LEVISTE VS CA

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of
discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.

ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that
bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of bail in
case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious,
such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused
was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the
language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail
bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
GOVT of HK vs OliLAO

Facts

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued
and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner
Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent.
In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following
conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan
Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of
the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

PADERANGA VS CA

Paderanga v CA
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Right to bail is accorded to persons constructively arrested even though they have
not been physically arrested
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.
PETITIONER: MIGUEL P. PADERANGA
RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petition:
 Petition for certiorari on the CA’s decision denying the motion for reconsideration on his petition
for bail.
Factual Antecedents:
 Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of multiple murder as
the mastermind.
 Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of Arrest
could be issued by the lower court.
 Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical attention.
His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the
local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said
hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.
 The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on his right to bail
Statute Involved:
 Art. 3, Sec. 12
 Sec. 1 of Rule 114
o Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Position of Respondent/s:
 The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in the custody of
the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition.

ISSUE:
 W/N it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner is not yet in custody of law

HELD/RATIO:
NO
 Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been arrested, detained, or
otherwise deprived of their freedom
 A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:
o when he is arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest
o when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering
to the proper authorities
  In the foregoing facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally under
custody
o Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his
person:
 firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court
 secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts;
 thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
o for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted
his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court
 an arrest is made either by:
o actual restraint of the arrestee or
o merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (house arrest)
Final Ruling
 Decision of CA is reversed. Petitioner is granted bail.

MIRANDA VS TULIAO

MIRANDA, ET. AL VS. TULIAO, MARCH 31, 2007

Facts:

On 8 March 1996, burnt dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao were discovered in Purok

Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela. Two informations for murder were filed. The RTC of Manila convicted all of the

accused therein and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was

yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review

where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Later

on, SPO2 Maderal was arrested and he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners herein as

the persons responsible.

Respondent filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe,

and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo

Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate,

and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion

on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be

properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo

T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint

Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the

warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and

Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001.

On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this

Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further

proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17

August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary

restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the

aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two

Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s

cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary

restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt. On 21

November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of

respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and

ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of

warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this

Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Issues:

1.

Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the

jurisdiction of the court;

2.

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when warrants of arrest were quashed on the
ground of prematurity constituted by the subsequent filing of petition for review with the secretary

of justice;

3.

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when the case was dismissed based on the

decision of the same case but with different accused;

4.

Whether or not the orders set aside by a nullified proceeding is deemed reinstated;

5.

Whether or not the reinstatement of the case constituted double jeopardy;

Ruling:

1.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the

person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person

of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. Custody of the law is required before the court

can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the

defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction

over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary

surrender,

while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary

appearance

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of

the court.

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As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in
civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is

accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings

requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by

filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused,

as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial

authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes

voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court.

This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court,

which only leads to a special appearance.

These pleadings are:

(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,

whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;

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(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of

the accused; and

(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them

would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.

The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the

submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not

present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest.

2.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the

Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes

grave abuse of discretion.

Even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that

the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the

warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,

25

we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the

information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse

resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest

against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.

3.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with

different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion

A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the

dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. We never ruled in Leaño that the

crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused

therein. It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now

beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the

same is without probable value."

35

On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an

acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version

of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.

4.

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set

aside by the nullified proceeding

.
Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,

37

which issued

the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by

Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it

the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the

warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed

unquashed.

5.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before

arraignment

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute

double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it

was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed

OBOSA VS CA

FACTS:
While a fugitive from justice, petitioner committed other crimes including double murder for which he was
convicted only for double homicide. While he was appealing his conviction therein, the convicting court
allowed him to post bail notwithstanding that he was already serving prison terms for prior offenses.
Respondent court, in a resolution, canceled petitioner’s bail bond, nullified the trial court’s order granting
him bail, and issued a warrant for his immediate arrest. It also denied petitioner’s twin motion for
reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal from judgment convicting him of homicide
though charged with murder.

RULING:
NO. Bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is charged with a capital
offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding
applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital
offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be
well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense
originally charged, to the appellate court’s sound discretion.
Basco vs rapatalo

FACTS:
One of the accused in a murder complaint filed a petition for bail. A hearing was set and reset several
times but did not materialize. It was later discovered that bail had already been granted and a release
order was issued.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not applications for bail must be heard.

RULING:
YES. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused
to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Since the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to
just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court.