Professional Documents
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From the said decision Antonio Lusin filed a motion for fishpond surrounded with dikes. A concrete gate was constructed (3) Land covered with water bordering upon the shores of navigable
reconsideration which was denied as per order of this Office dated on the western side of the fishpond in 1951. Water breakers were lakes or rivers.
February 28, 1953. Still not satisfied with the aforementioned order, constructed around the dikes to protect them from the action of the
waves. The remaining portion of the area in question is fenced with The phrase "bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or river"
Lusin again filed a second notion for reconsideration predicating his
bamboo stakes. in said provision modifies only the third classification, that is, "lands
motion on the following grounds:
covered with water", for if the law that said phrase should modify
1. That he (Lusin) is in actual ion of the land in question since 1920; On the other hand, it is apparent that the area in question is an the three types of land enumerated are then the punctuation mark,
extension of Lot 986 to the sea and that its present existence is the comma, should not have been placed before the alternative "or"
2. That said area is an agricultural land actually devoted to fishpond result of the continuous recession of the water of the sea. There is but instead between the words "water" and "bordering" making
and, therefore, is not a foreshore land; no doubt that the area in question is a foreshore, it being situated said provision to appear as follows:
along the shore lying between medium high and low water marks
3. That even granting without admitting that Santolan is a riparian The owner of the property adjoining foreshore ands marshy lands or
and is covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of ordinary tide.
owner, Santolan had lost his riparian right thereto in view of the lands covered with water, bordering upon the shores or banks of
continuous ion by Lusin of the area since 1920; and Both Parties claim prior ion of the disputed area, Santolan's claim navigable lakes or rivers ... .
dating way back in 1907, the year he claims said area was donated
4. That in the investigation relied upon by the Director of Lands in The use of the alternative "or" instead of the conjunction "and"
to him by his father-in-law while Lusin alleges that he was already in
his decision and confirmed by this Office, the movant herein was shows the intention of the law in segregating foreshore lands from
possession of the same since 1920. The evidence presented by both
not given opportunity to be heard because the said investigation marshy lands and those two from lands covered with water
parties during the reinvestigation were so diametrically opposed
was never completed, and as a result, the conclusions of the bordering upon shores of navigable lakes or rivers.
with each other that they only create doubts as to the veracity of
investigator thereat were one sided
the respective claims of said parties. From the testimonies of
It is also alleged that even granting that Santolan was the
Adhering to its Policy of giving party litigants the outmost witnesses for both sides, there could be gathered sufficient grounds
preferential rights accorded to a riparian owner, said right has
opportunity to present their respective sides of the case, this Office to believe that prior to 1942, neither Party Possessed the area to
prescribed on the ground that Lusin has been in continuous ion of
ordered a reinvestigation of the case to determine whether or not the exclusion of the other. Rather, there are good reasons to believe
the said area since 1920. This allegation was not duly proven during
the allegations of Antonio Lusin are true. that both parties fished in the premises jointly and/or
the reinvestigation. While Lusin claims ion of the disputed area
since 1920, on the other hand. Santolan claims that he possessed area and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate public During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this
the same since 1907 when it was donated to him by his land application therefor. Office, it was found that Lusin was the, actual occupant of the
father-in-law. As we have- already stated, it is the - finding of this disputed area since 1951. During his occupation, Lusin was
Office that prior to 1942, neither party the premises exclusively. It SO ORDERED. introduced considerable improvements in the area, investing his life
was only in 1942 when Santolan took positive steps to claim the Manila, Philippines, December 14, 1954. savings therein. At the time of inspection, approximately two (2)
area for himself. There are even evidence on record that Santolan hectares of the said area was a veritable and complete with dikes
paid the land taxes for the area in 1936. In 1951, Lusin effected his By Authority of the Secretary: and water breakers, and the remaining portion was surrounded
entry to the area up to the present. It may be recalled, however, with bamboo stakes. While this Office of Lusin's occupation as
JAIME M. FERRER
that these actuations of Lusin had been the subject of a criminal having effected by force, this Office also believes that such force
Undersecretary of Agriculture
complaint filed by Santolan before the Justice of the Peace Court of was employed by Lusin only to enforce what he believed was his
and Natural Resources
Kawit, Cavite, wherein Lusin was acquitted on the ground that his right over the property in question. This being the case, justice and
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. equity demands that Lusin should be compensated of the
improvements introduced by him in the area in question by
Needless to say, proof beyond reasonable doubt is absolutely ANNEX F whomsoever shall enjoy the fruits of his (Lusin's) toil. Julian
necessary before conviction in criminal cases could be had. On the Santolan, being the person who shall benefit from said
other hand, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove a ORDER
improvements, it is only fair and just that he should reimburse Lusin
matter of fact in civil and/or administrative cases. The On December 14, 1954, this Office issued an order in connection of the value of said improvements, especially considering that the
preponderance of evidence adduced at the reinvestigation of this with the above-entitled case wherein the rejection of the foreshore said area adjudicated to Santolan is already a producing fishpond.
case conducted by a representative of this Office, shows that the lease application and revocable permit (both new) of Antonio Lusin
present occupation of Lusin of the area in question was effected by was upheld and Foreshore Lease Action No. V-62 of Julian Santolan Antonio Lusin, on the other hand, contends that the order sought to
force, although there are good reasons to believe that such force given due course provided he reimburses Antonio Lusin of the be reconsidered is contrary to the facts of the case and to the law
was employed by Lusin to assert what he believed was his right over appraised value of the improvements now existing in the area applicable thereto.
the property in question. within sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal. Lusin assigns the following errors as having been allegedly
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is therefore, From said order, both parties to this conflict filed separate motions committed by this Office:
apparent that the area in question is a foreshore land, and Santolan, seeking reconsideration of the same.
being the riparian owner, is entitled to the preferential rights (1) In holding that the possession of Lusin dated only as Of 195 1;
accorded by the provision of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Santolan premised his motion on the theory that as fat as that po of (2) In holding that the ion of Lusin was effected through force;
Order No. 7-1. Considering, however, the fact that during the the order which requires him to reimburse Lusin of the appraised
reinvestigation of this case, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin had value of the improvements within sixty (60) days after notification (3) In holding that Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1
introduced considerable improvements in the premises and had of said appraisal is concerned, same is contrary to the provisions of is applicable in the instant case;
invested his life savings therefor, and considering further that if Commonwealth Act No. 141 and of the New Civil Code.
(4) In not holding that the preferential rights of Julian Santolan,
Santolan were the one who converted the area into a fishpond, as
Santolan argues that the best procedure that should have been granting that he has any, has already prescribed; and
he intends to do, he would have incurred the same expenses as was
followed in the disposition of this case was for the Government to
incurred by Lusin in the premises in question, it is the belief of this (5) In giving due course to the foreshore lease application of
forfeit all the improvements introduced by Lusin in the area in
Office that justice would be fully served if Santolan be required to Santolan for the entire area in question.
question in its (Government's) favor and then let Santolan pay to
reimburse Lusin of the value of the improvements now existing in
the Government the appraised value of said improvements within With respect to the first two assignments of errors, a review of the
the area as may be appraised by the Committee on Appraisal of the
ten (10) years after notification of said appraisal. He further argues records of this case shows that the findings of this Office are in
Bureau of Lands.
that the "law does not authorize the Secretary of Agriculture and accordance with the facts of the case as deduced from the
WHEREFORE, the above-noted foreshore lease (New) application Natural Resources to dispose of the proceeds of the sale of the reinvestigation Of this conflict, and as supported by previous
and revocable permit (New) application of Antonio Lusin should improvement to any person whomsoever", and "certainly the records of this case. This Office, therefore, finds no sufficient ground
remain, as hereby it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease Application Secretary does not claim the prerogative of disbursing government to disturb its findings of facts.
No. V-65 of Julian Santolan given due course, PROVIDED, he funds without authority of law."
reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the Anent the next two assignments of errors, which are mere
In the first place, the order sought to be reconsidered does not reiteration of movant's allegation in his previous memorandum, and
improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days after
contemplate any ale from which proceeds could be disposed of by which were thoroughly passed upon by this Office, it is believed that
notification of said appraisal.
the Secretary "to any person whomsoever". In the second Place, in discussing them further is no longer necessary since after another
The Director of Lands is hereby directed to instruct the Committee the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered this Office has close examination of the case, this Office finds its disposition in this
on Appraisal concerned to make the necessary appraisal of the taken into consideration the Provisions of Wealth Act No. 141 and particular respect well justified and in accordance with the law and
value of the improvements now existing in the area in question those of the Civil Code cited by movant Santolan with in go me regulations applicable thereto.
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this order and to notify Julian respect to the forfeiture ' favor of the government of the
Santolan of the result of said appraisal. improvements found in the areas covered by rejected applications. Now coming to the last allegation, Lusin contends that the
However, this Office is also fully aware of that cardinal principle that foreshore lease application of Julian Santolan, if given the course,
In the event that Julian Santolan fails to reimburse Antonio Lusin of 'no man shall enrich himself at the expense of another. should not cover the entire area in question. Movant Lusin advances
the appraisal value of the said improvements within the period the theory that since the reason behind the law in granting
specified in this order, he shall lose his preferential rights over the preferential rights to reparian owners is to compensate for
whatever loss said riparian owner may suffer from the actions of the Eduardo G. Makalintal for private respondent. petitioner was a certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that
water, said riparian owner cannot stand to lose more than what he the Order sought to be appealed from had long become final and
owns, and therefore, since Santolan's property, which adjoins the executory as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
area in question, is only two (2) hectares, Santolan can never lose MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: was pro-forma and did not suspend the running of the reglementary
more than two hectares. period of appeal.
This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari filed by the
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the particular Republic of the Philippines from the Decision of the Court of On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and
Point of law involved provides as follows: Appeals promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. mandamus with the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial Court
Sp-01504 denying the State's Petition for certiorari and Mandamus. gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction when,
32. Preference of Riparian Owner.— The owner of the property without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition
adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: for Review; and since said Petition raised certain issues of fact which
water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or cannot be decided except in a trial on the merits, the dismissal of
rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands, adjoining Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967,
the Petition on the basis of private respondent's Opposition,
his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the
considered as a Motion to Dismiss, constituted a denial of due
the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of
process of law. Petitioner then prayed that the Order of the trial
that he applied therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971.0569 hectares, pursuant
Court, dated December 20, 1968 dismissing the Petition for Review,
receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him to Republic Act No. 931, as amended by Republic Act No. 2061,
be declared null and void, and that said trial Court be directed to
of his preferential right. docketed as Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097. In the
give due course to the Petition for Review; or, in the alternative, to
absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from
The above-quoted provision of the Lands Administrative Order does give due course to petitioner's appeal.
private individuals, private respondent was allowed to present her
not impose any restriction or limitation with respect to the extent of evidence ex-parte. On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
the area to which a riparian owner is preferred as long as said area Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of Court's dismissal of the Petition for Review stating:
is not needed for public service. The said order, being clear on this private respondent. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance
point, this Office has no other alternative but to interpret said of a decree of registration on November 20, 1967, and on ... We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which
regulation in the meaning it clearly conveys. November 21, 1967, the Land Registration Commission issued shows that private respondent had committed fraud against
Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, petitioner. Its representations and officials were duly notified of
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant private respondent's petition for reopening and registration of title
motion for reconsideration filed respectively by the conflicting Original Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor.
Private respondent thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and in her name. In said petition, the technical descriptions of the
parties herein, should be, as hereby they are, denied. portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre,
the corresponding titles. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 18905 to
SO ORDERED. 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds. subject-matter of the petition were expressly stated, the boundaries,
specifically delineated. The alleged ground that the land forms part
On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said
registration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. petition. Failure to file opposition is in effect, an admission that the
38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the petition is actually not part of a forest land. Indubitably, therefore,
period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said no justifiable reason exists for the annulment of the Order, dated
parcel of land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan. December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) of the lower court dismissing
which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines herein petitioner's petition for review of the decree issued in favor
only on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public of private respondent Lastimado. 1
forest of Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to
disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law. Respondent The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows:
field an Opposition thereto, which was considered by the trial Court, WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed
as a Motion to Dismiss, and on December 20,1968, said Court any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the
(Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing the issuance of an Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition)
Petition for Review mainly on the ground that the Solicitor General dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review, the present
had failed to file opposition to the original Petition for reopening of petition for review is hereby denied.
the cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from
questioning the decree of registration ordered issued therein. On The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition
January 28, 1969, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was is no longer necessary as this Court, in the exercise of its appellate
denied by the trial Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of jurisdiction and authority to supervise orderly administration of
merit. justice, has already resolved on the merits the question whether or
not the dismissal of the petition for review had been done with
Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2
Appeal, which was objected to by private respondent. On July 15,
G.R. No. L-39473 April 30, 1979
1972, or three years later, * the trial Court (Judge Abraham P. Vera, From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, presiding) refused to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed (Appeal) by certiorari assigning the following errors to the Court of
vs. a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial Court denied it in its Appeals and to the trial Court:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO, respondents. Order of October 14, 1972 on the ground that the proper remedy of
1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding sought to be annulled was rendered. 5 The following ruling spells the d without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and
that there can be possession, even for the purpose of claiming title, out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud: claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is
of land which at the time of possession is subject to a military predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower Court should
reservation. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it."
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
2. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside
that such land which is subject to a government reservation, may attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented the military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it
appropriately be the subject of cadastral proceedings, and hence. from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic cannot be the object of any cadastral p nor can it be the object of
also of a petition to reopen cadastral proceedings. fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial reopening under Republic Act No. 931. 9 Similarly, if the land in
such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which question, indeed forms part of the public forest, then, possession
3. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding did not affect the present action of the case, but did prevent a fair thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it
that a parcel of land which is part of the public forest is susceptible and just determination of the case. 6 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
of occupation and registration in favor of private individual. beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register
The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the under the Torrens System. 10
4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not Court. 7
finding that the Republic of the Philippines is not estopped from Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for
questioning the decree of registration and the title issued pursuant In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor General claims that it
thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado over the parcel of land in alleged that fraud was committed by private respondent when she received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by
question. misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its
in possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and officials or agents. 11 Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal
5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the adversely against the whole world as owner for more than forty
Republic of the Philippines. consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity,
years when, in fact, the subject land was in. side the former U.S. which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land"
6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's petition for Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the under basic Constitutional Precepts, and that it is moreover charged
certiorari and mandamus. Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she with the conservation of such patrimony. 12
likewise contended that her rights, as derived from the original and
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides: primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
confirmation under existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of 30, 1974, dismissing the Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of
land is within the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, and is not before it, as well as the Order of the Court of First Instance of
decree.
subject to disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Bataan (Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing the Petition
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse Public Land Law. for Review, are hereby set aside and the records of this case hereby
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and ed to the latter Court for further proceedings to enable petitioner to
The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that present evidence in support of its Petition for Review.
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration
no fraud was committed by private respondent, which deprived
shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land,
petitioner of its day in Court as there was no showing that she was No pronouncement as to costs.
and quiet title thereto. subject only to the exceptions stated in the
aware of the facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not
following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, SO ORDERED.
have suppressed them with intent to deceive. The trial Court also
including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
noted that petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice of citation,
reopening of the cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only
or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern".
to the Solicitor General as required by Republic Act No. 931. but to
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as well. It then
or other disability of any person affect thereby, nor by any
concluded that "the remedy granted by section 38 of the Land
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
Registration Act is designed to give relief to victims of fraud, not to
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
those who are victims of their own neglect, inaction or carelessness,
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
especially when no attempt is ever made to excuse or justify the
fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for
neglect." With the foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court
review within one year after entry of the decree provided no
dismissed the Petition for Review.
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... 3
We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the
The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review
parties to submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition for
of a decree are: a) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right;
Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in
b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that the
the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed
petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
the Petition outright but should have afforded petitioner an
e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to
purchaser. 4
constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private
However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., 8 it was
extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not held that "the action of the lower Court in denying the petition for
been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment review of a decree of registration filed within one year from entry of