COIN IS ABOUT TWO THINGS - SURPRISE AND SUPPLY

An Australian perspective from lessons learnt in Malaya, Borneo and South Vietnam
By Lachlan Wilson
IN 1965 Col Serong who had just taken over command of the Australian forces in Vietnam was
asked if he was worried about the VC lurking in the jungle he replied
"WHEN WE ARE IN THE JUNGLE WE DO THE LURKING".
75% of all contacts between the US forces and the VC/NVA were initiated by the VC/NVA in
contrast 80% of all contacts between the ANZAC forces and the VC/NVA were initiated by the
ANZAC forces.

"A lack of rice became increasingly serious each day and for months the cadre and soldiers of
445 VC Bn had to eat bushes,leaves and jungle roots in lieu of rice." " For 445 VC Bn a time of
hunger, difficulties and violence began. We didn't know where the Australian ambushes were
located, it was often at the jungles edge . No matter what track we took we couldn't slip through.
The enemy had the initiative we were lucky to stay alive”. (from "The Viet Cong D445 Their Story "
translated by Ernst Chamberlain )

The purpose of this paper is to introduce mainly old ideas into the discussions on COIN. These
ideas are vital to the success in the field . They are the method of operations established by the
1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) a brigade battle group with ancillary units in Phouc Tuy
Province in South Vietnam, which proved highly successful but were never given the
prominence they should been given. Instead most discussion has been on the successful and
unsuccessful doctrines established by the US Forces in SVN. I am also going to combine these
Australian methods of operating with with some of the successful techniques used by the
Commonwealth forces used in the Malayan Emergency, the Borneo Confrontation where the
ANZAC forces learnt their lessons prior to SVN, and some of my own thoughts on the matter.

Please excuse my lack of current military terminology as I have been out of the army for
approximately 45 years and will tend to be of a simpler nature as terminology was then.
I believe these methods would help break the impasse currently being experienced by current
COIN operations. In some of them I believe it may be too late to reverse current techniques . I
am therefore looking at the problem from the establishment stage.

These initial requirements by the assisting force are for political approval from the assisting
country or province etc.for such Free Fire Zones ( FFZ ) , Rules of Engagement ( ROE ) and
who does what. Without these requirements being approved I would suggest the the chances of
success are highly reduced or maybe failure.

1. INSIDE TOWNS AND VILLAGES IS A CIVIL MATTER .

Investigations and Justice should be handled by Police and Judiciary or the existing village
system if no higher authority is present . Thus killings and bombings are considered murder and
have nothing to do with the military. This will obviously require a strong and honest and well
paid force. The training will have to take into consideration the culture of the assisted country.
The police are the most important piece on the chess board. Their operations must commence
from day one. Embedded with the police are assisting foreign police advisers who should take a
back seat. It will also consist of a Police Special Branch with a large intelligence capability.
Police understand the culture and speak the same language and thus are far better positioned
than an external army whose culture and training is diametrically opposed lacking investigative
skills with tactics being uppermost in their mind.
The lack of a decent police is singularly the greatest failing in all COIN operations with the
military getting involved like a bull in a china shop . I recently read a good article on the Afghan
police force by one of their own and it is a shocking indictment in relation to training and
assistance. ( “The Impact of culture on policing in Afghanistan” by Capt. Pashtoon Atif ANP found in “Our Latest
and Longest war Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan” University of Chicago Press.)

By doing this you are killing two birds with one stone,namely this civil system will continue after
you are gone as one can see with the successful Malaysian example. The population want the
rule of law more than anything else. This is why the Afghans initially welcomed the Taliban to
save them from the corruption and injustices of the warlords.The Villagers are more likely to
confide in the Police than to a foreign army through an interpreter .The police are a highly
visible force and are around 24/7. Forget your bridges and schools and other presents, these
can be done at a later date by the Government and not the assisting army. Spend the money on
the Police.If the army gets involved in civil projects and not the government you are supporting
you have weakened the authorities goodwill. The game is to get their respect of their
government not you.

Secondly by not involving and exposing the presence of the military in civilian areas you are
reducing the "Invading Army" argument used by the insurgents which in the case of Vietnam,
Iraq, Afghanistan has been very successful. Also keep the Special Forces out of villages with
lightning raids etc. As they are an unmitigated disaster trying to win the locals over to the
government, they do not see this as justice and either would you. I have very little knowledge of
police work so I will comment no further on the nuts and bolts .

2. THE INVISIBLE MILITARY HEARD BUT NOT SEEN. "The VC/NVA referred to this system
as the Australian "Barrier" and they hated it.

FFZ system was highly successful for the Australian Forces in Phouc Tuy Province as it
simplified the ROE for both the civilian population and the military . This reduced civilian
casualties considerably and one will be able to retrain the legal unit as Infantry as they will not
be needed.

THE THREE TIERS OF FFZs :-

1. THE VILLAGE/TOWN . This zone is completely out of bounds for any military operations by
the assisting army with all problems being solved by the civil authorities. One has to watch the
military from slowly getting involved as is the Allied way, better to let them learn by their
mistakes. If you take over you have failed. Any human intelligence required by the assisting
forces should come through the Police Special Branch.
 Although the ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand forces )in the early stages of operations in
the province did Cordon and Search of villages I believe this was necessitated by the lack of a
reliable Police Force, I know that at the later stages ANZAC units very rarely entered a village. I
believe this lack of fraternising resulted in the general population respecting us which they
remarked on after the war.
Remember the insurgents always attack the army and police in the village very rarely the
population, as this would be counterproductive . So you are not protecting the village by being in
it . Remember the Officer who said "We had to destroy the village to save it". You are protecting
the village by preventing the insurgent from supplying or getting close to the village by staying
out of it. In SVN it was often the regional or popular forces who operated in the economic zone
as discussed below.These were made up of local men. The problem in Vietnam was they were
the bottom of the food chain and lacked training and weapons to effectively look after the village
. This was a tragedy as they knew the area and the population intimately . Best example of
excellent use was by the USMC CAPS Program.
In the village the insurgent is a criminal in the FFZ he is a soldier.
Population size has little to do with the size of the assisting military it is the size of the insurgent
army that is important.

2. THE SURROUNDING ECONOMIC / CULTIVATION ZONE.

This is the transition zone from village to the wild west. It consists of the farming and herding
areas surrounding all third world rural populations . It is the economic powerhouse of the village.
It is the most difficult to administer ROE. In SVN we applied the same rule from our experience
in Malaya and Borneo by imposing a curfew at night and anyone found there in the hours of
darkness was fair game . It requires a very visual and obvious boundary around its border with
the FFZ and also around its internal boundary with the village/town.
In this area latitude must be given in relation to first and last light and the benefit of the doubt
must be given. It is this area that requires visual surveillance through the day and patrolling
and ambush at night to follow-up what the day's surveillance has revealed .
It is here that there may be some minor interaction between the army and the population
especially where small patrols are operating. Remember the less the insurgents know about you
the more they fear. Obviously today this area would be under heavy electronic surveillance a
luxury we did not have.
The local military and any advisors will normally be based in the village /town and should be
responsible for patrolling and ambushing in the economic zone by day and night . They do not
have anything to do with the FFZ .The assising army must be made aware of their night ambush
positions.

The population must in no doubt that to be in this zone after dark will result in being shot. Also if
the assisting army were to shoot a member of the population in this zone after dark then no
charge or prosecution would result . This occurred in a half platoon ambush by my platoon
where a family were killed well inside the FFZ approx 3km from the village at 2am in the
morning. And apart from they being very upset emotionally no action was taken against them. If
everyone knows the rules then no problem.
In relation to houses in this area one has two options move them into the village or set up a
safety zones at night ie. 20 metres and they must not move outside it.

3. THE FREE FIRE ZONE - No quarter given no questions asked.

This is generally the area where the insurgents will hide their arms, equipment and food
supplies. It is also the area the insurgents need to transit for resupply and provide
reinforcements and base areas usage .It is also in this zone that food supplies gained from the
villages are stored. This is the assisting army military zone to prevent interaction between the
non village insurgents and the population. At first one may not be aware that the stranglehold is
working but if successful ,one will see a drying up of enemy ammunition availability and a
reduction in IEDs .It is the area where patrolling by day and especially night ambushes are set
up depending on the topography .This area is generally used by the insurgents for movement
at night or day where the vegetation is thick to avoid detection . In SVN this was done by looking
for signs of enemy movement and locating their bases till a pattern emerges.( An example of this
can be found at Porky Seven The 7Bn Royal Australian Regt Association Web site under, headings Operations,
South Vietnam , Nui Kho). Today
this task becomes easier with electronic and thermal devices both
in the air and on the ground.
By also denying food storage to the insurgents operation in the FFZ it reduces the ability of the
insurgents to form into larger units. This occurred in Phou Tuy Province as large Main force
units outside the province would not enter it because there was a lack of food supplies to
sustain them in any operations. Remember an army marches on its stomach .

As this is a FFZ it allows both air and ground forces to shoot first and ask questions later ,
obviously friendly forces must have some form of electronic and visual identification and AOs
strictly enforced . As you can see the problem of friend or foe in the FFZ becomes non existent
and thus there is no hesitation initiating contact . This is the zone where the assisting military
should have a far more intimate knowledge of the area than the enemy. This will assist in a
greater detection of IEDs and where best to set up ambushes with the enemy being denied the
eyes and ears to pass on intelligence and information as they can do in the village or economic
zone. This is what allows you to do the LURKING and have the upper hand which is what
happened in Phouc Tuy Province later in Task Forces tenure. It is also the boundary between
the economic and FF zones where most patrolling and ambushing takes place to deny the
insurgents access to the population. As occurred in the later stages of operations in SVN the VC
considered it suicide to enter a village and would draw lots to decide who would go.
The Assisting Army troops can now spend their time familiarising themselves with their AO .
Training of local forces in FFZ techniques should be done in their own AOs not in or with
Assisting Army AO to prevent intelligence breaches and to remain invisible with slowly returning
Assisting Army AOs to the local armies as they become more effective .
The local army should be trained using only the assets that they could be expected to have after
the Assisting Army leaves. This was a major mistake at the end of the Vietnam War as the Army
of South Vietnam (ARVN ) were used to having the massive fire-power available through the US
military and their training reflected this use .When the US left they lacked these resources and
were at loss as to carry out operations effectively.
The FFZ allows the air assets to attack instantly without recourse to command for lengthy
approval and since you already know where the friendlies are and as there are no civilians,
collateral damage is a thing of the past.
The FFZ becomes a pretty scary place for the insurgent as he has nowhere to hide except the
village /town and he has to go through you to get there and hope the police do not recognise as
the new boy in town ( something the army are incapable of doing.).
You could probably pull out of an FFZ and it would take some time for the insurgents to be
aware that you had left because you are nearly invisible.

4. PATROL AND FORWARD OPERATING BASES

Patrol bases must be set up in the FFZ away from prying eyes again to deny the insurgents
intelligence as to strengths and behaviour of the assisting military. They must be close enough
to the economic zone for night ambushing . No access to this base must be given to the
population. All work in the base to be done by the assisting military ,NO LOCAL
CONTRACTORS, POLICE,OR ARMY ARE TO GAIN ACCESS . Meetings etc are best held
elsewhere . I well remember visiting a US Brigade Fire Support Base as I was going to be
patrolling in their Area of Operations (AO ) and needed to define my AO so there would be no
blue on blue mistakes. Whilst waiting to see the relevant Staff Officer I was watching a
Vietnamese raking leaves in the briefing tent and at the same time studying the operations map
with unit locations marked thereon . I ask the Bde Major who he was and was informed that they
gave the jobs to the first 80 Vietnamese ( which probably included the local VC and NVA comdr
just getting his daily briefing ) who lined up at the gate in the morning. I was horrified and tripled
the size of my AO and vowed to only give my exact location in the event of a contact. The
Australian Task Force Base allowed a select few escorted Vietnamese in so they were not
aware of the strength or dispositions of units within the base.
Having your base in or adjacent to the village/town is suicidal as you are giving away priceless
intelligence to the enemy which will then be used against you.
Since the base is in the FFZ no local can go anywhere near it thus reducing their ability to plant
IEDs also the area around the base should be statically covered by sight and electronically. And
clearing patrols every day around the base.

5. PATROLLING AND AMBUSHING AROUND THE ECONOMIC ZONE That’s what it's all
about.
We performed two types of patrolling village edge and deep patrolling into the FFZ.
Economic edge ambushing was done at mainly at night with a number of ruses used to disguise
the intended ambush location. I read with amusement that the VC believed we carried another
soldier on our back under a raincoat to disguise the fact that there were two of us as we would
drop him of at an ambush position and they did not know where ( with the gear I carrying there
is no way I would want another guy on my back ).Our deception was that good that they
believed this.We generally moved within 1km of the ambush position near nightfall and then
moved into the final position at night to disguise whereabouts. Claymores Claymores we loved
them the more the merrier . As an interesting aside, talking to a Platoon comdr in 3RAR he told
me when they initiated an ambush they only detonated the claymores so the enemy would think
it was a IED which then allowed a second bank to be fired whilst they were sorting out the
wounded as they thought it was detonated by themselves and would not think to counter attack
. A third bank was kept for protection No small arms were used except for protection. Through
the day observation posts should be set up on the FFZ/economic border as this will supply
intelligence on enemy paths and IED placement. It was generally found that the enemy will
usually exit the village the same path they entered on, as they consider if it safe to enter then it
will be safe to exit. This was the case where an ambush set up by 8RAR at Hoa Long. They
saw the enemy enter at a distance of 200 metres from their ambush position they then moved
the ambush up to the entry path and killed approx 28 VC on the exit.
Sitting in a base does nothing except securing the base only . Active patrolling prevents bases
being attacked. A classic case of the occurred in the ANZAC "Battle of Long Tan " where a
company ( approx 120 ) patrol encountered a VC/NVA force of 2500 which was about to attack
the fledgling ANZAC base in Phouc Tuy . The result was a major ANZAC victory in that the
VC/NVA never attacked the base again even through the Tet offensive. Approx 250 VC bodies
were found next day with intelligence giving a figure of approx 600 dead. Because no
Vietnamese were allowed inside the base unescorted it was difficult for them to gauge
strengths and dispositions.

ROADS
Checkpoints are best controlled by police with local troops protection. There are two types of
checkpoints one for through traffic and one lane for those stopping between checkpoints. Any
vehicle wishing to stop between checkpoints must receive a pass. Again to control the
movement of supplies and insurgent personnel a vigorous regime of examination must be
carried out especially vehicles that will be stopping between the checkpoints and they and their
passengers must be checked minutely.
A no stopping rule outside villages should be enforced to reduce IEDs, with approved stopping
and rest areas designated. All roads should have vegetation cleared either side of the road .
Any one found in that cleared area by day is to be arrested and shot at night. Designated safety
crossing points should be established so population movement is not denied . There should be
no commercial traffic at night .
Where the road and the economic zone coincide as it appears from photos of some areas of
Afghanistan, one may have to create cleared areas from one side of the FFZ to the other side
across the "Green Zone ".This is done to further isolate the village and Economic zone from the
FFZ. This is obviously a good site for a checkpoint and a Patrol base to one side in the FFZ . It
should be wide and cleared of vegetation . The land may have to be purchased or rented and
bunds etc. built for the protection from small arms fire. The area is considered a part of the FFZ
except for the road.
LONG TERM
One is now strangling the movement of the insurgents and slowly as the police remove the
criminals from the village and the insurgents are denied the ability to take away food and deliver
insurgents and ammunition a slow drying up will occur,at times violent,as they realise they are
losing the struggle . Remember every mortar round fired by them maybe their last they have in
stock if security is tight.

CONCLUSION
I reiterate the what I believe are main initiatives .First you must receive clear political approval
for these measures otherwise failure is assured so don't bother assisting. You must use the
Police as much as possible in the populated areas and outside that area use the army to seal
the population from insurgents and supplies from the FFZ. Failure to do this will result in a war
going on forever.I invite and appreciate others to a vigorous debate on the above ideas as I
believe this is where the problem lies.
Lachlan was an Infantry Platoon Commander in SVN in 1970, he also trained and advised 44
Cav 18 ARVN Division and the Popular Forces.