PRE-TRIAL 6.

6.) TC’s desire speedily to dispose of case pending for almost (4) years in that sala is understandable and
1. FILOIL MARKETING CORP (plaint.). vs DY PAC (def) praiseworthy; but it cannot justify Order of dismissal.
7.) Dy's appeal from decision of City Court of Manila was entitled to regular trial
1.) action for collection of a sum of money w/ interest commenced by Filoil (now Petrophil Corporation) 8.) under Sec. 45 of RA No. 296 (the Judiciary Act of 1948) amended by RA 6031, Dy was entitled to have
in City Court of Manila against Dy its affirmative defenses & counterclaim passed upon by CFI in a trial de novo.
*plaintiff sold and delivered on credit petroleum products to def., who became indebted amount of 9.) TC’s Order denied Dy its right to due process and must hence be set aside.
P2,123.69; notwithstanding repeated demands def. refused to pay.
2.) Dy’s ANSWER w/ Counterclaim- admitted credit transactions alleged by plaintiff but denied
indebtedness, alleging lack of cause of action, payment and prescription.
3.) hearing set on 17 June 1969- neither def. nor his counsel appeared; plaintiff was allowed to present
evidence ex parte
4.) CITY of COURT RULING: same date ordering def. to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,123.69 plus 6% interest
5.) denial of def.’s MR, def. appealed to CFI Manila,
6.) CFI, in accordance w/ RA No. 6031 immediately set case for pre-trial, with warning that no further
postponements would be granted.
7.) CFI issued pre-trial order:
*parties are hereby ordered to prepare stipulation of facts based on their exhibits already marked and
submit the same to the Court w/in (30) days from that day; parties must define issues to be resolved by
Court and if they are submitting case for decision on tbasis of their exhibits; parties are warned that if
they cannot submit stipulation of facts, the court will dismiss appeal,
8.) In a subsequent Order, TC dismissed Dy's appeal for failure of parties to submit required stipulation of
facts and ordered immediate return of records to City Court for execution.
9.) Dy’s MR denied, hence appaled to CA
10.) Dy claimed, it was deprived of its day in court and urged that TC erred (a) in dismissing its appeal on
ground that parties failed to submit stipulation of facts and (b) in finding that Dy's counsel not filed his
authority to appear during pre-trial.

ISSUE: W/n TC erred in dismissing Dy’s appeal on ground that parties failed to submit stipulation of facts.
YES.

SC: 1.) No law which compulsorily requires litigants to stipulate at pre-trial on facts & issues that may
possibly crop up inparticular case
2.) process of securing admissions whether of facts/evidence is essentially voluntary, since stip. of facts,
like contracts, bind parties who are not allowed to controvert statements made therein.
3.) TC may, advise and urge parties during pre-trial conference (PTC) to try to arrive at stip. of facts for
their own convenience & to simplify subsequent proceedings by identifying facts are not really
controverted and not need to be proved. Courts, however, cannot compel the parties to enter into an
agreement upon the facts.
4.) If parties unable to arrive at stip. of agreed facts and not reach amicable settlement controversy,
court must close PT proceedings & go forward with trial of case.
5.) TC committed serious/reversible error in dismissing Dy's appeal from City Court of Manila solely upon
ground that parties failed to comply w/ court's Order to submit stip. of facts.
2. Paredes (defs) vs Verano and Cosme (plaint)
1.) complaint for establishment of right of way filed by Paredes against Verano in RTC of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte,
2.) Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme granted (2) meter-wide right of way in favor of Paredes
in consid. of P6k which Paredes agreed to pay
3.) Alleging that Paredes blocked passage way in viol. of Compromise Agreement, Verano filed a
complaint for specific performance w/ damages against Paredes
4.) Paredes’ Answer: denied having violated Compromise Agreement.
*like them, Verano were not actual residents of Barangay Tagnipa where "road right of way" was
established and that respondent Cosme already sold his remaining lot
5.) Subsequent to answer, Paredes filed MD on the ground of lack of cause of action.
6.) TC denied MD.
7.) Paredes elevated order of denial to CA and thereafter to SC, both to no avail.
8.) Pre-trial initially set for 24 April 2003, but was reset to 3 June on motion of Verano's counsel.
9.)PT set on 3 June not push through either because none of parties appeared.
10) PT reset to 11 November
*Petitioner Baybay's counsel moved to reset it to another date on account of conflicting hearing.
*But petitioner Baybay, who is father of counsel for petitioners, was present in court along w/ other
defs., when the case was called on 11 November
11.) RTC was informed of proposed settlement between parties, although Baybay qualified his reaction
by telling court that he would 1st inform his lawyer and co-defs of said proposal.
12.) RTC then commented unfavorably on absence of pet's counsel, expressing disappointment towards
his attitude,
13.) RTC reset PT for 23 January 2004.
14.) Shortly before new PT date, counsel for pet filed Manifestation of Willingness to Settle W/ Request
for Cancellation
*pet’s' counsel through Manifestation suggested to opposing counsel that he be informed of terms of
proposed settlement.
15.) But hearing push through on 23 January 2004.
*respondents and their counsel were present
* pet. Baybay and Paderes, and co-def Alago present, but not their counsel.
* RTC allowed resp. to present evidence ex parte, "for failure of pet’s counsel to appear
16.) CA RULING: dismissed Pet for certiorari for failure to attach duplicate original copies of the annexes
to the petition other than RTC Orders
17.) CA denied Pet. MR
ISSUE: W/n absence of the counsel for pet-defs at PT w/ all defs themselves present, is a ground to
declare defs in default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte= NO
SC:1.) SC reversed TC &CA.
2.) Judgment of default against def. who failed to attend PT, or even any def. who failed to file an
answer, implies a waiver only of right to be heard & to present evidence to support their allegations but
not all their other rights
3.) under Sec. 5, Rule 18, failure of plaintiff/def. to appear during PT authorizes court to either dismiss
complaint w/ prejudice, if plaintiff were absent; or allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte, if def.
were absent.
4.) Nothing in Rules of Court authorizes trial judge to allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte on
account of absence during PT of the counsel for def.
5.) Section 4- imposes duty on parties and their respective counsel during PT but nothing provides for a
sanction if parties/respective counsel be absent during PT. Instead, penalty is provided for in Section 5.
6.) Sec. 5 penalizes failure to appear of either plaintiff/defendant,and not their respective counsel.
7.) absence of counsel for defs at PT not ipso facto authorize udge to declare def. in default and order
presentation of evidence ex parte.
8.) Due process dictates that petitioners be deprived of their right to be heard and to present evidence to
support their allegations if, and only if, there exists sufficient basis in fact and in law. There being
manifest lack of such basis in this case, petitioners would be unjustly denied of opportunity to fully
defend themselves if SC would affirm questioned orders issued by the RTC with grave abuse of
discretion.
9.) it would be most unfair to penalize petitioners for what may be the deficiency of their lawyer when
the consequent penalty has no basis in law.
10.) Particularly mitigating in this case is the fact that the counsel for PR intimated, at an earlier hearing,
a possibility of an amicable settlement to the case. Counsel for petitioners labored under false
understanding that compromise agreement was an imminent possibility.
11.) Still, no clear demonstration that acts of counsel of petitioners were intended to perpetuate delay in
litigation of the case.
12.) Assuming arguendo that actions of the counsel of petitioners to be dilatory, it cannot be said that
the court was powerless and virtually w/o recourse but to order the ex parte presentation of evidence by
therein plaintiffs.
*there were other remedies available to the court- authority to enforce order in proceedings before it,,
compel obedience to its judgments, orders, amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice; Code of Judicial Conduct empowers the courts to judiciously take
disciplinary measures against lawyers for unprofessional conduct.
13.) A show cause order to counsel would have been the more cautious and reasonable course of action
to take under the circumstances then prevailing.
14.) In failing to do so, tc DEPRIVED petitioners of the opportunity to meaningfully present an effective
defense and to adequately adduce evidence in support of their contentions.
INTERVENTION SC:1.) nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
3. NUNAL (def) vs CA; PR (plaint) becomes immutable and unalterable.
*The judgment may no longer be modifed in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
1.) a suit docketed filed by Emma de Leon in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of minors (herein what is perceived to be erroneous conclusion of fact/law, and regardless of whether the modification is
private respondents-PR) against Luisa Nuñal, now deceased and herein represented by her heirs, Albert attempted to be made by Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land.
and Anita for partition and accounting of land located in Isabela, Basilan City. 2.) The only recognized exceptions- the correction of clerical errors/ making nunc pro tunc entries which
2.) land formerly owned by Frank & May Lyon, deceased parents of Luisa, cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.
3.) PR claimed that said land, formerly covered by TCT in name of Frank has been in possession of Luisa 3.) any amendment/alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void
and that she made no accounting of income derived despite demands made by PR for lack of jurisdiction, including entire proceedings held for that purpose
4.) after trial and hearing, TC rendered its judgment in favor of PR and ordered partition of property but 4.) In the case at bar, decision of TC in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its
dismissing PR’s complaint for accounting. finality, trial judge lost his jurisdiction over case.
5.) order of partition affirmed in toto by CA in CAG. 5.) Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Martin
6.) case was remanded to court of origin for ordered partition. 2 would be in excess of his authority.
7.) order for issuance of writ of execution was issued by the court a quo 6.) remedy of Mary Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties and all other heirs for her
8.) Mary Martin, daughter of late Frank and Mary Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed motion to quash share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
(MQ) order of execution w/prelim. injun.
*not being a party to case, her rights, interests, ownership over the land should not be affected by
judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, said share
not been brought within Jurisd. of court a quo.
9.) TC issued order revoking appointment of 3 commissioners and ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution.
10.) TC issued an order appointing Board of Commissioners to effect partition of the contested property.
11.) TC dismissed MQ and directed partition of property among original party plaintiffs and defendants.
12.) Commissioners manifested to TC the fact that the name of Mary Martin also appears in TCT she
could therefore be construed as one of the heirs.
13.) TC issued an order directing counsel of Emma to furnish court within 5 days from receipt all names
of heirs entitled to share in the partition
14.) Pet. filed a manifestation praying that court issue an order directing partition of prop
15.) W/o ruling on manifestation, TC issued order directing Board of Commissioners to immediately
partition the said property
16.) PR filed Motion for Clarification as to whether partition of property is to be confined merely among
the party plaintiffs and defendants, to exclusion of Mary Lyon Martin
17.) TC issued assailed order directing inclusion of Mary Martin as co-owner with share in partition
18.) CA denied Pet. Appeal

ISSUE: W/n TC may order the inclusion of Mary Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition
of the property (considering that she was neither party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case for
partition and accounting and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and
executory. NO.
*Petitioners contend TC’s decision ordering partition of land among plaintiffs and defendants has long
become final and executory. Hence TC no jurisdiction to issue questioned Order
property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case.
4. UNION BANK vs. CONCEPCION
1.) EYCO Group of Companies (EYCO or EYCO Group) filed with SEC PETITION for declaration of suspension of payment,
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver/committee and approval of rehabilitation plan w/ alternative prayer for liquidation
and dissolution of corporations *
* EYCO depicted the Group's composite corporations as having combined assets more than enough to pay off all their
debts, but n unable to pay them as they fall due.
2.) Joining EYCO as co-petitioners were Yutingco and 2 other individuals holding controlling interests in the composite
corporations (collectively, the Yutingcos).
3.) SEC Hearing Panel, directed the suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against EYCO, et al. pending before
any court, tribunal, board
4.) Panel set the petition for hearing.
5.) a group of private banks which granted credit facilities to EYCO, among them, Union Bank, convened to map out their
collective collection options.
6.) formation of management committee (ManCom) to represent the creditor banks was agreed upon in that meeting.
7.) Union Bank (UB) decided to break away from the consortium/group and, w/o notifying its members, filed civil cases
against EYCO, et al.
*1st, a complaint for a sum of money ibefore the (RTC) of Makati City, against (4) members of EYCO Group and spouses
Eulogio and Bee Kuan Yutingco, as sureties of corporate obligations, with application for prelim. attachment; The next day,
Makati RTC issued writ of preliminary attachment, to w/c levy on attachment was annotated on titles
*Also attached, per herein respondent Concepcion w/o denial from petitioner, is a parcel of land covered allegedly held by
the Yutingcos in trust for Nikon Industrial Corporation
8.) UB moved, for the dismissal of SEC Case and EYCO submitted its rehabilitation plan.
9.) UB, w/o waiting for SEC's ruling on its MD filed w/ CA a petition for certiorari to nullify SEC suspension order and its
creation of ManCom.
*In same petition, UB alleged that the jurisdiction over basic petition for declaration of suspension of
payment pertains to RTC under Insolvency Law.
10,) CA rendered judgment declared Union Bank guilty of forum shopping and accordingly dismissed its petition for
certiorari.
11.) SC affirmed CA, but proceeded further to declare the SEC as possessed of jurisdiction over EYCO's petition for
suspension of payments but not insofar as Yutingcos' petition was concerned.
*With respect to Yutingcos, SC held that the SEC's jurisdiction on matters of suspension of payments is confined only to
those initiated by corporate entities, as said section not allow an individual to file petition.
*In line with rule on misjoinder of parties, SC directed SEC to drop individual petitioners from petition for suspension of
payment.
12.) Makati RTC issued, in Civil Case an Order 14 indefinitely suspending proceedings in that collection suit until further
orders- complaint filed by UB against EYCO INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED until further Orders from court in view of existing
petition for Suspension of Payment before the [SEC].
* def's MD complaint against individual-defendants, namely: Spouses Eulogio and Bee Yutingco, is DENIED for lack of merit.
13.) to give Yutingcos ample time to prepare defense they were given new (15) days period from to file their answer
14.) SEC Hearing Panel, over objection of consortium of EYCO's creditor banks, approved, the rehab. plan 15. The
consortium lost no time in appealing to SEC en banc the Hearing Panel's approval order and prayed for liquidation and
dissolution of EYCO,
16.) SEC en banc issued order finding for consortium,
17.) Another en banc order followed, with the SEC this time appointing respondent Concepcion to act, as EYCO Liquidator.
18.) Among Concepcion's 1st act as such liquidator was to file in Civil Case No. Motion to Intervene (MOI) and To Admit
Motion to Set Aside Order of Attachment
19.) SEC approved, Concepcion’s ubmitted Liquidation Plan. 18 Concepcion's motion to intervene
20.) Makati RTC denied Concepcion's MOI on ground of lack of standing to intervene, his appointment as Liquidator being
of doubtful validity.
*The order granted UB's earlier motion to declare EYCO in default, and set date for ex-parte reception of UB's evidence.
21.) UB presented evidence ex parte, on the basis of which Makati RTC rendered, partial judgment ordering EYCO to pay
bank P400M plus interests and attorney's fees.
22.) CA reversing the Makati RTC's
23.) PET CONT: Concepcion’s appointment as liquidator of EYCO was invalid for lack of jurisdiction of SEC to preside, over
EYCO's liquidation and dissolution; EYCO is already insolvent and insolvency proceedings fall under jurisdictionof regular
courts under the Insolvency Law
ISSUE: W/n respondent Concepcion has right to intervene in said Civil Case= YES
SC: 1.) underlying petition EYCO filed with SEC assumed jurisdiction was one for declaration of suspension of payment, etc.
*Even if jurisdiction over a petition to declare a corporation in a state of insolvency lies w/ regular courts, SEC possessed,
during period material, ample power under P.D. No. 902-A, to declare a corporation insolvent as incident of and in
continuation of its already acquired jurisdiction over petition to be declared in the state of suspension of payments Said
* EC with exclusive and original jurisdiction over petitions for suspension of payments which may either be: (a) a simple
petition for suspension of payments based on the Insolvency Law, or (b) a similar petition filed by an insolvent corporation
accompanied by prayer for creation of management committee and/or
rehab. receiver
*In the case at bench, EYCO's petition for suspension of payment was mix of both situations adverted to above for while
EYCO, in said petition, alleged being solvent but illiquid, it pleaded for the constitution of a rehabilitation
receiver/committee,
*SEC has, from the start, jurisdiction over EYCO's petition for suspension of payment,
2.) If the SEC contextually retained jurisdiction over the liquidation of EYCO, it’s logical then that it has competence to
appoint Concepcion as liquidator
3.) Intervention is a procedure by which 3rd person, not originally party to suit but claiming interest in the subject matter,
comes into case, to protect his right or interpose his claim; Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by single
judgment all conflicting claims/ whole controversy among the persons involved.
4.) 2 requisites must concur: (a) movant has legal interest in matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must not unduly delay
or prejudiceadjudication of the rights of parties, nor should claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in
a separate proceeding.
5.) The interest must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain/ lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
6.) Just like CA, SC has no doubt about Concepcion, as duly-appointed liquidator of EYCO's remaining assets, having a legal
interest in matter litigated in Civil Case
7.) parcels of land covered by writ of attachment which, in implementation of the SEC-approved Liquidation Plan for EYCO,
been conveyed to Concpcion in trust for benefit of creditors, EYCO's stockholders and other persons in interest.
8.) At very least, Concepcion, as liquidator-trustee, is so situated as to be affected by distribution /disposition of the
attached properties which were under threat of being levied on execution and sold at public auction.
9.) Concepcion would be unfaithful to his trust if he does take a bona fide effort to intervene in Civil Case to stop attempt of
petitioner to collect unpaid loans ahead of other legitimate creditors similarly situated.
10.) liquidator is empowered and duty bound to "[R]epresent debtor in any case filed by or against the debtor in any
tribunal"
11.) Far from unnecessarily prolonging/complicating the case, the desired intervention, if allowed, would possibly enable
the court in one single action and judgment to protect the collective interests of the creditors of EYCO Group that are
seriously threatened by imminent exclusion of certain properties from the pool of assets that should legally, if not ideally,
be equitably distributed among them.
12.) Disallowing intervention would cover way for petitioner to grab proceedings before the Makati RTC to work entirely in
its favor.
13.) claim of Concepcion over attached properties could not be better threshed out in separate but subsequent
proceedings given that he already secured titles over them.
5. VIRA MALL TENANTS ASSOC (VMTA) v. VIRA MALL GREENHILLS ASSOC (VMGA).
1.) (Ortigas) is owner of Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC).
2.) Ortigas and Virra Realty Development Corporation (Virra Realty) entered into Contract of Lease (First
Contract of Lease) over portion of the GSC.
*VR constructed (Virra Mall), which was divided into either units for lease or units whose leasehold rights
were sold
3.) VR organized respondent (VMGA)-association of all tenants and leasehold right holders, who
managed and operated Virra Mall.
4.) In 1st Contract of Lease, VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all rights, of VR
5.) VMGA, through its president, (Uy), requested from Ortigas renewal of 1st Contract of Lease.
6.) VGMA secured 2 insurance policies to protect Virra Mall against damage fire and other causes. *
insurance coverages expired simultaneously with 1st Contract of Lease
7.) VGMA acquired new sets of insurance policies
8.) Virra Mall was gutted by fire, requiring substantial repair and restoration.
9.) VMGA filed insurance claim through insurance broker, respondent (Winternitz).
*proceeds o insurance released to VMGA.
10.) Ortigas entered (2nd Contract of Lease) with Uy who assigned and transferred to petitioner (VMTA)
all his rights and interests over the property.
11.) Ortigas filed Complaint for Specific Performance w/Damages and Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Prelim. Attachment against several defendants, including herein VMGA accusing them of fraud,
misappropriation and conversion of substantial portions of the insurance proceeds for own personal use
12.) VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention; as assignee/transferee of rights and obligations of Uy in the
2nd Contract of Lease, & upon order of Ortigas, it engaged the services of various contractors.
*These contractors undertook restoration of damaged area of Virra Mall, Thus, VMTA sought the
reimbursement of expenses it incurred in relation
13.) TC admitted the Complaint-in- Intervention
14.) VMGA moved for dismissal of the Complaintin- Intervention on ground that it stated no cause of
action.
15.) TC denied MD
16.)CA reversed the ruling of TC & dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention on grounds: (a) VMTA failed
to state a cause of action; (b) no legal interest in matter in litigation; and (c) the Complaint-in-
Intervention would causedelay in trial of the action, make issues more complicated, prejudice
adjudication of rights of the parties, stretch the issues, and increase the breadth of the remedies and
relief.
17.) According to VMTA, it has legal interest in Civil Case, rooted in alleged failure of VMGA to turn over
insurance proceeds for restoration & rehabilitation of Virra Mall, in breach of VMGA’s contractual
obligation to Ortigas.
ISSUE: W/N Complaint-in-Intervention is proper in enforcing VMTA rights= YES
SC: 1.) Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by court when applicant
shows facts w/c satisfy requirements of statute authorizing intervention.
2.) Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of legal interest in the
matter in litigation or in success of either of parties, or nterest against both; or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by distribution/disposition of property in custody of court or an of􀁂cer
3.) As regards legal interest as qualifying factor, SC ruled that such interest must be of a direct and
immediate character so that intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation of judgment.
* interest must be actual and material, more than mere curiosity, or sentimental desire; it must not be
indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral.
4.) notwithstanding presence of legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to sound discretion of
the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering "w/n intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of original parties and w/n intervenor's rights may be fully protected in
separate proceeding.
5.) Applying to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene
6.) VMTA has a cause of action; in its Complaint-in-Intervention, it explicitly laid down its cause of action
as follows: VMGA and VMGA Board Members, received, at various times, from their insurance broker,
the insurance proceeds arising out of such claim which having failed to deliver said proceeds to real
beneficiary inspite of due notice and demand, plaintiff Ortigas herein instituted the present action
against all the defendants to compel delivery of said insurance proceeds which are being unlawfully and
illegally withheld by VMGA
*clear that VMTA's purported right is rooted in its claim that it is the real beneficiary of the insurance
proceeds, on the grounds that it had (a) facilitated repair and restoration of the insured infrastructure
upon orders of Ortigas, and (b) advanced the costs thereof.
*VMGA has duty to reimburse VMTA
* imputed act or omission on the part of VMGA that violated right of VMTA was VMGA's refusal, despite
demand, to release insurance proceeds
7.) VMTA has a legal interest in matter in litigation considering that it had already advanced the
substantial amount of P18M for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall.
* main issue in Civil Case is w/n Ortigas has contractual right to insurance proceeds received by VMGA.
Thus, the recoupment by VMTA of expenses it incurred in repair of Virra Mall depends on success of
either party in the main case.
* issuance to Ortigas of Writ of Preliminary Attachment against VMGA puts VMTA in situation in which it
will be adversely affected by distribution or other disposition of property in custody of court,
8.) VMTA's intervention will avoid a multiplicity of suits
9.) allowing VMTA to intervene in Civil Case finds support in The purpose of intervention to enable a
stranger to an action to become a party for him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all
con􀁂icting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits
10.) SC do not see how delay will be occasioned by intervention of VMTA, contrary to the fear of the CA.
MODES OF DISCOVERY
6. LOPEZ (plaint) vs MACEREN (def)
1.) Lopez, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, is the plaintiff in Civil Case of CFI
of Davao; other Lopez are defendants in said case, the purpose of which is to secure delivery of some
property of deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., as alleged share of petitioner, who claims to be his widow.
*She contends that, although his previous marriage w/ respondent Maria Lopez, which was unknown to
pet., had not been dissolved and was still subsisting, and acting in bad faith, and without advising pet. of
such 1st marriage, Salvador Lopez, Sr., wedded pet. and lived as husband and wife with her;
*as a consequence of said union, Salvador Jr., and Luis were born in Manila
2.) After the filing of Answer of said respondents, as defs, petitioner herein through her counsel filed a
"notice for taking" of her deposition and that of one Pilar Cristobal,
3.) Acting, upon an urgent motion of def-resps, Judge Maceren, issued an order prohibiting the taking of
said deposition.
4.) petitioner instituted the present case for annulling said order; she being entitled as a matter of right,
without leave of court, after the filing of answer of defs for section 1 of Rule 18 provides: "Deposition
pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction been obtained over any def. or
over property which is subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served,
testimony of any person, whether a party/not, may be taken, at instance of any party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories. Attendance of witnesses may be compelled by use of
subpoena.
5.) respondents invoke, section 16 of the same rule- explicitly vests in court power to "order that
deposition shall not be taken" and, this grant connotes authority to exercise discretion
disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file specific documents enclosed in sealed envelopes to
be opened as directed by the court.
*In other words, this provision affords adverse party, and the deponent, sufficient protection against
abuses that may be committed by party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery.
4.) courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but
merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both."
5.) It is not claimed that order complained of sought to avert any of the evils which said section was
meant to prevent or arrest.
6.) Moreover, petitioner was permitted to institute and maintain Civil Case as a pauper. As such, she can
ill afford to meet expenses to make, with her witnesses, trip or trips from Manila to Davao, and to stay in
said province
7.) Hence, the order in question deprived her, not only of her right, to take deposition but also, of the
opportunity to prove her claim and, consequently, of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution.
8.) records indicate that def. in Civil case who are the widow of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and their legitimate
children - must be well — off financially, for the estate of the deceased which has already been
partitioned among them, appears to be worth approximately half a million pesos.
9.)main reason given in support of contested order is that, if deposition were taken, the court could not
observe behaviour of deponents.
10.) order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take depositions, and,
therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not
intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule.

ISSUE: W/n REsp. Judge is correct in prohibiting taking of deposition= NO.

SC:1.) It is well-settled, that discretion conferred by law is limited; that it must be exercised, not
arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner
2.) provision is intended to be one of safeguards for protection of parties and deponents on unrestricted
right to discovery
3.) A party may take the deposition of a witness who knows nothing about the case, with the only
purpose of annoying him or wasting time of other parties. In such case, court may, on motion, order that
the deposition shall not be taken.
*Or, party may designate distinct place for taking of deposition, and adverse party may not have
sufficient means to reach that place, because of poverty or otherwise, in which case the court, on
motion, may order that deposition be taken at another place, or that it be taken by written
interrogatories.
*party serving the notice may wish to inquire into matters the disclosure of which may be oppressive or
embarrassing to deponent, especially if disclosure is to be made in presence of 3 rd persons; Under such
circumstances, the court, on motion, may order 'that certain matter shall not be inquired into or that
scope of examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that exam. shall be held with no one present
exceptparties to action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be
opened only by order of court, or that secret processes, developments, or research need not be
7. VERAN vs CA
1.) Plaintiffs brought action to recover possession of a parcel of land located in Atimonan, Quezon and
registered in name of Aleja Glodoveza, mother&grandmother of said plaintiffs, against the defendant
Primitiva Villareal, who died during pendency of action and was substituted accordingly.
*alleged in complaint that plaintiffs only allowed defendant, being a cousin, to erect her house on a land
in dispute,
*Said defendant, however, refused to vacate the lot when demanded to do so repeatedly, claiming co-
ownership also by inheritance from their common ancestor, mother of Aleja
2.) In amended answer, def interposed special defenses: a.) land particularly was originally owned pro-
indiviso and in common by def's mother, deceased plaintiffs' predecessor, and late Ladislawa after
whose death their children above-mentioned orally partitioned said land, portion occupied by the
defendant was given and received by her from her predecessor; b. That even if the plaintiffs have
registered said land in yet said registration was secured thru fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
3.) Because of the pendency of administrative case as mentioned in the answer, trial of case was
suspended indefinitely on petition of both parties.
4.) when the plaintiffs changed their counsel, latter moved for setting case for trial; motion was granted,
but for failure of defs. to appear on hearing, plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte,
after w/c decision was rendered in favor of plaintiff
5.) DEF’s MR- granted Upon to allow def. to present her evidence, after filing amended answer, on advice
of TC, to include a prayer for reconveyance of disputed portion of the lot, said lot.
6.) Def. offered as part of her evidence deposition of Apolonia, but it was denied admission by TC on the
ground that no proof was submitted to show THAT witness was so old and infirm as not to be able to
come to court to testify
7.) TC RULING rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, declaring plainitffs owners
pro-indiviso of Lot ordering defs to vacate the portion of the land occupied by her house
8.)CA reversed decision of TC dismissing complaint
* use of a deposition- there is occasion for court to exercise its discretion, the proper time being when
deposition is formally offered in evidence.
5.) In instant case, TC did not admit deposition when it was formally offered, on the ground that
petitioners were denied their right to cross-examine the deponent.
*However, CA, in deciding to admit the deposition, observed that The rejection of said deposition is
assigned as one of the errors of the trial court.
6.) no irregularity in its execution.
7.) reason for taking was disclosed not only in notice, but also in deposition itself.
8.) To reject such deposition on ground considered by TC is technicality which does not serve the ends of
substantial justice.
9.) counsel of the plaintiffs was notified sufficiently in advance of deposition-taking, and his opposition
was not acted upon favorably before the day set for the taking of the deposition.
*If he failed to appear on that day, as he could have done if he exerted diligent efforts, he did so at his
own risk.
10.) petitioners' contention that they were denied right to cross-examine the deponent is unfounded.
11.) before the deposition was formally offered, respondent had already testified as to age of deponent:
12.) CA not commit reversible error when it admit deposition of Apolonia
13.) With admission of deposition, a very significant fact gets into records which is that assignment of lot
in question was to 2 sisters, not to Aleja alone, and the segregation or apportionment thereof among the
said sisters was made by their eldest sister, Ruperta Glodoveza in 1905.

ISSUE: W/n rejection by TC of Apolonia’s Deposition is proper= NO

DOUBT AS TO THE OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED PORTION OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
SC:1.) deposition of Apolonia was taken on January 21, 1961. At that time applicable rules of procedure
were provided in the (old) Rules of Court, Section 1 of Rule 18 of which states: By leave of court after
jurisdiction been obtained over any defendant or over property which is subject of the action, or w/o
such leave after an answer has been served, testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories
2.) Considering that deposition was taken long after answer had been filed and served, there’s no need
to seek approval of TC for the taking of the deposition, notice of such taking being sufficient.
3.) In the instant case, not disputed that notice of deposition-taking was received by petitioners before
intended date and that although petitioners filed opposition, this was not acted upon by TC before taking
of the deposition.
4.) Leave of court for taking depositions vs approval of court for use of the deposition.