1980 Agricultural Modernization in Smallholding

Agricultural Modernization in Smallholding Areas of Mexico: A Case Study in the Sierra Norte
De Puebla
Author(s): Marc Edelman
Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, Peasants: Capital Penetration and Class
Structure in Rural Latin America/Part III (Autumn, 1980), pp. 29-49
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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AGRICULTURAL
MODERNIZATIONIN
SMALLHOLDING
AREASOF MEXICO:
A CASESTUDYINTHESIERRANORTEDE PUEBLA
by
Marc Edelman*
Beginningin 1940,the Mexican stateembarkedon a policyof industrial
which,in somethreedecades,radicallyalteredtheeconomicrole
self-reliance
thatMexican capitalismassignedto millionsof smallholdingpeasants.1The
rapid post-1940industrialization,stimulatedat first by the scarcity of
manufactured importsduringthe Second World War, was accompaniedby
sustainedeffortsto modernizecertainpartsoftheagricultural sectorand by a
virtualabandonmentof the extensiveagrarianreforminitiatedduringLazaro
Cardenas'presidency(1934-1940).Initiallythetaskof producinga marketable
surplus of food to supportthe industrialization drive was allottedto a
relativelysmallnumberof largecapitalistfarmsprincipally in thenorthwest-
ernstatesof Sonoraand Sinaloa and in theBajio region.The smallholdingre-
gionsof the countrywere viewed primarily as sourcesof inexpensivelabor
*The authoris a graduatestudentin the Department of Anthropology at ColumbiaUniversity.
His researchwas fundedby a 1978 SummerField TrainingGrantfromthe Instituteof Latin
AmericanStudies,ColumbiaUniversity. He would like to thankRobertWasserstrom and the
editorsof Latin American Perspectives fortheirhelpfulcommentson an earlierversionof the
paper and Debora Soler Munczekforcollaborating in the field research.
'The fieldresearchpresentedhere,which involvedtwo monthsof workin Zacapoaxtla and
Nauzontla,Puebla,duringJune-August 1978,was largelyexploratory. In such a briefperiod,it
was not possible to collect the type of data which mighthave furtherdocumentedthe
preliminaryconclusionsreached in this paper. In order to supplement I and balance the
information providedby key informants, informalinterviewswere held withpeople in thirty
householdswhichwere selectedat random.The samplewas stratified betweenthosereceiving
and thosenotreceivingPlan Zacapoaxtlatechnicalassistanceforpotatocultivation in 1977-1978.
The firstgroupwas chosen by cross-checking a list, providedto me by Plan Zacapoaxtla
personnel, of all personsreceivingtechnicalassistanceforpotatocultivation in the zona media
(municipio of Nauzontlaand partsofthemunicipiosof Xochitlfn and Zacapoaxtla)witha listof
all householdheads in Nauzontlatown(excludingthethreebarriosofthemunicipio)compiledin
1977 by the teachersof the InstitutoNacional Indigenista(INI). This consistedof thirteen
persons,each ofwhichwas assigneda numberfromone to thirteen. A sampleoftenwas chosen
fromthissmalluniverseusinga tableof randomnumbers.The secondgroupwas chosenfroma
universeconsisting oftheINI listminusthosereceiving technicalassistanceforpotatocultivation
in 1977-1978.Thisconsistedof203persons.A sampleoftwentywas thenchosen,also by usinga
table of randomnumbers.
29

30 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
for both the urban sectorsand for capitalistagriculture.

Increasingly,however,the logic of the post-1940developmentmodel
requireda moredirectformof stateintervention in peasantagriculture and a
transformation of the existingrelationsof productionin smallholdingareas.
Since the late 1960s,the Mexican government has undertakento reorganize
theserelationsof productionand to stimulatecommercialproductionof basic
foodstuffs by peasantsmallholders.In partthiswas theresultof thegrowing
inabilityof the capitalistfarmsectorto meetthe nation'sneed forgrains,an
incapacitywhichhad its rootsin rapidpopulationgrowthand in thegrowing
importance in theirrigated zones oflucrativeluxurycrops,such as fruitsand
vegetables,many of which are producedprimarilyfor export(Rama and
Vigorito,1979;Feder,1977b).Also important in thelate 1960s'reorientation of
policytowardthesmallholding sectorwas a spreadingagrariancrisismarked
by land occupationsand violentconflictsbetweenpeasantsand landowners.
The state'sprincipalobjective- rapid industrialization at any cost - was,
untilthe late 1960sat least,simplyincompatiblewithcontinuedreformand
the extensivespendingon social programswhich that implied(Hewittde
Alcafntara,1977: 10-15).
This paper outlinesthe politicalcontextof agricultural modernization in
Mexico with particularemphasis on recent attemptsto modernize the
smallholding sectorthroughthe provisionto peasantsof moderntechnology,
credit,and government-sponsored commercialization opportunities.Although
government plannerstend to view smallholdingagriculturalists as a single
undifferentiated mass, the effectof these innovationshas not been felt
equallyby all strataof the peasantry.Plan Zacapoaxtla is one of some fifty
regionaldevelopmentprojectsin Mexico financedby the World Bank and
directedthroughthe Mexican government agencyProgramade Inversiones
Puiblicaspara el DesarrolloRural (PIDER). In generalthese projectsmake
intensiveuse of local laborand aim at increasingbothagricultural productiv-
ity and employment.
Nevertheless, an examinationof one municipio,Nauzontlain the stateof
Puebla,suggeststhatwhile agricultural wages have risen,landpoorpeasants,
tenantsand sharecroppers are graduallylosingtheiraccess to land. A stratum
of relativelywealthy peasants has emergedas the main beneficiaryof
government modernization efforts.This grouphas managedto accumulatea
modestamountof capitalas a resultof theirprivilegedaccess to relatively in-
expensivegovernment creditand of theiroperatingat a scale which allows
themto circumvent the intermediaries and sell directlyto the statecommod-
ities agency.But forthe poorerpeasantsa processof proletarianization has
been set in motion,spurredby risingrentsforland,increasedrelianceon in-
termediaries, higherrisklevels in crop production, and higherunitcosts of
production.Whilethe poorerpeasantsalreadydepend on incomefromlocal
and migratory wage laborfora largepartoftheirsubsistence, government de-
velopmentplans have not takenany measuresto protectthemeconomically
in theirrole as agricultural workers.
MEXICO'S GREEN REVOLUTION
Mexico has had a longerexperiencewithscientific
effortsto raise yields
of basic foodcropsthanany otherunderdeveloped country.In 1943thesemi-

EDELMAN: AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION IN MEXICO 31
autonomousOfficeof Special Studies,staffedand fundedlargelyby the

RockefellerFoundation,was createdwithinthe Secretariade Agricultura y
Ganaderia to carry out researchon Mexican strainsof wheat and corn.
FoundationconcernwithMexico was promptedin partby two nonphilanth-
ropic considerations:first,the expropriationof RockefellerStandard Oil
interestsin 1939by the populistgovernment of LaizaroCardenasand second,
the wartimeefforts of the Nazis to increasetheirinfluencein LatinAmerica.
The expropriation notonlythreatenedRockefeller familyinterestsbut was a
directblow to thefoundationas well since overhalfof its assets at the time
were in StandardOil Companystock.In addition,theboycottof Mexicanoil
initiatedby U.S. companiesfollowingthe Standardtakeoverled Mexico to
sell oil to the Axis powers.By extendinga massivedevelopmentprojectin
1943,the foundationhoped both to lessen risingnationalismand maintain
wartimefriends(Cleaver,1972: 81; 1974: 305-306).
The cooperativeMexican-Rockefeller Foundationprogramachievedrapid
progressin breedinghighyieldingvarietiesof wheat and corn.But because
the new "miracleseeds" were only able to performefficiently with high
levels of soil moistureand the use of expensiveinputs,wealthierfarmersin
irrigatedareas, such as the Pacific Northwestand the Bajio, became the
principalbeneficiariesof virtualquantumjumps in yields and income.In
Mexico,the "greenrevolution"meantthe exacerbationof existingclass and
regional disparities(Hewitt de Alcaitara,1976). Nevertheless,significant
increasesin yieldsof bothwheatand corn,as well as expansionof irrigated
areas undercultivation, allowed Mexico to erase its graindeficitby 1960and
to become a modestexporterof both grainsby 1963.
Althoughcorn productionmore than doubled in the two decades after
1940,muchof thisincreasewas accountedforby largecommercialfarmsin
irrigatedareas. These farmsreceivedlarge indirectsubsidiesas a resultof
government policieswhichchannelleda disproportionate shareoftotalpublic
sectoragricultural investment to a few irrigation principallyin the
districts,
northwestern statesof Sonora and Sinaloa. Most of thenumeroussmall corn
farmersin thecentraland southernpartsof thecountrywere eitherunaware
of the new technologicalpackage or were unable or unwillingto adopt it
since it involvedincreasedinvestment and oftenincreasedriskas well. The
effort to developseeds whichproducehighyieldsunderoptimumconditions
was not designed to serve the needs of capital-poorsubsistence and
infrasubsistence peasants in rainfedareas of the country.2
The huge amountof fundspouredintogreenrevolution-style agronomic
researchand the tremendousinterestarousedby the dramatictechnological
breakthroughs this researchachieved have helped to obscurean important
chapterin thehistoryof Mexicanagricultural research(Hewittde Alcantara,
1976: 37ff.).DuringCardenas' presidency,the small Officeof Experiment
Stationswas establishedwithinthe Secretariade Agricultura y Ganaderia
and charged with findingsolutions to the practical problemsfaced by
smallholdersand ejidatarios.In 1947the ExperimentStationsOfficebecame
2Aninfrasubsistencepeasantfarm,as thetermis used in Mexico,is one whichdoes notproduce
sufficient
incomeor productforthereproduction ofitslaborforce.The peasantand/ormembers
ofhis familyare therefore
obligedto engagein othereconomicactivitiesin additionto working
theirland.
Issue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VIl, No. 4
LatinAmericanPerspectivest

the Institutode Investigaciones Agricolas(IIA), whichcontinuedto function

until1960.The IIA, in contrastto the more lavishly-endowed, Rockefeller-
supportedOfficeof Special Studies,concentratedon developingimproved
open-pollinated maize varietiesforpoor farmers.3 While the approachof the
Officeof Special Studies emphasizedthe need to reducemaize importsby
raisingyields throughthe use of hybridsgrown with irrigation, the IIA
attemptedto find means of dealing with the physical inadequacies of
traditionalmilpas (maize fields). Nevertheless,their effortswere largely
overshadowedby the Officeof Special Studies,and after1960,agronomic
researchforsmallholdersin drylandareas receivedrelativelylittleattention.
Even themorerecentconcernwiththe "smallfarmer"has focusedlargelyon
areas with abundantand regularseasonal rainfall.
By the late 1960s it became apparentthat the productionof wealthy
farmersin the irrigatedareas would not be sufficient to meet the nation's
grainneeds. Rapid populationgrowth- 3.5 percentper year from1964 to
1974 (Porras,1975) - helped bringabout large increases in demand for
agricultural products,especiallycorn. In the early 1970s Mexico was again
forcedto importsignificant quantities- between15 and 20 percentof its
basic food grains(Wellhausen,1976:129). The burdenof these importshas
been all the morecostlysince the government, in an effortto maintainthe
low cost of reproducingthe urban workforce, has continuedto sell basic
grainsat approximately one-thirdof the world marketprice.The dramatic
growthof Mexican agriculturein the 1950-1970period was primarilythe
resultof infusinglargeamountsof capitalintoa previouslyundercapitalized
agriculture. Whenthe sectorswhichwere able to absorbthe new inputsand
productionmethodshad achievedfulladoptionand when the technological
limitsto raisingyieldshad been approached,thegrowthofgrainoutputcould
no longerkeep pace with populationgrowth.
It is importantto note,however,thatthe stagnationaffecting basic grain
productionis also in large part the resultof the capitalistsector'staking
advantageof moreprofitableinvestment opportunities in the productionand
processingof luxuryvegetable and fruitcrops which are consumed by
affluentMexicansand NorthAmericans(Rama and Vigorito,1979).In 1970,
only 21.9 percentof the land in Mexico's irrigationdistrictswas used to
producecornand beans (Hewittde Alcaintara, 1976:53). By 1976,thephysical
volume of grains and oilseeds produced in the countrywas a mere 59.9
percentof what it had been in 1970;the totalarea devotedto thesecropsde-
clined22.1 percentin the same period(Rama and Vigorito,1979:92-93).Not
surprisingly, then,agriculturaldevelopmentofficials,foreseeinga new role
forthe smallholding sector,beganto maintainthat,giventhe rightecological
and institutionalconditions,large increases in the productionof basic
foodstuffs could be obtainedfrom"traditional"peasants.
PLAN PUEBLA
The severeagrariancrisisofthelate 1960s,whichwas markedby land in-
vasionsin severalpartsof thecountry,
was an additionalfactorin thestate's
3Hybridmaize seed must be purchased on the marketsince hybridgenotypes do not persist over
more than one generation. In contrast,farmersplanting open-pollinated varieties generally save
corn from one harvest as seed for the next cycle.

decisionto stimulategrainproductionby the peasantry.It was expectedthat

theintroduction ofnew,moreproductive technologywouldraisetheincomes
The landlesspeasants,it was hoped,
of smallholdersand alleviatediscontent.
would benefitfromthe increasedavailabilityof wage labor.
Plan Puebla, which began functioning in 1967,was the firstsustained
regionaleffortto extend"greenrevolution"maize technologyto the small-
holdingsector.Proponentsand criticsof the projectagree thatthe initiative
forestablishingPlan Puebla came fromthe RockefellerFoundationand from
the CIMMYT (CentroInternacionalde Mejoramientode Maiz y Trigo),an
agronomicresearchorganization locatedin Mexicowhichis fundedprimarily
by the RockefellerFoundation,the Inter-American DevelopmentBank, and
the U.S. Agencyfor International Development.The Mexican government
appearsto have had onlya minorrole in the earlydiscussionsregarding the
founding oftheplan (Pare,1975a;CIMMYT,1974).Accordingto an officialre-
port,the plan had two initialobjectives:
(a) to develop,fieldtest,and refinea strategy

forrapidlyincreasing
yieldsof a basic food
crop on small landholdings; and
(b) to traintechniciansfromotherregionsin the elementsand successfuluse of this
strategy(CIMMYT, 1974:xiii).
Likethe "greenrevolution,"Plan Puebla mustbe seen withinthe context

of a consciouspolicyon the partof U.S.- and quasi-U.S.aid organizations of
directingtheirassistanceprimarilyto countrieswhichfiguresignificantly in
the global strategyof the United States and its allies (Pare, 1975a; Feder,
1977a).Fromthe beginning, Plan Puebla was conceivedbothas an extension
effortand as an international
demonstration project.It is interesting
to note
thatPlan Puebla,unlikeany otherregionaldevelopment plan in Mexico,was
notinstitutionalizedunderany branchof thegovernment. Accordingto Pare:
thereis no foundingcharter,
In effect, norprecisedocumentsrelatingto thefunctions of
theparticipating The onlythingthatexistsis a protocol(acta de protocolariza-
institutions.
ci6n)betweenthe Secretariade Hacienda,the Secretariade Agricultura and CIMMYT
(Par6,1975a:17).
In late 1973,Plan Puebla was in factincorporated

intothe Secretariade
Agriculturay Ganaderia as part of the ProgramaNacional de Desarrollo
Agricolaen Areas de Temporal(PRONDAAT), whichwas administered by
the Colegio de Postgraduadosof the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura.4
Nevertheless, the CIMMYT-Rockefeller presenceremainedstrong.Longafter
CIMMYT withdrewfromactive extensionwork in Mexico, it continuedto
lend personneland facilitiesdirectlyto Plan Puebla. As late as 1974,the
Rockefeller Foundationprovidedsubstantialfundingforthe plan (CIMMYT,
1975).This combinationof largeamountsof foreignfundingand noninstitu-
tionalizationwas intendedto provide a more impressivedemonstration
projectand greaterflexibilityin dealingwiththe pervasive"tortuguismo"of
the Mexican bureaucracy.
4Tn 1978the Escuela Nacionalde becamethe UniversidadAut6nomade Chapingo.

Agricultura
Issue 27, FaIl 1980, Vol. VII, No. 4
LatinAmercanPerspectives:

Plan Puebla was also establishedin response to certain short-term

politicalconsiderations(Pare, 1975a; Lara et al., n.d.). Three smallholding
"traditionalfarming"areas of Mexico withfavorableecologicalcharacteris-
ticshad been studiedas possibleprojectsites:the Toluca Valleyin the state
of Mexico, the Tarascan Plateau in Michoacan,and the Valley of Puebla-
Tlaxcala. In the year precedingthe foundingof Plan Puebla,therehad been
numerousland invasionsby landlesspeasantsin the Puebla-TlaxcalaValley,
and the governorof Puebla statehad been forcedout of officeand replaced
by an interimgovernor.The armyhad been called in to disarmthe peasants
and maintainorder.It was expectedthata massiveprogramprovidingcredits
and new technology would raise peasantincomesand alleviatediscontent. In
addition,the Presidentof the Republic,GustavoDiaz Ordaz, whose parents
were fromPuebla,reportedly hoped to use the plan personneland resources
to modernizea farmhe owned in the area of Ciudad Serdanin theproposed
projectzone (Pare',1975a: 17).
Maize yields rose considerablythroughoutthe Plan Puebla region,
althoughreportsdifferas to whetherplan participantshad significantly
higheryieldsthan nonparticipants (Lara et al., n.d.). One fieldstudyfound
that since the "package" requiredincreasedlabor inputsper unit of land,
manyfamilieswere unableto adoptit because theywere unwillingto forego
more remunerative opportunitiesin the nonagricultural sector (Villa Issa,
1976). Other studies pointed to growingclass differentiation within the
peasantryin the plan area, but noted that the increased yields were
frequently consumedratherthancommercialized as theplan's organizershad
hoped (Pare',1975a; Lara et al., n.d.).
In spite of these difficulties, however, Plan Puebla was considered
successfulenoughto becometheprototype forsimilarprojectsin Toluca and
Tlaxcala as well as in otherLatin Americancountries(CIMMYT, 1974). In
1974 the Colegio de Postgraduadosset up a regionalcenterin the city of
Puebla to coordinatethe alreadyexistingPuebla and Tlaxcala plans and two
new plans centeredin the mountainousregionsaround Zacapoaxtla and
Chiautla.Much of the fundingforthis reorganizedand intensified effortat
agriculturalmodernization was providedby PIDER, the Mexican government
programestablishedin 1973 and the largest World Bank-financedrural
developmenteffortanywherein the world (cf. Krauss,1978; Proceso,1978;
Feder,1977a).
THE SIERRA NORTE DE PUEBLA
The SierraNortede Puebla,the settingforPlan Zacapoaxtla,is situated
at an altitudebetween500 and 2500 metersand is partof the sectionof the
Sierra Madre del Sur which runs fromOaxaca norththroughPuebla and
Veracruzinto Hidalgo. The regionis an importantproducerof coffeefor
exportand also providesfruit,potatoes,vanilla,and sesame forthe national
urbanmarket.Inhabitedmainlyby Nahuatl-and Totonac-speaking peasants,
the area supplies large numbersof migrantlaborers to the commercial
farmingareas in the lowlandsof northern Veracruz.The commercialtowns
of the Sierra - Zacapoaxtla, Cuetzalan and Tlatlauqui - function as
"concentrating" centerswheretheproductionofthemanysmallproducersin
thezone is collectedand senton to wholesalersin Puebla and MexicoCity.In

addition,purchasesof goods otherthanthose needed on a day-to-daybasis

can oftenonlybe made in the towns.Buildingmaterialsotherthancement,
for instance, are the monopoly of one supplier in Zacapoaxtla. Most
insecticidesand fertilizers
can onlybe obtainedin Zacapoaxtla,Cuetzalan,or
Tlatlauqui.The towns,which house government offices,secondaryschools,
and hospitals,are also important as administrativeand servicecenters.Large
citieson the edge of the Sierra,such as Poza Rica and Papantla,serveas re-
gional centersforthe modernagricultural zones of the Veracruzlowlands.
Power relationsin the Sierra Norte are still often characterizedby
personalisticrule and arbitraryviolence.5Today only the largest cattle
ranchesare muchmorethan 50 hectares;mostare well withinthe limitsset
by agrarianlegislation.Most of the largesthaciendas in the regionwere
dividedand sold beforetheycould be expropriated. Forthisreason,thereare
fewejidos (communities whichhave receivedland undertheagrarianreform)
in the area. Membersof the two ejidos near Zacapoaxtla have established
theirrightsto land onlyafterlongstruggles. The Atzalanforestry ejido in Xo-
chiapulco firstsolicited land from the governmentin 1917, received a
provisionalgrantin 1932,and did notreceiveits resoluciondefinitiva untilthe
mid-1970s(Pare, 1975b:55f;Plan Zacapoaxtla, Informeanual, 1975-1976).
Similarly,landless membersof the Acoaco ejido in Texocoyohuac,Zaca-
poaxtla,occupiedtheadjacentSan IsidroFinca in 1976afteryearsoffruitless
effortsto obtain it by legal maneuvers(Plan Zacapoaxtla, Informeanual,
1976-77;VIII:22). The fincawas owned by GustavoMacip who lived in the
cityof Puebla and whose brother,Rene Macip, was then presidentof the
municipio.For threegenerationsthe Macip familyhas been one of the most
powerfulfamiliesin thepoliticsand commerceoftheSierraNorte,particular-
ly in Zacapoaxtla.fNot surprisingly, the ejidatarioswere drivenfromSan
Isidro by the armyand the Federal JudicialPolice.
Otherland occupationshave occurredrecentlyin the Cuetzalanarea,led
in some cases by a clandestineorganizationcalled the Union Campesina
Independiente(UCI). The UCI, whose agrariandemands have been de-
nouncedas atavisticby some of the organizedleftin Mexico,is rumoredto
have been involved in shootoutswith landlord pistoleros(gunmen) in
Xochitlan,Huehuetla,and Huitzilan.The presence of the army and the
FederalJudicialPolice in Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalanin July,1978,ostensibly
for"maneuevers,"was said by my one informant withties to the UCI to be
'Little systematichistorical work has been done on the Sierra Norte de Puebla. Fabila (1949) and
Nutiniand Isaac (1974) provide some informationabout events since the sixteenthcenturybut lit-
tle analysis. Beaucage (1974) and Par6 (1975b, 1977) describe nineteenth-and twentieth-century
power relations in the Zacapoaxtla region.
6Ren6Macip and the Federal JudicialPolice are alleged by some informantsin Nauzontla to have
been implicated in the death of prisoners in the Zacapoaxtla jail. One such case occurred in late
August 1975 when a dispute over the handling of funds between the outgoing and incoming
municipal presidentsof Nauzontla led to the former'sincarcerationin Zacapoaxtla. He had been
involved in effortsto modernize Nauzontla and had succeeded in bringinga radio-telephoneto
the town and in organizingthe opening of the dirtroad fromthe Zacapoaxtla-Cuetzalan highway
through to Xochitlan. This may have earned him Macip's hostility; it is not uncommon for
representatives of the Zacapoaxtla commercial bourgeoisie to oppose attempts to open the
interiorof the Sierra since it mightlead to greatercompetition(cf. Par6, 1975b: 42). In any case,
the body of the formermunicipal presidentwas given to his widow on September 1, 1975, which
was, by coincidence, her saint's day. Officialsin Zacapoaxtla recorded it as a suicide by hanging.
Issue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VII, No. 4
LatinAmericanPerspectives:

relatedto UCI actionsin Cuetzalan.

This patternof violenceand class conflictoccursagainsta backgroundof
underdevelopment and extremepoverty.In the seven municipiosservedby
Plan Zacapoaxtla7in 1970,three-quarters of the 29 percentof the population
whichwas consideredeconomicallyactivehad a monthly incomeofless than
200 pesos. Eightypercentof the houses had dirtfloors.Fifty-five percentof
the school-agepopulationwent withoutinstruction, and 48 percentof the
populationovertenyearsof age could notread and write(Plan Zacapoaxtla,
"Programade Evaluacion,"1977).In 1974,a Plan Zacapoaxtla surveyof 147
randomlyselectedhouseholdsin the same area indicatedthat wage labor
provided38.7percentof familyincome.Those questionedreportedspending
an averageof 183 days per familyper yearworkingoutsidethefamily'sown
plots (if theywere fortunateenoughto possess one). While small numbers
workedas carpenters, barbers,and masons,thevastmajority- 65 percent-
workedas peons,mostoftenin theirown villagesor in thestateof Veracruz.
None reportedworkingin the UnitedStates(Plan Zacapoaxtla,"Programade
Evaluacion,"1976).
The widespreaddependenceon income fromwork outsidethe family
farmholdingis immediately observablein any of the towns and villagesin
theregion.In June,July,and earlyAugustwhenthecornis tall and no longer
requirescultivation,thefieldsare empty.Few menare seen in thecantinasor
plazas, and those that are have frequentlyjust returnedfromstintsof
contractlaborin Veracruz.Those thatremainhomeall yeareitherhave a sec-
ond occupationsuch as carpentry or bricklaying,or else belongto thatsmall
stratumof rural storeownersand landownerswith sufficient resourcesto
remainwith theirfamilies.
In part, the extent of outward migrationis related to severe land
fragmentation and highpopulationdensities.Only 27 percentof the land in
the regionis consideredarable,yetthe seven municipioshave a population
densityof 125 personsper square kilometer, whereasthe averagein Puebla
stateis 74 per squarekilometer (Plan Zacapoaxtla,"Programade Evaluacion,"
1977).As earlyas 1910,thefourmunicipiosof Zacapoaxtladistrict had a pop-
ulationdensityof 77.8,morethantwice the averageforthe state,ten times
thatforthe countryas a whole,and higherthanany districtin the stateex-
ceptthecityof Puebla (DGE, 1910,vol. Puebla).The historicalreasonsforthis
patternin the Sierra Norteare not entirelyclear. While plantationsin the
nineteenth centuryusurpedlargeareas of land in the surrounding lowlands,
theydid not displace largeindigenouspopulations(Beaucage,1974:116).It is
probable,however,thatthe consequentdemandforseasonal wage labor in
thelowlandshas contributed to boththehighdensityand therapidgrowthof
populationin the Sierra.
PLAN ZACAPOAXTLA
Plan Zacapoaxtla, founded in 1974, is a PIDER developmentproject
modeledon Plan Puebla which operatesin seven municipiosin the Sierra
Nortede Puebla. The Valley of Puebla,the site of Plan Puebla,differsfrom
the Sierra Nortein many respects,notablyin its well-developedtransport
7These municipios are Zacapoaxtla, Cuetzalan, Nauzontla, Xochitlan,Xochiapulco, Huitzilan and
Zoquiapan. In 1974, the population of the seven municipios was estimated at 80,258.

infrastructure,
thehighpercentageof Spanishspeakersin thepopulation,and
the greateravailabilityof nonagricultural employment.The Plan Puebla
approachto agricultural modernization had to undergocertainmodifications
in a mountainouszone withpoorlydevelopedinfrastructure and communica-
tions,whereoverhalfof the populationdoes not speak Spanish,and where
theprincipalcommercialcropsare notthegrainswhichhad been thefocusof
most of the agronomicresearchin earlierdevelopmentefforts(Plan Zaca-
poaxtla, Informeanual, 1976-1977).
In the economyof any agricultural region,ownersof trucksand storage
facilitiesoccupy a strategicposition.In poor smallholdingareas with few
roads,such intermediaries commonlyprovidesmallproducerswiththeironly
access to the marketand may, withina given community, exercise true
monopolypower.By 1974it was widelyrecognizedthatthe economicpower
of such intermediaries,referredto by thepeasantsas acaparadores(monopo-
lists)or simplycoyotes,contributed bothto the low level of peasantincome
and, consequently, to the low level of investment in subsistenceand cash-
cropproduction. The elimination of theintermediary and the organizationof
directcommercialization of peasants' crops thus became key objectivesof
Plan Zacapoaxtla.In addition,the varietaltestingof maize whichhad been
the principalfocusof agronomicresearchin the firststagesof Plan Puebla
had to be extendedto potatoesand several kinds of fruittrees.
The strategyof Plan Zacapoaxtla's Technical AssistanceProgramwas
modeledalmostentirelyon that of Plan Puebla, althoughgreaterattention
was given to peasant organization.The statedgoals were as follows:
(1) Development of technology through agronomic investigation on the peasants' own
lands.
(2) Extension work in order to orient the participatingsectors (peasants, technicians,
institutions)in the use of the results of the agronomic research.
(3) The timely provision of credit, with reasonable terms and interestrates.
(4) The adequate and convenientprovision of agriculturalinputs in places accessible to the
peasants.
(5) An acceptable relation between input costs and prices paid for products.
(6) An agriculturalinsurance whose fundamentalinterestwould be the protectionof the
producers' investmentsagainst the unforeseendangers which can threatenthe harvests of
an entire region.
(7) An organization of producers which would permit the direct commercialization of
inputs and production,i.e., withoutintermediaries(Plan Zacapoaxtla, Informeanual, 1976-
1977, II: 4).
The young economists,agronomists, and social workerschargedwith

realizingthese objectivesare, for the most part,university
graduatesfrom
urban areas of Mexico who bringto their work a genuine concern for
improvingconditionsin the countryside.Ideologically,they run the range
fromthosewho are franklyapoliticalto thosewho have been influencedby
variousMarxistcurrents.Many,unlikesome sectarianMarxistsin Mexico,
are stronglysympathetic to thepeasants'agrariandemands.Ironically,
many
are quite criticalof the optimistictechnocraticassumptionswhich underly
the strategy.These premises,as statedin an officialreport,are that
Through agronomic investigation it is possible to generate technical recommendations
which complement traditional agricultural technology and which permit considerable
LotinAmercanPerspectivesIsu 27, FaIl 1980, Vol. Vll, No. 4

increases in production.
It is possible to widen the internal market,making the productive process more efficient
with the growth of production.
Through trainingand organization of the producers it is possible to break the circle of
commercialization,thus generatinggreater incomes.
The generationof greaterincomes, well-utilized,exercises a multipliereffectwhich betters
living conditions (Plan Zacapoaxtla, Informe anual, 1976-1977,II: 3).
It was also suggestedthatincreasingproductionwould benefit"notonly

the peasants,but . . . bringbetternutritionto the urbanpopulation,as well
as additionalincometo the regionand to the statethroughthe paymentof
taxes on commercializedproducts"(Plan Zacapoaxtla, Informe anual, 1975-
1976:25). The possibilitythatsome strataof the peasantryare morelikelyto
benefitfrommodernization effortsthanothersis rarely,ifever,consideredin
officialplan documents,much less in the formationof actual development
strategies.
The foundingof Plan Zacapoaxtlafollowedcloselyon a numberof other
developmentsin the early 1970s which had significantly strengthened the
region'stransport and communications These includeda large
infrastructure.
electrification campaignin 1970 whichextendedpower lines into severalof
the municipiosto the west of the Cuetzalan-Zacapoaxtlahighway;the
openingin 1972 of an all-weatherdirt road, built largelyby faena labor
(communalwork),fromthe highwaythroughNauzontlato Xochitlafn, where
it connectedwitha jeep trackto Huitzilan,the buildingof a largenumberof
potable water systemsin 1974 and 1975, and the installationof radio-
telephonesin severalof theoutlyingmunicipalseats. Finally,a branchof the
government creditbank, the Banco de CreditoRural del CentroSur, was
openedin Zacapoaxtlain 1975.This coincidedwiththemergerat thenational
level of the old Banco Ejidal and the Banco Agricola.Priorto that time,
peasantsusuallyhad to travel,oftenseveraltimesin a season,to Teziutlanor
Puebla in order to secure loans. The firstpotato crop planted with Plan
Zacapoaxtla technical advice received officialfinancingonly from the
Teziutlanbranchof the Banco Agricola.
At first,the Plan Zacapoaxtlatechnicalassistanceteam,whichconsisted
of seven trainedtechniciansand twenty-sixauxiliarypersonnel,devoted
considerableattentionto developingpromotionalmedia as well as to
organizationaleffortsand agronomicresearch.A numberof imaginative
techniqueswere employed,includingfreemoviesshown on marketday in
Zacapoaxtla,slide shows, pamphlets,a twice-weeklyradio broadcastfrom
Teziutlan,and skitswith such titlesas "The Role of Intermediaries in the
Commercialization of Potatoes." Effortswere made to hold meetingsor
agriculturalfairsin everyone of theninetycommunities coveredby theplan.
Women social workersattachedto the plan were chargedwiththe task of
"integrating women." They were to train women in health and home
economicsand to organizethe productionand commercialization of handi-
craftsin orderto raise householdincomes.
Plan Zacapoaxtla's propagandaeffortwas successfulin creatingwide-
spread,if somewhatvague,awareness amongthe peasants thata groupof
young agronomistsplanned to improve the region's agricultureand to
organizeagainstthe "coyotes."The firstagronomicexperiments, carriedout

on lands lentby local peasantsand usingin mostcases thepeasants'own cul-

tivationtechniques,demonstratedthat productionof maize and potatoes
could be significantlyincreased.Nevertheless,certainproblemswere evident
fromthe verystart,some of which were amenableto technicaland short-
term organizationalsolutionswhereas others were not. The plan's first
annual reportnoted that technicalpersonnelwere so occupied with bank
paperwork,attendingofficialmeetings,and takingcare of important visitors
thattheywereunableto spendmuchtimein the countryside. The reportde-
clared thatif the situationpersisted,manyof the gains reachedup to that
timecould be reversed(Plan Zacapoaxtla,Informeanual,1974-1975, IV: 13).
In thesucceedingyear,moreauxiliarypersonnelweretrainedin orderto ease
thedemandson thetechnicalpersonnel.Even as late as 1978,however,it was
reportedthatthetechnicalpersonnelstillhad notfounda "methodology" for
"penetrating" nonparticipating communities, that many peasants were con-
tinuingto buylow qualityfertilizersand insecticidesfromintermediaries,
and
that auxiliary personnel were inadequately trained for many of their
responsibilities.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Two principalcroppingsystemsare widelyused in Nauzontlaand other

communitiesin the intermediatealtitudes or zona media of the Plan
Zacapoaxtlaregion.In general,interplanted cornand beans are grownin the
springand summer,and potatoes,which were grownon only a verysmall
scale prior to 1974, are now planted in the winter.There was general
agreementthat before the 1974-1975growingseason most of the land
remainedfalloweach wintersincetherewas littleknownabouthow to use it
productively. Only one informant reportedhavinggrownpotatoespriorto
1974,havingused animal manuresterilizedwithboilingwaterforfertilizer.
The major technicalcontribution of the agronomistswas theirsystematic
researchon appropriatefertilizers
and plantdensities.It was thisresearch,of
course,whichpermitted the widespreadintroduction of potatoes8as a new
commercialcrop in the zona media. But beyondthis,the plan's moderniza-
tion strategydid not involve large-scalechanges in existingcultivation
practices.Hybridmaize,forexample,was foundto have inferior yieldsto lo-
cal varieties(mostlyvariouscolorsof tall tuxpeno maize) in all excepta few
cases whereverylarge (and oftenuneconomic)quantitiesof fertilizer were
BThe potato strain planted in the 1974-1975season was a red variety with a twentyweek cycle
called L6pez, which received widespread acceptance in urban markets. Nevertheless,the seed
potatoes usually originatedin warm lowland areas near the town of Libres and Oriental, Puebla,
and were poorly-adaptedin termsof disease and pest resistance. The subsequent introductionof
the white Greta variety,with a cycle of fifteenweeks and higheryieldingqualities, did not result
in any dramatic change. Yields were still low compared to those in other potato growingareas of
the country.Large-scale productionof improvedvarieties was not practical because of the lack of
storage facilitiesin the Sierra. The cost of storinglarge amounts of potatoes for seed was simply
not justified.An additional and more importantfactorworkingagainst the selection of improved
seed was the fact that many peasants' only source of capital was intermediariesfromoutside the
region.
Issue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VII, No. 4
LatinAmericanPerspectives:

applied.9
The wide-scaleintroduction of potatoes,however,has set in motiona
new cycleof capitalaccumulationwhichhas benefitedthewealthierstrataof
thepeasantry.In orderto understandthisprocessit is necessaryto examine
both the technologicaland economicaspects of potato cultivationand the
existingrelationsof production.Potatoesinvolvea muchgreaterinvestment
than maize and are considerablymore labor intensive.This, of course,
assures thatonly those peasants with access to relativelylarge amountsof
capitalcan growthem.Because certaincultivations mustbe performed within
a limitedtimeperiod,virtuallyanyonewho growsmore than a verysmall
plot of potatoesmustrely on hiredlabor. Similarly,the purchaseof large
amountsof fertilizer,seed, and otherinputsrequiressubstantialsavingsor
access to credit.
Potatoes,unlikecorn,are not partof the government's guaranteedprice
program,althoughthe CompaniaNacional de SubsistenciaPopular(CONA-
SUPO), the state commoditiesagency,will buy lots as small as five metric
tonsiftheyare gradedby size and do notcontainunacceptablyhighlevelsof
pesticideresidues.Marketprices,however,tendto declinerapidlyduringthe
ten-weekharvestperiodwhichbeginsin March.Thus thosewho plantearly,
in Septemberor earlyOctober,while theyruna significantly greaterriskof
frostdamage,will also receivemuchbetterpricesfortheircropifit survives.
The implicationsof these factorswill be discussed in more detail below.
LAND TENURE AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
It is difficult
to describeland tenurepatternsin any detailin mostparts
of the SierraNorte.As notedabove,thereare few verylargeholdingsand a
pervasivepatternof extremefragmentation. Small plots are typicallymea-
suredin termsof thenumberof litersor almudesof cornwhichcan be sown
in a particulararea (a hectareis equivalentto 20 liters,14 kilogramsor 2 al-
mudesof cornl0).CensusfiguresforNauzontlain 1950,thelast yearin which
a detailedbreakdownof the size of productionunitswas made, indicated
onlyfourplotsover25 hectares,all of whichwere under59 hectares(DGE,
1950, vol. Puebla: 311). Census figuresdo not, of course, reveal hidden
concentrationswhich may result fromone individualor familyowning
several large plots.
ifone considersthepeasants'practiceof savingthelargest,healthiest
9Thisfactis notsurprising
maize ears fromone harvestas seed corn forthe followingyear. Ninety-four percentof the
householdssurveyedin thepreviously-mentioned 1974Plan Zacapoaxtlastudyreported thatthey
selectedseed cornin thismanner(Plan Zacapoaxtla,"Programade Evaluaci6n,"1976).Clearly,
thiskindof selectionprocessis morecloselyattunedto microenvironmental pecularitiesthan
those used in mostagronomicresearch.
Agronomic technocratsoftenimplythattheyare thefirstto undertake varietalselectionof crop
plants.Wellhausen,forinstance,writesthat,"The race Tuxpeniois a strikingexampleof what
naturecan produce"(1975:57). "Nature"did notproduceTuxpefioor anyothermaizevariety, as
thearcheologicalworkof MacNeish(1964)in theTehaucanvalleyso convincingly demonstrates.
Maize varietieswere and continueto be producedby the selectioneffortsof millionsof small
farmers.While they cannot introducedwarfor opaque-highproteincharacteristics to their
maize,theyare nevertheless selectingforthehighest,mostreliableyieldsobtainablegiventhe
cultivationpracticesto whichtheyare accustomed.
l?Whilethealmudin use in theSierraNortede Pueblais widelyreportedto equal tenliters,that
in Chiapas measures15 liters(cf. Collier,1975).

Land recordsare notparticularly revealingeither,sincemostholdingsare

notformallyregistered, and the real pricesand surfaceareas in recentyears
at least are not recorded.An examinationof the Zacapoaxtla DistrictPublic
propertyRegistryfor the period 1902-1922revealed only 22 notations
regardingland transfersor registrations to verifypossessionin Nauzontla.
The nineteenentrieswhichindicatedthe size of the parcelrangedfromthe
equivalentof 0.25 to 12 hectares,witha mean of 2.53 hectares.In the 1962-
1977 period,land sale prices are uniformlylisted as eitherfiftyor one
hundredpesos and surfaceareas are not indicatedexcept in descriptive
terms,e.g.,"fromthelargeoak treeto thestonewall whichmarksthelimitof
Sr. Jimenez'spasture.
The land recordsforthe 1962-1977perioddo not even mentionthe name
of the individualwho is widely recognizedin Nauzontla as the largest
landownerin themunicipio.This individual,a gregarious, forty-eight-year-old
fatherofnine,whomI shall referto as Joaqufn Ruiz,owns sometwentyhect-
ares of pasturein one piece,a secondpasturewhose size I was unableto as-
certain,a totalof tenhectaresof cultivatedland in severalplots,a new panel
truck,and threehouses,one of whichis used to storegrain,anotherof which
containsa small store-cantina, and the family'shome. Ruiz insiststhat he
purchasedall his land withmoneyhe made in tradewhileworkingas an ar-
riero(muleteer)in the Sierra. Other informants, however,noted that his
paternalgrandfather had been a cacique who frequently seized parcels of
land when poordebtorsfailedto meettheirobligations.Ruiz's father,now in
his eighties,also owns several houses and relativelylarge tractsof land,
includingthe best level land in the centerof the municipio.It seems likely,
then,thatJoaquinRuiz's holdingsare not merelythe fruitof his commercial
acumen.
The Ruiz familyand the six otherfamiliesin Nauzontlawhicheach own
about thirtyhectaresof land are not wealthyby the standardsof Zaca-
poaxtla which, with its large stores and warehouses,has a sizable and
prosperouscommercialbourgeoisie.Unlikethe rest of the peasantry,these
Nauzontlafamiliesare virtuallyneverforcedto work forwages. They are
generallyamongthe largestemployersof peones and oftenderiveconsider-
able incomefromrentspaid forthe use of theirlands.
One of the Nauzontlafamilieswhichbecame economicallysuccessfulin
the1940sas a resultof its connectionswithPresidentManuelAvila Camacho
owns a car and a smalltruck.Anotherfamilyowns a large,well-stocked gen-
the only one of its kind in the municipio,and
eral store-post-office-cantina,
rentsmuchofitsland. The head ofthisfamilywas theprincipaldonservative
forcein local politics.He had workedactivelyagainstgovernment effortsto
build a road from the Zacapoaxtla-Cuetzalanhighway,to install radio-
telephoneservice,and also had opposedthe construction of thegradeschool
sponsored by the InstitutoNacional Indigenistaand the warehouse of
CONASUPO.
Beneath the principalfamilies of Nauzontla (the so-called gente de
catergorfa or gentedecente)is a somewhatlargerstratumof mestizopeasants
who own on theorderof two to six hectaresof land per householdand who,
in manycases, have a sourceof incomein additionto agriculture such as ma-
sonryor carpentry.Membersof this stratummay, in a given year, find
Latin~ Issue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VII, No. 4
AmericanPerspectives:

themselvesin the role of both employerand employee.While they will

almostcertainlyhiresome peons to assistwithagricultural tasks,particularly
iftheygrowpotatoes,theyare also likelyto workperiodicallyforothers.Be-
foretheroad was extendedto Nauzontla,manyworkedas arrieros,engaging
in small-scalecommerce.
The landpoorpeasantryin the municipiomay own one or more tiny
plots, often totalingless than a hectare per household,and may rent
additionalparcels.This groupdependsheavilyon incomeearnedfromfarm
laborin Veracruzand, duringthewinterpotatoseason,in Nauzontlaas well.
Accordingto Plan Zacapoaxtladata for1976,eightypercentof thehousehold
heads in Nauzontlaworkedoutsidethe municipioforfivemonthsor more
(Plan Zacapoaxtla Archivo,1977). These migrantsare, of course, drawn
primarily fromtheranksofthelandpoorand landlessgroups.Notsurprising-
ly, the majorityof the Indians in Nauzontlaare in these groups.
The landlesspeasantrybarelysurviveson thefoodgrownon rentedland,
from wage labor, and from selling blouses and embroideredstrips to
intermediaries who resellthemin themarketsof Zacapoaxtlaand Cuetzalan.
For additionalincome,virtuallyall womenin Nauzontla,withthe exception
of thosewiththe pooresteyesightand a few membersof the upperstratum,
sew eitherby hand or machine.Their work is very poorlycompensated;
embroideredstrips,whichtake fourdays of intermittent labor to complete,
may bringonly 20 pesos. While mostwomenspoke of sewingas a way of
"passingthe time"or "makinga few centavitos"betweenfood preparation
tasks,I have no doubtthatthis worktakes on particularimportancein the
poorestgroup,especiallyduringthe summerwhen manymen are away for
monthsat a time and the women are leftto fend forthemselves."
The landpoorand landless usually attemptto rentsmall plots to grow
cornand beans and, occasionally,potatoes.Land parcelsas small as "fiveli-
ters"(0.25hectare)are rentedfora year at a time.Renterswere universally
reluctantto name theirlandlords,althoughsome of the gentede categoria
mentioned to me in passingthattheyrentedland,and itis clearthattheland-
lordsare primarily drawnfromthisgroup.Priorto the widespreadintroduc-
tion of potatoesby Plan Zacapoaxtla agronomists, rentswere considerably
lower and probably within the reach of virtuallyeveryone.With the
availabilityofnew commercialopportunities, however,land valueshave risen
dramatically.Ironically,the rise in rentsis relatedto the introductionof a
crop- potatoes- whichmostpeasantrenterscannotaffordto grow.Only
one informant reportedthatin winterhe re-rented his rentedland to someone
who cultivatedpotatoes.Generally,rentedlands remainfallowin winterif
not used forpotatoes.To some extent,the rise in rentshas been offsetby
new opportunities forwage labor. In any case, membersof the poorerstrata
frequently complainedthattheywere being pricedoffthe land.
The potatoboom has also led ownersof pastureand forestland to clear
moregroundforplanting.Cattlein the Nauzontlaarea generallyrequirean
annualminimum of one hectareper head forgrazing.The sellingpriceof one
"Many informantsindicated that during periods in which the men were away working,they
were reluctantto send or receive remittancesthroughthe mails. The town postmasterwas widely
believed to steal fromthe mails and to cheat illiteratepeople who wanted to change checks at his
store.

head usually ranges from4,000to 8,000 pesos, considerablyless than the

profitalone on a well-managedhectareof potatoes.Land clearinghas also
providedadditionalwage labor opportunities, especiallyin the summerand
early fall. Some owners of forestor scrub land "loan" it to landpoor or
landlesspeasantsto growmaize,withthe conditionthattheyclear it. After
the peasant harveststhe corn, the landowneruses the land for potato
cultivationand is not burdenedwiththe extracost of clearingit. He is also
providedwith a free demonstration of the fertility (or lack of it) of the
particularplot. Since clearing forestor scrub is an onerous and time-
consumingtask, only those peasants who have no other resources or
alternative wage laboropportunities will electto open lands forsomeoneelse.
Frequently, theycannoteven affordthe small amountof fertilizer necessary
to producegood yields.
The larger landownersand some of those in the two-to-sixhectare
stratumrelyforfinancing primarily on thegovernment bank or on theirown
resources.Those peasantswho are unable or unwillingto securebank loans
maystillgrowpotatoesthrougha sharecropping arrangement called a medias
or medieria.As practicedin Nauzontla,this arrangement worksas follows:
thepeasantmedieroprovidesland (rentedor owned)and labor(hired,as well
as familylabor),and his socio or "partner," usuallya truckownerfromone
of the lowlandtownsat the edge of the Sierra,providesall the inputs(seed,
fertilizer, insecticides, and so on). The harvestis thendividedequally.Several
interesting featuresof the a medias arrangement were describedby infor-
mants.12 Firstof all, the socios are frequently the same individualsas the
coyotes,i.e.,theintermediaries. The peasantoftensells his halfofthecropto
his "partner"at whateverpriceis offered, since otherintermediaries maynot
maketheeffort to removehalfthe cropfroma smallplot,particularly if it is
not near the road. Second, the "partner"is usually involvedwith several
peasantsin the same locale. Finally,"partnerships" of this kindrangefrom
tenuousties which change fromyear to year to full-fledged compadrazgo
relationships.
Despite the rhetoricof equalityand partnershipused to describeme-
dieria, it is clear thatwhatis seen as a mediasis notreallyan equal division
of the profits.The "partner's"shareof the totalcash outlayis less thanone-
half that needed to begin cultivation.If the land is rented,however,as is
sometimesthe case, the percentageof the initialcapital providedby the
outsidepartneris less. Whenrentsincrease,as is now thecase, thereturnson
investmentof the respective"halves" of the peasant and the "partner"
becomeincreasingly disproportionate,especiallyif the "partner"' attemptsto
cut inputcosts by providing less than the required amounts of pesticides or
soil fumigants. The temptation to cut costs in this manner is, of course,
greaterfor the "partner"than for the peasant because of the following
factors:(1) inputsare countedas partof the "partner's""half"of the initial
investment; (2) theriskis dispersedbetweentheseveralpeasantswithwhom
the "partner"is cultivating a medias,ratherthanconcentrated in one parcel,
as is the case forany individualpeasant;and (3) a fieldof potatoesmay,in
some years,producefairlyhighyields withoutapplyingthe recommended
12sinceI was notin Nauzontladuringthewinterpotatoseason,mydescription
ofmedieriarelies
on peasants' reports.
Issue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VIl, Na. 4
latin AmericanPerspectives:

amountsof pesticidesand fumigants.

The real profitsin potato cultivationaccrue to intermediaries. The
"partner"is able to makethe peasantoffershe cannotrefuse.Withthe price
of potatoesdroppingdaily duringthe harvestseason,the peasantis not in a
positionto delay and shop around for the best buyer.Plan Zacapoaxtla's
effortsto circumvent the intermediariesand organizethe directcommercial-
izationof potatoesto CONASUPO have been shaped by the regulationsof
CONASUPO itself.Delayingthe harvestin searchof betterpricesis likelyto
increasethe pesticidelevels in the potatoesand to lead to theirrejectionby
CONASUPO buyers(Direccionde Sanidad Vegital,1978). Similarly,forthe
peasant mediero'sshare to reach five metrictons,which is the minimum
quantityrequiredto sell to CONASUPO, he would generallyhave to plant
morethanone hectareof the Greta(white)varietyor almosttwo hectaresof
the Lopez (red) variety.In eithercase, he would then be eligiblefor bank
loans and would not have to cultivatea medias. Some peasants,however,
continueto cultivatea mediasbecause theysee how late bankpaymentsand
time-consuming paperworkhave forcedtheirneighborswithofficialcreditto
plantlate, thus assuringthemlow harvestprices.The continuedvitalityof
the coyotes,then, is due not only to the seeming advantages of their
"partnership" forthe peasants,but to the regulationsand the bureaucratiza-
tion of the officialbank and the incompetenceof many of its personnel.
THE CREDIT SYSTEM AND THE POTATO BOOM
The minimumquantityof short-term workingcredit (credito avio or
cr6ditode habilitacion)offeredby theZacapoaxtlabranchof thegovernment
credit bank is generally 10,000 to 12,000 pesos, an amount which is
supposedlysufficient to financethe cultivationof one hectareof potatoes.
The bank bases the size of loans on its determination of the costs of
of
particulartypes production and makes payments according to its concep-
tionof the agricultural schedule.Peasantsin Nauzontlawho receivedcredit
for potato cultivationhad many complaintsabout theirdealingswith the
bank,but foremostamongthese was the bank's underestimation of actual
production costsand its failureto providefundsearlyin theplantingseason.
As notedabove,peasantswho plantpotatoeslate,while runningless riskof
frostdamage,are verylikelyto receivelowerpricesfortheircrop.Almostall
thosewithwhomI spokeexpresseda preference forplantingearly,no doubt
because a late harvestalmost always meant low prices,while an early
harvestwas almostthe only possibleway of makinga profit.Nevertheless,
thebank'sdelay in providingthe firstpaymentsforcesmanyof its clientsto
plantlate and therebyhas theeffectof increasingthe amountof unrecovera-
ble loans and of turninggrowingnumbersof bankruptloan recipientsinto
virtualbank employees,workingundertermsdictatedby the bank on lands
to which theytechnicallyhave title.
The bank's "operationalplans" or cost estimatesfor different types of
productionare revisedannually.The cost of inputsused in thiscalculation,
however,is revisedonlyby estimation, even thoughthe bankis theprincipal
to its clientsand is obviouslyaware of real risesin input
supplierof fertilizer
costs.Laborcosts are revisedeach yearin accordancewitha regionalsurvey
whichone Zacapoaxtla bank employee,the directorof cr6ditorefaccionario
LatinAmro Perpeties Issue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VIl, No. 4

(long-term investmentcredit),admittedwas probablynot representative of

actual costs in the area. This systematicunderestimation of real production
costs assures that only peasants with considerablecash resourcesof their
own can take advantageof the bank's offerings. Those who have sufficient
land to providecollateralfora bankloan but do nothave cash savingsto in-
vest in theirpotatofield run considerablygreaterrisksof crop loss.
Duringthe 1977-1978winterpotatocycle,only 74 farmersin the entire
Plan Zacapoaxtla regionreceivedcreditforpotatocultivation.A totalof 92
receiveddirecttechnicalassistanceforpotatoproduction, and 63 harvested
thefivetonsor morefromone plotnecessaryto sell directlyto CONASUPO.
In the town of Nauzontla, only 8.4 percentof the households received
technicalassistanceforgrowingpotatoesin 1977-1978.Even in the case of
maize, a crop which is grownby virtuallyeverypeasant householdin the
plan region,only1,118or some 7.6 percentof an estimated14,800agricultura-
listsreceivedtechnicalassistancein 1977.The totalarea in potatoesunderdi-
rectplan supervisionin the entirezona media (all fourbarriosof Nauzontla
municipioand the adjacent villagesof Huahuaxtlaand Tecuicuilco)was a
mere 178.5 hectares,113.25hectaresof which were cultivatedwith credit
(Plan Zacapoaxtla Archivo,1977-1978).It mustbe remembered thatpotatoes
the
are virtually only winter crop in the zona media.
The 92 farmerswho receivedtechnicalassistanceforpotatoproduction
each cultivatedan averageof slightlyless than two hectaresof potatoesin
1977-1978.Nevertheless,in the contextof the severe land fragmentation
whichcharacterizesmanyareas of the SierraNorte,thisgroupconstitutes a
privilegedstartum.They are generallyable to investsufficientcapital in
pesticidesand laborso as to minimizetheriskofcroploss. Theyare also in a
special position vis "a vis the marketsince they produce in sufficient
quantitiesto sell directlyto the government purchasingagency.Many of
thesesame individualsown relativelyextensivetractsof pastureland which
theyare in the processof clearingin orderto plantmorepotatoes.As noted
above,theproductionofpotatoeshas provenmorelucrativethanraisingbeef
cattlealthoughthe risksare greater.
The poorpeasantsin the'area,who iftheyhave any land at all are likely
to measureit in litersof seed cornor fractionsof an almud,are onlyable to
plantpotatoesthroughthe a medias typeof sharecropping. They receivea
disproportionately low returnon theirshareof theinvestment and are also at
themercyof intermediaries whenit comesto marketing theircrop.The risks
of crop loss for this groupare significantly greater,both because of their
"partners'"tendencyto skimpon the necessaryinputsand because they
themselvesare less likelyto be able to hirewage laborduringperiodsof peak
demand.Those peasantsin thisgroupwho rentland are unlikelyto be able to
affordpotatocultivation even as sharecroppers.A few tenants,however,are
beginningto look to potatoes as the only means of meetinghigh rent
payments.For the rest, even their small plots of corn and beans are
jeopardizedby the rise in rentswhich has accompaniedthe potatoboom.
The seasonal labor scarcityin the potato-growing area assures peasants
of thislast groupof daily wages of up to one hundredpesos per day during
much of the periodfromNovemberto May. It seems clear,however,that
wage laborwill becomeof increasingimportance to theirsurvival.The risein
Issue 27, Fal) 1980, Vol. VII,No. 4
LatinAmonica,Perspectives:

cash wages does not appear to be such a boon when seen in the contextof
the presentprocess in which controlover the land is being wrestedfrom
those at the verybottom.As rentedland becomes less available, an even
higherproportionof the lifetimecost of subsistenceformanypoor families
mustbe derivedfromwages.
The upper stratumfarmerswhich receiveofficialcreditare able to use
theirown resourcesboth to supplementinadequateloan paymentsand to
avoid indebtednessin theeventof cropdamage,since compensation fromthe
AseguradoraNacional Agricolay Ganadera,Sociedad Anonima(ANAGSA),
thestateagriculturalinsuranceagency,usuallydoes notcoverthefullamount
of losses. Moreover,corruptionwithin the bank assures that a certain
percentageof loans are made forpoliticalreasonsand thatrepaymentis not
expected.The Zacapoaxtlabank's directorof creditorefaccionariocomment-
ed duringan interviewthatmuchof the 20 to 25 percentof loaned monies
whichare notrecoveredfallintothiscategoryand become,in thebank's ac-
countbooks,fondosperdidos.These "lostfunds"constitute, in effect,
a direct
transferof resourcesto the politicallyand economicallymost powerful
individualsin the region.
CONCLUSIONS
The allocationof the benefitsof agriculturalmodernization is at every
level decided largelyby political criteria.The World Bank's fundingof
PIDER, forexample,is partof a consistentpolicyofchannelingthebulkofits
aid not to the poorest countries,but ratherto that key, strategictier of
"middleincome" nations which includes Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria,Morocco
and the Phillipines(Feder,1977a: 65ff).
WithinMexico,the earlygreenrevolutionwas an attempton the partof
the"counterreform" presidentsand theirsupporters to concentratebenefitsin
thehandsof a new agrarianbourgeoisiein certainareas ofthecountry. When
thiscapitalistfarmingsectorbegan to shiftout of grainproductionas more
profitabletypesof investment became available,effortswere made to have
the peasantsectorassume moreof the burdenof producingbasic foodstuffs
for Mexico's growingpopulation.Modernizationprograms,such as Plan
Puebla and related "littlegreen revolutions,"are also frequentlyseen as
meansofdefusingor controlling peasantunrest.The labor-intensivecharacter
ofmanyPIDER programs, includingPlan Zacapoaxtla,is intendednotonlyto
providea slightlybettersubsistencelevel for rurallabor,but also to stem
somewhatthe rate of rural-urbanmigration.Creditbank practiceswhich
increasethedefaultrate,such as failingto providefundson timeand at a lev-
to coverthe actual costs of production,
el sufficient also serveto tie certain
sectorsof the peasantryto theirland and to keep themfromfleeingto the
cities.
In regionsserved by particulardevelopmentplans, such as the Sierra
Norte de Puebla, influentialindividualsmay receive direct transfersof
resourcesin the formof bank loans forwhich repaymentis not expected.
Even when loans are made accordingto the rules of good bankingpractice,
largenumbersof peasantsare excludedfromconsideration. The structure of
boththe officialand unofficialcreditsystemsassures thatlargerproducers
receivebetterreturnson the capitaltheyinvestand on theirown labor.The

existenceof two commercialization structures, one based on CONASUPO,

and the otheron intermediaries, has a similareffect.
The availabilityof new commercialopportunities and outsidesourcesof
capitalhas set in motiontworelatedand immediately observableprocessesof
proletarianization.First,tenantshave been dispossessedby membersof the
so-calledgentedecentewho wish to make moreprofitableuse of the land.
Second,peasantswho failto meetcommitments to theofficialbank,oftenbe-
cause theylack the additionalresources of theirown neededto meetthereal
costs of production,are requiredto place the managementof theirland
entirelyin the bank's hands. The bank's demonstratedincompetencein
estimating costs and establishingproductionschedulesassures thatit is not
easy forthe indebtedpeasant to escape fromthis new type of peonage.
A thirdfactorwhichcontributes further to theultimateproletarianization
of manysmallholdersinvolvesthe operationof agricultural pricingmecha-
nisms.Whenthesupplyof a particularcommodity exceedsthedemand,as is
thecase withpotatoesduringmuchof theyear,the marketpricetendsto be
determinedby the productioncosts prevailingin the technicallymore
advancedsectorproducingthatcommodity. This sector,due to its relatively
highprofitmargin,is able to accumulateincreasingamountsof capitalat the
expense of the uneconomicsmall producers,who are frequently unable to
even cover theirexpenses (Rello and Montes de Oca, 1974: 65ff.).Often
peasantswho do not even counttheirown labor as a cost findthattheyare
unable to compete and must rely on income fromwages instead of on
earningsfromcommercialagriculture. This in turnmaylead themto alienate
the land theycan no longermake economicallyproductive.
Even in an area of labor-intensive cash crop production,such as the
Sierra Nortede Puebla, small differences in the level of capital investment
mayacceleratethedifferentiation process.Attempts by poorerfarmersto use
less thantherecommended amountofinsecticides, forexample,mayresultin
crop loss and the beginningof a downwardspiralof indebtedness, eitherto
the officialbank or to private"partners."The potatofarmersof the Sierra
Norte,by producinga productthatentersthe marketat a pricewhichoften
does not reflectits actual costs of production, contributeto the highprofit
marginsand the accumulationof capital of both the modernagricultural
sectorand urbanindustry.Similarly,the poorerfarmersof the SierraNorte,
because of thesame marketmechanismsand because of thelow cost of their
labor,contributeto the accumulationof theirwealthierneighbors.
The modernization of smallholding zones highlights some of theprincipal
contradictions in Mexican agriculture. The infrasubsistence peasantfarm,by
supplementing the low wages in the industrial and modern agricultural
sectors,has played an important role in the accumulationof capitalin those
sectors.The penetrationof outside capital into the productionprocess in
smallholdingregions,however,sets in motiona series of processeswhich
favorsaccumulationby a stratumof relativelywealthysmall farmersat the
expenseof theinfrasubsistence peasantry.The smallparcelsof land cultivat-
ed by the infrasubsistence peasantryconstitutein effecta subsidyto the
richerpeasantsand the othersectorswhichcontinueto offerextremely low
wages. It is these small plots, rentedor owned, which sustain the poor
peasants and allow the reproductionof theirlabor. Now, however,rural
LatinAmanican Issuo 27t,FaIl 1980, Vol. VIl, Na. 4
Perspechveas:

laborersare losingtheiraccess to land and are onlyrarely,and, if then,tem-

porarily,able to commandwages which would compensateforthe loss of
theirlands.
The PIDER approachto agricultural modernizationhas as a primarygoal
themaintenanceofthisclass oflandpoorand landlessin thecountryside, at a
minimalsubsistencelevel, away fromthe cities where it is beyond the
capacityof industryto absorb them.This is, at best, a stopgap measure.
Demandforagricultural laboris highlyseasonal. Smallholderswho lose their
land are forcedto migrate.They may be able to followthe harvestsfora
while, but with the proletarianization process occurringwith increasing
intensityin manypartsof Mexico,thisis notlikelyto be a viablestrategy for
long. Many will, of course,migrateto the urban areas and to the United
States. What is most striking,however,about the organizationof Mexican
agriculturalmodernizationis thatwe are witnessing thecreationof an excess
populationforwhich thereis no space in eitherthe countrysideor in the
cities.
REFERENCES
Beaucage,Pierre
1974"Comunidadesindfgenas de la SierraNortede Puebla,"RevistaMexicanade Sociologia
XXXIV (January-March), 11147
CIMMYT (CentroInternacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo)
1974 The Puebla Project:Seven Years of Experience1967-1973,El Batan: CIMMYT
1975 CIMMYT Review 1975,El Batan: CIMMYT
Cleaver,HarryM.
1972 "The Contradictions of the GreenRevolution,"MonthlyReview,24 (June),80-111
1974 The Originsof the Green Revolution,unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,Stanford
University
Collier,GeorgeA.
1975 "Are MarginalFarmlandsMarginalto theirFarmers?"in S. Plattner(ed.), Formal
Models in EconomicAnthropology, Washington, D.C.: AmericanAnthropological Associ-
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DGE (Direcci6nGeneralde Estadistica)
1910 Tercercenso de poblaci6n
1950 Censo agricola,ganaderoy ejidal de 1950
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1978 Manual de plaguicidasautorizados-Papa
Garcia Sordo,Mario
las autoridadesen las zonas agrariascriticas,"Uno Mias Uno,(Mexico
1978 "Intervienen
City)June17, 5
Fabila,Alfonso
1949 SierraNortede Puebla: Contribuci6n para su estudio,Mexico City:SEP
Feder,Ernest
1977a "Capitalism'sLast-DitchEffortto Save Underdeveloped International
Agricultures:
the WorldBankand the RuralPoor,"Journalof Contemporary
Agribusiness, Asia,VII (1),
56-78
1977bStrawberry
Imperialism:An EnquiryintotheMechanismsofDependencyin Mexican
Mexico City:EditorialCampesina
Agriculture,

IN MEXICO 49
EDELMAN: AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION
Hewittde Alcantara,Cynthia
1976 ModernizingMexican Agriculture:SocioeconomicImplicationsof Technological
Change1940-1970, Geneva: UN ResearchInstituteforSocial Development
1977 Ensayosobrela satisfacci6n de necesidadesbasicas del pueblomexicanoentre1940y
1970,Mexico City:Centrode EstudiosSociol6gicos,El Colegiode Mexico
Krauss,Clifford
1978"Apoyodel Banco Mundialal agro- La mayoroperaci6nen AmericaLatina,"Uno
Ma!s Uno (July10), 1, 13
Lara, Sara; LorenaPaz P.; and MiguelLantz
n.d. "La zona del Plan Puebla - San Buenaventura Nealtican- San AndresAzumiatla,"
Mexico City:Institutode Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM, mimeographed
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1964 "AncientMesoamericanCivilization,"Science,143 (3606),531-537
Nutini,Hugo and BarryL. Isaac
1974 Los pueblosde habla nahuatlde la regi6nde Tlaxcalay Puebla,MexicoCity:INI-SEP
Pare, Luisa
1975aEl Plan Puebla: Una revoluci6nverdeque esti muyverde,Chapingo:Edicionesde So-
ciologiaRural
1975b"Caciquismoy estructure de poderen la SierraNortede Puebla,"in R. Bartraet al.,
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and Class Relations(SierraNorteregion;stateof Puebla),"in J.Rex (ed.),
1977"Inter-ethnic
Race and Class in Post-colonialsociety,Paris: UNESCO
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1974-1977Informesanuales
1976-1977"Programade Evaluaci6n,"Encuestas,9 volumes,unpublished
Plan Zacapoaxtla Archivo
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ciclo 77-78
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de EstudiosTransnacionales-Editorial
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December),61-76
Villa Issa, Manual R.
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PerspectivesIssue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VIl, No. 4

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Agricultural Modernization in Smallholding Areas of Mexico: A Case Study in the Sierra Norte

This content downloaded from 189.217.24.83 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:26:45 PM

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for both the urban sectorsand for capitalistagriculture.

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autonomousOfficeof Special Studies,staffedand fundedlargelyby the

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the Institutode Investigaciones Agricolas(IIA), whichcontinuedto function

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decisionto stimulategrainproductionby the peasantry.It was expectedthat

(a) to develop,fieldtest,and refinea strategy

Likethe "greenrevolution,"Plan Puebla mustbe seen withinthe context

In late 1973,Plan Puebla was in factincorporated

4Tn 1978the Escuela Nacionalde becamethe UniversidadAut6nomade Chapingo.

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Plan Puebla was also establishedin response to certain short-term

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addition,purchasesof goods otherthanthose needed on a day-to-daybasis

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relatedto UCI actionsin Cuetzalan.

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The young economists,agronomists, and social workerschargedwith

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It was also suggestedthatincreasingproductionwould benefit"notonly

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on lands lentby local peasantsand usingin mostcases thepeasants'own cul-

Two principalcroppingsystemsare widelyused in Nauzontlaand other

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Land recordsare notparticularly revealingeither,sincemostholdingsare

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themselvesin the role of both employerand employee.While they will

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head usually ranges from4,000to 8,000 pesos, considerablyless than the

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amountsof pesticidesand fumigants.

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(long-term investmentcredit),admittedwas probablynot representative of

This content downloaded from 189.217.24.83 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:26:45 PM

This content downloaded from 189.217.24.83 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:26:45 PM

existenceof two commercialization structures, one based on CONASUPO,

This content downloaded from 189.217.24.83 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:26:45 PM

laborersare losingtheiraccess to land and are onlyrarely,and, if then,tem-

This content downloaded from 189.217.24.83 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:26:45 PM

PerspectivesIssue 27, Fall 1980, Vol. VIl, No. 4

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