TORTS AND DAMAGES COMPILED DIGESTS – ATTY.
PAMARAN the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was
I. TORTS
II. QUASI – DELICTS
A. ELEMENTS
B. NEGLIGENCE
C. CAUSATION
a. PROXIMATE CAUSE; IMMEDIATE CAUSE
1. SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR
and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN vs. MARIANO MEDINA
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
FACTS:
Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, defendant Mariano Medina,
under a certificate of public convenience left town of Amadeo, Cavite on its way to Pasay City
and drove by Conrado Saylon. There were 18 passengers including the driver and the
conductor. One of the 18 passengers is Juan Batacan. At about about 2 in the morning while
driving in Imus Cavite the front tire burst and the vehicle began to stumbled and fell into a canal.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus while Batacan, Lara and Visayan and the
women behind them named Natalia Villanueva could not get out of the overturned bus. After
an hour of helping them to escape, a group of men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made
of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fuelled by petroleum. Upon approaching the bus,
the gasoline began to leak and the fire broke out.
The petitioner in this case and in behalf of her minor children, brought the present suit to recover
from Mariano Medina damages in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the CFI of Cavite
awarded P1,000 to the plaintiff plus P600 as attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Batacan to Pasay City. The plaintiffs and the defendants
appealed to the CA, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in
the claim in the complaint.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina which was the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan.
Held: YES
The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he
must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to
hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help.
The driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area,
can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
2. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO
No. L-65295. March 10,1987
FACTS:
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where
he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his car when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a
dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. and driven by Armando U. Carbonel, was
parked on the right hand side of the street facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew in
such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncomphiing traffic.
There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
dump truck, front or rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to
the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to
him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver. Moreover, Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was
negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. While the petitioner truck
driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the
accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance"
must bear his own injuries alone.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dionisio is negligent?
1

HELD: YES, but Dionisio’s negligence was only contributory.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night
and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights and thus did
not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful —
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's
negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is
quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump
truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down the
street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What
the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent
manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose
upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and
that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to
overcome this presumption of negligence. The failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix
to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises,
is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
3. LAMBERTO RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
GR No. 184905, August 28, 2009
DOCTRINE: Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
FACTS: Aquilino Larin, driver of a Toyota altis own by C.O.L. Realty was driving along Katipunan
ave. corner Rajah Matanda Ave. in Quezon City. He was driving at a speed of 5 to 10 kilometers
per hour and had just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when suddenly a Ford
Expedition owned by Lamberto Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo violently rammed against
the cars right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees
towards the direction where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property. Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
repair of its car and the cost of hospitalization in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The
demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on
quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City.
Ramos denied liability insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver,
which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car
crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed
thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.
Ramos also claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
driver, Rodel.
The MeTC exculpated Ramos from liability. The Regional trial Court (RTC) upheld the decision of
the lower court.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited.
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah
Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless,
Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were
broken, thus violating the MMDA rule.
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos vehicle
was moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction
(the Katipunan Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass). It therefore found the driver Rodel
guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy
intersection.
The appellate court modified the RTC decision. The CA found Ramos to be solidarily liable Rodel
Ilustrisimo.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rodel’s negligence is the proximate cause of the accident.
2. Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable.
2
HELD: Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover,
it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages
suffered by respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within
the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the
accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since it
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause
of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos
seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a
result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an
assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not
eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.
4. MANUEL BELARMINO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990
FACTS:
Manuel Belarmino is the husband of Oania Belarmino. Oania was a classroom teacher of DECS
assigned at the Buracan Elementary School. One unfortunate day, Oania, who was then in her
8th month of pregnancy, while performing her duties, accidentally slipped and fell on the
classroom floor. Immediately thereafter, and subsisting for several days, she experienced
abdominal pains and a heavy feeling in her stomach. 11 days after her accident, she went into
labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl. Her abdominal pains persisted, accompanied by
high fever and headache. She was brought to the hospital where she was diagnosed with
septicaemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from
the hospital after 5 days, apparently recovered, but died 3 days later.
Manuel filed a claim for death benefits which was denied by GSIS on the ground that she did
not suffer from an occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was
contracted by reason of her employment. Manuel appealed to ECC but to no avail. Hence, this
petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N ECC and GSIS are liable to pay death benefits to Manuel – YES
RATIO:
The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly
not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher.
However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because
an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its
development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and
suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which
culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her
fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the
proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her
demise.
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent
abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death,
are compensable.
3
5. FERNANDO v. CA
FACTS: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of
the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won. On November 26, 1975, Bascon signed the
purchase order. However, on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found
dead inside the septic tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman. The body of Joselito Garcia was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia, and taken to the Regional Hospital, but he expired there. The City Engineer's
office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it
nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who
did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died
from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas.
The trial court dismissed the case. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled that the
law is intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent.
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. CA issued an amended decision,
granting that of Davao City and dismissing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Davao City is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause; thus,
can be liable for damages
HELD: NO. The Court affirmed the CA’s amended decision.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case is: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic
tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the
market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public
Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Bascon. The public respondent,
therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an
undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since
1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but
have remained unscathed.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code
which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of
these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the
putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements. Accident such as toxic gas leakage
from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers.
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service,
who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to
take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.
6. TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570, 30 January 1976.
Facts:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP)
were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which
was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning,
barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter
told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix
it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P.
Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the
broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently
died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues:
(1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm;
(2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling:
Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the
part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution.
With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case
of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case)
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants'
(petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt
him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employee’s negligence is well
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
4
 b. CONCURRENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSES
c. TEST OF CAUSATION
a. CAUSATION IN FACT
b. SUBSTANTIAN FACTOR
c. “BUT FOR” or “SINE QUA NON”
d. FORSEEABILITY
e. CAUSE AND CONDITION
f. NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
d. INTERVENING CAUSE
1. M.H. RAKES vs THE ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
7 Phil. 359
FACTS:
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day,
they were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars
(karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from
the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards
installed on the sides of the cars, but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars
move were also weakened by a previous typhoon.
It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same
were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed
portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails
slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and
he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the
cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that
Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired;
that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track, yet he
continued to work.
ISSUE: Whether the Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes, the Atlantic is civilly liable.
Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another
employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other
hand, though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the
side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing
near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages
though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500
pesos.
In this case, the Supreme Court also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a
real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist
without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation
(contractual or culpa contractual).
2. TEAGUE vs FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
A fire broke down in a building where Realistic Institute, a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes Teague, was located which
caused the death of four students including Lourdes Fernandez, the sister of the appellant. The
brothers and sisters of Lourdes filed an action for damages against Mercedes. The RTC ruled in
favor of Mercedes causing the appellant to appeal to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of
the RTC holding that there had been a negligence on the part of Mercedes. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a negligence on the part of Teague considering the fact
that she was just a lessee in the building.
HELD: The Court held yes. The CA was correct in holding that Teague was negligent and from
which caused the death of Lourdes Fernandez based primarily on the fact that the section 491
of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila had not been complied within the connection
with the construction and use of Gil-Armi bldg.. where Realistic Institute was located.
Furthermore, It is true that the non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy
of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of
safety designed to prevent specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of
the building.
Thus, the doctrine of proximate cause applies to such violation.
3. MCKEE vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter,
Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kim’s
babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City
(northward) in a Ford Escort.
Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben
Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward),
going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans
of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.
As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly
ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth,
unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to
swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in.
5
Jose switched his headlights on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane.
However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck. The
collision occurred on the bridge, which resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-
old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the
passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,
received physical injuries from the collision.
An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and
achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for
Review.
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second
one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other
children.
The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not
included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually consolidated.
The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s
fees.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its
finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.
However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and
upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and
the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was
negligent.
ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision?
HELD: NO. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly
shows. Jose’s entry into Galang’s lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his mind at the time,
a greater peril – death or injury to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent behavior.
Another witness said that the truck only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police
investigated the scene of the collision, they found skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it.
This indicated that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision.
On the basis of the DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE
Layugan v. IAC: The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Corliss v. Manila Railroad: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It
is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.
and the TEST OF NEGLIGENCE,
Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
no negligence can be imputed to Koh.
Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys
by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down,
move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
THE EMERGENCY RULE: “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.”
Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be
considered negligent. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL
WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE:
1. PROXIMATE CAUSE: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
• Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping (instead, he continued at full speed
towards the car) and allowing the Escort to return to the right lane was the SUFFICIENT
INTERVENING CAUSE and the ACTUAL CAUSE of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary
measures and the degree of care necessary to avoid the collision)
Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the
truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the
car instead of meeting it head-on.”
o Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at
30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on
a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.
Under ARTICLE 2185 of the Civil Code, “a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.”
2. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
6
consequences thereof, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third
person.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff.
• Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence
presented. Therefore, respondents are found, under ARTICLE 2180, directly and primarily
responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows from the negligence of their
employee.
Such presumption is juris tantum (REBUTTABLE) and NOT juris et de jure (CONCLUSIVE). They did
not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee, Galang.
D. PERSONS LIABLE
a. TORTFEASOR / JOINT TORTFEASOR
1. CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. ESTRELLA
FACTS:
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San
Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their destination
because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South
Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in
front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and
extricated their legs from under the seats.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan,
Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the
drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2)
that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employees;
ISSUE: whether the petitioner and BLTB and/or its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for
the damages sustained by respondents.
Held: YES.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is
responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the
employer for an employees act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to
prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Payunan, Jr.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual
damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established that
Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the police
investigator.
In a joint obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a solidary or joint
and several obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close
that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation. Joint tort
feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.
E. VICARIOUS LIABILITY, ART. 2180
a. PARENTS/GUARDIANS
1. SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 1957
FACTS:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 where he
was found guilty of the crime charged. He was only (15) years old when he committed the
crime. Sabina Exconde, filed a separate civil action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son
Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro
Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident,
the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was
sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay
the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions
of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of
the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31,
1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going
to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
ISSUE: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his
son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent
act of minor Dante Capuno?
HELD:Yes. It is true that under the law, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
7
institution. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city
school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then
a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903,
last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.
2. MARIA TERESA CUADRA vs ALFONSO MONFORT
G.R. No. L-24101, September 30, 1970
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade 6. Their
teacher assigned them, together with 3 other classmates, to weed the grass in the school
premises. While thus engaged, Monfort found a plastic headband and jokingly said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At the
precise moment, Cuadra turned around to face her friend and the object hit her eye. Smarting
from the pain, she rubbed rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next
day, the eye became swollen and Cuadra was taken to a doctor for treatment. Despite the
medical efforts, Cuadra completely lost her right eye sight.
Cuadra’s parents subsequently instituted a civil suit against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
Monfort’s father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Alfonso Monfort is liable for the act of his minor child.
RULING: NO. Art. 2180 provides, “The father… or mother… are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company”
“The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
The presumption of vicarious liability is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted, as
can be clearly drawn from the last paragraph of Art. 2180. The burden of proof necessarily rests
on the defendant.
In the present case, there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it.
His child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right
to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as for the injury, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against.
b. EMPLOYERS
1. GUTIERREZ V. CA
FACTS: Benigno C. Gutierrez and Domingo N. Balisalisa (petitioners) as contractor and project
engineer, respectively, of the contract executed by the former with the Bureau of Public Works,
undertaking the construction of the N. Reyes-Severino Drainage Main, Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project, Manila.
The workers of petitioner startrd digging up Severino Street, at first by manual labor and later by
means of a crane to speed up the excavation. The earth and mud dug up were scooped by the
crane and dumped against the exterior side of the adobe stone fence of the A. Mabini
Elementary School along the street. When the pile of earth and mud reached the height of the
fence, the crane's steel scooper was used to press them down. Because of heavy stress thus
placed on the fence, where Edna, daughter of respondent spouses Beloyo, was playing, a
portion of it gave way and collapsed resulting to Emma’s death.
Respondents-spouses Eliseo G. Baloyo and Soledad Ramos de Baloyo filed a suit for actual,
moral and exemplary damages arising from the death.
Issue: Whether the amount and character of the damages awarded by the trial court is proper
Ruling: The negligence of the defendants has been clearly established by the evidence. Indeed,
no evidence is necessary to show that the defendants were negligent in the performance of
their obligation. They ought to have known that it was not the right thing to do — to pile up the
big volume of earth excavated against the wall, which was fragile, being made only of adobe
stones held together by weak mortar and without reinforcements. The collapse, therefore, of the
said wall could reasonably be expected by any person of ordinary prudence, if not intelligence.
The danger not only to the wall but also to anybody on the other side of the wall, being a school
ground, could have been anticipated by the defendants herein and yet they failed to take the
necessary precautions to avoid the same, For this omission on their part, they should be held
responsible for moral and exemplary damages. This is more so with respect to the contractor,
Benigno C. Gutierrez, in order that other contractors similarly situated should be more careful in
the performance of their contracts. It is a matter of public knowledge that there are important
public works projects of the government that have been awarded to contractors, who are not
reliable, if not irresponsible.
2. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES AND FELIX PANGALANGAN vs. PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, INC. (PAFI), ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT AND FERNANDO PINEDA
GR No. L-25142, 25 March 1975
Facts: Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit alleged that on 24 November 1962, Fernando Pineda
drove recklessly the freight truck owned by his employer Philippine-American Forwarders along
the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. It bumped the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by
Felix Pangalangan.
As a result of the accident, Pangalangan was injured and the damaged bus cannot be used for
seventy-nine (79) days, causing loss of income amounting to PhP8,665.81 to Philippine Rabbit.
Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan as plaintiffs, filed a case for damages against the
defendants Philippine-American Forwarders, its manager Archimedes Balingit and the driver
Fernando Pineda for damages and lost income sustained by Philippine Rabbit and the injuries
sustained by Pangalangan.
8
Balingit stated in defense that he is not Pineda’s employer and he asked for the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ case as they had no cause of action against him.
The CFI Tarlac held only PAFI and Pineda liable for damages and injuries sustained and dismissed
Balingit’s liability. As a result, Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan appealed the trial court’s
decision to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Balingit as manager and employee of Philippine-American Forwarders Inc. is not
liable for damages awarded to Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit
Ruling: Yes, the trial court’s decision on appeal is affirmed. Thus, the Supreme Court held that
Balingit, as manager and employee of Philippine-American Forwarders, is not liable for damages
awarded to Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit.
The Supreme Court held that based on the allegations of the complaint of appellants Philippine
Rabbit and Pangalangan, Balingit has no liability based on tort or quasi-delict as manager of
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. in connection with the vehicular accident because he may be
regarded as an employee of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The Supreme Court interpreted the
term “manager” is used in the sense of employer, as it may be gathered from the article’s
context.
The New Civil Code states that,
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
3. PLEYTO VS. LOMBOY
FACTS: A head-on collision between a bus and a car along McArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac
happened on May 16, 1995 at around 11:30am.
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc (PRBL), bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur at the time of the
accident, is engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare servicing various routes in
Central and Northern Luzon. Its driver was Ernesto Pleyto.
Ricardo Lomboy was a passenger to a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Arnulfo Asuncion,
Ricardo’s brother-in-law. Carmela, the daughter of Ricardo, also a passenger to said car,
suffered injuries requiring hospitalization. But her father Ricardo Lomboy died.
Ricardo’s heirs filed an action for damages against Pleyto and PRBL. A witness and one of the
bus passengers, Rolly Orpilla, testified that Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle but hit it instead.
Pleyto then swerved in to the left opposite lane and smashed the Manila-bound car killing
Arnulfo and Ricardo Lomboy while the other passengers, Carmela and friend Rhino Daba
suffered injuries.
According to Pleyto, the tricycle suddenly stopped without warning to which Pleyto stepped on
the brakes and bus lost speed but swerved to the other lane to avoid hitting the tricycle.
Unfortunately, it collided with the Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs awarding P1,642,521.00 for lost earnings
of Ricardo Lomboy. It found that Pleyto is negligent and lacked precaution when he overtook
the tricycle disregarding completely the approaching car in the other lane. Pleyto should have
been more prudent in overtaking considering the slippery road. The court held that Pleyto
violated traffic rules and regulations and was negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code and
PRBL liable as owner of the bus and as employer of Pleyto under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for
its failure to observe the required diligence in its supervision of its employees and the safe
maintenance of its buses.
CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification in the award of damages reducing the
award for loss of earning capacity to P1,152,000.00 and took note of the amounts that were duly
supported by receipts only.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in pegging the monthly living expenses at 50% of gross earnings
considering that no substantial proof was presented to prove Lomboy’s gross income
HELD: No reversible error may be attributed to the court in fixing the loss of earning capacity at
the amount P1,152,000.00.
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the net earnings,
which is computed by deducting necessary expenses from the gross earnings, and not the gross
9
earnings, is to be utilized in the computation. The amount of net earnings was arrived at after
deducting the necessary expenses (pegged at 50% of gross income) from the gross annual
income. This computation is in accord with settled jurisprudence. (Villa Rey case)
The testimony of the wife, Maria Lomboy, that her husband was earning a monthly income of
P8,000.00 is sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity.
Jurisprudence provides that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings are:
the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and,
the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Factor No. 1
Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-age at death]) adopted from
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.
Factor No. 2
Multiply the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e, the total earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent of the gross
earnings.
Thus, in the given case, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at the time of death) x (gross annual income –
reasonable and necessary living expenses)]
= [2/3 x (80 – 44)] x [(P96,000 – 50%of P96,000)]
= [2/3 x (36)] x [(P96,000 – P48,000)]
= 24 x P48,000
= P1,152,000.00
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of
the defendant’s culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration of the spiritual proportionate
to the suffering inflicted.
Thus, moral damages of P500,000 is reduced to P100,000 in keeping with the purpose of the law
and jurisprudence in allowing moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 61300 is AFFIRMED,
with the sole MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy is
reduced from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
4. YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN
G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at
Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended
McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important people, accompanying him in
visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for the children and in
distributing the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to
transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were
employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the
keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin's booking at the
Tropicana where he started staying during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to
September 1987.
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented
a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered
at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by
Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened
through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other
remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When a registered guest wished to
open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then
would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety
deposit box with the two keys. Private respondent placed envelopes inside the safety deposit
box containing certain amounts of money. Before his trip to Hongkong he took two envelopes,
his passports and credit cards from the safety deposit box and left. Upon arriving in Hongkong,
he found that certain amounts of money were missing. He did not think much of it and returned
to Manila afterwards. Upon arriving in Manila and checking out of Tropicana, he left for Australia.
There he found that the envelope he kept inside the safety deposit box containing 10,000 USD
was missing 5,000 and the jewelry he bought from Hongkong, save for a diamond bracelet, was
also missing. Upon returning to Manila he checked in again at Tropicana and asked Lainez of
someone returned his missing jewelry and money, and surrendered the same with the
management. Lainez replied in the negative. McLoughlin again rented a safety deposit box
and stored several envelopes inside containing certain amounts of money of different
currencies.
On 16 April 1988, McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his safety deposit box. He
noticed that in the envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), Two
Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) were missing and in the envelope previously containing Ten
Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian Dollars
(AUS$4,500.00) were missing. He confronted Lainez and Payam and they later admitted that
they assisted Tan in opening his safety deposit box. Apparently, Tan stole the key from
McLoughlin while the latter was sleeping. Respondent asked management to conduct an
investigation. Upon confrontation, Tan admitted to the deed and wrote a promissory note to
answer for the stolen money. Despite the promissory note, McLoughlin insisted that the hotel must
assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the
conditions of the rental of safety deposit boxes. McLoughlin returned to Australia and consulted
his lawyers as to the validity of the conditions and was advised that the same was null and void
for being violative of universal hotel practice. Mcloughlin returned to Manila and asked the
Office of the President for assistance, he was referred to the DOJ and WPD which conducted
and later a case was filed. YHT was impleaded along with Lainez and Payam. However Tan and
Lopez were not because they were not served summons. RTC decided in favor of respondent
hence an appeal was filed with the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N YHT can be held liable for the negligence of its employees?
10
RULING: Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their
obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of
paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed
that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to
prove the negligence of such employer.35 Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin's
money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to
open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting employees and YHT
Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable
pursuant to Article 2193.
5. MARCELO MACALINAO vs EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG
FACTS:
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron
International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian.
On 25 April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy
piece of machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in
Angat, Bulacan. While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong,
Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of a private
jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the
morning.
Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a
consequence of the collision.nMacalinao incurred the most serious injuries among the
passengers of the truck. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid
treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to the Capitol Medical
Center by his parents, petitioners herein, for medical reasons and later to the Philippine General
Hospital for financial considerations. Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the
neck down as a result of the accident and per doctors’ advice, his foot was amputated. He also
suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the doctor’s
recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died on 7 November 1992.
Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and
Sebastian.
RTC Held that Ong and Sebastian are jointly and solidarily liable. On appeal the CA reversed the
decision
ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT SEBASTIAN AS AN EMPLOYER IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE WITH THE ACTION OF
ONG (EMPLOYEE)?
HELD: YES.
Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done . . . .
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
...
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
...
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[45] To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
6. MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO vs.SPOUSES HUANG
FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi
Truck. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen
Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. in C5, Taguig (from Alabang
going to Pasig City). The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the
truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the
island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the
car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of a Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His driver’s license had
been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.
The car, valued at ₱300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal
cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his
chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while driving,
and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
The trial court found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to ₱1,000,000.00. The appellate
court also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. WON Del Rosario was negligent.
2. WON Mercury Drug Corp. failed to exercise the diligence required in supervising its employees despite overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner company.
11
HELD:
1. YES. We affirm the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that petitioner Del Rosario was negligent.
Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He conducted
a study based on the following assumptions provided by respondents, among others:
1. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the other;
2. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per hour;
3. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier
vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the
other way around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to move as it is heavier. Thus, there is very little chance that the
car will move towards the left of the truck.
The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence as the direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done
under the circumstances.
2. YES. ARTICLES 2176 AND 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
The LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER under Art. 2180 IS DIRECT OR IMMEDIATE. It is NOT CONDITIONED ON A
PRIOR RECOURSE AGAINST THE NEGLIGENT EMPLOYEE, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is
ALSO JOINT AND SOLIDARY WITH THE EMPLOYEE.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family,
both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its
prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.12 With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance
with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, Del Rosario took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for the position of
Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. The recruitment officer also admitted that petitioner
Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests. No NBI and police
clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars – on June 30, 2001,
February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident which occurred in 1996
was held twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the
accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its
employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a
TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We
therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
c. STATE
7. MERITT V. GOVERNMENT OF P.I
G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916
FACTS:
1. The plaintiff (E. Merritt), while riding on a motorcycle, collided with the General Hospital
ambulance which resulted to Plaintiff E. Merrit’s severe injuries.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg
and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the
Uy Chaco building.
2. The plaintiff E. Merritt ruled that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur; CFI in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741.
3. Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages
which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in
limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and
fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding
that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be
true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
ISSUE: As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or
employee of the Government, whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom (NO)
HELD:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.
It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in
the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and
that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore,
12
no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the
state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as
an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
The Government of the Philippine Islands is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents,
and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special
agent.
Disposition: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without
costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the
amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent
acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and
not with the courts.
8. REPUBLIC VS PALACIOS
Facts:
In April 1960, a certain Ildefenso Ortiz sued the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which was under the
Department of Public Works because ISU, without the consent of Ortiz, encroached upon his
land by allegedly inducing the Handong Irrigation Assoc. to do so. The basis of the suit was that
ISU, though created by the government, is engaged in private business (selling of irrigation
pumps/construction materials in installment) and being such has opened itself to suit thereby
waiving immunity from suit. Judge Palacio of CFI Camarines Sur ruled in favor of Ortiz so did the
Court of Appeals. The CA also ordered the issuance of the order of garnishment against the
deposit/trust funds in ISU’s account in the PNB (such fund were generated from the installment
payments ISU received)
Issue: Whether or not such deposits may be garnished
Held: No. ISU’s activity of selling irrigation pumps is not intended to earn profit or financial gain. It
is actually just to replenish the funds used in purchasing said irrigation pumps (the original funds
were from FTA from US). The CA ruled that ISU, by selling irrigation pumps is engaged in private
business, hence it waived its immunity from suit and had also ordered the garnishment of ISU’s
deposits in PNB. But then again, as based in Merritt vs Insular Government, the waiver of said
immunity does not make the government liable. This would only lead to a disbursement of fund
without any proper appropriation as required by law. There is also no showing that the ISU’s
alleged inducement of Handong is authorized by the State hence the government cannot be
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
9. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA
FONTANILLA
Facts:
A pickup owned and operated by respondent NIA and driven by Hugo Garcia bumped a
tricycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioners, and Restituto Deligo at San Jose City
along Maharlika Highway, resulting to Francisco and Restituto having injuries and sent to San
Jose City Emergency for treatment. Francisco was later transferred to Cabanatuan Provincial
Hospital where he died. The parents of Francisco filed for damages. The trial court rendered
judgment against NIA to pay for damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners.
NIA filed an appeal to CA but the Petitioners, instead of filing the required brief, filed the petition
to SC.
Petitioners allege the following:
Award of moral damages allowable under Art. 2206 par. 3 of the New Civil Code and such be
awarded to each of the petitioner-successors individually which should not be less than Php
50,000.00 each;
NIA acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the
NIEA personnel including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to the victims, thus liable
for exemplary damages under Art. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.
They are entitled to attorney’s fees.
NIA, through the Solicitor General, contends the following:
The negligence of the driver, Hugo Garcia, must be determined first before the claims of
petitioner against NIA be entertained;
Petition is not proper;
The petition shall be dismissed since the party failed to agree on whether or not the negligence
caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact which should have been brought to
CA within the reglementary period;
Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the
shock and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son and NIA shall not
be held liable for damages because it is an agency of the State performing governmental
function and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent hence
the driver shall solely shoulder the liabilities.
The matter of due diligence of NIA in selection and supervision is not an issue since Garcia is not
a special agent but a regular driver of the vehicle.
Issue:
1. Whether or not NIA, as a government agency, may be held liable for damages caused
by its employees.
2. Whether or not NIA is a government agency exercising governmental functions.
Ruling:
1. YES. NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of
the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it
now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act
of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
13
 ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. Under Arts. 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code:
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated,
Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts
or conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be
specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's
usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer
and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private
individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the
meaning of the provision.
The assumption of liability is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of NIA; in
this case was its negligence on supervision. It should be emphasized that the accident
happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban
area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact,
there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by
the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the
fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown
by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial
reaction.
2. NO. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act
provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the
National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be
organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper
conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-
Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:
xxxxx
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be
necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain
period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other things and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or
less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from
tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private
corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of
their employment.
10. QUEZON CITY GOV’T vs. FULGENCIO DACARA SR.
G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
FACTS:
On the midnight of February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., a father and son were driving an 87
Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan at Matahimik St., Quezon City. The driver and passenger were
Fulgencio Dacara, Sr., Fulgencio Dacara Jr... While driving, their vehicle suddenly slammed into a
pile of street diggings situated exactly within the areas being repaired by Quezon City.
The son Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered considerable
damage for it over turned when it hit the street pile that was left open without any warning signs.
Consequently, the father Fulgencio Dacarra Sr filed his claims for damages against the LGU of
Quezon City. The later then denied liability stating that they were not negligent further insisting
that they placed precautionary signs at the construction site. A case was filed by Dacara Sr. for
the recovery of moral and exemplary damages sustained by his son from the accident and the
trial court decided in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether the LGU of Quezon City is liable to pay for the moral and exemplary damages
sought by Mr.Dacara Sr.
THE COURT’S RULING:
The court sustained the grant of Exemplary damages but the award for Moral
damages was rejected.
For Exemplary damages the court invoked Article 2231 of the Civil Code which states
that in quasi delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. Such gross negligence must amount to reckless disregard of safety of persons or
property and that the person at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences
of their carelessness.
14

Likewise, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. LGU’s and their agents are
expected to exercise utmost responsibility not only for the maintenance of roads and streets but
also for public safety.
Gross negligence is evident in this case because according to the court, the LGU of
Quezon City through its agents have failed to show even a hint of responsibility by simply leaving
an open street digging without any warnings signs more so it happened in a first class LGU like
Quezon City.
As for the recovery of Moral damages, the court ruled that one who claim must prove
these; 1. There is injury sustained by the claimant; 2. A culpable act or omission factually
established; 3. Proximate Cause of the injury sustained by the claimant and 4. The award must
fall in the cases in Art.2219.
In the case, the Fulgencio Jr testified that he sustained a deep cut wound on his left
arm however they did not presented any medical certificate or proof of medical expenses.
Further, the witnesses also did not mentioned anything like mental anguish, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation or social humiliation which were all indications of moral sufferings.
Emotional and mental sufferings must be proven to support claims for moral damages. Absence
of these actual proofs, the Dacaras was not sustained by the court in their claim for moral
damages.
11. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121920 August 9, 2005
FACTS:
MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service
Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of
MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San
Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipesand tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that
the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for
the water connections to the concessionaires. Between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the
evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991
at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards
thedirection of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-
awa. The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car
fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.Consequent to the foregoing
incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila acomplaint for
damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
officials.After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa
adjudging MWSS and theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA affirmed
RTC with modification.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable
HELD: Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
ownership of the roads,streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a
controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province,city or municipality has control or supervision
thereof.At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach thatthe defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. Whatsaid article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or roadWe must
emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government Code, the
phrases“regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer,
and other pipes”, and “adoptmeasures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes,
live wires and other similar hazards to life andproperty”, are not modified by the term “municipal
road”. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provisionof Section 149 that petitioner’s
power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in caseswhere such
activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the municipality’s liability for
injuriescaused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of
gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is
made on a national or municipal road, for as long asthe same is within its territorial
jurisdiction.Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge
of the excavation and thecondition of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May
30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It mustbe borne in mind that the obligation of the
petitioner to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is acontinuing one which is
not suspended while a street is being repaired
1. D. TEACHERS/HEAD OF ESTABLISHMENTS
12. CIRIACO MERCADO vs. CA, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14342, May 30, 1960
PARTIES:
Ciriaco L. Mercado – petitioner; father of Augusto Mercado
Manuel Quisimbing, Jr. – private respondent, classmate of Augusto Mercado
Ana Pineda, Manuel L. Quisimbing – private respondents; parents of Manuel Quisimbing, Jr.
FACTS:
Augusto lent his "pitogo", an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank, to Benedicto P.
Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto. Manuel, Jr. was likewise unaware of such fact. He thought it was the
"pitogo" of Benedicto, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato,
Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes
of the "pitogo". Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggressively pushed the latter.
After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless
position, Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
Counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent
occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner
herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter.
ISSUE: Whether the teacher or head of the school should be liable for damages resulting from
the tort of their pupil/student
15
HELD: NO. This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and
Capuno, but we held:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution.
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the
school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
It would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence
on the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over
the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher;
and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the
case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes
with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article
2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that
responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.
13. SPOUSES PALISOC VS ANTONIO BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548
FACTS:
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and
Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a
school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This
caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon
delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school
president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio
Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the Court of Appeals, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and
that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only
liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as
per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for
the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other
officials of the school – which Daffon was not.
ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the court in the Mercado Case still applies.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in
the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case.
Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly
and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight
between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their
duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises
to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At
any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance
with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of
the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
The Supreme Court reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student
must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the
school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.
14. FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO vs. EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
FACTS:
1963, Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational
institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time,
the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop
that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one
as early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal
on October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton
concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left
unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of the
original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty
centimeters deep. At this point, Edgardo Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils
remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Edgardo and his four
pupils got out of the hole. Then, Edgardo left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted
to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving. , Edgardo allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
The three of the four pupils playfully jumped in the pit. The 4th pupil jumped on a concrete block
but the block slid in the opening, the two pupils were able to escape but Ylarde was caught and
got pinned on the wall. Ylarde sustained some injuries and after 3 days he died.
The parents filed for damages against Edgardo and Mariano. The lower court dismissed the case
on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called
Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and
(3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. The CA affirmed the
decision.
The parents based their action on Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
16

Issue: W/ON the cited provisions, both private respondents can be held liable for damages?
Held: No and Yes.
No. As regards the principal (Mariano), We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the
death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts
and trades (Art. 2180). We rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held
liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts
and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
Yes. Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure
to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However, as earlier
pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176
which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on the
part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal
relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for
damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted
with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-
ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to
remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying
nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the
perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able
to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously
attractive nuisance.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work
Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge concrete
block 7 would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and
not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise
when private respondent Aquino himself admitted that there were no instructions from the
principal requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was
included in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Even the Court of Appeals made mention of
the fact that respondent Aquino decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury the
concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore, the excavation should not be placed
in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not
expose the children to any risk that could result in death or physical injuries.
15. BENJAMIN SALVOSA AND BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (G.R. No. 70458, 05 October 1988)
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is both an academic institution and an institution of arts and
trade. Within its premises is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). Said ROTC Unit has an office and an armory located at the basement of BCF’s main
building.
Jimmy B. Abon (Abon), a commerce student of the BCF, is the duly appointed armorer of the
BCF ROTC Unit. Not being an employee of BCF, Abon received his appointment from the AFP.
Accordingly, he received his salary from the AFP as well as orders from Captain Roberto C.
Ungos (Ungos), the Commandant of the BCF ROTC Unit.
On 03 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro
(Castro), a student of the University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm which Abon took from
the armory of the BCF ROTC Unit. As a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30 of AFP.
The heirs of Castro sued for damages, impleading Abon, Ungos, Benjamin Salvosa (President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF), and the BCF as party defendants.
The trial court thereafter rendered a decision sentencing Abon, Salvosa, and BCF jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Castro, and absolving the other defendants. The Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Held: No. Salvosa and BCF cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180, par. 7 of the Civil Code provides that, “…teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” This means that so long as the
student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.
The “custody” referred to means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils for as long as they are at attendance in school,
including recess time.
In the case of Palisoc vs. Brillantes, it was held that a student not “at attendance in the school”
cannot be in “recess” thereat. A “recess” contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within the call of his mentor and is not permitted
to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. The mere
fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute
“attending school” or being in the “protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
The record showed that when Abon shot Castro, he was supposed to be working in the armory
with definite instructions from Ungos, his superior, to not leave the office and to keep the armory
well-guarded. This negated the allegation that Abon was “at attendance in the school” or in the
custody of BCF when he shot Castro. Hence, the Supreme Court held that Salvosa and BCF
cannot he held solidarily liable with Abon under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
16. AMADORA VS. CA
17

FACTS:
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. Daffon was convicted
of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's
parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped.
His parents contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for
the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because
the semester had already ended.
RTC- Liable
CA- Absolved. Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a
school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students
were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
ISSUE:
1. WON the respondents are liable based on Art 2108.
2. WON Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
HELD:
1. NO. In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle o frespondeat superior, but
then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180.
a. NO, there was no teacher in charge. Evidence does not support who teacher in
charge was aside from the fact that he just submitted his Physics report.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined.
Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to
report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody
of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it
has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the
student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence
on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the
gun that killed the petitioners' son.
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by
any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged
with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
2. It applies to academic and non-academic.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the
nature of the school where he is teaching. The Court cannot see why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by
the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that
he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
liable if the school were non-academic. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its
present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and
original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject
to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally
ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the
custody of the school
18

1. e. SCHOOLS
17. REYNALDO PASCO V. CFI BULACAN
FACTS: On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions, while
walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was
accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were
also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life.
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim
Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant
based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.
Respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
a. Article 2180 under which it was sued applies only to vocational schools and not to academic institutions;
b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the RPC. Hence, the civil
liability in this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant university has not committed;
c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring
an action for damages against defendant University.
On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider
the Order of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient justification to disturb
its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari under R.A No. 5440, praying that judgment be rendered setting aside
the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against respondent school and the order of July 17,
1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal, with costs against respondent school.
ISSUE: Whether or not ART. 2180 is applicable to academic institutions (the school or the university itself, as
distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable.
HELD: NO. The provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads," and not the academic institution itself.
18. ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
G.R. NO. 143363 FEBRUARY 6, 2002
FACTS:
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where the prospective
enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos, part of the campaigning group, together with
James Daniel II (15 years old, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (in possession and was
driving the jeep, grandson of Vivencio Villanueva-owner of the jeep) and other companions
were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when James Daniel II allegedly
drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle that caused the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached.
Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II, his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.
The Trial Court absolved Vivencio Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and school liable.
The Court of Appeals, held the school liable under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code,
finding that the school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher
accompanying them.
ISSUE: WON St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos and
liable for damages.
HELD:
No. The negligence of St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident, between
the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. For the school to be liable, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong
done, the connection between the negligence and the injury must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient cause.
The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim. The cause of the accident was not recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance
on Article 219 is unfounded. There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep, it was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep,
and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents
primarily. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
19. CHILD LEARNING CENTER vs TAGARIO
Facts:
Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and
maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1
and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building
to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for
help. When no help arrived, he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of
opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was
hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by Timothy’s parents against the CLC. In
its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of
the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further
maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to
ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
19
Trial court ruled in favor of the parents. Court of Appeals affirmed ruling.
Issue: Whether or not CLC can be held liable
Held: Yes, CLC is liable.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
CLC failed to fix a defective doorknob despite having notice it was faulty, and also failed to
install security grills on the window where Timothy fell. An architect witness also testified that he
was not sure if the doorknobs that were installed in the building were in accordance with his
specifications.
Even if there was no direct evidence that the door knob was defective during the day in
question, the fact that Timothy fell from the window proves a defective doorknob, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
CLC argued that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is only
applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
maintained.
20. JOSEPH SALUDAGA, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as
President of FEU
G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU)
was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school
premises.
Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU and Edilberto C. De Jesus (De Jesus), in his
capacity as President of the University, on the ground of breach of obligation to provide students
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Rosete was
released since no formal complaint was filed against him.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Saludaga. FEU and De Jesus appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s decision. Saludaga filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was later denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45.
ISSUE:
1. What is the source of FEU’s liability to Saludaga?
2. Whether De Jesus is liable?
3. Whether FEU is vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
1. The source of FEU’s liability is the contract between students and learning institutions.
In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. x x
x...
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. x x x . . . Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in FEU. As such, a contractual obligation
was created between the two parties. On Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the
rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated
to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain
peace and order within the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Here, Saludaga was
shot inside the campus by Rosete who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises,
hence, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
FEU claimed that the incident was a fortuitous event because such could not have been
reasonably foreseen nor avoided since Rosete was not their employee; and that they complied
with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having exercised
due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy. The Court ruled that FEU failed to show
that it undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. A learning
institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its
premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Article 1170 of the New Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of
their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence
in providing a safe learning environment, FEU is liable to Saludaga for damages.
2. No, De Jesus is not liable.
In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x . . . Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not
necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who,
20
having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written
objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the
corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his
corporate action.
Here, none of the foregoing exceptions was established; hence, De Jesus should not be held
solidarily liable with FEU.
3. No, FEU is not vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that respondents cannot be held liable for damages
under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code because FEU is not the employer of Rosete. The latter
was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by FEU's Security Consultant to Galaxy and its
security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the
element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.
21. ST. FRANCIS HIGHSCHOOL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 82465 February 25, 1991
FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of St. Francis High School wanted to join a
school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Because of short notice, his Parents,
respondents spouses Castillo did not allow him to join the picnic. However, he was only allowed
to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home
after doing so. But because of the persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to
the beach.
During the picnic, one female teacher was drowning wherein some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue. But in the process, it was Ferdinand who drowned and
eventually died. Respondent spouses Castillo then filed a Civil Case in the RTC of Lucena City
against St. Francis Highschool represented by the Principal and Teachers for damages due to
failure of Petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of the good father of the family in
preventing their son’s drowning. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and expenses for litigation. The trial court found in favor of the
respondent spouses Castillo and against the teachers but dismissed the case against St. Francis
High School.
Both Petitioners and Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court ruled
that, under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be
found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule that the negligence of the employees in
causing the injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner
and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its
principal); and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and
convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the
injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is liable on the death of respondent spouses’ son.
HELD:
The court ruled in the NEGATIVE.
The Court stated that, If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own
negligence or the negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be
shown hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the
negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot
be held liable for damages of any kind. At the outset, it should be noted that respondent
spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son. Article 2180, par. 4 states
that: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. .xxx… Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence
of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred
while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the
findings of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and
danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even
if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required
diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at
bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the
claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of
Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the
petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their
counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
22. PHIL. SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (PSBA) vs CA
G.R. No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992
School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be
committed by its students against another student, not by an outsider
General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no pre-existing contract between the parties.
21
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the
second-floor premises of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic
community but were elements from outside the school. The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action
against the school authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The
appellate court found in their favor, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180
(in loco parentis)
2. Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-
existing contract
HELD:
The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case
for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the
school could have been made liable.
IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?
It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. The school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA
and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person
is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted
the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art.
21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done
in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-
delict.
In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had
been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.
23. SOLIMAN VS. TUAZON
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
FACTS:
Maximo Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against the Republic Central colleges
alleging the R.L. Security Agency, Inc. And Jimmy Solomon, a Security Guard, as defendant. He
alleged that while he was in the campus of RCC, as a student, Jimmy Solomon, duly appointed
Security Guard under R.L. Security Agency, Inc. headed by Benjamin Serrano, without any
provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, malevolent manner, with intent to kill,
attack, assault, strike and shoot Maximo Soliman on his abdomen with a .38 calibre Revolver.
Soliman was treated and may not be able to attend regular class and be incapacitated in usual
work for 3-4 months. RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint has no cause
of action against it. The trial Judge granted the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic Central Colleges is vicariously liable for damages.
RULING:
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to
it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards
cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or
property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give
instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being no
employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student
cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against
it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at
bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly
tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal,
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could
have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent
trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest
of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
f. OWNER OF VEHICLE
g. PROPRIETOR OF BUILDING OR STRUCTURE
h. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
F. DEFENSES; TOTAL and PARTIAL
i. PLAINTIFF’s OWN NEGLIGENCE
a. EXCEPTIONS:
i. THEORY OF IMPLIED INVITATION
ii. DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
ii. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
22
1. FIDEL CABARDO vs CA and JUANITO C. RODIL case is the simple negligence of driver Jose C. Peralta for failure to install an early warning
device. The judgment rendered in the Santa Cruz case would not be res judicata in the instant
case.
Jose Peralta was a driver of the Consolidated Industrial Gases Incorporated (CIGI). On October 26,
1987, while driving the company's truck-tanker on the southbound lane of the South Luzon Expressway,
he met an accident. Peralta claimed that a Volkswagen car suddenly took the inner lane occupied by his WHEREFORE, motion to dismiss (affirmative defenses pleaded) is hereby denied for lack of
truck, as a result of which he was forced to swerve to the left. This caused the truck-tanker to veer and roll merit.
over the center island of the expressway until it fell on its right side, lying perpendicular to the expressway
with its undesirable facing the north. With him at the time of the accident was petitioner Fidel Cabardo
On January 3, 1991, after hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment against private
who was his helper and pump operator.
respondent Juanito Rodil. It found private respondent guilty of recklessness in driving his car which, it
held, was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by petitioner Fidel Cabardo. 19
Moments later, private respondent Juanito Rodil came along in a Toyota Corolla car, also southbound,
on the inner lane of the highway. There was a heavy rain which affected visibility along the highway. Rodil
Private respondent Rodil filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied in an order of the
claimed that upon seeing the disabled vehicle on the center island, he immediately stepped on his brakes,
court dated March 15, 1991. 21
causing his car to swerve to the left and slide sideways towards the truck-tanker, stopping only after it had
crashed into the underside of the truck-tanker. With private respondent was his wife Leveminda.
Private respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its now questioned decision
reversing the RTC's decision on August 9, 1994. The Court of Appeals held that the testimonies of
Private respondent and his wife were injured. The truck-tanker driver, Jose Peralta, was unhurt but his
petitioner Cabardo and Peralta could not be believed because of inconsistencies. 22
helper, petitioner Cabardo, suffered a fractured left leg. He and the Rodil spouses were taken to the
hospital by passing motorists.
Petitioner Cabardo filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution dated December 8, 1994. 23 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Fidel Cabardo and the truck driver Jose Peralta gave their respective statements, on the basis
of which a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed by
the Biñan INP police against private respondent Juanito Rodil. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred: 24

The Rodils filed a complaint for damages against CIGI and truck driver Jose Peralta. I. IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONER AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
On the other hand, petitioner Cabardo filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Juanito
Rodil. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he and Peralta "were able to get out of the vehicle unhurt" II. IN STATING THAT THERE WERE APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN THE STATEMENT
after the "truck tanker fell on its right side in the middle portion of the center island of the [South Luzon] OF PETITIONER AND PERALTA.
Expressway"; 12 that, as he was about to put up the early warning device, however, private respondent,
driving a Toyota Corolla in a "reckless and negligent manner
III. IN STATING THAT NEITHER THE PETITIONER NOR PERALTA WAS CATEGORICAL IN
. . . , bumped the truck-tanker and hit [him] on his left leg, causing him to be thrown off balance and lose
THEIR TESTIMONIES REGARDING THE INCIDENT.
consciousness" and that as a result, he "suffered a fractured left leg and other injuries." 13

IV. IN STATING THAT PETITIONER SUFFERED INJURIES WHEN THE TRUCK-TANKER

In his answer, private respondent denied having caused petitioner's injury. He alleged that the same was
SWERVED TO THE CENTER ISLAND OF THE EXPRESSWAY.
sustained when the truck-tanker, driven by Jose Peralta, fell on its side.

Private respondents, on the other hand, argue 25 that —

RTC of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment finding CIGI and Peralta guilty of negligence, even as it
held private respondent Juanito Rodil guilty of contributory negligence.
I. The petition suffers from numerous procedural deficiencies
Meanwhile, the Malolos court considered private respondent's motion as a motion to dismiss and denied it
on the ground that 18 II. The petition raises only questions of fact not cognizable by this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 and neither does this case constitute an exception.
In the defense of litis pendencia, it is necessary that there be another action pending involving
the same parties, subject matter and cause of action (Santa Ana vs. Narvades, 30 SCRA 454). We find the petition to be meritorious. To begin with, both the Santa Cruz court and the court below found
private respondent Juanito Rodil guilty of negligence in running his Toyota Corolla at a high speed in
driving rain with the result that he did not see the disabled truck-tanker until it was late and thus failed to
The plaintiff in the case at bar is not a party in the Santa Cruz, Laguna case. The cause of
stop his car on time. The Santa Cruz court found:
action in the instant case is the reckless imprudence of defendant Juanito C. Rodil which
caused the injuries sustained by Fidel C. Cabardo while the cause of action in the Santa Cruz

23
 . . . . Letter of Instructions No. 229, which requires the installation of an early warning devi[c]e
infront [sic] and rear of a stalled vehicle, is precisely intended to prevent fatal or serious accidents.
Here, there was that omission. While the defendant driver, attempted to show, that he gave
instructions to his helper to install the early warning devi[c]e. there is absolutely no corroboration on
this alleged fact. As a matter of fact, not one of the several defense witnesses testified as to the
existence of that early warning device. If it existed, than it would have been presented as a piece of
evidence. Consequently, it is here clear, that the defendant driver, was negligent when he failed to
cause the installation of the early warning device, the same of which could have warned the
plaintiffs of the stalled truck tanker on the middle of expressway island, which ordinarily should not
be staying there. In fact, there is even now a doubt as to whether or not said truck had any early
warning device.
xxx xxx xxx
Be all that as it may, however, the plaintiff driver [herein private respondent Juanito Rodil], in this
case, does not appear without a fault. He testified that it was raining heavily and that while driving
for home, he noticed the truck tanker from about 5 to 10 meters, more or less, from his car. When
he applied his brakes, his car skidded to the left and slipped to the right and smashed into the truck
tanker. From the way his car reacted to his application of its brakes, the plaintiff driver [Rodil], was
driving at a fast pace, because it skidded for a very long space, that of about 5 to 10 meters, and
the impact it caused on the truck tanker, was strong. Clearly, therefore, the plaintiff driver, was
driving fast, while it was raining heavily. 26
If the court allowed recovery to private respondent, it was only because the defendants in that case (CIGI
and Peralta) were negligent in failing to install an EWD.
27
On the other hand, the Malolos court likewise found private respondent negligent:
The defendant was reckless in driving his car. This conclusion is based on defendant's own
admission, he was travelling on the left lane of the expressway at the rate of 60 to 70 kilometers
per hour despite the heavy rain and he could hardly see an object at the distance of ten (10)
meters. The heavy rain fell between San Pedro and Biñan, Laguna, according to the defendant
which is a few kilometers away from the scene of the accident. A careful and prudent driver
would slow down, put his head lights on and transfer to the lane for slow moving vehicles. This
precaution the defendant failed to take. Instead he recklessly and imprudently continued to
drive on the left lane without regard to the surrounding circumstances at that time.
Not a portion of the truck-tanker was protruding the asphalted portion of the expressway,
according to the police investigator. The police investigator testified that when he arrived at the
scene of the accident he saw the truck-tanker and the car in contact inside the center island.
The defendant is liable for the injury sustained by the plaintiff even assuming that a portion of
the truck-tanker was protruding the pavement of the expressway. The accident could have been
prevented had defendant exercised reasonable care in driving his car. He was driving
unreasonably fast even if he could hardly see an object at a distance of ten meters. The truck-
tanker was already stationary inside the center island of the expressway. Had defendant
exercised reasonable care and prudence the accident would have been avoided and the
plaintiff would not have been injured as a consequence. The law provides that whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. . . . (Art. 2176, Civil Code).
Indeed, there is no question that private respondent drove his car negligently. The question in this case is
whether petitioner's injuries were caused by private respondent's car or whether he was injured as a
result of the fact that the truck-tanker in which he was riding turned turtle and fell on its side.
After reviewing the evidence in this case, we are inclined to agree with the trial court's finding that
petitioner's injuries were caused by private respondent's car. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision on the ground that petitioner, as plaintiff below, failed to prove that he sustained injuries
as a result of having been hit by private respondent's car and not as a result of the truck-tanker having
veered and rolled over its side. The appellate court's decision is based mainly on alleged inconsistencies
in the testimonies of petitioner and his witness Jose Peralta. The Court of Appeals stated: 28
On direct examination, appellee testified that after the truck landed on its side, Peralta and he
(Cabardo) got out of the truck. He found that the truck did not sustain any damage. He was then
told by Peralta to put up the early warning device (EWD) behind the truck. He was then hit on
the left leg by the rear tire of the car after which he lost consciousness. (TSN, May 7, 1990, pp.
8-9).
On cross-examination, appellee stated that after coming out of the truck he was asked by
Peralta who stood nearby to inspect the truck. In the course of his inspection at the truck, he
depressurized its valve and it was while he was looking for the pressure gauge when the car
bumped him. (Ibid. pp. 23-24).
When confronted with a portion of his answer to question No. 7 in his statement. Exhibit A,
which reads, thus:
. . . Tumaob ang sasakyan namin sa mismong sakop ng center island ng
expressway. Ako naman ay matiwasay na nakalabas mula sa loob ng tumaob
naming sasakyan at hindi ako nagkaroon ng anumang pinsala sa katawan. Kinuha ko
ang early warning device na dala-dala ng trak para ilagay sa bandang likuran ng
aming tumaob na trak sa pinanggalingan ng mga sasakyan. Hindi pa ako gaanong
nakakalayo sa aming trak ay bigla na lamang na may kotseng bumundol sa aking
kaliwang paa ako ay tumilapon at nawalan ng ulirat. . . .
and asked which version was correct: his statement on cross-examination that after getting out
of the truck, he looked around the truck and at the gauge at which time he was hit by the car, or
his written statement that after coming out of the truck, he got the EWD and he was on his way
to putting it up when he was hit by the car, appellee initially answered that he was confused
(Ibid., p. 25), then later explained that at the time, he was also carrying the EWD but he did not
follow Peralta's instructions to set it up (Ibid., p. 27). Farther down his testimony on cross-
examination, appellee changed his statement again by saying that at the time when he was
looking at the gauge and he was hit by the car, he was not holding anything, not even the EWD,
because he did not follow Peralta's instructions right away (TSN, May 14, 1990, p. 4).
Peralta, on the other hand, testified that after he and appellee got out of the truck, it was he
(Peralta), who checked the pressure on the gauge and that the he also instructed appellee to put up
the EWD, but he was not sure if appellee followed his instruction, although appellee was able to get
the EWD (TSN, May 21, 1990, pp. 4, 16). Concerning the exact moment when appellee was hit by
the car, Peralta's testimony is far from being clear-cut and straightforward. In one breath, he stated
that he saw appellee hit by the car (supra). In another, he said he did not see appellee bumped by
the car but that he saw appellant fall down (Ibid., pp. 18, 19 and 20).
24
 Peralta's answer to question No. 5 in his written statement, Exhibit C, taken by the police reads,
thus:
. . . Kapwa kami hindi nasugatan ng aking kasamang si Fidel Cabardo at kami ay lumabas
mula sa trak at inutusan ko si Fidel na kunin iyong aming dala-dalang early warning device
para ilagay sa lugar na di-kalayuan sa aming sasakyan na pinagmulan ng mga sasakyang
dumadaan. Ng bitbit na ni Fidel iyong early warning device ay nakita ko na lamang (sic) na
mayroong isang kotse na nag-slide doon sa tinatakbuhan niyang lane ng expressway at
tinumbok nitong kotse si Fidel. Nabunggo si Fidel nung kotse at si Fidel ay tumilapon at
tinamaan din ng kotse iyong aming bumaligtad na trak. . . .
In view of the apparent inconsistencies in the statements of appellee and Peralta which cannot be
considered as insignificant, their version of the incident can not inspire credence and should not
have been given much weight by the court a quo. Where the narration's concern essential facts and
the very event sought to be established, such inconsistencies cannot inspire belief in the integrity of
the witnesses' testimonies.
There are indeed inconsistencies but these are minor and inconsequential. What is important is that the
statements dovetail in essential details with the testimonies given in court: Petitioner claimed that he was
unhurt after their vehicle turned turtle and fell on its side; that he and Jose Peralta, who was driving the
vehicle, got out of the truck-tanker; that he was asked by Peralta to put up the EWD; and that petitioner
was hurt because he was hit by private respondent's car. Petitioner said in court that he was hit while
checking the pressure gauge. It is possible that this happened before he could put up the EWD.
The statement (Exh. A) that he was hit while in the act of putting the EWD could be a mistake of the police
investigator who took down petitioner's statement. We have noted in a number of cases inaccuracies and
their causes, but as long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, we have not allowed the
resulting inconsistencies to affect our judgment of the credibility of witnesses. Indeed, as we have also
said, "a witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection down to insignificant
and minute details." 29 Nor is the contradiction between petitioner's statement (Exh. A) that he was holding
the EWD when hit by the car and Peralta's testimony in court that he (Peralta) was not sure whether
petitioner followed his (Peralta's) instruction to put the EWD fatal to his credibility. What is important is that
Peralta said he had instructed petitioner to put the EWD and that petitioner was hurt because he was hit
by private respondent's speeding car.
It is noteworthy that at the scene of the accident, Peralta told police investigators of the Biñan Police
Station that petitioner had been hit by a car which crashed against their truck-tanker. That was shortly
after the accident and before he had time to invent a story. His statement to the police is reflected in the
entry made in the police blotter on the day of the accident, which reads: 30
On this date and time indicated above Pfc Jenario Zavalla and Pat Antonio Enriquez of this station
reported a vehicular accident that occurred on or about 12:20 P.M., this dated at the Luzon South
Expressway, Brgy. San Francisco, this locality wherein a Cargo Truck with Plate No. NBG-925 T Pil
'86 owned by CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL GASES INCORPORATED with office address at Brgy.
Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna and driven by one: JOSE PERALTA y CARUNGAN, 37 yrs old,
resident of same address, holder of Prof-DLR-8972935 was accidentally swerved to the left to avoid
hitting the volkswagen running ahead while travelling towards South direction, simultaneously lost
control of its wheel and turned side-down which plunged at the center island of the highway.
Indeed, it is more probable that petitioner's injuries were caused by private respondent's car hitting him.
First, as the Court of Appeals itself found, petitioner was taken to a hospital in Biñan, Laguna together
with the Rodils. Had he been injured earlier when the truck-tanker turned turtle, he would, in all
probability, have been taken for treatment much earlier.
31
Second, as the trial court observed:
The Plaintiff, as passenger of the truck-tanker was seated at the right side of the driver. The driver did
not sustain any injury. On the other hand, the plaintiff sustained and was treated of the following
injuries.
If the plaintiff sustained his injuries when the truck-tanker he was riding turned turtle and landed on its
right side in the center island of the expressway, it would not have been on his left knee but in some
parts of the body, more especially on the right side that must have came in contact with the door. This
is the law of gravity, and testimony to the contrary should not be given credence. The plaintiff was
categorical in his testimony that after the car fell on its right side the driver and he came out of the
truck and he was already looking at the gauge [sic] carrying the EWD when the car hit him. The
defendant, in contrast, did not state categorically that his car did not hit the plaintiff. What defendant
testified was that he did not see a person hit by the car. Moreover, defendant admitted that
immediately before the accident he was driving on the left lane at the rate of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour and he could hardly see an object at a distance of ten (10) meters because of the heavy rain.
Private respondent argues that the petition in this case should be dismissed on procedural grounds. It is
not true that the petition does not contain an assignment of errors. There is an assignment of
errors, 32 and it is quoted in this opinion.
It is further contended that the motion for extension to file petition was made on behalf of the Consolidated
Industrial Gases Inc. This is obviously a mere typographical error made in the title of the motion. A
reading of the allegations of the motion for extension shows plainly that it was actually filed on behalf of
Petitioner Cabardo. 33 Anyway the defect should have been pointed out earlier, instead of only now.
Lastly, petitioner's failure to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the
Court of any petition which might be filed, as required under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be
overlooked since it does not appear that any petition related to this case has ever been filed in any other
court. On the other hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to uphold technicality over
substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and that of the Regional Trial
Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
2. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his
wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The
tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. The
ship sailed on the said date. However, in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off
the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
25
(PNOC/STC). Tthe M/V Don Juan sank and several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy,
some of whose bodies were never found including the respondents’ families.
Ramon Miranda and Spouses Ricardo and Virginia De La Victoria filed a complaint with the RTC
against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la
Victoria Miranda, Rosario V. Miranda, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., and Elfreda de la Victoria. Negros
Navigation admitted that Miranda purchased tickets, the victims were listed in the passenger
manifest but denied that the four relatives actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that
their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy
and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault
of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
PNOC and Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby
petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of
or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability
to it.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. When raised to the Court
Appeals, the decision was affirmed with modification on the amount of damages. Thus, the
petition with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals,[2] finding the crew members of petitioner
to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case
2. Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioners liability
RULING:
1. Yes, the ruling is binding in the case.
Following the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, the Court adhered to the Mecenas
v. Intermediate Appellate Court case, where it was found that although the proximate cause of
the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don
Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latters master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was
playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De
Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing
them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take
steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the
abandoning of the ship. Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating
the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship
and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to 15
minutes of its impact. M/V Don Juan, as the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have
avoided a collision with the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if the Tacloban City had
been at fault for failing to observe an internationally-recognized rule of navigation, the Don
Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. The Don Juan was more than twice as fast as the
Tacloban City, it carried the full complement of officers and crew members specified for a
passenger vessel of her class and it was equipped with radar which was functioning that
night. Furthermore, the Don Juans officer on-watch had sighted the Tacloban City on his radar
screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Had it taken seriously its duty of
extraordinary diligence, the collision could have easily been avoided. Don Juan having sighted
the Tacloban City when it was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive
action and in allowing the two (2) vessels to come to such close quarters as to render the
collision inevitable. In addition, the trial court did not merely base its decision on the
Mecenas case and made its own independent findings on the basis of the testimonies of
witnesses. The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the then Minister of National Defense
finding both vessels to be negligent.
3. No, the total loss of the M/V Don Juan did not extinguish the petitioner’s liability.
In well-settled jurisprudence, it provides that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to
passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault
can be attributed to the shipowner. In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence
in allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the
voyage; in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy; and in allowing the ship to carry more
passengers than it was allowed to carry. The petitioner was clearly liable for damages to the full
extent.
EXCEPTIONS: CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
iii. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
3. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES A.K.A AMAY BISAYA
G.R. No. 154259, Feb. 28, 2005
Facts:
Year 1994, Mr. Roberto Reyes, more popularly known as AMAY BISAYA, was having a coffee at
the lobby of Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, where he spotted his friend Dr. Violeta Filart, who was
going to attend a birthday party at the same place. According to Reyes it was Filart who
approached him and invited him to the birthday party of a certain Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka at
the penthouse of the same hotel. When Reyes was lined-up to the buffet table herein petitioner
Ms. Ruby Lim, the executive secretary of the said hotel, approached him and told him to leave
the party as he was not invited. Not long after the said conversation between Reyes and Lim, a
Makati Policeman approached Reyes and escorted him out of the Hotel. Being put to shame
and embarrassment Mr. Roberto Reyes, now claims for damages.
After trial, the lower court dismissed the case and held that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being
thrown out for attending a party for which he was never invited. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court, contending that Mr. Reyes was put in a very
embarrassing situation, that telling him to not finish his food and leave within the hearing distant
of other guests is act which is contrary to morals, good customs for which Mr. Reyes should be
compensated for the damage that he has suffered as a consequence thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out the party
Held: Yes. According to the Supreme Court, as far as Ms. Lim and Nikko Hotel are concerned,
any damages which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate
right done within the bound of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court said when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is
to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's right but also in
the performance of one's duties. When article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
26
under articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
a law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave.
4. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB V. RICARDO ELIZAGAQUE
G.R. No. 16273 January 18, 2008’
Facts:
Ricardo Elizagaque, Senior Vice-President of Operations of San Miguel Corp. (SMC), was
designated as a special non-proprietary member by SMC, a special company member, of the
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Cebu Country). The designation was then approved by the board.
After this, Elizagaque filed an application for proprietary membership, it was indorsed by Cebu
Country's two proprietary members one of which is Edmundo Misa. The price for a propriatary
share for was around the Php 5 million range, but the president of Cebu Country offered
Elizagaque a share amounting to Php 3.5 million. However, Elizagaque was able to purchase a
share amounting to Php 3 million for a member. Therafter, Elizagaque's application for
proprietary membership was deferred, and in the following meeting it was outright denied.
Elizagaque received a letter informing of his application being denied. Misa, then wrote a letter
of reconsideration to the board of Cebu Country, for the reconsidaration of Elizagaque's
application and nother letter, this time inquiring for the members of the board who voted
against the application. Both letters received no reply. Elizagaque then goes to the RTC with a
complaint of damages against Cebu Country, which ruled in his favor. Cebu Country then filed
appealed to the CA then a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Issue:
(1) WON Cebu Country is liable for damages;
(2) WON damages is joint and severally.
Held:
(1) The Supreme Court found that Cebu Country is liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the same Code. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications.
This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy.
It bears stressing that the amendment of Cebu Country’s Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form. Cebu Country explained that the amendment was not printed on the
application form due to economic reasons. Which the SC founnd as a flimsy and unconvincing
excuse. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced almost twenty
(20) years ago.
It is thus clear that Elizagaque was left in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was
required. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary
member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the
very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. It bears
reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that disapproval of the application
is characterized by bad faith.
As to Cebu Country’s reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria, suffice it to state that
the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does not apply when
there is an abuse of a person’s right.
(2) Lastly, in the argument that Cebu Country could not be held jointly and severally liable for
damages because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondent’s application lacks
merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly
and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
members and other persons.
iv. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
5. PICART vs SMITH (No. 12219. March 15, 1918)
Facts:
Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge at San Fernando, La Union. Before he had
gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going
at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared the bridge, he saw a horseman
(Picart) on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback was not
observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, he became anxious
due to the unusual apparition or rapidity of the automibile’s approach so he pulled the pony to
the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.
Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side, so he guided his automobile
toward his left, which is his proper lane. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, instead of
veering to the right, Smith continued to approach directly toward the horse without slowing
down. When he had gotten quite near, giving the horse no chance to get to the other side,
Smith quickly turned his car to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned
its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse was hit by the car and its
limb was broken. Hence, it fell and its rider was forcefully thrown off. As a result, the horse died
and Picart suffered contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
Picart sought to recover damages. The Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
absolved Smith from liability. Hence, Picart appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the Smith was guilty of negligence.
27
Held: Yes.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In
the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to
escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had
then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature
of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.
When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the f facts
involved in the particular case… They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence
is clearly established.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen
harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and f ails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
6. LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LADECO) VS. MICHAEL
RAYMOND ANGALA
G.R. No. 153076, June 21, 2007
Parties:
Apolonio Deocampo – employee of LADECO and assigned as driver and bodyguard of Manuel
Mendez.
LADECO – Employer of Apolonio Deocampo and owner of the crewcab.
Henry Beneguel – LADECO’s Administrative Officer.
Michael Raymond Angala – Owner of Chevy pick-up which was bumped by the crewcab driver
by Apolonio
Bernulfo Borres – Driver of the chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala
FACTS:
On May 1993, a chevy pick-up owned by Raymond Angala was bumped by a Datsun crewcab
driver by Apolonio Deocampo. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao,
Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.
Michael Angala sent a demand letter to LADECO for the payment of the damages he incurred
but he did not receive any reply. Michael Angala the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and
Deocampo.
Michael Raymond Angala filed a quasi-delict, damages, and attorney’s fees against LADECO,
Berenguel, and Deocampo. He alleged that his pick-up was slowing down and was making a
left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab.
Apolonio Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were both
running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along the outer lane. The pick-up was about
10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. Apolonio testified that he tried to avoid
the pick-up but was unable to avoid the collision. He further stated that he did not apply the
brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable. Apolonio admitted that he stepped on
the brakes only after the collision. |
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sec 45 of RA 4136 and Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code apply to this case; and
2. Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that both negligent in this case. Bernulfo Borres was at the outer
lane when he executed the u-turn, he should have stayed at the inner lane which is the
nearest to the center of the highway. However, Apolonio was equally negligent because he
should have slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. The pick-up and the crewcab
were the only vehicles on the road, Apolonio could have avoided the crewcab if he was not
driving very fast before the collision.
2. Yes. Since both parties are at fault, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
28
 avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. n this case, Deocampo had the
last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Apolonio was driving the rear vehicle, he had
full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
Apolonio had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is
done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. He could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while
following the pick-up and he was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step
on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the
collision.
7. PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban
FACTS
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at
25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the
spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from
the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the
lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her
cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who
should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from
the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified
of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint, saying
that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.
HELD: NO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not
imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen
because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had
to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had
not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle,
he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have
made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft
high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it
many previous times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and there by
precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By
exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on
the part of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost
everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence,
the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore,
Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case,
there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was
presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a
portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of
a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even
been explain
8. ACHEVERA VS. RAMOS (G.R. No. 175172)
PARTIES: Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo Achevara, and Benigno Valdez
Elvira Ramos, John Arnel Ramos, and Khristine Camille Ramos
FACTS: Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep on a national highway in a reckless,
careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep
to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos.
The injuries sustained by Arnulfo caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance.
Cresencia was the operator of a passenger jeep which was driven by Benigno during the
incident wherein Arnulfo, the husband of Elvira, died.
Elvira her two minor children, namely, John Arnel and Khristine Camille, then filed with the RTC of
Ilocos Sur a complaint for damages under Article 21763 of the Civil Code against Cresencia and
her husband Alfredo along with the driver Benigno for the death of Arnulfo.
Elvira and her children alleged that Crescencia failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep and sought to recover
damages. Cresencia, Alfredo, and Benigno claim that Benigno was driving southward at a
moderate speed when he saw an owner type jeep coming from the south and heading north,
running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision,
Benigno drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the
owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the
passenger jeep. They claim that it was Arnulfo who was careless and negligent in driving a motor
vehicle which clearly had a mechanical defect.
29
Testimonies of various witnesses from each side were taken. One of which was that taken from
SPO3 De Peralta who said that he saw Arnulfo driving in a zigzag manner. Alfredo claimed that
they exercised due diligence in the selection of Benigno as their employee, requiring the latter to
show his professional license and they likewise investigated on his personal background, training
and experience as a driver. They also had an apprenticeship which required Benigno to drive
from Metro Manila to Tagaytay
City, and then back to Metro Manila for a day. Benigno also never had a traffic violation.
The trial court ruled in favor of Elvira holding that the doctrine of last clear chance was
applicable to this case. Applying the said doctrine, where both parties are guilty of negligence,
but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party. The doctrine of last clear chance, as applied to this case, implied a contributory
negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew of the mechanical defect of his
vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed the same decision with modification, reducing the
amount of damages awarded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Acheveras and Benigno Valdez are liable to the Ramoses for damages
incurred as a result of the vehicular accident.
RULING: No, the Acheveras and Benigno Valdez are not liable.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have
acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class
of risks.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when
Arnulfo continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its
mechanical defect, while Benigno did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road
upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Arnulfo—perhaps because it still kept to its lane and Valdez
did not know the extent of its mechanical defect. However, when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered
the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this
point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was
Valdez who had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep
towards the right shoulder of the road.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered. Even if it can be said that it was Benigno who had
the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western
lane of the passenger jeep, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
Both Arnulfo and Benigno failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily
prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence
of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause
of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the
Civil Code.
v. FORTUITOUS EVENT
9. ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN
ELECTRONICS, INC.
G.R. No. 107968. October 30, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is engaged in the
rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote. Private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc.,
through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to petitioners shop for
rustproofing. On April 30, 1991, the car was brought to his shop at 10 am and was ready for
release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing. On
the next day, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his
Motobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including
private respondent’s car. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from
theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was simply not enough
time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which had been saved because they
were parked near the entrance of the garage. On May 8 1991, Private respondent sent a letter
to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. Petitioner, in its reply,
denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event.
Private respondent filed a suit against the petitioner for the value of its vehicle and for damages.
Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of
the petitioner, citing petitioner’s failure to register his business with the Department of Trade and
Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.
Petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he alleged
was due to a fortuitous event. He testified that he employed an electrician who regularly
inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. He claimed that he had installed
fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid
of any negligence on his part. He further averred that private respondent’s car was ready for
release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was respondent delay in claiming it
that was the cause of the loss. He explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like
materials underneath motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the materials
and chemicals used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to
assume the risk of loss due to fire. He claimed that he was not required to register his business
with the Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.
Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents which contended that the failure of defendant
to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant
[petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire, even as it
ruled that the business of rustproofing is definitely covered by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did
not register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his customers. As already
noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondentP252, 155.00 with interest at 6% per
annum from the filing of the case and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10, 000.00.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of trial court and ruled that the provisions of the Civil
Code relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable to this case, and that the law applicable
to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose of which is to protect customers who entrust their
properties to service and repair enterprises. CA held that by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No.
1572 and it’s implementing rules and regulations which require fire insurance coverage prior to
accreditation, owners of service and repair enterprises assume the risk of loss of their customer’s
property.
30

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received
by him in the course of his business and, if so, whether his failure to do so constituted negligence,
rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against.
Held: Yes. Petitioner is liable for loss due to his failure to comply with statutory duty. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals. It was held that violation of a statutory duty is
negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, SC held the owner of a furniture
shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his establishment in
view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In
Teague v. Fernandez, SC stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented
by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act
negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a
finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Petitioner's negligence is the source of
his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to
negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is
therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous
event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the
proximate cause of the loss. Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises for
motor vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and Industry.
10. SERVANDO VS. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.
G.R. Nos. L- 36481-2
PARTIES: Amparo C. Servando, Clara Uy Bico,
Philippine Steam Navigation Co.
FACTS:
Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel, FS-176, for
carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental certain cargoes such as rice, paper,
toys, and general merchandise. Bills of lading for the cargoes were issued by Philippine Steam
Navigation (Phil. Steam). Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, the cargoes were
discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At
about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying the cargoes. Before the fire, Clara was able to take some of the cavans of rice
because of that, her claims for the value of the goods was rejected by Phil. Steam. They then
filed a case against Phil. Steam for damages due to their lost goods.
The trial court ruled in favor of Clara and Amparo ordering Phil. Steam to pay them. Article 1736
of the Civil Code was applied in leading to such decision noting that common carriers the duty
to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in
their possession until it is delivered to the consignee or whoever shall receive the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Steam Navigation Co. is liable for the loss of the goods.
RULING: No, Philippine Steam is not liable.
While it is true that a common carrier has such obligation under Article 1736, it should be pointed
out that the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that
may be caused to the shipment under clause 14 of their agreement stating:
"Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk'
unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss
or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war;
public enemies; x x x fire x x x."
The same stipulation is valid and binding between the parties. There is nothing therein that is
contrary to law, morals or public policy. The stipulation is a mere iteration of the basic principle of
law written in Article 1174 of the Civil Code:
"Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared
by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable."
Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the
obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. There is nothing in the record to show that
the carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had
not only notified Clara and Amparo of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the
same be withdrawn.
Phil. Steam or its employees cannot be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in
the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made
with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by
the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no
control whatsoever over the same.
11. SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC., INDUSTRIAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and BLACK SEA SHIPPING AND DODWELL now INCHCAPE SHIPPING
SERVICES
G.R. No. 150255. April 22, 2005.*
FACTS:
SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V "Alexander
Saveliev" (a vessel of Russian registry and owned by Black Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets in coil.
The cargoes, which were to be discharged at the port of Manila in favor of the consignee, Little
Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), were insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance
Company Ltd. (Industrial Insurance). Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant) hired
Schmitz Transport, to secure the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes—hot rolled steel
sheets in coil, from the shipside, and to deliver them to its warehouse. Little Giant also engaged
the services of Transport Venture Inc., (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside. During
which the weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the
unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. No tugboat pulled the barge back
to the pier, however. Due to strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned it and transferred
to the vessel. The barge pitched and rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing
the 37 coils into the sea. After a while, a tugboat finally arrived to pull the already empty and
31
damaged barge back to the pier. Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received for transportation until they
and Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile. Little Giant thus filed a formal were delivered actually or constructively to consignee Little Giant. The delivery of the goods to
claim against Industrial Insurance. Little Giant thereupon executed a subrogation receipt in favor the consignee was not from "pier to pier" but from the shipside of "M/V Alexander Saveliev" and
of Industrial Insurance. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI, into barges, for which reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner. Since Black
and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape before the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant, through petitioner, it had
the amount it paid to Little Giant plus adjustment fees, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. discharged its duty.
Industrial Insurance faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading of the cargoes while
typhoon signal No. 1 was raised in Metro Manila.
EXCEPTIONS: McKee vs IAC
ISSUES: vi. PRESCRIPTION, Art. 1146
(1) Whether the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event, independent of any act of vii. DILIGENCE OF GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY
negligence on the part of petitioner Black Sea and TVI, and viii. RES JUDICATA
(2) If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea, petitioner and ix. WAIVER
TVI.

HELD:

(1) NO, the loss of the cargoes was not due to a fortuitous event. In order, to be considered a
fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito,or if it can be foreseen it
must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. [T]he principle embodied in
the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence
of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether
due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. The appellate court, in
affirming the finding of the trial court that human intervention in the form of contributory
negligence by all the defendants resulted to the loss of the cargoes, held that unloading outside
the breakwater, instead of inside the breakwater, while a storm signal was up constitutes
negligence. It thus concluded that the proximate cause of the loss was Black Sea’s negligence
in deciding to unload the cargoes at an unsafe place and while a typhoon was approaching.

(2) Petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes but no liability may attach to
Black Sea. TVI’s failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might
have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but was the proximate
cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating
for a considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing
that the barge does not have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of
the sea. That it was nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be
charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat. As for petitioner, for
it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence
of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods. While
petitioner sent checkers and a supervisor on board the vessel to counter-check the operations
of TVI, it failed to take all available and reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting
that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea
conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not.
As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the goods were

32
 CECILIO PE, ET AL, vs. ALFONSO PE
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
FACTS:
The plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe. Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Alfonso Pe, was a Chinese national, and a married man. He was an adopted son of
a Chinaman who was a collateral relative of Lolita’s father. The plaintiffs averred that Alfonso
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. They became close and eventually fell in love, to which Lolita’s parents adamantly
objected to.
Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters and one day she disappeared. Her brothers and
sisters discovered that her clothes were gone, as well as a note from Alfonso regarding a date
that they would have on that day. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police and
the NBI.
Plaintiffs brought an action before the CFI to recover damages from Alfonso based on Article 21
of the NCC. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove that
Alfonso, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s
affection. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Alfonso is liable for damages – YES
RATIO: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their
house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn
from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
of the new Civil Code.
VALENZUELA v. CA
FACTS:
At 2am of June 24, 1990, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards Manila. Having noticed that she had a flat tire,
she parked along the sidewalk about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights and opened
the car’s trunk. While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she
was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated, and she
was thrown against the windshield of Li’s car and then fell to the ground.
She was confined in the UERM Medical Memorial Center for 20 days, and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one. The expenses for the confinement
(P120,000) and the artificial leg (P27,000) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
The trial court found Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. It also held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable
for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
The CA held that there was ample evidence that Valenzuela’s car was properly parked beside
the sidewalk when it was bumped by Li’s car, but absolved Li's employer from any liability
towards Valenzuela. It found that Li’s testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 kph is
self-serving and was in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that Li was driving
on a very fast speed, was noticeably intoxicated and Li’s car was zigzagging.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Li was guilty of negligent
2. Whether or not Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence
3. Whether or not Alexander Commercial as Li's employer should be held liable
HELD:
1. YES. As between Li’s self-serving asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not
even know the victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident
similar to his testimony to the investigator, the latter’s testimony deserves greater weight.
Valenzuela’s version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness,
Rodriguez, owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the
accident. He testified that he observed a car being driven at a very fast speed and that he
was standing in front of his establishment when he saw the car hit Valenzuela. He then
crossed the street and noted that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from
the offending car. Also, he declared that Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near
the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation.
2. NO. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. However, under the "emergency rule,” an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a
hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a
parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.
33
 Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually
led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park
her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Blvd. was not of her own making, and it was evident that
she had taken all reasonable precautions.
3. YES. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, Alexander Commercial, based on
the principle of bonus pater familias, is jointly and severally liable with Li.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company
car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it
gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of resppndeat superior, which holds
the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of
its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Art. 2180. However, the case at bench presents a
situation of a character involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives. Also, Li’s claim that he was on the
road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an
officemate was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below and
was obviously self-serving.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs. CA and Tobias
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
Facts:
Respondent. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and
other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported
them his immediate superior Ferraren and to petitioner Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-
President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
One day after Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was
the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
When private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went
up to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler.” Tobias was then ordered to take a lie
detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials
for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing private respondent
of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator submitted a report
finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be
conducted.
Nevertheless Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the
filing of criminal charges against him.
Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents
pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime
report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in
the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of
Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that
the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed
with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed
against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while
the fifth was for of Article 290 of’ the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence). All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
In the meantime Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been
terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor
arbiter’s decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners’ appeal from the NLRC
ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter’s decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor’s order with
the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and
private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter’s
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the RETELCO. However, petitioner Hendry, without
being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the
CA. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
34
Ruling: The petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of
their right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners’ abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of “some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.” Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19
which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in
the performance of one’s duties.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since
they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not,
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides
that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the
legal and factual circumstances called for its application, the question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias
who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry “showed
belligerence..” This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter’s reaction towards the
former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions
that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action
such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and
the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-
handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work
on after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry
who said. “Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company.”
Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted some time
later, the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without
basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. If the dismissal is done abusively, then
the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant
case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias,
giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter’s termination from work. after the filing of
the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions
taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias’ protestations by telling him to just
confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail.
Hendry added that, “You Filipinos cannot be trusted.” The threat unmasked petitioner’s bad faith
in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about
Filipinos as well as Hendry’s earlier statements about Tobias being a “crook” and “swindler” are
clear violations of ‘Tobias’ personal dignity
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO .Because of
the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias
remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners, however, contend that they have a “moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was.” Petitioners
further claim that “it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or
warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter’s life, honor or property. And this
includes warning one’s brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting
into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect” These arguments, rather than
justify petitioners’ act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even
after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they
cannot be “penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal
complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries
35
and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of
money”
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to
the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal
prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by
a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and groundless.
In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were
filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners
were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
XX (on damages)
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.
It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable
tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory
language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to
RETELCO which resulted in Tobias’ loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the
criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds
that, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was
reasonable under the circumstances.
NOTES:
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of
damnum absque injuria. It is argued that “[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff
(private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed
from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners
herein).
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute
a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no
application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had
the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the
damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he
was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by
petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in
a case that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.” Hence, the CA committed
no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias
. Ongsip applied for gas service connection with Manila Gas Corporation and subsequently, a
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that “[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence,” the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason
is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad
faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by
petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS ROMEO JADER
327 SCRA 804
FACTS:
In 1987, Romeo Jader was a graduating law student at the University of the East. He failed to
take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade
(INC). He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth-year student and filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean.
In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth-
year students should be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name appeared on the tentative list, he
also attended the investiture ceremonies and later he gave blowout celebrations. He thereafter
prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to
take the 1988 bar examinations because his academic requirements were not complete
because it appears that his INC rating was not removed.
Then, he sued the University of East for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was not able to take
the 1988 bar examinations arising from the University of East ’s negligence. He prayed for an
award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
ISSUE: Whether University of East should be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the
case.
HELD: Yes.
The Supreme Court held that University of East is liable for damages. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each
student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the
conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate.
The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
MANILA GAS VS CA
FACTS:
year after, he requested that Manila Gas shall install additional appliances as well as additional
36
gas service connections in his apartment within the same compound. An employee of Manila
Gas went to the premises and changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections
without the consent of Ongsip. Thereafter, the said employees returned with a photographer
who took pictures of the premises. The employees said that there had been a by-pass valve and
they are asking money from Ongsip.
Then, Manila Gas filed a criminal case against Ongsip. Pending investigation of the criminal
complaint, petitioner disconnected the respondent’s gas service for alleged failure or refusal to
pay his gas consumptions. But were dismissed eventually, prompting Ongsip to file a civil action
against Manila Gas.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ongsip is entitled to a moral and exemplary damages
HELD: The Court held Yes. But in the awarding of damages, we must give due consideration to
respondent Ongsip’s social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he
suffered as a result of the false imputation. However, We also consider petitioner’s financial
capability. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the
people, the profit motive being merely secondary.
Furthermore, in the second contention in the act of disconnecting respondent’s gas service
without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The
prematurity if the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering
to private respondent. And is a ground for awarding of moral damages.
PATRICIO VS. HON. OSCAR LEVISTE.
FACTS:
Rafael Patricio was an ordained Catholic priest and was appointed Director General of the 1976
Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. On the evening of the benefit-dance, Fr. Rafael was accompanied by
two policemen, to check on the watchers of the gate.
Bienvenido Bacalocos, was also present near the gate. He was the president of the barangay
captains in Pilar, and thus occupied a seat as a municipal councilor. He was in a state of
drunkenness. He struck a bottle of beer on the table, injuring his hand. Bienvenido then
approached the priest in a hostile manner, and asked the priest if he had seen his wounded
hand.
Before the priest could respond, Bienvenido hit the priest’s face with his bloodied hand. A
commotion ensued thereafter, and Bienvenido was brought to the municipal building.
The criminal complaint against Bienvenido, for slander by deed was dismissed by the Municipal
Trial Court. A second case for damages was later brought by the priest, where the court ruled in
his favor. Bievenido was liable to the priest for moral damages, as a result of physical suffering,
moral shock and social humiliation as a result of the incident.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the priest. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to
par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”
The municipal councilor’s act of hitting the priest on the face caused mental anguish, moral
shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is of no moment that he had done so without
bad faith, or that he claimed that it was only accidental. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s findings that there was an existing feud between the families of the parties, and that
Bienvenido slapped Fr. Rafael’s face, without provocation and in the presence of several
persons.
AMERICAN EXPRESS VS. CORDERO
Facts:
Respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law, went on a
three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop. Noel picked
up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express extension
charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone
call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, the store manager, emerged
from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card.
Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This,
according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was
done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter.
When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She
was able to talk to Senior Authorizer, who informed her that, a person in Hong Kong attempted
to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card. The Hong Kong American
Express Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in
Hong Kong, placed his card in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. This is the system utilized by
petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use
of their charge cards.
When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong Office, its representative said he
wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure
observed under the Inspect Airwarn Support System. However, respondent refused.
Consequently, petitioners representative was unable to establish the identity of the
cardholder. This led to the confiscation of respondents card.
Respondent filed, a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the humiliation he
suffered.
Issue: WON the Petitioner is liable for damages against the Respondent.
Held: NO.
Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
37
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for
quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of
the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales
clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been
accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to
determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which
breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents
humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative.
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can revoke respondents card without
notice, as was done here. It bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been
confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself
as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part
of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy."1 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court which referred the
case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals declared the trial court’s order null and void
and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD: No. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of
the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute
an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity.
PASTOR TENCHAVEZ vs VICENTA ESCAÑO
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escaño on February 24, 1948 in Cebu City.
As of June, 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged.
On June 24, 1950, Escaño left for the US. On August 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada. On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce
was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escaño married an American Russel
Leo Moran in Nevada.
On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against
Vicente Escaño and her parents, Mamerto and Mina Escaño. The parents were charged with for
allegedly dissuading Vicenta from joining Tenchavez to be her husband, and alienating her
affections.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta’s Escaño are liable against Tenchavez for allegedly alienating the
affections and influencing the conduct of their daughter against Tenchavez.
RULING: NO. That the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment or her subsequent divorce are not supported by credible evidence.
That no re-celebration of the marriage ceremony was had was not due to defendants Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.
38

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless
in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
LAGON V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 119107, March 18, 2005
Facts:
Jose Lagon (petitioner) purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,
two parcels of land. Menandro Lapuz (private respondent) claims that he previously entered
into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi in which one of the provisions agreed upon
was for Lapus to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants.
The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent Lapus was obligated to pay
Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the
construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was
allegedly renewed
Lapus filed a complaint for torts and damages, accusing Lagon of inducing the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.
Issue: Whether the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of
Lapus’ lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
he should be held liable for damages.
Ruling:
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that
provision is known as interference with contractual relations. The interference is penalized
because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should
result therefrom.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements of tortuous
interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person
without legal justification or excuse.
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court found the contention of Lagon meritorious. He
conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious
circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any
conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire property’s title bore no
indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no
record of the same. In sum, the Court ruled that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold
Lagon liable for tortuous interference are present, the latter cannot be made to answer for
Lapus’ losses.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of
a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. The Court held
that there can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of
a legal duty. In that instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone
since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to
legal injury or wrong. Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery
of damages.
DELFIN G. VILLARAMA vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC.
G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994
“Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is reprehensible enough but more so when
inflicted by those with moral ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for
separation from service.”
Facts:
Petitioner Delfin Villarama was employed by private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., as its
Materials Manager. Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-
typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work.
This prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call Villarama to a
meeting, where Villarama agreed to tender his resignation. Golden Donuts moved swiftly to
separate petitioner - it approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay and
issued an inter-office memorandum advising all concerned that Villarama was no longer
connected with the company.
Later on, however Villarama defaulted on the agreement. Still, Golden Donuts terminated
Villarama prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of petitioner and there was
no valid cause for dismissal.
Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 16, 1992,
public respondent reversed the decision of the labor arbiter.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.
Ruling: Yes, The court held that petitioner committed immoral acts hence he should be dismissed
from service due to the sexual harassment charges against him.
The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. Initially, he
voluntarily agreed to be separated from the company. He took a leave of absence preparatory
to this separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto which
petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated claiming the seriousness of
his offense would not warrant his separation from service. Needless to stress, he cannot complain
there was no valid cause for his separation.
Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It
can be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. The Solicitor
39
General is correct when it ruled that petitioner not only failed to act accordingly as a good
father of the family because he was not able to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority
over the group in the matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he actively
facilitated the commission of immoral conduct of his subordinates by driving his car into the
motel. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed
to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity.
And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides justifiable
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors.
As to the monetary awards
The public respondent erred in awarding separation pay of P17,000.00 as indemnity for his
dismissal without due process of law. The award of separation pay is proper in the cases
enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, and in cases where there is illegal
dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and reinstatement is no longer feasible. But this is not to state
that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal notice and conduct the
necessary investigation before dismissing an employee.
Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There was no bad faith or
malice on the part of private respondent in terminating the services of petitioner. Petitioner is
entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay, as held
by the labor arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner and should be unaffected
by his separation from the service.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO, CORP.
Facts:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway
as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an
ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per
pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,”
and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette
brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the
ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or
bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
2. Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
Ruling:
1. On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of
his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of
the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized
by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where
said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
2. On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby
another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are
cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not
by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of
the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that
is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA,
and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006
FACTS:
40
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at
the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard
pounding sounds outside, prompting her to open the door of the locker room upon which she
saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not
employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. She even saw one of the
men hid something behind his back. She then closed the door and went back to bed. Soon
after she heard the door of the union office opened.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of
the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a
locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open
the door. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting
Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the female locker room, and to thereafter
proceed to the Engineering Office where they called for police assistance.
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter’s request, met. At the
meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would settle the
mauling incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the office could not be opened.
Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside,
Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even
asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana
flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police
conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers, namely:
Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene
Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina, Avelino Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani 9 was filed
before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
Hence a Complaint was filed with the RTC of Manila for violation of RA 6425. RTC acquitted the
accused. Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the
Manila RTC a Complaint against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and
Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. RTC found the
petitioners liable for damages. On appeal with the CA, the CA upheld the RTC decision with
modification that the accused were civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code and not for
Malicious Prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it rendered petitioner civilly liable under Art. 32 of the NCC in
citing People vs. Aruta?
RULING:
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and
democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether
constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. As the Code Commission
noted,
xxxx
(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms named are
not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale
of the penal law. It is in these cunning devices of suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are
not criminally punishable, where the greatest danger to democracy lies. The injured citizen
will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before the courts
because of the independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission
complained of does not constitute a criminal offense.
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private
individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is
why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice
or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of
individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS VS. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 135306, Jan. 28, 2003
FACTS:
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than 70 Muslim
religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc., arising
from an article, which reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
ISSUE: W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action
HELD: The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.
DEFAMATION DEFINED:
41
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
…where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that
the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that
the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be….
The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to
any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.
Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting
in damages.
The action likewise is not for emotional distress.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS v. DEFAMATION:
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in
the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming
there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm to social
relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of
reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction
of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in
Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the
present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for
defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress
properly belongs.
WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme
and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so
terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and
anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers
to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress
disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show,
among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of
action, not simply a matter of damages.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage
had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard
the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
VESTIL VS IAC
FACTS:
Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of Purita and Agustin Vestil in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu
General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted
one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia. The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were
liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente
Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the complaint
IAC: The Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under
Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had
died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof.
VESTIL: insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate
has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
ISSUE: whether or not Purita Vestil is liable for damages under Article 2183 of the Civil Code
RULING: What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the
house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as
follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
42
 only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who
has suffered damage.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She
said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him and maintained
themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement. There is contrary evidence
that the occupants of the house were boarders who paid the Vestils for providing them with
meals and accommodations. Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself,
categorically declared that the Vestils were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness
was bitten by a dog. Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and
that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of
the incident in question. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda and until the incident in question occurred.
The Vestils also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. The death certificate
declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia. The Court need not involve itself in an extended
scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a
result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused
her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was
bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo. The link between the dog bites
and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. Death certificate is not
conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of
the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince the SC that she died because she was bitten by
the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death.
Vestils’ contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not
acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal
should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either
that, as the Vestils also contend, the dog was tame or was merely provoked by the child into
biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as
they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, Theness was only three years old at the time
she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is
based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for
his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
Virgilio M. Del Rosario v. CA
G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997
Petitioners: Virgilio M. Del Rosario and Corazon Paredes-Del Rosario
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Metal Forming Corporation
Case:
On August 28, 1995, the Court En Banc promulgated judgment in the case of Metal Forming
Corporation v. Office of the President, etc., et al., dismissing the petitioner's appeal and affirming
the decision of the Office of the President dated April 30, 1993. The latter decision in turn
affirmed that of the Department of Trade and Industry rendered on May 29, 1991 in an
administrative case initiated against Metal Forming Corporation (hereafter MFC) by complaint of
the spouses Virgilio M. del Rosario and Corazon Paredes-del Rosario.
Facts:
1. Private respondent MFC, in selling the public roofing materials (Banawe Shingles) advertised
the same to be “structurally safe and strong” and that the "Banawe Metal Tile structure acts as a
single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps" The
advertisement prompted the Del Rosario’s to buy Banawe Shingles and have them installed at
their residence. However, two months after its complete installation, portions of the Del Rosario’s
roof were blown away by the strong wings of typhoon “Ruping.”
2. The Del Rosarios' filed a complaint charging private respondent Metal Forming Corporation
(MFC) with violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc."
After due proceedings, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) declared that MCF had
indeed misrepresented its product because "as the records showed," strong winds actually blew
off part of the structure/roof of the Del Rosario Spouses and the same acted in parts (instead of
as a single unit) when strong winds blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off.
MFC was ordered to pay an "administrative fine of P10,000 " (within 10 days from finally of the
decision), otherwise its "business name and registration ** would be deemed suspended and its
establishment closed until the fine was fully paid."
3. The decision of the DTI (of May 29, 1991) was, on appeal, affirmed in toto by the Office of the
President on April 30, 1993; and the latter judgment was in turn affirmed by this Court on August
28, 1995 with a modification solely as to the fine, which was reduced to P5,000. In said judgment
of August 28, 1995, this Court, stressing that the factual findings of such administrative bodies as
the Office of the President are generally to be accorded respect, if not indeed invested with
finality, pronounced as correct that Office's ruling, among others, that “although the occurrence
of a typhoon is a fortuitous event, . . . it cannot efface the fundamental fact that (petitioner)
acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for
the proper installation of the structure. . . and actually installed inferior roofing materials at
(private respondents') residence, in violation of the proper installation procedure expressly
specified in the former's brochures and advertisements for installation..”
It appears that MFC replaced and repaired the roof free of charge, evidently acknowledging
that the damage was covered by its one-year warranty on the materials and the installation. The
repair work was observed and analyzed by the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., which was
engaged by the Del Rosarios to determine the cause of the destruction. The repair; work was
begun on October 23, 1989, with the delivery of replacement tiles, and completed on
November 7, 1989. Thereafter the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. submitted its report to the
Del Rosarios, dated November 8, 1989, in which it made the following conclusion:
The "Banawe" metal tiles which were detached from the roof trusses were not fastened with two
(2) wood screws on each metal cleat as required but only with a single wood screw or a
combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail which is contrary to the design and
43
specification. We have observed during the course of repai(r) works that some "Banawe" metal
tiles installed were no longer than the roof span, hence there is overlapping on the ridge roll/hip.
It is very evident that the original subcontractor (which we were not able to identify) were in
haste to complete the project. . . .
4. MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the latter to
commence a civil action against MFC on April 16, 1990 in the RTC of Manila. In this suit, the
spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages resulting from the events just narrated,
contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its
electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. The
plaintiff spouses reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003 — "representing the estimated
cost of the repair, restoration and/or replacement of the damaged areas and items in plaintiffs'
house and the .cost of the inspection conducted by the independent adjuster (engaged by
them), with legal interests thereon from 21 February 1990 when defendant (MFL) received the
formal demand from plaintiffs until fully paid." They also prayed for an award to them of moral
damages in the sum of P3,000,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000, and
attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000.
5. MFC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. It stated that it had no
contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the contract for the purchase and installation
of the roofing, upon which the latter's claims were based, was actually entered into between it
and another person, Jesus M. Puno (an engineer identified as the Del Rosarios' contractor). The
Trial Court denied the motion. MFC assailed that denial in the Court of Appeals, but was
rebuffed; and its recourse to this Court (G.R. No. 95514) was also unsuccessful.
Trial then ensued after which RTC ruled in favor of the Del Rosarios in a judgment (November 18,
1991) ordering the defendant MFC to pay:
Actual Damages - P1,008,003 with legal interest thereon, from June 31, 1990 until fully paid;
Moral Damages - P500,000;
Exemplary Damages P300,000; and
Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation - P150,000
Counter claims filed by the defendant are dismissed.
The Trial Court held the corporation liable for breach of its contract for the supply and installation
of the roofing materials in the Del Rosarios' residence. The Trial Court ruled that there was privity
of contract between the Del Rosarios and MFC; Engineer Puno acted as MFC's agent in the
signing of the contracts for the supply and installation of the "Banawe'' shingles; hence, the
contract was really between the Del Rosarios and that company.
6. MFC appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision promulgated on June 29, 1994. said
Court reversed the Trial Court's judgment, It ruled that there was no privity of contract between
the Del Rosarios and MFC and thus the Del Rosarios had no cause of action against MFC for
breach of warranties, there being no law allowing them to proceed directly against those whom
their contractor had subcontracted to furnish materials and do part of the work that the latter
was engaged to perform.
The Del Rosarios appealed, and in this Court expectedly present for resolution, the issue of
"'WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A PRIVITY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES,'"
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is privity of contract between the parties (YES)
2. Whether or not upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the
Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of
shingles purchased from and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon
(YES, PARTIAL)
Held:
1. Whether or not there is privity of contract between the parties (YES)
The facts on record — including those set forth in the final judgment of the Court En Banc
involving the same parties, adverted to in the opening paragraph of this opinion, supra. of which
judgment official cognizance may properly be, as it is hereby, taken — constitute adequate
basis for a verdict against MFC.
All the quibbling about whether Engineer Puno acted as agent of MFC or of the spouses, is
pointless. The matter is not a factor in determining MFC's liability for its workers' use of inferior
materials and their defective installation of the "Banawe" metal tiles in the roof of the latter's
residence. Prescinding from the persuasive proof on record that at all times material and with
regard to the acquisition and installation of the metal tiles or shingles, Puno was in truth acting as
contractor of the Del Rosarios and on their instructions, ascertainment of the definite identity of
the person who actually ordered the shingles from MFC is utterly inconsequential — it might just
as well have been a construction foreman, a trusted domestic, or any friend or acquaintance of
the Del Rosarios — in view of the indisputable fact not only (1) that the tiles were delivered to the
Del Rosarios and used in fabricating the roof of their home, but also (2) that it was the employees
and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the
Del Rosarios' home, and (b) undertook and completed the installation thereof. These they did in
bad faith, using inferior materials and assembling them in a manner contrary to MFC's express
representations in its brochures and advertisements circulated and broadcast to the general
public — which representations had, in the first place, induced the Del Rosarios to choose the
metal tiles in question for their roofing. In fine, since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence,
infringed the express warranty made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe"
tiles brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and
thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity of the individual who actually dealt with
MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and installation is of little moment.
2. Whether or not upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the
Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of
shingles purchased from and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon
(YES, PARTIAL)
Turning now to the matter of damages, it is the Del Rosarios' contention that the pecuniary
detriment to their home amounted to P1,008,003, covering not only the destruction of the roof,
but also substantial harm to the electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wallpaper, wood parquet
flooring and furniture. They rely on the Report of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc, to which
the Regional Trial Court accorded full credit. But that report contains no statement whatever of
the amount of the damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the representative of the
Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to determine the
cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it. A similar aridity as to the amount of the
damage, unfortunately characterizes the testimony of Atty. Virgilio Del Rosario and the rest of
44
the spouses' proofs. There is therefore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an award of
actual damages. The Trial Court's grant thereof must be struck down. Lufthansa German Airlines
vs. CA, et al. promulgated on April 21, 1995, inter alia ruled that: "Actual or Compensatory
damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree
of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have (been) suffered
and on evidence of the actual amount thereof."
That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the
general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those
warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental
trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted.
Over a period of about a month, they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear,
embarrassment and anger. "As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of Appeals, among
other precedents: It is essential . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have
satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its
causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of
pecuniary estimation are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer and are allowable only
when specifically prayed for in the complaint. As reflected in the records of the case, the Court
of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish,
embarrassment and mental sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its
obligation to petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent acted in
wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay the basis and
justification for this Court to award petitioners moral and exemplary damages."
This Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exigible of MFC,
"Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether
or not exemplary damages should be awarded." "Exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." However, the same statutory and jurisprudential
standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
fixed by the Trial Court. There is, to be sure, no hard and fast rule for determining what would be
a fair amount of moral (or exemplary) damages, each case having to be governed by its
attendant particulars. Generally, the amount of moral damages should be commensurate with
the actual loss or injury suffered. The Court sees no reason to adopt a different treatment in the
case at bar, and accordingly reduces the moral damages from P500,000 to P100,000, and the
exemplary damages from P300,000 to P50,000.
Like the adjudication of actual or compensatory damages, the award of attorney's fees must be
deleted. The matter was dealt with only in the dispositive portion of the Trial Court's decision.
Since the judgment does not say why attorney's fees are awarded, there is no basis for such
award which should consequently be removed. So did this Court rule, for instance, in Scott
Consultants and Resource Development Corp., Inc. vs. CA, et al.: "It is settled that the award of
attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule and counsel's fees are not to be awarded
every time a party wins. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the
decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney's fees."
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS VS CA
Facts:
Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City.
In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft
drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said
bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a
result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12
December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which
dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the
CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
Issue:
WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be
treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes
after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
Held:
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on
quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of
warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated
food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER, its President;
JOHN COTTON and HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its Vice-Presidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City
Engineer of Quezon City, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-18390, August 6, 1971
Facts:
Appellant Velasco bought 3 adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets,
DIliman, Quezon City which were zoned out as “first residence” district by Quezon City Council.
Appellant sold 2 lots to Meralco and retained the lot farthest form the street where he built his
house. Meralco started construction on the said lots without prior building permit or authority
from Public Service Commission. The facility was built at a distance of 10-20 meters from
appellant’s house. The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but
along the side adjoining the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to
an interlink wire fence. Plaintiff filed for actionable nuisance against Meralco by the sound
emanating from the facility which was actionable under Art. 694 of the Civil Code. Subjection to
the sound since 1954 had disturbed the concentration and sleep of said appellant, impaired his
health and lowered the value of his property. Wherefore, he sought a judicial decree for the
45
abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory,
moral and other damages under Article 2202 of the Civil Code.
Trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the sound of substation was unavoidable and did not
constitute nuisance; that it could not have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis,
pyelonephritis, ureteritis, lumbago and anemia; and that the items of damage claimed by
plaintiff were not adequate proved. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the sound emanating from the Meralco facility be considered nuisance.
Ruling: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance.
In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and
appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary
sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses’
testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters
were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the
testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him,
unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and
tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the
nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the
readings include 52, 54, and 55.
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business condition of property or anything else
which:
(1)Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, when a person suffered from a nuisance made by another and as a
consequence, the former suffered damages, the latter is made liable to the injuries made by the
said nuisance, following Article 2202 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant.
The test is whether rights of property of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the
noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit
imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact
devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it
within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who though creating a
noise is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.
There can be no doubt but that commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the
enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. It is no defense that skill and care have been
exercised and the most improved methods and appliances employed to prevent such result.
The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the
opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and
unreasonable. Usually it was shown to be of that character. The determining factor when noise
alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary
sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it
can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a
question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions.
However, character and loudness of sound being of subjective appreciation in
ordinary witnesses, not much help can be obtained from the testimonial evidence. The
statement of Velasco is to plainly biased and too emotional to be of much value, and the
estimate of the other witnesses on the point of inquiry are vague and imprecise, and fail to give
a definite idea of the intensity of the sound complained of. To help establish the fact, sampling
was conducted under the instructions of DOH and form Meralco’s electrical laboratory, making
the court rely on quantitative measurements.
As to the caused by the noise, Velasco, being a physician, presented medical
evidence, supported by a host of expert witnesses and voluminous literature, laboratory findings
and statistics of income preponderates over the expert evidence of Meralco, not merely
because of its positive character but also because the physicians presented by plaintiff had
actually treated him, while the defense experts had not done so. Thus the evidence of the latter
was to a large extent conjectural. That appellant's physical ailments should be due to infectious
organisms does not alter the fact that the loss of sleep, irritation and tension due to excessive
noise weakened his constitution and made him easy prey to the infection. However, the
amounts given as damages are considered exaggerated.
SC reversed in part and affirmed in part the appealed decision. Meralco is hereby
ordered to either transfer its substation at South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City, or
take appropriate measures to reduce its noise at the property line between the defendant
company's compound and that of the plaintiff-appellant to an average of forty (40) to fifty (50)
decibels within 90 days from finality of this decision; and to pay the said plaintiff-appellant P20,
000.00 in damages and P5, 000.00 for attorney's fees. In all other respects, the appealed decision
is affirmed.
CITY OF MANILA VS. GERARDO GARCIA, CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA ET.AL
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
FACTS:
Right after the Liberation of Manila, Geraldo Garcia, Carmencita Villanueva and their
companions built houses of second class into parcels of lands in Malate which were owned by
the City of Manila. Such physical occupation was done without the knowledge and consent of
the city officials. Likewise, the construction of houses was done without the required building
permits to be issued by the city government.
In 1947, the occupation and possession of the lands was discovered by the City. The defendants
were given permits to occupy but with the label “Lease of Contract” and that they are to be
charged nominal rentals.
When it was time for the expansion of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School which is the
closest government own school to the disputed lands, the Mayor ordered to clear the houses of
Gerardo Garcia and his companions. They were given (30) days to vacate and remove their
46
constructions but they refused to leave alleging that they already acquired the legal status of
tenancy.
A civil action was filed against Garcia, Villanueva, et.al and the Court ordered them to vacate
the premises and pay the overdue rentals. An appeal was raised questioning the Court’s
decision on the validity of City Ordinance 4566 appropriating 100 thousand for the construction
of new building of the public school.
ISSUE: Whether the Trial Court is correct in its decision that Manila City needs the disputed
government lands for the utilization of a public school.
THE COURT’S RULING:
YES, the Trial Court is correct. Although at first there was contradicting decision, the Judge
explained that the reversal of his decision is due to his duty as a court officer to take notice of
the noble purpose of the City Ordinance 4566 in conformity with the Law and justice in
connection with the settled rule that the city’s dominical right is a paramount consideration.
The defendants in this case are considered squatters because from the beginning they entered
the lands without the consent of the owners and their construction of houses were illegal without
permits. Their claims of valid tenancy are tainted with misrepresentation and fraud because the
previous erroneous “contract of lease” was null and void because Manila Mayors did not have
authority to give permits.
The forcible entry to public lands makes one a public nuisance. These squatters hindered and
impaired the use of such lands which were necessary to build the extension of the already
crowded public school. They created obstruction to the city’s exercise of its duty to establish and
maintain an adequate educational system for the youth of Manila. The City Ordinance 4566 is
just a valid exercise of the police power of the city and as such, the city authorities may
implement even without the aid of courts.
FARRALES V. MAYOR OF BAGUIO
G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972.
FACTS:
Farrales was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the
temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct
a permanent building. She was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the
permanent building was completed. Instead, not liking the location the city officials gave her,
Farrales built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without
seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack,
she sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon
failure to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and the police then
demolished the shack.
Farrales argues that her stall was not a nuisance and that even if it was a nuisance its not a
nuisance per se, only per accidens
ISSUES:
(1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance;
(2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.
RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the
temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its
location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it
constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.
(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall
be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged
nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there
no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it
was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but
through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an
authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952
PARTIES:
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. - petitioner
Guillermo Balandan, Anselma Anila – private respondents, parents of Mario Balandan
FACTS:
Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice plant, in whose premises were installed two tanks full
of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. The factory was fenced but anyone
could easily enter the premises because the entrance gate was continually open and there was
no guard assigned in the said gate. Also, the tanks didn’t have any fence or top covers.
Private respondents’ son, Mario, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of
other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of
said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning
The lower court decided in the favor of the parents stating that that the petitioner is liable for
damages due to the fact that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and
neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its
premises, applying the doctrine of attractive nuissance. The CA affirmed it.
ISSUE: Whether the subject water tanks are attractive nuisance
HELD: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to
a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender
years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children
47
American jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the
water tanks themselves do not fall under such doctrine thus, the petitioners cannot be held liable
for Mario’s death.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive
nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any
new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No
costs.
HEIRS OF BORLADO V. VDA. DE BULAN
G.R. 114118 (2001)
FACTS: April 15, 1942: Serapio Borlado sold the lot to Francisco Bacero. Then on February 1948 his
widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, as legal guardian of her minor children, sold the lot to
the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon and they declared the lot in the name of
Bulan for Tax Declaration purposes and obtained the continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted,
adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until November 4, 1972 when heirs of Simeon
Borlado forcibly entered and wrested physical possession from them. On November 23, 1972, the
spouses filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment. The MTC ruled in favor of the spouses.
The heirs were ordered to vacate the lot and pay 100 cavans of palay annually from 1972 until
they vacate the premises and P5K for attorney’s fees and cost of suit. The Regional Trial
court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action in a decision.
ISSUE: Whether the 100 cavans of palay is an acceptable form of damages.
HELD: No, the Supreme Court held that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972
until they vacate the premises of the land in question. Palay is not legal tender currency in the
Philippines.
Chiang Yia Min vs CA and RCBC
[G.R. No. 137932. March 28, 2001]
Facts:
Chiang Yia Min alleges that a $100,000 was sent by Hang Lung Bank Ltd. of Hong Kong on
February 7, 1979 through the Pacific Banking Corporation to RCBC head office. The remittance
was for petitioners own account and was intended to qualify him as a foreign investor under
Philippine laws. As found by the trial court, it was sent by petitioner himself prior to his arrival in the
Philippines.
When Chiang checked on his money sometime in mid-1985, he found out that that the dollar
deposit was transferred to the Shaw Boulevard branch of respondent bank and converted to a
peso account, which had a balance of only P1,362.10 as of October 29, 1979. A letter of RCBC
dated August 9, 1985 stated Chiang’s Current Account No. 12-2009 was opened on February 8,
1979, with an initial deposit of P729,752.20; a total of P728,390.00 was withdrawn by way of five
checks respectively dated February 13, 19 and 23, 1979 and October 5 and 29, 1979, apparently
issued by petitioner in favor of Papercon (Phils.), Inc., (hereafter, Papercon) one of the herein
private respondents and a business venture of Tom Pek.Thus, the balance of the account was
reduced to P1,362.10 as of October 29, 1979 and no transactions were made on the account
since. In the same letter, the bank stated that it was no longer able to locate the microfilm
copies of the issued checks, specimen signature cards, and other records related to the
questioned account, since the account had been inactive for more than five years.
Chiang insisted that he did not cause the transfer of his money to the Shaw Boulevard branch of
RCBC.
RCBC alleged that there is no indication from its records of the transfer of US$100,000.00 for
petitioners account from Hang Lung Bank Ltd. through the Pacific Banking
Corporation. However, after Chiang had adduced his evidence, it filed a third-party complaint
against Papercon and Tom Pek, admitting that plaintiff conclusively appeared to have
deposited the sum of US$100,000.00 with the bank and said foreign currency deposit was
converted.
Tom Pek and Papercon did not deny receiving the checks worth P712,700.00 but argued that
unless proven otherwise, the said checks should be presumed to have been issued in their favor
for a sufficient and valuable consideration.
TRIAL COURT: Based on the evidence and arguments before it, the trial court determined that
the withdrawals were not made by petitioner nor authorized by him, and held respondent bank
liable for the US$100,000.00 (and the interest thereon from date of filing of the complaint),
damages, attorneys fees, and costs. The trial court further concluded that the withdrawals from
petitioners account could not have been made possible without the collusion of the officers and
employees of respondent bank.
CA: The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, found that the opening of the current account
and the withdrawals therefrom were authorized by petitioner; accordingly, it reversed the
decision of the RTC and absolved private respondents of liability.
Issue: W/ON Chiang had proven the negligence of RCBC
Held: No. RCBC have presented evidence that petitioner did sign and issue these checks. The
testimony of Catalino Reyes that petitioner told him to prepare the checks, and that he saw
petitioner sign these checks and give them to Tom Pek, stands unrebutted.
There is thus no evidence to demonstrate that respondent bank and respondents Papercon and
Tom Pek colluded to defraud petitioner of his money. What the evidence in fact establishes is
that the opening of the account and the withdrawals were authorized by petitioner, and that
the signatures appearing on the questioned checks were petitioners.
Petitioner, however, insists that respondent bank acted with negligence in opening Current
Account No. 12-2009 without properly verifying the identity of the depositor and in contravention
of sound and well-recognized banking procedures. The petition capitalizes on the following
purported irregularities surrounding the opening of the account: (1) the alleged depositor never
appeared at the bank; (2) the person who transacted for the alleged depositor was not shown
48
to have been authorized for that purpose; (3) the application form and other documents
required to open the account were brought out of the bank premises; and (4) the application
form, when submitted, was not properly accomplished, but was left blank on most of the
required details.
The arguments are unmeritorious for failure to show that such irregularities attending the opening
of the account resulted in the unauthorized withdrawal of petitioners money. The evidence
stands unrebutted that petitioner instructed the opening of the said account and signed the
pertinent application forms. Quite contrary to petitioners insinuations of fraud or negligence, the
evidence indicates that the reason why respondent bank relaxed its rules in handling petitioners
application was because, in addition to having been referred by a well-known client, petitioner
was in a hurry to have the remittance credited to his account.
The person who alleges fraud or negligence must prove it, because the general presumption is
that men act with care and prudence. Good faith is always presumed and it is the burden of the
party claiming otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. No
judgment for damages could arise where the source of injury, be it fraud, fault, or negligence,
was not affirmatively established by competent evidence.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES CHUA
G.R. No. 111584, 17 September 2001
Facts:
Sometime in April 1982, respondent Salvador Chua was offered by Jimmy Rojas (Rojas), manager
of petitioner Producers Bank of the Philippines (Bank), to transfer his account from Pacific
Banking Corporation to petitioner Bank. In view of Rojas’ assurances of longer loan terms and
lower rates of interest, respondent spouses opened and maintained substantial savings and
current deposits with the Bacolod branch of petitioner Bank. Respondent spouses also obtained
various loans from petitioner Bank, one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured
by a real estate mortgage and payable within a period of three (3) years from 1982 to 1985.
On 20 January 1984, respondent spouses deposited with petitioner Bank the total sum of
P960,000.00, which was duly entered in respondent spouses’ savings account passbook.
However, petitioner Bank failed to credit this deposit in respondent spouses’ savings account
due to the fact that its Branch Manager, Sixto Castillo, absconded with the money of the Bank’s
depositors. Subsequently, petitioner Bank dishonored the checks drawn out by respondent
spouses in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds despite the fact that
at that time, the balance of respondent spouses’ deposit was in the amount of P1,051,051.19.
Because of this, respondent spouses requested for copies of their ledgers covering their savings
and current accounts, but petitioner Bank refused.
Respondent spouses thereafter instituted an action for damages against petitioner Bank. On the
other hand, petitioner Bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage during the pendency of the respondent spouses’ civil case. As a result, respondent
spouses filed a complaint for injunction and damages alleging that the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in order to harass respondent
spouses.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent spouses. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification.
Issue: Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to payment of damages.
Held:
Yes. Respondent spouses are entitled to payment of damages. The contention of petitioner Bank
that it has a right to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by respondent spouses in its
favor as the loan under the real estate mortgage contract had become due and demandable
is untenable. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage
indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at
the time it is due.
In the case at bar, respondent spouses were constantly paying their loan obligations with
petitioner Bank. It is, therefore, not the fault of respondent spouses that their payment amounting
to P960,000.00 was not credited to their account. Thus, the loan which was secured by a real
estate mortgage cannot be considered as unpaid so as to warrant foreclosure on the
mortgage.
Moreover, respondent spouses have not yet defaulted on the payment of their loans. The term
of the loan was from 1982 to 1985. Petitioner Bank filed its application for extrajudicial foreclosure
on 15 October 1984. Indisputably, such application was premature because the respondent
spouses’ loan was not yet due and demandable.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the
respondent spouses’ are entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary
damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the
court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages
according to its discretion. The dishonor of respondent spouses’ checks and the foreclosure
initiated by petitioner Bank adversely affected the credit standing as well as the business
dealings of respondent spouses as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the
collapse of their businesses.
The damage to respondent spouses’ reputation and social standing entitles them to moral
damages, in accordance with Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Additionally, the award of exemplary damages is in order in view of the malicious and
unwarranted application for extrajudicial foreclosure by petitioner Bank which was obviously
done to harass, embarrass, annoy, or ridicule respondent spouses.
DE VERA V. SAN DIEGO CONSTRUCTION
Facts:
Respondent Q.P. San Diego Construction, Inc. (QPSDCI), entered into a Syndicate Loan
Agreement with respondent banks (hereafter collectively known as Funders) to finance the
construction and development of Lourdes I Condominium. QPSDCI mortgaged to the creditor
banks as security its Panay Avenue Property and the condominium constructed thereon.
Petitioner and QPSDCI entered into a Condominium Reservation Agreement where petitioner
undertook to buy Unit 211-2C of the condominium. Petitioner's remaining balance of the
purchase price was to be secured through his housing loan. As petitioner failed to obtain said
loan, he was not able to pay the balance of the purchase price.
49
Petitioner, upon discovering that the Funders had already published a notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage, filed a complaint against respondents for damages. Meanwhile,
QPSDCI failed to pay its obligations to the Funders. Asiatrust extra-judicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the condominium units, including that of petitioner. The trial court decided in favor
of petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and ordered
respondents to pay nominal damages, but deleted the award for actual and exemplary
damages.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages to petitioner is proper.
Held: In the present case, petitioner did not present any proof that he suffered any damage as a
result of the breach of seller's warranty. He did not lose possession of his condominium unit,
although the same had not yet been registered in his name. Article 2199 of the Civil Code
provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as duly proved. This provision denies the grant of speculative damages, or such damage not
actually proved to have existed and to have been caused to the party claiming the same.
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. T.E.A.M. ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, TECHNOLOGY
ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY and MANAGEMENT PACIFIC CORPORATION; and ULTRA ELECTRONICS
INSTRUMENTS, INC
FACTS:
T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation (TEC) was formerly known as NS Electronics(Philippines), Inc.
before 1982 and National Semi-Conductors (Phils.)
TEC is wholly owned by respondent Technology Electronics Assemblyand Management Pacific
Corporation (TPC).
On the other hand, petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) is a utility company supplying
electricity in the Metro Manila area.
MERALCO and NS Electronics (Philippines), Inc., the predecessor-in-interest of respondent TEC,
entered into two separate contracts denominated as Agreements for the Sale of Electric Energy
wherein:
petitioner undertook to supply TEC's building known as Dyna CraftInternational Manila (DCIM)
with electric power.
Another contract was entered into for the supply of electric power toTEC's NS Building under
Account No. 19389-0900-10.
TEC, under its former name National Semi-Conductors (Phils.) entered into aContract of Lease
with respondent Ultra Electronics Industries, Inc. for the use of the former's DCIM building for a
period of five years or until September 1991.
Ultra was, however, ejected from the premises on February 12, 1988 byvirtue of a court order, for
repeated violation of the terms and conditionsof the lease contract.
On September 28, 1987, a team of petitioner's inspectors conducted a surpriseinspection of the
electric meters installed at the DCIM building which were foundto be allegedly tampered with
and did not register the actual power consumptionin the building.
MERALCO informed TEC of the results of the inspection and demanded from the atter the
payment representing its unregistered consumption from February 10,1986 until September 28,
1987, as a result of the alleged tampering of the meters.
Since Ultra was in possession of the subject building during the covered period,TEC's Managing
Director, Mr. Bobby Tan, referred the demand letter to Ultra.
For failure of TEC to pay the differential billing, petitioner disconnected theelectricity supply to
the DCIM building.
TEC demanded from petitioner the reconnection of electrical service, claimingthat it had
nothing to do with the alleged tampering but the latter refused to heedthe demand.
Hence, TEC filed a complaint before the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) whichimmediately
ordered the reconnection of the service.
However, prior to the reconnection, petitioner conducted a scheduled inspectionof the
questioned meters and found them to have been tampered anew.
Meanwhile, on April 25, 1988, petitioner conducted another inspection, this time,in TEC's NS
Building. The inspection allegedly revealed that the electric meterswere not registering the
correct power consumption
MERALCO sent a letter demanding payment of representing the differentialbilling.
TEC denied petitioner's allegations and claim.
Petitioner, thus, sent TEC another letter demanding payment of the aforesaidamount, with a
warning that the electric service would be disconnected in case of continued refusal to pay the
differential billing.
To avert the impending disconnection of electrical service, TEC paid the aboveamount, under
protest.
TEC and TPC filed a complaint for damages against petitioner and Ultra beforethe RTC which
rendered a decision in their favor and affirmed by CA.
Petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not TEC tampered with the electric meters installed at its DCIM and NSbuildings;
2) If so, whether or not it is liable for the differential billing as computed by petitioner; and
3) whether or not petitioner was justified in disconnecting the electric power supply in TEC's DCIM
building.
HELD: The petition must fail.
50
 As to the alleged tampering of the electric meter in TEC's NS building, suffice it to state that the
allegation was not proven, considering that the meters therein were enclosed in a metal cabinet
the metal seal of which was unbroken, with petitioner having sole access to the said meters.
NELEN LAMBERT VS HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON
G.R. NO. 160709, FEBRUARY 23, 2005
FACTS:
Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around the city. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. After eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing
a bottle of beer they traversed the highway towards Tambo at high speed. Upon reaching Brgy.
Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a tamarraw jeepney, owned by Nelen Lambert
and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden
left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.
The heirs of Ray filed an action for damages against Nita the jeepney owner for the death of Ray
and damages to the motorcycle.
After trial the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Ray finding that Nita’s driver
was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the damages for which
Nita is liable. But the court reduced the liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of
Ray.
ISSUE: Nita claimed that the accident was entirely due to the fault of Ray since his motorcycle
bumped the rear of the jeepney and was therefore presumed to be the cause of the accident.
Was Nita correct?
HELD: No. The abrupt and sudden left turn of Gardo without first establishing his right of way, was
the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio.
Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces injury and without which the damage would not have occure.
The cause of collision is traceable to the negligent act of Gardo for without that sudden left turn
executed without precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Drivers of
vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident
unless contradicted by other evidence. The trial court likewise correct in finding Ray guilty of
contributory negligence, but the ratio of apportionment of damages must be increased. It was
established that at the time of the mishap Ray was 1) driving the motorcycle at high speed; 2)
was tailgating the jeepney; 3) had imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and 4) was not wearing a
protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximat
EQUITABLE PCI BANK vs NG SHEUNG NGOR
Facts: Ng Sheung Ngor, Ken Appliance Division, Inc. and Benjamin E. Go filed an action for
annulment and/or reformation of documents and contracts against petitioner Equitable PCI
Bank (Equitable) and its employees. Respondents claim that Equitable induced respondents to
avail of its peso and dollar credit facilities by offering low interest rates so they accepted
Equitable's proposal and signed the bank's pre-printed promissory notes on various dates
beginning 1996. They were allegedly unaware that the documents contained escalation clauses
granting Equitable authority to increase interest rates without their consent. Equitable argued
that the respondents knowingly signed the agreement.
RTC upheld the validity of the promissory notes. However, due to alleged damage of
respondent’s business reputation when Equitable froze their account, the trial court awarded
moral and exemplary damages to them.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper
Held: No basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer. To be entitled to moral
damages, a claimant must prove:
1. That he or she suffered besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant;
2. That the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission;
3. That the wrongful act or omission was the proximate cause of the damages the
claimant sustained;
4. The case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219
and 2220.
5.
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or
abusive.
When respondents defaulted on their obligation, Equitable applied respondents' deposits to their
loans upon maturity. Equitable had the right to exercise its legal right of set-off or compensation.
Whatever damage was sustained by the respondents was due to their failure to pay their loan.
Neither was there reason to award exemplary damages. Since respondents were not entitled to
moral damages, neither should they be awarded exemplary damages. And if respondents were
not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, neither could they be awarded attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
JOSE V. LAGON vs.HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 135657, January 17, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose V. Lagon (Lagon) is a businessman and owner of a commercial building in
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, who contracted Respondent Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc.
(Hooven), a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and installing of aluminum
materials, for the installation of said materials on the aforesaid building.
Two (2) contracts, both denominated Proposal, were entered into between the parties for a
total consideration of P104,870.00, where Hooven agreed to sell and install various aluminum
51
materials in Lagon's commercial building. Upon execution of the contracts, Lagon paid Hooven
P48,00.00 in advance.
Hooven commenced an action for sum of money with damages and attorney's fees against
Lagon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Hooven alleged that on different
occasions, it delivered and installed several construction materials in the commercial building of
Lagon pursuant to their contracts
. the exception and justify the grant of the award.[13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial
The RTC ruled that P39,140.00 remained unpaid and Lagon incurred delay. The RTC also
awarded Hooven P3,255.00 as attorney's fees, but sustained Lagon's counterclaims and
awarded him P26,120.00 as actual damages representing the value of the undelivered and
uninstalled materials, and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees in addition to litigation expenses of
P45,534.50. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which set aside the judgment of the
RTC and resolved the case in favor of Hooven. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner Lagon or Respondent Hooven is entitled for the award of attorney’s
fees.
HELD: Only Lagon is entitled to attorney’s fees of P30,000.00.
Considering the fact that Lagon was drawn into this litigation by Hooven and was compelled to
hire an attorney to protect and defend his interest, and taking into account the work done by
said attorney throughout the proceedings, as reflected in the record, we deem it just and
equitable to award attorney's fees for Lagon in the amount of P30,000.00.
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. State Investment House
GR No. 128538 February 28, 2001
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. amounting to
Php 129,824.48. To secure the payment of loan, private respondent executed a Comprehensive
Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity
date. SCC then failed to pay the loan when it matured. State Investment then sent demand
letters to SCC but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
State Investment filed a Civil Case against SCC at the RTC of Manila. SCC contended
that the promissory note upon which State Investment anchored its cause of action was null,
void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration. The RTC then promulgated its
decision in favor of State Investment. SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
contended that State Investment had failed to show, by preponderance of evidence, that that
the latter had a case against it. But, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed
from. SCC filed its motion for reconsideration but the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in awarding Attorney’s Fees to the
Private Respondent.
HELD: The Court ruled on the AFFIRMATIVE.
Petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having sustained the trial courts
award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v.
Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneys fees are awarded, the
reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision. Petitioner
submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of
attorneys fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court. The Court find for petitioner
in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be
disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to
explain the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
IRINGAN V. CA (2001)
Petitioners: ALFONSO L. IRINGAN
Respondents: CA, ANTONIO PALAO, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FELISA P.DELOS
SANTOS
FACTS:
March 22, 1985: Antonio Palao sold to Alfonso Iringan an undivided portion of a lot in
Tuguegarao. The parties executed a Deed of Sale with the purchase price of P295, 000, payable
as follows:
a. P10, 000 – upon the execution of this instrument, and for this purpose, the vendor
acknowledges having received the said amount from the vendee;
b. P140, 000 – on or before Apr. 30, 1985;
c. P145, 000 – on or before Dec. 31, 1985
When the second payment was due, Iringan only paid P40,000. Thus, on July, 18, 1985, Palao sent
a letter to Iringan stating that he considered the contract as rescinded for Iringan’s failure to
comply with his obligation, and that Palao would no longer accept any future payments.
Iringan agreed to the rescission but asked for the reimbursement of the P50,000 he paid as well
as geodetic engineer’s fee, attorney’s fee, and current interest. Palao refused.
Iringan then proposed that the P50,000 he paid be reimbursed or Palao could sell to him an
equivalent portion of the land. Still, Palao refused. Needless to say, they failed to reach an
agreement.
On July 1, 1991, Palao filed a Complaint for Judicial Confirmation of Rescission of Contract and
Damages against Iringan and his wife.
Iringans argued that the contract of sale was a consummated contract, hence, the remedy of
Palao was for collection of the balance of the purchase price and not rescission. Moreover, they
had always been ready and willing to comply w/ their obligations in accordance w/ said
contract.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Palao.
Iringan contended that no rescission was effected simply by virtue of the letter sent by Palao
stating that he considered the contract of sale rescinded. He also asserted that a judicial or
notarial act is necessary before one party can unilaterally effect a rescission.
52
Palao contended that the right to rescind is vested by law on the obligee and since Iringan did
not oppose the intent to rescind the contract, he in effect agreed to it and had the legal effect
of a mutually agreed rescission.
ISSUES: WON the contract of sale was validly rescinded
HELD: YES. A1592. “In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated
that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of
right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no
demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial
act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.”
A1592 requires the rescinding party to serve judicial or notarial notice of his intent to resolve the
contract.
Both RTC and CA affirmed the validity of the alleged mutual agreement to rescind based on
A1191, par. 1 and 2.
Even if Article 1191 were applicable, Palao would still not be entitled to automatic rescission. In
Escueta v. Pando, SC ruled that under A1124, OCC (now A1191), the right to resolve reciprocal
obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with what is
incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked judicially. The same article also provides:
"the court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of
a period."
However, when Palao filed an action for Judicial Confirmation of Rescission and Damages
before the RTC, he complied with the requirement of the law for judicial decree of rescission. The
complaint categorically stated that the purpose was 1) to compel appellants to formalize in a
public document, their mutual agreement of revocation and rescission; and/or 2) to have a
judicial confirmation of the said revocation/rescission under terms and conditions fair, proper
and just for both parties.
Iringan contends that even if the filing of the case were considered the judicial act required, the
action should be deemed prescribed based on the provisions of A1389.
A1389 applies to rescissible contracts, as enumerated and defined in A1380 and 1381. However,
that the "rescission" in A1381 is not akin to the term "rescission" in A1191 and 1592.
In A1191 and 1592, the rescission is a principal action which seeks the resolution or cancellation
of the contract while in A1381, the action is a subsidiary one limited to cases of rescission for
lesion as enumerated in said article.
The prescriptive period applicable to rescission under A1191 and 1592, is found in A1144, which
provides that the action upon a written contract should be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues.
The suit was brought on July 1, 1991, or six years after the default. It was filed within the period for
rescission. Thus, the contract of sale between the parties as far as the prescriptive period applies,
can still be validly rescinded.
CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) vs. ISAGANI C.
VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 141011. July 19, 2001
FACTS:
Isagani Villanueva opened a savings account and a current account with Citytrust Banking
Corporation. He deposited some money in his savings account with the Banks Makati Branch. He
requested new checkbook and filled up the requisition slip except his current account number
which he could not remember. The CSR of the Bank assured him that she could apply the
information from Banks account records. Another CSR, Pia Rempillo, filled the requisition slip with
its account number. Upon receiving the checkbook, he signed a check payable to Kingly
Commodities and delivered it to Helen Chu, the investment Consultant of Kingly Commodities.
The check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and disparity in the signature. Villanueva
called the Bank’s Makati Branch and was advised to re-deposit the check, which was again
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and a stop-payment order he allegedly issued.
Villanueva together with his investment consultant and trading partner personally inquire about
the matter. Marilou Guenino, the Bank’s branch Manager, found out that the account number
assigned to his new checkbook was the account number of another depositor with same name
but with different middle initial. Villanueva sent a demand letter for indemnification for actual
damages, moral and other damages suffered by him. Gregorio Anonas III, the Bank’s Senior
Vice-President, apologized but claimed that the dishonor was due to Villanueva’s failure, and
further stated that as soon as the mistake was discovered, the Bank promptly sent a check to
Kingly Commodities to avoid any further damage. Villanueva then filed a complaint for
damages based on breach of contract and/or quasi-delict before the RTC branch of Makati.
Bank claimed that it acted in good faith and asserted that Villanueva’s negligence was the
proximate cause of his self-proclaimed injury and the alleged losses and damages could not
likewise be deemed natural and probable consequence of the Banks breach of obligation, had
there been any,. Bank claimed that Villanueva acted with malice in filing the case.
ISSUE: Whether Villanueva is entitled to moral damages.
RULING:
No. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. Thus, case law establishes the
requisites for the award of moral damages, viz: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on
any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
It is beyond cavil that VILLANUEVA had sufficient funds for the check. Had his account
number been correct, the check would not have been dishonored. Hence, we can say that
VILLANUEVAs injury arose from the dishonor of his well-funded check. We have already ruled that
the dishonor of the check does not entitle him to compensatory damages. But, could the
dishonor result in his alleged intolerable physical inconvenience and discomfort, extreme
humiliation, indignities, etc, which he had borne before his peers, trading partners and officers of
Kingly Commodities? True, we find that under the circumstances of this case, VILLANUEVA might
have suffered some form of inconvenience and discomfort as a result of the dishonor of his
check. However, the same could not have been so grave or intolerable as he attempts to
portray or impress upon us.
53
Further, it is clear from the records that the BANK was able to remedy the caveat of Kingly
Commodities to VILLANUEVA that his trading account would be closed at 5:30 p.m. on 26 June
1986.The BANK was able to issue a managers check in favor of Kingly Commodities before the
deadline. It was able to likewise explain to Kingly Commodities the circumstances surrounding
the unfortunate situation. Verily, the alleged embarrassment or inconvenience caused to
VILLANUEVA as a result of the incident was timely and adequately contained, corrected,
mitigated, if not entirely eradicated. VILLANUEVA, thus, failed to support his claim for moral
damages. In short, none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code exists
to sanction the award for moral damages
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES &
RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
In 1946, Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings for the legal
adoption of petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. The petition was granted and Pedrosa
was declared the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina. In 1972, Miguel died intestate and his
heirs, Elena and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate,
adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Jose, Carmen,
Mercedes & Ramon, all surnamed Rodriguez, filed an action to annul Elena’s adoption which
was denied by the Court of First Instance. The decision was raised to the Court of Appeals. While
the appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. These
properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. The Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to third parties. The parties in the appeal filed
a joint Motion to Dismiss, wherein the appellate court dismissed the appeal but upheld the
validity of the adoption.
The petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were
not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The
petitioner filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition on January 29, 1987 and later amende on
March 25, 1987. The RTC dismissed the complaint and when the said decision was raised to the
Court of Appeals, it was affirmed. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the
Court of Appeals. Thus, the petition was filed with the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" had already prescribed
2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.
RULING:
1. No, the complaint had not yet prescribed.
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when
the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. The petitioner did not participate in the said partition, the
settlement is not binding on her. Furthermore, the provision is not applicable when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. The deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs (specifically Maria Elena, Miguel’s legally
adopted daughter), who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
vicious. Rosalina also cannot represent the petitioner in the partitioning since when Miguel died,
the petitioner was no longer a minor. Thus, the applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, which held that: The action to annul] a deed of
"extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. The complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three
years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, her action had not yet prescribed.
2. Yes, the petitioner can recover an award for damages.
No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence were presented to justify or
substantiate her claims for actual and moral damages. However, nominal damages are
awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be
vindicated and recognized. Technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was
not adequately and properly proved; petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal
participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father; the respondents had
transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and the case had dragged on for
more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in
recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such damages
should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept
and purpose of said damages.
BPI Investment Corporation vs. D.G. Carreon Commercial Corporation, Daniel G. Carreon, Aurora
J. Carreon, and Josefa M. Jeciel
G.R. No. 126524. November 29, 2001
Facts:
BPI Investment Corporation formerly known as Ayala Investment and Development Corporation,
was engaged in money market operations. The respondents D.G. Commercial Corporation was
a client of herein petitioner BPI investment together with spouses Daniel G. Carreon and Aurora
J. Carreon and Josefa M. Jeciel who also placed the personal moneys in the money market
placement. Sometime in the end of year 1979, BPI Investment paid D.G. Carreon twice,
representing a single money market placement due to bookkeeping error.
In 1982, BPI Investment wrote to respondents Daniel and Aurora Carreon demanding the return
of the over payments, the spouses however proposed a memorandum agreement in which the
BPI Investment ignored and instead filed a complaint for the recovery of sum of money against
D.G. Carreon with preliminary attachment. Respondent filed an answer with counterclaim,
wherein D.G Carreon asked for compensatory damages; spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon
asked for moral damages for the humiliation, great mental anguish, sleepless nights and
deterioration of health due to the filing of the complaint and indiscriminate and wrongful
attachment of their property, especially their residential house and payment of their money
market placement; Josefa Jeceil asked for moral damages; all respondents claimed for
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
54
The lower court finds the case unmeritorious and dismissed the case. On Appeal to the
Appellate Court, the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the complaint was affirmed, while the
counterclaim of defendants was granted and was awarded damages including exemplary
damages amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) to all defendants.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals awarded excessive moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees to respondents.

Held:
Yes. According to the Supreme Court, the law on exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts if the
defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Here, BPI Investments did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner, when it asked for preliminary attachment. It was just exercising a legal option. The sheriff
of the issuing court did the execution and the attachment. Hence, BPI Investments is not to be
blamed for the excessive and wrongful attachment. There is no doubt, however, that the
damages sustained by respondents were due to petitioners fault or negligence, short of gross
negligence. Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. The Court deems it prudent to award reasonable temperate damages to
respondents under the circumstances.

55