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Sanchez vs. People 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child
cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009 the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the
child is different from the former acts.
FACTS: Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or”
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence
Abuse in an Information[6] dated August 29, 2001 which reads: of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence,
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the use of “or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before
hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, the phrase “be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as the child’s development” supposes that there are four
follows: punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second,
child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s
municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted,
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be
old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries
which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident
amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended
No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As
offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial. defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the
child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot
minor in nature that it is not prejudicial to the child-victim’s accept appellant's contention.
development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and
he should be charged under the Revised Penal Code for slight Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in
physical injuries. relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610
and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case
at hand.
HELD:
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603
and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610 provides:
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
ISSUE:
HELD: