1.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208163. April 20, 2015.]

ROQUE B. BENITEZ and SANTA FE LABOR UNION-

FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS, petitioners, vs. SANTA FE MOVING AND
RELOCATION SERVICES/VEDIT
KURANGIL, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J :
p

We resolve the present petition for review

on certiorari 1 which seeks to annul the November 7, 2012
decision 2 and July 10, 2013 resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126213.
The Antecedents
On February 8, 2011, petitioners Roque V.
Benitez (Benitez) and Santa Fe Labor Union (union) filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with
money claims, 4 against respondents Santa Fe Moving and
Relocation Services (company) and its Managing Director,
Vedit Kurangil (Kurangil), an Australian citizen. The company is
engaged in providing relocation and moving services, including
visa, immigration and real estate services. Benitez (the union's
Vice-President at the time), was its former packing and moving
operator (crew leader) since June 2001. 5
Benitez alleged that on December 20, 2010, the company
served him a memorandum 6 advising him not to report for
work effective immediately, thereby terminating his
employment, supposedly on grounds of serious misconduct or
willful disobedience. He allegedly uttered abusive words
against Kurangil during the company's Christmas Party on
December 18, 2010. He bewailed that he was not given the
opportunity to defend himself.
Benitez claimed that during the party, he noticed that the
raffle committee members were putting back the names of
those who were already drawn, giving them more chances of
winning. He appealed to the committee to put a stop to what
they were doing, but they replied they would not "in the spirit
of Christmas." He denied having verbally abused Kurangil. He
presented the affidavits of co-employees Jhun Bulan,
Romualdo Elib, Carlos Morata and Raul Ramirez, 7 attesting
that Benitez, who was with them at one table, did not commit
the offense which led to his dismissal.
Benitez argued that his dismissal constituted an unfair
labor practice as he was a union officer and that it was
undertaken to derail the conclusion of a collective bargaining
agreement with the company. He further argued that the
penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to his alleged offense,
considering that it was committed during a casual gathering
and had no connection to his work.
The company and Kurangil denied liability. They
maintained that the company has developed a world-renowned
reputation for unsurpassed customer service and quality in its
line of business. They averred that during the Christmas Party
on December 18, 2010, Benitez berated and maligned Kurangil
by throwing foul and offensive words at him, such as "putang
ina mo ka VK, gago ka!" Benitez's tirade, they added, included
the company and it officers. Moreover, the incident happened
in front of the company's employees, their families, as well as
company clients and guests.
The company confirmed Benitez's claim that the incident
involved the conduct of the Christmas raffle. However, they
differed on what triggered his unruly behavior. It alleged that
while the raffle was going on, Benitez climbed up the stage
and questioned the management's decision to allow
contractual employees to join the raffle. This resulted in only
80% of the employees winning raffle prizes. Benitez then
started hurling invectives and foul language while still on
stage, mostly directed at Kurangil.
The company further alleged that even when Benitez
stormed out of the stage, he kept on berating Kurangil, such
that people he passed by overheard him cursing Kurangil and
the company and that he even attempted to a throw a beer
bottle at Kurangil, but he was restrained by other employees.
The respondents presented in evidence the affidavits of
Kurangil, 8 Reynaldo Delavin (Delavin), 9 a company driver, and
Diana Claros Urmeneta 10 (Urmeneta),11 a guest at the party.
Their statements were corroborated by the depositions 12 of
company employees Jim Robert Afos (Afos) and Marciano
Atienza, Jr. (Atienza). The two disputed the statements 13 of
Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez — witnesses for Benitez —
that they were seated together with Benitez at one table and
that he caused no disturbance during the Christmas Party.
Afos and Atienza stated that they were the ones who were
seated with Benitez, not Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez who
were at a separate table with another group of employees.
Afos and Atienza added that Benitez's tirade started
when the raffle for the grand prize was being conducted. All of
a sudden, Benitez, who had not yet won a prize at that time,
stood up and proceeded to the stage, fuming mad and
complaining about the conduct of the raffle. 14
The company required Benitez to explain in writing why
he should not be disciplined for serious misconduct and willful
disobedience of its lawful orders in connection with the
incident. Benitez failed to comply and neither did he show
remorse for what he did.
In view of Benitez's failure to explain his side, the
company issued a memorandum 15 dated December 20, 2010 to
Benitez (signed by Kurangil), terminating his employment
effective on the same day, for clear violation of "Santa Fe
Policy and Procedure under Conduct and Behavior as well
as Labor Code of the Philippinesunder Art. 282 — Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer . . . ."
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
In her decision 16 of September 14, 2011, Labor Arbiter
Fatima Jambaro-Franco (LA Franco) dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit. LA Franco found that Benitez, who was
holding a position of trust and confidence as packing and
moving operator, committed a serious misconduct at the
company's Christmas Party on December 18, 2010 by "hurling
obscene, insulting or offensive language against a
superior," 17 thereby losing the trust and confidence of his
employer.
Benitez and the union appealed, reiterating that his
dismissal is illegal. Moreover, they claimed, he was denied due
process as he was not given the opportunity to explain his
side.
The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dismissed the appeal, likewise for lack of
merit, in its decision 18 of March 15, 2012. It sustained LA
Franco's finding that Benitez was validly dismissed for serious
misconduct. However, it noted "that the respondents failed to
comply with the two-notice requirement as mandated by the
Labor Code in validly dismissing an employee." 19 Accordingly,
it affirmed LA Franco's ruling with modification by awarding
Benitez nominal damages of P50,000.00 for the violation of his
right to procedural due process.
Benitez and the union moved for reconsideration, to no
avail. The NLRC denied the motion, 20 prompting them to file a
petition for certiorari 21 with the CA.
The CA Decision
In its decision 22 under review, the CA found no grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC's affirmation of LA Franco's
ruling that Benitez was validly dismissed. It stressed that "the
findings of the NLRC which adopted those of the Labor Arbiter
were in accord with the evidence on record." 23 It dismissed
the petition and denied Benitez's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
The Petition
Benitez and the union now ask the Court to reverse his
dismissal and order his reinstatement with full backwages,
grant his money claims, award him moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses. They
submit in the main that the CA committed grave and palpable
error in misappreciating the facts and applicable jurisprudence
in this case, especially the Samson v. NLRC 24 ruling.
They contend that contrary to the appellate court's
opinion, Benitez was not liable for serious misconduct. They
insist that Benitez did not malign Kurangil, during the
Christmas Party and that if he indeed became unruly on that
day, the company guards should have restrained him and made
a report about it, but there was no such intervention from the
guards.
At any rate, they argue, Benitez should not have been
dismissed for the serious misconduct he allegedly committed
since it was not in connection with his work as moving and
relocation operator. Moreover, for misconduct to be serious, it
must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial and unimportant as the Court declared
in Samson which, they claim, has factual similarities with the
present case.
The Respondents' Case
In their Comment (on the Petition), 25 the respondents
pray that the petition be dismissed and the assailed CA rulings
modified through a deletion of the award of nominal damages
to Benitez and the reinstatement of LA Franco's September 14,
2011 decision. In the alternative, they ask that the nominal
damages award be tempered.
 They argue that the petitioners have not made out a case
showing that there are special and compelling reasons
requiring the exercise by this Court of its discretionary power
of judicial review. They submit that the petition virtually raises
the same arguments that had already been duly resolved,
based on evidence supporting Benitez's dismissal for cause.
Thus, the petition should be rejected outright for it raises only
questions of facts and not of law.
The Court's Ruling
The procedural question
Are the questions raised by the petitioners factual in
nature, or are they of law? The respondents contend that they
are questions of fact and are therefore not allowed in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, they ask for an outright dismissal of the
petition as the Court is not a trier of facts. 26
The respondents' arguments failed to persuade us. The
labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA uniformly ruled that there is
substantial evidence to warrant Benitez's dismissal for serious
misconduct. Although up to this stage of the proceedings
Benitez insists that he did not commit a serious misconduct,
he argues lengthily that the penalty of dismissal is not
commensurate to the offense as defined by law.
As we see matters, the question before us is what the law
is on the offense Benitez committed based on the facts of the
case, which we find to be clearly a question of law. 27 It does
not involve the probative value of the evidence adduced, which
is a question of fact. 28 We thus find no procedural infirmity in
the petition.
The substantive aspect of the case
Serious misconduct is a just cause for termination of
employment under the law. 29 Article 282 of the Labor
Code provides: "An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work. . . . ."
Benitez and his union stand firm on their position that he
was not liable for serious misconduct on account of his display
of unruly behavior during the company's Christmas Party on
December 18, 2010 for reasons earlier discussed. On the other
hand, the respondents maintain that he committed a serious
misconduct that warranted his dismissal.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Despite his denial, there is substantial evidence that
Benitez maligned the company's managing director and the
company itself during their Christmas Party on December 18,
2010. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise. 30
Benitez presented the affidavits 31 of four company
employees — Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez — who stated
under oath that Benitez was seated with them at one table and
that he did not cause any disturbance during the party. The
testimony of these four employees were belied by their co-
employees Afos and Atienza who executed a joint
affidavit, 32 stating that Benitez was seated with them at a
different table and that they witnessed him going to the stage
where he lost his temper and verbally abused Kurangil in
connection with the conduct of the Christmas raffle.
Delavin, 33 a company employee and guest
Urmeneta 34 corroborated Kurangil's statement 35 regarding
Benitez's outburst on the stage, particularly the invectives he
threw at him "Putang ina mo ka VK, gago ka." Urmeneta, for
instance, deposed that when Benitez left the stage angrily and
walked past her and others sitting at the table, she heard him
say "Putang-ina mo ka VK, gago ka." 36
Benitez further contends that the company guards could
have noticed the incident and therefore could have stepped in
to maintain order, but nothing of this sort took place as there
was even no report from the guards regarding the incident.
Again, we find this argument unpersuasive. There was no
need for the guards to intervene because Benitez was
restrained by people near the stage and who escorted him
outside the premises where the party was going on as attested
to by Kurangil himself, 37 as well as by Afos and Atienza. 38
Under the circumstances, we believe that Benitez's tirade
against Kurangil, the company and other company officers
indeed happened. Significantly, the Christmas Party was
attended not only by company officers and employees and
their families, but also by company clients and guests. With
such a big audience in front of him, we cannot imagine how
Benitez could get away with his claim that he did not malign
and disrespect Kurangil and the others.
The petitioners assert that even if Benitez committed the
offense for which he was charged, it was not a serious
misconduct that would warrant his dismissal under the law.
They cite Samson v. NLRC 39 as authority for their submission
that "misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in
connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause
for his separation." 40
They further cite the following excerpt in
the Samson case:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On or about 17 December 1993, during the Sales and
Marketing Christmas gathering, you made utterances of
obscene, insulting, and offensive words, referring to or
directed against SPC's Management Committee, in the
presence of several co-employees.
2. On that same occasion, and again in the presence of
several co-employees, you uttered obscene, insulting and
offensive words, and made malicious and lewd gestures ,
all of which referred to or were directed against Mr.
Epitacio D. Titong, Jr., President and General Manager of
SPC.
 3. Also on that occasion, you repeated your malicious
utterances and threatened to disrupt or otherwise create
violence during SPC's forthcoming National Sales
Conference, and enjoined your co-employees not to
prepare for the said conference.
4. Subsequently, on or about 3 January 1994, you
repeated your threats to some co-employees, advising
them to watch out for some disruptive actions to happen
during the National Sales Conference. (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners submit that the CA misappreciated the
facts of Samson and the present case when it ruled that "[In
the case of Samson v. NLRC] . . . the alleged offensive words
were not uttered by petitioner in the presence of respondent
company's president and general manager. In contrast,
petitioner was with Mr. Kurangil when he uttered the foul
words in the presence of the employees, their families and
guests." 41
We disagree. The CA committed no reversible error in not
applying the Samson ruling in this case. Samson's outburst
occurred during an informal Christmas gathering of company
sales officials and staff and his maligned superior was not
present during the gathering.
On the other hand, Benitez went up the stage and
confronted his superior with a verbal abuse. Also, the
petitioners cited Samson selectively and concealed its real
thrust, thus:
The instant case should be distinguished from the
previous cases where we held that the use of insulting
and offensive language constituted gross misconduct
justifying an employee's dismissal. In De la Cruz vs.
NLRC, the dismissed employee shouted "saying ang
pagka-professional mo!" and "putang ina mo" at the
company physician when the latter refused to give him a
referral slip. In Autobus Workers' Union (AWU) v. NLRC,
the dismissed employee called his supervisor "gago
ka" and taunted the latter by saying "bakit anong gusto
 mo tang ina mo." In these cases, the dismissed
employees personally subjected their respective
superiors to the foregoing verbal abuses. The utter lack
of respect for their superiors was patent. In contrast,
when petitioner was heard to have uttered the alleged
offensive words against respondent company's president
and general manager, the latter was not around.
(Emphases and underscoring ours.) 42
Further, it appears that in Samson, the company was
ambivalent for a while on what to do with Samson's offense as
it took several weeks after the last incident on January 3, 1994
before it asked him to explain. Moreover, the company official
maligned merely admonished Samson during a meeting on
January 4, 1994.
In contrast, the company acted swiftly and decisively in
Benitez's case, obviously and understandably, because of the
gravity and high visibility of his offense, which not only
constituted a frontal verbal, and nearly physical (the
attempted beer bottle throwing), assault against Kurangil.
Needless to say, Benitez's outburst also caused grave
embarrassment for the audience who witnessed the incident,
including company officials whom he likewise maligned, as
well as company clients and guests.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are
convinced — as the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA had
been — that Benitez's offense constituted a serious
misconduct as defined by law. His display of insolent and
disrespectful behavior, in utter disregard of the time and place
of its occurrence, had very much to do with his work. He set a
bad example as a union officer and as a crew leader of a vital
division of the company. His actuations during the company's
Christmas Party on December 18, 2010, to our mind, could have
had negative repercussions for his employer had he been
allowed to stay on the job. His standing before those clients
who witnessed the incident and those who would hear of it
would surely be diminished, to the detriment of the company.
 Finally, we agree with the NLRC ruling that the company
failed to observe the two-notice requirement in employee
dismissals as Benitez was dismissed on the same day that the
memorandum was served on him. The verbal directive for him
to explain why he should not be dismissed, assuming that
there was indeed such a directive, clearly was not in
compliance with the law. Nonetheless, considering the gravity
of Benitez's offense, we deem it reasonable to award him
P30,000.00 in nominal damages for violation of his right to
procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with
modification. The award of nominal damages to Benitez is
reduced from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. The complaint
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
(Benitez v. Santa Fe Moving and Relocation Services/Vedit
|||

Kurangil, G.R. No. 208163, [April 20, 2015])

2. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 212054. March 11, 2015.]

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs.

MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision 2 dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated
April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
129108 which affirmed the Decision 4 dated November 19, 2012
and the Resolution 5 dated January 14, 2013 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 06-001858-12,
declaring the dismissal of respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez
(Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke's
Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was eventually
assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric Unit until her
termination on July 6, 2011 for her purported violation of SLMC's
Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1 on Acts of
Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation
of Funds. 6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011,
Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization Entrance/Exit
where she was subjected to the standard inspection procedure
by the security personnel. In the course thereof, the Security
Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG Manzanade), noticed a
pouch in her bag and asked her to open the same. 7 When opened,
said pouch contained the following assortment of medical stocks
which were subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4
pieces]; (b) Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3
pieces]; (d) Micropore [1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1
pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces];
and (h)Gloves [4 pieces] (questioned items). 8 Sanchez asked SG
Manzanade if she could just return the pouch inside the
treatment room; however, she was not allowed to do so. 9 Instead,
she was brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department
(IHSD) where she was directed to write an Incident Report
explaining why she had the questioned items in her
possession. 10 She complied 11 with the directive and also
submitted an undated handwritten letter of
apology 12 (handwritten letter) which reads as follows:
 To In-House Security,
I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my
bag. Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng
tawad sa aking pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay
nagkamali. Hindi ko po dapat dinala yung mga gamit
sa hospital. Hindi ko po alam kung [paano] ako
magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit alam kong
bawal ay nagawa kong makapag uwi ng gamit. Marami
pang gamit dahil sa naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong
makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli. Hindi ko na po
naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip kong magagamit ko
rin po pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at talagang
may kailangan. ITaCEc

Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo

ko ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa pagkuha ng gamit para sa
bagay na alam kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging
madamot, pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko
ang comfort ko keysa gumawa ng tama. Manikluhod po
akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga. 13

In a memorandum 14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs

Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised SLMC
of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly admitted that
she intentionally brought out the questioned items.
An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC Division
of Nursing 15 which thereafter served Sanchez a notice to
explain. 16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report
Addendum 17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the questioned
items came from the medication drawers of patients who had
already been discharged, and, as similarly practiced by the other
staff members, she started saving these items as excess stocks
in her pouch, along with other basic items that she uses during
her shift. 18 She then put the pouch inside the lowest drawer of
the bedside table in the treatment room for use in immediate
procedures in case replenishment of stocks gets delayed.
However, on the day of the incident, she failed to return the
pouch inside the medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored
pen and calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag.
Eventually, she forgot about the same as she got caught up in
work, until it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of
SMLC's premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive suspension
effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the investigation by
SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations Department
(ELRD) 19 which, thereafter, required her to explain why she
should not be terminated from service for "acts of dishonesty"
due to her possession of the questioned items in violation of
Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline. 20 In response,
she submitted a letter 21 dated June 13, 2011, which merely
reiterated her claims in her previous May 31, 2011 letter. She
likewise requested for a case conference, 22 which SLMC
granted. 23 After hearing her side, SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed
Sanchez of its decision to terminate her employment effective
closing hours of July 6, 2011. 24 This prompted her to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as
NLRC NCR Case No. 07-11042-11.
In her position paper, 25 Sanchez maintained her innocence,
claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the SLMC's
premises the questioned items since she merely inadvertently
left the pouch containing them in her bag as she got caught up in
work that day. She further asserted that she could not be found
guilty of pilferage since the questioned items found in her
possession were neither SLMC's nor its employees' property. She
also stressed the fact that SLMC did not file any criminal charges
against her. Anent her supposed admission in her handwritten
letter, she claimed that she was unassisted by counsel when she
executed the same and, thus, was inadmissible for being
unconstitutional. 26
For its part, 27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly
dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in violation
of Section 1, 28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline, 29 which
punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery, theft, pilferage, and
misappropriation of funds, with termination from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled
that Sanchez was validly dismissed 31 for intentionally taking the
property of SLMC's clients for her own personal benefit, 32 which
constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided under SLMC's Code
of Discipline.HEDCAS

According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her

attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to her
out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous to
serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss her. 33 The
fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her co-
employees' property was not found by the LA to be material since
the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides that acts of
dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its employees, as
well as its customers, are punishable by a penalty of termination
from service. 34 To this, the LA opined that "[i]t is rather illogical
to distinguish the persons with whom the [said] acts may be
committed as SLMC is also answerable to the properties of its
patients." 35 Moreover, the LA observed that Sanchez was aware
of SLMC's strict policy regarding the taking of hospital/medical
items as evidenced by her handwritten letter, 36 but nonetheless
committed the said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that
SLMC's non-filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not
preclude a determination of her serious misconduct, considering
that the filing of a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct
from the determination of just cause for termination of
employment. 37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed 38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision 39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed and
set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a
unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks or
"hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the
Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC management
for a long time. 40 The NLRC held that while Sanchez expressed
remorse for her misconduct in her handwritten letter, she
manifested that she only "hoarded" the questioned items for
future use in case their medical supplies are depleted, and not
for her personal benefit. 41 It further held that SLMC failed to
establish that Sanchez was motivated by ill-will when she
brought out the questioned items, noting: ( a) the testimony of SG
Manzanade during the conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's
demeanor when she was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya
masyado nataranta," 42and her consequent offer to return the
pouch; 43 and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath
the bag. 44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the punishment of
dismissal was too harsh and the one (1) month preventive
suspension already imposed on and served by Sanchez was the
appropriate penalty. 45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her
reinstatement, and the payment of backwages, other benefits,
and attorney's fees. 46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration 47 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution 48 dated January 14, 2013. Thus, it
filed a petition for certiorari 49 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the
NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its discretion in
finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious
misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her
possession were not SLMC property since said items were paid
for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material or
economic damage on SLMC's part; ( b) the retention of excess
medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst nurses in
the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; ( c) it was
illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since she
would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's lack of
intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by her composed
demeanor upon apprehension and offer to return the pouch to the
treatment room; and (e) had SLMC honestly believed that
Sanchez committed theft or pilferage, it should have filed the
appropriate criminal case, but failed to do so. 51 Moreover, while
the CA recognized that SLMC had the management prerogative to
discipline its erring employees, it, however, declared that such
right must be exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only
impose penalties commensurate with the degree of infraction.
Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's actions
were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful objective, the
penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly oppressive and
disproportionate to her offense. 52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration, 53 but was denied
in a Resolution 54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this petition.
DaTICc

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was
illegally dismissed by SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment,
aptly called "management prerogative," gives employers the
freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best
judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignment,
working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and
the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. 55 In this light,
courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions
of employers. In fact, labor laws discourage interference in
employers' judgment concerning the conduct of their business. 56
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper
for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain
disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to assure that
the same would be complied with. At the same time, the
employee has the corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules,
orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or intentional
disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of
the contract of service and the dismissal of the
employee. 57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor
Code provides: 58
Article 296. Termination by Employer. — An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his work;
xxx xxx xxx

Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground,

the employer's orders, regulations, or instructions must be:
(1) reasonable and lawful, (2)sufficiently known to the employee,
and (3) in connection with the duties which the employee has
been engaged to discharge." 59
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez was
validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline,
which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., "theft,
pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, . . . or its attempt
in any form or mannerfrom the hospital, co-employees, doctors,
visitors, [and] customers (external and internal)" with termination
from employment. 60 Such act is obviously connected with
Sanchez's work, who, as a staff nurse, is tasked with the proper
stewardship of medical supplies. Significantly, records show that
Sanchez made a categorical admission 61 in her handwritten
letter 62 — i.e., "[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong
[makapag-uwi] ng gamit" 63 — that despite her knowledge of its
express prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still
knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It is
apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the
taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
manner) considering that the intent to gain may be reasonably
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property appertaining
to another. 64 Note that Section 1, Rule 1 of the SLMC Code of
Discipline is further supplemented by the company policy
requiring the turn-over of excess medical supplies/items for
proper handling 65 and providing a restriction on taking and
bringing such items out of the SLMC premises without the proper
authorization or "pass" from the official concerned, 66 which
Sanchez was equally aware thereof. 67Nevertheless, Sanchez
failed to turn-over the questioned items and, instead, "hoarded"
them, as purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject of
this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to the
employee, and evidently connected with the latter's work, the
Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just
cause. EScaIT

On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no

competent basis to support the common observation of the NLRC
and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a
tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While
there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it appears that such
acts were — in similar fashion — furtively made and the items
secretly kept, as any excess items found in the concerned
nurse's possession would have to be confiscated. 68 Hence, the
fact that no one was caught and/or sanctioned for transgressing
the prohibition therefor does not mean that the so-called
"hoarding" practice was tolerated by SLMC. Besides, whatever
maybe the justification behind the violation of the company rules
regarding excess medical supplies is immaterial since it has
been established that an infraction was deliberately
committed. 69 Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or disobedience
of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it may
encourage him or her to do even worse and will render a mockery
of the rules of discipline that employees are required to
observe. 70
Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not
suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the
charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee's
liability. 71 Neither is SLMC's non-filing of the appropriate criminal
charges relevant to this analysis. An employee's guilt or
innocence in a criminal case is not determinative of the
existence of a just or authorized cause for his or her
dismissal. 72 It is well-settled that conviction in a criminal case is
not necessary to find just cause for termination of
employment, 73 as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving
an employee arising from the same infraction are separate and
distinct proceedings which should not arrest any judgment from
one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez
was for a just cause, supported by substantial evidence, and is
therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any
substantial bases, the NLRC issued a patently and grossly
erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which,
in turn, means that the CA erred when it affirmed the same. In
consequence, the grant of the present petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's Decision
dated May 27, 2012 in NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding
respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to have been validly
dismissed by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
(St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 212054,
|||

[March 11, 2015])

3. FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 157633. September 10, 2014.]

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. MA.

CONCEPCION M. DEL ROSARIO, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

Under review is the decision promulgated on June 21,

2002, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by Northwest Airlines, Inc. to assail
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction the adverse decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Antecedents
Petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. employed respondent Ma.
Concepcion M. Del Rosario on December 10, 1994 as one of its
Manila-based flight attendants. On May 18, 1998, Del Rosario was
assigned at the Business Class Section of Northwest Flight NW
26 bound for Japan. During the boarding preparations, Kathleen
Gamboa, another flight attendant assigned at the First Class
Section of Flight NW 26, needed to borrow a wine bottle opener
from her fellow attendants because her wine bottle opener was
dull. Vivien Francisco, Gamboa's runner, went to the Business
Class Section to borrow a wine bottle opener from Del Rosario,
but the latter remarked that any flight attendant who could not
bring a wine bottle opener had no business working in the First
Class Section. Upon hearing this, Aliza Ann Escaño, another flight
attendant, offered her wine bottle opener to Francisco.
Apparently, Gamboa overheard Del Rosario's remarks, and later
on verbally confronted her. Their confrontation escalated into a
heated argument. Escaño intervened but the two ignored her,
prompting her to rush outside the aircraft to get Maria Rosario D.
Morales, the Assistant Base Manager, to pacify them.
The parties differed on what happened thereafter. Del Rosario
claimed that only an animated discussion had transpired
between her and Gamboa, but Morales insisted that it was more
than an animated discussion, recalling that Del Rosario had even
challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan). Morales asserted
that she had tried to pacify Del Rosario and Gamboa, but the two
did not stop; that because the two were still arguing although the
Business Class passengers were already boarding, she ordered
them out of the plane and transfer to another nearby Northwest
aircraft; that she inquired from them about what had happened,
and even asked if they were willing to fly on the condition that
they would have to stay away from each other during the entire
flight; that because Del Rosario was not willing to commit herself
to do so, she decided not to allow both of them on Flight NW 26,
and furnished them a Notice of Removal from Service (effectively
informing Del Rosario of her dismissal from the service pending
an investigation of the fighting incident between her and
Gamboa).
On May 19, 1998, Morales sent a letter to Del Rosario telling her
that Northwest would conduct an investigation of the incident
involving her and Gamboa. The investigation was held on May 28,
1998 before Atty. Ceazar Veneracion III, Northwest's Legal
Counsel and Head of its Human Resources Department. All the
parties attended the investigation.
On June 19, 1998, Del Rosario was informed of her termination
from the service. Northwest stated that based on the results of
the investigation, Del Rosario and Gamboa had engaged in a fight
on board the aircraft, even if there had been no actual physical
contact between them; and that because fighting was strictly
prohibited by Northwest to the point that fighting could entail
dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time,
Northwest considered her dismissal from the service justified
and in accordance with the Rules of Conduct for Employees, as
follows:
Section 1, General
 . . . . Rule infractions will be dealt with according to the
seriousness of the offense and violators will be subjected
to appropriate disciplinary action up to and including
discharge. Some acts of misconduct, even if committed
for the first time, are so serious that, standing alone, they
justify immediate discharge. Some examples of these
offenses are violations of rules regarding theft, alcohol
and drugs, insubordination,
dishonesty, fighting, falsification of records, sleeping on
the job, failure to cooperate or lying in a Company
investigation, intentional destruction or abuse of property,
threatening, intimidating or interfering with other
employees, abuse of nonrevenue and reduced rate travel
privileges and unauthorized use of Company
communications systems. HcaATE

xxx xxx xxx

Section 24 (c), Disturbing Others, which states that:
Harassing, threatening, intimidating, assaulting, fighting
or provoking a fight or similar interference with other
employees at any time, on or off duty is prohibited."(Italics
supplied)

Del Rosario subsequently filed her complaint for illegal dismissal

against Northwest. 2
Decision of the Labor Arbiter
In her decision dated January 18, 1999, 3 Labor Arbiter Teresita D.
Castillon-Lora ruled in favor of Northwest, holding that the
dismissal of Del Rosario had been justified and valid upon taking
into account that Northwest had been engaged in the airline
business in which a good public image had been demanded, and
in which flight attendants had been expected to maintain an
image of sweetness and amiability; that fighting among its
employees even in the form of heated arguments or discussions
were very contradictory to that expected image; 4 and that it
could validly dismiss its employees like the respondent because
it had been entitled to protect its business interests by putting
up an impeccable image to the public.
 Ruling of the NLRC
Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
and ruled in favor of Del Rosario, declaring that the incident
between her and Gamboa could not be considered as
synonymous with fighting as the activity prohibited by
Northwest's Rules of Conduct; that based on Black's Law
Dictionary, fight referred to a hostile encounter, affray, or
altercation; a physical or verbal struggle for victory, pugilistic
combat; that according to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, fighting did
not necessarily imply that both parties should exchange blows,
for it was sufficient that they voluntarily put their bodies in
position with that intent; 5 and that the incident between Del
Rosario and Gamboa could not be held similar to the fight that
Northwest penalized under its Rules of Conduct.
The NLRC further ratiocinated as follows:
Evident in the definition of fighting is the existence of an
underlying hostility between the parties which is so
intense that there is an imminent danger of a physical
conflict (if there is none yet). In other words, when we say
two people are fighting, at the very least, they should
project a general appearance of wanting to physically
strike each other. Was this the image that appellant and FA
Gamboa projected when they were facing each other
during the incident of May 18, 1998[?] We do not think so.
. . . Almost unanimously, the witnesses of NWA refer to the
incident as "arguing" or a "serious or animated
discussion." An argument is an effort to establish belief by
a course of reasoning (Bouvier's Law Dictionary). In
ordinary parlance, arguing is merely talking or debating
about a certain issue. There are no underpinnings of
animosity in the discussion nor (sic) between the parties.
These witnesses never saw any hostility between the
appellant and FA Gamboa. Neither did they see these two
ladies wanting to strike each other. What they saw were
two FAs engaged in an animated verbal exchange, arguing
but not fighting. 6
The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of Del Rosario to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and with payment of
backwages, per diems, other lost income and benefits from June
19, 1998; as well as the payment of attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the monetary award.
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, Northwest elevated the adverse decision of the NLRC
to the CA on certiorari, averring that the NLRC thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, and submitting that Del Rosario's dismissal
from the service had been for a just cause, with the evidence
presented against her being more than sufficient to substantiate
its position that there had really been a fight between her and
Gamboa; and that the NLRC likewise gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Del Rosario and the
payment of her backwages and attorney's fees.
As stated, the CA sustained the NLRC through its decision
promulgated on June 21, 2002, observing that Northwest did not
discharge its burden to prove not merely reversible error but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC; and that, indeed, the NLRC
had correctly held that Del Rosario's conduct did not constitute
serious misconduct, because the NLRC, in determining the usual,
ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the
wordfighting, had resorted to authoritative lexicons that
supported its conclusion that the exchange of words between Del
Rosario and Gamboa did not come within the definition of the
word fighting. 7
The CA disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition
is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the NLRC dated
January 11, 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION that in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner
is ordered to pay private respondent separation pay
equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service
plus full backwages without deduction or qualification,
 counted from the date of dismissal until finality of this
decision including other benefits to which she is entitled
under the law. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay
respondent Del Rosario attorney's fees consisting of five
(5%) percent of the adjudged relief.
SO ORDERED. 8

Issues
The issues are the following, namely: (1) Was Del Rosario's
dismissal from the service valid?; and (2) Were the monetary
awards appropriate?
Ruling
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.
As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may
terminate an employee for a just cause, to wit:
Art. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. —
An employer may terminate an employee for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. cHEATI

Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds

of serious misconduct and willful disobedience. Misconduct
refers to the improper or wrong conduct that transgresses some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment. But misconduct or
improper behavior, to be a just cause for termination of
employment, must: (a) be serious; (b) relate to the performance
of the employee's duties; and (c) show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer. 9
There is no doubt that the last two elements of misconduct were
present in the case of Del Rosario. The cause of her dismissal
related to the performance of her duties as a flight attendant,
and she became unfit to continue working for Northwest.
Remaining to be determined is, therefore, whether the
misconduct was serious as to merit Del Rosario's dismissal. In
that respect, the fight between her and Gamboa should be so
serious that it entailed the termination of her employment even if
it was her first offense. Northwest insists that what transpired on
May 18, 1998 between her and Gamboa was obviously a form
of fight that it strictly prohibited, but Del Rosario disputes this by
contending that it was only an animated discussion between her
and Gamboa. She argues that as settled in American
jurisprudence fightpertained to combat or battle, like the hostile
encounter or engagement between opposing forces, suggesting
primarily the notion of a brawl or unpremeditated encounter, or of
a pugilistic combat; 10 while argument was a connected discourse
based upon reason, or a course of reasoning tending and
intended to establish a position and to induce belief. 11
In several rulings where the meaning of fight was decisive, the
Court has observed that the term fight was considered to be
different from the term argument. In People v. Asto, 12 for
instance, the Court characterized fight as not just a merely
verbal tussle but a physical combat between two opposing
parties, to wit:
Well into their second bottle of gin, at about eleven o'clock
that morning, Fernando Aquino and Peregrino had a verbal
tussle. Fernando Aquino declared that he was going to run
for councilor of Alcala, Pangasinan. Peregrino countered
 by saying: "If you will run for that post, cousin, I will fight
you." After a brief exchange of words,Fernando Aquino,
laughing, went to sit beside Abagat. As Aquino continued
with his mirth, Abagat stared at Peregrino with contempt.
. . . . A few minutes later, he heard a commotion in the
plantation some two hundred meters away. He claims to
have seen several people fighting each other with pieces
of wood but did not go to the field to check what was
happening. 13 (Italics supplied.)

Similarly, in Pilares, Sr. v. People, 14 fight was held to be more

than just an exchange of words that usually succeeded the
provocation by either party, thus:
When the petitioner was about to hand over the bottles of
beer to the private complainant, the latter called him
"coward" and dared him to get out for a fight. Insulted, the
petitioner went out of his store and chased the private
complainant. (Italics supplied.)

Based on the foregoing, the incident involving Del Rosario and

Gamboa could not be justly considered as akin to
the fight contemplated by Northwest. In the eyes of the NLRC,
Del Rosario and Gamboa were arguing but not fighting. The
understanding of fight as one that required physical combat was
absent during the incident of May 18, 1998. Moreover, the claim of
Morales that Del Rosario challenged Gamboa to a
brawl (sabunutan) could not be given credence by virtue of its
being self-serving in favor of Northwest, and of its being an
apparent afterthought on the part of Morales during the
investigation of the incident, without Del Rosario having the
opportunity to contest Morales' statement. In that context, the
investigation then served only as Northwest's means to establish
that the grounds of a valid dismissal based on serious
misconduct really existed.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind
of fight prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct, the same
could not be considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del
Rosario's dismissal from the service. The gravity of
the fight, which was not more than a verbal argument between
them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwest's public
image.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the CA properly ruled that
the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by declaring Del Rosario's dismissal
unjustified. Northwest as the petitioner for certiorari must
demonstrate grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC. Grave abuse of
discretion, according to De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, 15 "must be grave, which means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious
or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."
Alas, Northwest did not show how the NLRC could have abused
its discretion, let alone gravely, in ruling adversely against it.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 21, 2002; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 157633,
|||

[September 10, 2014])

4. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208908. March 11, 2015.]

 THE COFFEE BEAN and TEA LEAF PHILIPPINES, INC.
and WALDEN CHU, petitioners, vs. ROLLY P.
ARENAS, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J :
p

We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the challenge

to the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision 2 dated March 26, 2013 and
resolution 3 dated August 30, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 117822.
These assailed CA rulings affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commission's (NLRC) decision 4 dated August 13, 2010, which
also affirmed the Labor Arbiter's (LA) February 28, 2010 decision.
The Antecedent Facts
On April 1, 2008, the Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf Philippines, Inc.
(CBTL) hired Rolly P. Arenas (Arenas) to work as a "barista" at its
Paseo Center Branch. His principal functions included taking
orders from customers and preparing their ordered food and
beverages. 5 Upon signing the employment contract, 6 Arenas was
informed of CBTL's existing employment policies.
To ensure the quality of its crew's services, CBTL regularly
employs a "mystery guest shopper" who poses as a customer, for
the purpose of covertly inspecting the baristas' job
performance. 7
In April 2009, a mystery guest shopper at the Paseo Center
Branch submitted a report stating that on March 30, 2009, Arenas
was seen eating non-CBTL products at CBTL's al fresco dining
area while on duty. As a result, the counter was left empty
without anyone to take and prepare the customers' orders. 8
On another occasion, or on April 28, 2009, Katrina Basallo
(Basallo), the duty manager of CBTL, conducted a routine
inspection of the Paseo Center Branch. While inspecting the
store's products, she noticed an iced tea bottle being chilled
inside the bin where the ice for the customers' drinks is stored;
thus, she called the attention of the staff on duty. When asked,
Arenas muttered, "kaninong iced tea?" and immediately picked
the bottle and disposed it outside the store. 9
After inspection, Basallo prepared a store manager's report
which listed Arenas' recent infractions, as follows:
1. Leaving the counter unattended and eating chips in
an unauthorized area while on duty (March 30,
2009);
2. Reporting late for work on several occasions (April
1, 3 and 22); andTAHcCI

3. Placing an iced tea bottle in the ice bin despite

having knowledge of company policy prohibiting
the same (April 28, 2009). 10
Based on the mystery guest shopper and duty manager's reports,
Arenas was required to explain his alleged violations. However,
CBTL found Arenas' written explanation unsatisfactory, hence
CBTL terminated his employment. 11
Arenas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. After due
proceedings, the LA ruled in his favor, declaring that he had been
illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA's
decision.
CBTL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
CBTL insisted that Arenas' infractions amounted to serious
misconduct or willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of
duties, and breach of trust and confidence. To support these
allegations, CBTL presented Arenas' letter 12 where he admitted
his commission of the imputed violations.
On March 26, 2013, the CA issued its decision dismissing the
petition. The CA ruled that Arenas' offenses fell short of the
required legal standards to justify his dismissal; and that these
do not constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience, and
gross negligence, to merit his termination from service. The CA
denied CBTL's motion for reconsideration opening the way for
this present appeal via a petition for review on certiorari.
The main issue before us is whether CBTL illegally dismissed
Arenas from employment.
The Petition
CBTL argues that under the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, Arenas agreed to abide and comply with
CBTL's policies, procedures, rules and regulations, as provided
for under CBTL's table of offenses and penalties and/or employee
handbook. 13 CBTL cites serious misconduct as the primary
reason for terminating Arenas' employment. CBTL also imputes
dishonesty on the part of Arenas for not immediately admitting
that he indeed left his bottled iced tea inside the ice bin.
Our Ruling
We DENY the petition.
As a rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA does not assess and weigh each piece of evidence
introduced in the case. The CA only examines the factual findings
of the NLRC to determine whether its conclusions are supported
by substantial evidence, whose absence points to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 14 In the
case of Mercado v. AMA Computer College, 15 we emphasized
that:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess
and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The
query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering
its decision. . . . 16 [Italics supplied]

Our review of the records shows that the CA did not err in
affirming the LA and the NLRC's rulings. No grave abuse of
discretion tainted these rulings, thus, the CA's decision also
warrants this Court's affirmation. The infractions which Arenas
committed do not justify the application of the severe penalty of
termination from service.
First, Arenas was found eating non-CBTL products inside the
store's premises while on duty. Allegedly, he left the counter
unattended without anyone to entertain the incoming customers.
Second, he chilled his bottled iced tea inside the ice bin, in
violation of CBTL's sanitation and hygiene policy. CBTL argues
that these violations constitute willful disobedience, thus
meriting dismissal from employment.
We disagree with CBTL.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these
two elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct
must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. 17
Tested against these standards, it is clear that Arenas' alleged
infractions do not amount to such a wrongful and perverse
attitude. Though Arenas may have admitted these wrongdoings,
these do not amount to a wanton disregard of CBTL's company
policies. As Arenas mentioned in his written explanation, he was
on a scheduled break when he was caught eating at CBTL's al
fresco dining area. During that time, the other service crews
were the one in charge of manning the counter. Notably, CBTL's
employee handbook imposes only the penalty of written
warning for the offense of eating non-CBTL products inside the
store's premises.
CBTL also imputes gross and habitual neglect of duty to Arenas
for coming in late in three separate instances.
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of, or failure to
exercise even a slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. 18 There is habitual neglect if
based on the circumstances, there is a repeated failure to
perform one's duties for a period of time. 19
IaHDcT
In light of the foregoing criteria, we rule that Arenas' three
counts of tardiness cannot be considered as gross and habitual
neglect of duty. The infrequency of his tardiness already removes
the character of habitualness. These late attendances were also
broadly spaced out, negating the complete absence of care on
Arenas' part in the performance of his duties. Even CBTL
admitted in its notice to explain that this violation does not merit
yet a disciplinary action and is only an aggravating circumstance
to Arenas' other violations. 20
To further justify Arenas' dismissal, CBTL argues that he
committed serious misconduct when he lied about using the ice
bin as cooler for his bottled iced tea. Under CBTL's employee
handbook, dishonesty, even at the first instance, warrants the
penalty of termination from service. 21
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for
dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that
the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer. 22
However, the facts on record reveal that there was no active
dishonesty on the part of Arenas. When questioned about who
placed the bottled iced tea inside the ice bin, his immediate
reaction was not to deny his mistake, but to remove the bottle
inside the bin and throw it outside. More importantly, when he
was asked to make a written explanation of his action, he
admitted that the bottled iced tea was his.
Thus, even if there was an initial reticence on Arenas' part, his
subsequent act of owing to his mistake only shows the absence
of a deliberate intent to lie or deceive his CBTL superiors. On this
score, we conclude that Arenas' action did not amount to serious
misconduct.
Moreover, the imputed violations of Arenas, whether taken singly
or as a whole, do not necessitate the imposition of the strict and
harsh penalty of dismissal from service. The LA, NLRC and the
CA all consistently ruled that these offenses are not grave
enough to qualify as just causes for dismissal. Factual findings of
the labor tribunals especially if affirmed by the CA must be given
great weight, and merit the Court's respect.
As a final remark, we note that petitioner Walden Chu ( Chu)
should not be held jointly and severally liable with CBTL for
Arenas' adjudged monetary awards. The LA and the NLRC ruled
for their solidary liability but the CA failed to dispose this issue in
its decision.
A corporation is a juridical entity with a legal personality
separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and,
in general, from the people comprising it. 23Thus, as a general
rule, an officer may not be held liable for the corporation's labor
obligations unless he acted with evident malice and/or bad faith
in dismissing an employee. 24
In the present case, there was no showing of any evident malice
or bad faith on Chu's part as CBTL's president. His participation
in Arenas' termination was not even sufficiently alleged and
argued. Hence, he cannot be held solidarily liable for CBTL's
liabilities to Arenas.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we
hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion in its decision of March
26, 2013 and its resolution of August 30, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No.
117822, except with respect to the liability of petitioner Walden
Chu. We thus absolve petitioner Walden Chu from paying in his
personal capacity the monetary awards of respondent Rolly P.
Arenas. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(The Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf Philippines, Inc. v. Arenas, G.R.
|||

No. 208908, [March 11, 2015])

5. FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 208890. December 8, 2014.]

JOEL N. MONTALLANA, petitioner, vs. LA

CONSOLACION COLLEGE MANILA, SR. IMELDA A.
MORA, and ALBERT D. MANALILI, respondents.
*

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the

Decision 2 dated May 31, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated August
30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127988
which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated July 31, 2012
and the Resolution 5 dated October 16, 2012 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 02-000556-12,
finding petitioner Joel N. Montallana (Montallana) to have been
terminated from employment by respondent La Consolacion
College Manila (La Consolacion) for a just and legal cause.
The Facts
Montallana was a faculty member of La Consolacion's College of
Arts and Sciences. 6
On January 16, 2009, Mrs. Nerissa D. Del Fierro-Juan (Juan), the
Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and the
immediate superior of Montallana, filed a formal administrative
complaint 7 with La Consolacion 8 against Montallana, charging
him of: (a) oral defamation (or slander); (b) disorderly conduct in
the school premises; and (c) discourteous/indecent behavior or
using profane or obscene language in addressing co-employees,
superiors, or anybody within the school premises.9
The said complaint arose from an incident that occurred in the
faculty room on January 12, 2009 while Dean's Secretary Ann
Ruiz (Ruiz) and student assistant Kathlyn Saez (Saez) were
numbering the lockers, pursuant to a policy implemented by
Juan. 10 At that time, Montallana was conversing with a co-faculty
member, Dr. Beatriz V. Pabito (Pabito), when the latter asked Ruiz
and Saez what they were doing. 11 Upon learning of the re-
assignment of lockers of faculty members through drawing of
lots, Pabito commented, saying "para naman tayong bata
nyan," 12 to which Montallana followed suit and, in a loud voice,
remarked "oo nga naman para tayong mga grade one nyan, anong
kabubuhan ng grade one yan." 13 Juan heard Montallana's remark
and confronted him, resulting in a heated altercation that ended
with the latter walking out of the room while Juan was still
talking to him. 14
After due investigation, La Consolacion's fact-finding committee
found Montallana guilty of serious misconduct in making
derogatory and insulting remarks about his superior, aggravated
by the fact that he made such remarks in a loud voice so that
Juan would hear them. 15 While noting that the foregoing may be
considered as a just cause for Montallana's termination, the
committee observed that it was his first offense and stressed on
the reformative and redemptive facets of the case. 16 In fine,
Montallana was only meted the penalty of suspension without
pay for a period of two (2) months and directed him to submit a
written public apology to Juan in a tenor satisfactory to her and
La Consolacion's Human Resource Department (HRD). 17 SDHAcI

In a letter 18 dated April 22, 2009, Montallana sought

reconsideration of his suspension and explained that a written
public apology was inappropriate at that time in view of the
pendency of a criminal complaint 19 for grave oral defamation
filed by Juan against him before the City Prosecutor's Office. He
mentioned that his issuance of a written public apology while the
criminal case was being heard might incriminate himself, adding
too that it was his lawyer who advised him to invoke his right
against self-incrimination. 20
The request having been denied by La Consolacion's President,
respondent Sr. Imelda A. Mora (Mora), in her letter 21 dated May
12, 2009, Montallana filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
unfair labor practice, with prayer for payment of salaries during
the period of suspension, and moral and exemplary damages
against respondents La Consolacion and Mora before the NLRC,
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 05-07667-09 (illegal suspension
case). 22
In a Decision 23 dated April 15, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled
in favor of Montallana, holding that his actions did not constitute
serious misconduct. 24 Hence, Montallana's suspension from
employment was declared illegal and respondents La
Consolacion and Mora were ordered to pay Montallana the
amount of P48,000.00 as his salary during the period of
suspension. 25
On appeal, 26 however, the NLRC disagreed 27 with the findings of
the LA and found Montallana's acts to be constitutive of serious
misconduct and against the rule of honor and decency expected
of any teacher. 28 While it found sufficient basis to impose the
penalty of termination, the NLRC nonetheless sustained the two
(2)-month suspension in deference to the school's prerogative to
discipline its employees. 29 Montallana moved for
reconsideration 30 but was denied by the NLRC in a
Decision 31dated February 7, 2011. Montallana no longer elevated
the matter to the CA and the NLRC's decision became final and
executory on February 28, 2011. 32
Thereafter, on June 1, 2011, La Consolacion, through its HRD
Director, respondent Albert D. Manalili (Manalili), directed
Montallana to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed
for failure to submit his written public apology which formed part
of the disciplinary sanction that was sustained with finality by
the NLRC. 33
In a letter 34 dated June 9, 2011, Montallana begged for La
Consolacion's indulgence, explaining that he had no intention of
defying the directive to submit a written public apology and that
his inability to comply therewith was, to reiterate, only in view of
the pendency of the criminal case against him. He, nonetheless,
expressed his willingness to comply with the directive once the
said case was resolved with finality. Finding Montallana's written
explanation unsatisfactory, Manalili terminated him from work on
June 13, 2011. 35
Asserting that his dismissal for failure to submit a written public
apology was unjustified and was, in fact, connected to his
position as an officer of La Consolacion's newly formed and
recognized Union, Montallana filed a complaint 36 for illegal
dismissal with money claims against respondents La
Consolacion, Mora, and Manalili (respondents), docketed as NLRC
NCR Case No. 06-09263-11.
In respondents' defense, 37 they contended that since the
directive to apologize was part of the penalty imposed on
Montallana, his refusal and/or failure to comply merited further
sanctions. 38 They denied having dismissed Montallana for his
union activities, pointing out that even the Union President
agreed to his suspension for his misbehavior. 39
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 40 dated November 14, 2011, the LA dismissed
Montallana's complaint, holding that his refusal to apologize — in
light of his chosen profession as a teacher and La Consolacion's
right to maintain a certain standard of behavior among its
faculty, who serve as models for its students — was tantamount
to serious misconduct and, hence, warranted his
termination. 41 In this relation, the LA found Montallana's reason
for refusing to apologize as invalid, observing that no evidence
was adduced to establish the existence of the criminal case
mentioned in his letters of explanation, and that even if there
was one, the case was strictly between Montallana and Juan and
not the concern of the respondents. 42
Aggrieved, Montallana filed an appeal 43 before the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision 44 dated July 31, 2012, the NLRC reversed and set
aside the LA's verdict, and thus, ordered respondents to reinstate
Montallana and to pay him backwages from the time he was
illegally dismissed up to his reinstatement. IDSETA
It ruled that Montallana's failure to submit a written public
apology was not an open defiance of respondents' order since he
even begged for the latter's indulgence, believing that the
issuance of a letter of apology would incriminate him in the on-
going criminal case filed by Juan. 45 To this, the NLRC added that
Montallana did not question his superiors' orders as he, in fact,
expressed his willingness to abide by the same, but only at a
later appropriate time. 46 Further, the NLRC observed that since
Montallana had already been suspended from work without pay,
respondents should have accorded him more consideration and
compassion to his plight. 47Thus, it ruled Montallana's dismissal
to be too severe a penalty and ordered respondents to reinstate
him to his former position without loss of seniority and to pay him
backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to his
reinstatement. 48
Respondents moved for reconsideration, 49 asserting that the
failure to comply with their directive to apologize constituted
insubordination which is subject to disciplinary sanction under
the school's Administrative Affairs Manual. 50 They further
manifested that the criminal case filed against Montallana had
already been dismissed in a Resolution 51 dated March 5, 2010
and dropped from the prosecutor's list of cases on July 2,
2010, 52 or way before La Consolacion sent the June 1, 2011
directive to explain why he failed to comply with the required
written public apology. Consequently, it was pointed out that
Montallana was lying not only to respondents but also to the
NLRC. 53
Montallana, in response, claimed to have acquired a copy of the
prosecutor's March 5, 2010 Resolution only on September 11,
2012 and, in this regard, submitted his letter of apology to the
NLRC. 54
In a Resolution 55 dated October 16, 2012, the NLRC found that
Montallana belatedly received the prosecutor's March 5, 2010
Resolution only on September 11, 2012 and, hence, denied
respondents' motion. 56 This prompted the filing of a petition
for certiorari 57 before the CA.
 The CA Ruling
In a Decision 58 dated May 31, 2013, the CA gave due course to
respondents' petition and eventually reversed and set aside the
NLRC's Decision.
It found that Montallana deliberately refused to obey the
directive of the respondents to apologize and that the pendency
of the criminal case against him was not sufficient justification
to excuse him from compliance. It observed that the said
directive was an integral part of his punishment for serious
misconduct, which had already been sustained with finality by
the NLRC in the illegal suspension case. 59 Further, the CA agreed
with the LA that La Consolacion, as an educational institution,
has the right to maintain and expect a certain standard of
behavior from its faculty, as they serve as role models for its
students. 60 All told, the CA was satisfied that Montallana's
employment was terminated for a just and legal cause. 61
Dissatisfied, Montallana moved for reconsideration 62 which was
denied in a Resolution 63 dated August 30, 2013, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
Montallana's termination from work was lawful and justified.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
"Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work" is one of
the just causes to terminate an employee under Article
296 (a) (formerly Article 282 [a]) of the Labor Code.64 In order for
this ground to be properly invoked as a just cause for
dismissal, the conduct must be willful or intentional, willfulness
being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental
attitude. 65 In Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co.,
Inc., 66 "willfulness" was described as "attended by a wrongful
and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act
inconsistent with proper subordination." 67
It is well to stress that it is the employer who bears the burden of
proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just
cause — or any other authorized cause for that matter — forms
the basis of the employee's dismissal from work. 68 Failing in
which, the dismissal should be adjudged as illegal.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to prove, by substantial
evidence, that Montallana's non-compliance with respondents'
directive to apologize was "willful or intentional." The Court finds
itself in complete agreement with the NLRC that the
disobedience attributed to Montallana could not be justly
characterized as "willful" within the contemplation of Article 296
of the Labor Code, in the sense above-described.
As culled from the records, aside from the administrative
complaint filed by Juan against Montallana for his serious
misconduct, the former also filed a criminal complaint for grave
oral defamation for the utterances he made arising from the
same incident before the Manila City Prosecutor's Office. In the
honest belief that issuing a letter of apology would incriminate
him in the said criminal case — and upon the advice of his own
lawyer at that — Montallana wrote to respondents and voluntarily
communicated that he was willing to issue the required apology,
but only had to defer the same in view of his legal predicament.
As the Court sees it, the tenor of his letters, and the
circumstances under which they were taken, at the very least,
exhibited Montallana's good faith in dealing with respondents.
This, therefore, negates the theory that his failure to abide by
respondents' directive to apologize was attended by a "wrong
and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act
inconsistent with proper subordination," which would warrant his
termination from employment. aESTAI

It beckons clarification that respondents' submission of the

prosecutor's March 5, 2010 Resolution to show that Juan's
criminal complaint against Montallana was dismissed way earlier
than their June 1, 2011 directive to explain is not enough to show
that the latter took a willfully defiant attitude against a lawful
order, considering that no other evidence was presented to prove
that the said Resolution had already attained finality. In fact, as
pointed out by the NLRC, it was only on September 11, 2012 that
Montallana was able to obtain a copy of the prosecutor's March
5, 2010 Resolution, or long after he had already submitted his
letter of explanation on June 9, 2011. 69 Therefore, respondents'
assertion that Montallana had lied to them cannot be given any
credence.
Besides, even on the assumption that there was willful
disobedience, still, the Court finds the penalty of dismissal too
harsh. It bears to stress that not every case of insubordination or
willful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the
penalty of dismissal. 70 The penalty to be imposed on an erring
employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his
offense. 71 To the Court's mind, the case of an employee who is
compelled to apologize for a previous infraction but fails to do so
is not one which would properly warrant his termination, absent
any proof that the refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his
employer. While there is no question that teachers are held to a
peculiar standard of behavior in view of their significant role in
the rearing of our youth, educational institutions are, in the
meantime, held against a legal standard imposed against all
employers, among which, is the reservation of the ultimate
penalty of dismissal for serious infractions enumerated as just
causes under Article 296 of the Labor Code. Unfortunately,
respondents herein failed to prove the seriousness of
Montallana's omission by the evidentiary benchmark of
substantial evidence. And to add, on a related note, while La
Consolacion's Administrative Affairs Manual 72 discloses that acts
of insubordination (particularly, that of refusing or neglecting to
obey the school's lawful directive) are dismissible violations, they
are only so if imposed as a third sanction. In the same vein,
records are bereft of any showing that Montallana's failure to
apologize was being punished as such.
In fine, since respondents failed to prove, by substantial
evidence, that Montallana's dismissal was based on a just or
authorized cause under the Labor Code or was clearly warranted
under La Consolacion's Administrative Affairs Manual, the Court
rules that the dismissal was illegal. Consequently, the NLRC's
identical ruling, which was erroneously reversed by the CA
on certiorari, must be reinstated with the modification, however,
in that the order for respondents Mora and Manalili to pay
Montallana backwages 73 should be deleted. It is a rule that
personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers
attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of
the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross
negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of
interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders
or other persons; (b) they consent to the issuance of watered
down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written
objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves personally and
solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are made by
specific provision of law personally answerable for their
corporate action. 74 None of these circumstances, in so far as
Mora and Manalili are concerned, were shown to be present in
this case; hence, there is no reason for them to be held liable for
Montallana's backwages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May
31, 2013 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127988 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 31, 2012 and the
Resolution dated October 16, 2012 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 02-000556-12, declaring
petitioner Joel N. Montallana (Montallana) to have been illegally
dismissed, are REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting the
order for respondents Sr. Imelda A. Mora and Albert D. Manalili to
pay Montallana his backwages.
SO ORDERED.
 (Montallana v. La Consolacion College Manila, G.R. No. 208890,
|||

[December 8, 2014])

6. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189629. August 6, 2014.]

DR. PHYLIS C. RIO, petitioner, vs. COLEGIO DE STA.

ROSA-MAKATI and/or SR. MARILYN B.
GUSTILO, respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J :p

Before us is a Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated 21 May
2009 and Resolution 2 dated 18 September 2009 by the Honorable
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89502 which ruled on the
legality of the dismissal of petitioner Dr. Phylis C. Rio (petitioner).
The Facts
Petitioner was hired by respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa-Makati
as a part-time school physician in June 1993. Petitioner was
required to report for work for four (4) hours every week with a
salary of P12,640.00 per month.
In February 2002 or after almost ten (10) years of service,
petitioner received a Contract of Appointment from Sr. Marilyn B.
Gustilo (respondent Gustilo), Directress/Principal, requiring
petitioner to report from Monday to Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00
p.m., with a salary of P12,500.00 per month. Due to the
substantial change in the work schedule and decrease in her
salary, petitioner declined the Contract of Appointment.
On 24 June 2002, through a Memorandum from respondent
Gustilo, petitioner was informed of a new work schedule. The
Memorandum required petitioner to report daily during the work
week, to wit: Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays from 8:00 a.m. to
11:00 a.m.; Tuesdays and Thursdays at 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. IcHAaS

In opposition, petitioner wrote respondent Gustilo a letter

refusing the unilateral change in her work schedule. In response,
respondent Gustilo revised the new work schedule to every
Tuesdays from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.
In a letter dated 30 July 2002, respondent Gustilo charged
petitioner and Mrs. Neneth Alonzo (Alonzo), the school nurse, of
"grave misconduct, dishonesty and/or gross neglect of duty
detrimental not only to the school but, principally, to the health
and well-being of the pupils based on the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools and Section 94 (a) and (b) and Article 282 (a),
(b) and (c) of the Labor Code." In the same letter, petitioner and
Alonzo were preventively suspended for a period of thirty (30)
days, effective 30 July 2002.
Petitioner was made to answer for the following: (1) nine (9)
students have medical records for school years during which they
were not in the school yet, thus could not have been the subject
of medical examination/evaluation; (2) seventy-nine (79) students
of several classes/sections during certain school years were not
given any medical/health evaluation/examination; and (3) failure
to conduct medical/health examination on all students of several
classes of different grade levels for the school year 2001-2002. 3
Petitioner denied the charges through a letter to respondent on 2
August 2002. On 9 August 2002 petitioner filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal and illegal suspension against
respondents Colegio de Sta. Rosa-Makati and Gustilo before the
Labor Arbiter.
Respondent Gustilo would later file a criminal complaint for
falsification of private documents against petitioner before the
Makati Prosecutors Office on 6 February 2003.
To investigate the charges against petitioner, respondent Gustilo
created an investigation committee, which issued a
Memorandum, instructing petitioner to appear before it on 30
August 2002.
On 8 October 2002, upon the recommendation of the
investigation committee, the services of petitioner and Alonzo
were terminated for their grave misconduct, dishonesty and
gross neglect of duty. 4AaIDHS

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Upon the filing of the parties' respective Position Papers, Labor
Arbiter Manuel Manansala ruled in favor of petitioner and Alonzo,
declaring that they were illegally dismissed. The pertinent
portion of the disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa guilty
of illegal dismissal for the reasons above-
discussed.
2. Directing respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa to pay
complainants Dr. Phylis C. Rio the sum of
P259,836.27 and Neneth M. Alonzo the sum of
P746,360.49 representing their backwages and
severance pay for the reasons above-discussed
as computed by the Examination and
Computation Unit of this Arbitration Branch. . . .
3. Directing respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa to
immediately reinstate complainant Ma. Corazon
P. Cruz to her former position without loss of
seniority right with full backwages from the
time of her unjust dismissal up to the time of
her actual reinstatement. The initial backwages
of complainant Cruz is P281,655.77 . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
6. Reminding individual respondent Sr. Marilyn
Gustilo in her capacity as Directress/Principal
 of respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa to be
cautious in matters involving dismissal and/or
termination from employment of the personnel
of the school. 5

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC). Petitioner, however, filed an appeal only to
correct the computation of the award from P259,836.27 to
P323,036.27. AEIHaS

The Ruling of the NLRC

On 10 January 2005, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter and likewise denied petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration on 7 April 2005. 6According to the NLRC, "[i]t
must be stressed that complainants Rio and Alonzo were tasked
with responsibilities vital to the health and safety of students.
Their apparent lack of interest, concern and system in
performing these tasks could very well earn dismissal from the
service even if they had not preempted the school by filing
charges prematurely." 7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA,
which the CA denied. According to the CA,
assuming arguendo that petitioner's failure to conduct medical
examinations on the scheduled dates were due to disruptions of
various school activities, it only shows that petitioner is
incapable of performing the tasks required of her. 8
Our Ruling
Hence, this Petition for Review, which, while it presents the need
to look into the matter of petitioner's dismi ssal, goes into the
question of whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, this being
the issue in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA. The ruling in Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque
City, Inc. 9 citing Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co. 10 is
apropos:
 As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess
and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The
query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering
its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court
may examine and measure the factual findings of the
NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court has not hesitated to affirm the
appellate court's reversals of the decisions of labor
tribunals if they are not supported by substantial
evidence. [Underscoring supplied] aSCHIT

In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, 11 We laid down the

manner of review of the decisions of the CA in labor cases, as
follows:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the
assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for
jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions
of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling
for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in
the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined
the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in
the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether
the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.
In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA
undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the
NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach
that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a
labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did
the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
(Underscoring supplied)
Our discussion on the meaning of grave abuse of discretion in Yu
v. Judge Reyes-Carpio 12 citing Beluso v. Commission on
Elections 13 and J.L. Bernardo Construction v. CA 14 is instructive:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific
meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary
cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial
body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is
clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 can only strike an act down for having been done with
grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly
show that such act was patent and gross. . . . . IHcTDA

Petitioner failed to show that the NLRC exercised its judgment

capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of
passion and hostility. Such a showing is needed for a reversal of
the ruling of the CA here questioned.
In fact, the antecedents of the letter dated 30 July 2002 show
that respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa-Makati had enough reason
to, as it did, terminate the services of petitioner.
Based on Article 282 of the Labor Code,15 in relation to Section
94 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, 16 petitioner was legally dismissed on the ground of
gross inefficiency and incompetence, and negligence in the
keeping of school or student records, or tampering with or
falsification of records.
As we already held, gross inefficiency is closely related to gross
neglect because both involve specific acts of omission resulting
in damage to another. 17 Gross neglect of duty or gross
negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. 18
As borne by the records, petitioner's actions fall within the
purview of the above-definitions. Petitioner failed to diligently
perform her duties. It was unrefuted that: (1) there were dates
when a medical examination was supposed to have been
conducted and yet the dates fell on weekends; (2) failure to
conduct medical examination on all students for two (2) to five
(5) consecutive years; (3) lack of medical records on all students;
and (4) students having medical records prior to their
enrollment. EDHTAI

As her defense, petitioner maintains that the discrepancies were

due to the loss of the cabinet key, which was misplaced by Sr.
Zenaida, the person-in-charge. Because the cabinet, which
contains the official medical records, could not be opened,
Alonzo had to record the medical examinations temporarily. Due
to pressure and time constraints, Alonzo erroneously transferred
the entries of the medical examinations to the official records.
However, petitioner waited for two (2) years to finally have the
cabinet opened. As correctly found by the CA:
. . . If petitioner had been attentive to her work as she
claims, this cabinet could not have been left dormant for
two years as she would have been regularly updating her
records and checking on them. . . . Assuming that the
cabinet was indeed locked, the fact that she did not
bother to have it opened for two years only showed that
she had no need to use the files contained therein
because she had not been maintaining and updating the
medical records as she had not been performing her job
actively conducting routine physical examination on the
students as required of her. 19 . . .
The CA went further, stating, "even assuming that petitioner was
telling the truth, the fact remains that she had been grossly
inefficient and negligent for failing to provide a proper system of
maintaining and updating the students' medical records over the
years of her employment with respondent." Indeed, petitioner
was grossly inefficient and negligent in performing her duties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision dated 21 May 2009 and R esolution dated 18
September 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89502
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. acAIES

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

(Rio v. Colegio de Sta. Rosa-Makati, G.R. No. 189629, [August 6,
|||

2014])

7. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114129. October 24, 1996.]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
JEREMIAS G. CORTEZ, respondents.

Atilano S. Guevarra, Jr., Gil S. San Diego and Alfonso Y. Lacap for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Teotico R. Quevedo and Luis Y. Del Mundo, Jr. for private
respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES, ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND
RESPECT; EXCEPTION. — A perusal of the records shows that
there is a divergence of views between the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC regarding the validity of the dismissal of respondent by
petitioner. Although it is a legal tenet that factual findings of
administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and respect,
we are constrained to take a second look at the facts before us
because of the diversity in the opinions of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC.
2. ID.; ID.; SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS; NO PROBATIVE VALUE IF
NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY MEANS OF A DOCUMENT OR AN
AFFIDAVIT. — A meticulous perusal of Annex "12" readily shows
that the statement "he went into hiding as he was engaged in a
trouble with a neighbor" was merely a defense adduced by
respondent employee and is tantamount to an alibi. The said
defense only proved to be self-serving as the same had not been
fully substantiated by private respondent by means of a
document or an affidavit executed to attest to the alleged
incidents.
3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE,
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE; SCOPE. — This cause for
termination includes gross inefficiency, negligence and
carelessness. Such just causes are derived from the right of the
employer to select and engage his employees. For indeed,
regulation of manpower by the company clearly falls within the
ambit of management prerogative. This court had defined a valid
exercise of management prerogative as one which covers: hiring,
work assignment, working methods, time, place and manner of
work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal and
recall of workers. Except as provided for, or limited by, special
laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. Moreover,
this Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so
long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of
the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
under valid agreements.
4. ID.; ID.; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; COMPANY
INFRACTION; IT IS THE TOTALITY, NOT THE
COMPARTMENTALIZATION, OF SUCH INFRACTION THAT THE
EMPLOYEE HAD CONSISTENTLY COMMITTED WHICH JUSTIFIED
HIS PENALTY OF DISMISSAL. — The penchant of private
respondent to continually incur unauthorized absences and/or a
violation of petitioner's sick leave policy finally rendered his
dismissal as imminently proper. Private respondent cannot
expect compassion from this Court by totally disregarding his
numerous previous infractions and take into consideration only
the period covering August 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989. As
ruled by this Court in the cases of Mendoza vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, and National Service Corporation vs.
Leogardo, Jr., it is the totality, not the compartmentalization, of
such company infractions that private respondent had
consistently committed which justified his penalty of dismissal.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEE'S HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM WITHOUT
LEAVE; SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION FROM
SERVICE. — Habitual absenteeism should not and cannot be
tolerated by petitioner herein which is a public utility company
engaged in the business of distributing and selling electric
energy within its franchise areas and that the maintenance of
Meralco's distribution facilities (electric lines) by responding to
customer's complaints of power failure, interruptions, line
trippings and other line troubles is of paramount importance to
the consuming public. Hence, an employee's habitual
absenteeism without leave, which violated company rules and
regulations is sufficient cause to justify termination from service.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE AND HEARING; DOES
NOT ENTAIL FULL ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS. — Notice and
hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial
proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this
court. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side. As held in the case
of Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas vs. NLRC: ". . .
Actual adversarial proceedings becomes necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to unclear witnesses. This is a procedural right which
the employee must, however, ask for it is not an inherent right,
and summary proceedings may be conducted. This is to correct
the common but mistaken perception that procedural due
process entails lengthy oral arguments. Hearings in
administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies
are neither oratorical contests nor debating skirmishes where
cross examination skills are displayed, Non-verbal devices such
as written explanations, affidavits, position papers or other
pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely aggrieved
parties predicament or defense. What is essential, is ample
opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that
management must accord the employee to prepare adequately
for his defense." In this case, private respondent was given the
opportunity of a hearing as he was able to present his defense to
the charge against him. Unfortunately, petitioner found such
defense inexcusable. In other words, the fact that private
respondent was given the chance to air his side of the story
already suffices.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE; NOT APPLICABLE TO
AN EMPLOYEE DISMISSED DUE TO SERIOUS AND REPEATED
COMPANY INFRACTIONS. — Private respondent herein cannot
just rely on the social justice provisions of the Constitution and
appeal for compassion because he is not entitled to it due to his
serious and repeated company infractions which eventually led
to his dismissal.
AaSCTD

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J : p

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary

restraining order to set aside the Resolution of the First Division
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
September 30, 1993 (which reversed the Decision dated August
13, 1991 of Labor Arbiter Cresencio R. Iniego), and its Order
dated December 29, 1993 (which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration).
Private respondent Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr. was employed on
probationary status by petitioner Manila Electric Company
(Meralco) on September 15, 1975 as lineman-driver. Six months
later, he was regularized as a 3rd class lineman-driver assigned
at petitioner's North Distribution Division. In 1977, and until the
time of his dismissal, he worked as 1st class lineman-driver
whose duties and responsibilities among others, includes the
maintenance of Meralco's distribution facilities (electric lines) by
responding to customer's complaints of power failure,
interruptions, line trippings and other line troubles.
Characteristic, however, of private respondent's service with
petitioner is his perennial suspension from work, viz:
Date of Memorandum Penalty Meted/Description
a. May 25, 1977 — Suspension of five (5) working
days without pay for violation
of Company Code on Employee
Discipline, i.e., 'drinking of
alcoholic beverages during
working time . . .'
b. March 28, 1984 — Suspension of three (3) working
days without pay for failure or
refusal to report to J.F. Cotton
Hospital [where petitioner
maintains a medical clinic] as
instructed by a company
physician, while on sick leave.
c. June 13, 1984 — Suspension of ten (10) working
days without pay for un-
authorized extension of sick leave.
d. June 5, 1987 — Suspension of three (3) working
days without pay for failure or
refusal to report to J.F. Cotton
Hospital [where petitioner
maintains a medical clinic] as
instructed by a company
physician, while on sick leave.
[Private respondent failed to
report for work from Sept. 18,
1986 to Nov. 10, 1986].
e. December 16, 1988 — Preventive suspension for failure
to submit the required Medical
Certificate within 48 hours from
the first date of the sick leave.
[Private respondent failed to
report for work from Nov. 28,
1988 to the time such
Memorandum was issued on
December 16, 1988].
f. February 22, 1989 — After formal administrative
investigation, suspension of five
(5) working days without pay for
unauthorized absences on
November 28, 1988 to December
2, 1988. Absences from
December 9-19, 1988 were
charged to private respondent's
vacation leave credits for the
calendar year 1989.
g. May 30, 1989 — Suspension of ten (10) working
days without pay for un-
authorized absences from May
17-19, 1989, with warning that
penalty of dismissal will be
 imposed upon commission of
similar offense in the future. 1
Due to his numerous infractions, private respondent was
administratively investigated for violation of Meralco's Code on
Employee Discipline, particularly his repeated and unabated
absence from work without prior notice from his superiors
specifically from August 2 to September 19, 1989.
After such administrative investigation was conducted by
petitioner, it concluded that private respondent was found to
have grossly neglected his duties by not attending to his work as
lineman from Aug. 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989 without notice
to his superiors.
In a letter dated January 19, 1990, private respondent was
notified of the investigation result and consequent termination of
his services effective January 19, 1990, viz:

"Mr. Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr.

16 E Jacinto Street
Malabon, Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cortez:
Official findings of formal administrative investigation duly
conducted by the Company's Legal Services Department
established the following:
1. You incurred unauthorized and unexcused absences
from work starting August 2, 1989 up to September 9,
1989. On September 20, 1989, you were allowed to return
to work but without prejudice to the outcome of an
administrative investigation. By your unauthorized and
unexcused absences from work, you have grossly violated
Section 4, par. (e) of the Company Code on Employee
Discipline which prescribes '(u)nauthorized and unexcused
absences from work which exceed five (5) consecutive
working days penalized therein with dismissal of the
erring employees from the service and employ of the
Company.
 xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing instances plus your series of violations of
the sick leave policy clearly show your gross and habitual
neglect of duties and responsibilities in the Company, a
condition which is patently inimical to the interests of the
Company as a public utility vested with vital public
interests.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, and considering your series of
violations of the Company Code on Employee Discipline,
Management is constrained to dismiss you for causes
from the service and employ of the Company, as you are
hereby so dismissed effective January 19, 1990, with
forfeiture of all rights and privileges.
Truly yours,
For E.L. Sapang,
Jr.
Assistant Vice
President
Personnel
Management
Department" 2
On March 7, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. After both parties submitted their
position papers and the documentary evidence attached thereto,
the case was submitted for resolution.
On August 13, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision
dismissing the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
ratiocinated thus:
"When complainant therefore, in patent violation of
respondent's clear and express rules intended to insure
discipline and integrity among its employees, deliberately,
habitually, and without prior authorization, and despite
warning, did not report for work from August 1, 1989 to
September 19, 1989, complainant committed serious
misconduct and gross neglect of duty. In doing so,
 complainant can [be] validly dismissed. For as held by the
Supreme Court, 'dismissal for violation of the Company's
Rules and Regulations is a dismissal for cause.' (Peter
Paul v. C.I.R., G.R. No. L-10130, September 1957; NMI v.
NLU, 102 Phil. 958).
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the above, we find the complainant's
dismissal from the service as lawful exercise by
respondent of its prerogative to discipline errant
employee.
WHEREFORE, the instant case should be as it is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit." 3

Aggrieved with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, private

respondent elevated his case on appeal to public respondent.
On September 30, 1993, the NLRC set aside the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent with
backwages. 4
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied.
Hence, this petition.
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not private
respondent's dismissal from service was illegal.
A perusal of the records shows that there is a divergence of
views between the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC regarding the
validity of the dismissal of respondent by petitioner. Although, it
is a legal tenet that factual findings of administrative bodies are
entitled to great weight and respect, we are constrained to take
a second look at the facts before us because of the diversity in
the opinions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Petitioner alleges that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC when it reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on the following grounds: (a) that petitioner admitted in
its Position Paper (Annex "12") that private respondent "went into
hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with a neighbor" and (b)
that in the said decision, the Labor Arbiter relied not so much on
complainant's absences from August 1 to September 19, 1989
which was the subject of the investigation, but on complainant's
previous infractions.
Article 283 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
termination. Among such causes are the following:
"a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work.
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties.
xxx xxx xxx"

This cause includes gross inefficiency, negligence and

carelessness. Such just causes is derived from the right of the
employer to select and engage his employees. For indeed,
regulation of manpower by the company clearly falls within the
ambit of management prerogative. This court had defined a valid
exercise of management prerogative as one which covers: hiring,
work assignment, working methods, time, place and manner of
work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal and
recall of workers. Except as provided for, or limited by, special
laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. 5
Moreover, this Court has upheld a company's management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements. 6
In the case at bar, the service record of private respondent with
petitioner is perpetually characterized by unexplained absences
and unauthorized sick leave extensions. The nature of his job i.e.
as a lineman-driver requires his physical presence to minister to
incessant complaints often faulted with electricity. As aptly
stated by the Solicitor General:
"Habitual absenteeism of an errant employee is not
concordant with the public service that petitioner has to
assiduously provide. To have delayed power failure in a
certain district simply because a MERALCO employee
assigned to such area was absent and cannot immediately
be replaced is a breach of public service of the highest
order. A deep sense of duty would, therefore, command
that private respondent should, at the very least, limit his
absence for justifiable reasons." 7

The penchant of private respondent to continually incur

unauthorized absences and/or a violation of petitioner's sick
leave policy finally rendered his dismissal as imminently proper.
Private respondent cannot expect compassion from this Court by
totally disregarding his numerous previous infractions and take
into consideration only the period covering August 2, 1989 to
September 19, 1989. As ruled by this Court in the cases
by Mendoza v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 8 and National Service Corporation v. Leogardo,
Jr., 9 it is the totally, not the compartmentalization, of such
company infractions that private respondent had consistently
committed which justified his penalty of dismissal.
As correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter:
"In the case at bar, it was established that complainant
violated respondent's Code on Employee Discipline, not
only once, but ten (10) times. On the first occasion,
complainant was simply warned. On the second time, he
was suspended for 5 days. With the hope of reforming the
complainant, respondent generously imposed penalties of
suspension for his repeated unauthorized absences and
violations of sick leave policy which constitute violations
of the Code. On the ninth time, complainant was already
warned that the penalty of dismissal will be imposed for
similar or equally serious violation (Annex "10").
In total disregard of respondent's warning, complainant,
for the tenth time did not report for work without prior
 authority from respondent; hence, unauthorized. Worse, in
total disregard of his duties as lineman, he did not report
for work from August 1, 1989 to September 19, 1989; thus,
seriously affected (sic) respondent's operations as a
public utility. This constitute[s] a violation of respondent's
Code and gross neglect of duty and serious misconduct
under Article 283 of the labor Code."10

Habitual absenteeism should not and cannot be tolerated by

petitioner herein which is a public utility company engaged in the
business of distributing and selling electric energy within its
franchise areas and that the maintenance of Meralco's
distribution facilities (electric lines) by responding to customer's
complaints of power failure, interruptions, line trippings and other
line troubles is of paramount importance to the consuming
public.
Hence, an employee's habitual absenteeism without leave, which
violated company rules and regulations is sufficient cause to
justify termination from service. 11
In reversing the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC
made the following findings, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
"We perused the records of exact what transpired in that
fateful August 1 to September 19, 1989 where complainant
failed to report for work, and found out that no less than
Annex "12" (to respondent's position paper which is
labeled "Administrative Investigation" dated 14 October
1989) shows that during that period, the complainant
'went into hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with a
neighbor.'
With such admission by respondent, that is, therefore, no
way with which the complainant may be validly penalized
for his absences during the period August 1 to September
19, 1989." 12

However, a meticulous perusal of Annex "12" readily shows that

the statement "he went into hiding as he was engaged in a
trouble with a neighbor" was merely a defense adduced by
respondent employee and is tantamount to an alibi. The said
defense only proved to be self-serving as the same had not been
fully substantiated by private respondent by means of a
document or an affidavit executed to attest to the alleged
incidents.

Furthermore, contrary to the findings of public respondent,

petitioner never admitted that private respondent "went into
hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with a neighbor." As found
out by petitioner in the course of its investigation:
"Out of curiosity, we verified from the Barangay where
private respondent resides to find out the nature of [the]
cases he was allegedly got (sic) involved. Records of the
Barangay Captain of Bgy. Concepcion, Malabon, Metro
Manila showed that Cortez's wife has a pending complaint
against a neighbor for physical injury the complaint was
filed on July 6, 1989."
xxx xxx xxx
We are also not convinced that he went into hiding as we
met him at his known address at that time he said he was
still beset with problems." 13
This report only bolstered the falsehood of private respondent's
alibi hence, petitioner had no other recourse but to mete the
penalty of dismissal as an exercise of its management
prerogative.
Private respondent herein cannot just rely on the social justice
provisions of the Constitution and appeal for compassion
because he is not entitled to it due to his serious and repeated
company infractions which eventually led to his dismissal.
Private respondent's prolonged absence from August 2, 1989 to
September 19, 1989 was the crucial period in this particular
case. Subsequent investigation conducted by petitioner, however,
showed that private respondent was given the full opportunity of
defending himself, otherwise, petitioner could not have possibly
known of private respondent's side of the story, viz:
 Statement of Respondent
"In his sworn statement, Cortez maintained his allegations
contained in his letters to his office explaining that his
absences were inevitable due to family problems. He
insisted that his wife and his children suffered from LBM
probably due to floods at their place brought about by a
typhoon. Since they were not treated by a physician, he
could not present a medical certificate to the effect.
Cortez also intimated that he was engaged in trouble and
averred that, for security reasons, he went into hiding in a
town in Cavite Province. He claimed that in several
occasions, he had informed his office about his problems
and requested the same that his absences be considered
excused." 14

Notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full

adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases
decided by this court. 15 The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. 16 As held in
the case of Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas
v. NLRC: 17
". . . Actual adversarial proceedings becomes necessary
only for clarification or when there is a need to propound
searching questions to unclear witnesses. This is a
procedural right which the employee must, however, ask
for it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings
may be conducted. This is to correct the common but
mistaken perception that procedural due process entails
lengthy oral arguments. Hearings in administrative
proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies are neither
oratorical contests nor debating skirmishes where cross
examination skills are displayed. Non-verbal devices such
as written explanations, affidavits, position papers or
other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely
aggrieved parties predicament or defense. What is
essential, is ample opportunity to be heard, meaning,
every kind of assistance that management must accord
the employee to prepare adequately for his defense."
In this case, private respondent was given the opportunity of a
hearing as he was able to present his defense to the charge
against him. Unfortunately, petitioner found such defense
inexcusable. In other words, the fact that private respondent was
given the chance to air his side of the story already suffices.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision rendered by
the National Labor Relations Commission is annulled and the
decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
(Manila Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
|||

G.R. No. 114129, [October 24, 1996], 331 PHIL 838-852)

8. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 196557. June 15, 2016.]

GREGORIO "TONGEE" BALAIS,

JR., petitioner, vs. SE'LON by AIMEE, AMELITA
REVILLA and ALMA BELARMINO, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

This is a Petition for Review Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated
February 25, 2011 and Resolution 3dated April 19, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 114899
entitled "Se'lon by Aimee and/or Amelita Revilla and Alma
Belarmino v. NLRC and Gregorio "Tongee" Balais, Jr." TIADCc
 The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, damages and
attorney's fees filed by Gregorio "Tongee" Balais,
Jr. (Balais) against Se'lon by Aimee, Amelita Revilla and Alma
Belarmino before the NLRC.
Balais narrated that he was Salon de Orient's senior
hairstylist and make-up artist from October 16, 2004 until
November 26, 2007 when respondent Amelita
Revilla (Revilla) took over the business. Revilla, however,
retained his services as senior hairstylist and make-up artist.
Under the new management, Salon De Orient became Se'lon by
Aimee and respondent Alma Belarmino (Belarmino) was
appointed as its salon manager, who was in-charge of paying
the employees' wages, dismissing erring employees, and
exercising control over them. Balais, on the other hand, being
the senior hairstylist and make-up artist, allegedly had the
discretion to choose from among the junior hairstylist who
should assist him in servicing his clients, as customarily
observed in beauty salons. He worked during the 10am-7pm
shift or 11am-8pm shift, six (6) days a week with Sunday as his
regular rest day for a monthly salary of Php18,500.00 paid
every two (2) weeks. In June 2008, his salary was reduced to
Php15,000.00. Balais claimed that his working relationship
with respondents had been harmonious until the evening of
July 1, 2008 when Belarmino dismissed him without due
process, in the following manner:
Belarmino angrily shouted: "You get out of this
Company! I do not need you here at Se'lon by Aimee!"
Balais Jr., calmly replied: "Ibigay mo ang 13th
month ko and sweldo ko, at separation pay."
Belarmino angrily replied: "Maghabla ka kahit saan
na korte at haharapin kita."
Balais Jr. responded: "Maski ang Jollibee
nagbibigay nang 13th month pay, sweldo and separation
pay pag may tinatanggal na empleyado!"
 Belarmino retorted: "Eh di doon ka magtrabaho sa
Jollibee kasi doon nagbibigay sila nang 13th month pay,
sweldo at separation pay pag may tinatanggal na
empleyado."
Balais felt humiliated as he was berated in front of his co-
workers. The next day, he did not report for work anymore and
instead filed the complaint before the NLRC.
For their part, respondents alleged that it was known to
all their employees that one of the salon's policies was for
junior stylists to take turns in assisting any of the senior
stylists for purposes of equalizing commissions. However,
Belarmino was told that Balais failed to comply with this policy
as the latter allegedly gave preference to only two (2) junior
stylists, disregarding the other two (2) junior stylists. When
Belarmino asked Balais for explanation, the latter allegedly
snapped and retorted that he would do whatever he wanted.
Belarmino reminded him of the salon's policy and his duty to
comply with it but petitioner allegedly insisted he would do as
he pleased and if they can no longer take it, they would have to
dismiss him. After the incident, Balais sued them and never
reported back to work.
Respondents insisted that Balais was not terminated
from employment but he instead abandoned his work.
Respondents explained that even assuming that he was indeed
dismissed, there was a valid ground therefor as his acts
amounted to serious misconduct against a superior and willful
disobedience to reasonable policy related to his work.
On February 11, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision 4 holding respondents liable for illegal dismissal. It
gave credence and weight to Balais' version that he was
dismissed without cause and notice for merely defending his
decision to avail of the services of some selected junior stylist
of his choice.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the decision before the
NLRC.
 On February 19, 2010, the NLRC affirmed in toto the
findings of the Labor Arbiter, declaring petitioner to be illegally
dismissed. 5 It ratiocinated that Se'lon by Aimee failed to prove
that the act of petitioner amounted to gross insubordination.
Other than respondents' bare denial of illegal dismissal, the
same was unsubstantiated by a clear and convincing evidence.
The NLRC further pointed out that respondents failed to
produce a copy of the supposed salon policy on the rule of
rotation of junior stylists, thus, the veracity of the allegation of
insubordination against Balais failed to convince.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated April 22, 2010.
Thus, before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to annul or modify the Resolutions of the
NLRC.
On February 25, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and reversed and set aside the NLRC Decision and
rendered a Decision 6 sustaining petitioner's dismissal as valid
and required respondents to pay Balais his accrued 13th
month pay and unpaid salaries.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution dated April 19, 2011. Thus, the instant petition for
review on certiorari raising the following issues: AIDSTE

I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE BY DECLARING THE
PETITIONER AS VALIDLY DISMISSED WHICH IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
 PROCEEDINGS AND CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF
THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC. 7
We find merit in the petition.
The Court's jurisdiction in cases brought before it from
the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to
consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule,
however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be
warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the NLRC and the LA, as in this
case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review the
records to determine which of them should be preferred as
more conformable to evidentiary facts. 8 In the instant case,
the conflict between the NLRC's and the CA's factual findings
as shown in the records of this case prompts the Court to
evaluate such findings anew.
Whether there was a valid dismissal.
The principle echoed and re-echoed in our jurisprudence
is that the onus of proving that the employee was dismissed
for a just cause rests on the employer, and the latter's failure
to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified. 9
In the instant case, a perusal of the records would show
that both parties presented their own versions of stories, not
necessarily contradicting but nonetheless lacking in some
material points.
Balais alleged that he was illegally dismissed as his
dismissal was allegedly made verbally and without due
process of law. Yet, Balais failed to explain what possibly
prompted said termination or even the likely motive for the
same. He nevertheless submitted the Affidavits of Gemma
Guerero 10 and Marie Gina A. Toralde,11 to prove his allegation.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that there was
no illegal dismissal as it was Balais himself who did not report
to work, thus, he abandoned his work.
 Interestingly, however, both parties never denied that
there was an altercation between them. Without admitting that
he violated the salon policy of rotation of the junior stylists,
Balais maintained that said policy runs counter with
customary salon practice which allows senior hairstylists to
choose their preferred junior stylist to assist them. For their
part, supplemental to their claim of abandonment, respondents
averred that assuming that Balais was dismissed, they insisted
that there was a valid ground therefor as he was disrespectful
and insubordinate due to his failure to comply with the salon's
policy.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondents never denied that
the incident narrated by Balais actually happened. In Solas v.
Power & Telephone Supply Phils., Inc.,12 this silence
constitutes an admission that fortifies the truth of the
employee's narration. While respondents were evasive on the
complete details of how the reported incident of termination
transpired, they never categorically denied that said incident
happened or the fact that Belarmino uttered: "get out of this
company! I do not need you here." Belarmino attempted to
sidestep the fact that she actually said it, yet, raised the
defense that assuming she had indeed verbally terminated
Balais, she was justified in doing so because of the disrespect
shown to her.
Under the rules of evidence, if an allegation is not
specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the
allegation is deemed admitted. 13 In fine, the fact that
respondents are even raising their own justification for the
alleged verbal dismissal means that the said verbal dismissal
actually transpired. If in the first place, said incident of verbal
dismissal truly never happened, there is nothing to assume
anymore or to justify. The fact that Belarmino was offering
justification for her action, it follows that indeed said incident
of verbally dismissing Balais on-the-spot actually happened.
Putting two versions of the story together, considering
that none of the parties categorically deny that an altercation
erupted between them which resulted in the dismissal of
Balais, and the tenor of Belarmino's statements leaving no
room for interpreting it other than a verbal dismissal, we are
inclined to believe that there was indeed a dismissal.
This being the case, having established that there was
dismissal, it becomes axiomatic that respondents prove that
the dismissal was valid.
Respondents averred that there was abandonment as
Balais failed to report back to work the following day after the
incident.
In this regard, this Court finds that respondents failed to
establish that Balais abandoned his work. To constitute
abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason,
and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. 14 Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of
the employee to resume his employment without any intention
of returning. Respondents, other than their bare allegation of
abandonment, failed to prove that these two elements were
met. It cannot be said that Balais failed to report back to work
without justifiable reason as in fact he was told that he was no
longer wanted in the salon. AaCTcI

Moreover, we likewise note the high improbability of

petitioner intentionally abandoning his work, taking into
consideration his length of service, i.e., 18 years of service
with the salon. It does not make sense for an employee who
had worked for his employer for 18 years would just abandon
his work and forego whatever benefits he may be entitled,
unless he was made to believe or was told that he was already
terminated.
Respondents cannot discharge the burden of proving a
valid dismissal by merely alleging that they did not dismiss
Balais; neither can they escape liability by claiming that Balais
abandoned his work. When there is no showing of a clear, valid
and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law
considers it a case of illegal dismissal.
Thus, respondents, presumably thinking that their claim
of abandonment holds no water, it likewise manifested that
assuming Balais was indeed terminated, there was a valid
ground therefor because of his insubordination.
We disagree.
Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a
just cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's
assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
attitude;" and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge. 15
It must be likewise stressed anew that the burden of
proving the insubordination as a just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure
to do so shall result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.
In this case, the salon policy of rotating the junior stylists
who will assist the senior stylist appears to be reasonable,
lawful, made known to petitioner and pertained to his duty as
senior hairstylist of respondent. However, if we will look at
Balais' explanation for his alleged disobedience thereto, it
likewise appears to be reasonable and lawful, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The duty of the Senior Stylist has the overall
function in seeing to it that the service accorded to the
client is excellent, thus, he has the right to refuse
service of a junior stylist whom he thinks that such
junior stylist cannot give equal or over and above the
 service that he can give to the client, thus his refusal to
obey the respondent does not constitute a just cause for
the treatment given by respondent to herein respondent
(sic).
xxx xxx xxx
The fact alone that Balais failed to comply with the salon
policy does not establish that his conduct in failing to comply
with the salon's policy had been willful, or characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude. Balais' justification maybe
adverse to that of the salon's policy but it was neither willful
nor characterized by a perverse attitude. We take note that the
alleged non-compliance with the salon policy was brought to
the attention of Balais for the first time only during the said
incident. There was no showing of prior warnings as to his non-
compliance. While respondents wield a wide latitude of
discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and
regulations on work-related activities of its employees, these
must, however, be fair and reasonable at all times, and the
corresponding sanctions for violations thereof, when
prescribed, must be commensurate thereto as well as to the
degree of the infraction. Given that Balais' preference on who
will assist him is based on the junior stylists' competence, the
same should have been properly taken into account in the
imposition of the appropriate penalty for violation of the
rotation policy. Suspension would have sufficed to caution him
and other employees who may be wont to violate the same
policy.
In adjudging that the dismissal was grounded on a just
and valid cause, the totality of infractions or the number of
violations committed during the period of employment shall be
considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an
erring employee. 16 Let it not be forgotten that what is at stake
is the means of livelihood, the name, and the reputation of the
employee. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of the
management's prerogative to terminate an employee is to
negate the employee's constitutional right to security of
tenure.
Whether the dismissal was effected with
due process of law.
Under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, the employer
must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a
written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must
give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides, inter alia:
(a) . . .
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to
security of tenure and their right to be protected against
dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. . . .
In particular, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code states:
Sec. 2. Standards of due process: requirements of
notice. — In all cases of termination of employment, the
following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
1. For termination of employment based on
just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:
(a) A written notice served on the
employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to
said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side;
 (b) A hearing or conference during which
the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so
desires, is given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence or
rebut the evidence presented against
him; and
(c) A written notice of termination
served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
Thus, to effect the dismissal of an employee, the law
requires not only that there be just and valid cause as provided
under Article 282 of the Labor Code. It likewise enjoins the
employer to afford the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself. On the latter aspect, the employer is
mandated to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices:
(a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for
the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires; (b) if the employer decides to
terminate the services of the employee, the employer must
notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating
clearly the reason therefor.EcTCAD

Here, a perusal of the records revealed that, indeed,

Belarmino's manner of verbally dismissing Balais on-the-spot
fell short of the two-notice requirement. There was no showing
of prior warnings on Balais' alleged non-compliance with the
salon policy. There was no written notice informing him of his
dismissal as in fact the dismissal was done verbally and on-
the-spot. Respondents failed to furnish Balais the written
notice apprising him of the charges against him, as prescribed
by the Labor Code. There was no attempt to serve a notice of
dismissal on Balais. Consequently, he was denied due process
of law accorded in dismissals.
Reliefs of Illegally Dismissed Employees
 Having established that Balais was illegally dismissed,
the Court now determines the reliefs that he is entitled to and
their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a
matter of right." Aside from the instances provided under
Articles 283 17 and 284 18of the Labor Code, separation pay is,
however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employer and the
employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine
is that separation pay is available in lieu of reinstatement
when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best
interest of the parties. 19
However, other than the strained relationship between the
parties, it appears that respondent salon had already ceased
operation of its business, thus, reinstatement is no longer
feasible. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the
petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered
as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up
to the finality of this judgment, as an alternative to
reinstatement. 20
Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled
to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their
actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of
their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of
their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an award of full
backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the
finality of this decision. 21
Balais is likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount
of 10% of the total monetary award pursuant to Article 111 22 of
the Labor Code. It is settled that where an employee was
forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights
and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally
 justifiable. Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the
monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid. 23
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 25, 2011
and the Resolution dated April 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 114899 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The respondents are hereby declared GUILTY OF ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL AND ARE hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner,
Gregorio Balais, Jr., the following:
(a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service,
with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as
one (1) whole year from the time of his dismissal up to
the finality of this Decision;
(b) full backwages from the time of his illegal
dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; and
(c) attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the total monetary award.
The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case
is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of
petitioner's monetary award.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Balais, Jr. v. Se'Lon, G.R. No. 196557, [June 15, 2016])

9. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200898. June 15, 2015.]

 BROWN MADONNA PRESS, INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY
A. CABANGON, FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
(now Fortune General Insurance Corporation) and/or
ANTONIO CABANGON CHUA, petitioners, vs. MARIA
ROSARIO M. CASAS, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J :
p

Before the Court is the petition for review

on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioners Brown Madonna Press,
Inc. (BMPI), Thaddeus Anthony Cabangon (Cabangon), Fortune
Life Insurance Company (now Fortune General Insurance
Corporation) and/or Anthony Cabangon Chua (Cabangon Chua),
to challenge the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116539.
Factual Antecedents
This case sprung from respondent Rosario M.
Casas's (Casas) parting of ways with BMPI as its Vice
President for Finance and Administration on January 5, 2007.
Casas claims she was forced to leave her work, while the BMPI
management asserts that she requested a graceful exit from
the company to avoid an administrative investigation. The
facts leading to this dispute are outlined below.
On May 1, 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk
at Fortune General Insurance, a member of the ALC Group of
Companies. She eventually rose from the ranks; on December
1, 2003, she was transferred to BMPI, another ALC member
company, as its Vice President for Finance and
Administration. 2
On January 5, 2007, Casas met with Cabangon, BMPI's
company president, and Victoria Nava (Nava), the Vice
President for the Central Human Resource Department of the
ALC Group of Companies. During the meeting, Casas was
allegedly told not to report to work anymore starting January
8, 2007, upon the instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALC's
Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the reason for her
abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was
promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and
left. 3
BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who
requested a graceful exit from the company during the January
5, 2007 meeting. The meeting was supposedly held to confront
Casas about certain complaints against her, and about the
growing rift between her and another company officer. BMPI
asserts that Casas opted to leave the company to avoid an
administrative investigation against her and to give her the
chance to jumpstart her career outside the company. She
succeeded in convincing Cabangon to grant her some form of
financial assistance as they were friends. 4
Casas no longer reported for work on January 8, 2007,
and BMPI, for its part, started the processing of her
clearance. 5 On May 17, 2007, Casas sent Cabangon-Chua a
letter asking for the reconsideration of his decision to
terminate her employment. Cabangon-Chua did not act on this
letter. 6
On July 20, 2007, Casas filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and for payment of separation pay, backwages,
retirement benefits and attorney's fees before the Regional
Arbitration Branch. The complaint was docketed as NLRC LAC
05-001892-08. 7
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
Labor Arbiter (LA) Fedriel S. Panganiban dismissed Casas'
complaint for lack of merit, and ordered BMPI to reinstate her
to her previous position without payment of backwages. 8
The LA found that Casas was not dismissed from work;
she instead abandoned her post. Citing Chong Guan Trading,
Inc. v. NLRC 9 and Security & Credit Investigation, Inc. v.
NLRC, 10 the LA held that no illegal dismissal takes place when
the employee has not been notified of his dismissal; in the
absence of any positive and overt act of dismissal, the claim of
illegal dismissal cannot be sustained. 11
CAIHTE

The LA noted that there was no written notice of Casas'

dismissal, and that it was contrary to sound business practice
to verbally terminate an employee facing investigation for
reported irregularities; BMPI had every reason to retain Casas'
services and to proceed with the investigation against her.
Thus, the LA agreed with BMPI's contention that Casas left her
work to pre-empt the investigation of complaints against her.
Her act of packing her things on January 5, 2007, in fact,
demonstrated that she no longer intended to return to work. 12
Because no illegal dismissal took place, the LA refused to
grant Casas her demanded backwages, separation pay and
retirement benefit. Instead, the LA ordered BMPI to reinstate
Casas so that a proper investigation may be conducted on the
irregularities she allegedly committed. 13
The NLRC's ruling
Casas appealed the LA's ruling with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed the LA's finding
that Casas had not been illegally dismissed. 14
The NLRC found that Casas' dismissal had been
sufficiently established by evidence on record. Contrary to the
petitioners' allegations, these records show that Casas'
services had been terminated by BMPI as she was issued a
"Clearance and Quitclaim" document that clearly stated that
she would "cease to be connected with the company at the
close of office hours on January 16, 2007." This, along with
BMPI's failure to respond to Casas' May 17, 2007 letter asking
for the reconsideration of her termination, constitute positive
and overt acts of dismissal. 15
Casas' dismissal, according to the NLRC, was without just
cause and did not have the benefit of due process. She was
never accorded any hearing or even a show-cause notice,
despite the serious allegations charged against her. Instead,
the records show only the "Clearance and Quitclaim"
document, which does not explain why her employment
relationship with BMPI would cease. The NLRC also found that
Cabangon and Cabangon-Chua acted with malice and bad faith
in dismissing Casas, and thus held them jointly and severally
liable with BMPI for payment of Casas' monetary award. 16
The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC's ruling, and held
that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding
that Casas had been illegally dismissed. The CA cited with
approval the NLRC's ruling that Casas' dismissal was without
cause and failed to comply with the procedural requirements
of the law. 17
The CA explained that Casas is presumed innocent until
proven guilty of the charges against her. Since her alleged
infractions had not been investigated, it followed that Casas
was dismissed without cause. The CA also noted that BMPI
failed to comply with the two written notices required prior to
a lawful termination of an employee, and hence failed to
comply with the procedural due process that the law
requires. 18
The present petition
BMPI, Cabangon and Cabangon-Chua assail the CA ruling
through the present petition for review on certiorari, 19 based
on the following arguments:
1) Casas voluntarily left the company to preempt an
administrative investigation against her, and to be
able to jumpstart a new career. 20
2) The clearance and quitclaim document is a standard
operating procedure for a person who has resigned
or retired from the company for the protection of the
employer. It establishes that the issue of
employment severance has been settled beforehand.
In fact, BMPI cited the clearance and quitclaim
 document to explain why Casas' last pay was
temporarily withheld from her. 21
3) BMPI denied receipt of Casas's letter, and claimed that
it did not issue any show cause order against Casas
because she left the company to prevent an
administrative investigation against her. Her
voluntary exit also explains BMPI's non-compliance
with the legal notice requirements. 22
In her Comment/Opposition 23 to BMPI's petition, Casas
maintained that the CA did not err in finding that she had been
illegally dismissed from work. She emphasized that the
quitclaim and clearance document unilaterally prepared by
BMPI was evidence of their expectation to sever her
employment, 24 and that BMPI filed to present any resignation
letter from her to prove that she voluntarily left her
work. 25 Lastly, Casas asserted that Cabangon compelled her
to quit her job, in exchange for a retirement package. This
package, however, was never granted to her, despite her
compliance with her end of the agreement that she would no
longer report to work after January 5, 2007. 26
Issues
The parties' arguments present to us the sole issue
of whether the Court of Appeals erred when it found no grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC's ruling that Casas had been
illegally dismissed.
The Court's Ruling
The CA did not err in finding that the NLRC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in its decision.
Mode of review in illegal dismissal cases
The present petition involves mixed questions of fact and
law, with the core issue being one of fact. This issue — from
which the other issues arise — relates to the nature of Casas'
termination of employment relationship with BMPI. Did she
voluntarily resign from, or abandon her work at, BMPI, or was
she summarily dismissed by Cabangon?
This question of fact is an issue that we cannot resolved
in a Rule 45 petition, except in the course of determining
whether the CA correctly ruled in determining that the NLRC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion. In other words, the
question we ask in resolving the present case is not whether
Casas abandoned her work or was illegally dismissed;
instead, we ask whether the CA erred in not finding grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC's decision finding that Casas
was dismissed from work. 27
Should we find that Casas had indeed been summarily
dismissed, the next question involves the nature of her
dismissal — did it comply with the procedural and substantial
requirements of the law, or was it an illegal dismissal that
should warrant the award to Casas of backwages and
separation pay?
Keen awareness of the lens used to review this question
is critical, given the jurisdiction of this Court and the nature of
review employed in labor cases appealed to the Court under
Rule 45. The Court, save for exceptional cases, is not a trier of
facts; as a general rule, it resolves only questions of law.
Additionally, the NLRC's decision is final and executory, and
can be reviewed by the CA only when the NLRC committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 28
Thus, the CA, in a Rule 65 petition assailing the NLRC's
decision, examines whether the NLRC acted in such a
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 29 This is in contrast
with appeals reaching the CA through a Rule 45 petition,
where it has more leeway in reviewing both questions of fact
and of law, and where the appealed decision may be reversed
because of an error in judgment. 30
 Once the CA decision reaches the Court through a Rule
45 petition, the question presented before us carries with it
the mode of review applied when the case has been appealed
before the CA. Although we are asked to determine whether
the CA committed an error in judgment, we necessarily have to
consider that the judgment made by the CA involves the
question of determining grave abuse of discretion. Unlike other
petitions for review on certiorari where we determine errors of
law (and in exceptional cases, errors of fact), our appellate
jurisdiction in labor cases involves the determination of
whether there had been an error in finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC. 31
With these considerations in mind, the onus probandi in
assailing a question of fact as determined by the NLRC and
upheld by the CA becomes heavier. Not only must an
exceptional circumstance allowing the Court to review a
question of fact exist; it must also be shown that the NLRC's
resolution of the factual issue must have been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, such that the CA erred in affirming
it.
Indeed, the labor arbiter and the NLRC in the present
case arrived at factual conclusions — the LA found that Casas
had not been dismissed, but the NLRC reversed this finding.
While the contradicting findings of the LA and the NLRC may
be a ground to re-evaluate the factual question of whether
Casas abandoned her work or had been dismissed, we find no
reason to dispute the NLRC's conclusion.
The CA did not err in affirming the
NLRC's factual finding that Casas
had been dismissed from work
We support the CA in finding no grave abuse of discretion
in the NLRC's factual conclusion that Casas had been
dismissed from work.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
proving that the employee's dismissal was legal. However, to
discharge this burden, the employee must first prove, by
substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from
employment. 32
The CA, in affirming the NLRC's conclusion that Casas
had been dismissed, gave emphasis to the existence of two
documents on record: first, the unsigned clearance and
quitclaim document unilaterally prepared by BMPI,
and second, the letter Casas sent to Cabangon-Chua, asking
the latter to reconsider her termination.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently establish Casas'
dismissal from the company.
The Clearance and Quitclaim document discloses that
Casas would "cease to be connected with the company at the
close of office on January 16, 2007." The document, which was
even introduced as evidence by the petitioners, was prepared
unilaterally at Cabangon's instructions. It shows the
company's intent to sever its employment relationship with
Casas. Considered together with the letter Casas sent
Cabangon-Chua asking for her reinstatement on May 17, 2007,
these documents back Casas's assertion that she was
compelled to leave her job on January 5, 2007.
As their main defense, BMPI and Cabangon claim that
they never dismissed Casas from work, and that she instead
requested a graceful exit from the company.
We do not find any merit in the petitioners' contention.
Jurisprudence has established that employers interposing
their employee's resignation as a defense from illegal
dismissal cases have the burden of proving that the employee
indeed voluntarily resigned. 33 Resignation — the formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office — is
the voluntary act of an employee compelled by personal
reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment. 34 It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied
by the act manifesting this intent. 35
 In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas
asked for a graceful exit from the company to avoid an
administrative investigation against her. They claim that Casas
had grossly failed to manage and take control of BMPI's ex-
deal assets, which caused the company serious losses. When
Casas was confronted about these reports of mismanagement,
she voluntarily resigned from office in exchange for separation
pay.
In our view, the NLRC and CA correctly disregarded these
allegations in concluding that Casas had been terminated from
office.
First, the pieces of evidence that the petitioners
submitted are insufficient to establish their claim. To prove
that Casas voluntarily abandoned her work, the petitioners
submitted affidavits from their employees, Domingo Almoninia,
Jr. and Victoria C. Nava, who both testified to the events
leading to a private conversation between Casas and
Cabangon.
Domingo Almoninia, Jr., BMPI's former Chief Audit
Executive, testified 36 that he had informed Cabangon of
reports regarding Casas's mismanagement of BMPI's ex-deal
assets on January 5, 2007. Casas, together with Vice President
for Human Resources Victoria Nava, were then summoned to
Cabangon's room. According to Almoninia, he witnessed
Cabangon confront Casas regarding reports about her
mismanagement and certain unauthorized transactions. In the
course of the discussion, Cabangon allegedly told Casas that
the reports against her would have to be investigated, and
instructed her to settle her differences with a certain Mr.
Tayag. Casas asked Cabangon if she was being dismissed, to
which the latter answered in the negative. Both Almoninia and
Nava were then asked to leave the room.
Nava, on the other hand, corroborated Almoninia's
narration, and added insinuations that Casas had been having
problems in the company. 37
 In considering their affidavits, we emphasize that neither
Almoninia nor Nava were present in the private conversation
that ensued between Cabangon and Casas, after the
confrontation that they witnessed. This leaves Cabangon's
claim that Casas asked for a graceful exit from the company
uncorroborated; what stands is Casas' statement
contradicting the claim that she had not been dismissed from
her job.
Second, Cabangon failed to provide any documentary
evidence supporting Casas' voluntary resignation. BMPI failed
to show any resignation letter from Casas. The Clearance and
Quitclaim document, which shows Casas' severance from the
company, does not contain her signature. 38 Neither was Casas
given any return to work order, notice of infraction, or notice of
termination, all of which could have supported BMPI's theory
that Casas was never prevented from going back to work.
Third, Cabangon, Almoninia and Nava's testimonies show
that Casas could have entertained the motive to resign from
her work, but does not prove her intent to leave her office.
Intent to relinquish one's office is determined from the acts of
an employee before and after the alleged resignation. Casas'
acts after allegedly resigning from work negate this intent: she
wrote a letter asking Cabangon-Chua to reconsider her
termination from office; she refused to sign the Clearance and
Quitclaim document; and she filed an illegal dismissal case
against her employers.
This conclusion brings us to the question of whether the
CA erred in affirming the NLRC's conclusion that Casas had
been illegally terminated from work.
The CA did not err in affirming the
NLRC's conclusion that Casas'
dismissal violated the procedural
requirements of the Labor Code
In ruling that Casas' dismissal had been contrary to law,
both the CA and the NLRC emphasized that her sudden
termination from office was without just cause and violated
procedural due process. HEITAD

According to the NLRC, despite the serious allegations

that the BMPI lodged against Casas, it never asked her to
explain her acts, and instead opted to sever its employment
relations with her. On this basis alone, the NLRC concluded
that Casas' dismissal had been illegal and non-compliant with
procedural due process. 39
The CA affirmed this conclusion by pointing out that
Casas had been dismissed prior to any probe on her reported
violation of company rules and regulations.40
In determining whether an employee's dismissal had been
legal, the inquiry focuses on whether the dismissal violated his
right to substantial and procedural due process. An employee's
right not to be dismissed without just or authorized cause as
provided by law, is covered by his right to substantial due
process. Compliance with procedure provided in the Labor
Code, on the other hand, constitutes the procedural due
process right of an employee. 41
The violation of either the substantial due process right
or the procedural due process right of an employee produces
different results. Termination without a just or authorized
cause renders the dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
An employee's removal for just or authorized cause but
without complying with the proper procedure, on the other
hand, does not invalidate the dismissal. It obligates the erring
employer to pay nominal damages to the employee, as penalty
for not complying with the procedural requirements of due
process. 42
 Thus, two separate inquiries must be made in resolving
illegal dismissal cases: first, whether the dismissal had been
made in accordance with the procedure set in the Labor Code;
and second, whether the dismissal had been for just or
authorized cause.
There can be no doubt that the procedural requirements
had not been complied with in the present case: shortly after a
private conversation between Cabangon and Casas, Casas
took her belongings from the office and left the building. As
explained earlier, Casas's acts after this private conversation
reveal that she had been summarily dismissed: Casas gave no
resignation letter, refused to sign the Clearance and Quitclaim
document that the company issued, and sent a letter asking
for her reinstatement.
Notably, the private conversation that led to Casas's
summary dismissal did not conform, in any way, to the
procedural due process requirements embodied in Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, viz.:
RULE XIV Termination of Employment
SECTION 1. Security of tenure and due process. —
No workers shall be dismissed except for a just or
authorized cause provided by law and after due process.
SECTION 2. Notice of dismissal. — Any employer
who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a
written notice stating the particular acts or omission
constituting the grounds for his dismissal . In cases of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the
worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may
answer the allegations stated against him in the notice
of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of
such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
 SECTION 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer
shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision
to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Cabangon failed to show any written notice provided to
Casas informing her of the charges against her, and neither
had she been informed in writing of her dismissal and the
reasons behind it.
Even assuming arguendo that Casas had indeed
voluntarily abandoned her work — an uncorroborated claim by
Cabangon — Cabangon had the duty to give Casas a written
notice of the grounds leading to her dismissal.
Thus, Cabangon failed to comply with the two-notice
requirement under the law, resulting in a violation of Casas's
right to procedural due process. This conclusion leads us to
the next query: whether her dismissal was for just cause.
The CA did not err in finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC's decision to hold that Casas
had been dismissed without just
cause
According to the CA, Casas's dismissal had not been for
just cause, because at the time she was dismissed, not one of
the charges against her had been proven. Casas was, at the
time of her dismissal, presumed innocent until proven guilty;
thus, there existed no just cause to terminate her employment
at the time she was summarily dismissed. 43
In reaching this conclusion, the CA reviewed whether the
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that
Casas's dismissal had no just cause. The NLRC, in its decision,
held that Casas's dismissal had not been for just cause
because she was not even allowed to explain the supposed
acts that had been inimical to BMPI's interests. 44
In affirming the NLRC's decision, the CA clarified the
application of procedural and substantial due process in the
present case: Casas had not been given the two-notice
requirement in the law, and hence, her procedural due process
rights had been violated. And because not one of the
allegations against her had been proven at the time she was
summarily dismissed, there existed no cause to terminate her
services.
We find that the CA did not err in making this ruling.
To reiterate, the CA reviews the decision of the NLRC
using the prism of grave abuse of discretion, and not through
an appeal. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner so patent or so gross that it
amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to act at all in contemplation of law.
Thus, for a decision to be in grave abuse of discretion, it
should involve not just an error of law or an error of fact, but
errors that are so patent or gross that the decision reached is
a decision that had not been made in contemplation of law at
all.
No such error exists in the present case.
We have, in the past, affirmed the NLRC in ruling that an
employee's act not proven at the time he had been dismissed
does not constitute just cause for his dismissal. 45 In other
words, for an act to justify an employee's dismissal, it should
have been proven, with substantial evidence, 46 at the time he
was dismissed. Otherwise, the dismissal would not be for just
cause.
This conclusion finds support in cases emphasizing that
an unsubstantiated accusation will not ripen into a holding
that there is just cause for dismissal. 47 A mere accusation of
wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an
employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be
backed by substantial evidence at the time the employee is
dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is being
questioned before the courts.
 In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas had
committed various infractions that would have warranted
disciplinary action against her. At the time that Casas was
dismissed, however, these alleged infractions were mere
speculations. The present petition for review
on certiorari admits this reality in two instances: first, in the
body of the petition itself stating that at the time of the
January 5, 2007 meeting, disciplinary proceedings had yet to
be initiated against Casas and that the reports against her
would still have to be verified; 48 and second, through its
annexes, 49 which provided that the result of the investigation
in the ex-deal assets that Casas allegedly mismanaged was
produced only on February 17, 2007, or a full month after
Casas' dismissal.
Thus, at the time Cabangon asked Casas to leave her
employment, all he had as basis for Casas's dismissal were
speculations. Worse, Cabangon's summary dismissal of Casas
left her with little opportunity to adequately defend herself
from the allegations against her.
In these lights, we support the CA in holding that Casas'
summary dismissal had not been for just cause.
Just cause must be proven with
substantial evidence at the time of
dismissal
At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to
liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted,
except through valid causes provided in the law. 50
The concepts of procedural and substantive due process
had been carried over and applied to illegal dismissal cases,
although notably, employers are not governmental bodies to
which these rights usually refer. Agabon v. NLRC 51 described
the due process required in dismissing employees as statutory
— requirements that the law imposes on employers to comply
with, in contrast to constitutional due process rights that
guarantee against overreach from the government.
 Although statutory in nature, the procedural and
substantive due process requirements in illegal dismissal
cases stem from the protection that the Constitution provides
labor — the Constitution has tasked the State to promote the
workers' security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. 52These guarantees, as well as a host of other
rights and responsibilities, 53 find implementation through
the Labor Code, which fleshed out the concept of security of
tenure 54 as the continuance of regular employment until an
employee's services are terminated because of just or
authorized causes enumerated in the law.
Thus, despite the differences in origin and application
between constitutional due process rights and the statutory
requirements in the Labor Code, we have applied concepts
implementing constitutional due process rights to the
statutory due process requirements of the Labor Code.We did
this in the present case, when we emphasized the need for
substantial evidence to support the just cause for the
employee's dismissal at the time her services were
terminated. In the same way that the crime charged against an
accused must first be proven before his or her right to liberty
is taken away, or that a government employee's infraction
must first be proven before the accused is deprived of the right
to continue to hold office, so too, must just cause against an
employee be proven before he or she may be deprived of a
means of livelihood. Otherwise, the employee's right to
substantive due process would be violated.
In these lights, and in order to give full effect to the
embodiment of substantive due process in illegal dismissal
cases, it is necessary to rule, that an employee, in this present
case Casas, cannot be terminated from service without
sufficient substantial evidence of the just cause that would
merit her dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED, and the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 116539 is AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas, G.R. No. 200898, [June 15,
2015])

10. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 196557. June 15, 2016.]

GREGORIO "TONGEE" BALAIS,

JR., petitioner, vs. SE'LON by AIMEE, AMELITA
REVILLA and ALMA BELARMINO, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

This is a Petition for Review Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated
February 25, 2011 and Resolution 3dated April 19, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 114899
entitled "Se'lon by Aimee and/or Amelita Revilla and Alma
Belarmino v. NLRC and Gregorio "Tongee" Balais, Jr." TIADCc

The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal

dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, damages and
attorney's fees filed by Gregorio "Tongee" Balais,
Jr. (Balais) against Se'lon by Aimee, Amelita Revilla and Alma
Belarmino before the NLRC.
Balais narrated that he was Salon de Orient's senior
hairstylist and make-up artist from October 16, 2004 until
November 26, 2007 when respondent Amelita
Revilla (Revilla) took over the business. Revilla, however,
retained his services as senior hairstylist and make-up artist.
Under the new management, Salon De Orient became Se'lon by
Aimee and respondent Alma Belarmino (Belarmino) was
appointed as its salon manager, who was in-charge of paying
the employees' wages, dismissing erring employees, and
exercising control over them. Balais, on the other hand, being
the senior hairstylist and make-up artist, allegedly had the
discretion to choose from among the junior hairstylist who
should assist him in servicing his clients, as customarily
observed in beauty salons. He worked during the 10am-7pm
shift or 11am-8pm shift, six (6) days a week with Sunday as his
regular rest day for a monthly salary of Php18,500.00 paid
every two (2) weeks. In June 2008, his salary was reduced to
Php15,000.00. Balais claimed that his working relationship
with respondents had been harmonious until the evening of
July 1, 2008 when Belarmino dismissed him without due
process, in the following manner:
Belarmino angrily shouted: "You get out of this
Company! I do not need you here at Se'lon by Aimee!"
Balais Jr., calmly replied: "Ibigay mo ang 13th
month ko and sweldo ko, at separation pay."
Belarmino angrily replied: "Maghabla ka kahit saan
na korte at haharapin kita."
Balais Jr. responded: "Maski ang Jollibee
nagbibigay nang 13th month pay, sweldo and separation
pay pag may tinatanggal na empleyado!"
Belarmino retorted: "Eh di doon ka magtrabaho sa
Jollibee kasi doon nagbibigay sila nang 13th month pay,
sweldo at separation pay pag may tinatanggal na
empleyado."
Balais felt humiliated as he was berated in front of his co-
workers. The next day, he did not report for work anymore and
instead filed the complaint before the NLRC.
For their part, respondents alleged that it was known to
all their employees that one of the salon's policies was for
junior stylists to take turns in assisting any of the senior
stylists for purposes of equalizing commissions. However,
Belarmino was told that Balais failed to comply with this policy
as the latter allegedly gave preference to only two (2) junior
stylists, disregarding the other two (2) junior stylists. When
Belarmino asked Balais for explanation, the latter allegedly
snapped and retorted that he would do whatever he wanted.
Belarmino reminded him of the salon's policy and his duty to
comply with it but petitioner allegedly insisted he would do as
he pleased and if they can no longer take it, they would have to
dismiss him. After the incident, Balais sued them and never
reported back to work.
Respondents insisted that Balais was not terminated
from employment but he instead abandoned his work.
Respondents explained that even assuming that he was indeed
dismissed, there was a valid ground therefor as his acts
amounted to serious misconduct against a superior and willful
disobedience to reasonable policy related to his work.
On February 11, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision 4 holding respondents liable for illegal dismissal. It
gave credence and weight to Balais' version that he was
dismissed without cause and notice for merely defending his
decision to avail of the services of some selected junior stylist
of his choice.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the decision before the
NLRC.
On February 19, 2010, the NLRC affirmed in toto the
findings of the Labor Arbiter, declaring petitioner to be illegally
dismissed. 5 It ratiocinated that Se'lon by Aimee failed to prove
that the act of petitioner amounted to gross insubordination.
Other than respondents' bare denial of illegal dismissal, the
same was unsubstantiated by a clear and convincing evidence.
The NLRC further pointed out that respondents failed to
produce a copy of the supposed salon policy on the rule of
rotation of junior stylists, thus, the veracity of the allegation of
insubordination against Balais failed to convince.
 Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated April 22, 2010.
Thus, before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to annul or modify the Resolutions of the
NLRC.
On February 25, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and reversed and set aside the NLRC Decision and
rendered a Decision 6 sustaining petitioner's dismissal as valid
and required respondents to pay Balais his accrued 13th
month pay and unpaid salaries.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution dated April 19, 2011. Thus, the instant petition for
review on certiorari raising the following issues:AIDSTE

I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE BY DECLARING THE
PETITIONER AS VALIDLY DISMISSED WHICH IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AND CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF
THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC. 7
We find merit in the petition.
The Court's jurisdiction in cases brought before it from
the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to
consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule,
however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be
warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the NLRC and the LA, as in this
case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review the
records to determine which of them should be preferred as
more conformable to evidentiary facts. 8 In the instant case,
the conflict between the NLRC's and the CA's factual findings
as shown in the records of this case prompts the Court to
evaluate such findings anew.
Whether there was a valid dismissal.
The principle echoed and re-echoed in our jurisprudence
is that the onus of proving that the employee was dismissed
for a just cause rests on the employer, and the latter's failure
to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified. 9
In the instant case, a perusal of the records would show
that both parties presented their own versions of stories, not
necessarily contradicting but nonetheless lacking in some
material points.
Balais alleged that he was illegally dismissed as his
dismissal was allegedly made verbally and without due
process of law. Yet, Balais failed to explain what possibly
prompted said termination or even the likely motive for the
same. He nevertheless submitted the Affidavits of Gemma
Guerero 10 and Marie Gina A. Toralde,11 to prove his allegation.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that there was
no illegal dismissal as it was Balais himself who did not report
to work, thus, he abandoned his work.
Interestingly, however, both parties never denied that
there was an altercation between them. Without admitting that
he violated the salon policy of rotation of the junior stylists,
Balais maintained that said policy runs counter with
customary salon practice which allows senior hairstylists to
choose their preferred junior stylist to assist them. For their
part, supplemental to their claim of abandonment, respondents
averred that assuming that Balais was dismissed, they insisted
that there was a valid ground therefor as he was disrespectful
and insubordinate due to his failure to comply with the salon's
policy.
 Noteworthy is the fact that respondents never denied that
the incident narrated by Balais actually happened. In Solas v.
Power & Telephone Supply Phils., Inc.,12 this silence
constitutes an admission that fortifies the truth of the
employee's narration. While respondents were evasive on the
complete details of how the reported incident of termination
transpired, they never categorically denied that said incident
happened or the fact that Belarmino uttered: "get out of this
company! I do not need you here." Belarmino attempted to
sidestep the fact that she actually said it, yet, raised the
defense that assuming she had indeed verbally terminated
Balais, she was justified in doing so because of the disrespect
shown to her.
Under the rules of evidence, if an allegation is not
specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the
allegation is deemed admitted. 13 In fine, the fact that
respondents are even raising their own justification for the
alleged verbal dismissal means that the said verbal dismissal
actually transpired. If in the first place, said incident of verbal
dismissal truly never happened, there is nothing to assume
anymore or to justify. The fact that Belarmino was offering
justification for her action, it follows that indeed said incident
of verbally dismissing Balais on-the-spot actually happened.
Putting two versions of the story together, considering
that none of the parties categorically deny that an altercation
erupted between them which resulted in the dismissal of
Balais, and the tenor of Belarmino's statements leaving no
room for interpreting it other than a verbal dismissal, we are
inclined to believe that there was indeed a dismissal.
This being the case, having established that there was
dismissal, it becomes axiomatic that respondents prove that
the dismissal was valid.
Respondents averred that there was abandonment as
Balais failed to report back to work the following day after the
incident.
 In this regard, this Court finds that respondents failed to
establish that Balais abandoned his work. To constitute
abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason,
and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. 14 Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of
the employee to resume his employment without any intention
of returning. Respondents, other than their bare allegation of
abandonment, failed to prove that these two elements were
met. It cannot be said that Balais failed to report back to work
without justifiable reason as in fact he was told that he was no
longer wanted in the salon. AaCTcI

Moreover, we likewise note the high improbability of

petitioner intentionally abandoning his work, taking into
consideration his length of service, i.e., 18 years of service
with the salon. It does not make sense for an employee who
had worked for his employer for 18 years would just abandon
his work and forego whatever benefits he may be entitled,
unless he was made to believe or was told that he was already
terminated.
Respondents cannot discharge the burden of proving a
valid dismissal by merely alleging that they did not dismiss
Balais; neither can they escape liability by claiming that Balais
abandoned his work. When there is no showing of a clear, valid
and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law
considers it a case of illegal dismissal.
Thus, respondents, presumably thinking that their claim
of abandonment holds no water, it likewise manifested that
assuming Balais was indeed terminated, there was a valid
ground therefor because of his insubordination.
We disagree.
 Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a
just cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's
assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
attitude;" and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge. 15
It must be likewise stressed anew that the burden of
proving the insubordination as a just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure
to do so shall result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.
In this case, the salon policy of rotating the junior stylists
who will assist the senior stylist appears to be reasonable,
lawful, made known to petitioner and pertained to his duty as
senior hairstylist of respondent. However, if we will look at
Balais' explanation for his alleged disobedience thereto, it
likewise appears to be reasonable and lawful, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The duty of the Senior Stylist has the overall
function in seeing to it that the service accorded to the
client is excellent, thus, he has the right to refuse
service of a junior stylist whom he thinks that such
junior stylist cannot give equal or over and above the
service that he can give to the client, thus his refusal to
obey the respondent does not constitute a just cause for
the treatment given by respondent to herein respondent
(sic).
xxx xxx xxx
The fact alone that Balais failed to comply with the salon
policy does not establish that his conduct in failing to comply
with the salon's policy had been willful, or characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude. Balais' justification maybe
adverse to that of the salon's policy but it was neither willful
nor characterized by a perverse attitude. We take note that the
alleged non-compliance with the salon policy was brought to
the attention of Balais for the first time only during the said
incident. There was no showing of prior warnings as to his non-
compliance. While respondents wield a wide latitude of
discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and
regulations on work-related activities of its employees, these
must, however, be fair and reasonable at all times, and the
corresponding sanctions for violations thereof, when
prescribed, must be commensurate thereto as well as to the
degree of the infraction. Given that Balais' preference on who
will assist him is based on the junior stylists' competence, the
same should have been properly taken into account in the
imposition of the appropriate penalty for violation of the
rotation policy. Suspension would have sufficed to caution him
and other employees who may be wont to violate the same
policy.
In adjudging that the dismissal was grounded on a just
and valid cause, the totality of infractions or the number of
violations committed during the period of employment shall be
considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an
erring employee. 16 Let it not be forgotten that what is at stake
is the means of livelihood, the name, and the reputation of the
employee. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of the
management's prerogative to terminate an employee is to
negate the employee's constitutional right to security of
tenure.
Whether the dismissal was effected with
due process of law.
Under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, the employer
must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a
written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must
give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides, inter alia:
(a) . . .
 (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to
security of tenure and their right to be protected against
dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. . . .
In particular, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code states:
Sec. 2. Standards of due process: requirements of
notice. — In all cases of termination of employment, the
following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
1. For termination of employment based on
just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:

(a) A written notice served on the

employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to
said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which

the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so
desires, is given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence or
rebut the evidence presented against
him; and

(c) A written notice of termination

served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the
 circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

Thus, to effect the dismissal of an employee, the law

requires not only that there be just and valid cause as provided
under Article 282 of the Labor Code. It likewise enjoins the
employer to afford the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself. On the latter aspect, the employer is
mandated to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices:
(a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for
the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires; (b) if the employer decides to
terminate the services of the employee, the employer must
notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating
clearly the reason therefor.EcTCAD

Here, a perusal of the records revealed that, indeed,

Belarmino's manner of verbally dismissing Balais on-the-spot
fell short of the two-notice requirement. There was no showing
of prior warnings on Balais' alleged non-compliance with the
salon policy. There was no written notice informing him of his
dismissal as in fact the dismissal was done verbally and on-
the-spot. Respondents failed to furnish Balais the written
notice apprising him of the charges against him, as prescribed
by the Labor Code. There was no attempt to serve a notice of
dismissal on Balais. Consequently, he was denied due process
of law accorded in dismissals.
Reliefs of Illegally Dismissed Employees
Having established that Balais was illegally dismissed,
the Court now determines the reliefs that he is entitled to and
their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a
matter of right." Aside from the instances provided under
Articles 283 17 and 284 18of the Labor Code, separation pay is,
however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employer and the
employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine
is that separation pay is available in lieu of reinstatement
when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best
interest of the parties. 19
However, other than the strained relationship between the
parties, it appears that respondent salon had already ceased
operation of its business, thus, reinstatement is no longer
feasible. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the
petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered
as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up
to the finality of this judgment, as an alternative to
reinstatement. 20
Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled
to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their
actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of
their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of
their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an award of full
backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the
finality of this decision. 21
Balais is likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount
of 10% of the total monetary award pursuant to Article 111 22 of
the Labor Code. It is settled that where an employee was
forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights
and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally
justifiable. Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the
monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid. 23
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 25, 2011
and the Resolution dated April 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 114899 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The respondents are hereby declared GUILTY OF ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL AND ARE hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner,
Gregorio Balais, Jr., the following:
(a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service,
with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as
one (1) whole year from the time of his dismissal up to
the finality of this Decision;
(b) full backwages from the time of his illegal
dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; and
(c) attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the total monetary award.
The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case
is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of
petitioner's monetary award.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Balais, Jr. v. Se'Lon, G.R. No. 196557, [June 15, 2016])

11. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207315. November 23, 2016.]

INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PHILIPPINES, INC.,

BERNARDINO G. BANTEGUI, JR. and SONIA J.
GRANDEA, petitioners, vs. REBECCA F.
SIMBILLO,respondent.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the

January 4, 2013 Decision 2 and May 24, 2013 Resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120474, which set
aside the March 24, 2011 4 and May 19, 2011 5 Resolutions of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC
No. 12-003076-10. The NLRC affirmed the October 29, 2010
Decision 6 of the Labor Arbiter declaring respondent Rebecca
F. Simbillo's (Simbillo) dismissal by petitioners Interadent
Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. (Interadent) and its officers
Bernardino G. Bantegui, Jr. (Bantegui) and Sonia J. Grandea
(Grandea), as President and Human Resource & Organizational
Development Manager, respectively, valid on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence.
Antecedent Facts
Simbillo worked at Interadent as a rank-and-file employee
from May 2, 2004 up to March 2006. In April 2008, she was
rehired by Interadent as its Accounting Manager. On April 16,
2010, she was promoted to the position of Finance and
Accounting Manager. She was also Interadent's Treasurer upon
being elected by the Board of Directors on March 31, 2010.
On July 23, 2010, Interadent sought a company-wide
implementation of the following security measures: body
frisking and bag/personal items inspection of all employees
upon ingress and egress of office, disconnection of all USB
ports and prohibition of cellular phone usage. 7 The immediate
implementation of these security procedures was brought
about by an alleged leakage of security information uncovered
by Interadent's external auditors.
On July 28, 2010, upon the directive of Bantegui, all
network and internet connections in Interadent's Accounting
Department were removed and disabled. Simbillo's electronic
mail (email) account was likewise suspended. 8
On July 29, 2010, petitioners served Simbillo a
Memorandum 9 (Notice to Explain) requiring her to submit a
written explanation and to attend an administrative hearing on
August 2, 2010, regarding a message she posted on her
Facebook account "referring to company concerns with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and insulting statements
against a co-worker." In the Notice to Explain, Simbillo was
reminded that as Treasurer, as well as Finance and Accounting
Manager, she should observe the highest degree of
confidentiality in handling sensitive information. She was
preventively suspended for seven days effective July 29, 2010
to August 6, 2010.
On the following day, Simbillo, through counsel, wrote a
reply-letter 10 arguing that she was already constructively
dismissed even prior to her receipt of the Notice to Explain
considering the discriminatory acts committed by petitioners
starting July 23, 2010 when certain security procedures were
directed exclusively and solely against her. Simbillo claimed
that the Notice to Explain was defective and was only used to
disguise the intent to dismiss her; hence there was no need for
her to submit an answer or attend the hearing. Simbillo further
asserted that she committed no violation of any rule or law
relative to the message she posted on her personal and private
Facebook account that would justify any disciplinary action.
In a letter 11 dated August 6, 2010, petitioners extended
Simbillo's suspension up to August 25, 2010 in view of her
failure to submit a written explanation and to attend the
scheduled hearing. In a reply-letter 12 dated August 9, 2010,
Simbillo reiterated her claim of constructive dismissal and that
there was no need for her to answer and attend the hearing.
On August 9, 2010, Simbillo filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Complaint 13 for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, illegal
suspension, claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against petitioners.
On August 24, 2010, petitioners issued a Second
Notice 14 informing Simbillo of her termination from service
effective August 25, 2010 on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. Petitioners found Simbillo to have disclosed
sensitive and confidential information when she posted on her
Facebook account on July 15, 2010, the following:
Sana maisip din nila na ang kompanya kailangan ng mga
taong di tulad nila, nagtatrabaho at di puro #$,*% ang
pinaggagagawa, na kapag super demotivated na yung tao
nayun baka iwan narin nya ang kawawang kumpanya na
pinagpepyestahan ng mga b_i_r_. Wala na ngang
credibility wala pang conscience, portraying so
respectable and so religious pa. Hay naku talaga,
nakakasuka, puro nalang animus lucrandi ang laman ng
isip. 15
Parties' Respective Positions
Simbillo asserted that her dismissal was without just
cause or compliance with procedural due process since the
alleged loss of trust and confidence was based on self-serving
allegations and mere speculation. She averred that the
Facebook entry cannot support the charge of breach of trust
since it did not mention Interadent or any of its personnel. She
maintained that the message actually pertained to a friend's
predicament in another company. She explained that the
term"ng mga b_i_r_" in the Facebook message was short
for "bwitre" and certainly did not refer to the BIR. She claimed
that the sentiments that she expressed did not refer to herself
or her work. She denied having been penalized for a past
infraction which involved disclosure of confidential
information.
Petitioners, for their part, denied Simbillo's claim of
constructive dismissal for absence of proof. They asserted that
the security measures were implemented company-wide
without favoring or discriminating against anyone.
Moreover, Simbillo was terminated for a valid and just
cause and with compliance with procedural due process. As a
managerial and confidential employee of Interadent, the
highest degree of professionalism and confidentiality was
expected of Simbillo and the presence of the basis for the loss
of the trust and confidence reposed upon her has warranted
her dismissal. Petitioners posited that Simbillo's Facebook
message implying that the BIR is "feasting on" the company
was derogatory because it compromised the company's
reputation, making it vulnerable to ridicule and suspicion
particularly in its dealings with government agencies. Such act
violated the company's Code of Conduct as well as the Code of
Ethics for Professional Accountants. Furthermore, Simbillo's
second infraction of divulging sensitive and confidential
financial information has merited the penalty of termination.
Petitioners maintained that they observed due process by
serving Simbillo both the Notice to Explain and the Second
Notice of Termination. Simbillo was afforded the opportunity to
answer but instead waived her chance to do so by opting not
to submit an answer and attend the hearing.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In a Decision 16 dated October 29, 2010, the Labor Arbiter
ruled that Simbillo was not constructively dismissed because
she failed to prove her claim of discrimination. The security
measures were implemented as part of management
prerogative to preserve the integrity of Interadent's network
system and encompassed all employees as gleaned from a
poster 17 Simbillo herself submitted. The Labor Arbiter
sustained Simbillo's preventive suspension since her
continued presence during investigation posed an imminent
threat to the company's confidential information and records.
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Simbillo was validly
dismissed. He held that there was no need for an actual
leakage of confidential information for Simbillo to be held
accountable; her mere laxity and carelessness in posting a
statement on her Facebook account that exposed the company
to ridicule already rendered her unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed on her. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we uphold the
legality of the dismissal of complainant. No
pronouncement as to costs. 18
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
In a Resolution 19 dated March 24, 2011, the NLRC
affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that Simbillo was not
constructively dismissed but was validly dismissed for loss of
trust and confidence. The NLRC held that the Facebook entry
was "indeed alarming" as it compromised Interadent's
reputation and was sufficient basis for the finding of willful
breach of trust. It also ruled that Simbillo was not denied due
process and that she was the one who did not avail herself of
the opportunity to explain her side. The dispositive portion of
the NLRC ruling reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED, and the appealed decision
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 20

Simbillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was,

however, denied in the NLRC Resolution 21 dated May 19, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, Simbillo filed a Petition for Certiorari 22 before
the CA ascribing upon the NLRC grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
legality of her dismissal.
The CA, in a Decision 23 dated January 4, 2013, found
merit in Simbillo's Petition. It ruled that to constitute a valid
cause for dismissal, the breach of trust should be willful and
intentional, which petitioners failed to prove in this case. It
rejected petitioners' allegation that Simbillo divulged
confidential company information. It noted that the Facebook
entry did not contain any corporate record or confidential
information but was merely "a vague expression of feelings or
opinion towards a person or entity, which was not even
identified with certainly." 24 It pointed out that the
term "b_i_r_" in the entry cannot be construed as the acronym
"B.I.R." or the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Finding no willful
breach of trust, the CA held that Simbillo's dismissal was
illegal and ordered the payment of her separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement due to strained relations of the parties plus
backwages. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition of GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated March 24, 2011 and May 19, 2011 of
the National Labor Relations Commission, are hereby
SET ASIDE. Finding private respondent InteraDent
Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. to have dismissed
petitioner Rebecca Simbillo without valid or just cause,
InteraDent is hereby ordered to pay her a separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement, of one (1) month salary for every
year of service plus full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent from the time her compensation was withheld
until the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED. 25

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was

denied by the CA in its Resolution 26 dated May 24, 2013.
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari 27 and a Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 28 to
restrain the implementation of the CA Decision and Resolution.
Issues
Petitioners raise the question on whether the CA may
reverse the factual declarations of both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC that there was substantial evidence of willful and
intentional breach of trust. According to petitioners, the CA
has no power to revisit the findings of fact of the NLRC by
making the following erroneous interpretations in its Decision:
a) that the Facebook entry "does not contain any corporate
record or confidential information;" b) that the entry is "[a]t
worst, . . . a vague expression of feelings or opinion towards a
person or entity, which was not even identified with
certainty;" 29 and (c) that the term "b_i_r_" "does not, in any
way, represent the acronym 'B.I.R.' or Bureau of Internal
Revenue." 30 In essence, they insist that, on account of such
Facebook post, Simbillo has failed to observe the degree of
cautiousness expected of a manager like herself and therefore
may be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
As a rule, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such
as the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but also
finality because of the special knowledge and expertise gained
by these agencies from handling matters under their
specialized jurisdiction. 31 However, well-settled is the rule that
for want of substantial basis, in fact or in law, these factual
findings cannot be given the stamp of finality and
conclusiveness normally accorded to it. 32 Hence, the CA can
review the factual findings or legal conclusions of the NLRC
and "is not proscribed from 'examining evidence anew to
determine whether the factual findings of the NLRC are
supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions
derived therefrom accurately ascertained.'" 33 In the exercise
of its power to review decisions of the NLRC, the CA can make
its own factual determination when it finds that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or disregarding the
evidence which are material to the controversy. 34 In the
instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the
conclusions arrived at by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
manifestly erroneous because the evidence does not support
their findings.
As a managerial employee, the existence of a basis for
believing that Simbillo has breached the trust of petitioners
justifies her dismissal. 35 However, to be a valid ground, loss of
trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of trust,
that is, done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently. 36
It bears emphasizing that the right of an employer
to dismiss its employees on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily. For loss
of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for
dismissal, it must be substantial and founded on clearly
established facts. Loss of confidence must not be used
as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified; it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought,
to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. Because of its
subjective nature, this Court has been very scrutinizing
in cases of dismissal based on loss of trust and
confidence because the same can easily be concocted
by an abusive employer. . . . 37
In this case, the act alleged to have caused the loss of
trust and confidence of petitioners in Simbillo was her
Facebook post which supposedly suggests that Interadent was
being "feasted on" by the BIR and also contains insulting
statements against a co-worker and hence has compromised
the reputation of the company. According to petitioners, there
was disclosure of confidential information that gives the
impression that Interadent is under investigation by the BIR for
irregular transactions. However, we agree with the CA's
observation that the Facebook entry did not contain any
corporate record or any confidential information. Otherwise
stated, there was really no actual leakage of information. No
company information or corporate record was divulged by
Simbillo.
Simbillo's failure to substantiate her claim that the
Facebook entry was posted for a friend who consulted her on a
predicament she has with her company and that the
term "b_i_r_" represents "bwitre" will not weaken her case
against petitioners. It must be emphasized at this point that in
illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is upon the
employer to show that the employee's dismissal was for a valid
cause. 38 "The employer's case succeeds or fails on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that
adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that
the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in
case of doubt in the evidence presented by them." 39 The
Facebook entry did not mention any specific name of
employer/company/government agency or person. Contrary to
petitioners' insistence, the intended subject matter was not
clearly identifiable. As acknowledged by petitioners
themselves, Simbillo's Facebook account contained a list of
her former and present employers. If anything, the entry would
merely merit some suspicion on the part of Interadent being
the present employer, but it would be far-fetched to conclude
that Interadent may be involved in anomalous transactions
with the BIR. Clearly, petitioners' theory was based on mere
speculations.
If at all, Simbillo can only be said to have acted
"carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently" in
making such a comment on Facebook; however, such would not
amount to loss of trust and confidence as to justify the
termination of her employment. When the breach of trust or
loss of confidence conjectured upon is not borne by clearly
established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the ground
of loss of trust and confidence cannot be upheld.
Petitioners' contention that Simbillo's second offense of
divulging confidential company information merits her
termination deserves scant consideration. Other than self-
serving allegations of petitioners, there was no concrete proof
that Simbillo had a past infraction involving disclosure of
confidential information of the company. If indeed Simbillo has
been found guilty for not being trustworthy due to an incident
that happened in July 2009 as alleged by petitioners, she
should not have been promoted to a higher position as Finance
and Accounting Manager in April 2010 and elected as Treasurer
in March 2010. Moreover, she was given salary and merit
increases for the period covering June 2009-May 2010, 40 which
is an indication of her high performance rating.
 All told, we find no reversible error on the CA in finding
that Simbillo was illegally dismissed. The allegation of loss of
trust and confidence was not supported by substantial
evidence, hence, we find Simbillo's dismissal unjustified. A
lighter penalty would have sufficed for Simbillo's laxity and
carelessness. As this Court has held, termination of
employment is a drastic measure reserved for the most
serious of offenses. 41
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 4, 2013
Decision and May 24, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 120474 areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. v. Simbillo, G.R. No.
207315, [November 23, 2016])

12. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 215555. July 29, 2015.]

CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. and ANTONIO

STEVEN L. CHAN, petitioners, vs. JANET T.
SIASON, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the

Decision 2 dated March 14, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated
November 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 130708, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated December 26,
2012 and the Resolution 5 dated April 30, 2013 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 07-
001998-12 declaring respondent Janet T. Siason (Siason) to
have been constructively dismissed by petitioners Central
Azucarera de Bais, Inc. (CABI) and Antonio Steven L. Chan
(Chan), the incumbent president of CABI (collectively,
petitioners).
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal, nonpayment of wages, separation pay, service
incentive leave pay, retirement benefits, emergency cost of
living allowance, with damages and attorney's fees filed by
Siason against petitioners before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-
NCR-CASE No. 11-17043-11. 6
Siason alleged that sometime in July 1988, petitioners
hired her as a Purchasing Assistant, and eventually, promoted
her to the position of Purchasing Officer. 7On October 3, 2011,
Chan confronted her on the propriety of the delivery of a
machine part via air freight in lieu of a previously approved sea
freight. She responded by explaining to Chan that such
delivery benefited the company, but the latter considered the
same as a "big infraction of the rules and regulations of
[CABI]." 8 Later that day, Siason received a letter 9 signed by
Chan informing her that she had been committing various
purchasing policy violations over the past 12 months which are
very unfavorable to CABI, and that the management could no
longer turn a blind eye on such violations; as such, she should
tender her immediate resignation from CABI, "rather than [to]
force [his] hand." 10 On October 4, 2011, Siason received
another letter, 11 this time from CABI's legal officer, Atty.
Suzette A. Ner-Tiangco (Atty. Ner-Tiangco), following up the
former's action regarding Chan's letter. Consequently, Siason
wrote a resignation letter, 12 stating that she was tendering her
resignation because Chan told her to do so. However,
petitioners refused to accept the same, 13 thus, Siason was
constrained to draft another resignation letter 14which was
acceptable to petitioners. On November 14, 2011, Siason filed
the instant complaint against petitioners alleging that Chan
forced her to resign as shown by his October 3, 2011 letter. 15
In their defense, 16 petitioners claimed that Siason was
not constructively dismissed since she voluntarily resigned
from CABI. 17 They explained that CABI's accounting
department audited the purchases made by Siason and
discovered irregularities in the procurement of several
supplies, such as when she increased price quotations without
the approval of CABI or of the supplier concerned. 18 They then
averred that in view of her long tenure in CABI and close
relationship with Chan, she was given the option of resigning
instead of facing an administrative investigation which would
eventually result in her termination. 19 Lastly, they asserted
that Siason shredded all company documents in her
possession and made unauthorized deletion of files stored in
her office-issued computer in order to cover her misdeeds. 20
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 21 dated May 24, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed Siason's complaint for lack of merit. Nevertheless,
Siason was awarded separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month pay for every year of service in the amount of
P923,210.00 in the interest of equity and compassion. 22
In ruling for petitioners, the LA found that petitioners did
not constructively dismiss Siason, since the latter voluntarily
resigned from her job. In this relation, the LA opined that if
Siason really had no intention to resign, no amount of
persuasion or instruction shall suffice to compel her to tender
her resignation. 23 Her voluntary resignation notwithstanding,
the LA opted to award separation pay in Siason's favor in view
of her long tenure in CABI as well as her humility, respect, and
obedience to the instruction of her superior when she was
asked to resign. 24
Dissatisfied, both parties appealed 25 to the NLRC.
Specifically, petitioners questioned the award of separation
pay in Siason's favor, while the latter assailed the finding that
she voluntarily resigned. 26
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision 27 dated December 26, 2012, the NLRC
reversed the LA ruling and held that petitioners constructively
dismissed Siason. Accordingly, it ordered petitioners to pay
Siason the aggregate amount of P1,736,041.95 representing
backwages, separation pay, and attorney's fees. 28
Contrary to the LA's findings, the NLRC found that Chan
coerced Siason to resign, as may be gleaned from his October
3, 2011 letter addressed to the latter. Further, the NLRC
pointed out that petitioners' disposition to force Siason into
resignation became more evident when taken in conjunction
with Atty. Ner-Tiangco's October 4, 2011 letter pressuring
Siason to tender her immediate resignation. 29 CAIHTE

Petitioners moved for reconsideration 30 which was,

however, denied in a Resolution 31 dated April 30, 2013.
Aggrieved, they elevated the case to the CA viapetition
for certiorari. 32
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 33 dated March 14, 2014, the CA affirmed the
NLRC ruling. It held that petitioners constructively dismissed
Siason, considering that the latter would not have resigned
from her job had it not been for the pressure exerted by Chan
on her. 34 The CA added that Siason's filing of a complaint for
constructive dismissal right after her severance from office
negated the voluntariness of her resignation. 35
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, 36 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution 37 dated November 25, 2014;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
CA correctly affirmed the NLRC ruling finding Siason to have
been constructively dismissed by petitioners.
 Essentially, petitioners contend that there is no
constructive dismissal to speak of, given that they merely
afforded Siason the option to have a "graceful exit" by
tendering her resignation instead of facing administrative
investigation and eventual sanctions for the irregularities she
committed regarding the purchase of supplies. 38 For her part,
Siason maintains that petitioners forced her to resign from
CABI, and thus, she was constructively dismissed. 39
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Resignation is the formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of
an employee who is in a situation where he believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency
of the service, and he has then no other choice but to
disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish
must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation
must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended
to terminate his employment. In illegal dismissal cases, it is a
fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the
defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to
prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. 40
In contrast, constructive dismissal exists where there is
cessation of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits.
Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive
dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable
on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice
by him except to forego his continued employment. 41 It must
be noted, however, that bare allegations of constructive
dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record,
cannot be given credence. 42
 Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds
that the CA erred in affirming the NLRC ruling, which found
Siason to have been constructively dismissed by petitioners.
A judicious review of the records reveals that CABI's
accounting department indeed made an audit of the purchases
made by the company through its Purchasing Officer, Siason.
This resulted in the discovery of a number of questionable
discrepancies in several purchasing transactions undertaken
by Siason, consisting in different price quotations for identical
items contained in various purchase documents prepared by
Siason herself. 43 Taking into consideration Siason's long
tenure at CABI, as well as her close relationship with Chan, the
latter sent her the October 3, 2011 letter asking her to resign
"rather than [to] force [his] hand" 44— which should be
construed as Chan telling Siason to resign or be faced with an
administrative complaint. On October 4, 2011, Atty. Ner-
Tiangco sent Siason another letter, essentially confirming if
the latter was going to resign or if she is subjecting herself to
an administrative investigation. Ultimately, Siason chose to
tender her resignation to save herself from the trouble of
besmirching her employment record.
The foregoing facts belie Siason's argument that
petitioners constructively dismissed her. These circumstances
show that she was given the option to voluntarily resign from
CABI, instead of dealing with an investigation which might
result in her dismissal. Verily, Chan's decision to give Siason a
graceful exit rather than to file an action for redress is
perfectly within the discretion of the former; as it is not
uncommon that an employee is permitted to resign to avoid
the humiliation and embarrassment of being terminated for
just cause after the exposure of her malfeasance. 45 It is
settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the
employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save
face rather than smear the latter's employment record, 46 as in
this case.DETACa
 In sum, petitioners did not constructively dismiss Siason;
but rather, the latter voluntarily resigned from her job in order
to avoid a full-blown administrative trial regarding her
misdeeds which could potentially result in her termination for
just cause. While it may be said that she did not tender her
resignation wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making
did not give her any other option but to voluntarily do
so. 47 Therefore, in view of her voluntary resignation from CABI,
she is not entitled to any separation pay in the absence of any
agreement with petitioners providing for such. 48
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated March 14, 2014 and the Resolution dated November 25,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 130708 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly the Decision
dated May 24, 2012 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-CASE No.
11-17043-11 isREINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of separation pay is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc. v. Siason, G.R. No. 215555 ,
[July 29, 2015])