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Raven Graham
Definition Paper
It was said by Albert Einstein, the great theoretical physicist, that, “Striving for social
justice is the most valuable thing to do in life.” What is social justice however, that which has
eluded a conclusive definition since before the Enlightenment and its glorious philosophers, such
as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kent? Such great thinkers often focused on the construction of
just and perfect institutions as the solution to the ailments of the world, fueled by esteemed logic
and reason. In The Idea of Justice however, Amartya Sen articulately argues for not a definition
of justice, but a theory of social justice, based on objectivity, openness, tempered emotion, and
imperfection, using comparative methods and results to rid the world of the immediate injustices
it faces. Ultimately, the answer is perhaps best given by what reasoned and reasonable
characteristics a theory of justice should and should not be possessed by, and what ideology
serves as not an infallible foundation, but rather an inspiration for change and improvement in
the real world. Such a theory while comparative in nature, should very well take into
consideration the progress made by transcendentalists, be open and impartial in nature, place
The first and most fundamental issue regarding a theoretical understanding of a theory of
social justice is whether such a theory should be transcendental or comparative in nature. In the
transcendental approach, pioneered by Thomas Hobbes in the 1600s, one concentrates largely on
“identifying just institutional arrangements for a society” (Sen 5). Further elaborated upon by
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institutionalism) is characterized by its focus on the identification of “perfect justice” and the
formation of perfectly just institutions for implementation by societies. (Sen 5-6) Realization-
“comparative approaches that were concerned with social realizations (resulting from actual
institutions, actual behavior and other influences)” (Sen 7). It is by way of contemporary
transcendentalists, such as Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, David Gauthier, and especially John
Rawls that social justice has continued to be explored in recent years, and a contributing factor to
the writing of The Theory of Justice. As stated by Sen on page 8, “Their theories, which have
provided different, but respectively important, insights into the demands of a ‘just society’, share
the common aim of identifying just rules and institutions…” Given its eminence amongst
theorists and Enlightenment tradition, transcendental tradition has served as the “… central
exercise in the modern theories of justice,” (Sen 8). All of this, however, cannot compensate for
the inherent flaws found in the transcendental tradition. First of all, the transcendental theory
does not allow for different reasoning, or plural groundings, even if the just conclusion is
reached. In a perfect theory of justice, only a single perfect line of reasoning may exist.
Additionally, transcendentalism cannot account for the realities of human behavior, in which no
one person is reasonable, logical, and conforms to social norms and rules all of, or even the
majority of a lifetime. Furthermore, in the transcendental theory, only one line of impartial and
non-arbitrary reasoning may exist, when in reality often multiple impartial and non-arbitrary
lines of reasoning can exist within a single society, based on personal philosophy. Thus as given
by Sen on page 15, “There may not indeed exist any identifiable perfectly just social
transcendental system on the global level would not be feasible. Ultimately, a theory of justice
may take into account the strides made by transcendental theorists, but be comparative at its
the open system. Impartiality is essential due to the influence of local parochialisms and vested
impartiality could be enforced through the use of the “original position” and “veil of ignorance”
when forming the principles of justice for a society. As given on page 54, Sen states,
The original position is an imagined situation of primordial equality, when the parties
interests, within the group as a whole. Their representatives have to choose under this
‘veil of ignorance’, that is, in an imagined state of selective ignorance (in particular,
ignorance about the distinct personal interests and actual views of a good life- what
Rawls calls ‘comprehensive preferences ‘), and it is that state of devised ignorance that
While Sen acknowledges that such a solution would remove vested interests, he refutes that such
a purposeful state of ignorance could remove the group from its various parochialisms, which
encourage conformity of thought and action and is so utterly invasive that they become a part of
one’s being. Instead, Sen says that under the veil of ignorance not only the representatives of the
nation-state would be included, but other individuals from different societies and cultures, with
their own parochialisms. This would be in keeping with Adam Smith’s idea of the “impartial
spectator” and an open system. By way of the impartial spectator, no matter if others take part or
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the breadth of inquiry is broadened, parochialisms, which may very well be detrimental or
unjust, may be scrutinized or negated. Sen, on page 125 further explains this idea, stating,
“Smith invoked the reflective device of the impartial spectator to go beyond reasoning that
what the accepted conventions would look like from the perspective of a ‘spectator’ at distance.”
A further result of an open social justice system would be, in a further globalizing world, the
effects that one nation’s policies on other nation-states, and bring about globally-sensitive
questioning, which is may be of more use with extensive questions and issues than limited local
questioning. Ultimately, a theory of social justice requires impartiality to be truly effective, and
in the modern era, to be open to the other voices in the world and the ramifications of a nation-
In a theory of social justice, the consideration of choice, opportunity, and capability are
essential. Freedom, as put by Sen has two main functions. As stated on page 228, “…more
freedom gives us more opportunity to pursue our objectives-those things that we value…Second,
we may attach importance to the process of choice itself.” Freedom, throughout The Idea of
Justice, is considered to be a primary good, or as put on page 64, “…the general-purpose means
for the pursuit of one’s comprehensive goals.” The key and often overlooked portion of this
statement is that of the pursuit of one’s goals. Sen, even though he is an economist, condemns
the perspective that human lives and success may be measured in achievement, function, and
material wealth, rather advocating that human lives may be measured in capacity and choice.
To understand that the means of satisfactory human living are not themselves the ends of
good living helps to bring about a significant extension of the reach of the evaluative
In Sen’s approach, and indeed that of the capability approach to economics and life, one’s
capacity and ability to make choices lays above the resulting outcomes and achievement. As an
example, Sen on page 237 provides the contrast between a person who voluntarily fasts for one
of any number of reasons, and another person who starves due to famine. As Sen states on page
237, “Their manifest undernutrition-their achieved function- may be much the same, and yet the
capability of the well-off person who chooses to fast may be much larger than that of the person
who starves involuntarily…” It is also necessary to understand that just because two people have
access to the same primary goods does not mean that they can make equal use of them. A
pregnant woman would require more resources than a man to make equal use of them, and the
disabled would often need more resources for medical care, and be less able to take proper
advantage of the rest. Given that primary resources may be considered tools used in the shaping
of one’s life, and that capability and choice are of more import to individual lives than economic
measures, it may be concluded that a social theory of justice should do its utmost to ensure the its
constituents the utmost freedom of choice and use of capacity as possible, while ensuring that
primary goods are accessible for the accomplishment of the decision-making that defines lives.
Democracy is the final important element essential to a theory of justice. This element is
reinforced by Rawls throughout his various works, and is demonstrated by way of the “veil of
ignorance” in which elected or chosen persons represent their constituents, from the local level to
the nation-state level, and eventually the global level. Indirectly, this is also reinforced by Rawls
support of a closed system in his theory of social justice. Meanwhile, Sen, throughout The Idea
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vested interests, and the whims of the masses. While no grand ideas for the remaking of the
nation-state are laid out in order to avoid such conflict, the idea of an oligarchy of acute
“philosopher kings” in keeping with the ideas of Plato, may not be far-fetched in Sen’s ideal
theory of social justice. However, such an idea is not necessarily in line with Sen’s established
realism and concern for the well-being of the masses. As stated by Sen on page 342, “…no major
famine has ever occurred in a functioning democracy…” whereas, with history as witness,
communist, feudal, and oligarchical governments (including juntas) are and were prone not only
to famines and a lack of access to primary goods, but the repression of human rights, liberties,
and choice. In reality, democracy is the best method towards justice and safeguard against
corruption, given that certain principles, such as impartiality, reason, and empathetic logic are
implemented where possible in the open system. Very rarely indeed, are the parochialisms and
varying vested interests of the many more dangerous than the aligned beliefs and interests of the
few.
Many different theories of social justice have been formulated in centuries past, and there
will no doubt be many more given the current political climate, both at a national and global
level. One of the more recent works on the topic is Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice may be
considered an outlier from other social justice works, given its unorthodox approach to social
justice; it does however bring to light many interesting and overshadowed elements “traditional”
social justice theorists overlooked or have dismissed. If one wishes to define a theory of social
justice and its components, it should be designed as comparative in nature, with an eye to
democratic in nature.
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Works Cited
1. Sen, Amartya Kumar. The Idea of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2011.