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Raven Graham

HNRS 0205: Schur

Definition Paper

February 2nd, 2018

An Issue of Social Justice

It was said by Albert Einstein, the great theoretical physicist, that, “Striving for social

justice is the most valuable thing to do in life.” What is social justice however, that which has

eluded a conclusive definition since before the Enlightenment and its glorious philosophers, such

as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kent? Such great thinkers often focused on the construction of

just and perfect institutions as the solution to the ailments of the world, fueled by esteemed logic

and reason. In The Idea of Justice however, Amartya Sen articulately argues for not a definition

of justice, but a theory of social justice, based on objectivity, openness, tempered emotion, and

imperfection, using comparative methods and results to rid the world of the immediate injustices

it faces. Ultimately, the answer is perhaps best given by what reasoned and reasonable

characteristics a theory of justice should and should not be possessed by, and what ideology

serves as not an infallible foundation, but rather an inspiration for change and improvement in

the real world. Such a theory while comparative in nature, should very well take into

consideration the progress made by transcendentalists, be open and impartial in nature, place

emphasis on choice and capability, and be democratic in nature.

The first and most fundamental issue regarding a theoretical understanding of a theory of

social justice is whether such a theory should be transcendental or comparative in nature. In the

transcendental approach, pioneered by Thomas Hobbes in the 1600s, one concentrates largely on

“identifying just institutional arrangements for a society” (Sen 5). Further elaborated upon by
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intellectuals past and present, transcendentalism (often also referred to transcendental

institutionalism) is characterized by its focus on the identification of “perfect justice” and the

formation of perfectly just institutions for implementation by societies. (Sen 5-6) Realization-

focused comparison, or simply comparative justice, meanwhile focuses primarily on

“comparative approaches that were concerned with social realizations (resulting from actual

institutions, actual behavior and other influences)” (Sen 7). It is by way of contemporary

transcendentalists, such as Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, David Gauthier, and especially John

Rawls that social justice has continued to be explored in recent years, and a contributing factor to

the writing of The Theory of Justice. As stated by Sen on page 8, “Their theories, which have

provided different, but respectively important, insights into the demands of a ‘just society’, share

the common aim of identifying just rules and institutions…” Given its eminence amongst

theorists and Enlightenment tradition, transcendental tradition has served as the “… central

exercise in the modern theories of justice,” (Sen 8). All of this, however, cannot compensate for

the inherent flaws found in the transcendental tradition. First of all, the transcendental theory

does not allow for different reasoning, or plural groundings, even if the just conclusion is

reached. In a perfect theory of justice, only a single perfect line of reasoning may exist.

Additionally, transcendentalism cannot account for the realities of human behavior, in which no

one person is reasonable, logical, and conforms to social norms and rules all of, or even the

majority of a lifetime. Furthermore, in the transcendental theory, only one line of impartial and

non-arbitrary reasoning may exist, when in reality often multiple impartial and non-arbitrary

lines of reasoning can exist within a single society, based on personal philosophy. Thus as given

by Sen on page 15, “There may not indeed exist any identifiable perfectly just social

arrangement on which impartial agreement would emerge.” Finally, the implementation of a


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transcendental system on the global level would not be feasible. Ultimately, a theory of justice

may take into account the strides made by transcendental theorists, but be comparative at its

core, focusing on real-world results.

Another important aspect in the formation of a theory of justice is impartiality through

the open system. Impartiality is essential due to the influence of local parochialisms and vested

interests in decision-making on humans. Rawls, the transcendental theorist, proposed that

impartiality could be enforced through the use of the “original position” and “veil of ignorance”

when forming the principles of justice for a society. As given on page 54, Sen states,

The original position is an imagined situation of primordial equality, when the parties

involved have no knowledge of their personal identities, or their respective vested

interests, within the group as a whole. Their representatives have to choose under this

‘veil of ignorance’, that is, in an imagined state of selective ignorance (in particular,

ignorance about the distinct personal interests and actual views of a good life- what

Rawls calls ‘comprehensive preferences ‘), and it is that state of devised ignorance that

the principles of justice are chosen unanimously.

While Sen acknowledges that such a solution would remove vested interests, he refutes that such

a purposeful state of ignorance could remove the group from its various parochialisms, which

encourage conformity of thought and action and is so utterly invasive that they become a part of

one’s being. Instead, Sen says that under the veil of ignorance not only the representatives of the

nation-state would be included, but other individuals from different societies and cultures, with

their own parochialisms. This would be in keeping with Adam Smith’s idea of the “impartial

spectator” and an open system. By way of the impartial spectator, no matter if others take part or
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the breadth of inquiry is broadened, parochialisms, which may very well be detrimental or

unjust, may be scrutinized or negated. Sen, on page 125 further explains this idea, stating,

“Smith invoked the reflective device of the impartial spectator to go beyond reasoning that

may… be constrained by local conventions of thought…to examine deliberately, as a procedure,

what the accepted conventions would look like from the perspective of a ‘spectator’ at distance.”

A further result of an open social justice system would be, in a further globalizing world, the

effects that one nation’s policies on other nation-states, and bring about globally-sensitive

questioning, which is may be of more use with extensive questions and issues than limited local

questioning. Ultimately, a theory of social justice requires impartiality to be truly effective, and

in the modern era, to be open to the other voices in the world and the ramifications of a nation-

state’s actions on the world.

In a theory of social justice, the consideration of choice, opportunity, and capability are

essential. Freedom, as put by Sen has two main functions. As stated on page 228, “…more

freedom gives us more opportunity to pursue our objectives-those things that we value…Second,

we may attach importance to the process of choice itself.” Freedom, throughout The Idea of

Justice, is considered to be a primary good, or as put on page 64, “…the general-purpose means

for the pursuit of one’s comprehensive goals.” The key and often overlooked portion of this

statement is that of the pursuit of one’s goals. Sen, even though he is an economist, condemns

the perspective that human lives and success may be measured in achievement, function, and

material wealth, rather advocating that human lives may be measured in capacity and choice.

This outlook is simplified in a statement Sen makes on page 234,


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To understand that the means of satisfactory human living are not themselves the ends of

good living helps to bring about a significant extension of the reach of the evaluative

exercise…the use of the capacity perspective begins right there.

In Sen’s approach, and indeed that of the capability approach to economics and life, one’s

capacity and ability to make choices lays above the resulting outcomes and achievement. As an

example, Sen on page 237 provides the contrast between a person who voluntarily fasts for one

of any number of reasons, and another person who starves due to famine. As Sen states on page

237, “Their manifest undernutrition-their achieved function- may be much the same, and yet the

capability of the well-off person who chooses to fast may be much larger than that of the person

who starves involuntarily…” It is also necessary to understand that just because two people have

access to the same primary goods does not mean that they can make equal use of them. A

pregnant woman would require more resources than a man to make equal use of them, and the

disabled would often need more resources for medical care, and be less able to take proper

advantage of the rest. Given that primary resources may be considered tools used in the shaping

of one’s life, and that capability and choice are of more import to individual lives than economic

measures, it may be concluded that a social theory of justice should do its utmost to ensure the its

constituents the utmost freedom of choice and use of capacity as possible, while ensuring that

primary goods are accessible for the accomplishment of the decision-making that defines lives.

Democracy is the final important element essential to a theory of justice. This element is

reinforced by Rawls throughout his various works, and is demonstrated by way of the “veil of

ignorance” in which elected or chosen persons represent their constituents, from the local level to

the nation-state level, and eventually the global level. Indirectly, this is also reinforced by Rawls

support of a closed system in his theory of social justice. Meanwhile, Sen, throughout The Idea
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of Justice seems to regard democracy in a pessimistic light, as too malleable by parochialism,

vested interests, and the whims of the masses. While no grand ideas for the remaking of the

nation-state are laid out in order to avoid such conflict, the idea of an oligarchy of acute

“philosopher kings” in keeping with the ideas of Plato, may not be far-fetched in Sen’s ideal

theory of social justice. However, such an idea is not necessarily in line with Sen’s established

realism and concern for the well-being of the masses. As stated by Sen on page 342, “…no major

famine has ever occurred in a functioning democracy…” whereas, with history as witness,

communist, feudal, and oligarchical governments (including juntas) are and were prone not only

to famines and a lack of access to primary goods, but the repression of human rights, liberties,

and choice. In reality, democracy is the best method towards justice and safeguard against

corruption, given that certain principles, such as impartiality, reason, and empathetic logic are

implemented where possible in the open system. Very rarely indeed, are the parochialisms and

varying vested interests of the many more dangerous than the aligned beliefs and interests of the

few.

Many different theories of social justice have been formulated in centuries past, and there

will no doubt be many more given the current political climate, both at a national and global

level. One of the more recent works on the topic is Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice may be

considered an outlier from other social justice works, given its unorthodox approach to social

justice; it does however bring to light many interesting and overshadowed elements “traditional”

social justice theorists overlooked or have dismissed. If one wishes to define a theory of social

justice and its components, it should be designed as comparative in nature, with an eye to

impartiality and openness, be capability-based rather than outcome-based, and be ultimately

democratic in nature.
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Works Cited

1. Sen, Amartya Kumar. The Idea of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

2011.

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