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Next, McConnell cuts the trained worms in half and tests the two
regenerated worms. Both regenerated worms scrunch more in response to
light than untrained worms.
Next, McConnell feeds trained worms to untrained worms, and the untrained
worms who are fed outperform untrained worms who were not fed.
Worms are being given “implants” rather than absorbing memory substance.
o McConnell then starts injecting RNA and reports success.
Worms cannot be trained, but instead are being made more sensitive with the
training. A sensitizing substance is being transferred rather than memory.
o McConnell randomizes light and shock exposure with one group of
worms, and associates light and shock with another group of worms.
The trained worms outperform the sensitized worms.
o Once memory transfer results were reported in tests conducted with
mice and rats, skepticism about worm training faded away because it
was believed that mice and rats could be trained. Now everyone
agrees that worms can be trained.
When critics perform a test and fail to get the observational consequence,
they reject the hypothesis. McConnell argues that the hypothesis is true, but
that the experimental setup failed to conform in some crucial way.
Who is correct?
Call McConnell’s theory, complete with its main hypothesis and auxiliary
hypotheses, “T1”. Call the theory that worms cannot be trained and that a
sensitizing substance is being transferred T2. T1 (plus initial conditions) and
T2 (plus initial conditions) both imply the same observational consequence:
worms in the test group scrunch in response to light more frequently than
worms in the control group.
McConnell takes his results to confirm T1. Some of his critics take his
results to confirm T2. Who is correct? Here we have a historical example of
the failure of the converse consequence condition.
We also have the ingredients for an example of the failure of the special
consequence condition:
T1: Worms can be trained but memory isn’t transferable. If worms are exposed to
conditions X, Y, and Z, they will be trained. These worms were exposed to conditions X, Y,
and Z.
___________________________________________
K1: These worms are trained.
T2: Worms can be trained and memory is transferable. If worms are exposed to conditions
X, Y, and Z, they will be trained. These worms were exposed to conditions X, Y, and Z.
____________________________________________
K1: These worms are trained.
T3: Worms cannot be trained. These worms were exposed to conditions X, Y, and Z.
____________________________________________
~K1: These worms are not trained.
Suppose you start out confident in T1 and K1. Then you learn about McConnell’s
experimental results. McConnell’s experimental results make you slightly more confident in
T2, but much more confident in T3; you now doubt T1. Furthermore, you are now much
less confident in K1. So, we have a case where confirming H (in this case, T2) fails to
confirm K (in this case, disconfirms K1).
Four independent researchers report that injections of brain extract from trained
mice/rats to untrained mice/rats results in behavior that lets one distinguish between
the injected rats and the non-injected rats.
o In one experiment, rats pick between entering a dark box and entering a
lightened box. A rat’s preference would be for the dark box, but upon
entering they are locked in and shocked. Soon, they learn to not enter the
dark box.
o Ungar then prepares an extract from their brains and injects it into mice. By
measuring the amount of time mice spend in the dark box, he can predict
whether or not they were injected.
Attempts to replicate the results are conducted. Arguably, there were 105 positive
replications and 23 negative ones.
Ungar explains away the failures by arguing that the experiments were improperly
conducted.
o Stanford researchers and Ungar argue over whether the important
observational result is “latency” (time spent before entering a dark box) or
dark box time (time spent in dark box). Ungar argues that latency is no good
because mice run into the dark box and then immediately out. His critics
argue that latency is the typical standard and that quantity dark box time is
explained by many variables other than fear of the dark/preference for the
dark.
McConnell and Ungar attempt to explain away the negative results. For the most
part, the positive experimental results are never explained away by their critics.
Nevertheless, the prevailing view today is that, while worms are trainable, memory is
not chemically transferrable.
It’s hard to say precisely what makes a hypothesis ad hoc, but it’s not so hard to come
up with examples.
“We no longer believe in memory transfer but this is because we tired of it, because
more interesting problems came along, and because the principal experimenters lost
their credibility.” (The Golem)