Editha and Evelyn. the owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747.29
12
The criminal case against Evelyn was dismissed while Editha was found guilty
as charged. the RTC dismissed the Complaint the RTC denied Bernardo's Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, he appealed to the CA.
Jovannie also took the witness stand. He testified that sometime in December
1997, Editha convinced him to surrender the owner's copy of TCT No. T- the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC
14
361747 which she would show her buyer. Subsequently, however, Editha Decision.
informed him that she misplaced the title. Hence, he executed in August
1998
15
an affidavit of loss and registered it with the Register of Deeds Issue
16
(RD). In September 1998, Editha finally admitted that the title was not lost
17 [T]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner is not a mortgagee in
but was in Evelyn's possession because of the REM. Upon learning this,
good faith despite the presence of substantial evidence to support such
Jovannie inquired from Evelyn if Editha mortgaged Bernardo's property to her. conclusion of fact.
Purportedly, Evelyn confirmed said mortgage and told him that she would not
return the owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 unless Editha pay the
18
loan, Jovannie also alleged that he told Evelyn that Bernardo's alleged
signature in the REM was not genuine since he was abroad at the time of its
execution.

On the other hand, Evelyn maintained that she was a mortgagee in good faith. Our Ruling
She testified that sales agents - Editha, Corazon Encarnacion, and a certain
Parani, - and a person introducing himself as ''Bernardo" mortgaged the The Petition is without merit.
subject property to her for P300,000.00 payable within a period of three
months.20 She asserted that even after the expiration of said period,
As a rule, the issue of whether a person is a mortgagee in good faith is not
"Bernardo" failed to pay the loan.21
within the ambit of a Rule 45 Petition. The determination of presence or
absence of good faith, and of negligence factual matters, which are outside the
Evelyn narrated that before accepting the mortgage of the subject property, scope of a petition for review on certiorari.34 Nevertheless, this rule allows
she, the sales agents, her aunt, and “Bernardo," visited the property. She certain exceptions including cases where the RTC and the CA arrived at
pointed out that her companions inspected it while she stayed in the vehicle as
different or conflicting factual findings, 35as in the case at bench. As such, the
Court deems it necessary to re-examine and re-evaluate the factual findings of
the CA as they differ with those of the RTC.

No valid mortgage will arise unless the mortgagor has a valid title or ownership
over the mortgaged property. By way of exception, a mortgagee can invoke
that he or she derived title even if the mortgagor's title on the property is
defective, if he or she acted in good faith. In such instance, the mortgagee
must prove that no circumstance that should have aroused her suspicion on
the veracity of the mortgagor's title on the property was disregarded. 36

Such doctrine of mortgagee in good faith presupposes "that the mortgagor,

who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already succeeded in
obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his name and that, after obtaining
the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies on
what appears on the said title."37 In short, the doctrine of mortgagee in good
faith assumes that the title to the subject property had already
been transferred or registered in the name of the impostor who thereafter
transacts with a mortgagee who acted in good faith. In the case at bench, it
must be emphasized that the title remained to be registered in the name of
Bernardo, the rightful and real owner, and not in the name of the impostor.

Thus, considering that the mortgage contract was forged as it was entered into
by Evelyn with an impostor, the registered owner of the property, Bernardo,
correspondingly did not lose his title thereon, and Evelyn did not acquire any
right or title on the property and cannot invoke that she is a mortgagee in
good faith and for value.45

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the October 22, 2012

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95046 is AFFIRMED.