RULE 65
CERTIORARI
G.R. No. 162575 December 15, 2010
BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Respondent
Ponente: DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Facts:
 Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc. (SBDI) entered in two
Distributorship Agreements with petitioner and Able
Transport in April 2002. Under the Agreements, respondent,
as seller, will sell, deliver or procure to be delivered petroleum
products, and petitioner, as distributor, will purchase, receive
and pay for its purchases from respondent.
 By virtue of the provisions of the distribution agreement,
petitioner applied for and was granted a credit line by the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), International Exchange
Bank (IEBank), and Security Bank Corporation (SBC) and Asia
United Bank (AUB) an irrevocable domestic standby letter of
credit in favor of respondent.
 All these banks separately executed several undertakings
setting the terms and conditions governing the drawing of
money by respondent from these banks.
 Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her obligations to respondent
despite demand, thus, respondent tried to withdraw from these
bank undertakings.
 Petitioner then filed with the RTC of Quezon City separate
petitions against the banks for declaration of nullity of the
several bank undertakings and domestic letter of credit which
they issued with the application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction.
 Petitioner alleged that prevailing market rate at the time of
respondent's intended drawings with which petitioner will be
charged of as interests and penalties is oppressive, exorbitant,
unreasonable and unconscionable rendering it against public
morals and policy.
 The court then issued Order granting the TRO and requiring
petitioner to implead respondent Subic Bay as an
indispensable party.
 RTC: Ordered issuance of Preliminary Injunction, restraining all
banks from releasing any funds to Respondent Subic Bay.
 WITHOUT FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR
THE JUDGEMENT OF THE RTC, Respondent filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and
writ of Preliminary injunction against respondent RTC Judge
and the petitioner.
 CA: Granted petiotion for certiorari and lifted the TRO issued
by the RTC.
 Petitioner claims that CA committed serious and reversible
error in giving due course and granting Respondents petition
even if it failed to file a motion for reconsideration before RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the lower
court was fatal infirmity to a Certiorari Petition.
Ruling:
 NO.
 Certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking
the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the
proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.16 It is an original and independent
action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the
complaint filed before the trial court.
 Petition is DENIED
G.R. No. 193058 July 8, 2015
EDGAR C. NUQUE, Petitioner, vs. FIDEL AQUINO and SPOUSES
ALEJANDRO and ERLINDA BABINA, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Herein petitioner is the owner of three parcels of land located in
Tarlac City. He acquired these lots in a public auction sale conducted by
the Sheriff of Tarlac City. The subject properties were originally owned by
one Hospicia Cardona (Cardona) who was able to obtain titles over the
said properties as early as 1935 and 1941. It is through Cardona’s titles
that petitioner derived his ownership over the disputed lands after
purchasing them in the abovementioned auction sale. However, petitioner
later discovered that herein respondent Fidel Aquino (Aquino) was able
to obtain title over the Lots by means of filing an application for free
patent, the subject lots were already owned by Cardona. Nonetheless,
Aquino was able to sell the subject properties to the spouses Alejandro
and Erlinda Babina (respondent spouses) who also obtained title over the
disputed lots. Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC of Tarlac City a
Complaint for cancellation of title and damages.
RTC declared null and void the OCT under the name of the private
respondents and declared as valid that of the petitioner.
The case, which was appealed by respondent Alejandro Babina
(Aljendro), eventually reached this Court. Court resolved to consider the
case closed and terminated for failure of Alejandro to file his petition for
review on certiorari. The Resolution had become final and executory on
September 13, 2006.
Respondent spouses’ title over the disputed lots was subsequently
canceled pursuant to and Order issued by the RTC. In the meantime,
petitioner learned that respondent spouses were occupying the subject
properties.
Petitioner filed with the RTC an Ex-Parte Motion for Writ of Possession
praying that he be placed in possession of the subject lots. Respondent
spouses, on the other hand, filed a motion for reimbursement of expenses
contending that they are possessors in good faith and that they are
entitled to be reimbursed for the improvements therein.
RTC denied the motions of both petitioner and respondent spouses. As to
petitioner’s motion, the RTC held that petitioner’s complaint was an
action for the cancellation of titles and that there was no prayer for the
recovery of possession of the disputed lots. The trial court also ruled that
its previous Decision had already become final and executory and has,
thus, become immutable and unalterable. Thus, the RTC concluded that,
since petitioner’s motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is not a
legal consequence of his action for cancellation of title, the said motion
can no longer be entertained after the finality of the decision in the action
for cancellation of title.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition
on the ground that the latter failed to move for the reconsideration of the
questioned RTC Order before filing his petition for certiorari. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper.
Rule 65 - - - 1 | P a g e
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. the outset, the Court agrees with
petitioner’s contention that the RTC Order denying his motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession is in the nature of a final order, as it left
nothing else to be resolved thereafter. Proceeding from this premise,
petitioner’s proper remedy was, thus, to appeal the RTC Order. It is settled
that the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits,
final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error
ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or
grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements
for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal. Thus, it was wrong for
petitioner to immediately resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
when he could have appealed the assailed RTC Order. While it is true that
the availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to a special civil
action of certiorari in cases where appeal is not adequate, equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient, petitioner failed to demonstrate that
these instances are present in the instant case.
In any case, even granting that petitioner’s resort to a certiorari petition is
proper, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in dismissing his
petition on the ground that he failed to move for the reconsideration of
the assailed RTC Order prior to filing his certiorari petition.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1, Petitioner for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, or resolution subject thereof copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
Our jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the plain and
adequate remedy referred to in the foregoing rule is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is
an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari. It is true that there are exceptions to the above rule, to wit: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or public interest is involved. However, an examination of the petition for
certiorari filed with the CA would reveal that petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the case falls under any of the above exceptions. Neither
was he able to show any other sufficient justification for dispensing with
the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration.
A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of
right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he
who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Petitioner ought to be reminded of the hornbook rule that judgments
become final and executory or, as petitioner puts it, "closed and finished,"
only upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal or to file a
motion for reconsideration without any appeal or motion for
reconsideration having been made.
G.R. No. 175792 November 21, 2012
RUBEN C. MAGTOTO and ARTEMIA MAGTOTO, Petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, and LEONILA DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Leonila sold her three parcels of land to petitioner Ruben C.
Magtoto. Ruben issued several postdated checks as payment. Meanwhile,
most of the checks that Ruben issued were dishonored. Despite Leonila’s
repeated demands, the balance of P9,497,750.00 remained unpaid. Hence,
the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages and prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction against the spouses.
1. June 6, 2003 - spouses Magtoto were served with summons requiring
them to file an Answer within 15 days from notice. The said spouses
thrice moved for extensions of time within which to file the same.
2. August 2, 2003 – last day given by RTC to spouses for filing the
Answer
3. August 4, 2003 - two days after the last day for filing the Answer, the
spouses Magtoto instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
4. September 25, 2003 - Atty. Noel T. Canlas (Atty. Canlas) filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Withdraw Appearance as counsel for petitioners. The
motion was set for hearing but Atty. Canlas failed to appear.
5. January 23, 2004 - Leonila filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in
Default and to Render Judgment Based on the Complaint. Citing
Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, Leonila argued that after the
denial of their Motion to Dismiss, spouses Magtoto should have filed
their Answer within the reglementary period. However, despite the
lapse of more than three months from receipt of notice of denial of
their Motion to Dismiss, the spouses Magtoto still failed to file their
Answer. Leonila also cautioned the spouses Magtoto that their
counsel’s withdrawal of appearance does not justify their failure to
file an Answer.
6. The motion to declare petitioners in default was heard by the RTC.
During said hearing, Ruben was present. The court a quo noted that
despite the spouses Magtoto’s counsel’s withdrawal of appearance,
they have not yet engaged the services of another counsel. The RTC
thus deemed the motion submitted for resolution.
7. March 23, 2004 - RTC declared the spouses Magtoto in default
8. June 25, 2004 - almost 3 months after they were declared in default,
the spouses Magtoto, through their new counsel, filed an Omnibus
Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, and
their Answer. The RTC denied the said motion.
The spouses Magtoto moved for reconsideration but the same was
likewise denied by the said court.
RTC: Spouses Magtoto failed to comply with their obligation to pay the full
amount of P11,952,750.00 for the purchase of the three parcels of land
and ordering them to pay the balance thereof.
CA: dismissed the appeal. Even prior to the initial dismissal of the
complaint, spouses Magtoto were already in delay. Instead of filing an
answer, spouses Magtoto’s counsel, lodged a motion to withdraw
appearance because he has lost contact with his clients despite
reasonable efforts to communicate with them. Thus, the principal cause of
the delay is no other than the spouses Magtoto. In the case at bar, spouses
Magtoto simply failed to provide persuasive reasons to warrant the
relaxation of the rule.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA , the
spouses Magtoto are now before this Court by way of this Petition for
Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari is proper.
Ruling: Petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate. Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse
Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on
Rule 65 - - - 2 | P a g e
Certiorari. As such, this petition should have been dismissed outright for
being a wrong mode of appeal. Even if the petition is to be treated as filed
under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for late filing and there being
no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records show that petitioners
received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration on October 30, 2006. They therefore had 15 days or until
November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court. However, they filed their Petition for
Certiorari on December 29, 2006, after the period to file a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired. Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal
which is not allowed.
The spouses Magtoto’s failure to file a timely Answer was due to their
own fault; the RTC correctly declared them in default.
We agree with the CA that the RTC correctly declared the spouses Magtoto
in default. The records show that after receipt of the summons, the
spouses Magtoto thrice requested for extensions of time to file their
Answer. The RTC granted these requests. For their final request for
extension, the RTC gave the spouses Magtoto until August 2, 2003 within
which to file their Answer. But still, no Answer was filed. Instead, on
August 4, 2003, or two days after the deadline for filing their Answer, the
spouses Magtoto filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Despite its
belated filing, the RTC acted on the motion and resolved the same, albeit
not in favor of the said spouses. Thereafter, Atty. Canlas, petitioners’
former counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his appearance since he could
no longer effectively defend spouses Magtoto because he had lost
communication with them.
After the denial of their Motion to Dismiss, petitioners should have filed
their Answer within the balance of the period prescribed in Rule 11.
Instead, they filed their Answer 9 months after the denial of their Motion
to Dismiss or 3 months after they were declared in default. This delay is
unreasonable as well as unjustified.
We find the allegations of spouses Magtoto as part of their desperate
efforts to attribute negligence to everybody else but themselves. RTC gave
spouses Magtoto until August 2, 2003 within which to file their Answer.
They did not file their Answer despite the deadline. It was only on
September 25, 2003 that Atty. Canlas moved to withdraw his appearance.
Clearly, even before Atty. Canlas moved for the withdrawal of his
appearance, the period within which spouses Magtoto should have filed
their Answer had already expired. This means that as early as that time,
they had already compromised their case. Hence, they cannot shift the
blame to the RTC for not resolving their counsel's motion to withdraw.
Besides, said withdrawal was not automatic as it was set for hearing but
their counsel however was absent during said hearing.
Similarly, petitioners should not blame Leonila for their failure to timely
file their Answer. Indeed, the RTC initially dismissed the case due to
Leonila’s lack of interest to prosecute. However, by this time, petitioners
were already in delay in filing their Answer. Recall that their Motion to
Dismiss was denied as early as September 11, 2003. Atty. Canlas received
the notice of denial on September 17, 2003. Hence, by December 12,
2003, the prescriptive period for filing the Answer had definitely expired.
It has not also escaped our notice that when Leonila moved to declare
petitioners in default, she already intimated that petitioners’
reglementary period to file an Answer had already lapsed. At the same
time, she reminded petitioners not to use their counsel’s withdrawal as
justification for not filing their Answer. Still, petitioners did nothing to
remedy their situation. When Leonila’s motion to declare petitioners in
default was heard, the RTC reminded Ruben in open court that after their
counsel’s withdrawal of appearance, they have not yet engaged the
services of a new lawyer. Again, petitioners did nothing. It was only after a
lapse of considerable time that they engaged the services of a new
counsel and filed their Answer.
In fine, the belated filing of the Answer is solely attributable to the
spouses Magtoto. They miserably failed to be vigilant in protecting and
defending their cause. The RTC thus properly declared them in default.
San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Pampanga Omnibus Development
Corporation and Dominic G. Aquino
GR 168088 (April 3, 2007)
Facts: Respondent Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (PODC)
secured 2 loans from petitioner amounting to Php 750,000.00 each
evidenced by separate promissory notes and secured by a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land in San Fernando, Pampanga which
respondent PODC owns. Meanwhile, PODC president Eliza M. Garbes and
her husband secured a Php 950,000.00 loan from petitioner secured by a
chattel mortgage over their personal property. Upon respondent PODC’s
failure to pay its loan, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a
Certificate of Sale on May 9, 2001, which stated that the period for
redemption of the property shall expire 1 year after registration in the
Register of Deeds. Petitioner did not file a writ of possession during the
redemption period. On May 11, 2002, petitioner executed a notarized
deed of assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its
right to redeem the property. Respondent Aquino redeemed the property
for Php1,588,094.00 but petitioner rejected the offer and demanded the
payment of Php 16,805,414.00 (including the loan of Garbes). Respondent
Aquino rejected petitioner’s demand. In a letter dated June 4, 2002, the
Ex-Officio Sheriff informed petitioner that subject property had been
redeemed by respondent Aquino. On June 10, 2002, petitioner executed
an Affidavit of Consolidation over the subject property, which respondent
Aquino opposed in a letter dated June 14, 2002 and requesting the
Register of Deeds not to register the petitioner’s Affidavit of
Consolidation. On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ
of Possession in the RTC of Pampanga which PODC opposed claiming that
it is respondent Aquino who is entitled to a Writ of Possession. Said
petition was granted in favor of the petitioner on December 20, 2002.
Respondents filed a joint motion to quash the writ of possession with the
CA, which the latter granted. Petitioner then filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner availed of the correct remedy.
Held: Yes. The petition is meritorious. The December 20, 2002 order of
the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession is final. The remedy
of respondents was to appeal to the CA by filing their notice of appeal
within the period therefor. Indeed, when the RTC denied the motion of
respondents to quash the writ, respondents appealed to the CA under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. An order granting a writ of possession
under Act No. 3135 as amended is final, hence appealable. Even if the trial
court erred in granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is
merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a
petition for a writ of certiorari. Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope
and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal
workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not to correct errors of judgment. As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion
will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by
an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of
law are involved. A cert writ maybe issued if the court or quasi-judicial
body issues an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. The threshold issue between petitioner and
respondents in the RTC was the correct amount of redemption money.
The ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of possession does not
become discretionary simply because the Register of Deeds had elevated
to the LRA the question of who should be given the Torrens title of the
subject property. The issue of the amount of redemption is a matter that
should be resolved by the courts. The LRA was vested with jurisdiction to
Rule 65 - - - 3 | P a g e
resolve only the registrability of the Affidavit of Consolidation and
Certificate of Redemption. Hence, the remedy availed of is proper.
GR No. 154462 January 19, 2011
Spouses Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division Of The Court Of Appeals,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur,
AndspousesGualberto& Rene Cabahug-Superales
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts: This case originated from a Complaint for forcible entry, damages,
and attorneys fees filed by respondents spouses Gualberto and Rene
Cabahug Superales (spouses Superales) against the spouses Leynes
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Branch 1 of Bansalan-
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. That the [spouses Superales] were the actual
occupants and possessors, being lawful owners of that certain parcel of a
residential lot within the NebradaSubd., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, That
sometime in February 2000, the [spouses Leynes] through force, stealth
and strategy encroached upon and occupied a portion of the [spouses
Superales] titled property Summons together with a copy of the
aforementioned Complaint was served on the spouses Leynes on May 10,
2000, giving them ten (10) days from receipt within which to file their
answer pursuant to Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The
10-day period for the filing of the spouses Leynes answer prescribed on
May 20, 2000, a Saturday. The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex
Parte Motion for in which they prayed that since the spouses Leynes
failed to file their answer to the Complaint within the prescribed period,
then judgment could now be rendered based on the evidence and
allegations contained in the Complaint. MCTC rendered its Judgment
denying the spouses Leynes Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and
resolving Civil Case entirely in the spouses Superales favor. Aggrieved, the
spouses Leynes appealed the foregoing MCTC Judgment to the Regional
Trial Court The spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration in which they sought the recall of the Decision dated July
9, 2001 and the remand of the case to the MCTC for trial on the merits.
However, the RTC, refused to reconsider its earlier decision. On October
11, 2001, the spouses Superales filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution
pursuant to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides for the immediate execution of the RTC judgment against the
defendant notwithstanding further appeal of the same before the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.Expectedly, the spouses Leynes opposed
the spouses Superales Motion for Execution. The spouses Leynes then
filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
on November 17, 2001. In its Resolution dated December 20, 2001, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes petition outright for being
the wrong remedy On January 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting
the spouses Superales Motion for Execution. On February 11, 2002, the
spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Manifestation with motion to hold in
abeyance the enforcement of the writ of execution, considering their
pending Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December
20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals. On May 17, 2002, the spouses Leynes
received a copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated May 7, 2002
denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. Thereafter, on July 17, 2002, the spouses
Leynes filed the instant Petition for Certiorari charging the Court of
Appeals, as well as the RTC and the MCTC, with grave abuse of discretion
Issue: W/N the proper remedy of the spouses Leynes is to file Petition for
Certiorari under rule 65?
Held: Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy if Appeal Is Available Where
appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not
be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and
certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence,
certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if
ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor
is grave abuse of discretion.We reiterate the well-settled rule that
certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is
plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.
The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the
availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are
mutually exclusive. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as
a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost. Appeal and
Certiorari Distinguished Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari,
there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below. As to
the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC,
we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light: When a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive
such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the
original civil action of certiorari. The supervisory jurisdiction of a court
over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error
is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of
judgment appeal is the remedy. As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal,
the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a
certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance
with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a
petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or
order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to
the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower
court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and
the private respondents, respectively). As to the Subject Matter.Only
judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari
may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to
an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy. As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals
should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from
the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be
filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed
also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of
the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be
filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was
Rule 65 - - - 4 | P a g e
timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion. As
to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy
expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order. The RTC decided Civil Case No. XXI-
228 (00) in its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the RTC Decision dated July
9, 2001, which affirmed the MCTC Judgment of May 29, 2000 against the
spouses Leynes, and Resolution inadvertently also dated July 9, 2001,
which denied the spouses Leynes Motion for Reconsideration, should
have been appealed to the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. he spouses Leynes, however,
went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court The spouses Leynes, however, went before the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
#6 PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (PHILEC), Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION
BOARD (NCMB), Department of Labor and Employment, RAMON T.
JIMENEZ, in his capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, PHILEC WORKERS'
UNION (PWU), ELEODORO V. LIPIO, and EMERLITO C.
IGNACIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168612 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
 Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) and its rank-and-file
employees were governed by collective bargaining agreements
providing for the following step increases in an employee’s
basic salary in case of promotion.
 PHILEC selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr., for promotion.
 PHILEC and PHILEC Workers’ Union (PWU)entered into a new
collective bargaining agreement.
 Under the new collective bargaining agreement, a rank-and-file
employee promoted shall be entitled to step increases in his or
her basic salary.
 Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the
memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio,Sr. did not conform to
the new collective bargaining agreement, PWU submitted the
grievance to the grievance machinery.
 PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance.
Thus, the parties filed a submission agreement20 with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board
 PWU maintained that PHILEC failed to follow the schedule of
step increases under the new collective bargaining agreement.
 For PHILEC’s failure to apply the schedule of step increases the
new CBA, PWU argued that PHILEC committed an unfair labor
practice.
 PHILEC disputed PWU’s claim of unfair labor practice.
According to PHILEC, it did not violate its collective bargaining
agreement with PWU when it implemented the "Modified SGV"
scale.
 Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez held in the decision that PHILEC
violated its collective bargaining agreement with PWU
 Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez dismissed PWU’s claim of unfair
labor practice.
 PHILEC filed a motion for partial reconsiderationof Voluntary
Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision
 Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez denied PHILEC’s motion for
partial reconsideration for lack of merit.
 PHILEC filed its petition for certiorari before the Court
ofAppeals 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez’s resolution, alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez
gravely abused his discretion in rendering his decision.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s
decision
 PHILEC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied.
 PHILEC filed its petition for review on certiorari before this
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of Petition for Certiorari is the
proper remedy?
HELD: No.This petition should be denied.
This was not the proper remedy.
Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s
or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the
award or decision before the Court of Appeals.
Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency, this court concluded
that a decision or award rendered by a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable
before the Court of Appeals.
Article 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator "shall befinal and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.
Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the
Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision mustbe appealed before the Court of
Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided
in the Labor Code.
Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision "shall befinal
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties."
(Highlighted in the Book)
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such
court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." 97 An
extraordinary remedy,98 a petition for certiorari may be filed only if
appeal is not available. 99 If appeal is available, an appeal must be
taken even if the ground relied upon is grave abuse of discretion.100
As an exception to the rule, this court has allowed petitions for
certiorari to be filed in lieu of an appeal "(a) when the public welfare
and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader
interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and
(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority."
PHILEC filed its petition for certiorari before the Court ofAppeals on
August 29, 2000,108 which was 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary
Arbitrator Jimenez’s resolution. The petition for certiorari was filed
beyond the 10-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. We cannot
consider PHILEC’s petition for certiorari as an appeal.
There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez’s decision became final and executory after 10 calendar days
Rule 65 - - - 5 | P a g e
from PHILEC’s receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial
reconsideration.
#7 LE SOLEIL INT'L. LOGISTICS CO., INC., AND/OR BETH UMALI,
REYNANTE MALABANAN, AND EUGENIO S. YNION,
JR., Petitioners, v. VICENTE SANCHEZ, DAVID R. CONDE, AND NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199384, September 09, 2015
FACTS:
 The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioners for failing to perfect their
petition for certiorariwithin the 60-day reglementary period.
 The Court resolves to dismiss the petition outright on the
following grounds:
o First, the petition was filed three (3) days late on
September 5, 2011
o Second, the petition contains no statement of the
specific material dates showing when petitioners
received a copy of the assailed decision.
o Third, the petition does not state the date of issue of
petitioners' counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not exercising its equity
jurisdiction as enunciated by jurisprudence on the matter.
HELD: No. Petition is denied.
(Highlighted in the book)
The general rule is that a timely appeal is the remedy to obtain
reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits. This is true
even if one of the errors to be assigned on appeal is the lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering the judgment over the
subject matter, or the exercise of power by said court is in excess of
its jurisdiction, or the making of its findings of fact or of law set out
in the decision is attended by grave abuse of discretion.
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory
because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by
the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude
the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the
judgment.
Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution.
Xxx
In this case, there is no debate that petitioners incurred in delay in filing
the petition for certioraribefore the appellate court.
While petitioners concede that the filing of the appeal was three days late,
they however invoke the indulgence of the Court to liberally apply the
rules to pave the way for the resolution of the case on the merits.
However, there is no compelling reason to except this case from the
operation of the general rule since none of the exceptionsenunciated in
the jurisprudence is attendant herein.
The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this
Court cannot trifle with.
CASE 8
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN
FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON
CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
This case is a direct resort to the Court by petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
The petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the
original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that
gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80’s. Initially,
respondent Judge gave due course to the petition, but after the
preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal which the RTC
subsequently denied for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to
reconsider
Hence, the petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that
respondent Judge had "unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon
him as a duly [sic] under Rule 7, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of
Court;"5 that "in finally dismissing the herein subject Petition for
Reconsideration, respondent Honorable Acting Presiding Judge has acted
without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion
to the further damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner;" and that it
had no other remedy in the course of law except through the present
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
The University of the Philippines (UP) sought leave to
intervene, attaching to its motion the intended comment/opposition-in-
intervention. The motion for the UP’s intervention was granted.
Respondent Judge justified the dismissal of the petition for
reconstitution by citing the opposition by the OSG and the UP, as well as
the recommendation of the Land Registration Authority (LRA). He
pointed out that the petitioner did not present its purported Torrens title
to be reconstituted; that the petitioner’s claim was doubtful given the
magnitude of the land area involved; and that the UP’s ownership of the
portion of land covered by petitioner’s claim had long been settled by the
Court in a long line of cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari and mandamus is devoid of
procedural and substantive merit.
HELD: YES
Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only
under the conditions defined by the Rules of Court. The conditions are
that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
Rule 65 - - - 6 | P a g e
quasi judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 19Without jurisdiction
means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority; there is excess
of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority; grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in the
Supreme Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there
are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The
Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free
itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford
time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks
that the Constitution has assigned to it.
Therefore, there being no special, important or compelling
reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of
courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
Case 9
FELIX UY CHUA, ROBERT IPING CHUA, RICHARD UY CHUA and Atty.
FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., petitioners, vs., COURT OF APPEALS,
SOFIA O. SANCHEZ, assisted by husband FORTUNATO
SANCHEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 121438. October 23, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Fernando B. Morada owned lot Cebu City. His only heirs were his
wife, Aida N. Morada, and two minor children. After his death, the probate
court presided by Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez appointed Aida as
administratrix of her husband’s estate.
The probate court allowed the sale of the lot to the spouses
Precioso and Consolacion Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida agreed to
rescind the said sale.
Later on, the probate court again issued an order allowing the re-
sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the P200K
already paid by the Enriquez spouses. A Deed of Absolute Sale thereof
was executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, P1M
payable with a down payment of P500K and the balance to be paid after
the lot was cleared of squatters.
Intervenor Sagrario Moreles filed a motion for reconsideration
opposing the sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs
of Fernando. He claimed that the land could be sold for P1.5 million pesos.
Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented
undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land. During the
conference, Atty. Cabilao revealed that he offered P2M for the lot. Judge
Abarquez approved the proposal of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property
and at the same time issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and
declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had earlier
approved with respondent Sofia Sanchez. Sanchez filed a motion for
reconsideration and made a counter-offer but her motion was denied by
the court.
After more than six months had elapsed since her receipt of the
order complained of and after more the five months after said order was
certified as final and executor, Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari under
rule 65 before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent Judges
Abarquez and Alinñ o-Hormachelos abused their discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when they issued the questioned orders.
The appellate court granted the
petition and the Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and
reinstated.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an error to bring the case before the
Court of Appeals on certiorari under Rule 65.
HELD: NO
Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for respondent was
to appeal under Rule 45 under which private respondent was already
time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance of
the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and
precedents.
A special civil action or certiorari challenging the RTC with
grave abuse of discretion may be instituted either in the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court. Both have original concurrent jurisdiction.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal
period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null
and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. As early as Crisostomo vs. Endencia, SC
held:
The remedy by certiorari may be successfully
invoked both in cases wherein an appeal does
not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal
having been lost with or without the appellants
negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue
the order or decision which is the subject matter
of the remedy.
Rule 65 Case # 10.
G.R. No. 85466 October 16, 1992
HUALAM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and TAN BEE
GIOK, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE,
INC., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts: The Private respondent (State Investment House, Inc.)entered
into a Contract to Sell with Petitioner (Hualam Construction and
Development Corporation)relative to a condominium unit occupied by
the latter in the respondent’s property. The said unit was payable in
installments.
Rule 65 - - - 7 | P a g e

However, despite repeated demands, petitioners failed and refused to pay
the accumulated downpayment, installments, utility charges and other
assessments mentioned in the Contract to Sell.As such, the private
respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners with
the MTC of Manila.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent, ordering
the petitioners to vacate the premises of the unit they were occupying in
the respondent’s property.
Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal before the MTC.
Private respondent filed for a Motion for Immediate Execution and the
MTC grantedthe same.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
MTC.It directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Pursuant to the same,
Deputy Sheriff Justinianodela Cruz of the MTC (Branch 27)restored the
possession of Unit No. 1505 to the private respondent and simultaneously
levied upon the personal properties of the petitioners found in the
premises to satisfy the money judgment decreed in the decision.
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari with
injunction against the Hon. Jose R. Bueno, the Sheriff and the private
respondent. They sought the issuance of an order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the writ of execution.
The RTC granted the petitioner’s petition and declared null and void the
Orders issued by the Respondent Judge of the MTC as well as the levy on
Petitioners' personal properties.
The Respondents were ordered to return to the Petitioners the personal
properties sold at public auction and to restore to Hualam the possession
of the aforementioned condominium unit.
The respondent filed a motion for RTC to reconsider said decision, but the
same was denied. Private respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals found the respondent’s petition meritorious and
granted the same, reversing and setting aside the RTC’s decision. It
reinstated the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila together
with all subsequent orders issued thereunder.
In ruling for the herein private respondent, the Court of Appeals declared
that the petitioner’s remedy is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary
appeal. Since they had already filed a notice of appeal, they should have
prosecuted it. Also, a petition for certiorari may not be availed of as
substitute for appeal.
Issue: W/N a certiorari may be availed as a substitute for appeal in the
case at bar?
Ruling:
The Court disagreed with the opinion and conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the proper remedy to assail the orders of the MTC is an
ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari.
According to the Court, under the circumstances obtaining in the case, the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court could
be availed of by the petitioners.
Since the MTC granted the motion for execution, the petitioners' ouster
from the premises was imminent. The appeal earlier interposed cannot
then be said to constitute an adequate remedy to prevent their ouster
from the premises. They cannot be confined or restricted to the sole
remedy of an appeal and simply wait for the judgment thereon by the
RTC.
Under such circumstances, the appellate process would be too slow and
the wait too long; it is also evident that such mode of review would be
inadequate and insufficient.
It is settled that although the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper
when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown
that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not
promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order
complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.
Prescinding, therefore, from the foregoing discussions, it is clear that the
dispositive portion of the challenged decision of the respondent Court is
correct, except insofar as that portion reinstating the decision of the MTC
is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals of 5 August 1988 is AFFIRMED subject
to the modification above indicated.
Costs against petitioners.
Rule 65 Case # 11
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 197665
P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE, SPO1 FERMO R. GALLARDE, PO3
LLOYD F. SORIA, PO1 HOMER D. GENEROSO, PO1 SERGS DC. MACEREN,
PO3 AVELINO L. GRAVADOR, PO2 FIDEL O. GUEREJERO, and PO1 JEROME
T. NOCHEFRANCA, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices from
implementing its Decision1 dated May 24, 2011 issued in OMB-P-A-07-
1396-L finding petitioners guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing the
penalty of Dismissal from Service, together with its accessory penalties.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint2 filed by Sandra UyMatiao
against petitioners P/S Insp. Samson B. Belmonte, SPO1 Fermo R.
Gallarde, PO3 Lloyd F. Soria, PO1 Homer D. Generoso, PO1 Sergs DC.
Maceren, PO3 Avelino L. Gravador, PO2 Fidel O. Guerejero, PO1 Jerome T.
Nochefranca, Jr., members of the Regional Traffic Management Office-7
(RTMO-7) as well as P/Supt. Eleuterio N. Gutierrez, Regional Director of
the Traffic Management Group Region 7 (TMG-R7).
Rule 65 - - - 8 | P a g e
In said Complaint, Sandra alleged that sometime on September 3, 2007 in
Dumaguete City, petitioners flagged down her vehicle because the 2007
LTO sticker was not displayed on its windshield. Consequently, petitioners
proceeded to seize and impound the subject vehicle without any warrant
or existing complaint for theft. Thereafter, Sandra alleged that they asked
her if she could shoulder their lodging expenses at the OK Pensionne
House and treat them for dinner while an initial macro-etching
examination was being conducted on her vehicle. Sandra acceded. While
on their way to dinner, however, petitioner Belmonte told Sandra to just
settle the problem for three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00).3
The next day, the macro-etching examination revealed that the engine,
chassis and production numbers of Sandra’s vehicle were tampered.
Because of this, the vehicle was placed under the list of stolen vehicles
and was subsequently brought to the PNP-TMG 7 Office in Cebu City
under the custody of P/Supt. Gutierrez.
In a demand letter dated September 14, 2007, Sandra requested Gutierrez
to release the subject vehicle. Immediately thereafter, she received a
phone call from petitioner Belmonte threatening to file criminal charges
against her for violations of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known
as the Anti-Carnapping Act and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Despite such threat, Sandra
filed a civil case against petitioners for Recovery of Personal Property
with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin before the RTC of Cebu City.
Conversely, petitioners filed the criminal cases they had previously
threatened to file against Sandra before the Prosecutor’s Office of
Dumaguete City, docketed as I.S. No. 2007-443.4
On December 12, 2007, Sandra filed the subject Administrative Complaint
for Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against petitioners before
the Visayas Office of the Ombudsman. In their Counter-Affidavits,
petitioners denied the charges and pleaded, as part of their defense, the
findings of Prosecutor May Flor V. Duka on the criminal charges for Anti-
Carnapping and Anti-Fencing in her Resolution dated December 14, 2007
which upheld, in their favor, the presumption of regularity in their
performance of duty. The Resolution noted that petitioners were on
official duty at the time when they apprehended and seized the subject
motor vehicle for not bearing the 2007 LTO sticker.
Petitioners also invoked good faith as regards the allegation that their
hotel accommodation was paid for by Sandra claiming to be in honest
belief that it was P/Supt. Manuel Vicente of the Negros Traffic
Management Office (NTMO) who billeted them at the OK Pensionne
House at said office’s own expense, and without any inkling that it was
Sandra who had paid for the same. They further averred that Sandra is
guilty of forum shopping due to the fact that she had already filed a civil
case for Recovery of Personal Property before the RTC of Cebu City, which
contains similar issues with the administrative case except for the
allegation of extortion, a mere afterthought.5
In her Reply-Affidavit, Sandra denied the forum shopping allegation in
stressing that her present cause of action pertains to petitioners’ acts of
extortion while the civil case for Recovery of Personal Property seeks the
recovery of the subject motor vehicle. She also averred that petitioners
tried to make it appear that there were irregularities in her vehicle so that
they could extort money from her. But when she refused to succumb to
their demands, they filed the Anti-Carnapping and Anti-Fencing charges.
On May 24, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Decision finding petitioners guilty of Grave Misconduct. It ruled that
Sandra presented substantial evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support
her allegations that petitioners demanded and received favours from her
as consideration for the processing of the macro-etching examination of
the subject vehicle. Accordingly;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents P/S INSP. SAMSON B.
BELMONTE, SPO3 LLOYD F. SORIA, PO1 HOMER D. GENEROSO, PO1
JEROME T. NOCHEFRANCA, JR., PO3 AVELINO L. GRAVADOR, SPO2
FERMO R. GALLARDE, PO2 FIDEL O. QUEREJERO, PO1 SERGS DC
MACEREN are hereby found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and are meted
out the extreme penalty of Dismissal from the Service, together with its
accessory penalties. Respondent P/SUPT. ELEUTERIO N. GUTIERREZ, on
the other hand, is hereby exonerated of the instant administrative
charges.6
On July 18, 2011, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing
that the Ombudsman’s decision is not supported by evidence and that the
penalty of dismissal imposed on them is oppressive.
Before the Ombudsman could resolve the said motion, however,
petitioners elevated the matter to the Court by filing the instant Petition
for Prohibition on August 3, 2011, praying that the Court issue a Writ of
Prohibition and Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction commanding the Ombudsman to desist from implementing its
Decision dated May 24, 2011 ordering their dismissal from service
pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration with said office or
until remedies under the Rules and law have been fully exhausted.
The Court notes, however, that on September 6, 2011, a month after the
filing of the instant petition, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an
Order7 modifying its Decision by finding petitioners guilty not of Grave
Misconduct, but of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and further modifying the penalty from dismissal to suspension from
office for a period of six (6) months and (1) day without pay. The
dispositive portion of said Order provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
the Decision dated 24 May 2011, be RECONSIDERED and MODIFIED.
Accordingly, this Office finds respondents P/S INSP. SAMSON B.
BELMONTE, SPO2 FERMO R. GALLARDE, SPO3 LLOYD F. SORIA, PO1
HOMER D. GENEROSO, PO1 SERGS DC MACEREN, PO3 AVELINO L.
GRAVADOR, PO2 FIDEL O. QUEREJERO and PO1 JEROME T.
NOCHEFRANCA, JR., guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and are hereby meted the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of Six (6) months and (1) day without pay. If the penalty of
suspension can no longer be served by reason of retirement or
resignation, the alternative penalty of FINE equivalent to the SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY salary of the respondents shall be imposed,
and shall be deducted from their retirement or separation benefits.
Considering that the Decision of the Ombudsman is immediately effective
and executory, petitioners alleged that they were left with no appeal, or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy but the instant petition.
According to them, their Motion for Reconsideration would not operate to
stay the implementation of the Decision rendered by the Ombudsman.
Thus, they stood to lose their jobs unless the Decision is stayed by the
Court.
ISSUE
1. W/N decision of Ombudsman is immediately executory?
2. W/N filing of writ of prohibition is proper while there is
pending motion for reconsideration ( ombudsman)?
HELD
In its Comment, Office of the Ombudsman countered that the instant
petition is dismissible outright. For a party to be entitled to a writ of
prohibition, he must establish that the office or tribunal has acted without
Rule 65 - - - 9 | P a g e
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and accurate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Public respondent asserted that, first, petitioners
have not shown that it gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
Decision. As can be seen in said Decision, substantial evidence existed to
warrant a finding of administrative culpability on the part of petitioners.
Public respondent further noted that, in any event, it issued an Order
dated September 6, 2011 modifying the assailed May 24, 2011 Decision
and eventually found petitioners guilty, not of grave misconduct, but of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Second, the remedy
of a motion for reconsideration was available and, in fact, availed of by the
petitioners. Thus, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Moreover, public respondent posited that petitioners violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, for appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be brought
not directly to the Court but to the Court of Appeals via petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Finally, public respondent
submitted that there exists no valid ground to grant petitioners’ prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for there is no such thing as a vested
interest in a public office, let alone an absolute right to hold it.
We rule in favor of public respondent.
The petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is inappropriate. Section
2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the
following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial;
(b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A cursory reading of the records of the case
readily reveals the absence of the second and third requisites.
First, the Court does not find that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the subject Decision. Grave abuse of discretion is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility. Petitioners, in this case,
must prove that public respondent committed not merely reversible error,
but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.11
Court observes that in arriving at the assailed Decision, public respondent
carefully weighed the rights and interests of the parties vis-aà -vis the
evidence they presented to substantiate the same. It ruled that Sandra
submitted substantial evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support her
allegations that petitioners demanded and received favours from her as
consideration for the processing of the macro-etching examination of the
subject vehicle. Thus, that public respondent’s ruling was unfavourable to
petitioners’ interests does not necessarily mean that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion, especially so when such ruling was aptly
corroborated by evidence submitted by the parties.
Second, petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly had some
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule,
order or resolution of the lower court or agency. As public respondent
pointed out, the remedy of a motion for reconsideration was still available
to petitioners, as expressly granted by the following Section 8 of Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order (AO) No. 17:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds –
Whenever allowable, a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may
only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following
grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed,
and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the same within five (5) days from
the date of submission for resolution.
In fact, as borne by the records, petitioners actually availed of the same
when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration with public respondent
on July 18, 2011.
Moreover, the mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision imposing the
penalty of dismissal from service is immediately executory, alone, does
not justify the issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the implementation
thereof. As the Court explained in Villasenñ or v. Ombudsman:13
The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, in fact, settled
in Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it was held that such are immediately
executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal
or the issuance of an injunctive writ.
Thus, petitioner Villasenñ or’s filing of a motion for reconsideration does
not stay the immediate implementation of the Ombudsman’s order of
dismissal, considering that "a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course" under
Section 7.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in
nature and, therefore, may be applied retroactively to petitioners’ cases
which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No.
17. No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the
respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal,
he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is important to note
that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office.
Rule 65 - - - 10 | P a g e
In view of the foregoing, therefore, the Court cannot give credence to
petitioners’ assertion that given the immediate effectivity of the assailed
Decision, a Writ of Prohibition and Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction must be issued to stay the implementation
thereof. As clearly held by the Court, they have no vested right which
stands to be violated by the execution of the subject decision.
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible
because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the
Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the
extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of
his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important
reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of
Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of
law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is
questioning the findings of the investigating team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where
the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of
the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must
be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an
imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
However, as in the foregoing pronouncement, petitioners herein directly
elevated the instant case before the Court failing to advance any
compelling reason for the Court to allow the same. In fact, they even
raised issues concerning public respondent’s factual findings, contrary to
the rule that parties who appeal directly to this Court must only raise
questions of law. It is clear, therefore, that the Court has ample reason to
dismiss petitioners’ recourse.
Besides, even granting the propriety of the instant petition, the same can
no longer be given effect under the circumstances availing. Note that the
instant petition particularly sought the Court to issue a Writ of
Prohibition and Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction commanding public respondent to desist from implementing
its Decision dated May 24, 2011. But as aptly pointed out by public
respondent, the assailed Decision had already been modified by its
September 6, 2011 Order finding petitioners guilty, not of Grave
Misconduct, but of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and imposing the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6)
months and (1) day without pay, instead of dismissal from service.
Accordingly, considering that the act sought to be enjoined has already
been modified, there is nothing more to restrain.17
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be
rendered directing the defendant to desist from continuing with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal. Its proper function is to
prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. When, however,
under the circumstances, the act sought to be restrained can no longer be
committed, resort to such recourse is rendered futile for prohibition is
not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Prohibition is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200670 July 6, 2015
CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS ASSOCIATION INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Clark Investors and Locators Association (petitioners) assail the validity
of RR 2-2012 via petition for certiorari (Rule 65) promulgated by the
Secretary of Finance upon the recommendation of the CIR. RR 2-2012
imposes VAT, and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad into the Freeport or Economic Zones
(former Clark and Subic Military Conservations). By virtue of RA
7227, the said military conservations were converted into Freeport or
Economic zones.RA 7227 provided thatthe zone shall be operated and
managed as a separate customs territory, therefore exempt from VAT, and
in lieu of national and local taxes, all businesses and enterprises operating
within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross
income tax rate of 5%. The said provisions were extended to the Clark
Economic Zone. It is also exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties
on the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment.
Thus, the petitioners assailed the validity of RR 2-2012. It argues that by
imposing the VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic
Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted by RA
No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating
within the Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone.
The Respondents however attacked the remedy resorted to by the
petitioners. According to respondents, Certiorari (via Rule 65) was not
the proper remedy because: (a) RR 2-2012 was issued by the respondents
in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, not quasi- judicial powers; (b)
violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. On the merits, it argued that it
did not unilaterally revoke the law because Sec. 3 of the RR provides for
tax refund, upon sufficient proof that the imported petroleum were used
within the zones.
Issues:
1. Whether a Special Civil Action via Certiorari under Rule 65 was
the proper remedy;
2. Whether or not RR 2-2012 is valid.
Ruling:
The petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was NOT the proper remedy.
Firstly, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites
must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Rule 65 - - - 11 | P a g e
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.2Quasi-judicial function, on the
other hand, is "a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts,
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature."
RR 2-2012 was issued in the exercise of Quasi- Legislative or Rule-
Making Powers
Respondents do not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They issued RR 2-2012 in
the exercise of their quasi-legislative or rule-making powers, and not
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Verily, respondents did not adjudicate
or determine the rights of the parties. In order to determine whether a
Revenue Regulation is quasi-legislative in nature, we must examine the
legal basis of the Secretary of Finance in the issuance thereof. In BPI
Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 5 we ruled that Revenue Regulation
19-86 was quasi-legislative in nature because it was issued by the
Secretary of Finance in the exercise of his rule-making powers under
Section 244 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Similarly, in
the case at bar, RR 2-2012 was also issued by the Secretary of Finance
based on Section 244 of the NIRC.
The proper remedy is a Petition for Declaratory Relief
While this case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no
denying the fact that, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of
the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule, thus
partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over which
this Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this petition must fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved.8 The special civil action of declaratory relief
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.9 The
Rules of Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the
appropriate Regional Trial Court.
The petition violated the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with
the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
With costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON
CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-
2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage
Fee, respectively, which are being imposed by the respondents.
Petitioner, a QC property owner, assails the constitutionality of two QC
ordinances, namely Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized
Housing Tax of Quezon City and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on
garbage collection fees.
Section 3 of SP-2095 provides:
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half
percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer
which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City
Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund
under a special account to be established for the purpose (i.e., programs
and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings).
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage
collection places the rates of the imposable fee dependent on the land or
floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium,
social housing project or apartment.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for certiorari proper?
HELD:
NO.
Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for
certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals,
boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that
in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235,
the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial
function because the ordinances ruled against the
property owners who must pay the SHT and the
garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic
essential public services that they should not be held
liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is improper,
petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of
cases like in Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 13 has taken
Rule 65 - - - 12 | P a g e
cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of
justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial
function where he has the power to determine what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are,
and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies … required
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights
of person s or property under which adverse claims
to such rights are made, and the controversy en
suing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board,
or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties.14
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer must have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of
the assailed ordinances was done in the exercise of
its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function.
Under Republic Act (R.A.) No.7160, or the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative
power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod for the city.15Said law likewise is specific
in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or
charge , or to generate revenue shall be exercised by
the sanggunian of the local government unit
concerned through an appropriate ordinance.16
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a
petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare
the unconstitutionality and illegality of the
questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the
nature of a petition for declaratory relief, over which
this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.17
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may
be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus, over
which we exercise original jurisdiction, in cases with
far-reaching implications or one which raises
transcendental issues or questions that need to be
resolved for the public good. 18The judicial policy is
that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when
the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts or when exceptional and compelling
circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of Our primary
jurisdiction.19
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down
under what circumstances a petition for prohibition
may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceeding in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person – whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions –
who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays
that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondents to desist from further proceeding in the
action or matter specified in the petition. In this
case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent
respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-
2095 and SP-2235. Obviously, the writ being sought
is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding
desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City
Treasurer, and City Assessor are performing
ministerial functions. A ministerial function is one
that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of
a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and
without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive of
the city government, exercises such powers and
performs such duties and functions as provided for
by the LGC and other laws.21 Particularly, he has the
duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of
the city are collected, and that city funds are applied
to the payment of expenses and settlement of
obligations of the city, in accordance with law or
ordinance.22 On the other hand, under the LGC, all
local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or
their duly-authorized deputies, while the assessor
shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all
laws and policies governing the appraisal and
assessment of real properties for taxation purposes
Rule 65 - - - 13 | P a g e
 are properly executed.23 Anent the SHT, the
Department of Finance (DOF) Local Finance Circular
No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Identified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands
within its jurisdiction which shall be subject to the
levy of the Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local
sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the
effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and
registered owners shall also be posted in 3
conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local
sanggunian concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real
Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special
assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, and the Mayor’s office the
monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An
annual report should likewise be submitted to the
HUDCC on the total revenues raised during the year
pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in
which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important
reasons as to why direct recourse to us should be
allowed. Aside from presenting a novel question of
law, this case calls for immediate resolution since
the challenged ordinances adversely affect the
property interests of all paying constituents of
Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test
case for the guidance of other local government
units (LGUs).Indeed, the petition at bar is of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In Social
Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim , 24the Court
cited the case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil.
Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We
ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar . x x x This is in accordance with the
well entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed.26
G.R. No. 178552
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism
Council
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 (Human Security Act) on July 15,
2007,[2] petitioners in this case including Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary MargaritoTeves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff
Gen. HermogenesEsperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-
Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency,
National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil
Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-MoneyLaundering Center,
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and
investigative elements.
The
petiti
ons
fail.
Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When
any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may
require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the
same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.[10]
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which
are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Rule 65 - - - 14 | P a g e

Petiti
oners
lack
locus
stand
i five (5) days from receipt, a written explanation as to why she should not
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[11]Petitioners have not
presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of
them faces any charge under RA 9372.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty.
Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the
issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must be settled
early and are of far-reaching implications, without mention of any specific
provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be
charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been
held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show
an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of
the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled
doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the
general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners
as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, [28] whereas citizen
standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29]
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a
direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. [32]
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and
supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations,
the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.[43]
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated
reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.[44]
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail
to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused. [45] Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settleactual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
G.R. No. 209283, March 11, 2015
CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, Petitioner, v. LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V. CARDONA AND NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, IN
THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY,
OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent.
The Antecedents
On the bases of these affidavits of Eugenio Buizon, Fernandez and Ayuste,
the CHR issued on the same day Resolution CHR (IV) No. A2013-148
(CHR Resolution), through Chairperson Rosales, a Show Cause Order
(dated September 18, 2013), requesting the petitioner to submit within
be held liable for any administrative disciplinary actions, and to transmit
the written explanation together with her supporting documents to the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Show Cause Order specified allegations of
the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of certain acts of
malfeasance or misfeasance constituting misconduct, dishonesty,
oppression, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service, all in violation of the Civil Service Laws and Rules and
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The Show Cause Order was served at the petitioner’s office on
September 19, 2013.
On October 4, 2013, the petitioner filed with the CHR Secretariat a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Show Cause Order. The
petitioner assailed the validity of the Show Cause Order, claiming that its
issuance is null and void because it denied her due process.
Without waiting for the CHR to act on her motion, the petitioner filed on
October 16, 2013, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before this Court.
On October 23, 2013, the CHR through Chairperson Rosales and
Commissioners dela Cruz and Mamauag issued an Order stating that it
could no longer act on petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss since the case had
been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman by virtue of its letter
dated September 27, 2013.
The petitioner argues that the respondents gravely abused their
discretion when they issued the Show Cause Order and the CHR
Resolution during the meeting held on September 18, 2013, knowing fully
well that the petitioner would not be able to attend the same. The
petitioner claims that the respondents acted in bad faith and with malice
when they brought up at this meeting, during her absence, the complaints
of her former employees, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to
refute the allegations and to participate as a member of the CHR.
The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the petitioner is entitled to
the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
The Court’s Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
We stress, at the outset, that the subsequent referral of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate prosecutorial action rendered
the issues raised in the present petition moot and academic insofar as the
CHR is concerned.
Records disclose that the CHR, through Chairperson Rosales and
Commissioners Dela Cruz and Mamauag, issued an Order stating that it
could no longer act on the petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss since the case
had been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, no practical
relief can be granted to the petitioner by resolving the present petition
since the proceedings before the CHR – the initiation of an investigation
through the issuance of the assailed Show Cause Order – had been
terminated.
The petition likewise fails for plain lack of merit. The OSG correctly
argued that the respondents, in their official capacities as Chairperson
and Members of the CHR, did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the
contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the investigation of
the allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry was not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, where offenses were charged, parties were heard and
penalties were imposed. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding
investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of
adjudication.4 The power to initiate an investigation and to refer the
matter to the Office of the Ombudsman is within the power of the CHR as
Rule 65 - - - 15 | P a g e
an entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no less
than the Constitution.5 Thus, the CHR did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in its actions.
The petition also fails with respect to the petitioner’s claim of denial of
due process. There can be no denial of due process where a party was
afforded an opportunity to present his case.6 In the present case, the
petitioner was given ample opportunity to air her side on the allegations
against her after being sufficiently apprised of the allegations against her;
she was afforded the chance to submit her written explanation.
Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to avail of that right, and chose to
directly seek the intervention of this Court. These circumstances, by
themselves, point the prematurity of the petition.
Jurisprudence tells us that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the chance to explain one’s side, or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before any definitive action is taken, the demands
of due process are sufficiently met.7
In sum, we find that the petition for certiorari and prohibition should be
dismissed for mootness and for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 211833 April 7, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-
New Bataan, Compostela Valley Province, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
Facts:
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge
Villanueva applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC
branches. The JBC however informed him that he was not included in the
list of candidates for such position because the JBC’s long-standing policy
requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can
apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule
65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the policy
of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center
Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the
policy should have been published because it will affect all applying
judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBC’s arguments was that the writ of
certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
applicable to JBC (Remedial)
Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Consequently, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of
selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of
guidelines and criteria is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBC’s constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether
the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the
policy of the JBC
No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not
properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise
of sound discretion by the JBC. Second, petitioner has no clear legal right
since there is no law that grants him the right of promotion to second-
level courts.
Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper
No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that
the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants
although he failed to meet JBC’s five-year requirement policy. Again, no
person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the
list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
Rule 65 - - - 16 | P a g e

enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The
inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such
appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any
right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appropriate RTC pursuant to BP 129, Sec 19, as amended by R.A. No.
7691.
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Court’s
supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial
power. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural
infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.
G.R. No. 212686, September 28, 2015
SERGIO R. OSMENA III, Petitioner, v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA,
JR., SPC POWER CORPORATION AND THERMA POWER VISAYAS,
INC., Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts
In a direct recourse to this Court, Senator Sergio R. Osmenñ a III
(petitioner) seeks to enjoin the sale of the Naga Power Plant Complex
(NPPC) to respondent SPC Power Corporation (SPC) resulting from the
latter's exercise of the right to top the winning bid of respondent Therma
Power Visayas, Inc. (TPVI), and to declare such stipulation in the Lease
Agreement as void for being contrary to public policy.
Respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM) is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by
virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001. Its principal purpose is to
manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of the National
Power Corporation's (NPC's) generation assets, real estate and other
disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts, with
the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded
contract costs in an optimal manner. 1 Respondent Emmanuel R. Ledesma,
Jr. (Ledesma) is the incumbent President and Chief Executive Officer of
PSALM.
SPC is a joint venture corporation between Salcon Power Corporation and
Korea Power Corporation (Kepco).2 TPVI is a subsidiary of AboitizPower,
the power generation company of the Aboitiz Group.
The Naga Land-Based Gas Turbine (LBGT) is located inside the same
compound as the NPPC.4
On October 16, 2009, PSALM privatized the 55-MW Naga Power Plant
(LBGT) by way of negotiated sale after a failed bidding in accordance with
the LBGT Bidding Procedures.5 The land underlying the LBGT was also
leased out for a period of 10 years. This bidding resulted in SPC's
acquisition of the LBGT through an Asset Purchase Agreement (LBGT-
APA) and lease of the land under a Land Lease Agreement (LBGT-LLA).
The LBGT-LLA would expire on January 29, 2020. The LBGT-LLA
contained a provision for SPC's right to top in the event of lease or sale of
property which is not part of the leased premises.
On December 27, 2013, the Board of Directors of PSALM approved the
commencement of the 3rd Round of Bidding for the sale of the 153.1-MW
NPPC. Only SPC and TPVI submitted bids. On March 31, 2014, TPVI was
declared as the highest bidder. Consequently, a Notice of Award 6 was
issued to TPVI on April 30, 2014, subject to SPC's right under Section 3.02
of the LBGT-LLA, as previously stated in Section 1B-20 of the Bidding
Procedures.
In a letter dated April 29, 2014, PSALM notified SPC of TPVI's winning bid
which covers the purchase of the NPPC and lease of the land. It also
advised SPC that under the terms of LBGT-LLA (Sections 2.01 and 3.02),
the lease of the land (as governed by the LBGT-LLA) will likewise expire
on January 29, 2020.8 In a letter-reply dated May 7, 2014, SPC confirmed
that it is exercising the right to top the winning bid of TPVI and will pay
the amount of Php1,143,240,000.00 on the understanding that the term
of the lease is 25 years from Closing Date. SPC argued that -
As SPC also participated in the bidding, the bid for the lease component
clearly computed on the basis of, and was for twenty-five (25) years.
However, by now stating in your letter that the "lease has a Term often
(10) years and will expire on 29 January 2020," SPC would effectively have
less than six (6) years from today to use the property, which is extremely
short for the lease component computed and based on the twenty-five
(25) year term that was offered during the bidding. While we are aware
that the second paragraph of Section 3.02 of the LLA-LBGT provides that
the property covered by the right to top will be "governed" by the LLA-
LBGT, we are of the reasonable belief that this does not include "Term"
under Section 2.01 thereof considering that the "Draft Land Lease
Agreement for the 153.1-MW Naga Power Plant," which formed part of
the bid documents, specifically provided for a "Term" of twenty-five
(25) years.9
PSALM then wrote the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) requesting for legal opinion or confirmation of its position that
the term of the lease of the NPPC upon SPC's exercise of its right to top
would be for the remaining period of the lease of the land of the Naga
LBGT Power Plant, which will expire in 2020.10
On May 21, 2014, the OGCC rendered Opinion No. 098, Series of 2014
which upheld PSALM's position that SPC may exercise the right to top
under the LBGT-LLA provisions, the source of such right. It explained that
the NPPC-LLA is a separate and distinct transaction which is inapplicable
with respect to SPC's right to top.11
However, upon re-evaluation of the arguments in the position papers
submitted by SPC and PSALM, the OGCC submitted its study and
recommendation to Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima. The study
concluded that the right to top exercised by SPC in the NPPC bidding is a
right to top on a sale, which must then be separately governed by the
NPPC-APA, and implemented in accordance with the NPPC-APA and LLA
provisions.12
On June 16, 2014, the present petition was filed in this Court praying that
(1) a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ex parte, and after
hearing the parties, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
PSALM from implementing SPC's exercise of its right to top in connection
with the NPPC bidding; (2) SPC's right to top as provided in Section 3.02
of the LBGT-LLA be declared void; and (3) a permanent injunction be
Rule 65 - - - 17 | P a g e
issued enjoining respondents Ledesma and PSALM from committing any
act in furtherance of SPC's exercise of the right to top.
Issue
Is certiorari the proper remedy and was it timely filed?
RULING
The petition is meritorious.
Propriety of Certiorari
The Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs the
Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but, to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. We thus have the
duty to take cognizance of allegations of grave abuse of discretion in this
case,20 involving the sale by PSALM of a power plant, which supposedly
contravenes the policy on competitive public bidding.
R.A. No. 9136 created PSALM for the principal purpose of undertaking the
mandated privatization of all disposable assets of the NPC as well as IPP
contracts in an optimal manner. 21 Such disposition is made subject to all
existing laws, rules and regulations. Thus, the implementing rules of R.A.
No. 9136 provided guidelines in the privatization to be conducted by
PSALM, among which are:
(a) The Privatization value to the National Government of the NPC
generation assets, real estate, other disposable assets as well as IPP
contracts shall be optimized;cralawlawlibrary
x xxx
(d) All assets of NPC shall be sold in an open and transparent manner
through public bidding, and the same shall apply to the disposition of
IPP contracts;cralawlawlibrary
x xx x22 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Specifically Section 51 (m) of the EPIRA empowered PSALM "[t]o
restructure the sale, privatization or disposition of NPC assets and IPP
contracts and/or their energy output based on such terms and conditions
which shall optimize the value and sale prices of said assets." Any act of
PSALM that violates these provisions and other applicable laws may
constitute grave abuse of discretion. There is grave abuse of discretion (1)
when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.23
However, the implementation of EPIRA may not be restrained or enjoined
except by order issued by this Court.24 Petitioner's resort to this Court to
obtain an order enjoining PSALM's privatization of the NPPC through
SPC's invalid exercise of its right to option, was therefore proper and
justified.
CAWAD VS ABAD
G.R. No. 207145
July 28, 2015
PERALTA, J.
FACTS
● PPHAI – Philippine Public Health Association
● DBM – Department of Budget and Management
● DOH – Department of Health
● CSC – Civil Service Commission
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise
known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed
into law in order to promote the social and economic well-being of health
workers, their living and working conditions and terms of employment, to
develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped to deliver
health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper
qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government
service. Accordingly, public health workers (PHWs) were granted the
following allowances and benefits, among others:
Section 20. Additional Compensation. - Notwithstanding
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, public health workers
shall receive the following allowances: hazard allowance,
subsistence allowance, longevity pay, laundry allowance and
remote assignment allowance.
Pursuant to Section 35 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of
Health promulgated its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July
1992. Thereafter, in November 1999, the DOH, in collaboration with
various government agencies and health workers' organizations,
promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all additional and clarificatory
rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from the
effectivity of the Magna Carta.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents’ issuance of DBM-DOH Joint
Circular No.1, s.2012 is null and void for being an undue exercise of
legislative powers?
RULING
The Court finds the petition partly granted. The DBM-DOH
Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the
minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of
its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar
as it provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted
Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step
Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The
validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of
actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the
rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to
longevity pay on the basis of the PHW's status in the plantilla of regular
positions, is UPHELD.
ARAULLO vs. AQUINO III
GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Note: This is a very lengthy case involving a wide array of legal issues-
both substantive and procedural. Even the digest is very long. Thus, only
the PROV REM issue is highlighted.
In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially
granted the consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition and
declared the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and
related executive issuances unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of
the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive
to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were
not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.
Rule 65 - - - 18 | P a g e
 The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed
funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that
the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance
with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs).
Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Other version: includes substantive issues
G.R. No. 209287
ARAULLO VS. AQUINO III
BERSAMIN, J.
This case is a consolidation of nine (9) cases, assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and in relation to this,
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 and related issuances of the DBM
in the implementation of DAP. This issue exploded when the topic of the
Congressional pork barrel was still fresh in the public mind. Belgica vs.
Executive Secretary was just filed with the Supreme Court [which is
subsequently declared unconstitutional (November 19, 2013)].
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
● Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada – delivered the privilege speech
on September 25, 2013 which prompted the DBM to issue a
public statement and bring to the public consciousness the DAP
● Araullo, Maria Carolina – Chairperson of Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan; G.R. No. 209287
● Secretary Florencio Abad – Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM)
FACTS
1. September 3, 2013 – Belgica, et. al. and Villegas filed an Urgent
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Immediate
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the
2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse
of discretion
2. September 25, 2013 – Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered his
privilege speech stating that some senators received Php 50 Million each
as incentive for impeaching Chief Justice Corona.
3. Secretary Abad responded through a public statement
explaining that the funds released were based on the Senators’ letters of
request for funding and explained further that these funds were part of
the DAP designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion (they also made claims in their website regarding
DAP and where it comes from).
4. DBM cited the following as legal bases for DAP’s use for
savings:
a. Section 25(5) Article VI, 1987 Constitution
b. Section 39 (Authority to use Savings for Certain
Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations,
Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)
c. General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013
provisions on the following:
i. Use of savings
ii. Meaning of savings
iii. Priority in the use of savings
d. For the use of the unprogrammed funds, DBM cited
provisions in the GAA 2011-2013 as legal bases
5. Nine (9) petitions assailing the constitutionality are filed
within days
6. The Court consolidated these cases to form the case at hand.
7. Oral arguments were held on November 19, 2013 and the
Court directed DBM Sec. Abad to submit the following:
a. List of savings brought under DAP sourced from:
i. Completed programs
ii. Discontinued or abandoned programs
iii. Unpaid appropriations for compensation
b. Certified copy of the President’s directive dated June
27, 2012 referred to in NBC 541
c. All circulars and orders issued in relation to DAP
8. In compliance, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
(government’s counsel) submitted seven (7) evidence packets (please see
Other Notes for the complete list of packets)
ISSUES with HOLDING
I. Procedural Issues
A. WHETHER OR NOT certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and
validity of DAP, NBC 541 and all other executive issuances allegedly
implementing DAP
● YES. Court says all petitions under Rule 65 are proper
remedies (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus)
● The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are broader in
scope and reach and may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction as well as set right, undo, and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
Government even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
● This is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 65 of the
rules of court.
● Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials
b. WHETHER OR NOT there is a controversy ripe for judicial
determination
· YES. There is an actual controversy ripe for judicial determination.
· The Court quotes Belgica vs. ES Ochoa
o xxx is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims…there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can
be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence…a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it…”
· The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the
constitutionality of DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement
for a conflict between legal rights.
· They meet the “ripeness” requirement since these allegedly
unconstitutional acts acts were already being implemented by the DBM.
Rule 65 - - - 19 | P a g e
Moreover, DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds.
· In addition, the fact that funds have been allocated or utilized give
rise to an actual controversy
· Respondents claim that since DAP has been discontinued, the
challenges are now moot and academic.The Court says: the discontinuing
of DAP did not moot the challenges to its constitutionality. because it falls
under all exceptions for mootness to be disregarded: (1) there was a
grave violation of the constitution, (2) the case involves a paramount
public interest, (3) the constitutional issue raised here requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public and (4) this case is capable of repetition yet evading review (there
is nothing to stop the DBM from re-implementing DAP).
c. WHETHER OR NOT the petitioners have standing
· yes PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI. the issuance and
implementation of DAP and issuances involved illegal disbursements of
public funds.
· Except for PHILCONSA, the petitioners have invoked their capacities
as tax payers and thus have an interest in further dissipation of public
funds.
· PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its
legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.
· IBP stands by its avowed duty to work for the rule of law and civic
duty as the official association of lawyers in this country.
· In any case, the Court adds that these cases pose issues that are of
transcendental importance to the entire nation (so procedural
technicalities can be waived).
II. Substantive Issues
a. WHETHER OR NOT DAP violates Section 29 Article VI of the
1987 Constitution[1]
· NO. DAP WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE HENCE, NO
APPROPRIATION LAW WAS REQUIRED TO ADOPT OR IMPLEMENT IT.
· DAP was only a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending the adoption of which was by virtue of the authority of the
President to ensure laws are properly executed.
· It is the Executive playing its role as the main actor during the
Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully
execute laws including GAAs
· Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or implement DAP
· Thus Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under
Section 29(1) Article VI of the Constitution
b. WHETHER OR NOT DAP, NBC 541 and all other executive
issuances implementing DAP violate Section 25(5) Article VI of the 1987
Constitution[2]:
· yes the violated section 25(5) article vi of the constitution.
· To discuss this, we follow the three (3) requisites set out in Section
25(5) of Article VI:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices.
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations of their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
(1) First requisite: there is a law authorizing the president to
transfer funds within his office
· this requisite is not met. gaa OF 2011 AND 2012 LACKED VALID
(FAITHFUL TO THE CONSITUTION) PROVISIONS TO AUTHORIZE
TRANSFER OF FUNDS UNDER THE DAP, HENCE THE TRANSFERS WERE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
· Section 25(5) is not a self-executing provision and must have a
law implementing it. Generally this is the GAA.
· A reading of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs show that its provisions
were textually unfaithful (hehe) to the Constitution for not carrying the
phrase “for their respective offices[3]” and literally allowed the transfer of
funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item
belonged to another office and thus contravene the Constitution
· Thus these provisions cannot be used by the Executive to claim
authority to transfer appropriations.
· The missing phrase was inserted in the 2013 GAA, however, even
with a valid law for the authorization of transfer of funds, there are still
two more requisites to be met
(2) SECOND REQUISITE: The funds to be transferred are savings
generated from the appropriations of their respective offices – WHERE
THERE ACTUALLY SAVINGs?
· Petitioners claim that the unreleased appropriations and
withdrawn unobligated allotments were not ACTUAL savings within the
context of Section 25(5) Art. 6 of the Constitution.
· Petitioners also argue that “savings” should be understood to
refer to the excess money after the items that needed to be funded have
been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid and they
insist that savings cannot be realized with certainty in the middle of the
fiscal year.
· Petitioners also say that “slow-moving” PAPs could not be savings
as they actually have not been abandoned yet (remember the note earlier
in NBC 541)
· The OSG represents that “savings” meant “appropriations
balances” – the difference between the appropriation authorized by
Congress (the Program Amount in the GAA) and the actual amount
allotted for the appropriation.
·
· To ascertain the meaning of savings, there are four principles:
(1) Congress wields the power of the purse and therefore chooses how
the budget shall be spent.
(2) The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs which
Congress allocated for.
(3) To make the power of the President to augment operative under the
GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution.
(4) Savings should be actual, something real and substantial. Not
possible, potential or hypothetical.
· This interpretation prevents the Executive from transgressing
Congress’ power of the purse.
· Definition of savings in the GAAs reflected this interpretation.
Savings are any programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any
obligation which are:
(1) Still available after the completion/ final discontinuance/
abandonment for which the appropriation is authorized
(2) Appropriation balances from unpaid compensation and vacant
positions/ LOA without pay
(3) Appropriations balances realized from improved systems/ measures
in implementation
· The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under DAP
came from “pooling unreleased appropriations such as unreleased
Personnel Services which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow moving projects, and discontinued projects per
Zero-Based Budgeting findings.”
· There is no clear legal basis for this declaration of DBM and their
treatment of unreleased or unallotted appropriations as savings.
· THUS THE SECOND REQUISITE IS NOT MET. The Court says:
these items have not yet ripened into categories of items from which
savings can be generated – they haven’t even reached the agency to which
they were allotted to under the GAA. These do not fall under the definition
of savings reflected in the GAA (items 1 to 3 aforementioned).
· Thus, unobligated allotments cannot be indiscriminately declared
as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances
stated earlier existed. This means that DBM’s withdrawal of the
Rule 65 - - - 20 | P a g e
unobligated allotments disregarded the definition of savings under the
GAAs.
· The GAA has a 2-year validity, however DBM declared that 2013
shall have a one year validity to force the agencies to plan properly and
expedite expenditures. This means that DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated
allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations to fund fast-moving
projects meant a complete disregard for the 2-year validity of the budgets
for 2011 and 2012 (and the 1-year validity for the 2013 budget). This is
because if you’re an agency, and you wanted to use the unobligated
budget you have left from last year to fund a project for this year, you can’t
anymore because DBM has withdrawn it and distributed it to faster
moving projects.
· The respondents insist that these were being withdrawn upon
the instance of the implementing agencies based on their own assessment
that they could not obligate these allotments. However, the Court states
that the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself, based on
the text of NBC 541.(Personal Note: I guess the DBM was not able to show
evidence to back up their claim because this is isn’t entirely true, the
agency always has a chance not to allow DBM to withdraw their
unobligated funds – and can always write a letter to get back the funds
that DBM has withdrawn – as long as they do it as early as possible)
· The petitioners claim that the retention of these funds were akin
to impoundment and that there was no law authorizing the withdrawal of
the unobligated allotments.
· The Court says: The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated
allotments and pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for
being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal cannot be
considered as impoundment as they entitled only the transfer of funds
and not the retention or reduction of appropriations
· The Court adds: relevant to remind that the balances of
appropriations that remained unused at the end of the year are to be
reverted to the General Fund (Treasury). This is the mandate of Section
28, Chapter IV, Book VI of EO 292.
· The Executive cannot circumvent this provision by declaring
unreleased appropriations
· and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the
fiscal year.
(3) third requisite: The purpose of the transfer is to augment an
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
· THIS REQUISITE IS NOT MET AS SOME OF THE SAVINGS POOLED
UNDER DAP WERE ALLOCATED TO PAPS THAT WERE NOT COVERED BY
ANY APPROPRIATION IN THE PERTINENT GAA. This means that the
Executive seemed to be specifying the PAPs where the money shall be
spent – which is the power of the purse that resides in Congress alone.
· An example was the Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and
Mitigation (DREAM) Project under the DOST which when broken down
did not have an item for personnel services and capital outlays, only for
MOOE.
· Aside from transferring funds to the DREAM project exceeding by
almost 300%, DAP allotted funds for personnel services and capital
outlays which Congress did not appropriate for in the first place.
· AGAIN, PROOF OF NON-COMPLIANCE TO THIS REQUISITE ARE THE
CROSS BORDER AUGENTATIONS FROM SAVINGS WHICH ARE CLEARLY
PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. SECTION 25(5) ARTICLE VI ONLY
ALLOWS AUGMENTATION WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE OFFICES STATED
THEREIN.
· During the oral arguments, Secretary Abad stated the following
instances wherein cross-border transfers/ augmentations transpired:
(1) Request from the House of Representatives for e-library funds
(Legislative Library and Archives Building/ Congressional e-library) (they
lacked 43 Million). The HoR were constrained to finish this project
because COA informed them that failure to do so will cause serious
deterioration of the building and equipments therein. They wrote to the
President requesting for an augmentation of that item, which was
granted.
(2) Request from the Commission on Audit for their good governance
programs. The COA needed IT equipment and consultants and litigators to
help with their audit work and they requested funds form the Executive
Department. When the President saw that it was important for the
Commission to be provided those equipment, the request was granted.
(3) President made available to the Commission on Elections the savings
of his department upon their request for funds.
c. WHETHER OR NOT the release of unprogrammed funds under
DAP was in accord with the GAAS[4]
· DBM avers that there are three instances wherein unprogrammed
funds can be availed of:
(1) Revenue collections exceeded original revenue targets proposed in
the BESF submitted by the president to congress
(2) New revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally
considered in the BESF
(3) Newly approved loans for foreign assisted projects secured
· no. the release of unprogrammed funds were not in accord with
the gaaS. The Court rules that there are only TWO instances when the
unprogrammed funds can be released (which are bolstered by the texts in
the 2011 and 2012 GAA and more clearly by GAA 2013)[5]
· The controversy arises due to the difference in the interpretation
of the phrase “revenue collections must exceed the original revenue
targets.” DBM construes this as to refer only to the collections for each
source of revenue in the BESF, the condition is complied as long as one
source of revenue exceeds its target.
· The petitioners, on the other hand (and the Court sides with them
on this) take the phrase to mean the total revenue collections must exceed
the total revenue target in the BESF.
· This requirement should be construed in light of the purpose of
the unprogrammed funds – as standby appropriations to support
additional expenditures. In the even that the revenue collections exceed
targets, the government shall have more than enough to cover additional
expenditures – thus the unprogrammed funds can be dispensed with and
disbursed.
· Following the DBM’s definition would create “fake surplus” since
exceeding targets in one revenue stream did not necessarily mean that
the government indeed had exceeded revenue targets as a whole.
d. WHETHER OR NOT DAP violates:
(1) Equal Protection Clause
· Petitioners say that DAP practiced undue favoritism in favor of
select legislators in contravention of this clause when it released funds
upon their request.
· They add that no reasonable classification was used in distributing
funds under DAP.
· COURT: THIS ALLEGATION LACKS FACTUAL BASIS. Claims are
unsupported with relevant data. On the discrimination against legislators:
cannot warrant a finding of contravention of the equal protection clause.
The denial of equal protection can only be raised by the parties who suffer
it, and in these cases, none of the legislators brought to the fore when and
how the denial of equal protection occurred and explain why there was a
denial in their situation. Ruling on this will cause the Court to speculate.
Guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed executive act.
(2) System of checks and balances
· Petitioners claim that the system of checks and balances was
compromised because some legislators were forced to be silent about the
issues and anomalies surrounding DAP when they were given funds from
it
· The President arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation
vested in the Congress because of NBC No. 541
· COURT: EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ON THE INFRIGEMENT OF THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS HAVE RESOLVED THIS ISSUE.
(3) Principle of public accountability
· Petitioners insist that DAP is repugnant to this principle because
the legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive
and exhibited a reluctance to inquire into DAP’s legality
· COURT: WE HAVE HELD THAT DAP AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
ISSUANCES WERE POLICIES AND ACTS THAT THE EXECUTIVE COULD
Rule 65 - - - 21 | P a g e
PROPERLY ADOPT AND DO IN THE EXECUTION OF GAAs to the extent
that they sought to implement strategies to ramp up and accelerate the
economy of the country.
e. WHETHER OR NOT factual and legal justification exists to issue
a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain implementation of DAP,
NBC 541 and all other executive issuances implementing DAP
· COURT: THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT SHALL APPLY. A
blanket TRO should not be applied.
· It is said that a legislative or executive act is declared void for
being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation. But the
Court asks: should we not recognize the need to except from the rigid
application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act
produced an almost irreversible result? This is answered by the doctrine
of operative fact.
· This doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or act prior to
the determination of its constitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
· This doctrine’s application to DAP proceeds from equity and fair
play.
· The Court cites the following cases to support its position:
o Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
§ “Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act,
certain acts or transactions were made in good faith…which cannot be
just set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation.”
o Tan v. Barrios – court held that despite invalidity of military courts
over civilians, certain operative facts should be acknowledged to have
existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused
o Olaguer v. Military Commisssion
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541
and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of
the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive
to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were
not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed
funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that
the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance
with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.
DOCTRINE
Doctrine of Operative Fact
Separation of Powers
Power of the Purse (Congress)
GR No. 173861, Jul 14, 2014
JAY CANDELARIA v. RTC
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Factual Antecedents
During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted in the evening of June 22,
2001, petitioners were arrested at the corner of Gueco St. and MacArthur
Highway, Balibago, Angeles City for delivering, with the intention to sell,
five cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. On the strength of the Joint
Affidavit[6] of the police operatives, petitioners were formally charged in
an Information[7] dated July 6, 2004 with violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
After they were arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge on
May 31, 2005,[8] petitioners filed on June 17, 2005 a Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence[9] based on inadmissibility of evidence. They
contended that the evidence the prosecution intended to present were
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This is considering that at the time the alleged
counterfeit products were seized, they were neither committing nor
attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers as
to justify the conduct of search and seizure following their unlawful
arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 12, 2005, the RTC issued the first assailed Order [10] denying
the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence. Observing that the motion was
anchored on petitioners' alleged illegal arrest, it cited
jurisprudence[11] wherein it was held that any objection to an arrest must
be made before an accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed
to move for the quashal of the information before the arraignment, an
accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Notwithstanding this reference, the RTC based its denial of the subject
motion on its examination of the Joint Affidavit of the arresting officers.
According to the said court, since it appears from the said affidavit that
the search and seizure was incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the
accused who were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence obtained
during such search and seizure is admissible in evidence.
Not satisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [12] which the
RTC denied in its assailed Order[13] of July 14, 2006.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored
on the sole ground of:
WHETHER X X X THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42 OF THE CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PETITIONERS TO SET THE CASE FOR
SUPPRESSION HEARING.[14]
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners failed to allege that
there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party
seeking the writ whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must
be able to show that his or her resort to such extraordinary remedy is
justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. "[H]e must allege in his petition and
establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or
adequate x x x."[15] As held in Visca v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources:[16]
x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege
with certainty in his verified petition facts showing that "there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law," because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition
for certiorari. "Being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must
allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy."
"Where the existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the petitioner
must allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or
unavailing, or that excuse petitioner for not having availed himself of such
Rule 65 - - - 22 | P a g e
remedy. A petition for certiorari which does not comply with the
requirements of the rules may be dismissed.[17]
Pursuant to the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismissible
for failure to allege that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as to justify resort
to certiorari.
Assuming the assailed October 12, 2005
Order to be erroneous, the mistake is an
error in judgment which is beyond the
ambit of certiorari.
In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,[18] the Court held that:
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein
the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover,
it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment.
The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake
made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment will be a void judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the
defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation
of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The
determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of
evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may
have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment,
not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court
on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the
course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of
a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors
and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by
the trial court on the merits of the case.[19]
Here, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the petitioners. As such, any perceived error in its
interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by
appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only be considered an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. In particular, the RTC's denial of the
Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its assessment that the
evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible, was done in the
proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Assuming that the RTC's determination
is erroneous, the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but of
judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
No grave abuse of discretion.
Even assuming that petitioners' resort of certiorari is proper, the Petition
must still be dismissed for their failure to show that the RTC acted in
grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. "Grave
abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility."[20]
In this case, petitioners miserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly
abused its discretion. In fact, we note that the main issue raised by
petitioners in their Petition is when is the proper time to file a motion to
suppress/exclude evidence.[21] They even conceded that this is a pure
question of law.[22]
In any case, our perusal of the records shows that the RTC did not abuse,
much more, gravely abuse its discretion. The RTC thoroughly considered
the pleadings submitted by the parties, to wit: Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence; Opposition (to the Motion to Suppress
Evidence); Reply; Rejoinder; and Sur-Rejoinder; as well as the Joint
affidavit submitted by the arresting officers. Only after a careful analysis
of the submissions of the parties did the RTC render its judgment.
Petitioners violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts.
It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a
direct recourse to this Court. This is against the well-settled principle
dictating that a petition for certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders of
the RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not directly with
the Supreme Court. It was held in Rayos v. City of Manila[23] that:
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.
However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners
unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, the Court held:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with
the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.[24]
Clearly, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may only be
allowed if there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically
set out in the petition which, however, are not obtaining in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Milwaukee vs CTA
G.R. No. 173815
November 24, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Milwaukee Industries Corporation
(Milwaukee) assailing the February 27, 2006 Verbal Order and the June 1,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), in CTA Case No. 6202
entitled Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
The Facts
In a Letter of Authority, dated July 17, 1998, public respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) notified Milwaukee of its intent
to examine their books of account and other accounting records for all
internal revenue taxes for 1997 and other unverified prior years.
Milwaukee complied with the directive and submitted its
documents to CIR.
Rule 65 - - - 23 | P a g e
 Thereafter, CIR issued three undated assessment notices
together with a demand letter and explanation of the deficiency tax
assessments. Milwaukee allegedly owed a total of P173,063,711.58
corresponding to the deficiencies on income tax, expanded withholding
and value-added taxes for the 1997 taxable year.
Due to CIRs inaction regarding its protest, on November 20,
2000, Milwaukee filed a petition for review before the CTA. This was
docketed as CTA Case No. 6202.
After Milwaukee had presented its evidence-in-chief, CIR
offered the testimony of Ms. Edralin Silario (Silario), the group supervisor
of the BIR examiners, who conducted the examination of Milwaukees
books. She testified on the Final Report she prepared for the BIR and
explained the grounds for the disallowance of the deductions being
claimed by Milwaukee on the following: (1) foreign exchange losses
classified as miscellaneous expenses; and (2) interest and bank charges
paid in 1997.
Subsequently, Milwaukee manifested its intention to present
documentary rebuttal evidence. By its Order of July 11, 2005, the CTA
permitted Milwaukee to present rebuttal evidence starting September 5,
2005. Milwaukee, however, moved for resetting on the scheduled
hearings, particularly on September 5, 2005 and October 26, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was able to partially present
its rebuttal evidence in a commissioners hearing. The CTA scheduled
another hearing on February 27, 2006.
On February 27, 2006, during the scheduled hearing, the CIR
waived its right to cross-examine Milwaukees witness. The CTA then
asked Milwaukee to continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence. Not
prepared, Milwaukee moved for the postponement of the pre-marking
and presentation of its rebuttal evidence relative to the deductibility of
some interests and bank charges from its corporate income tax for the
year 1997 amounting to P18,128,498.26.
Immediately, the CTA issued a verbal order denying
Milwaukees motion to be allowed additional commissioners hearing for
further presentation of its rebuttal evidence. The CTA likewise gave
Milwaukee ten (10) days within which to submit its Formal Offer of
Rebuttal Evidence.
Consequently, Milwaukee moved for reconsideration of the
CTAs verbal order. Milwaukee likewise moved to toll the running of the
period for filing its formal offer of rebuttal evidence.
In its June 1, 2006 Resolution, the CTA denied Milwaukees
motion for reconsideration but allowed its motion to suspend the period
for filing of formal offer of rebuttal evidence
This Court agrees with the respondent. The Court,
upon motion, allowed petitioner to present rebuttal
evidence. However, it was petitioner who asked for
several postponements of trial and commissioners
hearing, which lead the Court to issue final warnings
on October 26, 2005, January 16, 2006 and January
31, 2006.
It is worth stressing that the objective of
the procedural rules is to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action to the benefit
of all litigants. The Court will not countenance
further delay of the proceedings. Thus, the Court
hereby RESOLVES to DENY Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
However, finding petitioners Motion to
Toll Running of the Period for Filing Formal Offer of
Rebuttal Evidence to be in order, the Court hereby
RESOLVES to GRANT the same.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is ordered to
submit its Formal Offer of Rebuttal Evidence within
the remaining period prescribed by this Court upon
receipt of this Resolution. Respondent is given a
period of 10 days to file his Comment thereto.
Thereafter, petitioners Formal Offer of Rebuttal
Evidence shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
On June 21, 2006, Milwaukee filed its Formal Offer of Rebuttal
Evidence (ex Abundanti ad Cautelam) before the CTA.
Aggrieved by the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the
verbal order, Milwaukee filed this petition.
ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CTA
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION (AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION) IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION TO BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THEREON
Petitioner’s Claim:
Milwaukee claimed that the denial of its motions deprived it of
its right to have the case be decided on the merits. It wrote: Without said
countervailing evidence, the adjudication of the issue of deductibility of
certain interest and bank charges will [be] seriously impaired, because it
will not be based on substantial evidence or on the entire facts.
RULING
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
In order for a petition for certiorari to succeed, the following
requisites must concur, namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
Rule 65 - - - 24 | P a g e
functions; (b) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction
denotes that the tribunal, board, or officer acted with absolute lack of
authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent
exceeds its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of
discretion connotes such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; otherwise stated,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of
the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be
served thereby. Furthermore, this discretion must be exercised
intelligently.
In this case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough
opportunity for Milwaukee to present its rebuttal evidence. Records
reveal that when Milwaukee requested for resetting on September 5,
2005 and October 26, 2005, its motions were granted by the CTA. As a
matter of fact, by January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was already able to
partially present its rebuttal evidence. Thus, when the CTA called on
Milwaukee to continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence on February
27, 2006, it should have been prepared to do so. It cannot be said that the
CTA arbitrarily denied Milwaukees supposed simple request of resetting
because it had already given the latter several months to prepare and
gather its rebuttal evidence.
Milwaukee tried to reason out that if only the CIR gave an
advance notice that it would be waiving its right to cross-examine its
witness, then it could have rushed the collation and sorting of its rebuttal
documentary exhibits.
The Court, however, is not persuaded.
As stated earlier, Milwaukee was given more than ample time
to collate and gather its evidence. It should have been prepared for the
continuance of the trial. True, the incident on said date was for the cross-
examination of Milwaukees witness but it could be short; it could be
lengthy. Milwaukee should have prepared for any eventuality. It is
discretionary on the part of the court to allow a piece-meal presentation
of evidence. If it decides not to allow it, it cannot be considered an abuse
of discretion. As defined, discretion is a faculty of a court or an official by
which he may decide a question either way, and still be right.
Accordingly, Milwaukees right to due process was not
transgressed. The Court has consistently reminded litigants that due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard. The requirement of due
process is satisfactorily met as long as the parties are given the
opportunity to present their side. In the case at bar, Milwaukee was
precisely given the right and the opportunity to present its side. It was
able to present its evidence-in-chief and had its opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION INC.
(CREBA) v. SECRETARY OFAGRARIAN REFORM
G.R No. 183409 June 18, 2010
J. Perez
FACTS:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with application for
temporary restrainingorder and/or writ of preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, fileddirectly by the
petitioner CREBA with the Court seeking to nullify and prohibit the
enforcement ofDepartment of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No.
01-02 for having been issued by the Secretaryof Agrarian Reform with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
someprovisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND
ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO
REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
HELD:
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[30]
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of
jurisdictionmeans that an act, though within the general power of a
tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the
particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the
exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.[31] Without
jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear
and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with
reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority.[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or,
in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[33]
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the
questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88
were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the
aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never
be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for
he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his
quasi-legislative and administrative functions.
Rule 65 - - - 25 | P a g e

JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN DAGDAGAN, et al
vs CECILIA LICLICAN, et al.
G.R. NO. 208587 JULY 29, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.
FACTS:
During the stockholders meeting of the JM Dominguez Agronomic
Company, presided by Cecilia (one of the respondents,) and attended by
Norma and Purita (her co-respondents) and petitioners Helen, Patrick,
Kenneth and Shirley, Patrick and Kenneth were not allowed to vote as
their mother and grandmother, both deceased are the stockholders of the
company and no settlement of estate was shown to transfer their shares
in the company. Tensions rose, and respondents walked out of the
meeting. Since quorum still existed, the election proceeded. As a result,
Helen, Patrick, Kenneth and Shirley were elected officers. On the other
hand, after staging the walkout, the respondents executed a Board
Resolution certifying that during the meeting, the following set of officers
were elected as officers: Cecilia, Norma, Purita, Tessie, and Shirley.
The petitioners then filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC
of Baguio City for nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors
and officers, injunction and other reliefs, docketed as Civil Case No. 6623-
R. It was raffled off to Branch 7 of the RTC for Judicial Dispute
Resolution. The petitioners as stockholders then represented themselves
as JMD’s lawful directors and officers, collected rentals and deposited
rents due the company to its bank account. They then filed a complaint
for Qualified Theft against Ceclia, Norma and Purita. They alleged that the
respondents, without any authority, conspired to withdraw the amount of
P852,024.19 from the corporation’s savings account with Equitable
PCIBank, and issued Check No C0002489901 in the amount of
P200,000.00 payable to cash, drawn against JMD’s account with
Robinsons Savings Bank. In another compliant, they claimed that
respondents issued Equitable PCIBank check no. 320953 payable to one
Atty. Alexander Lava for P200,000.00.
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of Infomations against the respondents. The
Informations were raffled off to Branch 7 RTC of Baguio City. Finding
probable cause, the latter court issued a warrant for the arrest of
respondents.
Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
They averred the existence of a prejudicial question. By filing the
complaint, petitioners were already assuming that they are the legitimate
directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute
pending with the same RTC Branch 7.
The CA granted the petition for certiorari, holding that “Since there is
doubt in the instant case as to the sufficiency of the authority of a
corporate officer, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have exercised prudence
by holding the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution of the intra-
corporate dispute which private respondents themselves instituted.” The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that their election
as officers of JMD had been sustained by virtue of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 6623-R date May 6, 2011. The issue of whether or not the judge
committed grave abuse of discretion was rendered moot and academic by
the judge’s inhibition in the criminal cases. The CA nevertheless denied
the motion. Hence, the petitioner elevated their case to the Supreme
Court via petition for review on certiorari, on whether or not a prejudicial
question exists.
ISSUES:
Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance
of the two assailed March 10, 2009 Orders in Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R
and 29176-R
RULING:
The challenged Orders of the trial court were issued in grave abuse of
discretion
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a
lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word “capricious,”
usually used in tandem with the term “arbitrary,” conveys the notion of
willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.1
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted
with grave abuse of discretion when she ordered the arrests of
respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.
[G.R. No. 140189. February 28, 2005]
GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION (GSMSC),
FERRY CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER INSURANCE AND
SURETY CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JENNIFER ANNE B.
ACUA, HAYDEE ANNE B. ACUA, MARITES T. CLARION,
MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ, GRACIELA M. TORRALBA and MARY
PAMELA A. SANTIAGO, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS
1. Petitioner GSMSC is a manning agency and the local agent of
petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited. Petitioner Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation is the surety company of petitioner
GSMSC.
2. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioners before the POEA, claiming that they were deployed
by petitioner GSMSC to work as croupiers (card dealers) for
petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited under a six-month contract
with monthly salaries, however, Sue Smits, the Casino Manager,
informed them that their services were no longer needed. They
also averred that considering that their plane tickets were
already ready and they were subjected to harassment, they had
no alternative but to sign documents specifying that they were
the ones who terminated their employment.
3. Petitioners denied the allegations of respondents and averred
that respondents voluntarily resigned from employment.
4. POEA: ruled against petitioners, holding that the respondents
were illegally dismissed since petitioners failed to prove that
respondents voluntarily resigned from employment. It held
that the alleged resignation letters are only declarations of
release and quitclaim.
5. On appeal, NLRC: dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal,
ruling that the contested letters are not only declarations of
release and quitclaim but resignations as well. It further held
Rule 65 - - - 26 | P a g e
 that there is no concrete evidence of undue pressure, force and
duress in the execution of the resignation letters.
6. Respondents filed MR but the was denied.
7. Hence, respondents filed a petition for certiorari.
8. Petitioners, in their Comment, prayed for outright dismissal of
the petition for certiorari, grounds: (a) failure of respondents
to submit a verified statement of the material dates to show
that the petition was filed on time, and (b) filing a certification
on non-forum shopping signed only by their counsel. In
addition, petitioners argued that the issues raised are factual
and there is no showing that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion.
9. In accordance with St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC, we
referred the petition to the CA.
10. CA: respondents were illegally dismissed since the petitioners
failed to substantiate their claim that respondents voluntarily
resigned from employment. It ruled that the quitclaims are not
sufficient to show valid terminations. Anent non-compliance
with the formal requirements of the petition, the Court of
Appeals, adopting the observation of the Solicitor General, held
that the case is an exception to the rule on strict adherence to
technicality.
11. Petitioners filed MR but was denied.
12. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari on the
following grounds:
1. Under the law and applicable jurisprudence, the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondents should have been
denied outright for non-compliance with the
requirements for filing a Petition for Certiorari.
2. Under the law and applicable jurisprudence, respondents
cannot be considered to have been dismissed from
employment, because it was respondents who resigned
from their employment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition of the respondents should be denied outright
for noncompliance with the requirements for filing a Petition for
Certiorari.
RULING
Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that there are
three material dates that must be stated in a petition
for certiorari brought under Rule 65:
(a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution was received,
(b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration
when one such was filed, and
(c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. This
requirement is for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the
petition, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal
as required by law renders the judgment final and executory.
The same rule requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-
forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party.
Obviously, it is the plaintiff or principal party, and not the counsel whose
professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in
the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the
filing of a petition in that case.
As a general rule, these requirements are mandatory, meaning,
non-compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.
In the case before us, the failure to comply with the rule on a
statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the
dates are evident from the records. A thorough scrutiny of the
records reveals that the January 15, 1997 decision of the NLRC was
received by respondents counsel on January 24, 1997. On February
19, 1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated April 30,
1997. Respondents counsel received the resolution on May 30, 1997
and they filed the petition for certiorari on July 18, 1997.
In view of the retroactive application of procedural laws, Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
2-03 which took effect on September 1, 2000, is the governing
provision. It provides that when a motion for reconsideration is timely
filed, the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion. While respondents
motion for reconsideration was filed 16 days late, the NLRC nonetheless
acted thereon and denied it on the basis of lack of merit. In resolving the
merits of the motion despite being filed out of time, the NLRC
undoubtedly recognized that it is not strictly bound by the
technicalities of law and procedure. Thus, the 60-day period for
filing of a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the date of
the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, i.e., May 30, 1997, and thus, the filing made on July
18, 1997 was well within the 60-day reglementary period.
As regards the verification signed only by respondents counsel, this
procedural lapse could have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondents petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However,
it must be remembered that the rules on forum shopping, which
were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective which is the goal of all rules of procedure - that is, to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
Needless to stress, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated
to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or
except a particular case from its operation.
As the Court eloquently stated in the case of Aguam vs. Court of
Appeals:[32]
The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's
appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion
must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each
case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is
to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities."
"Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every
party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more
prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of
justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 65 - - - 27 | P a g e
 Thus, in Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals,[34] we held that the procedural
lapse of a partys counsel in signing the certificate of non-forum shopping
may be overlooked if the interests of substantial justice would thereby be
served. Further, in Damasco vs. NLRC,[35] we noted that the certificate of
non-forum shopping was executed by the petitioners counsel, but
nevertheless resolved the case on its merits for the reason that
technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the equity and obligations of the parties to a labor
case.
Indeed, where a decision may be made to rest on informed
judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be
accorded their due weight because labor determinations should not only
be secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.[36]
In this case, the Court of Appeals aptly found compelling reasons to
disregard respondents procedural lapses in order to obviate a patent
injustice.
RULING AS TO THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
(*iapil alng nako ni guys just in case mangutana si Maam)
Time and again we have ruled that in illegal dismissal cases like the
present one, the onus of proving that the employee was not dismissed or if
dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, rests on the employer and
failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not
justified and therefore illegal. Thus, petitioners must not only rely on the
weakness of respondents evidence but must stand on the merits of their
own defense. A party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation
with substantial evidence for any decision based on unsubstantiated
allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. Petitioners failed to
discharge this burden.
Petitioners complete reliance on the alleged resignation letters cum
release and quitclaim to support their claim that respondents voluntarily
resigned is unavailing as the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is
inconsistent with resignation. Resignation is the voluntary act of
employees who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate
themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of
relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. [40] Thus,
it is illogical for respondents to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. We find it highly unlikely that respondents would just quit even
before the expiration of their contracts, after all the expenses and the
trouble they went through in seeking greener pastures and financial
upliftment, and the concomitant tribulations of being separated from
their families, having invested so much time, effort and money to secure
their employment abroad. Considering the hard economic times, it is
incongruous for respondents to simply give up their work, return home
and be jobless once again.
Likewise, petitioners submission that respondents voluntarily
resigned because of their desire to seek employment elsewhere, as
accentuated by the concurrent fact that two of the respondents, Haydee
Anne B. Acua and Marites T. Clarion, already have jobs in Singapore is an
unreasonable inference. The fact that these two have already found
employment elsewhere should not be weighed against their favor. It
should be expected that they would seek other means of income to tide
them over during the time that the legality of their termination is under
litigation. They should not be faulted for seeking employment elsewhere
for their economic survival.
A thorough scrutiny of the purported resignation letters reveals the true
nature of these documents. In reality, they are waivers or quitclaims
which are not sufficient to show valid separation from work or bar
respondents from assailing their termination. The burden of proving that
quitclaims were voluntarily entered into falls upon the employer. Deeds of
release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to
which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their
dismissal.[43] The reason for this rule was laid down in the landmark case
of Cario vs. ACCFA:
Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is
plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same
footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must
have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh
necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money
proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure,
however, is that petitioners did not relent their claim. They pressed it.
They are deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.
Thus, we are more than convinced that respondents did not
voluntarily quit their jobs. Rather, they were forced to resign or were
summarily dismissed without just cause. The Court of Appeals acted in
the exercise of its sound discretion when it denied petitioners insistence
to dismiss the petition for certiorari, in light of the factual and antecedent
milieu. By so doing, the appellate court correctly gave more importance to
the resolution of the case on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No.
50504 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,
vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196894 (March 3, 2014)
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of
money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various properties
including two (2) parcels of land, which were attached by various
creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were
annotated on the back of the said titles.
JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologo’s failure to file a motion to
intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or annulment of judgment,
which were plain, speedy and adequate remedies then available to them,
rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked
the legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded
in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo were
not indispensable parties since their rights over the properties had been
rendered ineffective by the final and executory October 19, 1998 Decision
of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally and absolutely the subject
properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
HELD:
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-
Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in
dismissing the petition via Rule 65. It states that:
a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such as
intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the judgment, or even an
annulment of judgment, which are, by all means, plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law;
b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition since they
were not impleaded in the Branch 14 case.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if
there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses
Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to
use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of
RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable parties, to
simply recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through
a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the adverse
rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the
subject TCTs.
March 12, 2014 G.R. No. 193494
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,
Rule 65 - - - 28 | P a g e
vs.
ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION and the PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-
year contract of leased over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto,
Buhangin, Davao City.
Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property,
the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it.
Zuellig Pharma informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of
Communications’ claim. Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and
insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent.
Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already
consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental payments. Zuellig Pharma
prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims.
Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss beyond the
15-day period to file an answer, Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui
Enterprises be declared in default.
The trial court denied Lui Enterprises’motion to dismiss and declared it in
default.
The RTC of Makati ruled that Lui Enterprises "was barred from any claim
in respect of the rental payments" since it was declared in default. Thus,
there was no issue as to which corporation had the better right over the
rental payments. The trial court awarded the total consigned amount of
P6,681,327.30 to the Philippine Bank of Communications.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of Makati.
If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to
the judgment becoming final and executory, he or she may file a motion
for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. If he or she discovers his or her default after the
judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
may be filed.
Appeal is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she
may appeal the judgment for being contrary to the evidence or to the law
under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.120 He or
she may do so even if he or she did not file a petition to set aside order of
default.
A petition for certiorari may also be filed if the trial court declared the
defendant in default with grave abuse of discretion.
The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new
trial, and petition for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or cumulative. This is to compel defendants to remedy their
default at the earliest possible opportunity. Depending on when the
default was discovered and whether a default judgment was already
rendered, a defendant declared in default may avail of only one of the
three remedies.
Upon the grant of a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new
trial, or a petition for relief from judgment, the defendant is given the
chance to present his or her evidence against that of plaintiff’s. With an
appeal, however, the defendant has no right to present evidence on his or
her behalf and can only appeal the judgment for being contrary to
plaintiff’s evidence or the law.
Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant
to present evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring him
or her in default.
Thus, should a defendant prefer to present evidence on his or her behalf,
he or she must file either a motion to set aside order of default, motion for
new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment.

In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional
ISSUES: Trial Court of Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to
set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence.
Whether the RTC of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’motion to
set aside order of default.

HELD: No.
G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
The RTC of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to
answer the complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.,
motion to set aside order of default without an acceptable excuse why its
and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of
counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove excusable
Manila, Petitioners,
negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set aside
vs.
the order of default.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART,
After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the
INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER;
default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set
SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON
aside order of default. The defendant must properly show that his or her
PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES,
negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Rule 9,
Respondents.
Section 3, paragraph (b) of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 3. Default; declaration of. – x x x x Facts

(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any
The City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,
time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to
assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002
set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc.,
that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may
Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp.,
be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes
interest of justice.
Rule 65 - - - 29 | P a g e
purportedly due from private respondents, said assessment covered the
local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect. Because
payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their
business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the
P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed with the RTC Pasay City
the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally
and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer
to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC
In 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that
it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund,
which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with
the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant
petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court
discovered that a Decision in the main case had already been rendered by
the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders
JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a
tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue
Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following
amounts. Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under
Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above
Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of
Finality issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ
of Execution was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the
foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition,
which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by
the RTC, have already become moot and academic.
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the
Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which
petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in
assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed
with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are
in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It
is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered
final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant
case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case.
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent
action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of
Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that
the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of
judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and,
thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the
rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority
to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to
quasi-judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Morales vs. CA
GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its
dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under
this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.
Rule 65 - - - 30 | P a g e
– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive
relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage
of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,”
the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the
Supreme Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for
prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an
opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety
of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if
it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring
a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for
prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions
attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA -
and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is
put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of
the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the
Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence,
involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no
less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally
important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the
condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires
exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's
direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court,
notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the
assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504
before the CA, is justified.
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her
Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 115 Hence, it should be
preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the
validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to
point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be
heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through
his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the
Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its
dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under
this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any
court (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It
may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an
incident in the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay,"
which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains
pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only
refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a
provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
Rule 65 - - - 31 | P a g e
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only
of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by
officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman
has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies,
but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public
officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of
the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is
supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial
review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is
unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings"
refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure
question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of
statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the
legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that
when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law
seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to
look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at
the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which
the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x
[a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and
in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this
construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is
entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the
legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not
conclusive."124
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful
meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be
adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA
6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions
or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations: 127
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14,
after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu
thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the
decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for
review, but on certiorari.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that?
Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is
that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not
unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will
be a very strict appeal procedure.
x x x x
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if
there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent
himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to
him?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short
by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?
Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?
Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example,
if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his
administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the
appropriate action?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change
the administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must
exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and
seeks judicial review.
x x x x
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee
in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review to
a petition for certiorari?
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the
provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the
Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable
Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the
appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of
discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to the
petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue
is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without
jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr.
President.
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of
the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but
should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a
distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ;
because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order,
ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under
the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by
this change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the
facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review
into the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a
determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in
excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I
assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Rule 65 - - - 32 | P a g e
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It
is very well stated, Mr. President.
x x x x
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to
render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the
Supreme Court?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr.
President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.
Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have
made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period
of Individual Amendments.
xxxx
The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment
inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing
none, the same is approved.128
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however,
unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as
the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the
suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after
the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word
"certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the decision of the
Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but
on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and
Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review
from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to
make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the
change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari"
was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed
"petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14,
RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly
its second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy
one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it
only reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure
questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral
arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification made
on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at
least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate
support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject
matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these
deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section
27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of
Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's
decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court
(fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of
the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial
evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of
written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;cralawlawlibrary
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the '
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in
stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by
Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the
Ombudsman Act was passed way back in 1989130and, hence, before the
advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the
governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770,
referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus
possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the
provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal
by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from
notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed
in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without
proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis
supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory
construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law." ;cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the
whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by
prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the
exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for
remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from
the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy
(whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the
maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to
be understood in a general sense.134 By the same principle, the word
"findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the
disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the
Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing
Rule 65 - - - 33 | P a g e
general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower
text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA courts,136 and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be
6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of
findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to
the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More
law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the
Procedure: provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in
courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also
increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however,
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar
to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which
RULE 45
was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA
x x x x
6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision
statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the
was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997
court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition,
Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of
and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized
any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified
by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the
statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion
Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of
for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.
Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of
Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition,
shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the
of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to
assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the
RULE 45
Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to
only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its
appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court
advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final
may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
law." We pointedly said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the
could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional
taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is
based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy
classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c)
against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and
questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural
thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts
rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition
to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without
on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction
its advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former
principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject.
Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-
Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and
stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover
subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility. 135 There should then
the same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of
be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers
judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate
construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the
determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over
above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed,
C. Validity of the second paragraph of
the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own
Section 14, RA 6770.
motion146). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its
bearings in settled case law:
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely
limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal
-which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this
Rule 65 - - - 34 | P a g e
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in
this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and
other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear
, that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is
the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute,
governs in a case before them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions
which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to
admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring
into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks
jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in
the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction
of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which
case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any
point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly
recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory
order,148 hence, unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65
petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this
Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a
preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was -
similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed
by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a
finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was
certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by
Section 1 of Rule 65."152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and unappealable order of
the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court
remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this
case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated that while "a special civil action
for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with
the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts."
Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it
was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition
to the CA. The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar156 (September 16,
2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that
the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 petition. That being said, the Court now examines the objections
of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the
assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the preventive
suspension order, incidental to that main case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been
adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional
injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension
orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987
Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her
office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally
obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as
effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." 159
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced
the historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several
Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing
grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the
government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize
their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the
effective performance of their function as government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman
became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political
independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to
the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630,
creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was
tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any
administrative act of any administrative agency, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the
Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the
Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was
given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding
information, and control the prosecution of these cases.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman
was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its
objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the
standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution. These provisions
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's
mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:
Rule 65 - - - 35 | P a g e

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize
the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court
has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad
powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these
actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with
the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all
acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their
tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and
influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of
external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.
x x x x
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman
is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a
notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers,
both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its
daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by
the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do
not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the
Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In
general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the
extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment
of their core functions"163;cralawlawlibrary
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express
mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
fabric of our constitutional system is based";164 and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional
Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973
Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing
for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one
created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is
dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar
manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on
Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared
towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political
pressure."165
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the
foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently
intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these
bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential
interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA
358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have
been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not
under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that
are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the
President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as
Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-
meaning" it might have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court
categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the
independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under
the discretionary power of the President.
x x x x
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman
certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the
independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and
proper functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which
provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from
office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar
as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the
President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the
validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not
considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and
is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.167
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the
concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot
be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows,
or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes
germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to
impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which
means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by
an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of
the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free
it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169
Rule 65 - - - 36 | P a g e

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which
are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of
judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale
of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence
notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive
relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage
of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not
cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate
deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an
amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record
whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no
injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it
necessary to have a special paragraph for that?
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will
prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being
one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only
to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the
Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be
allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say,
the Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the
Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left
by RTC judges all over the country.
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that
effect?
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other
than the Supreme Court.
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same
is approved.171
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including
interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial
review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive
writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial
review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to
differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts,
except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an
Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is
the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue
anent its constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the
course of these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly
necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral
Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government." 176 The
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government is more commonly known as the principle of separation of
powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court
held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when
one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another."178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there
is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another
department's functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is
allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all
other lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress.
Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known
as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the
Regional Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183were established. Later,
through the passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1486,185the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were
respectively established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5186 of the same Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.
x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction
over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v.
Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the
authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject
matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned
constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts,
through the passage of BP 129, as amended.
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay,
Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
Rule 65 - - - 37 | P a g e
 auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not
only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under
Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the
concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v.
Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals.189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as
conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts
established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a
case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes
"the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.192
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 196 and 1973
Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme
with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually
altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's
rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would
show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-
making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial
suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by
"the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase
"the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the
phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes
were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual
reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5),
Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."201
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As
pronounced in Echegaray:

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the

jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r
judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter." 194
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various
rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed
various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the
Rule 65 - - - 38 | P a g e
for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction were thus provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in
and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled
that the sole objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is
to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard.
They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is
committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act
that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In
other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself,
but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory
processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts
of the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the
provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is
defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule
enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section
5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides
with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and
other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect
under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in
the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law 208 or
by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or
rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions,
orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and
be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the
final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it
the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ;
will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with
the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before
it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court
endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have
powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent
in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process
and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
x x x x cralawlawlibrary
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or
are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as
well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their
granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-
entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case
of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred."215
In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the
principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they
are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and
general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of
inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably
necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is
sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its
constitutionally mandated functions."216
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of
a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a
revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that
which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering
the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that
". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by
the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to
make that power effective in the administration of justice."
(Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional
injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this
end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the
same was constitutionally impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the
language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once
and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a
cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power,
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the
administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this
power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the
subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to
make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary
injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular
instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm
of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature
to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the
legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this
inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the
Rule 65 - - - 39 | P a g e
power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of
constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x
x x x x
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having
obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general
jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the
administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the
inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a
right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could
control the appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal
does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted
powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and
the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to
control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial
rules have come into play and have preempted the field. 219 (Emphasis
supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress
passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this
Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances,
which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under
the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which
belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed
the means of implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for
temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is
threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the
case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:
misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the
subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases;
the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the
relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed.
Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional
remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated
rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to
every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent
to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation
of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in
prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry
out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be
mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is
extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's
acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is
rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under
the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to
regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated,
when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been
acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true
meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our
Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should
therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the
policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should
only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court
given its sole prerogative over the same.
The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F.
Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay
(Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
Court?
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
then the rule deals merely with procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 58, Your Honor.
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the
JUSTICE LEONEN:
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I
cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from
will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies,
Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the
our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from
for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.
Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases
x x x x
involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and
controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus,
JUSTICE LEONEN:
effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees),
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article
it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or
VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you
even establish new rules of procedure225 solely belongs to the Court,
please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary
to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision?
government. On this score, the Court described its authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.
"[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."226
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2,
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1,
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading,
Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own
practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence,
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under
the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?
Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these
powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a
The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its
jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
JUSTICE LEONEN:
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2
jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman
Rule 65 - - - 40 | P a g e
which we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is
that not correct? ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of
Correct, Your Honor. jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN: JUSTICE LEONEN:

Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when
Congress, is that not correct? they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does
not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:
When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that JUSTICE LEONEN:
not correct? Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a
TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: correct?
Correct, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
JUSTICE LEONEN: Yes, Your Honor.
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or
is it part of litigation in an ordinary case? JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?
It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
JUSTICE LEONEN: Correct, Your Honor.
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?
xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 229 the Court
instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental
JUSTICE LEONEN: powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of these powers are distributed among the several departments. The
litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
correct? conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.230
Correct, Your Honor.
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers
JUSTICE LEONEN: principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional? the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory
provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority
No, Your Honor. over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the
prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
x x x x provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of
JUSTICE LEONEN. procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under
Rule 16? Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through
passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the
Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the
remedies, x x x. preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the
point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
JUSTICE LEONEN. CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-
power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
[s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: IV.

That is true.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely
JUSTICE LEONEN abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No.
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection
correct? to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court
first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct. A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive
suspension order.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?
Rule 65 - - - 41 | P a g e
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a
preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the
Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the
official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction
between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty.
The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is
readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of
the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided
by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for
misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.
(Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive
suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So
Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged
is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of
the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found
guilty.232 (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly
stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by
the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first
requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however,
show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided
in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs.
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the
assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were
established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint
were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then,
following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively
charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it
would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the
very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the
seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x
x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of
the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case
of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose
preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013
as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from
2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts
which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e.,
the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the
services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation
dobtrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made
after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely
effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election. 242
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have
considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense
which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the
administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees
with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given
that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive
relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the
subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly
raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, 244 the CA did
not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily
argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the
application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin
the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior
term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be
administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been
invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset,
the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against
him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive
writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed
writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA
gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express
or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the
Rule 65 - - - 42 | P a g e
offender as if there had been no offense."246
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based
on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from
the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija,247 (Pascual),which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected
to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6,
1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative
charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave
abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a
criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20,
1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for
the acts charged against him since they were committed during his
previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him
during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when
the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy
posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be
disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately
preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court,
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on
the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes
and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views
with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or
appointment condones the prior misconduct."248Without going into the
variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state
that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule
denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct
during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered
that there is really no established weight of authority in the United States
(US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual,
theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from
office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out
during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in
the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman
aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature
published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not
uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is
nuanced:
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing
a public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he
allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language
of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a
particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an
example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only
for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be
prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed
prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from
office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or
omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v.
Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or
unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of
the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly
construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of
malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear
legislative language making, the word "office" must be limited to the
single term during which the offense charged against the public officer
occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga
County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution
was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an
officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to
the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite
was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view
that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of
certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office,
adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or
purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the
Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the
court construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of
office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the
legislature in enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of,
and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official
could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a previous one
(Newman v. Strobel).257
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public
officer was a successor in the same office for which he has been
administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is
recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is
premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not
taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one continuous
term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds
for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak
of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common
Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of
Atlanta).263
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the
continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine
was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer
charged with malversation of public funds was denied the defense of
condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the
large sums of money illegally collected during the previous years are still
retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of
Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation
doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;]
[thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand
of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v.
Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as
nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a
continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the
country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect to
discharge it constitutes misconduct."
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion
in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the
condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show
that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the
debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this
jurisdiction would not have been proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of
this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents,
but as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on
whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and
carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing
legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this
Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica,
the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful
countervailing considerations against its application.268 In other words,
stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist
to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman
correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along
with the society within which it thrives.270 In the words of a recent US
Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."271
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the
time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution,
which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino
Rule 65 - - - 43 | P a g e
People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain
difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious
re-examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially
true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W.
2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw
vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs.
Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A.
67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x
x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor;
and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So.
559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281,
63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man
to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by
reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the
people.274 (Emphases supplied)
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first
applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated
passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court
clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal
case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an
administrative case in that the former involves the People of the
Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large;
whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency he serves is
affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may
pardon a criminal offense.
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided
under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was
applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although
his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the
Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is
justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation
prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative
cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has
to defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court
mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-election
covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related
therewith.279
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) -
wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor
Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in
an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed
only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that
notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is
presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character,
including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was
deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the
Court held that the determinative time element in applying the
condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was
perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into
during a prior term, acts which were done to implement the same,
even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application
of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April
23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the
doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the
administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the
public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days
before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the
date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged
misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or
period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was
committed prior to the date of reelection. 282 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as
to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein
the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate
court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to
justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for
condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework
was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these
cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was -
and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted
from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by
their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative
cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-
election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense
committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our
jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never
tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of
condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the
adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of
our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the
continued application of the doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the
Rule 65 - - - 44 | P a g e
supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary
should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
a framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or
take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the dereliction of duty;cralawlawlibrary
operation of the political branches of government.286 (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. (e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days,
which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang
that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II barangay;cralawlawlibrary
which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be the status of an immigrant of another country; and
required by law to render personal military or civil service." 287 Perhaps (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as enumerated above by order of the proper court.
the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection
confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states
originated from select US cases existing at that time. that those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with
public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter
introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified
Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and from running for any elective local position:
declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of x x x x
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain
accountable to the people." (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
positive and effective measures against graft and disqualification from holding public office:
corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public
servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the
integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle
and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -
and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times: a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and the civil service examinations.
employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of
lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local
official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the
In Belgica, it was explained that: qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision
only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their
official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis x x x x
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense,
section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in the Code of nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291 suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal
suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October
10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992: To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
Rule 65 - - - 45 | P a g e
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction
to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted
in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason
why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative
cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for
discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an
elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-
elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation
since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position
due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar
regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty
of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US
State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative
liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision
stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct
committed during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold
the office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's
delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision
against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the
LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was
deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under their
constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our
present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was
even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated
upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case,
which was not reported in full in the official series, the crux of the
disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way
pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be
incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability,
none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the
condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local
official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-
election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v.
Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it
was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct
committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in
Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative
liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no
legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth
in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate
of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be
sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a
particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In
this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say
that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of
condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability
would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have
been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at
the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that
such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate's will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-
electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of
his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. 302 Besides, it is
contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly
points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are
shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct
committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost
always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a
conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City
Council of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his
removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on
the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because
condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in
the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot
forgive something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this
discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back
in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to
abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret
what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those
called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be
respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v.
Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
Rule 65 - - - 46 | P a g e
 will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated: Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides
defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation
that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided."
doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the
discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is
simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution
easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights
which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that
that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
and hence, is unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit
that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape
from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly
administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this
perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was
doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional
able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this
character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the
Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons
doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public
the condonation doctrine.
accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the
years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
E. Consequence of ruling.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or
not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal
discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered
Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to
as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious
explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
public office.
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against
passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of
them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312
the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on
the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing
hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as
the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases
dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were
enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015
placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and
Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the
prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case
case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing
is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the
following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that
prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential
time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution
the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that
above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive
render the subject of discussion moot.chanrobleslaw
suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to
resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the
merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015,
had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him
the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative
charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been
mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only
an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the
Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more
purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's
process of investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness
of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order
subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations,
particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained
in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court
V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the
Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an
impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty
therefor would result in her effective removal from office.318 However, a
reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that
she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance,
in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the
Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course
to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:

Rule 65 - - - 47 | P a g e
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for
Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as
the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government]
are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and
Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a
comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the
exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due
course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same.
Sjmply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been
given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to
rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is
perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of
this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under
the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the
Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor;cralawlawlibrary
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment
is PROSPECTIVE in effect;cralawlawlibrary
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of
its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively
liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-
0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-
A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's
comment, the CA is DIRECTEDto resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 65
GMA vs PP and SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
 On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in Sandiganbayan
petitioners in this case, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and PCSO Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas,
among others that include PCSO Chairman Uriarte, PCSO Board
of Directors, and COA officials, with plunder as defined and
penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080 in the total amount of
P365,997,915.00.
 Witness to the suit was Atty. Aleta Tolentino, who happened to
be a member of the Board of Directors of PCSO. The audit
review proceeded when she reviewed COA Annual Reports of
PCSO for years 2006 to 2009 and annual financial statements
for the years 2005 to 2009. One of her major findings was that
the former management of the PCSO was commingling the
charity fund, the prize fund and the operating fund. By
commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only
one main account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169
(PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting principles.
 The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive
disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF).
There were also excessive disbursements for advertising
expenses. The internal audit department was also merged with
the budget and accounting department, which is a violation of
internal audit rules.
 Apart from Atty. Tolentino, the State a;lso presented evidence
in the testimonies of officers coming from different law
enforcement agencies to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to
the effect that the PCSO had not requested from their
respective offices any intelligence operations contrary to the
liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas. Other PCSO
and COA officials were presented as additional witnesses.
 The present issue stemmed after the Prosecution rested its
case as GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero and
Villar separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting
that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder
against them.
 On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to
evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed
the charge against them. It held that said accused who were
members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to
have diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided
the public treasury by conveying and transferring into their
possession and control any money or funds from PCSO account.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA,
Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence
showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that
the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of
malversation against Valencia.
 Hence, this petition. Considering that the Sandiganbayan
denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and Aguas, they have
come to the Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said
denial, claiming that the denial was with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Case for prosecution: The Prosecution insists that the petition for
certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to
evidence; that she also thereby failed to show that there was grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying her demurrer to
evidence; and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only interpreted
what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the
established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively
discussing how she had connived with her co-accused to commit plunder.
Issue: Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to
assail the denial of the petitioners’ demurrers to evidence.
Ruling: YES.
 As a general rule, the special civil action for certiorari is not
proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment."
 It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that
the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was
an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings,
and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to
trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal
the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to
do so- (the SC cited Ong vs People)
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that
authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is
more discretionary than either prohibition or
mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending
control over other courts, we are to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case 'as
the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the
writ will be granted where necessary to prevent
a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
 The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the
other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction
as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic
Rule 65 - - - 48 | P a g e
 exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of
Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
 The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be
thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake
of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has
the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the
denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the
accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari
when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As
we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied
the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent
and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder,
and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty
verdict.
CASE NO. 33: LAGMAN vs EXECCUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
 President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 (PN 216),
effective May 23, 2017 for a period not exceeding 60 days,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. A written
report on the factual basis od PN 216 was submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017,
 The report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only
escalated and worsened with the passing of time. On May 23,
2017,a government operation to capture the high-0ranking
officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group
was conducted. However, the government was confronted by
the ASG and Maute’s intensified efforts at sowing violence
aimed at both the government and the civilians and their
properties. These groups were able to take control of major
social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi City
which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was
intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment
of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
 From the reports received by the President, he concluded that
such activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a
clear attempt to establish the groups’ seat of power in Marawi
City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat. No
doubt, the lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
president of his power, authority, and prerogatives within
Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the
entire Mindanao.
 According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG,
Maute, and other criminals brought about undue constraints
and difficulties to the military and government personnel in
the performance of their duties and function, and untold
hardships to the civilians. The report also highlighted the
strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant
role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole.
 The petitions (Lagman, Cullamat, and Mohamad petitions)
were anchored on Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Philippine
Constitution on the constitutionality of PN 2016 for lack of
sufficient factual basis. The Mohamad Petition, in particular,
invoking the Court’s power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, insists
that the Court may look into the wisdom of the president’s
actions and not just the presence of arbitrariness. The
Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to
review, “compel respondents to present proof on the factual
basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao and
declare PN 216 as unconstitutional.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that although
Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such
authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to
specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the
“appropriate proceeding” mentioned therein may be resorted
to. The OSG suggests that the “appropriate proceeding”
referred to in Section 18, Art. VII may be availed of using the
vehicle, mode or remedy of certiorari petition, either under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
Section 18, Article VII. The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.
Section 1, Article VIII. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Section 5, Article VIII. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
Rule 65 - - - 49 | P a g e
 increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary
in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
 The OSG further maintains that the review power is not
mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. OSG
contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of PN 216
should be reviewed by the Court “under the lens of grave abuse
of discretion” and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts.
Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the standard in
reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.
Issue: Whether or not the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” under
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution refers to a petition
for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
Ruling: NO.
 A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII
reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
 The phrase ““in an appropriate proceeding” under paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution that the phrase ““in an appropriate proceeding”
would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Sec. 1 or 5
of Art. VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is
whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under
Sec. 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency
power. Put differently, if this court applies the standard of
review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would
emasculate its constitutional task under Sec. 18, Art. VII.
 As to the purpose or significance of sec. 18, Art. VII allowing
judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the
1987 Constitution reverted to the Lansang doctrine, which
viewed the same not being a political question and within
ambit of judicial review. The 3rd par. of Sec. 18, Art. Vii should
be treated as sui generis as it follows a different rule on
standing as any citizen may file it, it limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive his emergency powers. And the usual period for
filing pleadings in petition for certiorari is likewise not
applicable under the 3rd paragraph of section18, Art. VII.
 In fine, phrase ““in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on
the 3rd par. of Sec. 18, Art. VII refers to any action initiated by a
citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of the Chief executive’s emergency
powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, petition, or a matter to be resolved by Court.
 To conclude that the phrase ““in an appropriate proceeding”
refers to a petition for certiorari filed under the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional
safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably,
the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 18, Art. VII would be subsumed under
Section 1, Art. VII. In other words, the framers of the
Constitution added the safeguard under the 3rd paragraph of
Sec. 18, Art. VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this
Court.
PROHIBITION
c
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI
KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI
ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M.
REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT,
CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR,
YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
THE CASE:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges
posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP
contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public
money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various
agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional
authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds
out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the
Executive Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further
complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to
agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
FACTS:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the
DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of
Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that the funds released to the
Rule 65 - - - 50 | P a g e
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the
funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request
for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP
had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to
ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of
the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the
funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased
appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3)
carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4)
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had
been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the
pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued
projects per zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that
had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of
savings, namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his
office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use
Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a)
use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c)
priority in the use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as
legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in
the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM
brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and
made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP
came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over
Congressional pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district" 7 – excited the Nation as heatedly as
the pork barrel controversy.
Petitioners:
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances
relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows: G.R.
No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on
October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), 8 on October 16, 2013; G.R.
No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on
October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R.
No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE),
on November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s
attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure –
Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),
alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP,
directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of
government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for
continuing and current allotments.
Respondents:
The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other
executive issuances implementing the DAP.
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no
authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or
controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely
appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a
law or any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is
for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of
the President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and
that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP
and NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory
opinion that no court can validly render
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual
situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in
the COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of
the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial
courts by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final
order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and
all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
RULING:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. The respondents’
arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress
concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court,
upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the
repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a
constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its
exercise of the legislative power.
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
Rule 65 - - - 51 | P a g e
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgmenton matters of this nature.
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining
and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of
certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable
only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power
by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is
no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents
are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess
of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court
through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text
of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and
undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the
Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The
Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication
with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and
balances.
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork
barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional
duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial
power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations
on the Chief Executive’s spending power.
THIRD DIVISION
DESTILLERA LIMTUACO & CO. INC., and CONVOY MARKETING CORPORATION,
petitioners,
versus
ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
November 28, 2008 G.R. No. 164242
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
THE CASE:
The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of
the Philippines (AdBoard) to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising
and to impose sanctions on its members who broadcast advertisements without its
clearance.
FACTS:
AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974 composed
of several national organizations in the advertising industry. Destileria Limtuaco &
Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.
In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its
advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with
the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement
entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ngKinse Anyos).
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started
airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This
prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no response. With the
continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its
advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously
issued, effective immediately.
Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint
which was later on amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and
Rule 65 - - - 52 | P a g e
Application for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-277. The
Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration
and its dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen,
review and approve all radio and television advertisements. Petitioners seek the
nullity of AdBoard's Code of Ethics for Advertising and ACRC Manual of Procedures
for Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals.
On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its
members-organizations of Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which
prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it.
Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service against AdBoard's officers.
On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner:
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as
well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance
from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an
exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.
Respondent:
On the other hand, AdBoard seeks the dismissal of the petition for failure to observe
the rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure to comply with certain requirements for
the filing of the petition, namely: statement of material dates, attachment of certified
true copy of ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, and defect in the certification of non-forum
shopping.
As to the merits of petitioners' arguments, AdBoard counters that it derives its
authority from the voluntary submission of its members to its jurisdiction. According
to AdBoard, there is no law that prohibits it from assuming self-regulatory functions
or from issuing clearances prior to advertising.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of AdBoard sought to be prohibited in this case are not acts of
a tribunal, board, officer or person exercising judicia, quasi- judicial or ministerial
functions.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to
command AdBoard to desist from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and
imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads
without such clearance.
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such
recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial
function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board,
officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at
contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several
members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own
members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of
a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of
persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against
private individuals or corporations so acting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MANDAMUS
G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014
STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., CELSO A.
FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN and CITY
COUNCIL OF PUERTO PRINCESACITY,Respondents.
MENDOZA
Pe tition ers, SSW DA In c., C el so and Man ue l were the own ers
of two ( 2) parce l s of l and l ocate d in Pue rto Princesa City.
B efore Pue rto Prin ce sa be came a city, the nation al
g overnm ent establ ishe d a military camp in Puerto Prin cesa,
kn own as the We stern Command. In buil ding the comman d’ s
facilitie s an d road network , encroachm ent on several
p rop erties of pe tition ers re sulte d. Petitione rs’ property was
use d as a road right- of-way l eading to the m ilitary camp.
This road was name d the "We scom Road." S oon after, the City
of Puerto Prin ce sa de cide d to deve lop the "Wescom Road"
b ecause l ocal re side nts starte d to build their houses
alongside it .
In vie w of the en croachmen t, petition ers filed an action for
Payme nt of Just C om pen sation again st the resp on dents
Pue rto Princesa C ity, Mayor Hag edorn an d the City Coun cil of
Pue rto Princesa C ity be fore the RTC of Que zon City. The RTC
re nde red a decision in favor of petition ers.
A fter the RTC De cision becam e final an d executory, a writ of
exe cution was issue d. The money judgm ent amoun ted was
re duce d to P12,000,000.00, subje ct to the con dition ag reed
by the partie s. Pe titione rs cl aime d that re sp on den ts paid the
initial P2,000,000.00 b ut fail ed to g ive further paym ents
afte r. H oweve r, re cords show that the total n egotiated
am oun t of P12 million was al re ady fully paid an d received by
pe titione rs on the b asis of the ce rtification issued by then
C ity Tre asure r of Puerto Prince sa.
Neverthel e ss, petition ers file d a compl aint before the RTC-
B r. 223 against re sp on de nts for coll ection of unpaid just
compen sation , in cl uding inte re sts an d re ntal s, in accordan ce
w ith the RTC- Br. 78 Decision . If al so file d comp lain ts b efore
Rule 65 - - - 53 | P a g e
the COA , Omb udsman and DI LG to comp el the re sponden ts to
p ay the judgment b ut COA counte re d that it doe s not have
jurisdiction over the matter.
The petitioners filed the pre se nt petition for m andam us
seeking to direct, comm an d an d compe l the re sp on de nts
toen force, impl emen t or p ay the pe titione rs the judgm ent
award of the D ecision of the Que zon C ity RTC .
ISSUE:
Is mandam us a proper rem e dy to compe l the re sp on de nts to
p ay the just comp en sation?
RULING :
No. Mandam us is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction , in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court , tribunal, or
b oard, or to some corp oration or person re quiring the
perform an ce of a particul ar duty the re in spe cifie d, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom
the writ is directed or from op eration of l aw. This defin ition
recog nizes the pub lic characte r of the rem e dy, an d cle arly
excludes the idea that it may be re sorte d to for the p urp ose
of en forcing the perform an ce of dutie s in which the publ ic
has n o in terest. The writ is a p rope r re course for citizen s
who seek to enforcea pub lic right an d to compe l the
perform an ce of a pub lic duty, most e sp ecially whe n the
public right involved is man date d by the C on stitution . As the
q uoted provision instructs, man damus w ill lie if the trib un al ,
corp oration , b oard, office r, or person unl awfully ne gl ects the
perform an ce of an act which the l aw enjoin s as a duty
resul ting from an office , trust or station .
The writ of man damus, however, w il l n ot issue to comp el
anofficial to do anything which is not his duty to do or which
it is his duty not to do, or to give to the app licant anything
to which he is not entitle d by l aw. Nor will m andam us issue
toen force a right which is in sub stantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt ex ists, al though objection raising
a mere technical question will b e disregarde d if the right is
clear an d the case is me ritorious. As a rule , man damus will
n ot l ie in the absen ce of any of the fol l ow in g g rounds: [a]
that the court , officer, board, or pe rson against whom the
action is taken unl awfully ne gle cte d the performance of an
act which the l aw sp ecifical ly en joins as a duty re sul ting
from office, trust, or station ; or [b ] that such court , office r,
b oard, or person has unl awful ly exclude d petition er/rel ator
from the use and en joym en t of a right or office to which he
is en titl ed. On the part of the re lator, it is e ssen tial to the
issuance of a writ of m andam us that he shoul d have a cl ear
l egal right to the thing de manded an d it must be the
imperative duty of resp on de nt to perform the act re quire d.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principl e that
mandam us can not be use d to en force contractual
obl igation s. G eneral ly, man damus will not l ie
to en force purely private con tract rights, and w il l n ot lie
again st an individual unle ss som e obl igation in the nature of
a p ubl ic or quasi-public duty is impose d. The writ is not
app ropriate to enforce a private right against an in dividual .
The writ of man damus lies toen force the exe cution of an act ,
when, otherwise, justice would b e obstructe d; an d, re gularly,
issues on ly in cases re lating to the pub lic an d to the
g overnm ent; hen ce, it is cal le d a p re rogative writ . To
p reserve its p rerogative character, m andam us is n ot use d for
the redress of p rivate w ron gs, but on ly in matters re lating to
the public.
More ove r, an imp ortan t prin cipl e fol l owe d in the issuan ce of
the writ is that the re should be n o plain , speedy an d
ade quate rem edy in the ordin ary course of law other than
the rem e dy of mandam us being invoke d. In other wo rds,
mandam us can be issue d on ly in case s where the usual
m ode s of proce dure and form s of rem edy are powerless to
afford rel ie f. Although classifie d as a legal rem edy,
mandam us is eq uitabl e in its nature an d its issuan ce is
gen e rally con trol le d by equitabl e prin ciples. Indeed, the
g rant of the writ of man damus lies in the soun d discretion of
the court .
The le gal re me dy is to see k rel ie f with the COA p ursuan t to
S uprem e Court Adm in istrative C ircular 10-2000 dated
Octob er 25, 2000, which enjoin ed judg es to observe utm ost
caution , prude nce an d judiciousn ess in the issuance of writs
of exe cution to satisfy money judgm ents again st
g overnm entage ncie s and local g ove rnmen t un its. Under
C omm onwealth Act No. 327, as amen de d by Section 26 of P.D.
No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to
examine , audit and se ttle "all deb ts an d claims of any sort"
due from or ow ing the G overnme nt or any of its
sub divisions, ag en cies and instrumen talities, including
g overnm ent- own e d or controll ed corporation s and their
sub sidiarie s.
The se ttl eme nt of the mone tary cl aim was still sub ject to the
prim ary jurisdiction of the COA de spite the fin al decision of
the RTC having al ready val idated the claim . A s such, the
claim ants had n o al te rn ative excep t to first seek the
app roval of the COA of the ir m on etary cl aim. Con sidering
that the COA still re tain e d its primary jurisdiction to
adjudicate mon ey claim , petitione rs shoul d have fil ed a
pe tition for certiorari with this C ourt p ursuan t to Section 50
of P.D. No. 1445. H en ce , the COA' s re fusal to act did not leave
the pe titione rs without any re me dy at all.
H ence , pe tition for man damus is not p rope r. Petition ers are
en joine d to file its cl aim w ith the C om mission on Audit .
G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.
Facts:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy
that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential
election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex
officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that
the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution
which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon
the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next
step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the
Rule 65 - - - 54 | P a g e
public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,
not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided
on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position
due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors
called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist,
mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing
the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments
Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela
case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions
during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE
WON mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
RULING
No. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct
the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a)
the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the
duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law;
(c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty
enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not
discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Angeles vs. Sec. of Justice
G. R. No. 142549 March 9,2010
J. Leonardo De-Castro
Facts:
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them
claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and
alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the
parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of
Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action
for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo
Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19,
1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this
Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus,
in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of
Appeals,[4] reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals, [5] the
Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917,
was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D.
Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in
that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and
Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-
Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said
parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the
proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective
interests in the property.
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City
and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were
still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before
proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator
to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, informed the counsel of the petitioner that the
request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of
Justice in its 1st Indorsement, finding that there is only one OCT No. 994
which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not
on 19 April 1919)
Issue: whether or not respondent can be compelled by writ of
mandamus.
Held: We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents
unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the
questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs
(in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the
use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the
issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to
this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not
unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order,
and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty;
hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
Rule 65 - - - 55 | P a g e
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of
a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is
in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. [27] It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of
an action already taken in the exercise of either.[28]
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if
compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the
alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public
respondents refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents
have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration
Authority[29] instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose,
and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law
or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial
doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. (Emphasis
ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA
officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases
where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same
parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves
the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot
be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there
were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of
land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for
the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be
mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with
said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA
Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by
respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee
Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request.
[31]
There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse
to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited
documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not
exist.
Special People Inc. Foundation vs Canda
GR No, 160932 January 14, 2013
J. Bersamin
Special People Inc. Foundation (SPIF) was a proponent of a water-
resource development and utilization project in Bohol that would involve
the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the
distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other
municipalities. SPIF applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with
the Environmental Management Bureau(EMB) of the DENR, Region 7,
seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC)under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1586. Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental
impact of the project, Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol,
rendered his findings that the project is located within a critical area;
hence, Initial Environmental Examination is required. SPIF appealed
Canda’s findings to EMB RD Lipayon, claiming that it should also be issued
a CNC because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay water
works project of the DPWH that had recently been issued a CNC. RD
Lipayon notified SPIF that its documents substantially complied with the
procedural aspects of the EMB’s review, and Later on, RD Lipayon
informed the SPIF that an Initial Environmental Examination documents
was required for the project due to its significant impact in the area to
determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical
area or not, one of which is a
Certification from PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to
earthquakes of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its
equivalent during the period of 1949 until the year 2001 to which the
SPIF complied. However, due to the tenor of the certification from
PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon declared that the project was within an
environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to
the CNC. SPIF filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the RTC in
Loay, Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right
after having complied with the certification requirements; and that the
EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks
project in the same area. The trial court dismissed the petition for
mandamus ruling that the RTC would not interfere with the primary
prerogative of the EMB to review the merits of the petitioner’s application
for the CNC. Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: whether the petition for mandamus was the correct recourse.
Ruling: Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped
of its highly prerogative features and has been assimilated to the nature of
an ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an
extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in extraordinary
cases and where the usual and ordinary modes of proceeding and forms
of remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party aggrieved, and where
without its aid there would be a failure of justice. 37
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it
apart from the other remedial writs, i.e., that it is used merely to compel
action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty. 38 In fact, a
doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue
only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the
act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to
perform the same.39 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is
such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding
compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. 40
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is
that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties
that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. 41 A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
Rule 65 - - - 56 | P a g e
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion
or judgment.42
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for
mandamus rendered its petition in the RTC untenable and devoid of
merit.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173428 November 22, 2010
FROILAN DEJURAS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian
Reform; the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the CENTER
FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of
Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO; ARTEMIO
ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it requires discretion and
judgment on the part of the DAR to find whether petitioner has a clear
legal right that needs to be protected and that the acts of SMPHI are
violative of such right.
Be that as it may, We take note that, the measure of compulsion
petitioner had sought before the Court of Appeals against the DAR is
already unwarranted, because first, the DAR has already denied for lack of
merit the “Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order
or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.” And second, in a Joint Order issued by
the DAR, the Petition for Coverage and the Petition for Revocation have
been both denied, thereby affirming the Exemption Order issued by a
former DAR Secretary.

PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Faced with the prospect of ejectment due to SM Prime Holdings
Inc.’s (SMPHI) impending construction operations on the parcel of land
that they occupy, – where SM Sta. Rosa is set to be built – Florencio and
Froilan Dejuras, who are successors-in-interest of a self-proclaimed
legitimate tenant of that land, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Regional Office a “Petition for Coverage with Urgent Prayer
for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order” against SMPHI. They prayed that
a cease-and-desist order be issued to enjoin SMPHI from entering the
property; that the land be declared as covered by the agrarian reform
program; and that their family be declared qualified beneficiaries thereof.
Unfortunately, the DAR Regional Director denied the petition for lack of
merit.
From the denial of the petition, Florencio and Froilan
immediately lodged an appeal with the DAR Secretary. Before the same
office, they also filed an “Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Cease-
and-Desist Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction” in connection, among
others, with the Petition for Coverage under appeal. Florencio and Froilan
had sought the early resolution of this motion, yet despite their efforts in
filing six successive motions to that end, it appears that the DAR Secretary
had not promptly come up with a resolution on the application for
injunctive relief.
Florencio meantime died and was survived by Froilan, who
then instituted a Petition for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals (CA),
praying, among others, that a temporary restraining order be issued ex
parte to prevent SMPHI from proceeding with its construction operations,
and that the DAR Secretary be ordered to grant the urgent ex parte
motion for injunctive relief. Unfortunately, the CA denied due course to
the petition on the ground that mandamus is not the proper remedy to
correct the errors which the DAR Secretary may have committed, as the
said remedy avails only in relation to official duties which are ministerial
in character.

Issue: Should the writ of mandamus be granted?

Held: No. Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of

mandamus generally lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty,
but not the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily
involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the act sought to be
performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be
directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. It is,
nonetheless, also available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions.
Rule 65 - - - 57 | P a g e
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA,
WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUNÑ A
CAUSING, Petitioners, v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS
BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, IN BEHALF OF CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P.
CUDIA, AND ON HER OWN BEHALF, Petitioner-Intervenor.
PERALTA, J.
 PMA, as an academic institution, has the right to remove erring
cadets under the principle of academic freedom
 But PMA must still observe due process in removing cadets
 PMA cadets are entitled to due process
 PMA cannot be compelled by mandamus to reinstate cadets
separated therefrom if due process was observed
G.R. No. 211362 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom
Remedial Law – Mandamus – Ministrant vs Discretionary Function
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class
had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the
schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their
OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied
and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English
teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class
was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the
matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was
dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class
late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of
said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not
content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the
penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked
Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control
because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started
at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the
interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss
them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not
3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his
examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused to
leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late
because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as
they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if
Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such
transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia
(because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two
students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them
cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for
allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written
appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was
late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior
required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to
separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is
composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two
hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their
witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote.
The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia.
Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of
Cudia. However, they also have a practice of chambering where the
members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is
to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter
was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he
changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually,
the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the
PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various
military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that
there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of
such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation
violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the
AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme
Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not
proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering
with military matters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
HELD:
Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should
be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed
academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court,
cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights
and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act.
Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in
this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is
Rule 65 - - - 58 | P a g e
within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether
or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the
duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to determine
whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention
into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that
judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
MMDA' et al., vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R. No.
171947-48, Dec. 18, 2008 Velasco, Jr.,J.:
Facts: On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay filed acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint
alleged that the water qualify of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD)
I152 orthe Philippine Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the
continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay
constitutes a violation of, among others:(l) Respondents' constitutional
right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) TheEnvironment Code
(PD 1152); (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 98\; @) The Water
Code(PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856); (6) The Illegal
Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD825); (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD
979); (8) Executive Order No. 192; (9) The ToxicandHazardous Wastes
Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisanceand
human relations; (l l) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of
Guardianship; and (12)International Law.
Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC ruled in favor of the Concerned Residents
of ManilaBayand rendered a decision ordering the defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily,to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-
diving and other forms of contact recreation. Further, the RTC directed the
defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, within six
(6)months from receipt of the Decision, to act and perform their
respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted
scheme of action for the rehabilitation andrestoration of the bay. The RTC
also ordered the different government agencies to act on specific
activities in order to rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Appellate Court's Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
RTC in toto.
Issues; Whether the cleaning of Manila Bay is a ministerial act which can
be compelled bymandamus:
Whether the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152)
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover
cleaning in general.
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay and affirmed the Decisions of the RTC
and Court of Appeals with modifications.The Supreme Court went on
further to order the heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd,
DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," to each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of
the activities undertaken in accordancewith the Decision.
On the First Issue The Supreme Court ruled that the cleaning or
rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus. It
enumerated the enabling laws and issuances of each concerned agency
and held that the mentioned enabling laws and issuances are in
themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations
and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law.
Petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two
different concepts. The govemment agencies (petitioners) are enjoined, as
a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating
directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties.
On the Second Issue The Supreme Court held that Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code include cleaning in general. Sec. 17 does not in any
way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the
quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident. A perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,
indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the
pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left
behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall
undertake the cleanup work for the polluters' account. Petitioners'
assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay
only when there is a water pollution incidentand the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite
off mark. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec.
20 of PD 1152 or Sec.16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup
mandate depends on the happening of aspecific pollution incident. In this
regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse overSecs. 17 and 20
of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote:
"PDIl52 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental
protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 &
20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution
incidents."RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically
transform and improvewaste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitlyprovides that the State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.So it was that in
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically
prodding petitionersto clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly
as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in
them.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and
the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water
quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the
cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants
found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped
from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be
a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set
by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the
Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and
the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and
to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards
cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to
the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus, the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to
Rule 65 - - - 59 | P a g e
enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River
from industrial and municipal pollution.
Maricris DOLOT vs. Hon. Ramon PAJE, [G.R. No. 199199, August 27,
2013]
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order2dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution
dated October 18, 2011 issued by the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The
assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing
Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Facts:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together
with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of
Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of
Sorsogon.
The petition contained the following pertinent allegations:
* Sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being
conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located
in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail;
* Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to
protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality;
* Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with
the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground
settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard;
* after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have
the required permit to operate;
* Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority
to issue;
* the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the DENR,
despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the
people of Matnog; and
* The respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations
in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary
environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-
agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award
of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. The case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution. Aside
from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC
further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision
yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition
for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was
prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the rules.w library Petitioner Dolot
went straight to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
Issue: WoN there is a need for final court decree, order or decision for the
issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus?
Ruling:
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay. Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of
continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary
civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which
are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that
the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court
may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition
outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to
give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of
discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance
with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it
that justice is served.
> The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may
be availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law. The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment,
decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:(c)
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
> The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the
RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would
eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and
which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. Under the
Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still
retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the
effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the
final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it “permits the court to
retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision.
> The petition was granted.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Rule 65 (Writ of Kalikasan) No. 1
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO,
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Rule 65 - - - 60 | P a g e
Facts of the case:
 In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by
virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Aquino on
August 11, 1988. In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. On April 6, 2010, Congress
passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure
the protection and conservation of the globally significant
economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific
values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-
take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated
and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or
fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing
the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the
Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which
shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the
TRNP.
 In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the vessel, USS Guardian "to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to
arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 15,
2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan.
 On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf
and in representation of their respective sector/organization
and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed
the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G.
Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013
Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno
S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F.
Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary
Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary
Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural
Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy
Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena
(Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico
Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major
General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively
the "Philippine respondents."
 Petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry
(Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 );
obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages
to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing
resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail
certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
which they want this Court to nullify for being
unconstitutional.
 The petitioners prayed, among others, for the immediate issue
upon the filing of the petition a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan.
ISSUE: W/N Petition for Writ of Kalikasan is the proper remedy.
RULING: (SC denied the petition)
 The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the
doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the
State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
 In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, SC ruled on the
immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local
courts:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign
state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then
closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic
states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state,
or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity.
 In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they we:re performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons
of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
 Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted
in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency,
private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or
restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency,
private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the
decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency,
or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the
execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 SC agreedwith respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting
that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage
operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been
accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this
Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to
protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stnicture and marine
Rule 65 - - - 61 | P a g e
 habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are
concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS
Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the
fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed
readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation
for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy
has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists
and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and
appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
 SC denied the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the
Writ of Kalikasan.
 Hon. Ramon Jesus Paje vs. Casino GR#207257 February 3,
2015
 conference wherein the parties, with their respective counsels.
 Factual Antecedents
 In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a
government agency organized and established under Republic
Act No. (RA) 7227,4 and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation
(TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay
which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP).5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU,
whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired
power plant.
 The SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration
International Corporation (TCIC).
 On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under
the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc.
(RP Energy),11 a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with the primary purpose of
building, owning, and operating power plants in the
Philippines.
 RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-
fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the
issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
 On August 27, 2008, the SangguniangPanglungsod of Olongapo
City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the
city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an
energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer
alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay.
 On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW
coal-fired power plant.
 On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and
Development Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-square
meter parcel of land to be used for building and operating the
coal-fired power plant.
 On August 1, 2011, the SangguniangPanglalawigan of Zambales
issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of
a coal-fired thermal power plant at SitioNaglatore, Brgy. Cawag,
Subic, Zambales.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 On August 11, 2011, the Ligangmga Barangay of Olongapo City
issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its strong
objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.
 On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casinñ o,et al. (Casinñ o Group)
filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against
RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity
as Secretary of the DENR.
 On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1)
issue a Writ of kalikasan; and (2) refer the case to the CA for
hearing and reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.
 On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of kalikasan was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015 and raffled to the Fifteenth
Division of the CA.31 In the Petition, the Casinñ o Group alleged,
among others, that the power plant project would cause grave
environmental damage;32 that it would adversely affect the
health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales,
Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;33 that the ECC
was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under
Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC);34
that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior
certification from the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law);35 that
Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO
2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs is ultra vires
because the DENR has no authority to decide on requests for
amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a new
EIS;36 and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-
30, all amendments to RP Energy’s ECC are null and void.
 On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary
 Thereafter, trial ensued.
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 On January 30, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision denying the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an
environment protection order due to the failure of the Casinñ o
Group to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology was violated or threatened.53 The CA
likewise found no reason to nullify Section 8.3 of DAO No.
2003-30. It said that the provision was notultra vires, as the
express power of the Secretary of the DENR, the Director and
Regional Directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly
includes the incidental power to amend the same. In any case,
the CA ruled that the validity of the said section could not be
collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of kalikasan.
 Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this wise:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered DENYING the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and
the application for an environmental protection order.
 Unsatisfied, the parties appealed to this Court.
 ISSUE: W/N the denial of the Writ of kalikasan is proper?
 HELD:YES.The Rules on the Writ of kalikasan, which is Part III
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued
by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in
particular, the individual’s right to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides:
 Section 1.Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to
a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
 The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus,
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to
provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of
the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a
magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and
territorial boundaries. It is intended “to provide a stronger
defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where
institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation
and legislation have fallen short” and seeks “to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.”
 Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be
present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the
actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
Rule 65 - - - 62 | P a g e
 life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
 Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree
of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently
grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to
call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of
environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be
decided on a case-to-case basis.
 If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites,
the court shall render judgment granting the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan. Otherwise, the petition shall be denied. If the
petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for
under Section 15 of Rule 7, to wit:
 Section 15.Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
 The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:
 (a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
 (b) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
 (c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency,
private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the
decision and orders of the court;
 (d) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on
the execution of the final judgment; and
 (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
 It must be noted, however, that the above enumerated reliefs
are non-exhaustive. The reliefs that may be granted under the
writ are broad, comprehensive and non-exclusive.
 Prescinding from the above, The appellate court correctly
ruled that the Casinñ o Group failed to substantiate its claims
that the construction and operation of the power plant will
cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated
under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy
presented evidence to establish that the subject project will not
cause grave environmental damage, through its Environmental
Management Plan, which will ensure that the project will
operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and
standards;
 The Petition for Writ of kalikasan, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 00015, is denied for insufficiency of evidence.
G.R. No. 194239
June 16, 2015
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the
Residents of West Tower Condominium and in representation of
Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet
unborn, Petitioners,
vs.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN
CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, ( 1) the White Oil Pipeline
(WOPL) System from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and
transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (2) the Black Oil
Pipeline (BOPL) System which transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a
depot in Paranñ aque.
In May 2010, a leakage from one of the pipelines was discovered after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas
within the condominium. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial
stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the
discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay
Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to
abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's power
was shut down.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West
Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation
of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West
Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and public
interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of
the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.1
In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board
of directors and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of
directors and officers be directed to:
(1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in
the performance of their functions as a common carrier;
(2) continue to check the structural integrity of the whole 117-kilometer
pipeline and to replace the same;
(3) make periodic reports on their findings with regard to the 117-
kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the same;
(4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal
and West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak
became manifest; and
(5) to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and future
contingencies in the future.
For petitioners, the continued use of the 47-year old pipeline would not
only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and property of those who
live or sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but
would also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn to live in a
balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan 2 with a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring
respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to
file their respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to:
(a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b)
check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-kilometer
WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any
untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c)
make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
In compliance with the writ, FPIC submitted its "Report on Pipeline
Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program”. They also prayed
for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal capacity to
institute the petition; there is no allegation that the environmental
damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces;
and the continued operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the
interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the public.
Rule 65 - - - 63 | P a g e
On February 9, 2011, petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted,
their Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference and
Hearing7 pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the
Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA was required to
conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and recommendation.
On March 21, 2012, the preliminary conference was continued before the
CA wherein the parties made admissions and stipulations of facts and
defined the issues for resolution. On December 26, 2012, the CA Former
11th Division submitted to the Court its well-crafted and exhaustive 156-
page Report and Recommendation.
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity
to represent the other petitioners and whether the other
petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order
should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to
desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and
rehabilitate the affected environment;
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by
respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and

As to the merits of the case, the CA submitted the following 4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents
recommendations: FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the environmental
protection order.38
(a) That the people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and public interest
groups that indicated their intention to join the
petition and submitted proof of juridical personality RULING:
be allowed to be formally impleaded as petitioners.
I. Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
(b) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a
certification from the DOE Secretary that the WOPL
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited
is already safe for commercial operation. The
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
certification should take into consideration the
the suit.39 Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection
name of the real parties-in-interest.40 In other words, the action must be
system to be used in monitoring the entire pipeline's
brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought
mass input versus mass output. The certification
to be enforced.41 Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect
must also consider the necessity of replacing the
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for
pipes with existing patches and sleeves. In case of
it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or
failure of respondent FPIC to submit the required
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.42
certification from the DOE Secretary within sixty
(60) days from notice of the Honorable Supreme In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL
Court's approval of this recommendation, the TEPO affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as,
must be made permanent. in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of
July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut down.
(c) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a
special trust fund to answer for similar There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the
contingencies in the future be denied for lack of common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal
sufficient basis. standing to file and pursue the instant petition. It is of no moment that
only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of
d) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable
the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such
under the TEPO.
petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons
who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie
(e) That without prejudice to the outcome of the civil
case of a massive environmental disaster.
and criminal cases filed against respondents, the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with
not held liable in their individual capacities.
the unit owners and residents of West Tower and are real parties-in-
interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial
Reconsideration19 of the CA's Report praying that (a) instead of the DOE,
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and
the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry
submitted proof of juridical personality, including the Catholic Bishops'
Research and Development Center; (b) a trust fund be created to answer
Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc.,
for future contingencies; and ( c) the directors and officers of FPIC and
Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers
FGC be held accountable.
International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati
Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
On January 25, 2013, FPIC filed its Compliance (Re: Department of Energy
Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their
Certification on the Black Oil Pipeline). The DOE Secretary issued on
intervention in the present controversy.
October 25, 2013 a Certification,27 attesting that the WOPL is safe to
resume commercial operations, subject to monitoring or inspection
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ
requirements, and imposing several conditions that FPIC must comply
of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for
with.
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly
affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical
ISSUES:
persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional
Rule 65 - - - 64 | P a g e
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation.
II. Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its
Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL's
Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners' persistent plea is for the conversion of the
November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection
Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,46 Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the
measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address any concern
of oil leaks from the WOPL. The CA, however, observed that all of these
tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak
detection and pipeline integrity maintenance.
Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our
July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said
certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case
requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and
various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE
submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the
Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho I.
Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the
timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a
dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions
of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in
the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL.
The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests
proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that
the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall
issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the
other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no
longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or
that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of
the WOPL may be ordered.
It is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and
proficiency available within its offices, it has also rallied around the
assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other administrative agencies: the
ITDI49of the DOST, which is mandated to undertake technical services
including standards, analytical and calibration services; the MIRDC, 50 also
of the DOST, which is the sole government entity directly supporting the
metals and engineering industry;51 the EMB52 of the DENR, the agency
mandated to implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275
(Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the DPWH, which is
mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects
of projects of government agencies.53
The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must,
therefore, be availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of
allowing the immediate resumption of the WOPL's operation. In a host of
cases, this Court held that when the adjudication of a controversy
requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an administrative
body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative
body equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical
expertise.54 Hence, the courts, although they may have jurisdiction and
power to decide cases, can utilize the findings and recommendations of
the administrative agency on questions that demand "the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact."55
III. Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note
that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or
restoring the environment. Said proviso pertinently provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees,
costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator
to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a
special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.
(emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of damages to
petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or
denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
xxxx
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration
readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar
future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a
special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably
already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the
observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that the
creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on
petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant
recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising
from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
IV. Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors
and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors
and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without
prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC,
Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for
Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City)
filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC
are not liable in their individual capacities.
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The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the
explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a
petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of
damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case
and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the
proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of
respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the
management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the
FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the
civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
April 12, 2016
G.R. No. 209165
LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
AGHAM PARTY LIST (represented by its President Rep. Angelo B.
Palmones), Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Amended
Decision dated 13 September 20132 of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a
mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI embarked on a project
to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining
company to ship out ores and other minerals extracted from the mines
and make the venture economically feasible. Brgy. Bolitoc, about 25
kilometers away from the mine site, makes it an ideal location to build a
port facility. In the area of Sta. Cruz, Shangfil Mining and Trading
Corporation (Shangfil)/A3Una Mining Corporation (A3Una) and DMCI
Mining Corporation, have been operating their own ports since 2007.
LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the
port project: (1) Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Environmental Compliance Certificate5 (ECC); (2) DENR
provisional foreshore lease agreement with LAMI; 6 (3) Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) Clearance to Develop a Port; 7 (4) PPA Permit to Construct
a Port;8 (5) PPA Special Permit to Operate a Beaching Facility; 9 and (6)
Tree Cutting Permit/Certification10 from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR.
On 6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its
President, former Representative Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones),
filed a Petition21 for the issuance of a Writ22 of Kalikasan against LAMI,
DENR, PPA, and the Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).
Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 68 of PD No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, or the Revised Forestry Code; and
(2) Sections 57 and 69 of Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 (Philippine Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut
mountain trees and flattened a mountain which serves as a natural
protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of
Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns located in
Pangasinan.
On 13 June 2012, this Court remanded the petition 29 to the Court of
Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.
On 25 June 2012, LAMI filed its Verified Return dated 21 June 2012,
controverting Agham’s allegations. LAMI stated that it did not and was not
violating any environmental law, rule or regulation.
In a Decision37 dated 23 November 2012, the Court of Appeals decided the
case in favor of petitioner. The appellate court found that the government,
through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to cut trees and LAMI strictly
followed the proper guidelines stated in the permit. The appellate court
also stated that there can be no flattening of a mountain when there is no
mountain to speak of. Thus, for failing to comply with the requisites
necessary for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan, the Court of Appeals
resolved to deny the petition.
Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. In its
Motion for Reconsideration, Agham argued that the alleged leveling of the
subject hill by LAMI: (1) was not sanctioned by the DENR since LAMI
allegedly had no ECC from the DENR; (2) affected the ecological balance
of the affected towns and provinces since such leveling was done without
the concurrence of its residents; and (3) instigated the gradual
eradication of the strip of land mass in Sta. Cruz, Zambales that serves as
protective barrier from floods brought about by the swelling or surging of
the coastal water moving inward reaching other towns of Zambales and
Pangasinan.39
In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside its original Decision dated 23 November 2012. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 23,
2012 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof,
another judgment is rendered GRANTING the petition for WRIT OF
KALIKASAN as follows, to wit:
(1) respondent LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is
directed to PERMANENTLY CEASE and [DESIST] from scraping
off the land formation in question or from performing any
activity/ies in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(2) the respondent LAMI as well as the Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and/or
their representatives are directed to PROTECT, PRESERVE,
REHABILITATE and/or RESTORE the subject land formation
including the plants and trees therein;
(3) the Secretary of DENR and/or his representative is directed
to MONITOR strict compliance with the Decision and Orders of
the Court; and make PERIODIC REPORTS on a monthly basis on
the execution of the final judgment.
SO ORDERED.41
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the
environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether LAMI flattened
Rule 65 - - - 66 | P a g e
any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces.
RULING:
The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan
which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. 42 Section
1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ. – The writ is a remedy available to a natural
or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, 43 covers environmental
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available
against an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity.
The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there
is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation
arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation
involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces.
I. Whether LAMI violated environmental laws - No
In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, cited
two laws which LAMI allegedly violated: (1) Section 68 of the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine
Mining Act.
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
xxxx
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68
of PD 705:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.44
In the present case, LAMI was given a Tree Cutting Permit 45 by the CENRO
dated 17 April 2012. Since LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by
the CENRO and even passed the evaluation conducted after the issuance
of the permit, then clearly LAMI had the authority to cut trees and did not
violate Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
Next, Agham submitted that LAMI allegedly violated Sections 57 and 69 of
the Philippine Mining Act.
Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act state:
Section 57. Expenditure for Community Development and Science and
Mining Technology – A contractor shall assist in the development of its
mining community, the promotion of the general welfare of its
inhabitants, and the development of science and mining technology.
Section 69. Environmental Protection – Every contractor shall undertake
an environmental protection and enhancement program covering the
period of the mineral agreement or permit. Such environmental program
shall be incorporated in the work program which the contractor or
permittee shall submit as an accompanying document to the application
for a mineral agreement or permit. The work program shall include not
only plans relative to mining operations but also to rehabilitation,
regeneration, revegetation and reforestation of mineralized areas, slope
stabilization of mined-out and tailings covered areas, aquaculture,
watershed development and water conservation; and socioeconomic
development.
These two provisions are inapplicable to this case. First, LAMI is not
conducting any mining activity on the port site. LAMI’s mine site is about
25 kilometers away from the port site. Second, LAMI secured all the
necessary permits and licenses for the construction of a port and LAMI’s
activity was limited to preparatory works for the port’s construction. The
Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining
activities. Sections 57 and 69 deal with the development of a mining
community and environmental protection covering a mineral agreement
or permit.
Clearly, Agham did not give proper justifications for citing Sections 57 and
69 of the Philippine Mining Act. Agham did not even present any evidence
that LAMI violated the mining law or any mining undertakings in relation
to LAMI’s construction of a port facility. Agham only alleged in very
general terms that LAMI was destroying the environment and leveling a
mountain without conducting any scientific studies or submitting expert
testimonies that would corroborate such allegations.
Section 2(c), Rule 7, Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases provides:
Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the
following:
(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated, the act or omission complained of, and the environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Rule 65 - - - 67 | P a g e
The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden
to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or
threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
states that the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine
qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be
contained in the verified petition.
II. Whether LAMI flattened any mountain - No
The mountain, according to Agham, serves as a natural protective barrier
from typhoons and floods to the residents of Zambales and nearby towns
of Pangasinan. Thus, Agham argues that once such natural resources are
damaged, the residents of these two provinces will be defenseless and
their life, health and properties will be at constant risk of being lost.
However, Agham, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain,
did not cite any law allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim.
Agham did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents
in Zambales, and even the nearby towns of Pangasinan, complained of any
great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land formation which
may affect their lives, health or properties. Neither was there any
evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to
the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.
Testimonies of those experts in their fields, show that there is in fact no
mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. The Regional Director of
DENR EMB R3, Dir. Claudio, categorically declared that there is no
mountain on LAMI’s property. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB),
Regional Office No. III, through the OIC of the Geosciences Division, issued
a Memorandum dated June 26, 2012 proving that there is no mountain in
LAMI’s property. The proper description of the landform, according to the
said memorandum, is an "elongated mound"48
Several government entities and officials have declared that there is no
mountain on the port site: (1) in a Letter 51 to LAMI signed by
the Sangguniang Bayan members of Sta. Cruz dated 4 June 2012,
the Sangguniang Bayan members stated that there is no mountain in the
area; (2) in a Memorandum 52 dated 4 June 2012, the CENRO concluded
that the "mountain" is a "hill falling under Block I, Alienable and
Disposable land per LC Map 635"; and (3) in a Special Report53 re: Police
Assistance dated 6 May 2012, the Provincial Director of PNP Zambales
reported to the PNP Regional Director, citing the findings of the local chief
of police, that no leveling of a mountain transpired in the area.
The Court of Appeals did not provide any basis, in fact and in law, to
support the reversal of its original decision. Agham, in its Motion for
Reconsideration, did not present new evidence to refute its claim that
LAMI leveled a "mountain" or that there was an environmental damage of
considerable significance that will harm the life, health and properties of
the residents of the municipality of Sta. Cruz and its neighboring towns or
cities, or even the provinces of Zambales and Pangasinan. The pleadings
and documents submitted by Agham were just a reiteration of its original
position before the original Court of Appeals’ decision was promulgated
on 23 November 2012.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a
Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated
or would be violated. In the present case, the allegation by Agham that
two laws – the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine
Mining Act – were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by
Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish environmental
damage were mere general allegations.
Contrary to Agham’s claim that LAMI had no ECC from the DENR, the
DENR restored LAMI’s ECC. After LAMI was issued a Notice of Violation of
its ECC dated 1 June 2012 by the DENR-EMB R3, LAMI complied with all
the requirements and its ECC had been reinstated.
Thus, from all the foregoing, we agree with the appellate court, in its
original Decision dated 23 November 2012, when it denied the petition
for a Writ of Kalikasan:
As between the too general and very hypothetical allegation of large-scale
environmental damage at one hand, and the remarks of government
experts on the other, We are inclined to give more credit to the latter.
Presumption of regularity
It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official
duty has been regularly performed. Therefore, the fact that the "remarks
and recommendation" of the composite team from EMB R3, MGB R3, and
PENRO Zambales were made in the exercise of their government function,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of such official duty
stands. It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove otherwise, a task which it
failed to do here.
Expert findings are afforded great weight
The findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific
field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and
in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be
disturbed. x x x.64
In sum, contrary to the findings of the appellate court in its Amended
Decision dated 13 September 2013, we find that LAMI did not cause any
environmental damage that prejudiced the life, health or property of the
inhabitants residing in the municipality of Sta. Cruz, the province of
Zambales or in the neighboring province of Pangasinan. Agham, as the
party that has the burden to prove the requirements for the issuance of
the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan, failed to prove (1) the
environmental laws allegedly violated by LAMI; and (2) the magnitude of
the environmental damage allegedly caused by LAMI in the construction
of LAMI' s port facility in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales and its
surrounding area. Thus, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of
the Writ of Kalikasan must be denied.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013 of the Court of Appeals
and REINSTATE AND AFFIRM the original Decision dated 23 November
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012 which DENIED the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
SO ORDERED.
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